CITY CHARTER: SUBPART A

Sec. 3. - Powers.

The City of Miami shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary
powers to enable it to conduct municipal government, perform municipal
functions and render municipal services and may exercise any power for
municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.

The city shall have the extraterritorial powers granted to the city by general and
special law and including Laws of Florida, ch. 10847 (1925), as amended.

The City of Miami shall have power to:

(a)—(e). [Reserved.]

(f) Acquisition and disposition of property and services:

(i) To acquire by purchase, gift, devise, condemnation or otherwise,

real or personal property or any estate or interest therein, inside or
outside the city, for any of the purposes of the city; and to improve,
sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of such property
or any part thereof.

(ii) To acquire or dispose of services inside or outside the city, by

purchase, gift, or otherwise for any purposes of the city.

(iii) To lease to or contract with entities for the management of any of

the city's waterfront property, but only in compliance with the other
requirements of this charter and on condition that:

(A) the terms of the contract allow reasonable public access to

the water and reasonable public use of the property, and
comply with other charter waterfront setback and view-
corridor requirements; and

(B) the terms of the contract result in a fair return to the city
based on two independent appraisals; and
 (C) the use is authorized under the then existing master plan of
the city;

(D) the procurement methods prescribed by ordinances are

observed;

(E) the contract does not exceed five years and does not contain
an automatic renewal or termination penalty.
Any such lease or management agreement or proposed
extension or modification of an existing such lease or
management agreement which does not comply with each of
the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first
been approved by a majority of the voters of the city.
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner affect or apply
to any project the financing of which has been provided by
the authorization of bonds to be issued by the city.

(g)—(l). [Reserved.]

(m) Harbor and shipping facilities: To establish, construct, maintain,

and operate, both inside and outside the city, public landings,
wharves, docks, and warehouses; to dredge or deepen harbors
and rivers, or any branch or portion thereof; to install turning
basins, build jetties, and otherwise improve the harbor and
shipping facilities of the city, inside and outside the city and inside
and outside harbor lines where such improvements outside of
harbor lines are approved by the United States Government or its
proper agencies; to acquire by condemnation or otherwise all
lands, riparian, and other rights and easements [necessary for the
purposes aforesaid; to lay and collect] reasonable duties or fees
on vessels coming through or using said landings, wharves, docks
or warehouses; to regulate the manner of using other landings,
wharves, docks, and warehouses within the city; to prescribe and
enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the protection and
use of said property; to advance to the Government of the United
States, with or without interest, funds to be expended in harbor
improvements to be made by the government in or near the city, or
directly affecting the city within Miami Harbor and the approaches
thereto, if such work has been duly authorized by laws of the
 United States; and to issue bonds or notes to obtain funds for such
advances.

(n)—(ll). [Reserved.]

(mm) Building and zoning:

(i) To provide by ordinance building, planning, and zoning regulations

and restrictions governing the height, number of stories, method of
construction, type, and size of buildings and other structures; the
percentage and portion of the lot or site that may be occupied; the
size of the front, rear, and side yards, courts, and other open
spaces; the location, use of buildings, structures, and land for trade,
industry, residences, apartment houses, and other purposes; and
the widening and future widening of streets in zoned street areas
that the city may establish. Such regulations may provide that a
board of appeals or the city commission may determine and vary
the application of building, planning, or zoning ordinances in
harmony with their general purpose and intent.

(ii) In order to preserve the city's natural scenic beauty, to guarantee

open spaces, and to protect the waterfront, anything in this Charter
or the ordinances of the city to the contrary notwithstanding, neither
the city nor any of its agencies shall issue building permits for any
surface parking or enclosed structures located on Biscayne Bay or
the Miami River from its mouth to the N.W. 5th Street Bridge,

(A) which are not set back at least 50 feet from the seawall
(where the depth of the lot is less than 200 feet, the setback
shall be at least 25 percent of the lot depth), and

(B) which do not have average side yards equal in aggregate to

at least 25 percent of the water frontage of each lot based on
average lot width.

(iii) The above setback and side-yard requirements may be modified by

the city commission after design and site-plan review and public
hearing only if the city commission determines that the
modifications requested provide public benefits such as direct
public access, public walkways, plaza dedications, covered parking
up to the floodplain level, or comparable benefits which promote a
 better urban environment and public advantages, or which preserve
natural features. Wherever setback, side-yard, or site-plan review
requirements of zoning ordinances are greater than the foregoing
requirements, such greater requirements shall govern.

(iv) These requirements shall not apply to docks and appurtenant

structures, single-family residences and appurtenant structures,
and waterfront industrial uses along the Miami River and at the Port
of Miami. Nothing herein contained shall in any manner affect or
apply to: the City of Miami/University of Miami James L. Knight
International Center and hotel facility, including all improvements
thereon, or to lands and projects which the city commission has
approved prior to September 18, 1979, by development order
pursuant to F.S. ch. 380 of a planned area development pursuant
to article XXI-1, City of Miami Comprehensive Zoning ordinance or
which have received site and development plan approval, including
Plaza Venetia, Phase II, Resolution No. 72-113, April 20, 1972;
Resolution No. 72-114, April 20, 1972; and Resolution No. 72-416,
July 20, 1972.

(Res. No. 01-841, § 2, 8-9-01; Res. No. 01-843, § 2, 8-9-01)

Editor's note—

The department of neighborhood rehabilitation of the city and all functions

involved therein were abolished pursuant to Ord. No. 7576, § 1, adopted July 17,
1967, and effective on the date of transfer of said department to Dade County. At
the direction of the city, § 3(vv), added to the charter by Char. Amend. No. 2,
effective Jan. 1, 1963, is not set forth herein.
Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143
828 So.2d 411
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District.
HOMESTEAD–MIAMI SPEEDWAY, LLC.,
Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, etc., et al., Appellees.
Nos. 3D02–1506, 3D02–811, 3D02–814.
| Licenses Revocable
Sept. 30, 2002.
Synopsis
Competitor brought action against city, alleging city could
not enter into agreement with company planning to build
racetrack on waterfront property without following
competitive bid procedures applicable to leases and
alleging city violated the Sunshine Law. Company
intervened. The Circuit Court, Miami–Dade County,
Michael Genden, J., entered summary final judgment in
favor of competitor as to competitive bidding claim, but
found city did not violate Sunshine Law. All parties
appealed in consolidated appeal. The District Court of
Appeal, Ramirez, J., held that: (1) agreement was lease,
not license and city was obligated to follow competitive
bid procedures applicable to leases, but (2) city complied
with Sunshine Law.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
West Headnotes (4)
[1]
Licenses
Lease
Municipal Corporations
Requisites and validity of conveyance or
disposition
Agreement between city and company, allowing
company to use waterfront property for motor
car races, was a lease, not a license, as it was
assignable and could not be revoked without
notice of default and the opportunity to cure, and
gave company exclusive use of property for at
least three days each year for 15 years, and thus
city was obligated to follow competitive bid
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
procedures before conveying lease to company.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[2]
Licenses
Transfer of rights
Licenses
A license is revocable at will and cannot be
assigned.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[3]
Injunction
Issues, proof, and variance
In competitor’s action against city alleging city
could not enter into agreement with company
planning to build racetrack on waterfront
property without following competitive bid
procedures applicable to leases, trial court could
not order city to comply with all applicable
competitive bid procedures and give competitor
full and equal opportunity to submit competing
bid, since such relief was neither pled nor
requested by competitor.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]
Municipal Corporations
Rules of procedure and conduct of business
City did not violate Sunshine Law, requiring
public meetings of any board or commission of
any municipal corporation at which official acts
were taken, when it negotiated contract to allow
races at waterfront park, because there were
several publicly-noticed meetings regarding
proposed agreement in which there was public
participation and debate; Sunshine Law did not
require that all negotiations about contract be
1
Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143
open to the public. West’s F.S.A. § 286.011(1).
Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*412 Kenny Nachwalter, and Kevin J. Murray, and
Thomas H. Seymour, and Robert D.W. Landon, III,
Miami, for appellant.
Alejandro Vilarello, City Attorney, and Henry Hunnefeld,
Assistant City Attorney, and Myrna D. Bricker, Assistant
City Attorney, and Erica Wright, Assistant City Attorney;
and Lauri Waldman Ross, and Theresa L. Girten;
Greenberg Traurig, and Alan T. Dimond, and Elliot H.
Scherker, and Paul C. Savage, Miami, for appellees.
Before FLETCHER, and RAMIREZ, JJ., and NESBITT,
Senior Judge.
Opinion
RAMIREZ, J.
In this consolidated appeal, the City of Miami and
intervenor Raceworks LLC appeal the entry of summary
final judgment in favor of Homestead–Miami Speedway
LLC (“Speedway”) in which the trial court held that the
original agreement between Raceworks and the City of
Miami was void and issued an injunction prohibiting any
races from going forward under that agreement.1
Speedway appeals from a summary final judgment
entered in the City’s favor in which the trial court held
that the City did not violate the Sunshine Law in its
negotiations with Speedway. We affirm the trial court’s
determination that the agreement was a lease, not a
license, and as such should have been competitively bid
as required by the City Charter.2 We also affirm the trial
court’s determination that there were no Sunshine Law
violations.
[1] [2]
The original agreement between the City and
Raceworks was not a license *413 because a license is
revocable at will and cannot be assigned. See Outdoor
Media of Pensacola, Inc. v. Santa Rosa County, 554
So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (county’s granting
exclusive right to use right of way was a lease subject to
competitive bidding procedures). See also Randall Indus.,
Inc. v. Lee County, 307 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
(license agreement which gave taxi company exclusive
use of airport parking spaces was a lease which required
competitive bidding). The agreement at issue here was
assignable and could not be revoked without notice of
default and the opportunity to cure. Additionally,
Raceworks was given the exclusive use of Bayfront Park
for at least three days each year for fifteen years.
Since the agreement between the City and Raceworks was
a lease, it fell within the purview of section 3(f)(iii) and
section 29–A(d) of the City Charter.3 The pre-amendment
language of section 3(f)(iii) required competitive bidding
for the commercial use of any of the City’s waterfront
property.4 Section 29–A(d) requires competitive bidding
for any agreement which conveys any interest the City
has in waterfront property. The City leases the waterfront
from the federal government. The agreement at issue here
gave Raceworks in effect a sub-lease for Bayfront Park,
part of the City’s interest in waterfront property. Thus, the
original agreement to hold races in Bayfront Park should
have been the result of competitive bids.
[3]
The trial court therefore correctly held that the City was
required to follow competitive bid procedures and that
any contract for the use of the City’s waterfront property
entered into without complying with those procedures
was void. However, we agree with the City that paragraph
5 of the March 4, 2002 order must be deleted because it
was neither pled nor requested by Speedway. See
Cardinal Inv. Group, Inc. v. Giles, 813 So.2d 262, 263
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“[C]ourts are not authorized to
grant relief not requested in the pleadings.”)
[4]
Florida’s Sunshine Law, section 286.011(1), Florida
Statutes, provides that:
All meetings of any board or
commission of any ... municipal
corporation, or political
subdivision, except as otherwise
provided in the Constitution, at
which official acts are to be taken
are declared to be public meetings
open to the public at all times, and
no resolution, rule, or formal action
shall be considered binding except
as taken or made at such meeting.
The board or commission must
provide reasonable notice of all
such meetings.
Speedway argues that the City violated the Sunshine Law
because it held no public hearing on the final negotiated
contract *414 before the City voted to approve the
2
Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

proposed contract at the August 9, 2001 meeting, and
there was no cure by the City of this violation. The record
reflects, however, that there were meetings regarding the
proposed agreement between the City Manager and
Raceworks in which there was public participation and
debate. The publicly noticed meetings were held on May
24, 2001, July 10, 2001, July 26, 2001, August 9, 2001
and September 25, 2001, and involved a discussion of the
terms of the proposed agreement. At the July 10 and July
26 meetings, there was specific public comment regarding
the proposed agreement. Furthermore, Speedway has not
relied upon any case which requires that “all” such
negotiations be open to the public so as not to violate the
Sunshine Law. We thus find that the public was involved
in the decision making process that resulted in the final
negotiated contract of the parties and Speedway’s
argument lacks merit.
This appeal was further complicated by a subsequent
agreement between the parties negotiated after the trial
court had entered summary judgment. Despite this new
agreement, the City and Raceworks continue to argue the
validity of the old agreement. By our opinion today, we
do not address whether the subsequent agreement
between the City and Raceworks was also subject to
competitive bidding because the trial court has never
ruled on the legality of the new agreement.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
All Citations
828 So.2d 411, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

Footnotes
1 Order of March 4, 2002:
1. Speedway has standing to assert its claims and the contract is a lease.
2. Because the contract is a lease, the City was and is required to follow competitive bid procedures applicable to
leases, and the City’s failure to do so renders the contract void as a matter of law.
3. Alternatively, even if the contract were not a lease, the City was required to follow competitive bid procedures
pursuant to the provision of City Charter § 3(f)(iii). The City’s admitted failure to follow any competitive bid
procedures renders the contract void as a matter of law.
4. The contract between the City and Raceworks, which is acknowledged to have been entered into without the City
having complied with any of the applicable competitive bid procedures, is hereby declared null, void and of no further
legal effect.
5. The City is hereby directed to comply with all applicable competitive bid procedures, and thereby to give
Speedway a full and equal opportunity to submit a competing bid, and to have its bid fully and equally considered,
before entering into any lease, or any contract for use of the City’s waterfront property, for motor car races.
6. The City and Raceworks’ cross-motions for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the Second Amended
Complaint are denied.
2 We do, however, reverse the language contained in paragraph 5 of the March 4, 2002 order as it exceeded the relief
requested in the pleadings.
3 Section 29–A(d) of the City Charter states: “[s]ales and leases of real property; prohibition. Except as otherwise
provided in this charter section, there shall be no sale, conveyance, or disposition of any interest, including any
leasehold, in real property owned by the city ... unless there has been prior public notice and a prior opportunity given
to the public to compete for said real property or interest.”
Section § 3(f)(iii) of the City Charter states: “[t]he City of Miami shall have power ... [t]o lease to or contract with
private firms or persons for the commercial use or management of any of the city’s waterfront property, but only in
compliance with the other requirements of this charter and on condition that ... (D) the procurement methods
prescribed by ordinances are observed. Any such lease or management agreement ... which does not comply with
each of the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first been approved by a majority of the voters of the
city.”
4 The City Charter was amended by referendum on November 6, 2001 to delete the words “commercial use” from
section 3(f)(iii).

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4