January 10, 2018

G.R. No. 199527

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru Private Complainant BRIAN VICTOR

BRITCHFORD, Petitioner
vs.
SALVADOR ALAPAN, Respondent

DECISION

MARITRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution, dated 22 November
2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333, which dismissed the
petition seeking the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of fine in
eight (8) cases of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).

THE FACTS

In an Information, dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan (respondent) and

his wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Upon arraignment on 1 September 2006, they pleaded not guilty to the
charges.

In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian
Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount
within three (3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8)
postdated checks.

When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner
that the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the
checks were drawn was closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the
dishonor of the checks.

On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed only on the
last week of October 2005 because they suffered business reverses. They
nonetheless stated that they were willing to settle their monetary obligation.

The MTC Ruling

In a decision,1 dated 4 February 2009, the Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe,
Zambales (MTC), convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Big.
22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that
respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and
that he was a first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna
because she did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks.
The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established
the guilt of Accused Salvador Alapan of the eight (8) counts of Violation of B.P. Blg.
22 and imposes upon the aforenamed accused to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 for each
case or total of ₱240,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party, Mr. Brian Victor
Britchford the sum of FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND (₱411,000.00)
Philippine Currency, representing the face value of the dishonored checks, with legal
interest per annum commencing from March 8, 2006, when demand was made, until
fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs.2

After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued.
The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose
Subsidiary Penalty3 for respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.
In its Order,4 dated 24 September 2010, the MTC denied the motion on the ground
that subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was not imposed in the judgment
of convicion.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Iba,
Zambales (RTC).

The RTC Ruling

In a decision,5 dated 25 January 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. It held that respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary
imprisonment because the judgment of conviction did not provide for such penalty in
case of non-payment of fine. The RTC further opined that the MTC decision which
already attained finality could no longer be altered or modified. It disposed the case
in this wise:

IN VIEW THEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.6

Undeterred, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution, dated 22 November 2011, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the petition was filed without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which was contrary to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code. The dispositive portion reads:

In view of the foregoing and finding the Manifestation (in lieu of Comment) filed by
the OSG to be well-founded, the petition is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section
3, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.7

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT

FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.

Petitioner argues that Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code is applicable only in cases wherein the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities is directly involved; that the said law does not cover matters wherein
it is the interest of the private complainant that is directly affected; and that
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 expressly states that there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine.8

In his comment, respondent counters, citing Gonzales v. Chavez, 9 that it is

mandatory upon the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer; that it is only
the State, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, which has the sole right and
authority to institute criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court;10 that the imposition or the non-imposition of subsidiary penalty is a
matter that involves the interest of the State, thus, the private offended party is
without legal personality to bring an appeal on the criminal aspect of the case; and
that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment must be clearly stated in the
judgment.11
In his reply, petitioner avers that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 categorically
implies that subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to even if the penalty
provided by the trial court is limited only to fine; and that the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment would emphasize the gravity of the offense committed by respondent
and would serve as a deterrent to others not to emulate this malicious act.12

OUR RULING

Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.

In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This
power is expressly provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the
Revised Administrative Code.13 Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of
the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.14

Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is
limited only to the civil liability arising from the crime. Thus, in Bautista v. Cuneta-
1âwphi1

Pangilinan, 15 the Court ruled:

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended
party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party
is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general.
As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.16

In this case, respondent was convicted of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
for which he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment pursuant to
Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13- 2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the
criminal aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face value
of the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case. Consequently
petitioner could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty which was not even
questioned by the People through the OSG. "While a private prosecutor may be
allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence,
he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General.
To do so would be tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the direction and
control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law."17 Hence, the CA
properly dismissed the petition for review.

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the

judgment of conviction.

Another reason which militates against petitioner's position is the lack of provision
pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of conviction. People v.
Fajardo, 18 in relation to Republic Act. No. 5465 which amended Article 39 of the
RPC, discusses the rationale behind the necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary
imprisonment in the judgment of conviction, viz:

The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the
fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the
following rules: ...

Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which deals with the
execution and service of penalties, provides:
ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall executed
except by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor
with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of

Congress of the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was
still in force when the order appealed from was made, that no person may be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. This constitutional provision was in a
sense incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing that no
penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. As the fact show that
there is no judgment sentencing the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvent to pay the fine imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary
imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court
could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A contrary
holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned. That subsidiary
imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for, according to article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of the
fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency. There is not a single provision in
the Code from which it may be logically inferred that an accused may automatically
be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case where he has been sentenced
merely to pay a fine and has been found to be insolvent. Such would be contrary to
the legal provisions above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs.
Miranda (2 Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the lower court
fails to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for indemnification to
the owner of the banca, but only imposes subsidiary punishment as to the costs. In
this respect the judgment is erroneous and should be modified."

We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by final judgment
to pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent and could not pay the fine for this
reason, cannot be compelled to serve the subsidiary imprisonment provided for in
article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. [emphasis supplied]19

Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment."
However, the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment for the same must still comply with the law.

Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of
failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed
without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be modified.

Finally, the time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification

of a final and executory judgment:

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality
of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds
true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality
set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained
by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such
principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness
of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are
ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had
been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the
correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and (3) void Judgments.20

There is no doubt that the MTC decision has long attained finality and that none of
the aforementioned exceptions finds application in this case. Hence, the MTC
decision stands and any other question involving the said decision must now be put
to rest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 November 2011 Resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARITRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 224498

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is an appeal from the June 10, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No; 05671, which affirmed with modification the June 25, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Manila, in Criminal Case No.
91-97103, modifying accused-appellant PFC Enrique Reyes' conviction from Murder
to Homicide, and the CA's February 3, 2016 Resolution3 which denied his Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Facts

Accused-appellant was charged with the murder of Danilo Estrella y Sanchez

(Danilo) in an Information dated August 1, 1991, the accusatory Portion of which
reads as follows:

That on or about August 13, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and
evident premeditation and with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon C2C DANILO ESTRELLA Y SANCHEZ by then and there firing his armalite rifle
at said C2C Danilo Estrella y Sanchez who was then walking home and hitting him
on different parts of the body, depriving the latter of a chance to defend himself from
the attack thereby inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds in the different parts of
his body which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.4

On accused-appellant's motion for the determination of probable cause, the RTC, in

its July 23, 1992 Order, found probable cause to hold accused-appellant for trial and
ordered his arrest. Finding, however, that the evidence of guilt was not strong, the
RTC allowed accused-appellant to post bail in the amount of ₱150,000.00. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of "not guilty."5

Based on the testimonies of its three eyewitnesses, namely, Eliseo de Castro

(Eliseo), Apolonio Gaza, Jr. (Apolonio) and Rolando Quintos (Rolando), the
prosecution sought to prove that around 7:00 in the morning of August 13, 1990,
Eliseo and several others were in the basketball court along Francisco Street, Tondo,
Manila, in front of Danilo's house, while Rolando was cleaning his truck parked in the
same basketball court. Eliseo and Rolando saw accused-appellant fire his Armalite
rifle upwards while his nephews, Rey Buenaflor, a certain Al and Bernie, picked up
the empty slugs. Danilo was then walking towards his house after tending to his
fighting cock, and was three steps away from his residence when accused-appellant
suddenly fired at him from behind, causing him to fall on the ground. Accused-
appellant then approached Danilo. Hearing the gunshots from his house prompted
Apolonio to go to nearby Francisco Street where he saw Danilo's body on the
ground, bathing in blood, while accused-appellant, who was wearing only a pair of
camouflage pants and holding an Armalite rifle in his right hand, stood in front of
Danilo. Accused-appellant took the .38 caliber firearm tucked in Danilo's waist, and
fired the same upwards thrice. Afterwards, he placed the gun on Danilo's right hand
and turned the latter's body on a lying position. Out of fear, Eliseo and the others hid
behind Rolando's truck, and when the firing stopped, they tried to get Danilo's body.
Accused-appellant, however, fired his Armalite upwards, saying "walang kukuha
nito," and then walked to his house. When the policemen later arrived, they went into
accused-appellant's house. The policemen, together with accused-appellant,
subsequently boarded the mobile car.6

Dr. Emmanuel Lagonera took the witness stand for the prosecution to identify the
certificate of identification of dead body as well as the medicolegal report executed
by the National Bureau of Investigation's Dr. Marcial Cenido who passed away
before he could testify in court.7 Based on said report, Danilo died from multiple
gunshot wounds.8

The report listed the following injuries to Danilo's body:

1. Gunshot wound, right clavicular region, 8.5 cm. From the anterior midline,
measuring 13 cm[.] 8 cm., directed obli-backwards, slightly upwards and towards the
middle fracturing the clavicle, middle Yd, right and 61h cervical vertebra lacerating
the spinal cord, and with the recovery of a markedly deformed copper jacket and lead
fragments embedded in the muscle tissue at the left lower nape and a lead splinter at
the left upper nape;

2. Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry at the left temporal region, 2.3 cm.
above the left ear, measuring 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., directed obliquely backwards,
downwards and slightly towards the midline penetrating the cranial cavity and
lacerating the left temporal and occipital lobes and left cerebellar hemisphere and the
slug exiting behind the left ear and which measures 7 cm. x 6 cm.;

3. Gunshot wound, thru and thru, right ring finger, point of entry at the dorsal surface
measuring 1 cm. x 0.6 cm., directed obliquely forwards, very slightly upwards and
towards the small finger fracturing and dislocating the proximal interphalangeal joint,
slug exiting anteriorly measuring 3 m. 1.2 cm., and lacerating the palmar surface of
the right small finger and which measures 5.5 cm. x 1.5 cm.;

4. Lacerated wound, proximal 3rd, right arm, antero-lateral surface measuring 4 cm.
x 3 cm. thru the subcutaneous tissue;

5. Lacerated wound, right arm, middle 3rd, antero-medial surface measuring 7.5 cm
x 4.5 cm. thru the subcutaneous tissue;

6. Splinter wounds, right and left thigh, anterior; and

7. Abrasion, upper distal 3rd, right leg, antero-medial surface measuring 2 cm. x 0.2
cm.9

Testifying as the prosecution's rebuttal witness, P/Sr. Insp. Joseph

Torcita of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory identified a Chemistry

Report by which the prosecution sought to prove that a paraffin examination of
Danilo's hands yielded a negative result for the existence of gunpowder nitrates.10

With his nephews Adelardo Buenaflor III (Adelardo) and P/Insp. Gary Reyes (P/Inp.
Gary), his neighbors Celia Rodriguez (Celia) and Ernesto Galvez (Ernesto), police
officer Felizardo Ellano (Ellano) and retired police ballistician Nelson Fuggan
(Nelson), as his witnesses,11 accused-appellant invoked self-defense. He claimed
that even before the incident, he was already receiving death threats from Danilo's
uncle, Manuel Sanchez (Manuel), who was a suspected member of
the "Bawas Gang" whose activities he had a hand in exposing as an Investigator of
the Theft and Robbery Section of the Manila Police Department.12

According to accused-appellant, he was on his way home in the morning of August

13, 1990, after preparing his son's wake, when he was met by Adelardo who
informed him that he had overheard Danilo and four other men talking on board an
owner-type jeep parked along Velasquez Street, Tondo, Manila. One of them
remarked "ltumba na natin iyan puede na kahit anong mangyari," to which Danilo
replied "Hagisan ng granada kahit sa bahay."Fearing for his family's safety, accused-
appellant prepared his Armalite rifle and called for assistance from the Police Station
1, Theft and Robbery Section, and the SWAT. After a while, someone outside the
house shouted that there were policemen in civilian clothes. Hearing this, accused-
appellant stood from a rocking chair, got his Armalite rifle and told Gary and his other
companions not to leave the house. Accused-appellant then proceeded towards
Francisco Street going to Velasquez Street, thinking that the police he called had
arrived. At that time, Celia, who was on her way to accused-appellant's house, saw a
man holding a gun approaching accused-appellant from behind. When Celia shouted
"Ricky," accused-appellant turned towards Celia and saw Danilo holding a gun in the
act of shooting him. Accused-appellant drew and fired his Armalite rifle, hitting Danilo
who fell on the ground. He took Danilo's gun for his safety. He was about to lift
Danilo to bring him to the hospital, when he heard gunfire and the cocking of a gun
from a container van parked nearby. Fearful of a possible ambush, he fired Danilo's
.38 caliber revolver as well as his Armalite rifle at the direction of the container van,
taking cover behind a ten-wheeler truck parked on the street until the police patrol
car arrived. He proceeded to his house through the backdoor. When he heard Ellano
call his name, he surrendered himself as well as his Armalite rifle and Danilo's gun.13

On June 25, 2012, the RTC rendered its Decision14 convicting accused-appellant of
murder. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, accused Enrique Reyes is hereby found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the [sic] imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the surety bond
posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and the accused
is hereby ordered to be committed at the National Bilibid Prison.

He is, further, sentenced to compensate the Heirs of Danny Estrella the following
amounts consistent with law and jurisprudence relating to an accused adjudged
guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages.

Furnish the Public Prosecutor, the private complainants, the accused, his counsel
and the Warden of the Manila City Jail copies of this decision.

Given in open court this 25th day of June 2012 in the City of Manila, Philippines.15

The RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
rejected accused-appellant's claim of self-defense, finding no clear and convincing
proof that Danilo had assaulted him or posed an imminent threat to him. The RTC
held that the killing was attended by treachery because accused-appellant fired at
Danilo suddenly and without giving him the chance to run or defend himself The trial
court likewise appreciated the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation,
holding that accused-appellant had sufficient time to contemplate his actions while
sitting in his rocking chair before emerging from his house armed with a rifle, ready to
kill.16

On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC's finding that the killing was not done in self-
defense in the absence of unlawful aggression. However, finding no sufficient
evidence that would establish the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, the appellate court downgraded accused-appellant's
conviction from murder to homicide. The dispositive portion of the CA's June 10,
2015 Decision17 reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila in Criminal Case No. 91-97103 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant PFC ENRIQUE
REYES is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE. He is

hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum, and to pay civil indemnity and moral damages
of ₱50,000.00 each. The award of exemplary damages is hereby deleted. Further, all
the monetary awards for damages are subject to a 6% interest per annum from date
of finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration, assailing both his conviction and the
penalty imposed on him by the appellate court.18 Accused-appellant also moved to
post bail in view of the downgrading of the offense from murder to homicide.19 Both
motions were denied in the CA's Resolution dated February 3, 2016.20

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he acted m complete self-

defense and, thus, prays for an acquittal.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

By invoking self-defense, accused-appellant admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that

caused Danila's death, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to him to show that
the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
invoking self-defense.21

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from criminal

responsibility, it is incumbent upon him who invokes the same to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of his life or
personal safety.22 When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused,
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.23

Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful

aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing for there
is nothing to repel.24 Verily, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person
invoking it as a justifying circumstance.25

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real

imminent injury, upon a person.26The test for the presence of unlawful aggression is
whether the victim's aggression placed in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself. The danger must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the confluence of these elements of unlawful aggression must be
established by the accused, to wit: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or
assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or at least imminent; and (c) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.27

As the second element of unlawful aggression will show, it is of two kinds: (a) actual
or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression Actual or
material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury.28 Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the
point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening or intimidating attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive, menacing and positively
strong, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury (like aiming a revolver
at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack).29 There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof: which puts the accused's life in real peril.30

Tested against the foregoing criteria, the Court finds the element of unlawful
aggression to be wanting in this case. As the CA succinctly held:

There is nothing in the records which would clearly and convincingly prove Enrique's
claim that his life was in danger when he saw Danilo. Enrique claimed that when
Celia shouted his name, he saw Danilo who was about to shoot him. However,
based on Celia's testimony, Danilo was only approaching Enrique while holding a
gun. Celia did· hot witness any positive act showing the actual and material unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Even P/Insp. Gary, whom Enrique presented as
an alleged eyewitness, only testified that he saw a man carrying a small firearm
approaching Enrique and when the latter turned to his right, a volley of gunshots
followed. Evidently, the records of this case are -bereft of any indication of unlawful
aggression that would justify a finding of self-defense.31

Indeed, accused-appellant failed to show an attack so offensive, menacing and

strongly indicative of an intent to cause injury, as to justify the killing of Danilo.
In People v. Rubiso32, the Court held:

Assuming that Hubines had a gun and pulled it, however, records show that he did
not manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled the life and limb of herein
appellant. It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of one's hand into his pocket as if for
the purpose of drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a
rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude
that one's life was in imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon,
or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary
that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external
acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful
aggression.33 (Emphasis ours)

Furthermore, the prosecution's eyewitnesses have established that Danilo was on

his way home after tending to his fighting cock, and was three steps away from his
house, when accused-appellant suddenly fired his Armalite at him. They also testified
that Danilo's gun was tucked in his waist (or his right side), repudiating accused-
appellant's claim that the victim had been holding a gun when accused-appellant
shot him.

Both the RTC and the CA gave weight and credence to the testimonies of said
eyewitnesses. The CA noted that they were "made in a clear, positive,
straightforward and consistent manner that inspire(s) belief, unwavering even under
cross-examination by the defense."34 The appellate court further observed that the
·testimonies were "replete with details that could not easily be concocted by
prevaricating witnesses."35

The trial court's assessment of the facts, as affirmed by the CA, is entitled to great
weight and respect.36 Absent any clear disregard of evidence, We find no reason to
deviate from such finding.37

The records also show no evidence of any dubious or improper motive on the part of
the prosecution's eyewitnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellant.38 It is
settled that where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and
their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.39

Accused-appellant harps on the alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses'

testimonies. He points to the supposed disparity between Rolando's testimony that
accused-appellant got Danilo's gun from his waist and Apolonio's account that
accused-appellant took it from the right side of Danilo's chest. Accused-appellant
likewise impugns Rolando's testimony that accused-appellant shot Danilo six times,
which allegedly conflicts with the three gunshot wounds indicated in the medico-legal
report.40

However, after having owned the crime, the burden of proof has been shifted to
accused-appellant to establish self-defense. He, therefore, cannot simply protest that
the prosecution's evidence is weak. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence
because even if weak, the prosecution's evidence cannot be disbelieved after the
accused himself has admitted to the killing. His failure to adduce clear and
convincing evidence of self-defense will accordingly result in his conviction.41

In any event, as the CA correctly found, the inconsistencies thus cited refer to minor
matters.

Inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies referring to minor details do not destroy

their credibility.42 Such minor inconsistencies even manifest truthfulness and candor
and remove any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.43Different persons have different
reflexes which may produce varying reactions, impressions, perceptions and
recollections.44 Considering the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to
assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight variances in the declarations
of witnesses hardly weaken their probative value.45 As long as the testimonies of the
witnesses corroborate one another on material points, particularly in relating the
principal occurrence and in the positive identification of the assailant, minor
inconsistencies therein will not impair their credibility.46

The alleged inconsistencies aside, the testimonies of the prosecution's eyewitnesses

concur on material points.47Taken as a whole,48 they clearly establish that Danilo was
neither holding nor pointing a gun at accused-appellant, and was in fact on his way
home, when accused-appellant shot him with an Armalite rifle.

Besides, whether Danilo's gun was taken by accused-appellant from his waist or
from the right side of his chest, the testimonies of Apolonio and Rolando are
consistent in showing that the gun was tucked close to the victim's body, negating
accused-appellant's claim that Danilo was pointing the same at him.

Furthermore, in People v. Joel Taneza y Dacal,49 the Court held:

Accused-appellant points to the fact that Esgrina's testimony conflicts with the
medico-legal report of Dr. Figuracion as well as the physical evidence, for while
Esgrina stated that the victim was shot four times, the autopsy indicated at least five
gunshot wounds and only four empty shells were submitted in evidence by the
prosecution. Furthermore, there is no indication of head bruises in the autopsy report
as to coincide with Esgrina's representation that she saw accused-appellant strike
Umandam on the head with the gun.

Even as Esgrina's eyewitness account does not tally to the last detail with the
findings in the medico-legal report, we do not perceive such inconsistencies as
materially affecting the substance of her testimony. Inconsistencies such as these in
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses have been known to happen, and indeed
acquittals have been the result where the inconsistencies and self-contradictions
dealt with material points as to altogether erode the credibility of the witness. On the
other hand, discrepancies which are minor in character may also serve to add
credence and veracity to a witness' testimony, and enhance her credibility in the
process. The latter rule we find applicable to the instant case, for the inconsistencies
pointed out by the defense do not alter the substance of Esgrina's testimony - which
is that accused-appellant attacked a defenseless Emersion Umandam.50

Accused-appellant contends that the "looming" death threat from Manuel's group,
owing to his exposure of the latter's alleged illegal activities, became real and evident
when his nephew, Adelardo, overheard Danilo's plan to kill him. Thus, he submits
that Danilo's remarks were "more than enough to show the imminent and real
danger" to his life.51
The jurisprudential standards for a finding of unlawful aggression clearly negate
accused-appellant's argument. Granting they were true, neither the "looming" threat
perceived by accused-appellant nor the remarks overheard by his nephew satisfies
the requirement of an actual, menacing, sudden and unexpected danger to accused-
appellant's life. To constitute imminent unlawful aggression, the attack must be at the
point of happening and must not be imaginary or consist in a mere threatening
attitude.52 Furthermore, as the trial court found, the supposed threat overheard by
Adelardo actually made "no specific or definite reference to (accused-
appellant)."53 The Court is thus unconvinced that there was a real peril to accused-
appellant's life when he killed Danilo.

Accused-appellant avers that in self-defense, he fired shots at Danilo, hitting the ring
finger of the latter's right hand which supposedly held a gun pointed at him. Accused-
appellant thus argues that the gunshot wound through Danilo's right ring finger as
well as the lacerated wounds on his right arm prove that Danilo was in the act of
shooting and guilty of unlawful aggression.

We are not persuaded. Said injuries do not conclusively prove accused-appellant's

theory of unlawful aggression, and accused-appellant has offered no credible
evidence to convince the Court otherwise. The testimonies of accused-appellant's
own witnesses failed to establish that the victim was aiming a gun at him.
Furthermore, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses consistently showed that
the victim was neither holding a gun nor pointing one at accused-appellant. Plainly
taken, therefore, the argument is baseless and self-serving. Besides, accused-
appellant's contention only serves to prove that the other gunshots, to the victim's
head and clavicle, both fatal,54were neither necessary nor justified in the name of self-
defense.

Verily, accused-appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful

aggression by clear and convincing evidence. Unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim is a statutory and doctrinal requirement for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense to be appreciated. Without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.55

In fact, evidence clearly establishes that accused-appellant was the aggressor. As

the RTC found, Eliseo and Rolando positively and categorically stated that even
before Danilo was shot, accused-appellant was already firing his Armalite rifle
upwards and as Danilo was walking towards his house, accused-appellant suddenly
fired at him, causing him to fall on the ground. Eyewitnesses also saw accused-
appellant then take the firearm tucked in Danila's waist and fire it thrice in an upward
direction, placing the gun thereafter on Danila's right hand and turning his body in a
lying position. When Eliseo and others tried to get Danila's body, accused-appellant
fired his Armalite upward, telling them "walang kukuha nito."

Considering that accused-appellant was the aggressor, his employment of any

means in furtherance of the aggression cannot be considered as the rational means
to repel an illegal aggression.56

Furthermore, accused-appellant's plea of self-defense is belied by the nature and

number of wounds suffered by Danilo which reveal an intent to kill and not merely an
effort to prevent or repel an attack.57

The autopsy report shows that the victim died from multiple gunshot wounds,
including one on the left temple and another on the right co1larbone, both of which
proved fatal. The gunshot wound on the victim's head, a vital part of the body,
demonstrates a mind resolved to end the life of the victim.58 The multiple shots which
accused-appellant fired at the victim unmistakably manifested an irrevocable
decision to kill.59 It has been held in this regard that the location, gravity and presence
of several wounds on the victim's body provide physical evidence that eloquently
refutes allegations of self-defense.60 Physical evidence is evidence of the highest
order; it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.61
The last element of self-defense is also wanting. As the clear aggressor, accused-
appellant cannot successfully argue that there was no sufficient provocation on his
part.

Another factor that militates against accused-appellant's defense lies in the

incredulous aspects of his version of the incident.

It is settled that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Accordingly, the
test to determine the value or credibility of a witness' testimony is whether the same
is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of
mankind.62

Accused-appellant alleged that minutes after calling the police station for assistance,
"somebody shouted coming from the outside that there were policemen who were in
civilian clothes outside [sic]," which prompted him to go out of the house with his
Armalite rifle.63 It is, however, against common experience for someone to shout the
arrival of the police and in the same breath describe their attire. It appears that
accused-appellant had to add that sartorial detail if only to justify his leaving the
house when no policemen were visibly outside. The excuse proffered, indeed, hardly
inspires belief. Furthermore, as it would have been readily apparent that the police,
whose protection accused-appellant allegedly sought, were not in fact present, the
most natural and logical reaction was for him to have immediately returned to the
safety of his house.

Accused-appellant also alleged that when he shot Danilo, he was merely defending
himself from the unlawful aggression of the latter and his group who were
armed.64 He averred that after he shot Danilo in self-defense, he tried to lift Danilo so
he could bring him to the hospital but he was fired upon, allegedly by Danilo's group,
until the police arrived.65 However, it taxes credulity how the victim's group would not
have immediately fired at him the moment he shot Danilo. It is implausible that they
would wait until he has fired several shots, taken Danilo's revolver and tried to lift
him, before commencing fire either to protect their own or to execute the purported
plan to kill him.

In fine, the Court agrees with both the trial and appellate courts that accused-
appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving self-defense.

Contrary to accused-appellant's assertion, the Court cannot disregard the trial court's
findings or reverse its decision on the ground that it has been reached by a trial judge
who merely took over the case and did not hear or observe the deportment of the
witnesses. While the trial judge who presided over the trial of the case would be in a
better position to determine the truth or falsity of the witnesses' testimonies, it does
not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render
a valid and just decision, as he could rely on the transcribed stenographic notes
taken during the trial as the basis for his decision. This is the main reason for the
mandatory requirement that all trial courts be courts of record.66

The Court agrees with the CA that the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation was not sufficiently proved.

The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.67 Every element of the circumstance must be shown to exist beyond reasonable
doubt.68 To be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not
merely be premeditation but must be evident premeditation.69

The foregoing elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

In finding the existence of evident premeditation, the trial court observed that there
existed an animosity between accused-appellant and Danilo's uncle and close ally,
Manuel, after he exposed Manuel's alleged illegal activities and the latter filed a libel
case against him. The RTC concluded that accused-appellant, who had a grudge
against Manuel, had sufficient time to ponder his feelings for Danilo and his uncle as
he "waited several minutes to lapse while sitting in a rocking chair inside his house
before he went out of the house carrying a loaded assault rifle."70

It is settled, however, that mere existence of ill feelings or grudges between the
parties is not sufficient to sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.71 Furthermore,
it cannot be said that enough time has passed to allow accused-appellant to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.72 "It has been held in one case that even the lapse
of 30 minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution
thereof is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the act."73

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent during an interval of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.74 There is no.
evident premeditation when the attack; was the result of rising tempers or made in
the heat of anger.75

The Court, however, disagrees with the CA's finding that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was absent.

There is treachery when the offender, in committing any of the crimes against
persons, employs means or methods which tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. When alleged in the information and clearly proved, treachery qualifies
the killing and elevates it to the crime of murder.76

Treachery was established in this case. Prosecution witnesses Eliseo and Rolando,
whose testimonies were found to be credible by both the RTC and the CA, showed
that Danilo was walking towards his house after tending to his fighting cock, and was
three steps away from his residence when accused-appellant suddenly rushed
towards his direction and shot him.77 Accused-appellant's shots, fired from an assault
rifle, were multiple and successive, depriving Danilo of any chance to run or to
defend himself and repel the attack. The foregoing circumstances are manifestly
indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be
appreciated.78

In finding that the killing was not attended by treachery, the CA reasoned that "(the)
bad blood between Enrique and Danilo, taken together with the fact that accused-
appellant was firing an assault rifle while walking towards Francisco St. and the
victim attt'.mpted to retreat to the comfort of his residence militate against the
prosecution's claim .that the attack was sudden and unexpected."79

It has been held, however, that treachery may still be appreciated even when the
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to retaliate or defend
himself,80 as in this case. Furthermore, that Danilo did not find it necessary to pull out
his gun and prepare to defend himself against a Possible assault from accused-
appellant, underscores the fact that he did not expect the attack.

Even it the Court were to consider accused-appellant's contention, supposedly based

on the autopsy report, that Danilo was shot frontally, it is settled· that the essence of
treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the. victim that renders the latter
unable and unprepared to defend himself because of the suddenness and severity of
the attack. This criterion applies whether the attack is frontal or from behind. Thus, a
frontal attack could still be deemed treacherous when unexpected and on an
unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or avoid it.81 It has
been sufficiently established by the prosecution that accused-appellant's attack on
Danilo was unexpected and executed in a manner that deprived the latter of a
chance to put up a defense.

The killing having been committed with alevosia, accused-appellant's conviction for
homicide, as determined by the CA, must be modified to one for murder. It must be
stressed that an appeal in a criminal case throws the ·entire case wide open for
review, and it becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed
judgment, whether or not raised by the parties.82 The appeal confers on the reviewing
tribunal full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, and increase the penalty.83

On the strength of defense witness Ellano's testimony, the CA appreciated the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. To be considered a mitigating
1âwphi 1

circumstance, voluntary surrender must be spontaneous and made in such manner

that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and
expense that will be incurred in his -search and capture.84

Ellano's testimony indicates that around 6:30 in the morning on August 13, 1990,
before the shooting incident, he received a call from accused-appellant asking for
police assistance as his family was reportedly in danger.85 The prosecution's
evidence showed that after the incident, accused-appellant went back to his house
and the policemen later on arrived.86 Ellano confirmed that as he and his team of
policemen approached the gate of accused-appellant's residence, the latter
appeared and surrendered himself, his firearm and Danilo's revolver.87

The confluence of the foregoing circumstances justifies the appreciation of a

mitigating circumstance of a similar nature or analogous to voluntary surrender,
under number 10, Article 1388 of the Revised Penal Code.89 Indeed, it would appear
that accused-appellant returned home following the incident and resolved to remain
there, knowing that the police was on its way to his house. And as the policemen
approached his home, he directly gave himself up to them. If accused-appellant
wanted to abscond, he could have readily done so but this, he did not do.90

The crime was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No.
7659,91 during the suspension of the death penalty.92 Before RA No. 7659 took effect
on December 31, 1993 reimposing the death penalty, the penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death.93 Since the crime in this
case was not attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, and the mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender is
credited in accused-appellant's favor, the minimum penalty for murder, i.e., reclusion
temporalin its maximum period, shall be imposed pursuant to Article 64(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.94 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant
is sentenced to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.95

In keeping with prevailing jurisp1udence on damages to be awarded when murder is

committed,96 the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the CA are each
increased to ₱100,000.00. Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 are
also awarded. Accused-appellant shall additionally pay temperate damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered
pecuniary loss although - the exact amount was -not proved.97 All monetary awards
are subject to interest- at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this decision until fully paid.98

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 10, 2015 in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05671 is MODIFIED in· that accused-appellant is held guilty of murder
and sentenced to a penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Furthermore, accused-appellant shall pay civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages, each in the amount of ₱100,000.00, as
well as temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00. The civil indemnity and all
damages payable by accused-appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205440

PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES, Plaintiff-Appelle
vs.
YOLANDO B. PANERIO alias JOHN "Yolly" LABOR and ALEX (JOJO) F.
ORTEZA, Respondent
YOLANDO B. PANERIO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

On appeal is the 24 February 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00707-MIN, which affirmed with modification the 4 February 2009
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12, in Criminal Case No.
22,247-91, finding accused-appellant Yolando B. Panerio alias John
"Yolly"3 (Panerio) and accused Alex (Jojo) F. Orteza (Orteza) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

On 23 February 1991, Panerio and Orteza were charged with the crime of murder
committed upon the person of one Elesio4 Ung (Elesio) in an Information5 which
reads:

That on or about February 18, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of ELESIO
UNG by then and there stabbing him on the different parts of his body with the use of
a fanknife (balisong) and ice pick, thereby inflicting upon the said Elesio Ung mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.6

On 29 April 1991, Panerio and Orteza, with the assistance of counsel, were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge.7 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Virgilio Olivar (Olivar), Exipher
C. Rebosura (Rebosura),Police Officer Gualberto Callos (PO Callas), Police Officer
Wenifredo Dutano (PO Dutano), Patrolman George Alojado (Alojado ), and Antonio
Ung. Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

On 18 February 1991, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at the billiard hall of a
certain Piatos in Mintal, Davao City, Panerio and Orteza, both drunk, scattered the
billiard balls causing disruption of the billiard games going on there; thus, the games
stopped. Thereafter, Panerio and Orteza left the billiard hall,8 and saw Elesio on the
road. While under the influence of alcohol, Panerio and Orteza repeatedly stabbed
Elesio. Panerio, using a fan knife or balisong, was in front of the victim; while Orteza,
using an ice pick, was at the victim's back.9

After stabbing Elesio, the two assailants ran towards the nearby elementary school.
Witness Olivar brought Elesio to the hospital but he expired the following day.10

Meanwhile, at about 11:00 o'clock of the same evening, Rebosura who was then on
guard duty at the Mintal public market located in front of the billiard hall, was
approached by Panerio and Orteza. The accused told Rebosura that somebody,
whom they did not know, was stabbed and killed. Rebosura then was advised by his
superior to report the matter and refer Panerio and Orteza to the police.11 Thus,
Rebosura, together with Panerio and Orteza, went to the Tugbok police station in
Davao City, where they met with Alojado, a police officer Dodong Molve, and Andoy
Bintad (Bintad), a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit.
Thereafter, the police officers and Bintad accompanied Rebosura and the two
accused to the place where the stabbing incident occurred.12

On their way to the crime scene, Alojado noticed bloodstains on the hands of Panerio
and Orteza. When asked about it by Alojado, the two replied that they helped the
victim and tried to bring him to a hospital.13 At this juncture, Alojado frisked the two
accused and recovered a fan knife from Panerio and an ice pick from Orteza.14 After
marking the fan knife and ice pick, Alojado turned these over to PO Dutano, the desk
officer of the Tugbok police station.15PO Dutano, in tum, endorsed the confiscated
items to PO Callos, the Exhibit Custodian of the Tugbok police station. PO Callos
identified the fan knife and ice pick in open court.16

The post-mortem findings17 revealed that Elesio sustained a total of eleven (11) stab
and puncture wounds. The cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to multiple
stab wounds.

Evidence for the Defense

On 23 November 1992, Panerio and Orteza escaped from their guards while on their
way back to detention prison from a court trial.18 Thus, on 24 November 1992, the
trial court ordered that the case be archived pending the arrest of the accused.19

On 14 April 2008, Panerio was re-arrested and re-committed to the Davao City Jail,
while Orteza remained at large.20 Trial resumed thereafter.

The defense presented Panerio as its sole witness. In his testimony, Panerio offered
the exculpatory circumstance of self-defense and narrated his version of the incident,
as follows:

On the night of 18 February 1991, Panerio, together with Orteza, went out to buy
food. They walked by the store of Piatos where they saw two persons, including
Elesio, drinking. Elesio and his companion called them and offered them drinks but
they refused.21 Feeling disrespected, Elesio got mad and boxed Panerio.22 When
Panerio fell to the ground, Elesio rushed towards him and attempted to stab him with
a knife twice, but missed. Elesio tried to stab Panerio for a third time, but the latter
was able to hit the former's hand causing the knife to fall.23 Panerio picked up the
knife off the ground and stabbed Elesio with it three times.24 After stabbing Elesio,
Panerio, prompted by his guilt, immediately surrendered to Rebosura, the guard on
duty at the nearby Mintal public market. Rebosura brought Panerio to the police
station where he was detained.25

Regarding his escape, Panerio claimed that such was not his intention. He averred
that it was Orteza's idea; he was merely dragged by him as they were handcuffed
together.26

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, dated 4 February 2009, the RTC found Panerio and Orteza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The trial court deemed Orteza had
waived his right to present evidence because he escaped detention.

The trial court found Panerio's uncorroborated testimony unconvincing and

insufficient to show that he had acted in self-defense. With respect to Orteza, the trial
court opined that the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify him as
one of the assailants. It also considered Panerio and Orteza's escaped from
detention as indicative of their guilt. The trial court likewise ruled that Panerio and
Orteza conspired in killing Elesio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding

Accused YOLANDO B. P ANERIO alias JOHN "Yolly" LABOR and ALEX (Jojo) F.
ORTEZA guilty of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said Accused to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of [Elesio] Ung jointly and severally
the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages.

Considering that Accused ALEX (Jojo) F. ORTEZA is at large, let the promulgation of
the Judgment of this case be made by recording the Judgment in the criminal docket
and furnishing him a copy of the Judgment at his last known address pursuant to
Rule 120, Sec. 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.27

Aggrieved, Panerio appealed before the CA.28

The CA Ruling

In its appealed decision, dated 24 February 2011, the CA affirmed with modification
the 4 February 2009 RTC decision. The appellate court concurred with the trial court
that Panerio failed to sufficiently show that he acted in self-defense. It noted that the
sheer number, nature, and location of the stab wounds sustained by the victim is
telling of the determined effort of Panerio and Orteza to kill Elesio. Thus, it opined
that Panerio's account of the incident does not inspire belief. The appellate court
likewise appreciated the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. It
noted that the two accused repeatedly stabbed the victim until he died.

With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the appellate court deemed it proper to
further award temperate damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, considering that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery attended the commission of the felony.

The fallo of the appealed decision provides:

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed judgment convicting the accused-appellant

YOLANDO B. PANERIO alias JOHN "Yolly" LABOR and co-accused ALEX (Jojo) F.
ORTEZA of Murder is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they are jointly and
severally ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱30,000.00
as temperate damages. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.29

Hence, this appeal.

THE ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED
TO APPRECIATE THE JUSTIFYING CRICUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

OUR RULING

The appeal lacks merit.

Self-defense not established

The plea of self-defense is as much a confession as it is an avoidance. By invoking

self-defense, the accused admits having killed or having deliberately inflicted injuries
on the victim, but asserts that he has not committed any felony and is not criminally
liable therefor.30 Thus, the plea of self-defense can be described as a double-edged
sword which can either bring favorable or unfavourable consequences to the
accused.

To bring about a result favorable to the accused in the form of exculpation from
criminal liability, jurisprudence teaches that the accused must establish the essential
requisites of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.31 The accused has the burden to prove these requisites by clear and
convincing evidence. In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because it could no longer be denied
that he admitted to be the author of the victim's death or injuries.32

After careful review of the records of the case, the Court is convinced of Panerio's
failure to prove that he acted in self-defense when he and Orteza killed Elesio.

Most important among the requisites of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is

the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as justifying circumstance.
Unless the victim commits unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated, for the two other essential
elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful
aggression to prevent or repel.33

As aptly stated by the trial court, Panerio's uncorroborated testimony regarding the
incident is unclear and unconvincing. His assertion that Elesio, then drunk, boxed
him and attempted to stab him is unsubstantiated by any convincing proof. Moreover,
Panerio's account on how many times he stabbed the victim is miserably inconsistent
with the post-mortem findings on the deceased.

In sum, Panerio's self-serving testimony that Elesio mounted an unlawful aggression

must fail when weighed against the positive, straightforward, and overwhelming
evidence of the prosecution.

Even on the assumption that Elesio was the unlawful aggressor, self-defense cannot
be appreciated on account of the evident lack of reasonable means employed
necessary to repel it. To recall, the post-mortem findings reveal that Elesio sustained
eleven (11) stab and puncture wounds, to wit:

On autopsy, pertinent findings are:

(1) Stab wound - 1.2 cm. by 0.5 cm., single-edge[d] sharp slanting across
and near the right anterior axillary line, directed medially puncturing the right
lung;

(2) Stab wound - 3 cm. by 1 cm., single-edge[ d] sharp slanting across the
right chest, just above the nipple, directed posteriorly, slightly upwards and
medially hitting the middle lobe of the right lung;

(3) Stab wound - 2 cm. by 1 cm., single-edge[ d] sharp, slanting across the
epigastrium, slightly right to the mid line directed posteriorly puncturing the
liver;

(4) Incised wound - 0.5 cm. by 0.3 cm., across proximal base of the right
thenar prominence;

(5) Incised wound - 1 cm. by 0.5 cm., across the proximal portion of the right
palm;

(6) Stab wound - 3 cm. by 1 cm., single-edge[ d] sharp, slanting across the
left mid clavicular line on the level of the 3rd ICS directed posteriorly
puncturing the heart;

(7) Stab wound - 1 cm. by 0.5 cm., single-edge[ d] sharp, across the left
anterior axillary line on the level of the 4th ICS directed medially and
posterior puncturing the left lung;

(8) Stab wound - 2 cm. by 1 cm., single-edge[ d] sharp, across the upper mid
portion of the epigastrium, directed posteriorly hitting the liver;
 (9) Stab wound - 3 cm. by 1 cm., single-edge[ d] sharp, along the mid line,
just above the navel, directed posteriorly hitting some loops of intestine;

(10) Punctured wound shallow - 0.5 cm. by 0.2 cm., at the upper medial
quadrant of the right gluteal region;

(11) Punctured wound shallow - 0.5 cm. by 0.3 cm., at the mid portion of the
right gluteal region.

Cause of death: Hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds.34 (emphases

supplied)

Of the eleven (11) stab and puncture wounds, at least seven (7) are deemed fatal
having been inflicted over vital organs such as the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the
intestines. The large number of wounds sustained by the victim negates any claim of
self-defense. Rather than imply an effort for self-defense, the presence of multiple
stab wounds on the victim strongly indicates a determined effort to kill the victim. 35
Considering the quantity, nature, and location of the wounds sustained by Elesio, the
Court finds Panerio's plea of self-defense incredible.

The crime committed is homicide; treachery was not established.

Although the guilt of Panerio and Orteza for the death of Elesio is unquestioned, the
Court is of the considered view that the accused may only be convicted of homicide,
not murder. The prosecution failed to prove that the crime was committed with
treachery or with any other qualifying circumstance.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in its execution, tending directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.36 For treachery to be appreciated, the concurrence of two
conditions must be established: first, the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and second, the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.37Moreover, in order to qualify the killing as murder, treachery must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.38 The
presence of treachery cannot be presumed.39

In this case, only Olivar personally witnessed the stabbing incident which he narrated
in this wise:

PROS. ALBARRACIN:

Q. What, if anything, transpired while you were playing billiards?

A. [Yo ]Lando and Alex arrived and they scattered the balls causing disruption of our
games, Sir.

Q. Why did they scatter the balls and interrupt the games?

A. They were drunk, Sir.

Q. What else transpired?

A. The games were stopped. They left and I proceeded home, Sir.

Q. What happened next?

A. When I was on my way home, I saw the accused Yolando Panerio and Alex
Orteza stabbing Elesio Ung.40 (emphasis supplied)
The testimony of Olivar clears the fact that he only witnessed the incident when
Elesio was already being stabbed by Panerio and Orteza. He did not witness how the
incident started and he had no idea what moved the two accused to stab Elesio to
death. All that could be gleaned from Olivar's account was that Panerio and Orteza
were both under the influence of alcohol; and that they stabbed Elesio, presumably
when they met him on the road.

In this regard, it has been held that even where all indicia tend to support the
conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected, yet no precise data on this
point exists, treachery cannot be taken into account.41 Thus, when the witness did not
see how the attack was carried out and cannot testify on how it began, the trial court
cannot presume from the circumstances of the case that there was treachery.
Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures,
no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable
existence. Mere probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish each
element necessary to convict.42

From the foregoing, the Court finds without any basis the trial and appellate courts'
conclusion that treachery attended the commission of the crime. In fact, the trial court
merely concluded that the crime committed was murder without a single mention of
any aggravating circumstance that supposedly qualified the crime. Similarly, the
appellate court simply concurred with the trial court and ruled that the attack was
treacherous because it was sudden and unexpected, without citing any evidence
showing that the attack was indeed done so.

Penalties and monetary awards

In the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstance, the crime committed by

Panerio and Orteza is Homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal as
provided in Article 249 of the RPC. Considering that there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period
pursuant to Article 64(1) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Panerio and Orteza should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum
of which should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the offense, that is, prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12
years); and the maximum of which should be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period (14 years 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months). Accordingly, the Court imposes upon each of the two accused the
indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,as maximum.

In People v. Jugueta, 43 the Court summarized the amounts of damages which may
be awarded for different crimes. In said case, the Court held that for the crime of
homicide, the following amounts may be awarded: (1) ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity;
and (2) ₱50,000.00, as moral damages. Further, the Court deems it proper to delete
the awards of exemplary and temperate damages considering that no aggravating
circumstance attended the felony. Although exemplary damages, being corrective in
nature, may be awarded even if in the absence of aggravating circumstance,44 the
Court sees no reason for such award in this case.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Yolando B. Panerio and accused Alex F. Orteza

are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are each sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Accused-appellant Yolando B. Panerio and accused Alex F. Orteza are further

ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Elesio Ung the
following amounts: (1) ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity; and (2) ₱50,000.00, as moral
damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until its full payment.45

SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 217974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
RESURRECT ON JUANILW MANZANO, JR. and REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO,
Accused
REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Rezor Juanillo Manzano (accused-

appellant) from the 29 October 2014 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Twentieth Division in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01473 affirming in toto the
17 April 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under
Article (Art.) 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

The accused-appellant and his elder brother Resurrecion

Manzano (Resurrecion) were charged with murder before the RTC of San Jose,
Antique, in an Information3 docketed as Crim. Case No. 10-07-8009, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 19th day of March 2010, in the Municipality of Hamtic, Province
of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with knives, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with said knives
one Lucio Silava, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on his body which caused
his instantaneous death.

With qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

Contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The parties agreed to have an inverted trial after the accused-appellant who,
pleading not guilty during the arraignment, raised the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Resurrecion remained at large.

To prove his claim of self-defense, the accused-appellant himself testified. SP02

Roberto Javier (SP02 Javier) of the Hamtic police office took the witness stand to
prove that the accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered.

The prosecution tried to prove its case against the accused-appellant by calling to
the witness stand Dr. Ma. Eva D. Pacificador (Dr. Pacificador), Victoria N.
Silava (Victoria), Atty. Rean S. Sy (Atty. Sy), and Luisa P. Monteclaro (Luisa).

Version of the Defense

At about 9:30 p.m. on 19 March 2010, while the accused-appellant was home sitting
by the window, he saw Lucio Silava (Lucio) throwing stones at his house. The
electric lamppost was lighted, thus, the accusedappellant, who was then eighteen
years old, was sure that it was Lucio.4

The accused-appellant immediately went out to inquire from Lucio why he was
throwing stones at his house but Lucio threw a stone at him that hit his right knee
and caused him to fall down. Lucio rushed towards the accused-appellant to stab him
with a knife but was unsuccessful as they grappled for its possession. It was at that
instance that the accused-appellant called out to Resurrecion, who was home that
time, to run away so that he would not be involved. Because Lucio was very drunk,
the accusedappellant was able to take hold of the knife, but blacked out and started
stabbing Lucio. Thereafter, the accused-appellant ran away and proceeded to the
house of Reno Manzano (Reno), an elder brother, at Barangay San Angel, San Jose,
Antique, where he also met Resurrecion. The following day, the accused-appellant
surrendered to the police authorities.5

The accused-appellant had known Lucio for eight years already since the latter's
house was in front of his house and were separated only by the road. Accused-
appellant was as tall as Lucio but the latter had a bigger body build. Resurrecion had
a dislocated right shoulder and a smaller build than that of Lucio and the accused-
appellant.6

Version of the Prosecution

At about 9:00 p.m. on 19 March 2010, the spouses Lucio and Victoria were inside
their store fronting the accused-appellant's house. Lucio was having his dinner at the
kitchen inside the store while Victoria was watching the store when the accused-
appellant and Resurrecion called out from the gate saying that they would buy
cigarettes. Because the gate leading to the store was already closed, Lucio told the
accused-appellant and Resurrecion to come.7

Resurrecion stood outside the store and told Victoria that he wanted to buy Fortune
white cigarettes and handed her ₱20.00. The accused-appellant entered the store
and proceeded to where Lucio was having dinner. After realizing that she had no
more stock of the Fortune white cigarette, Victoria told Resurrecion who, in reply,
said that he would no longer buy cigarettes and then proceeded towards the kitchen.
Thereafter, Victoria heard Lucio ask, "What wrong have I committed?" Victoria
rushed to the kitchen and there saw Lucio bloodied and leaning on the door, while
the accusedappellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him.8

Victoria went out of the store shouting for help and saying that the accused-appellant
and Resurrecion were stabbing Lucio. When Victoria went back inside, she saw
Lucio run outside the store but still within the fenced premises, and the accused-
appellant and Resurrecion were going after him. From where she stood, Victoria saw
Resurrecion hold Lucio's hands while the accused-appellant, who was positioned
behind Lucio, held Lucio’s body with one arm while with his other hand stabbed
Lucio’s back. When Resurrecion released his grip on Lucio, the latter fell face down
but the accused-appellant and Resurrecion continued to stab him causing Victoria to
utter, "I will let you eat the whole body of my husband alive." The accused-appellant
and Resurrecion thereafter ran towards the direction of the farm.9

Lucio was brought to the hospital but Victoria had to stay behind to find money for his
medical expenses. On her way to the hospital, Victoria was informed that Lucio had
died. Luisa, a cousin of Lucio, took pictures of the dead body. Victoria had the
pictures10 developed and secured Lucio's death certificate.11 Victoria incurred a total
of ₱15,000.0012 for the funeral expenses.13

On 23 March 2010, Dr. Pacificador conducted a postmortem examination on the

body of Lucio, the results of which follow:

Left Anterior Thorax

StabWound # 1 - Horizontal in direction about 3 cm in length located at the left

anterior chest below the left clavicle penetrating the upper lobe of the left lung and
aorta.

StabWound # 2 - Vertical in direction about 3 cm in length located below wound #1

resulting into fracture of 3rd rib.

Right Anterior Thorax

StabWound # 3 - Vertical in direction about 2 cm in length on the left shoulder, non-
penetrating.

StabWound # 4 - Vertical in direction about 4.5 cm in length located below right

clavicle penetrating the upper lobe of the right lung.

StabWound # 5 - Vertical in direction about 4 cm in length below the sternum

penetrating the liver.

StabWound # 6 - Vertical in direction about 4.5 cm in length about 3 cm below

wound # 5 penetrating the liver.

StabWound # 7 - Vertical in direction about 1.5 cm in length below wound # 6 non-

penetrating.

Extremities

StabWound # 8 - Vertical in direction about 3.5 cm in length located on the left upper
arm going through the axilla.

StabWound# 9 - Horizontal in direction about 2.5 cm in length on the left lower arm
below the left antecubital fossa, nonpenetrating

StabWound# 10 - Horizontal in direction about 3 cm in length just below wound # 9

left lower arm.

StabWound # 11 - Horizontal in direction about 2 cm in length located below left

wrist, non-penetrating.

Posterior Thorax

StabWound # 12 - Vertical in direction about 2.5 cm in length just below the neck in
between scapula, non-penetrating.

StabWound # 13 - Vertical in direction about 5 cm in length just below wound# 12,

non-penetrating.

StabWound # 14 - Vertical in direction about 2 cm in length below wound# 13, non-

penetrating.

StabWound # 15 - Horizontal in direction about 1.5 cm in length on the right lumbar

area, non-penetrating.

Cause of death:

Hypovolemic Shock secondary to Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab Wounds.14

It was a week after the stabbing incident that Atty. Sy took pictures15 of the place
where Lucio was attacked. He saw splatters of dried blood inside the store and within
the fenced perimeter enclosing the crime scene.16

The Ruling of the RTC

According to the RTC, a careful and deeper examination of the facts and
circumstances tend to contradict the accused-appellant's version of the incident and
his claim that he acted in self-defense. In so ruling, the RTC considered the
following: that if there was no intention on the part of the accused-appellant and
Resurrecion to kill Lucio, they could have easily overpowered him because he was
very drunk at that time; it was not convinced that Lucio hit the accused-appellant on
his right knee causing him to fall since the latter failed to present a medical certificate
notwithstanding his contention that he was brought by a police officer to a doctor for
his knee injury; it was not satisfied with the accused-appellant's version that after he
fell down, Lucio held his neck and stabbed him because not once was the accused-
appellant hit; the number of stab wounds sustained by Lucio negates self-defense;
the serious injuries sustained by Lucio demonstrate the accused-appellant's intent to
kill; the splattered blood inside the store and on the bamboo slats serving as wall of
the kitchen are proofs that the incident started at the kitchen of Lucio’s store and
continued outside but still within the fenced perimeter; that when the accused-
appellant blacked out, he was still able to shout at Resurrecion to run away so as not
to be involved in the incident; the portrayal on how the accused-appellant
singlehandedly stabbed Lucio was not worthy of credence; the claim of the accused-
appellant that he hit Lucio frontally was denied by the postmortem examination
results; the only plausible explanation for Lucio's back injuries was that these were
inflicted by either the accused-appellant or Resurrecion or by both of them; and the
accused-appellant had not assailed or contradicted, by testimonial or documentary
evidence, the truthfulness and trustworthiness of Victoria's testimony.17

On the one hand, the R TC found that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion
conspired as shown by their concerted action of surprising Lucio in the kitchen and,
without justifiable reason, helping each other assault their victim. Moreover, the RTC
ruled that the commission of the felony was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of noctumity which facilitated the assailants' escape. According to the
RTC, it was unfortunate that this circumstance was not properly appreciated as this
was not alleged in the information.18

The RTC, however, was not convinced that the accused-appellant voluntarily
surrendered considering the following reasons: he fled from the locus criminis and
proceeded to Reno's house in San Jose instead of going to the Hamtic police station;
he did not surrender to the San Jose police; and it was Reno who informed the
Hamtic police station of the accused-appellant's presence in San Jose, thus, the
policemen proceeded to Reno's house and took custody of the accused-appellant.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

rendered convicting accused REZORMANZANOyJUANILLO, beyond reasonable
doubt, of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua.

He is also ordered to indemnify the legal heirs of Lucio Silava the amount of
₱75,000.00 for the death of the said victim and to pay the said legal heirs actual
expenses in the amount of ₱15,000.00 as well as moral damages amounting to
₱25,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, the accused-appellant appealed
before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA noted the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio which made
the claim of self-defense unavailable. According to the CA, the accused-appellant
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence since he had admitted that he killed Lucio. The CA held that
there was no proof that the RTC failed to appreciate facts and circumstances which
would have merited the accused-appellant's acquitta1.20

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC that treachery and abuse of superior strength
attended the killing of Lucio, and that the accused-appellant had not voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities.21

In view of its findings, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 20, 2012 of
the RTC, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique in Criminal Case No. 10-07-8009 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.22

ISSUES

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT

AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF VICTORIA SILAVA.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING INCOMPLETE SELF-

DEFENSE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT REZOR MANZANO, AS A PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT

ACTED WITH ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.23

OUR RULING

The appeal does not deserve any merit.

The findings of the RTC

as to the credibility of

witnesses should be

respected especially

when these are affirmed

by the CA.

It has been trenchantly maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve
matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect.24The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
gruelling examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies.25 The factual findings of the R TC, therefore, are accorded the highest
degree of respect especially if the CA adopted and confirmed these,26 unless some
facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted
as to materially affect the disposition of the case.27 In the absence of substantial
reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, as when
no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings.28
It must be noted that it is a general rule in criminal cases that an examination of the
entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct
conclusion; as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it
being the duty of the appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of the assignment of
errors or not.29 It is for this reason that the Court has painstakingly reviewed the
records of this case; yet, it found no reason to depart from the well-entrenched rule
that the findings of the R TC as to the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed
considering the absence of any showing that it had overlooked a material fact that
otherwise would change the outcome of the case or had misunderstood a
circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses.30

The testimony of Victoria identifying the accused-appellant and Resurrecion as the

ones who assaulted Lucio was positive, convincing, and straightforward, viz:

Q. You said a while ago that your store is lighted with bulb, what is the voltage of the
electric bulb?

A. Ten (10) watts.

Q. So, what did you do after you heard your husband said those words?

A. I immediately went towards the door of the store towards the kitchen area and I
saw my husband leaning on the wall full of blood and the two accused
simultaneously stabbing my husband.

Q. So both of them are holding a knife?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you saw both of them stabbing your husband?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please tell us how near is your door to the [location] of your husband when he
was stabbed?

A. (Witness as this juncture pointed at the distance from the witness stand to the
place occupied by Atty. Rivero which is estimated to be about two (2) meters, as
agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense, as the distance from the door to
the [location] where the husband was stabbed.)

Q. And when you came out of your door that was your distance from your husband
after he was being stabbed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And please describe to us what did you do immediately after coming out of that
door?

A. From the door, I saw my husband leaning on the wall full of blood with the two
accused simultaneously stabbing him.

Q. And you saw that there was no structure blocking your side?

A. No, sir.

Q. While they were stabbing your husband, can you tell us if the two accused uttered
any words?

A. Nothing, sir.
Q. Can you recall while standing how many times did the two accused stab your
husband?

A. I cannot count how many times the two accused stabbed my husband but I saw
both of them stabbing my husband.

Q. At that time your husband is facing you?

A. Yes, sir because he was leaning on the wall.

Q. What did you do next?

A. After that I ran out of [the] house and ran towards the fence and shouted that
Resurrecion and Rezor are stabbing my husband and I went back inside the house
after saying those words.

Q. When you said those words you came back to your house, please tell us when
you came back to your house, you entered the main gate or front of the road?

A. Just in front of our store when I shouted for help.

Q. While standing on the road facing your husband, please tell us what did you see?

A. While I was standing on the road, I saw Resurrecion holding my husband and
holding [his] hands while Rezor was behind my husband and one hand was holding
the body of my husband and the other hand was stabbing at the back of my
husband.

Q. At that point did you see on what portion of the body of your husband was Rezor
stabbing him?

A. At the back.

Q. How far were you from them?

A. Very near. (x x x two (2) meters, as agreed upon by both counsel)

Q. Please tell us, when the two accused Resurrecion and Rezor were holding your
husband and Resurrecion was stabbing on the back, in what portion were they
located?

A. In front of our store.

COURT:

Q. Are you telling the court that the two accused were already outside the store?

A. Yes, sir.

ATTY. SY:

Q. Outside the store but within the gate?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q. From inside the kitchen, can you tell the court where did the three pass by?

A. My husband was able to run outside the house.

Q. So when your husband ran outside the house, the two accused followed him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you saw your husband and the two accused in that position they were
directly in front of your store but still within the gate?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is this store lighted?

A. Yes, sir, it is lighted with a bulb.

Q. And from your position you can properly see their faces?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell us what happened next?

A. At that particular moment, I saw Resurrecion holding the two hands of my

husband while Rezor's [other] hand was holding my husband while the other hand
was stabbing my husband. I cannot recall which hand was used by him in stabbing
my husband.

xxxx

Q. So, are you telling the court that Rezor was in the grip of your husband?

A. Yes. Sir.

xxxx

Q. Now, do you realize that both injuries of your husband were in [the] front portion of
his body?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About how many times did you see Resurrecion stab your husband while he was
at the back of your husband?

A. I saw Rezor stabbed my husband once and that was the time that Resurrecion
released my husband from his grip and so my husband fell to the ground facing
down.

xxxx

ATTY. SY:

xxxx

Q. So, when your husband fell down, what did you do next?

A. Rezor and Resurrecion helped each other in stabbing him and at that point in time
I told Rezor and Resurrecion "I will let you eat the whole body of my husband alive,"
and then that was the time the two accused ran away."31

It was clear from the testimony of Victoria that she was able to personally witness
when the accused-appellant and Resurrecion assaulted Lucio; and that she could not
be mistaken as to the assailants' identity since the place where the crime happened
was well-lighted.
Accused-appellant tried to dent the credibility of Victoria by asserting that she did not
actually see the scuffle between him and Lucio as verified by her admission during
the cross-examination by the defense.32

The contention of the accused-appellant is without merit. The records bear out that
Victoria admitted that right after she heard Lucio utter "What wrong did I commit,"
she immediately went to the kitchen and found her husband leaning on the kitchen
door, bloodied, while the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him.
Contrary to the claim of the accused-appellant, a review of the testimony of Victoria
would show that what she claimed she did not witness was the scuffle, if there was
any, between Lucio and the accused-appellant prior to her hearing her husband utter
"What wrong did I commit?" It was also pointed out that Victoria had claimed that she
did not hear anything from the accused-appellant and Resurrecion before she heard
Lucio utter these words in a soft and pleading manner, hence, accentuating the fact
that no such scuffle had taken place.

In the same vein, the position of the accused-appellant that Victoria could not have
seen the actions of Lucio and the accused-appellant as she had gone out of the
house to ask for help,33 fails to persuade. Victoria stated that after running out to the
street and shouting for help, she went back inside the fenced premises of the store;
thus, she was able to see Lucio run outside from the kitchen, and saw the accused-
appellant and Resurrecion follow Lucio, get hold of him, and stab him again.34

In stark contrast to the allegation of the accused-appellant that Victoria's statements

before the trial court were inconsistent and incredible, a perspicacious review of her
testimony sustains a finding that her narration of what happened on that fateful day
of 19 March 2010 was plausible, being consistent in all important details. For sure,
the records are bereft of any showing that Victoria's testimony was inspired by ill
motive or was attended by bad faith. Jurisprudence holds that when there is no
evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely
against the accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such
motive exists, and that the former's testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.35

We underscore that, except for the alleged inconsistencies which to the mind of the
Court are inconsequential, the accused-appellant failed to proffer any convincing and
material variations in the testimony of Victoria that would warrant the Court to reverse
the RTC’s finding as to her credibility. It is settled in this jurisdiction that as long as
the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically believable as a whole,
discrepancies in minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity or
detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses' declarations.36Of utmost
meaning to this case is the ruling laid down in Velasquez v. People,37 viz:

Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of [a] crime

need not be foolproof: "Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude
every minute detail of an event. This is especially true when the witnesses testify as
to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by flurry and excitement."
This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing ordeal.
One who has undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected
to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account" of every minutiae.

The accused-appellant

assumes the burden of

establishing his plea of

self-defense by credible,

clear, and convincing

evidence.
Jurisprudence instructs that an accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under
Article 1138 of the Revised Penal Code admits to the commission of acts, which would
otherwise engender criminal liability.39 Corollary thereto, the rule consistently adhered
to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admit that they are the authors of the
death of the victim, and their defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes
incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the
court.40 With this admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant to
prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are present.41 Verily, to invoke
self-defense effectually, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack
that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds
upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.42Self-
defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
invoking it.43 Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the
existence of justifying circumstances.44

Accused-appellant contends that he merely repelled the unlawful aggression of

Lucio, viz: when Lucio threw a stone at him that hit his knee; and when Lucio rushed
towards him to stab him. Additionally, accusedappellant avers that his testimony was
credible that he alone inflicted the stab wounds on Lucio.45

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: (1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person resorting to self-defense.46

On the first element, the consistent teaching by the Court on unlawful aggression is
as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression
under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril
the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b)the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;

and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means
an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must
not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must
be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to
shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing
his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.47

The evidence before the Court palpably lend negative credence to the presence of
unlawful aggression. Primarily, when compared to Victoria's testimony which
withstood the crucible of intense cross-examination by the defense and the
clarificatory questioning by the trial court, accused-appellant’s testimony was not only
incongruous with the evidence on record but also improbable.

The version of the defense was that the unlawful aggression began with Lucio who
was outside the accused-appellant's house throwing stones at its roof. Allegedly,
Lucio likewise threw a stone at the accused-appellant when he came out of the
house which hit his knee and caused him to fall down. Lucio was about to stab the
accused-appellant with a knife but then a scuffle ensued for its possession. When the
accused-appellant got hold of the knife, he "blacked out" and stabbed Lucio several
times.
The defense’s version of the events is swiftly denied by the prosecution’s
pictures48 showing Lucio’s blood splattered in the kitchen of Victoria's store and at the
fenced premises. These pictures are silent evidence that confirm the truth of
Victoria's testimony and easily weaken the defense's version that when the accused-
appellant acted in self-defense to Lucio’s unlawful aggression, they were at the road
in front of accused-appellant’s house. Where the physical evidence on record runs
counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the physical evidence must
be upheld.49

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant has neither witness nor evidence to fortify
his claim that the unlawful aggression started with Lucio. Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence
or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.50 The fact that Resurrecion is still in hiding
instead of giving his testimony before the trial court to boost the theory proffered by
the accused-appellant well confirms the finding that the defense's version of the
events was contrived.

To amplify his position that he acted in self-defense, the accusedappellant tried to

make issue of his absence of motive to stab Lucio. The accused-appellant basically
anchored his position on the ruling laid down by the Court in Borguilla v. Court of
Appeals, 51 that "the absence of motive is important in ascertaining the truth as
between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing. Herein, it was the victim
who had reason to harm the accused."52

The quoted ruling in Borguilla does not find meaning in this case considering that the
identity of the accused-appellant as the assailant of Lucio has been firmly
established by the prosecution. For sure, even the accused-appellant admitted that
he stabbed Lucio several times after he blacked out. In Borguilla, because of the
contradictory accounts of the event by both parties, the Court resorted to searching
for facts or circumstances which could be used as valuable aids in evaluating the
probability or improbability of a testimony; thus, the Court had appreciated the
presence of motive of the victim to harm the accused in ascertaining which of the
versions was true. In the present case, however, both the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the prosecution demonstrably disproved the defense's
version that unlawful aggression was initiated by Lucio. Also revealing was that, in
contrast to the Borguilla ruling, there was conspicuous dearth of evidence to
establish that Lucio had motive to kill the accused-appellant.

Notwithstanding the accused-appellant's contention that he has no motive in killing

Lucio, we point out that motive is not material in this case. As a general rule, proof of
motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt; and the
absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the
crime charged such as murder.53 To emphasize, "motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness. Intent is not synonymous
with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential element of a
crime."54

It is vigorously underscored that the pith and soul of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense is the presence of unlawful aggression; thus, the absence of this
requisite readily converts the claim of self-defense into nothingness even with the
existence of the other elements because the two other essential elements of self-
defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to
prevent or repel.55 As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.56

Accused-appellant's plea of self-defense is controverted by the nature, number, and

location of the wounds inflicted on the victim, since the gravity of said wounds is
indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend.57 The postmortem
examination58 conducted by Dr. Pacificador on the body of Lucio revealed that he
sustained fifteen wounds, four of which were fatal, and that the cause of his death
was hypovolemic shock secondary to hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab
wounds. The findings of Dr. Pacificador justify a declaration that there was
undeniable intent on the part of the accused-appellant to kill Lucio.
The absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio in this case unmistakably
belies the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. In view of this, the Court finds no reason to further discuss the other
elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense and will proceed to determine
the offense committed by the accused-appellant.

The crime committed by

the accused-appellant

was murder.

The accused-appellant averred that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder;
he maintained that he was guilty only of homicide in view of the absence of the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength .59

The crime of murder, under Article (Art.) 24860 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is
committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Art. 24661 of the
same Code, shall kill another with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means
or persons to insure or afford impunity.62 Jurisprudence provides that to warrant a
conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be present:
(a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 of the
RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.63

There is no question that the first, second, and fourth elements are present in this
case. It is the resolution of the issue on whether the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength that attended the killing of Lucio can
determine whether the accused-appellant should be held liable for murder. The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is
sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.64 On the one hand, if the qualifying
circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused may only be convicted with homicide under Art. 24965 of the RPC.66

Both the trial and the appellate courts appreciated treachery and abuse of superior
strength in convicting the accused-appellant of murder.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.67 Treachery is not presumed but must be
proved as conclusively as the crime itself.68 Treachery, whenever alleged in the
information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to
the category of murder.69

For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following

elements must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory
acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender.70

Relative to the first element, the legal teaching consistently upheld by the Court is
that the essence of treachery is when the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow.71

As to the second element, jurisprudence requires that there must be evidence to

show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution to
ensure its success72 since unexpectedness of the attack does not always equate to
treachery.73 The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to
ensure success in committing the crime.74
Additionally, in murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill;
otherwise, the offender is liable only for physical injuries.75 The evidence to prove
intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time of or immediately after the killing of the victim.76

The prosecution established that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion deliberately

made it appear to Victoria and Lucio on the night of 19 March 2010, that their main
purpose in coming to the store was to buy cigarettes. They came at night when
neighbors were probably asleep which would make it impossible for them to lend
assistance to Lucio. Once the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were allowed to
enter the premises, the accused-appellant immediately went inside the store and
proceeded to the kitchen where Lucio was having dinner. In the meantime,
Resurrecion engaged Victoria in a talk by pretending that he was buying cigarettes
but he, too, forthwith went to the kitchen upon being told by Victoria that she had run
out of the cigarette he was looking for. Thereafter, Victoria heard Lucio uttering softly,
"What wrong have I committed"; and then she saw her bloodied husband being
stabbed by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion. The absence of scuffle among
Lucio, the accused-appellant, and Resurrecion substantiate the finding that the
attack was swift and deliberate so that the unarmed and unsuspecting Lucio had no
chance to resist or escape the blow from his assailants.

The intent to kill by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion was confirmed by the fact
that they were armed with knives when they attacked Lucio who sustained a total of
fifteen wounds. Despite the fact that Lucio was already bleeding from his wounds, he
was able to run away from his assailants who pursued him. Resurrecion stood in
front of Lucio while the accused-appellant held him at the back and both assailants
continued to stab him. According to Dr. Pacificador, there were four fatal wounds
inflicted on Lucio, i.e., wounds numbered 1, 4, 5, and 6 which penetrated his major
organs.77

It must be pointed out that since treachery had qualified the crime to murder, the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily
included in the former.78

The RTC and the CA

were correct in not

appreciating the

mitigating circumstance

of voluntary surrender.

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following

elements must be present, to wit: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2)
the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3)
the surrender is voluntary.79 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and
the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.80

Records show that it was Reno who went to the Hamtic police station to request that
they take custody of the accused-appellant who was then in his
house.81 Undoubtedly, when the police went to Reno's house at San Angel, San
Jose, Antique, it was for the purpose of arresting the accused-appellant and not
because he was surrendering to them voluntarily. Simply put, Reno merely facilitated
the accused-appellant's arrest. Thus, without the elements of voluntary surrender,
and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest
and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and therefore
cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating
circumstance.82
The penalty to be imposed

upon the accused-appellant

Pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Applying Art. 63(2)83 of the RPC, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties,
i.e., reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed upon the accused-appellant in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the killing of
Lucio.

Following the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in People v. Jugueta, 84 accused-
appellant shall be held liable for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each. It was also ruled in Jugueta that when
no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. In this case, Victoria
showed that she spent a total of ₱13,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Lucio. In
conformity with the jurisprudence in Ocampo v. People,85 the temperate damages of
₱50,000.00 shall likewise be awarded instead of the damages substantiated by the
receipts. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.86

On the loss of earning capacity, it is noted that Victoria failed to substantiate her
claim that her husband was receiving a monthly income of ₱20,000.00. The Court
reiterates its ruling that "for lost income due to death, there must be unbiased proof
of the deceased' average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement, is not
enough. "87

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01473 finding the accusedappellant Rezor Juanillo
Manzano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the
award of damages to the heirs of Lucio Silava, as follows: civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00; moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱75,000.00; and
temperate damages of ₱50,000.00. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of
this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

G.R. No. 208651

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROMEO ANTIDO y LANTAYAN a.k.a. ROMEO ANTIGO y LANTAYAN alias
"JON-JON", Accused-Appellant

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In a Resolution1 dated April 7, 2014, the Court affirmed the Decision2 dated
December 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04602
finding accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan
alias "Jon-Jon" (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
December 7, 2012 Decision of the CA in CAG. R. CR-HC No. 04602
and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accusedappellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan
a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to
paragraph 5 of Article 266-B, under RA 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay private complainant the
following amounts: (a)₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent with
existingjurisprudence.3

However, it appears that before the promulgation of the said Resolution, accused-
appellant had already died on December 28, 2013, as evidenced by his Certificate of
Death.4

As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside the April
7, 2014 Resolution and enter a new one dismissing the criminal case against
accused-appellant.

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89
(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment[.]

In People v. Culas, 5 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based solely thereon. As
1âwphi1

opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) xxx

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section l, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.6

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it
is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA,7 may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case,
AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may
be warranted by law and procedural rules.8

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated
April 7, 2014 in connection with this case; (b) DISMISS Criminal Case No. 03-212115
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29 by reason of the death of
accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias
"Jon-Jon"; and (c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 226846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JEFFREY MACARANAS y FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For consideration of this Court is the appeal of the Decision 1 dated October 29, 2015
of the Court of Appeals (CA)dismissing appellant Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez's
appeal and affirming with modification the Judgment2 dated August 22, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 38-M-
2008, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

The facts follow.

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at
Meyland Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard
Frank's motorcycle, a green Honda Wave 125 with Plate No. NQ 8724, registered
under the name of Jacqueline Corpuz Langaman. When they were about to leave the
place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets suddenly approached them,
followed by a third man who was earlier standing at a post. One of the three men
held Frank by the neck and shot Frank causing the latter to fall down. The same man
pointed his gun at Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone. After
Kathlyn gave her cellphone, the same man hit her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn
pretended to be unconscious and saw that the men searched the body of Frank for
any valuables. While the incident was taking place, the second man took Frank's
motorcycle, while the third man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted
as the look-out. Afterwards, the three men left together riding Frank's motorcycle. It
was then that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank was taken to the hospital.
According to Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing
the neck area which necessitated surgery. Eventually, Frank died on the 27th post-
operative day or on March 30, 2007. The cause of Frank's death was
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to the spinal cord injury with retained metallic
foreign body secondary conjunction injury status post the surgery done which is
laminectomy infusion with rods and screws," as shown in the Post-Mortem
Certificate.

Thus, an Information was filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and a certain John
Doe charging them of violation of R.A. No. 6539, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of February, 2007, in the City of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with gun, by means of violence and intimidation,
with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away with them one Honda Wave 125 motorcycle
with Plate No. NQ 8724 valued at ₱59,000.00 belonging to Jacqueline Corpuz
[Langaman], to her damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ₱59,000.00,
and by reason or on the occasion of the commission of the said carnapping act, the
said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy and with intent to kill did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Frank Karim
Langaman with the gun they were then provided, hitting the latter on his neck which
caused his death.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the pre-trial ended,
the trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jacqueline Langaman, Kathlyn Irish

Mae Cervantes, Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon and SPO 1 Hernan Roble Berciles, Jr.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified in his defense and denied the charges against
him claiming that on February 18, 2007, he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before
proceeding to his father Eming Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where they usually
eat and sleep. According to him, they left early in the morning of the following day'
and just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter, sometime
in June, 2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they beat and mauled
him in order to admit that he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his
cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and disposed the case, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Jeffrey
Macaranas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Carnapping.

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman Corpuz the amount
of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Frank Karim Corpuz Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of

PhpS0,000.00 as temperate damages;

(d) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject motorcycle or
in default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(e) To pay the costs of the suit.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since the filing of
the Information is ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his apprehension. Issue an
alias warrant of arrest for the arrest of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.3

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the

Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch79, Malolos, Bulacan, dated 22 August
2012 is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:

xxxx

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman [y] Corpuz the
amount of seventy-five thousand (Php75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity forthe
death of Frank Karim Corpuz Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of fifty
thousand (Php50,000.00)pesos as moral damages;

(d) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of thirty
thousand (Php30,000.00)pesos as exemplary damages;

(e) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of twenty-five
thousand(Php25,000.00) pesos as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages;

(f) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject motorcycle or
in default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(g) To pay the costs of the suit.

The damages awarded shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of judgment until fully satisfied.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since the filing of
the Information is ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his apprehension. Issue an
alias warrant of arrest for the arrest of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.4

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellant insists that the trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full
credence to the testimony of the lone witness and in rejecting his defense of denial
and alibi.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping
as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or
by using force upon things. 5 By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659,
Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof (Emphasis supplied)

Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the
commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of thecommissionof the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof" This thirdamendment clarifies the law's intent to make the
offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the
Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons.
Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution
has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of
the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the
culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on theoccasion thereof" Consequently, where the
elements of carnapping are notproved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act
would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.6

"There is no arguing that the anti-camapping law is a special law, different from the
crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly
addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law
with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and
characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-
carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence
a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to
gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the
use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was
certainly the case before the enactment of said statute."7

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it

becomes qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the
occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or raped. 8 As we
have ruled in People v. Mejia: 9

The killing or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x and no
distinction must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the
other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof'
makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.

It is similar to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and in People v.
Bariquit, 10 it was ruled that:

In the present case, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried, and convicted
for the crime of robbery with homicide. In our jurisdiction, this special complex crime
is primarily classified as a crime against property and not against persons, homicide
being a mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose and
object of the criminal.

Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is applicable only to crimes
against persons. Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is a crime against
property and not against persons, cannot treachery be validly considered in the
present case.
Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as
amended are the following:

1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and

4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 11

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the
prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide
or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal
design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." 12 In other
words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must
be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the
original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 13

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets
and bonnets, together with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness
Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took
the victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his death.

Appellant argues that the RTC, as well as the CA, erred in appreciating the testimony
of the lone witness of the prosecution because of its inconsistencies and the
improbability of her imputations.

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the
witness[es], considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a
witness on the stand. 14 From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of witness[es]. 15 The factual findings of the appellate court
generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the
findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion. 16

The CA, therefore, did not err when it concurred with the RTC on the following:

The testimony of Kathlyn satisfies the aforementioned test of credibility. More

importantly, during her time at the witness stand, Kathlyn positively and categorically
identified accused-appellant as one of the three (3) men who committed the crime.
We agree with the court aquo's observation on this, thus -

xxx

The testimony of the Prosecution witness Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes reveals that
she came face to face with accused Jeffrey Macaranas. Though the other two (2)
accused wore bonnet at the time of the shooting incident, she was able to identify
accused Jeffrey Macaranas and narrate to the court his specific participation in the
carnapping incident. She testified that before the two (2) male persons approached
her and Frank Karim, she saw accused Jeffrey Macaranas who was then standing
beside a post, staring at them while they were moving slowly on board the
motorcycle. Again, she saw Jeffrey following the two male persons who approached
her and Frank Karim. Jeffrey Macaranas was just a meter away from her because he
was near the person holding the motorcycle. Jeffrey Macaranas boarded the
motorcycle together with his two (2) male companions immediately after the incident.
xxx

There was indeed a positive and unequivocal identification of the accused. It has
long been settled that where the witnesses of the prosecution were not actuated by ill
motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled
to full faith and credit. Herein, no imputation of improper motive on the part of Kathlyn
was ever made by the accused-appellant, as the latter even testified he was without
knowledge of any grudge Kathlyn might have against him. Further, relationship per
se of Kathlyn with the victim does not necessarily mean that her testimony is biased
and/or fabricated.

xxxx

Moreover, as correctly held by the People, through the OSG, any inconsistency, if at
all, was already superseded by Kathlyn's positive identification of the accused-
appellant in court. x x x

x x x17

Conspiracy was also proven in this case. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, 18 which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. 19 In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present
when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance
of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated. 20 As the CA correctly ruled:

In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the
three accused. Accused-appellant was seen standing by the post looking at Kathlyn
and the victim aboard the motorcycle. When his co-accused approached the former,
accused-appellant followed suit and was standing guard nearby, while his
companions committed their criminal acts. After the victim fell down, and apparently
thinking Kathlyn to be unconscious, the trio left together taking with them the victim's
motorcycle. Clearly, the accused-appellant and company all acted in confabulation in
furtherance of their common design and purpose, i.e., to carnal the motorcycle. As
aptly held by the court a quo thus -

xxx

From the acts of accused Jeffrey Macaranas, there was unity in his action with his
co-accused and a concerted effort to commit the crime charged. The simultaneous
acts of Macaranas and his two (2) companions indicate a joint purpose and
concurrence of intentions on their part. x x x

x x x21

Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, this Court has consistently ruled that
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-
serving evidence, which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters22 and that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b)
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime23during its
commission.24 In correctly ruling that the defense of denial and alibi of appellant is
inconsequential, the CA stated the following:

In the face of the serious accusation, accused-appellant merely interposed the

defense of denial and alibi to prove his innocence. Time and again, this Court held
1âwphi1

that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with
disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently
weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the in the light of positive identification of the
accused-appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only
when the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the prosecution witness who
testified on affirmative matters. The Court finds inadequate the accused-appellant's
defense of alibi absent any credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, to
exculpate him of the crime charged. 25

As to the imposable penalty under Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, it is

provided that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and
eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

Thus, the RTC did not commit an error in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua considering that there was no alleged and provenaggravating
circumstance. In line, however, with the recent jurisprudence,26 in cases of special
complex crimes like carnapping with homicide, among others, where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua,the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages are pegged at ₱75,000.00 each. The appellant is also ordered
to pay ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the award of ₱25,000.00 as
actual damages to the private complainant.27 All the other dispositions of the CA
stays.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez

is DISMISSED. Consequently, the Decision dated October 29, 2015 of theCourt of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant is ordered to
indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of ₱75,000.00
instead of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 instead of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and the amount of ₱50,000.00 instead of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

G.R. No. 177000

NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SP02 ALFREDO

CARANDANG y PRESCILLA,Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision2dated November 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 27021, affirming in toto the conviction of Nestor Guelos (Nestor),
Rodrigo Guelos (Rodrigo), Gil Carandang (Gil) and Senior Police Officer 2 Alfredo
Carandang y Prescilla (Alfredo) (petitioners) rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tanauan City, Batangas, Branch 83 in its Decision3 dated January 24, 2003
in Criminal Cases Nos. P-204 and P-205. The CA Resolution4dated March 6, 2007
denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Facts
On December 5, 1995, two separate Informations5 were filed with the RTC against
the petitioners for Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48,
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portions of the two Informations
state:

Criminal Case No. P-204

That on or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at
Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one
another, [Nestor]' while armed with an Armalite Rifle, with intent to kill and without
any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with the said firearm one SP02 Estelito Andaya, a bonafide
member of the Philippine National Police assigned at Tanauan Police Station, while
engaged in the performance of his official duties as peace officer, and while the latter
is being held from the back by [Gil] and other companions, whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, thereby hitting and inflicting· upon the said SP02
Estelito Andaya gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

Contrary to law. 6

Criminal Case No. P-205

That on or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at
Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other, [Nestor] while armed with an Armalite Rifle, with intent to kill and without any
justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said firearm, one P/Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, a
bonafide member of the Philippine National Police and concurrently the Chief of
Police of Tanauan, Batangas, while engaged in the performance of his official duties
as peace officer, and while the latter is being held at the back including his two arms
by [Alfredo] and the barrel of his armalite rifle is being held by [Rodrigo], thereby
hitting and inflicting upon the said P/Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho gunshot
wounds on his head which caused his instantaneous death.

Contrary to law. 7

The petitioners pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges. Thereafter, the joint trial
of the two cases ensued. The prosecution and the defense presented their
respective versions of the case. 8

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: P02 Edgardo Carandang (P02
Carandang), Alex Malabanan, P02 Pastor Platon Castillo, Ruel Ramos, Ricardo
Jordan, SPOl Anacleto Garcia (SPOl Garcia), Dr. Olga Bausa, Rowena Rios, Police
Inspector Loma Tria, Dr. Hermogenes Corachea, P03 Eugenio Llarina, Marilou
Reyes Camacho and Teodora Torres Andaya. 9

On the other hand, the defense presented: Cancio Angulo (Angulo), Juana Precilla
and herein petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and Rodrigo as its witnesses.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

In the morning of June 4, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho (P/C
Insp. Camacho), SP02 Estelito Andaya (SP02 Andaya), P02 Carandang and SPO 1
Garcia set off for Sitio Mahabang Buhangin in Tanauan, Batangas to conduct their
routine as peace officers of the area. It was already 10:00 a.m. when they left
Tanauan Police Station on board a patrol car driven by SPO 1 Garcia. While they
were in Barangay Gonzales waiting for a boat that would bring them to Sitio
Mahabang Buhangin, they heard successive gunshots apparently coming from
Barangay Boot. P/C Insp. Camacho then decided to proceed to Barangay Boot to
check and to apprehend those who were illegally discharging their firearms. Upon
arrival at the place, they were invited for lunch in the house of Angulo. Thereafter,
they stayed at the house of the incumbent Barangay Captain, Rafael Gonzales. 10

At around 2:45 p.m., P/C Insp. Camacho instructed SP02 Andaya and P02
Carandang to join the religious procession to monitor those who will indiscriminately
fire guns. As they were moving on with the procession, they heard successive
gunshots, which they determined to have emanated from the backyard of Silveria
Guelos (Silveria). They went back to the house of the Barangay Captain to report to
P/C Insp. Camacho what they found out. Acting upon their report, P/C Insp.
Camacho decided to go with them to the place of Silveria. In going to the house, they
rode a passenger jeepney in order to conceal their purpose. SPOl Garcia drove their
patrol car and followed them. 11

Upon reaching the place of Silveria who let them in, P/C Insp. Camacho, P02
Carandang and SP02 Andaya then proceeded to the back of the house where they
saw around 15 persons drinking liquor. They also noticed empty shells of armalite
rifle scattered on the ground. P/C Insp. Camacho then introduced himself as the
Chief of Tanauan Police Station and told the group that he and his men were
verifying who fired the shots. Someone from the group of drinking men asked him:
"Who are you going to pick-up here?" Before P/C Insp. Camacho was able to
respond to the taunting question, P02 Carandang pointed to him the "empty shells"
near the comfort room located at the right side from where the group was drinking.
Consequently, P/C Insp. Camacho instructed him to collect the scattered empty
shells. 12

When P02 Carandang was about to follow P/C Insp. Camacho's orders, the former
noticed a person, whom he identified as Nestor, wearing a white sando and blue
walking shorts stand up. While P02 Carandang was collecting the empty shells,
somebody hit him on his nape which caused him to drop his armalite. When he tried
to retrieve his firearm, someone hit his hand. 13

As he was trying to stand up, he saw Alfredo tightly holding (yapos-yapos) P/C Insp.
Camacho from behind while Rodrigo grabbed the former's baby armalite. As soon as
P02 Carandang was able to stand up, he was hit by Nestor on his left jaw, even as
he received a blow to his left eye. Thereafter, as P/C Insp. Camacho was in a
helpless and defenseless position, he was shot by Nestor causing him to fall to the
ground and later die. 14

While P02 Carandang was retreating, he saw SP02 Andaya being tightly held by the
neck by Gil. He then saw Nestor shoot at SP02 Andaya, who then fell to the ground
and died. 15

P02 Carandang retreated and started to run but Nestor went after him and shot at
him. It was at this juncture when SPO 1 Garcia arrived at the scene and returned fire
at Nestor, hitting the latter with three out of six shots. 16

For the defense, petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and Rodrigo took the witness stand and
denied the accusations. They narrated a different story. 17

Nestor testified that at around 3:00 p.m. on June 4, 1995, he was inside the house of
his mother when he heard several gunshots. He told his children to lie flat on the
floor until it stopped. Thereafter, he went out of the house and saw four persons lying
on the ground; he identified two of them as Gil and Alfredo. He also saw an old man
standing nearby and asked the latter what happened, but the old man did not reply.
Just when he heard that people were rushing towards his mother's house, the old
man asked him to pick up the gun laying on the ground. He followed and picked up
the same with the intention of surrendering it to a police officer but as he was on his
way towards the gate, SPO 1 Garcia shot him instead. He was hit three times: on his
stomach, his left side, and on his left hand. 18

Alfredo, on the other hand, testified that as they were drinking, P/C Insp. Camacho
together with two other police officers came. They entered one after the other but
P/C Insp. Camacho came in first. They were wearing civilian clothes, although he
noticed that P/C Insp. Camacho was also wearing a vest where extra ammunition-
magazines were kept. P/C Insp. Camacho was armed with a baby-armalite, while his
companions were carrying M-16 rifles. The police officers asked who among them
fired a gun to which somebody answered, "We do not know who fired the shot." At
this point, Alfredo introduced himself as a fellow-member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP); he even saluted P/C lnsp. Camacho, but the latter merely ignored the
former. Instead, P/C Insp. Camacho pointed the nozzle of his baby armalite at
Alfredo's stomach and used it to lift hist-shirt, as the former asked the latter if he had
a gun. Alfredo answered that he had none. While P/C Insp. Camacho was frisking
three other men, Rodrigo approached him to ask if he can be of help to the former.
P/C Insp. Camacho did not answer Rodrigo's query. Rather, while he was in "port-
hand position," P/C Insp. Camacho pushed Rodrigo with his firearm; the latter was
out-balanced and fell on his back. While P/C Insp. Camacho was pushing Rodrigo
with the use of the nozzle of his "armalite rifle", the latter swiped the said firearm as
he told the former, "Baka pumutok iyan." Thereupon, the firearm of P/C Insp.
Camacho fired; a bullet hit Alfredo's thigh. Thereafter, the latter lost consciousness
and awakened only when being transported to a nearby hospital. 19

Rodrigo testified that in the afternoon of June 4, 1995, he was watching a religious
procession in front of the gate of his parents' house when P/C Insp. Camacho and
two others, all in civilian clothes and each bearing a long firearm, entered the
premises of his parents' house. The group went directly to the area where people
were drinking liquor. P/C Insp. Camacho introduced himself as the Chief of Police of
Tanauan, and asked who among them fired a gun. He poked his gun at the people
there and then started frisking some of them. Alfredo stood up and introduced
himself as a fellow-member of the PNP, to which P/C Insp. Camacho responded by
poking his gun at the former, asking him ifhe had a gun. Answering "none," Alfredo
pulled-up his t-shirt to show he had no gun. His t-shirt was lifted by P/C Insp.
Camacho with the nozzle of his gun. Rodrigo approached P/C Insp. Camacho and
offered to assist the latter, but instead, P/C Insp. Camacho pointed the gun at his
face. Rodrigo swayed the gun away from his face, but he was, in tum, pushed back
by P/C Insp. Camacho with the use of the barrel of the same gun causing him to fall
to the ground. Then he heard several gunshots, so he covered his head with his
hands. When the gunshots stopped, he saw two persons lying, one by his left side
and the other, by his right. He then ran for help but on his way out of the premises,
he saw a wounded person whom he offered to help. The wounded person ignored
him and continued to walk towards a jeepney. Rodrigo proceeded to approach a
Barangay Tanod and asked him to report the incident to the Barangay Captain. Soon
thereafter, the Barangay Captain arrived; police officers from Tanauan also came
and Rodrigo was invited to the Police Station for investigation.20

On January 24, 2003, the RTC issued a Joint Decision,21 the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. P-204, this Court finds accused [NESTOR] and
[GIL] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of
a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and
249, in relation to Article 48, of the [RPC], for killing [SP02 Andaya], and hereby
sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven (11) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum, and a fine of One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00). The
accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim [SP02 Andaya] an indemnity of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the amount of One Million
Pesos (Phpl,000,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. P-205, the Court finds accused [NESTOR], [RODRIGO] and
[ALFREDO] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Direct Assault Upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles
148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the [RPC], for killing [P/C Insp. Camacho],
and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven (11) years
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos
(Phpl,000.00) each. The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim [P/C Insp.
Camacho] an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in
the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (Phpl,600,000.00), and
moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.22

The RTC found that between the conflicting versions of the parties, that of the
prosecution is more credible; the positive declarations of the police officers who
testified for the prosecution, particularly that of eyewitness P02 Carandang, were not
impeached.23 Further, the RTC did not find any reason for any of the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against the accused. The trial court observed that said
witnesses, with special reference to P02 Carandang, testified in a straightforward
manner and showed signs of candor, as compared to the accused, who were smart-
alecky and did not sound truthful. 24 The petitioners appealed to the CA.

On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed in toto the petitioners' conviction in its
Decision25 as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, this petition for review with the following assignment of errors:

A. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE UNSUBSTANTIATED

TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS P02 CARANDANG AND
HOLDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

B. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE JUDGMENT OF THE

LOWER COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THE GLARING INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS.

C. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS

CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.27

Forthwith, the petitioners fault the CA for affirming their conviction, contending that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were uncorroborated by evidence
sufficient to establish the petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the
petitioners allege the following, to wit:

1. There is no direct assault of a person in authority to speak of because the group of

P/C Insp. Camacho was not in the performance of their duties. The prosecution failed
to present the alleged mission order supporting the intelligence operation conducted
by P/C Insp. Camacho and his men in Barangay Boot. Further, while the police
officers were in civilian attire (shorts, slippers and t-shirts) to go undercover, they
were carrying rifles that were not concealed;28

2. The injuries suffered by P02 Carandang, as a result of the assault upon his person
while he was in the act of collecting the empty bullet shells, are also unsupported by
evidence. The trial court simply took the testimony of P02 Carandang as the "biblical
truth;"29 and

3. The narration of P02 Carandang on how P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya
were killed cannot stand the test of logic. He could not have possibly witnessed the
entire event at the precise moment that he was also assaulted and injured.30

Notably, in their Reply,31 the petitioners incorporated a motion for new trial based on
alleged new and material evidence impugning the credibility of P02 Carandang. They
averred that in the case for Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide which P02
Carandang also filed against Nestor, docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-401 and
pending before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, his testimony
therein given from October 10, 2007 to July 30, 2008 was different from his testimony
in the case at bar. 32

Ruling of the Court

It is clear that the petitioners basically raise only questions of fact. Nonetheless, the
Court gave due course to the instant petition due to the following reasons:

Firstly, pursuant to the settled rule that in a criminal case an appeal throws the whole
case open for review, 33 the Court, however, finds that this case actually presents a
question of law; specifically, on whether or not the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was properly
observed.

Secondly, the petitioners, in the Reply, invite the Court's attention to the subsequent
testimony of P02 Carandang in the later case filed against Nestor. The petitioners
1âw phi 1

assert that said testimony should be considered as new and material evidence which
thereby makes the findings of the trial court in the instant case as manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible. Thus, the petitioners moved for a new trial on the
ground of alleged newly discovered evidence without, however, necessarily
withdrawing their petition.

At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial is denied.

Clearly, the Rules of Court proscribe the availment of the remedy of new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence at this stage of appeal. Section 1 of Rule 121
states:

At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion
of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a
new trial or reconsideration.

Under Section 14 of Rule 124, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence may be filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court
has been perfected and before the judgment of the CA convicting the appellant
becomes final. Further, Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for new trial
is not among the remedies which may be entertained together with a petition for
appeal on certiorari.

More importantly, the alleged newly discovered evidence is not worthy of the Court's
consideration.

The petitioners allege that in the MTC proceedings, P02 Carandang failed to
positively identify who actually hit him and/or the persons involved in the killing of P/C
Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya which is a complete tum-around from his
testimony in the case at bar where he positively identified the petitioners as the
perpetrators. At any rate, aside from this alleged glaring inconsistency of P02
Carandang's testimony, said subsequent testimony is marred by inconsistencies in
itself For instance, in his cross-examination on May 14, 2008, he stated that when he
came to his full consciousness after being unconscious or dizzy for about two
minutes, he saw P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya lying down; then, during his
re-cross examination on July 30, 2008, he stated that when he regained
consciousness after being unconscious or dizzy for about five minutes, he did not
see where P/C Insp. Camacho or his other teammates were. Still, on numerous
occasions, he failed to categorically answer questions as he could not recall.
Considering the value of P02 Carandang's testimony, he being the only eyewitness
to the said fateful event, there would have been no sufficient evidence to prove the
guilt of the petitioners.34

However, the Court cannot agree with the petitioners' contention that the testimony
of P02 Carandang before the MTC effectively cast doubt upon his previous testimony
or makes it a falsity. The MTC testimony was given after 10 years from the time P02
Carandang testified in the case at bar. Considering the length of time that had
elapsed and the frailty of human memory, the Court gives more credence to P02
Carandang's testimony in the instant case which was given after a year and 10
months from the incident testified upon. In fact, the drama. of the fateful incident
appeared so fresh to P02 Carandang that in the course of his direct examination on
April 22, 1997 and while he was demonstrating how Alfredo embraced P/C Insp.
Camacho, he became 'emotional' when asked about the next thing that happened to
P/C Insp. Camacho.35

Jurisprudence dictates that even if a witness says that what he had previously
declared is false and that what he now says is true is not sufficient ground to render
the previous testimony as false. No such reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule
of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous
contradictory statement not that a previous statement is presumed to be false merely
because a witness now says that the same is not true. Indeed, it is a dangerous rule
to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of justice in
an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and
forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony
later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place
the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.36

Thus, the Court finds no reason to give merit to the petitioners' contentions of alleged
new evidence.

In Sison v. People of the Philippines,37 the Court has held that:

[W]hen the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and
are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood
or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the
case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and
manner of testifying, x x x all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination
of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if
such witness were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for
it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the [CA].38

For this reason alone, the petition must fail.

However, the Court cannot totally affirm the rulings of the courts below. As forthwith
stated, an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review; the Court can
correct errors unassigned in the appeal. The Court finds that the Informations in this
case failed to allege all the elements which constitute the crime charged.

The petitioners are being charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles
148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC.

The RPC provides:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. -Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine not exceeding ₱l,000.00 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender
lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
₱500.00 pesos shall be imposed.
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished
by reclusion temporal.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.

While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were properly alleged in the
two Informations and were duly established in the trial, the said Informations,
however, failed to allege all the elements constitutive of the applicable form of direct
assault. To be more specific, the Informations do not allege that the
offenders/petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a
person in authority, in the exercise of their duty.

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by
"any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition"; and second, by any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance."39 (Citation omitted)

Indubitably, the instant case falls under the second form of direct assault. The
following elements must be present, to wit:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;

3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged
in the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties;

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority
or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and

5. That there is no public uprising.

In the instant case, the Informations40 alleged the following, to wit:

1. That on or about the 4th day of June 1995, at about 5:00 p.m., in Barangay Boot,
Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one another,
Nestor while armed with an armalite rifle, with intent to kill and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said firearm the victims, SP02 Andaya/P/C Insp. Camacho;

2. That the said victims are bona fide members of the PNP assigned at Tanauan
Police Station, and one of them was the current Chief of Police ofTanauan,
Batangas; and

3. That at the time of the incident, they were engaged in the performance of their
official duties.

In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently established the
foregoing allegations including the fact that the petitioners came to know that the
victims were agents of a person in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to
be members of the PNP.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the
victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the
Informations that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same
defective. In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed with
insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to
justify the imposition of an increased penalty against the petitioners.

As the Court held in People v. Rodil:41

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim,
who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority, he
cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of
a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the
fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim
was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant
did "attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance
of his official duties, ... " Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the
essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily
requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly
and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such
allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven,
would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this
principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer,
could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of/or with insult to public
authorities" (Par. [2], Art. XIV of the [RPC], or as an "insult or in disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ... "(Par. 3, Art. XIV, [RPC]).

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority.42

"The Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, shall enjoy
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. From
this fundamental precept proceeds the rule that the accused may be convicted only
of the crime with which he is charged. "43 This right is accorded by the Constitution so
that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him.
Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating on his defense
against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. 44 It must be
noted that said constitutional right is implemented by the process of arraignment45 in
which the allegations in the document charging an offense is read and made known
to the accused. Accordingly, a Complaint or Information which does not contain all
the elements constituting the crime charged cannot serve as a means by which said
constitutional requirement is satisfied. Corollarily, the fact that all the elements of the
crime were duly proven in trial cannot cure the defect of a Complaint or Information
to serve its constitutional purpose.

Pursuant to the said constitutional precept, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
complaint or information so as to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. Corollarily, qualifying circumstances or generic aggravating
circumstances will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the
Information. This requirement is now laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to
wit:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or om1ss1ons complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly mandates that qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language in
the complaint or information. When the law or rules specify certain circumstances
that can aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a greater penalty
than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven
in order to justify the imposition of the increased penalty.46 Due to such requirement
being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even
those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of
the effectivity of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the
requirement).47

In People v. Flores, Jr., 48 as reiterated in the more recent cases of People v.

Pangilinan49 and People v. Dadulla,50the Court ruled that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him cannot
be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or
information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven,
unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information.51 In other
words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. 52 Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the insufficiency or defect in
the information would not amount to a waiver of any objection based on said ground
or irregularity.

Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal procedure reads:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.-The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections EXCEPT THOSE
based in the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule.

Indeed, the foregoing provision provides that if an accused fails to assert all the
grounds available to him under Section 3 of Rule 117 in his motion to quash, or if he,
altogether, fails to file i motion a quash - any I objection based on the ground or
grounds he failed the raise through a motion to quash shall be deemed waived,
except the following, thus:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - x x x: I

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;

x x xx !

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; [and] x x xx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead of
the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with
Homicide due to the simple reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge
the latter.

[T]he real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts
in the complaint or information ... it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal
appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but
the facts alleged in the body of the Information. 53

Nevertheless, by reason of the fact that the presence of the aggravating

circumstance of acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his rank was proven in the course of the trial, exemplary
damages should be awarded in each case in addition to such other damages that
were already awarded by the courts below. Exemplary damages are justified
regardless of whether or not the generic or qualifying aggravating circumstances are
alleged in the information. The grant in this regard should be in the sum of
₱30,000.00.54 In the case of People v. Catubig,55 the Court elucidated on the nature of
exemplary damages, thus:

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages

are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for
those guilty of outrageous conduct. x x x In common law, there is preference in the
use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for
the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury
that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should
be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant - associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud - that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer
to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for
his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future. 56 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Accordingly, since the petitioners are all found to be principally liable for the crimes
committed as conspiracy was duly proven, exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00 should be awarded against each of them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners

Nestor Guelos, Rodrigo Guelos, Gil Carandang and SP02 Alfredo
Carandang y Prescilla are hereby found GUILTY of Homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (I) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The fine of ₱ l,000.00 is DELETED. In addition to the amount of damages
and civil indemnity that were already awarded by the courts below to the respective
heirs of Police Chief Inspector Rolando Camacho and Senior Police Officer 2 Estelito
Andaya, each of the petitioners are also directed to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages to each of the victims.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 220977

PO1 CELSO TABOBO III y EBID, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
 RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision2 dated January 23, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated October 12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
35948, affirming the Decision4 dated May 15, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 41, convicting Police Officer 1 Celso Tabobo III y Ebid (petitioner)
of the crime of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 06-248576.

On January 19, 2005, at around 7:00 a.m., Manuel Zachary Escudero y Araneta
(Escudero) was walking along P. Ocampo Street, Manila whentwo men riding on a
motorcycle in tandem suddenly approached him and grabbed his cellphone. The
back rider then fired a shot at Escudero, resulting to his death. The incident was
reported to Police Station 9 (PS-9) of the Manila Police District. Station Commander
Police Superintendent Marcelino DL Pedrozo, Jr. (P/Supt. Pedrozo) dispatched a
team of police officers to the crime scene. After conducting a manhunt operation, the
team arrested two suspects who fit the description given by witnesses, namely,
Victor Ramon Martiny Ong (Martin) and Leopoldo Villanueva. They were directly
brought to PS-9 for investigation and both were detained at the detention cell of the
PS-9 located at the rooftop. 5

On January 20, 2005, at around 4:00 a.m., Police Officer 2 Jesus De Leon (P02 De
Leon) was interviewing 1\1artin at the second floor of PS-9 when the latter requested
to remove his handcuffs to answer the call of nature. When P02 De Leon removed
the handcuffs, Martin suddenly grabbed his service firearm. A scuffle ensued and the
gun went off. The petitioner, who was then at the ground floor, heard the gunshot
and proceeded to the second floor. After seeing P02 De Leon almost subdued by
Martin, the petitioner fired his gun twice and hit Martin on the chest. Martinto was
rushed the Ospital ng Maynila but he was declared dead upon arrival. 6

Consequently, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide for Martin's
death before the RTC of Manila. 7

The prosecution presented Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot), the physician
who conducted the autopsy on Martin's body. 8 He testified that Martin bore two
gunshot wounds on the chest.9 Considering that the exit wounds were higher than
the entrance wounds, it was possible that Martin was shot by someone who was
positioned lower than him. 10 Dr. Baluyot also testified that Martin had various injuries
that could have been caused by forceful contact with hard, blunt objects. 11

On the other hand, the defense presented P/Supt. Pedrozo who testified that when
he was informed of a robbery incident, he dispatched a team of police officers to
investigate. On the same day, he learned that the suspects were arrested. However,
he had no personal knowledge of the incident surrounding Martin's death. 12

P02 De Leon initially took the witness stand for his direct examination. However, he
was not able to complete his testimony prompting the R TC to order his direct
testimony to be stricken off the records. Accordingly, the case was considered
submitted for decision. 13

Ruling of the RTC

On May 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision 14 convicting the petitioner of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

[petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal, imposed in its medium period.
However, for lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged. x x xx

SO ORDERED. 15
In so ruling, the RTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that all the elements of
justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger are present in this case. 16

On July 1, 2013, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to allow accused to avail of
the remedy of appeal by accepting his justification and further allow him temporary
liberty under his original bond. He later filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and New Trial. The petitioner alleged that his counsel's gross
mistake and negligence deprived him of his right to due process. 17

The RTC issued an Order allowing the petitioner to post cash bail in the amount of
₱150,000.00. However, the RTC deferred the resolution of the motion for new trial
and informed the petitioner that should he choose to avail of the remedy of appeal,
the entire records would be forwarded to the CA. Hence, the petitioner appealed to
the CA. 18

Ruling of the CA

The CA in its Decision 19 dated January 23, 2015, affirmed the decision of the RTC, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision datedMay 15, 2013 rendered
by the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 06-248576,
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prisionmayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay heirs of the victim, [Martin],
Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.20 (Citation omitted)

The CA reasoned that the prosecution need not prove the elements of homicide
considering that the burden of proof in this case has shifted to the petitioner for
interposing the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.21However, it
concurred with the findings of the RTC that the defense failed to prove the existence
of all the elements of defense of a stranger.22

The petitioner moved for reconsideration 23 of the CA decision, but the motion was
denied in a Resolution 24 dated October 12, 2015. Hence, the present petition.

The petitioner argues that he was denied due process in court due to the gross
negligence and incompetence of his counsel before the trial court. Moreover, he
asserts that the CA should have considered the stipulations Made the by parties
respecting the that Crime Report Senior Police Officer 2 Edmundo C. Cabal (SP02
Cabal) executed to the effect that the petitioner acted in defense of P02 De Leon
when he shot the victim, which consequently relieves him of his duty to prove the
elements of the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.25

Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction for the crime of
homicide.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

"Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for
review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned."26 This rule is
strictly observed, particularly where the liberty of the accused is at stake, as in the
extant case. Thus, while the Court generally firmly adheres to the principle that
factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the
evidence on record, 27 the same is not ironclad and applicable at all times.

In convicting the petitioner, the RTC and the CA primarily relied on the testimony of
the prosecution witness, SP02 Cabal's Crime Report, and the petitioner's
declarations in his Sworn Statement, Counter-Affidavit, and Joint Rejoinder. The CA
held that the petitioner admitted shooting Martin as stated in his Sworn Statement
dated January 26, 2006, Counter-Affidavit dated March 21, 2006 and Joint Rejoinder
dated April 25, 2006. It further noted that in his Appellant's Brief, the petitioner relied
on the "defense of a stranger" as justification for his act. Thus, the CA concluded that
the petitioner admitted that he killed the victim. 28

However, the fact that the petitioner may have admitted shooting Martin in the said
documents does not necessarily establish his guilt for the crime charged. An
admission of fact is starkly different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of
guilt. In People of the Philippines v.Buntag, 29 the Court elucidated that:

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a

statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which
he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged. It is an
acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. A
confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of
the crime charged. 30 (Citations omitted)

In this case, the Court notes that while the Sworn Statement, Counter-Affidavit, and
Joint Rejoinder may be considered as the petitioner's admission as to the fact of the
killing, the same were never identified by the petitioner in court since he never took
the witness stand, and is thus, hearsay as regards to him. As elucidated in Republic
of thePhilippines v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al.,31 affidavits are considered as hearsay
evidence unless the testify affiants themselves thereon:

Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they
are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by
the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the
affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon. 32 (Citation omitted)

The RTC, therefore, should not have readily relied on the said documents to
establish the petitioner's admission of the killing, more so when the admission was
not corroborated by evidence, except for the Crime Report.

The Court observes that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the killing during
arraignment and invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. One who invokes self-defense admits
responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused
who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative
or a stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self-
defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. 33

In People v. Patrolman Belbes,34 the Court ruled:

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted
the fatal injuries on the deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid
criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the
prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the
prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had
admitted the killing."35(Citations omitted)

Thus, the petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing
was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. However, the
petitioner was deprived of such opportunity to effectively present his evidence and to
defend himself due to the gross and palpable negligence and incompetence of his
counsel. Such deprivation amounts to a denial of the petitioner's due process,
vitiating the integrity of the proceedings before the trial court.

Evidently, the trial was marked by gross negligence and incompetence of the
petitioner's counsel due to numerous delays and postponements. The Court notes
that the petitioner's counsel failed to attend the hearings set on September 21, 2011,
October 17, 2011, November 16, 2011, November 5, 2012, November 26, 2012, and
March 18, 2013 despite notice, all of which were crucial for the defense. As a result,
the R TC ordered the initial testimony of P02 De Leon, the sole witness to the
shooting, to be stricken off the records and to consider the presentation of the
defense's evidence waived.36

Moreover, the petitioner's counsel failed to ask for reconsideration of the RTC order,
knowing fully well that P02 De Leon's testimony of what transpired in the police
station is crucial to the petitioner's defense. Likewise, no formal offer of exhibit was
filed for the defense. Thus, the petitioner's counsel can hardly be considered to have
defended the petitioner at all.

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel
bind the client. A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so
1âwphi1

long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case
and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. 37 The only
exception would be where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave
injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.38 The Court finds that the
exception applies in this case.

The petitioner is, without doubt, entitled to competent legal representation from his
counsel. In Sanico v. People,39the Court held that:

If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was
so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation
ought to be reopened to give to the client another chance to present his case. The
legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction
reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of
technicalities.40

Furthermore, in Reyes v. CA,41 the Court held that in cases where the counsel is
grossly negligent as to deprive the accused of his constitutional right to be heard, the
conviction should not be based solely on the evidence of the prosecution, thus:

It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which appear to be the
cause for the defense's failure to present its evidence. Atty. Tenorio's negligence did
not consist in error of procedure or even a lapse in strategy but something as basic
as failing to appear in court despite clear warning that such failure would amount to
waiver of her client's right to present evidence in her defense.

Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of counsel
was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner's
constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on
a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the
presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid
application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is
due - to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of
a crime with which he or she might be charged. 42 (Citation omitted).
In the Reyes case, the Court resolved to remand the case to the R TC for further
reception of the accused's evidence. Hence, in accordance with the Court's
pronouncement in Reyes, and in view of the irregularities prejudicial to the rights of
the petitioner that attended the trial, the case calls for a new trial pursuant to Section
243of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. The case should be remanded to the trial court
to enable the petitioner to effectively defend himself and present evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. TheDecision dated January

23, 2015 and Resolution dated October 12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 35948 and the Decision dated May 15, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 06-248576 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for a new trial
for the purpose of allowing Police Officer 1 Celso Tabobo III y Ebid to present
evidence in his defense with directive to the court thereafter to decide the case with
all deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 224886

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal @

Rambo (Racal), assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February
27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01450, which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal
Case No. CBU-77654, finding herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The antecedents are as follows:

In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006,
Racal was charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads, thus:

That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe"
Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a
consequence of which he died.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon arraignment, Racal entered a plea of not guilty.4 Subsequently, trial on the
merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution established that around 4 o'clock in the morning of
April 19, 2006, "trisikad" drivers were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at
Sitio Alseca in Cebu City. Among the "trisikad" drivers was Jose Francisco
(Francisco). Also present at that place during that time was Racal, who was then
standing near Francisco. While the "trisikad" drivers were waiting for passengers,
Racal spoke in a loud voice, telling the group of drivers not to trust Francisco
because he is a traitor. Francisco, who was then holding a plastic container in one
hand and a bread in another, and was eating, retorted and asked Racal why the
latter called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed
him several times with a knife, hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body.
Francisco, then, fell to the pavement. Immediately thereafter, Racal stepped
backwards and upon reaching a dark portion of the street, he hailed a "trisikad" and
sped away. Thereafter, one of the "trisikad" drivers called the barangay tanod, but by
the time they arrived, Francisco was already dead.

Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the
defense of insanity. He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a
predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control. Under this state, the
defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and, thus was not
capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.

After Trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Racal as charged. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, dated September 14, 2011, read as follows:

WHEREFORE, on the following considerations, the court renders judgment finding

accused ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and
sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties.
He is likewise directed to pay the heirs of the late Jose "Joe" Francisco the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC ruled that the evidence for the defense is insufficient to convince the court
that Racal was indeed deprived of his mind and reason at the time when he
committed the crime as to exempt him from criminal liability becaµse his depression
and psychotic features are not the kind of insanity contemplated by law. The trial
court found the circumstance of treachery to be present, but ruled out the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 contending that the trial court failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party and voluntary confession of guilt on the part of Racal. However, the
RTC denied the Motion for

Reconsideration in its Order7 dated December 15, 2011. Aggrieved by the ruling of
the RTC, Racal appealed to the CA. In his Appellant's Brief, Racal reiterated his
defense of insanity contending that, at the time he stabbed the victim, he snapped
into a fatal episode of temporary loss of rational judgment and that such a
predisposition to "snap" was testified upon by his expert witnesses.

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of Racal but modified the
judgment of the RTC by imposing interest on the damages awarded. The CA
disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the September 14, 2011 Judgment in Criminal Case No. CBU-77654,
convicting accused-appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo of Murder and sentencing him
with reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accusedappellant is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of Jose "Joe"
Francisco, interest on damages awarded, the amount of 6% from the date of finality
of the judgment until fully paid, and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

The CA held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime necessary to
convict Racal for the murder of Francisco. The CA gave credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. It also affirmed the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and affirmed the trial court in ruling out the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As to Racal's defense of insanity,
the CA held that he failed to rebut the presumption the he was sane at the time of his
commission of the crime. The CA, nonetheless, appreciated the mitigating
circumstance which is analogous to an illness of the offender that would diminish the
exercise of his will-power.

Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 questioning the penalty imposed upon him,
but the CA denied it in its Resolution 10 of October 22, 2015.

Thus, on November 23, 2015, Racal, through counsel, filed a Notice of

Appeal 11 manifesting his intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.

In its Resolution 12 dated March 16, 2016, the CA gave due course to Racal's Notice
of Appeal and directed its Archives Section to transmit the records of the case to this
Court.

Hence, this appeal was instituted.

In a Resolution13 dated July 20, 2016, this Court, among others, notified the parties
that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.

In its Manifestation and Motion, 14 filed on September 23, 2016, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it will no longer file a supplemental brief
because it had already adequately addressed in its brief filed before the CA all the
issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief.

On the other hand, Racal filed a Supplemental Brief15 dated October 21, 2016,
reiterating his defense of insanity by contending that at the time of the commission of
the crime, expert evidence demonstrates that he had, within him, predisposing
factors that cause insanity. He also argues that the lower courts failed to appreciate
the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim and
voluntary confession of guilt on his part.

The basic issue for the Court's resolution in the present appeal is whether or not the
CA correctly upheld the conviction of herein appellant, Racal, for murder.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in the review of a case, the Court is guided by
the long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect.16 These factual findings should
not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were
overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the
case.17

In the present case, after a careful rading of the records and pleadings, this Court
finds no cogent reason to deviate from the RTC’s factual findings. There is no
indication that the trial court, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, the factual findings of
the RTC are affirmed by the CA. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court in this
respect, especially considering that it was in the best position to assess and
determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.

In any case, the Court will proceed to resolve the present appeal on points of law.

The Information in the instant case charged appellant with the crime of murder, for
stabbing the victim, Francisco, which offense was alleged to have been attended by
treachery and evident premeditation.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity;

xxx

2. With evident premeditation;

xxx

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be

established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3)
that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.18

In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco
was stabbed and killed; (2) appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by
prosecution eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco was neither parricide nor
infanticide.

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that
the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. 19 In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be
present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.20 These elements are extant in
the facts of this case and as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize,
the victim, Francisco, was caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified
to by a prosecution witness, Francisco was then holding a plastic container
containing bread and was eating. The stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by
which the attack was carried out gave the victim no chance at all to evade when
appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there is no denying that appellant's
sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and the fact that the former did
not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact that appellant was facing
Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no consequence. Even a frontal attack
could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in
no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and
the CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the
RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Appellant, nonetheless, insists on his defense of insanity. In this regard, the Court's
pronouncement in the case of People v. Estrada22 is instructive, to wit:

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly
based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral
creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he
commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been
done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be
adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under
our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.
This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is
insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are
exempt frorri criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines
as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a
hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An
acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict
which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedor~/ of the will.

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an

exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
to the very moment of its execution.

To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to

receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before
and after that time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if
clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt
acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward
acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.23

In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The
testimonies of Dr. Preciliana Lee Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong
(Dr. Gerong), as the defense's qualified expert witnesses, failed to support
appellant's claim of insanity. As correctly observed by the CA, the separate
psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which
are three and four years after the crime was committed on April 19, 2006. In People
v. So,24 which is a case of recent vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into the
mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the
very moment the felony is committed.25Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests
done on appellant and testified to by the defense witnesses, may not be relied upon
to prove appellant's mental condition at the time of his commission of the crime.

In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years
up to the time that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the
guardian of his sister's children.26 He took care of their welfare and safety, and he
was the one who sends them to and brings them home from school. Certainly, these
acts are not manifestations of an insane mind. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on
direct examination, that he found appellant to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to discern
what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime."27"Diminished
capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment."
Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 28 Thus, on the
basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that
appellant acted without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a
complete absence of intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the
commission of the crime.

Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods

to ensure the killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the victim might make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately
fleeing after his commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the
product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact
that appellant was not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to,
and even right after the commission of the crime.

In his Supplemental Brief, appellant cites the "Durham Rule" which was used in
criminal courts in the United States of America. This rule postulated that an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the result of a mental disease or
defect at the time of the incident.29 However, in subsequent rulings, US Federal
Courts and State Courts, even by the court which originally adopted it, rejected and
abandoned this rule for being too broad and for lacking a clear legal standard for
criminal responsibility. 30 As earlier discussed, in the Philippines, the courts have
established a clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total
deprivation of the will.31 Thus, appellant's reliance on the Durham Rule is misplaced
and, thus, may not be given credit.

Having been shown beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with
certainty all the elements of the crime charged, the Court will now proceed to
determine the correctness of the penalty and the civil liabilities imposed upon
appellant.

As to the penalty, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under

Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion
perpetua to death. As to the alleged aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, this Court has ruled that for it to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, the prosecution must prove (a) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the detennination and
execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.32In the instant case, no proof has
been adduced to establish that appellant had previously planned the killing of
Francisco. There is no evidence when and how he planned and prepared for the
same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had lapsed between his
determination and execution. In this respect, the Court quotes with approval the
disquisition of the CA, to wit:

The circumstances that transpired immediately before and after the stabbing negate
evident premeditation. The time when accused-appellant conceived the crime cannot
be determined. Even assuming that there was an altercation that arose between the
accused-appellant and the victim due to the remarks made by the former to the latter,
this is not the overt act indicative of his criminal intent. Simply put, the prosecution
failed to establish that there was a sufficient lapse of time for accused-appellant to
reflect on his decision to kill the victim and the actual execution thereof. 33

Thus, the RTC and the CA are correct in not considering the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.

The Court likewise agrees with the RTC and the CA in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and
voluntary plea of guilt on the part of appellant.
With respect to the alleged mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the
part of Francisco, the rule is that, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation
is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to ~xcite a
person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity.34 In the
present case, appellant asserts that several days before he stabbed the victim, the
latter teased appellant to be "gay" and taunted him that the girl whom appellant
courted rejected him. However, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
ruling of the RTC on this matter, to wit:

For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines to apply, three requisites must be present:

a) provocation must be sufficient;

b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and

c) it must originate from the offended party.

"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to commit

the crime and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. L-46025, September 2, 1992], the mitigating circumstance did not
apply since it is not enough that the provocating act be unreasonable or annoying.
Certainly, calling a person gay as in this case is not the sufficient provocation
contemplated by law that would lessen the liability of the accused.

"Immediate" on the other hand means that there is no interval of time between the
provocation and the commission of the crime. Hence, in one case [People v. Co, 67
O.G. 7451] the Supreme Court ruled that provocation occurring more than one hour
before the stabbing incident is not immediate and in People v. Benito [62 SCRA 351]
24 hours before the commission of the crime. Per admission of the defense
witnesses, the taunting done by the victim occurred days before the stabbing incident
hence the immediacy required by law was absent. The lapse of time would have
given the accused [chance] to contemplate and to recover his serenity enough to
refrain from pushing through with his evil plan. 35

Anent the supposed voluntary plea of guilt on appellant's part, it is settled that a plea
of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the
accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.36 Again, the
Court quotes with approval the RTC's disquisition, thus:

The second mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt. claimed by the

accused could likewise not be considered. The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the
1âw phi 1

accused is not spontaneous because it was made after his arraignment and only to
support his claim of the exempting circumstance of insanity. The voluntary plea of
guilt required by law is one that is made by the accused in cognizance of the
grievous wrong he has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and
respect for the law. It is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition in the
accused favorable to his reform. It may be recalled that accused in the case at bar
did not change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty". In a last ditch effort to elude
liability, however, accused claimed the defense of admitting the act of [stabbing].37

The Court, however, agrees with the CA in appreciating the mitigating circumstance
of illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however,
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9
and 10 of the RPC, as he was found by his examining doctors to have "diminish[ ed]
capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the
crime."38 Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, appellant was correctly meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63, paragraph 3 of the RPC.

With respect to appellant's civil liability, the prevailing rule is that when the
circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, as in this case, the
proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of
qualifying aggravating circumstances present.39 In conformity with the foregoing rule,
the awards granted by the lower courts must, therefore, be modified. Thus, the award
of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Appellant
should also pay the victim's heirs exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00.
The award of ₱75,000.00, as civil indemnity, is sustained.

As regards the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00,
the same must, likewise, be modified. The settled rule is that when actual damages
proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court
as temperate damages, 40 the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of
actual damages which is of a lesser amount.41 Conversely, ifthe amount of actual
damages proven exceeds, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded;
actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be
granted.42 The rationale for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the
victim's heirs, who tried and succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to
prove actual damages, to receive an amount which is less than that given as
temperate damages to those who are not able to present any evidence at all.43 In the
present case, Francisco's heirs were able to prove, and were awarded, actual
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in murder cases, the Court finds it
proper to award temperate damages to Francisco's heirs, in lieu of actual damages.

The imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from
the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, as well as the payment of costs, is
likewise sustained.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, finding accused-appellant Roger
Racal @ Rambo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) The award of moral damages is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos

(₱75,000.00);

(2) Accused-appellant is DIRECTED TO PAY the heirs of the victim Jose "Joe"
Francisco exemplary damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00); and (3) The award of actual damages is DELETED and, in lieu
thereof, temperate damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) is awarded to the heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 214762

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROMMEL RONQUILLO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

"I don't even know her" is the usual excuse of a rapist who expects a reprieve from
conviction, as if knowing the victim is a precondition to carnal desire. And while
abhorrent in all instances, lust manifested through rape is especially reprehensible
when committed against a child. Thus, our law on statutory rape demands only the
requisite proof of the victim's age and of carnal knowledge with the accused to
sustain his conviction.

For review is the Decision1 dated 11 November 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05077 affirming the Decision2 dated 23 November 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 01-817,
finding accused-appellant Rommel Ronquillo guilty of statutory rape under Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,3 the real name and identity of the victim in
this case is withheld and fictitious initials are used to represent her. In this regard, the
rape victim is referred to as "AAA."

THE FACTS

On 15 November 2001, accused-appellant was charged with statutory rape before

the RTC. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 4th day of October 2001, in the Municipality of x x x, Province of
x x x Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused Rommel Ronquillo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design, by means of force, threat and intimidation, have carnal knowledge
with "C,"4 eleven (11) years old, a minor, by then and there inserting his penis into
her vagina, against the latter's will and consent.5

On 9 August 2002, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.

Thereafter, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting the testimonies of AAA and
Dr. Stella Guerrero-Manalo (Dr. Guerrero-Manalo) of the Child Protection Unit of the
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH) in Manila. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the lone testimony of accused-appellant.

Version of the Prosecution

On 3 October 2001, at about 5 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, then eleven (11)
years old, watched, with her friend Minia Antigo (Minia), an amateur singing contest
held at the basketball court of Barangay XXX. When AAA and Minia parted ways at
around 12:00 o'clock midnight, AAA proceeded to the house of her other friend,
Jenny Sanchez (Jenny), as they had agreed that she would spend the night at
Jenny's house. While about to cross the road towards Jenny's house, AAA noticed
accused-appellant standing at a nearby waiting shed, fanning himself with a
handkerchief and looking at her. AAA was familiar with accused-appellant because
the latter had chased her several times, asking for her name, when AAA was still
studying at an elementary school in her barangay. Accused-appellant then
approached AAA, telling her that he would accompany her. AAA did not respond,
prompting accused-appellant to follow her and ask where she was going. When AAA
did not reply, he asked if she wanted him to escort her on her way home. AAA
refused the offer and proceeded to Jenny's house. When she looked back at
accused-appellant, she saw him return to the waiting shed.

After reaching Jenny's house, AAA waited for an hour for Jenny to come out; but
Jenny did not awake, so she decided to head home. While walking home, she
noticed that someone was following her. When she looked back, a man poked a gun
at her and pushed her against a wall. AAA fought back and tried to wrestle the gun
away from her attacker. She tried to shout, but the man choked her. The man then
cocked his gun and told her to calm down, follow him, or he would shoot her. Afraid
that the man would kill her, AAA told him that she would follow all his orders.

Thereafter, the attacker brought AAA to an isolated place and pressed her against a
wall. The man then told her to remove her shorts and panty and to raise her blouse
up to her head so that she would not be able to see him. Then he started kissing
AAA all over her body and then told her to lie down. He parted her thighs, inserted
his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull movements. AAA felt intense pain
and cried. While she was being raped, AAA' s hands were tucked inside her shirt
which was raised over her head to prevent her from recognizing the rapist. Her
attacker, on the other hand, had covered his face with a red hankerchief.

Shortly, the man let AAA up and told her to get dressed. While the man himself was
getting dressed, AAA noticed that the maong pants he was wearing were the same
pants she saw worn by accused-appellant at the waiting shed earlier. She also
recognized accused-appellant as her attacker when the red handkerchief covering
his face fell off. AAA then rushed home and related the rape incident to her parents,
who immediately reported it to the authorities.

On 5 October 2001, AAA was brought to the UP-PGH Child Protection Unit for
medical examination. Dr. Guerrero-Manalo then issued a Provisional Medico-Legal
Report, which showed that "physical findings of genital area are definitive for recent
penetrating injury."6

Dr. Guerrero-Manalo testified that she observed some fresh lacerations on AAA' s
external genitalia which could have been inflicted within twenty-four (24) to seventy-
two (72) hours prior to her examination. Further, she said she also found fresh
lacerations at 6 o'clock position on AAA's hymen, consistent with a recent
penetration injury caused by a pointed object or a penis.7

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant claimed that on 3 October 2001, he attended a barrio fiesta at

Barangay XXX, with six (6) friends. He and his friends sang at a videoke in a carnival
and later watched an amateur singing contest at the basketball court. In both
instances, accused-appellant saw AAA for short periods.8 However, he claimed not to
have known her name until the time he was charged in court.9

The RTC Ruling

In its 23 November 2010 Decision,10 the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.11

The RTC held that AAA gave a detailed and credible narration of the incident, which
positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator and sufficiently
established that the crime of rape was committed against her. The RTC further ruled
that this prevails over the bare denial of accused-appellant. It also gave credence to
the medical findings of Dr. Guerrero-Manalo, which confirmed that AAA was
physically and sexually violated.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its 11 November 2013 Decision,12 the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused-
appellant with modification as to the award of damages. It reduced the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages to ₱50,000.00, but it ordered the additional award of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the imposition of interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid.13 The
CA held that accused-appellant did not present any evidence to substantiate his alibi
and thus his defense of denial and alibi rests on shaky grounds, in stark contrast to
the detailed declarations of AAA. It further held that there is sufficient foundation to
conclude the existence of carnal knowledge since the victim's testimony is
corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

The essential issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the accused-
appellant's conviction should be upheld.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the RTC,
as affirmed by the CA. However, the amount of damages awarded should be
modified, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.

The prosecution was able to prove

beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of all the elements of statutory rape.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for statutory rape are: (1) the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse
of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was
sexual intercourse.14

In People v. Arpon,15 citing People v. Macafe,16 the Court explained that consent is
immaterial, and force and intimidation are not necessary in every prosecution for
statutory rape, viz:

Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and
intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does
not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from
good.17 (emphasis in the original and underlining supplied)

The requisite elements were proven in the present case. As to the first element, AAA'
s age at the time of the commission of the offense is uncontroverted. Her birth
certificate, which was duly presented and offered in evidence, shows that she was
born on 9 November 1989.18 Thus, AAA was only 11 years and 11 months old at the
time she was raped.

Accordingly, this Court only needs to contend with the sufficient establishment of the
second element-that is, whether accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the
victim.

Carnal knowledge was proven

through AAA 's categorical testimony,
corroborated by medical findings.

AAA rendered a detailed narration of her ordeal. As found by the RTC and affirmed
by the CA, she recounted, in a steadfast and unequivocal manner,19 the
circumstances clearly showing that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her:
(1) she was followed by a man while she was walking home from her frietjd's house;
(2) the man thereafter pointed a gun at her and told her that he would shoot her if
she did not follow his orders; (3) she agreed to follow his orders out of fear for her
life; (4) she was taken to an isolated place, where she was ordered to remove her
clothing and to cover her face with her blouse to conceal the assailant's face from
her view; and (5) she felt her thighs being parted, where the assailant then inserted
his penis into her vagina, causing her intense pain. AAA also positively identified
accused-appellant as her assailant by recounting that after the commission of the
rape, she noticed that her attacker was wearing the same maong pants that
accused-appellant wore when she saw him earlier. She further confirmed his identity
when the handkerchief he used to cover his face fell off, giving AAA a clearer
glimpse of his face.20

AAA' s testimony is sufficient to convict accused-appellant of statutory rape. The

nature of the crime of rape often entails reliance on the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the victim, which is sufficient for a conviction, provided that such
testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature.21
The trial court found AAA's testimony to be detailed, credible, and
unwavering.22Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that
"questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court
because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the
appellate courts. x x x The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court
has concurred with the trial court."23 Here, both the RTC and the CA found AAA's
testimony to be credible and convincing.

Nevertheless, the trial court's conviction resulted not only from AAA's testimony but
was also based on the corroborative testimony of Dr. Guerrero-Manalo, who
examined AAA after the commission of the rape. AAA's testimony relative to the
sexual assault against her is consistent with Dr. Guerrero-Manalo's medical report
and testimony that AAA's genitalia had some fresh lacerations which could have
been inflicted by the penetration of a pointed object or a penis within twenty-four (24)
to seventytwo (72) hours prior to examination.24 Considering that it is undisputed that
the incident happened on 3 October 2001 and the medical examination upon AAA
was conducted on 5 October 2001, the fresh lacerations found, indicating penetration
within the last 24 to 72 hours, were consistent with her testimony that she was raped
on the said date. There is thus greater reason to believe the veracity of her
statements, as to both the fact of rape and the identity of the assailant.

The Court has held that "hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best
evidence of forcible defloration. And when the consistent and forthright testimony of a
rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established."25

Accused-appellant attempts to cast aspersions on AAA's credibility and character by

questioning her decision to stay out late at night by herself. Accused-appellant
1âwphi1

argues that no young Filipina would still be out alone on the streets in the middle of
the night. He also questions AAA's failure to call out to her friend Jenny upon
reaching the latter's house but, instead, chose to remain outside and do nothing.26

Accused-appellant's arguments are too flimsy to merit consideration. AAA' s alleged

series of unwise actuations on the night in question is an inconsequential matter that
has no bearing on the elements of the crime of statutory rape. The decisive factor in
the prosecution of rape is whether its commission has been sufficiently proven.27 As
previously discussed, the prosecution sufficiently established that accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of AAA, who was only eleven (11) years old at the time of
commission.

Moreover, the Court has explained that the testimonies of young rape victims
deserve full credence, to wit:

This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young
and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl
of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any
man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.28 (emphasis and
underlining supplied)

Notably, accused-appellant did not even establish any ill motive that could have
compelled private complainant to falsely accuse him of rape.

Accused-appellant's defense
of denial and alibi are
inherently weak.

It is well-settled that denial is an "intrinsically weak defense which must be supported

by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility."29 Alibi, on the other hand, is
the "weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for
which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the
accused establishes two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene at the time of its commission."30

Accused-appellant was unable to establish any of the foregoing elements to

substantiate his alibi. He merely claimed that he could not have committed the
offense because he was asleep at his house, with his friends, at the time of the
commission. This testimony is uncorroborated. For some reason, he did not even
present any of the six (6) friends who he claimed were with him at the time of the
incident in question. In contrast to AAA's direct, positive, and categorical testimony,
accused-appellant's testimony will not stand.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that all the elements of statutory rape have been
proven in the instant case. The conviction of accusedappellant must be upheld.

Kinds and amount of damages

In rape cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the Court
generally awards three kinds of damages: civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages.31

Civil indemnity proceeds from Article 100 of the RPC, which states that "every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable." Its award is mandatory upon a finding
that rape has taken place.

Moral damages are awarded to "compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the
concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the
claimant for the injury suffered."32 In rape cases, once the fact of rape is duly
established, moral damages are awarded to the victim without need of proof, in
recognition that the victim necessarily suffered moral injuries from her ordeal.33

Finally, exemplary damages may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. It serves to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
conduct in the future. The award of this kind of damages in criminal cases stems
from Articles 222934 and 223035 of the Civil Code. While Article 2230 provides that
they may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, the Court has held that being corrective in nature, exemplary
damages can be awarded not only in the presence of aggravating circumstances but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible conduct of
the offender. In a number of cases, the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and
to protect the latter from sexual abuse.36

In People v. Jugueta,37 the Court addressed in detail the award of damages in

criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. It held
that "when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages."

Thus, the Court increases the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages to ₱75,000.00. In line with current policy,38 the Court also
imposes interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary
awards for damages, from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 11 November 2013 Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05077 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the amount of damages. Accused-appellant Rommel
Ronquillo is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of STATUTORY RAPE as
defined in Article266-A and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant is ordered to pay AAA the following amounts: civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00,
moral damages of ₱75,000.00, and exemplary damages of ₱75,000.00. All monetary
awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 200026

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ARMANDO DELECTOR, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case involves a brother fatally shooting his own brother. In his defense, the
accused pleaded accident as an exempting circumstance. The trial and intermediate
appellate courts rejected his plea and found him guilty of murder qualified by
treachery. Hence, he has come to us to air his final appeal for absolution.

The Case

Under review is the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision rendered on March 17, 2003 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, in Gandara, Samar convicting the accused of
murder for the killing of the late Vicente Delector, and penalizing him with reclusion
perpetua, with modification by increasing moral damages to ₱50,000.00.2

Antecedents

At about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8, 1997, the late Vicente Delector
was talking with his brother, Antolin, near his residence in Barangay Diaz in
Gandara, Samar when the accused, another brother, shot him twice. Vicente was
rushed to the Gandara District Hospital where he was attended to by Dr. Leonida
Taningco, but he was later on transferred to the Samar Provincial Hospital where he
succumbed to his gunshot wounds at about 1:00 a.m. of the next day.3

Vicente's son, Amel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father's assailant. Amel
attested that the accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother's
house,4 and had hit his father who was then talking with Antolin. Corroborating
Amel's identification was Raymond Reyes, who had happened to be along after
having come from his school. Raymond also said that Vicente had been only
conversing with Antolin when the accused shot him twice.5

On October 2, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar charged the
accused with murder in the RTC through the following information, viz.:

That on or about the 8th day of August, 1997, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
at Barangay Diaz, Municipality of Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one VICENTE
DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused
had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of
said Vicente Delector.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

In his defense, the accused insisted during the trial that the shooting of Vicente had
been by accident. His own son corroborated his insistence. According to them,
Vicente had gone to their house looking for him, but he had earlier left to go to their
mother's house nearby in order to avoid a confrontation with Vicente; however,
Vicente followed him to their mother's house and dared him to come out, compelling
Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead, Vicente attacked Antolin,
which forced the accused to go out of their mother's house. Seeing Vicente to be
carrying his gun, he tried to wrest the gun from Vicente, and they then grappled with
each other for control of the gun. At that point, the gun accidentally fired, and Vicente
was hit.7

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision,8 finding the accused guilty of murder, and
disposing:

WHEREFORE, accused Armando Delector is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby meted a penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Accused shall likewise indemnify the heirs of Vicente Delector the sum of
Php50,000.00, actual damages of Phpl2,000.00, moral damages of Php30,000.00
and costs.

In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Warden of
the Sub-Provincial Jail, Calbayog City, is hereby directed to immediately transmit the
living body of the accused Armando Delector to the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila where he may remain to be detained. The accused shall be
credited for the period he was under preventive detention provided he has previously
expressed his written conformity to comply with the discipline, rules and regulations
by the detention center, otherwise he shall be entitled to only 4/5 thereof pursuant to
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.9

Decision of the CA

Aggrieved, the accused appealed, contending that:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED GIVING FULL FAITH AND CEREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and

II

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the conviction for murder subject to an increase of the
moral damages to ₱50,000.00,10 to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
court in Criminal Case No. 3403 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is increased to ₱50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable,
stating:

Indeed, given the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim, it is highly
improbable that the same was due to an accident. It is unlikely that the accused-
appellant would purposely set out and grapple with the victim who, if he is to be
believed, was already armed with a gun while he (accused-appellant) was totally
unarmed. Such actuation is utterly inconsistent with the ordinary and normal behavior
of one who is facing imminent danger to one's life, considering the primary instinct of
self-preservation. But then, even granting that the accused-appellant merely acted in
defense of his other brother, Antolin, his failure to help or show concern to the victim,
who was also his brother, casts serious doubts to his defense of accident.

Furthermore, a revolver, the gun involved in this case, is not one that is prone to
accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism. Considerable pressure on
the trigger must have been applied for it to have fired.11

Hence, this appeal, in which the accused insists that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. 1âw phi 1

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.12

On its part, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted
its appellee’s brief maintaining that the evidence of guilt was sufficient, but
recommending that the crime for which the accused should be held guilty of was
homicide, not murder, considering that the records did not support the holding that he
had deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack that would insure the
death of the victim; and that evident premeditation was not also shown to be
attendant.13

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the decision of the CA that accident could not be appreciated in favor of
the accused, but we must find and declare that, indeed, the crime committed was
homicide, not murder.

To start with, the lower courts did not err in giving more credence to the testimonies
of the Prosecution's witnesses instead of to the testimony of the accused and his
son. Arnel and Raymond positively identified the accused as the assailant. Their
identification constituted direct evidence of the commission of the crime, and was
fully corroborated by the recollection of a disinterested witness in the person of Dr.
Taningco, the attending physician of the victim at the Gandara District Hospital, to
the effect that the victim had declared to the police investigator interviewing him that
it was the accused who had shot him.14 The testimonies of Raymond and Dr.
Taningco are preferred to the self-serving and exculpatory declarations of the
accused and his son.

The factual findings of the RTC are accorded the highest degree of respect,
especially if, as now, the CA adopted and confirmed them. Unlike the appellate
courts, including ours, the trial judge had the unique firsthand opportunity to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses when they testified at the trial, which
were factors in the proper appreciation of evidence of past events. Such factual
findings should be final and conclusive on appeal unless there is a demonstrable
error in appreciation, or a misapprehension of the facts.15
Secondly, the RTC and the CA both observed that the exempting circumstance of
accident was highly improbable because the accused grappled with the victim for
control of the gun. We see no reason to overturn the observations of the lower
courts.

Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability
"(a)ny person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it." The elements of this exempting
circumstance are, therefore, that the accused: (1) is performing a lawful act; (2) with
due care; (3) causes injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or
intention of causing it.

Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance simply

because the accused did not establish that he had acted with due care, and without
fault or intention of causing the injuries to the victim. The gun was a revolver that
would not fire unless there was considerable pressure applied on its trigger, or its
hammer was pulled back and released. The assertion of accident could have been
accorded greater credence had there been only a single shot fired, for such a
happenstance could have been attributed to the unintentional pulling of the hammer
during the forceful grappling for control of the gun. Yet, the revolver fired twice, which
we think eliminated accident. Verily, the CA itself pointedly debunked the story of the
accused as to how the accident had occurred by characterizing such story not only
incomprehensible but also contrary to human experience and behavior.16 We adopt
and reiterate the following observations by the CA:

... had the accused really been grappling and twisting the victim's right hand which
was holding a gun, the latter would not have sustained the wounds. It was
improbable that the gun would fire not only once but twice and both times hitting the
victim, had its trigger not been pulled. Further, the location of the gunshot wounds
belies and negate(d) accused (appellant's) claim of accident.

Also, the Court finds incredible [the] accused (appellant's) allegation that he did not
know that the victim was hit. He admitted there were two gun reports. The natural
tendency of (a) man in his situation would (be to) investigate what was hit. He surely
must have known his brother was hit as he even said he let go of the gun. Then he
said his brother went home so he also went home. It is odd that he did not attempt to
help or show concern for the victim, his brother, had his intention (been) really merely
to pacify.17

We reiterate that issues concerning the credibility of the witnesses and their account
of the events are best resolved by the trial court whose calibration of testimonies,
and assessment of and conclusion about their testimonies are generally given
conclusive effect. This settled rule acknowledges that, indeed, the trial court had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, and is
thus in the best position to discern whether they were telling or distorting the truth.18

Nonetheless, the Court cannot uphold the judgments of the CA and the RTC and
convict the accused for murder. A reading of the information indicates that murder
had not been charged against him. The allegation of the information that:-

x x x the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TING TING with the use of a
firearm (revolver), which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the
purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his
body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector.

did not sufficiently aver acts constituting either or both treachery and evident
premeditation. The usage of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without
anything more, did not suffice considering that such terms were in the nature of
conclusions of law, not factual averments.
The sufficiency of the information is to be judged by the rule under which the
information against the accused was filed. In this case, that rule was Section 9, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provided thusly:

Section 9. Cause of accusation. - The acts or om1ss1ons complained of as

constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without
repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (8)

Section 9 required that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense must be stated "in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense." As such, the nature and
character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the
provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the
indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the
information, and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law.19 The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the
technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information,
determine the character of the crime.20

To enable "a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to

be charged," as Section 9 further required, the courts should be mindful that the
accused should be presumed innocent of wrongdoing, and was thus completely
unaware of having done anything wrong in relation to the accusation. The information
must then sufficiently give him or her the knowledge of what he or she allegedly
committed. To achieve this, the courts should assiduously take note of what Justice
Moreland appropriately suggested in United States v. Lim San,21and enforce
compliance therewith by the State, to wit:

xxxx Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe

that we ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in
the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated
in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands
charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is
permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with
common sense and with the requirements of plain justice.

xxxx

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no
way aids him in a defense on the merits. xxx. That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the
facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him,
either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused
never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense
he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for
the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did
you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" If he performed the acts
alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and
fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is
or what it is named. x x x.

In People v. Dimaano,22the Court has reiterated the foregoing guideline thuswise:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as
to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused
has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

If the standards of sufficiency defined and set by the applicable rule of procedure
were not followed, the consequences would be dire for the State, for the accused
could be found and declared guilty only of the crime properly charged in the
information. As declared in People v. Manalili:23

x x x an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the

complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that
charged in the complaint or information would be violative of this constitutional right.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is
alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.

Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]here is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party
might make." For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements must concur,
namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted,24 that is, the means, method or
form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by
the offender.25

Treachery, which the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, always included basic
constitutive elements whose existence could not be assumed. Yet, the information
nowhere made any factual averment about the accused having deliberately
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act - setting forth such
means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged - that tended
directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. To reiterate what was earlier
indicated, it was not enough for the information to merely state treachery as
attendant because the term was not a factual averment but a conclusion of law.

The submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that neither treachery nor
evident premeditation had been established against the accused is also notable. A
review reveals that the record did not include any showing of the presence of the
elements of either circumstance.

As a consequence, the accused could not be properly convicted of murder, but only
of homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished
by reclusion temporal.

The accused is entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus,
the minimum of his indeterminate sentence should come from prision mayor, and the
maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal due to the absence of any
modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence is nine years
of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum.

Conformably with People v. Jugueta,26the Court grants to the heirs of the late Vicente
Delector ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages (in lieu of actual damages for burial expenses),
plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until the full
satisfaction.

The records show that the accused was first detained at the SubProvincial Jail in
Calbayog City on November 19, 1997,27 and was transferred by the RTC on July 18,
2003 following his conviction for murder to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.28 Under the terms of this decision, the period of his
actual imprisonment has exceeded his maximum sentence, and now warrants his
immediate release from his place of confinement.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 22,

2006 of the Court of Appeals subject to the MODIFICATION that
accused ARMANDO DELECTOR is found and pronounced guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of NINE YEARS OF PRIS/ON MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM,
TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS
THE MAXIMUM; and ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision
until the full satisfaction, and the costs of suit.

Considering that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR appears to have been in

continuous detention since November 19, 1997, his immediate release from the New
Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila is ordered unless there are other
lawful causes warranting his continuing detention.

The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to immediately

implement this decision, and to render a report on his compliance within 10 days
from notice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 227705

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
HERMIN ROMOBIO y PAULER, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the November 13, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06513, which affirmed with modification the
August 14, 2013 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 22, Naga City,
Camarines Sur, finding accused-appellant Hermin Romobio y Pauler (Hermin) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape as defined and penalized under Article
294, in relation to Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended.

The Information dated August 11, 2009 alleged:

That on or about August 9, 2009, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly
weapon did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons, take, steal and carry away three cell
phones (Samsung E200, Nokia 2660, and another Nokia); Four (4) pcs. gold ring;
three (3) wristwatches (2 lady and 1 men); three (3) gold necklaces, cash money of
₱4,000.00, bags, wallet, perfumes, lotions, yellow jacket, BDO and RCBC ATM
cards, or a total of ₱120,000.00, belonging to and owned by the herein complaining
witness [AAA]3 and that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, tied, boxed
complainant on the different parts of her body causing physical injuries and with the
use of a bladed weapon, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously thru
force and violence, by poking a knife succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the
said complaining witness against her will as evidenced by medical certificate hereto
attached, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Hermin pleaded "Not Guilty" in his arraignment.5 Trial ensued while he was under
detention.6 The witnesses for the prosecution were AAA, Dr. Vito C. Borja II, and P02
Alexander Sierra Lapid. The defense presented Hermin, his mother Rosita Romobio,
his brother Henry Romobio, and his wife Annaliza Delos Reyes Romobio.

Version of the Prosecution

AAA is a 44-year-old woman, separated in fact from her husband, and a mother of a
child. In the early morning of August 9, 2009, she was sleeping in her house, which
was lighted with a 20 watts fluorescent lamp. She was alone because her daughter
slept in the house of her (AAA's) sister. just few steps away. Around past 1:00 a.m.,
she was awakened when she felt the presence of somebody inside the house. When
she opened her eyes, she saw a man armed with a knife, wearing a ball cap, and
whose face was covered by a white "Good Morning" towel from the middle of the
nose to the chin. He made a gesture by placing his forefinger on his lips, warning her
not to make a noise if she wanted to live. She was surprised and afraid. He
demanded for her cellular phone and bag, and proceeded to open the drawers. She
attempted to get up from the bed, but he rushed towards her and hit her forehead
several times with the knife handle.

AAA was trembling in fear, while the man kept on ransacking the drawers and
placing the items taken in a plastic bag. He told her not to make any sound,
otherwise, she would be killed. Every time she tried to move, he would rush towards
her and hit her either with his fist or the knife handle.
AAA observed that the man was of medium built and height, with fair complexion and
curly hair. As she kept on watching him, with his eyes and forehead exposed, she
recognized him as Hermin, a person who used to work as a helper/mechanic at her
brother BBB's auto repair shop located in the same compound as her house. She
had seen him around the compound since 2006, with the last being sometime
February or March in 2009. He likewise did some carpentry and masonry works for
her sister. In fact, she had previously talked to him when he was requested by her
sister to install the clothesline.

When Hermin noticed that AAA kept on looking at him, he got mad. He took a
pajama and covered her eyes. Before she was blindfolded, she was able to see that
he took her jewelries and another cellular phone. He also tightly tied her hands and
feet. Her arms were raised wide open, while her legs were spread apart. He tied her
left hand with one end of a plastic yellow cord and the other end was tied to her right
hand and the middle portion of the cord was placed under the mattress. Both of her
ankles were "spread-eagle" and tied with a cord to the cabinet ("aparador"). The
black strap of her bag was also used to tie her. He then inserted a piece of cloth
inside her mouth and tied it up with a handkerchief.

Hermin continued ransacking AAA's house, placing all his loot inside a plastic bag.
Upon finding two ATM cards, he poked a knife at her throat and asked for their PINs,
but she gave him incorrect ones. He then told her that he wanted to drink coffee.
When she answered that she had no thermos, he heard him switch on the stove and
turn on the television.

Thereafter, Hermin sat at AAA's bed side, removed her blanket, tore her pink T-shirt
and white underwear, and removed his belt. He placed himself on top of her, licked
her nipples, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. While he was doing it, he
said: "Pasensiya ka na kan gigibohon ko saimo." She begged him to stop, reasoning
that she is already old. Upon learning her age, however, he told her that she is old
yet she is still hardheaded. He ordered her to do what he wanted since her life was in
his hands.

While Hermin was raping AAA, he saw one more cellular phone under her pillow. He
punched her, hitting her left chin, and told her that she is a liar for not surrendering
the phone. After he finished with the sexual act, he stood up and went to the comfort
room. She smelled his sperm. With her eyes still covered, she tried to take a peek
and check if he was still around. When he saw her moving, he threw something at
her. She then heard him searching for things again.

By almost 4:00 a.m., AAA heard that the barrel vault of the front door opened.
Sensing that Hermin already left, she pushed the cloth in her mouth with her tongue
and removed the blindfold using her right arm. She called out her nephew, CCC, who
lived nearby, but there was no response. When she heard someone murmuring at
the adjoining house, she shouted the name of her neighbor, Tiya Rose Bulauan. The
latter's son, Ruel, eventually went inside the house, untied her, and later on called
her relatives. Meantime, she went to the bathroom to wash herself.

Tiya Rose and her husband went to the nearby police station. When the police
officers arrived, they investigated on the surroundings of the house and told AAA
that, considering the absence of forcible damage on the front and back doors, the
window of the comfort room, measuring approximately 40 cms. x 40 cms., could be
the only possible entry point of the perpetrator. AAA, who was obviously in a state of
shock, crying and trembling, claimed that she was robbed of ₱120,000.00 worth of
valuables, consisting of: three (3) cellular phones, five (5) pairs of earrings, five (5)
necklaces, five (5) rings, one (1) bracelet, two (2) wristwatches, two (2) sunglasses,
imported perfumes, USB device, cash of not less than ₱4,000.00, bag, jacket, and
other personal effects. At the crime scene, the police officers were able to recover,
mark, and take into custody the following items: pink T-shirt, white underwear,
electrical wire, pajama, blanket, coffee mug, kitchen knife, and handkerchief.

AAA told PO2 Lapid the physical appearance of the perpetrator and that he looked
familiar to her. She identified him as Hermin, who, incidentally, was also known to
him (PO2 Lapid) because there were two to three instances when he personally
arrested him and recovered from him things belonging to other persons.
Subsequently, the police officers conducted a hot pursuit operation. They went to his
residence and that of his brother, but he was not there. The next day, about 11:40
a.m., Hermin was arrested. At the Naga City Central Police Office, AAA positively
pinpointed him as the person who robbed and raped her. She recalled that the
perpetrator wore a silver square ring on his right hand so she asked the police to
check whether he (Hermin) was wearing one. The police replied in the affirmative.
Hennin was then detained and the necessary papers were prepared for the filing of a
complaint.

The Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Borja, who saw and examined AAA on August 11,
2009, indicated the following:

FINDINGS:

1. Thickened vulva with healed laceration located at perineum.

2. NEGATIVE for Sperm Cells

Other findings:

1. Contusion hematoma, 4.5 cms. x 3 cms., mandible, left.

2. Contusion hematoma, .5 cm. x 10 cms., wrist, left.

3. Lacerated wound, .5 cm. x 1 cm., anterior neck.

4. Severe pain on the forehead and on the right wrist.7

Version of the Defense

On August 8, 2009, Hermin reported for work as a mason in the construction of the
comfort room in the house of Joy Adorna (Adorna) from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. He
directly went home after. He cooked and ate dinner with his mother Rosita who just
arrived from Manila, his wife Annaliza, his three children, and his brothers Herson
and Henry. After meal, he and his brothers and some friends had a drinking session
in the living room. By 11:00 p.m., he slept in the same room with his mother, wife,
and children. He woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day. After cooking and eating
breakfast, he accompanied his mother to the cemetery to visit the grave of his
grandfather. Around 10:00 a.m., they returned to the house where they prepared and
ate lunch. By 3:00 p.m., he went to Adorna to request for a cash advance. Before
going home, he bought milk for his youngest child. After a while, he went again to the
store to buy some viand. There, he met Henry who told him that there was a
complaint filed against him at the police station. After their conversation, he went
home and slept early for his 7:00 a.m. work the following day.

Around 7:30 a.m. on August 10, 2009, Hermin left the house and, together with his
son and mother, went to the police substation to verify the complaint filed against
him. They waited for SPO2 Lapid, who arrived by 9:00 a.m. and later invited them to
go to the Central Police Headquarters. They agreed. There, Hermin was interrogated
and frisked by the policemen, made to stand in front of a one-way mirror together
with four policemen, and identified by AAA as the one who committed the crime.

Hermin confirmed that he has known AAA since 1995 when he and her nephew,
DDD, became friends; he met BBB before her; he worked until 2006 as a helper of
BBB whose auto repair shop was inside the same compound where AAA's house
was situated; and he was previously asked to fix her door and clothesline when he
was still working in the shop.

On August 14, 2013, Hermin was convicted by the RTC of the crime
charged. Thefallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing premises, the Prosecution having
proven the guilt of the Accused, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding Accused
HERMIN ROMOBIO y PAULER, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the special
complex crime of ROBBERY with RAPE defined and penalized under Article 294, in
relation to Article 266-A and B of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify [AAA] the amount of
SEVENTY- FIVE THOUSAND (PHP 75,000.00) PESOS as MORAL DAMAGES; the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (PHP 30,000.00) PESOS as EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES and to restitute the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS & 00/100 (PHP 120,000.00) Philippine Currency, representing the value of
the stolen property to [AAA].

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.8

Hermin elevated the case to the CA, which denied the appeal for lack of merit. In
affirming the RTC Decision, the CA further ordered Hermin to pay an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on all the damages awarded reckoned from the finality of
the judgment until the same are fully paid.

Before Us, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief considering that its arguments have already been amply
discussed in the Appellee's Brief filed before the CA.9 Likewise, the Public Attorney's
Office stated that it would adopt its Appellant's Brief filed before the CA, since a
supplemental brief would only be a rehash of the previous discussions.10

Hermin argues that the judgment of conviction was based on the flawed testimony of
AAA and on conjectures and speculations which have no basis in fact and in law. He
asserted that he was not positively identified by AAA as the one who robbed and
raped her; thus, it is possible that he merely resembled the appearance of the
wrongdoer. Also, the testimony of Dr. Borja did not serve to corroborate AAA's
version since the former was not able to find injuries in the latter's body that might
indicate that she had sexual intercourse through force or violence. Moreover, AAA
neither adduced a single receipt to prove the value of the items allegedly stolen nor
stated the particular value of each and every item that was said to be taken. Finally,
not all denials and alibis should be disregarded for being mere fabrications.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

In most criminal cases, the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies. With respect thereto, We adhere to the principle that the evaluation of
the witnesses' credibility is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court
because of its unique and direct opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand, to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude, and, in the process, to ascertain if they
were telling the truth or not.11 These elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying is an opportunity that is denied to
the appellate courts.12 Thus, findings of the trial court on such matters deserve much
weight and respect and are even treated as binding and conclusive on the appellate
court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case.13

The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659. As a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints.14 To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is
imperative that the robbery itself must be conclusively established; proof of the rape
alone is not sufficient.15 The crime of robbery, as defined under Article 293 of the
RPC, has the following elements: (1) intent to gain; (2) unlawful taking; (3) personal
property belonging to another; and (4) violence against or intimidation of person or
force upon things.16 In robbery with rape, the State must satisfactorily establish the
concurrence of the following essential elements: a) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; b) the property taken
belongs to another; c) the taking is done with intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and d)
the robbery is accompanied by rape.17

The true intent of the accused must first be determined in robbery with rape, because
it determines the offense committed.18 For a conviction of the crime of robbery with
rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the
occasion of a robbery and not the other way around.19 This felony contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another, and rape is committed on the occasion
thereof or as an accompanying crime.20 In other words, the offenders had an intent to
rob personal property belonging to another, and such intent preceded the rape.21 If
the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape also
committed the robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the offense should be
viewed as separate and distinct; if the intention of the accused was to rob, but rape
was committed even before the asportation, the crime is robbery with rape.22 The
rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery.23 Article 294 of
the RPC does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during or after
the robbery; it suffices that the robbery was accompanied by rape.24

In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
robbery with rape. The RTC found, which the CA substantially adopted, as follows:

It can be culled from the evidence presented by the Prosecution that before HERMIN
raped [AAA] he first ransacked the drawers inside her room and even had a plastic
where the things he took from the drawers and "aparador" such as her jewelries and
cellular phones were placed. Afterwards, HERMIN sat on the bed where [AAA] was
lying and tied, removed her blanket, tore her T-shirt and underwear then raped her.
The primary intention of HERMIN was made manifest by his actions - that is, to rob
[AAA] which precedes his intention to rape her.

x x x As testified to by LAPID, a member of the team who responded to the victim

and who went inside the house of [AAA], her belongings were scattered. They
checked on the possible entries since there was no damage on the front door and
the back door of the house and noticed that there was an open window inside the
comfort room which was around 40-50 centimeters wide, thus, the perpetrator must
have entered the house of [AAA] through the said open window of the comfort room.
[AAA] also testified that when she was awakened, she saw HERMIN holding a knife
and upon seeing him he made a gesture telling her not to make noise, otherwise [he]
[would] kill her ("dai ka magribok ta gagadanon ta ka "), thus, robbery was committed
not only with force upon things but through intimidation.

In proving that rape was committed on the occasion of robbery, [AAA] testified that
the perpetrator tied her left hand with one end of the plastic yellow cord and the other
end was tied to her right hand. The middle portion of the cord was placed on her
mattress. Both of her legs and ankles were "spread-eagle apart" and tied by a cord
tied to a cabinet or "aparador". Her arms were raised while they were tied and the
black strap of her bag was also used in tying her. She was tied while lying in bed
then he inserted a piece of cloth inside her mouth and tied it. Thereafter, the
perpetrator sat by the side of her bed, removed her blanket then tore her pink T-shirt
and white underwear. Afterwards, [AAA] heard a rattling sound of a belt being
unfastened then he placed himself on top of her. She felt that he licked her nipples
and then inserted his penis into her vagina. While he was raping her, he
uttered: "Pasensiya ka na sa gigibohon ko sa imo." [AAA] begged [to] him not to do it
since she is already old but HERMIN told her: "follow what I want because your life is
in my hands." [AAA] broke [down] in tears and her hands trembled while narrating
how HERMIN raped her.25

Since rape, by its nature, is usually committed in a place where only the rapist and
the victim are present, the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than
the victim herself.26 An accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim provided that such testimony is credible, consistent with human nature
and the course of things, and in conformity with the knowledge and common
experience of mankind.27 When an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her.28 No
decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the
risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.29

The Court has closely examined the records and it has found nothing substantial to
warrant a reversal of the assessment made by the trial court on the narration given
by AAA. There is no evidence to show that she has been motivated by any ill will or
improper motive to testify against Hermin. In fact, the RTC noted that AAA would not
subject her family and womanhood to humiliation and disgrace for an accusation that
is untrue considering that she is a married woman although separated, has a child
and a nephew who is a priest.30 Her act of immediately reporting the incident is a
factor that strengthens her credibility.31 AAA even broke down in tears during the
trial.32The display of such emotion, which indicates the pain that she had felt in
recalling her traumatic experience, is evidence of the truth of the rape charges.33

We cannot give credence to Hermin's claim that he was not positively identified by
AAA and that it is possible that he merely resembled the appearance of the real
culprit. The natural reaction of victims of a crime is to strive to know the identity of
their assailants by looking at their appearance, features, and movements and
observing the manner the crime was perpetrated to create a lasting impression that
could not be erased easily in their memory.34 Where conditions of visibility are
favorable and the victim had no axe to grind against the accused prior to the incident,
the assertion of the complaining witness as to the identity of the wrongdoer
commands the greater weight over the denial of the suspected offender.35

What is crucial is for the witness to positively declare during trial that the person
charged was the malefactor.36 Here, aside from pinpointing Hermin at the police line-
up AAA positively and categorically identified him in open court as her molester. She
could not have been mistaken because she had seen him a number of times prior to
the commission of the crime. At the time of the incident, she also took note of specific
details that would help her asce1iain his identity. All throughout, she never faltered in
identifying him.

The RTC noted that AAA vividly described Hermin's built and physical features, even
recalling that he was wearing a ring at the time of the incident. As for the CA, it held:

[HERMIN], however, was positively identified by [AAA] as the one who perpetrated
the robbery and sexually assaulted her at the latter's house on August 9, 2009 in
Naga City. She noted specific details that would ascertain the identity of her
assailant. For one, [she] was familiar with him as he used to work for her brother in
the workplace located at the same compound where [she] lives. They even had a
previous conversation when [she] requested [him] to fix the door and the clothesline
inside her sister's house. She also noted that he was wearing a silver ring during the
commission of the crime, which fact was confirmed by the policeman during [his]
interrogation at the police station.

xxx

We agree with the submission of the OSG, thus:

" ... [Hermin] conveniently downplays the crucial fact that [AAA] was familiar with him.
His argument would have been acceptable had the perpetrator been a total stranger,
someone whom [she] saw for the first time. That was, however, not the case.
[Hermin] used to work for [AAA's] brother and their workplace was in the same
compound as [AAA's] house. She [had] seen him around since 2006. Moreover, [he]
also did some carpentry and masonry work for [AAA's] sister. [She] even [had] an
occasion to talk to [him] while [he] was setting up the clothesline for [her] sister.37

Hermin's argument that no injuries were found on AAA's body which would indicate
that he had carnal knowledge with her through force or violence was correctly
disregarded by the CA. The absence of fresh lacerations in the victim's hymen does
not prove that the victim was not raped.38 A freshly broken hymen is not an essential
element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape.39 In addition, a medical
examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not
indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case.40 Even without that report, rape may
still be established.41

The absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not
committed by the accused as proof thereof is not an essential element of rape.42 To
emphasize, tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined
or a persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary.43

x x x It is well settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. Thus, the
law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs
only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the
accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim.44

AAA's positive identification of Hermin as the offender in the robbery with rape that
took place on August 9, 2009 defeats the latter's defense of denial
and alibi. Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one
hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce
prevail.45 An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness who was not shown to have any
ill-motive to testify against the accused.46 Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.47 They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not
only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted.48

As to the defense of alibi, the basic rule for it to prosper is that –

the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant
was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the
accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.49

In the case at bar, Hermin's defense of denial and alibi must be dismissed. No fault
can be attributed to the RTC for treating with disfavor the "collective uncorroborated
testimonies" of Rosita, Henry, and Annaliza who supported the allegation that
Hermin was at his residence on the date and time when the felony occurred. To add,
the trial court, as the CP~ quoted, noted not just Hermin's admitted familiarity of AAA
but his knowledge of her residence as well. Thus:

It is clear from the testimony of HERMIN that he knows [AAA] well and was very
familiar with the place where she lives. He even confirmed that the place of ADORNA
was five (5) houses distance away from the house of [AAA] and that there are
several pathways to and from Princeton Street going to the direction at the back of
her residence as well as to the other houses inside the compound. HERMIN also
declared that even during the time when he worked as helper of [BBB], the brother of
[AAA], there was no instance that he saw her husband and recalled an incident when
[AAA] even requested him to fix the door and the clothesline inside her house. He
also knew of the faucet in front of the house of [DDD], as he used to wash (sic
machines) engines in that area when he was still working with [BBB]. The
[overfamiliarity] by HERMIN of [AAA], as well as of the place where she lives, were
validated and confirmed by his own unequivocal testimony.

x x x No less than [HERMIN] himself declared that the compound where the
automobile repair shop and the house of [AAA] are located is nearer to his house
than the place of JOY ADORNA. He claimed that it [would] only take him twenty (20)
minutes from his house to go to the compound where [AAA] lives and thirty (30)
minutes, more or less, to the house of ADORNA.50
Under Article 105 of the RPC, Hermin is obliged to return to AAA the personal
properties, as alleged in the Information and proven during the trial,51 that she was
unlawfully deprived of, whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration or
diminution of value as determined by the trial court.52

Consistent with Article 106 of the RPC, if the accused-appellant can no longer return
the things stolen, he is obliged to make reparation for their value.53 The trial court
shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the
thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value. That the determination of
the amount of the deterioration or of the diminution of value, as well as of the
damages and losses, has been commended by the law entirely to the discretion of
the courts does not mean that proofs are unnecessary and useless.54 On the
contrary, evidence should, whenever possible, be produced to enlighten the
discernment of the judge, but with or without proofs, the determination of the
question always depends finally upon judicial discretion.55

In this case, We are constrained to agree with Hermin that private complainant
neither stated the particular value of each and every item that was said to be taken
nor adduced a single receipt to prove the value of the items. Both the Information
and AAA's direct testimony are wanting of the essential details. Even her statements
while under cross-examination, as quoted below, did not reveal much:

Q: With [regard] to the missing items, you mentioned three (3) cellphones were
missing. Correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you own those three (3) cellphones?

A: One of which belongs to my daughter which she failed to bring with her.

Q: Do you have receipt for the cellphone?

A: None, sir, because it was just given to me by my brother.

Q: How about the jewelries, do you own them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you buy them?

A: They were all given to me by my brother and sister.

Q: How about those perfumes, do you own them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said that you were selling those perfumes. Correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Of all those things that were taken from you during the investigation of the police,
did you present any receipt or proof of ownership to tell them that you own them?

A: Only the boxes of cellphones.

Q. And what other box that you showed the police?

A: The three (3) cellphones.

Q: But you did not present receipt?

A: I have no receipt to produce because it was just given to me.56

An ordinary witness such as private complainant AAA cannot establish the value of
jewelry (consisting of earrings, necklaces, wristwatches, rings, and bracelet in this
case) and the trial court cannot take judicial notice thereof because the value of
jewelry is neither a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration.57 In the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides
the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution witnesses, we cannot award the
reparation for the stolen jewelry.58 Similarly, there is no evidence to establish the
value of the cellular phones and the USB device since no proof as to their
description, kind/model, and competent evidence of value was given by prosecution
witnesses.59 As to the sunglasses, bags, wallet, imported perfumes and lotions, ATM
cards, jacket, and other personal effects taken by Hermin, the same could not be
compensated as no value therefor was actually alleged in the Information or testified
to in court.60Nonetheless, Hermin is ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱4,000.00,
representing the amount of cash stolen. This amount was alleged in the Information,
established by the prosecution, and not rebutted by the defense.61

With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the RTC and the CA correctly
sentenced Hermin to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, robbery with rape is
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty being a range consisting of
two (2) indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty is applied when, pursuant to Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code, there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that
are shown to be in attendance. The use by appellant of a knife was the means
availed of to perpetrate the crime and to qualify it as being one of robbery with rape.
The use of deadly weapon is here a qualifying circumstance, and not being among
the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
it cannot also be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.62

On the award of damages, consistent with People v. Jugueta, 63 the amounts of

damages shall be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Further, six percent (6%) interest per annum is
imposed on all the amounts awarded reckoned from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

As a final note, the Prosecution should have alleged in the Information that the crime
was committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Dwelling, which is an
aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the RPC, was proven during the trial.
Therefore, it should have been appreciated in order to impose a higher penalty, civil
liability and damages. The prosecuting arm of the Government is thus reminded that
prudence should be exercised as to what should be alleged in the Information, as the
latter is the battleground of all criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the November 13, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 06513, finding accused-appellant Hermin Romobio y Pauler guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape, as defined in and penalized under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn an
interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be computed from the finality of the
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 224979

IVY LIM, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and BLUE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC.,
Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision1 dated October 27,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which denied petitioner Ivy Lim's petition for
review, and affirmed the Decision2 dated September 30, 2013 and the Order dated
December 3, 2013 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in
Criminal Case No. 13-1586- 86. The RTC affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated May 22,
2013 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, which found Lim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Big.) 22 in Criminal Cases No. 346643-52.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. (BPHI) granted Rochelle Benito a loan
amounting to ₱1,149,500.00 as evidenced by a Promissory Note acknowledged
before a notary public on July 29, 2003. Petitioner Lim signed as a co-maker of her
sister Benito. To secure payment of the loan, Benito and Lim issued eleven (11)
Equitable PCI Bank checks with a face value of ₱67,617.65 each, or a total amount
of ₱743,794.15, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

0105461 May 29, 2004 ₱67,617.65
0105462 June 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105463 July 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105464 August 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105465 September 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105466 October 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105467 November 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105468 December 29, 2004 67,617.65
0105452 January 29, 2005 67,617.65
0105477 February 28, 2005 67,617.65
0105478 March 29, 2005 67,617.65

Later on, 10 of these 11 checks were dishonored when presented for payment for
having been drawn against a closed account. BPHI sent Lim various demand letters,
but to no avail. On June 28, 2005, BPHI sent a final demand letter, which Lim
supposedly received as shown by the registry return card bearing her signature.

For failing to pay the amounts corresponding the dishonored checks, Lim was
charged with 11 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For her part, Lim raised the
defenses that (1) she could not have signed and issued the checks on July 29, 2003
in the presence of BPHI Finance Officer Juanito Enriquez because she was then
abroad as shown by the Certification of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID); (2) BPHI has no permit to conduct financing business; (3) the
checks were issued to facilitate illegal trafficking of teachers to the United States for
which there has been a criminal action filed and resolved for human trafficking; and
(4) there was no valuable consideration given.
Upon arraignment on December 13, 2006, Lim, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to all charges. During the preliminary conference, the parties admitted the
following matters: (1) the jurisdiction of the trial court; (2) the identity of Lim as the
accused, (3) the existence of the complaint affidavit, (4) the existence of the
promissory note and Lim's signature thereon, and (5) the existence and due
execution of the 11 checks with BPI-II as payee.

During trial, the prosecution presented its witness, BPHI Finance Officer Enriquez,
and documentary evidence consisting of the complaint-affidavit, the promissory note
and the 11 checks, and the demand letters, among others. For the defense, Lim
claimed that the subject checks were unauthenticated because she was out of the
country on July 29, 2003, as shown by the certification of her travel record issued by
the BID. She refuted the testimony of Enriquez that he personally saw her signed the
checks before him.

On May 22, 2013, the MeTC rendered a Joint Decision finding Lim guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 10 counts of violation ofB.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused IVY LIM a.k.a. IVY BENITO LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 in Criminal [Case Nos.] 346643 or ten (10)
counts and hereby orders her to pay a FINE of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX PESOS AND 50/100 (₱676,176.50)
which is the face value of the ten (10) checks with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused IVY LIM a.k.a. IVY BENITO LIM is acquitted in Criminal Case No.
346642 for failure of the prosecution to establish all the elements of the crime
charged.

With regards to the civil aspect of these cases, she is hereby ordered to pay the
private complainant Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. the total amount of SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR
PESOS AND 15/100 (₱743,794.15) which corresponds to the face value of the
eleven (11) checks subject matter of the present cases, plus 12% interest per
annum from date of the filing of the Informations on May 22, 2006 until the amount
shall have been fully paid. She is likewise ordered to pay the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the RTC found no reversible error and affirmed the MeTC Decision.

Dissatisfied, Lim filed a petition for review before the CA, which denied the same and
affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA also denied her motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petition.

Lim raises the following grounds in support of her petition for review on certiorari:

A. AN UNAUTHENTICATED REGISTRY RETURN CARD CANNOT PROVE

RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR
CONVICTION FOR A CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE SUCH THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RULINGS
OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT - THAT
THERE WAS PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE OF NOTICE OF
DISHONOR ON THE PETITIONER BASED ON A COMPARISON OF
SIGNATURES ON THE SUBJECT CHECKS AND OF THE SIGNATURES
ON THE REGISTRY RETURN CARD - AND IHA T HEREIN PETITIONER
WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22
 B. UNAUTHENTICATED CHECKS CANNOT PROVE THJ\ T HEREIN
PETITIONER WAS THE SAME PERSON WI-IO ISSUED SAID CHECKS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN UNCHUAN V
LOZADA. ET AL (SUPRA.), SUCH THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT HEREIN PETITIONER WAS
PROPERLY CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF BAT AS PAMBANSA BLG.
22

C. A DOCUMENT THAT WAS NEVER PRESENTED, IDENTIFIED,

AUTHENTICATED NOR TESTIFIED ON DURING TRIAL CANNOT BE
ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE NOR USED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF HEREIN
PETITION[ER] FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED AGAINST HER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE IN UNCHUAN V LOZADA, ET AL,
(SUPRA.), SUCH THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT THAT HEREIN PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY
CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF BAT AS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
CRIMINALLY AND CIVILLY LIABLE.5

The petition lacks merit, but a modification of the imposed penalty and the interest on
actual damages awarded are in order.

First, Lim argues that the signature in the registry return card of the demand letter
was never authenticated because the prosecution's sole witness, Enriquez, admitted
that he did not personally or actually see her receive the notice of dishonor nor sign
the registry receipt. She faults Enriquez for failing to explain why he claimed that the
signature on said registry return card was hers. She also contends that the CA
committed manifest error in ruling that her actual receipt of the notice of dishonor
was proven by comparing her signatures in the subject checks with that of the
registry return card, because nowhere in the Rules of Evidence or jurisprudence is it
provided that proof/authentication can be made by comparing two unauthenticated
documents.

Second, Lim points out that while Enriquez testified that he saw her personally
signed the 10 postdated checks on July 29, 2003 in Makati City, his testimony was
belied by a BID Certification showing that she was out of the country that day and
could not have signed the same checks. Since she did not sign the checks in the
presence of Enriquez on said date, then the subject checks could not have been
properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Evidence.

Lastly, Lim asserts that in holding her liable to BPHI, the trial court primarily relied on
the Promissory Note which was never produced, presented, identified, authenticated
or testified on by Enriquez. Thus, the trial court erred in admitting the said evidence
and using it as basis for holding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Due to the improper admission of such evidence, Lim also contends
that she could not be held civilly liable to BPHI for the issuance of the postdated
checks, inasmuch as lack of consideration is a defense under the Negotiable
Instruments Law.

Lim's arguments are untenable.

First, contrary to Lim's claim that only the unauthenticated registry return card was
the only proof presented by the prosecution to establish service of a notice of
dishonor, the evidence on record shows that the prosecution also presented the
registry receipt and the testimony of Enriquez who sent the demand letter by
registered mail.

In Resterio v. People,6 the Court ruled that the notice of dishonor required under B.P.
Blg. 22 to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of the check should be written. "If
the service of the written notice is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not
only in the presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the
registry receipt together with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the
notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice
of dishonor is insufficient, unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the
sending by registered mail."

Here, the transcript of stenographic notes confirm that the prosecution complied with
the requisite proof of service of the notice of dishonor by presenting Enriquez, who
testified on the sending of such notice by registered mail, and identified the demand
letter, the registry receipt and the registry retun1 card, viz.:

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q Mr. Witness, during the last hearing of this case, you went to identify the checks in
question in this case which have been previously marked in evidence as Exhibits "E"
to "O'", and you testified that these checks after they were issued to your company
by the accused, Ivy Lim, the same were deposited and dishonored by the bank for
the reason of account closed, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, after the checks in question were dishonored by the bank for the reason as
stated account closed, what did you do?

A We called the accused by telephone to follow up payments of the returned checks,

sir.

Q Were you able to talk to the accused through telephone?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was the reply of the accused, if any?

A The reply of Ms. Ivy Lim is that, can I answer that in Tagalog, your Honor?

COURT:

Yes.

(Witness testifying in Tagalog)

A "Ayaw pabayaran ni Ate."

Q What did you do after that?

A Since our demand fell on death case, the office sent a demand letter dated 18 May
2005, sir.

Q To whom, was the demand letter sent?

A To Ms. Rocel Benito and Ms. Ivy Lim, sir.

Q Do you have a copy of the letter which you sent to the accused, Ivy Lim?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please produce the letter which you said was sent to the accused, Ivy
Lim?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Witness is producing the Letter dated May 18, 2005 which has been marked in
evidence as Exhibit "Q" and "Q-1", respectively.

Q Mr. Witness, there appears to be a signature on top of the name Juanita M.

Enriquez, whose signature is this?

A The same is my signature, sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we request your Honor that the signature properly identified by the witness be
marked as Exhibit "Q-4".

COURT:

Mark it.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q How was this demand letter sent to the accused, Ivy Lim?

A The demand letter was sent through registered mail at Malolos, Bulacan, sir.

xxxx

Q Do you have any proof that the said letter, marked as Exhibit "Q" was sent be
registered mail, as you claimed in Malolos, Bulacan?

A I have the registry receipt and the registry return card of the registered mail, sir.

Q Please produce the said registry receipt and the registry return card?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where is the Registry Receipt in this document?

A This long bond is the Registry Receipt because the registered mail is composed of
several letters, sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we respectfully request the Registry Receipt your Honor which this witness
identified be marked in evidence as Exhibit "Q-5."

ATTY. ALCUDIA:

Your Honor, that's already been marked in evidence as "Q-c." That is the list of mail
matters, your Honor.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Yes, I stand corrected, your Honor.

Q Now, who mailed this letter in Malolos, Bulacan?

A I am, sir.

xxxx

Q You said that you made a letter dated May 18, 2005 to the accused, Ivy Lim, what
happened to this letter?
A The letter was received by Ms. Lim, sir.

Q Do you have any proof to show that the letter was received by the accused,
Ivy Lim?

A The return card of that registered mail attached to the letter, sir.

Q I am showing to you the return card which have been previously marked in
evidence as Exhibit "Q-2", where in this Exhibit "Q-2" will show that the
accused received the letter of demand.

A The signature of Ms. Lim on May 24, 2005 at the back of the Registry Return
Receipt, sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we respectfully request that the dorsal portion of the Return Card your
Honor be marked in evidence as Exhibit "Q-5" the date May 24, 2005 and
Exhibit "Q-6" which is the signature of the accused.

COURT:

Mark them.7

In claiming that an unauthenticated registry return card cannot prove receipt of the
notice of dishonor, Lim only objected to Exhibits "Q", "Q-2" and "Q-3" because there
is no showing at all that the Demand Letter of Juanito Enriquez was actually and
personally received by her.8 However, actual receipt of such notice of dishonor was
proved by the prosecution through Enriquez who identified the signature on the
dorsal portion of the registry return card as that of Lim. Enriquez can credibly identify
Lim' s signature because he testified having witnessed her signed the subject
checks:

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, in Exhibit "E" there appears to be a signature on the lower
portion which has been marked in evidence as Exhibit "E-2". Whose signature is that,
the signature marked as Exhibit "E-2"?

A The signature of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q And why do you know that is the signature of the accused Ivy Lim?

A I was, I saw her when she signed the check sir.

Q Now again Mr, Witness, in Exhibit "F" there appears to be a signature on the lower
portion of the check, more particularly this space for the drawer which has been
marked Exhibit "F-2", whose signature is that Mr. Witness?

A The signature is that of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q Why do you know that is the signature of lvy Lim?

A Again, I saw her when she signed the check.9

It bears emphasis that despite Lim's opposition to the prosecution's Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence, the MeTC admitted all its exhibits, noting that the objections
thereto merely pertain to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, which shall be
considered by the court when it decides the case.10 Eventually, the MeTC has
exercised its sound discretion, pursuant to Section 22,11 Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court in comparing the signatures of Lim in the registry return card and the checks to
ensure that the notice of dishonor was indeed received by her, to wit:
As to the third element, Exhibit "Q", the demand letter dated May 18, 2005
addressed to Ivy Benito Lim and signed by Juanita Enriquez was undisputedly
received by the accused Ivy Lim as shown in Exhibit "Q-6". The distinctive strokes in
writing the name "Ivy" and the flourish of the stroke in writing "im" in the latter part
thereof, compared with the signatures appearing on all the checks shown that these
signatures were made by one and the same person.12

There is also no merit in Lim's claim that the subject checks were unauthenticated
and not proven to have been issued by her. For one, in the Preliminary Conference
Order13 dated March 28, 2007, the parties admitted that whenever the court refers to
the name of Ivy Lim, the name pertains to the accused, and stipulated on the
existence and due execution of the eleven (11) checks with payee Blue Pacific
Holdings, Inc. For another, BPI-II Finance Officer Enriquez presented and identified
during trial the 11 checks issued by Lim, to wit:

ATTY. LEOPOLDO DELA ROSA:

Q Do you have in your possession or in your presence the checks that were issued
in payment of a loan by the accused in this case?

A What I have sir are the checks that bounced.

Q Yes, that is why can you produce them now?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please produce them now.

A Here sir.

Q Witness is producing the checks that bounced.

COURT:

Are those ten (10) checks?

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Yes, I'll just count it your Honor. Ten (10) checks, original checks were produced by
this witness and we would like to manifest for the record that these checks have
already been marked in evidence as Exhibits "E" to "O". Now, I have here in my
possession your Honor the original of the checks, as well as, the photocopies of
checks which had [already been] marked your Honor and we would like to request
again for the second time if counsel for the accused would like to examine the
photocopies as well as the original checks although these checks were already
produced during the pre-marking your Honor.

ATTY. ALCUDIA:

We manifest that all checks except the check which was marked Exhibit "G" has not
been presented your Honor.

COURT:

I think he is presenting the check.

ATTY. ALCUDIA:

I make of record that Exhibit "G" has not been presented for payment.

COURT:
Not presented for payment?

ATTY. ALCUDIA:

Not presented your Honor.

COURT:

Duly noted. So they are faithful reproduction of the original?

ATTY. ALCUDIA:

Yes, all Exhibits "E" to "O" including "G."

COURT:

So stipulated.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

xxxx

Q Now again Mr. Witness, in Exhibit "F" there appears to be a signature on the lower
portion of the check, more particularly this space for the drawer which has been
marked as Exhibit "F-2", whose signature is that Mr. Witness?

A The signature is that of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q Why do you know that is the signature of Ivy Lim?

A Again I saw her when she signed the check.

Q May we manifest for the record that the signature in Exhibit "F" of the accused Ivy
Lim has been marked as Exhibit "F-2". Let us go to Exhibit "G", again there appears
to be a signature on the lower portion of this check, whose signature is that?

A Again the signature of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q May we respectfully manifest that the signature of Ivy Lim identified by this witness
has been marked as Exhibit "G-1". In Exhibit "H" there appears to be again a
signature of the drawer. Whose signature is that? A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we again manifest that the signature appearing in Exhibit "H" is the signature
of the accused marked and bracketed as Exhibit "H-1" and properly identified by this
witness. Again, Mr. Witness, there appears to be a signature on the lower portion of
Exhibit "I". Will you please identify the signature, whose signature is that?

A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature identified by this witness has been marked in
evidence as Exhibit "1-1". Again, in Exhibit "J" for the prosecution, there appears to
be a signature on the lower portion. Whose signature is that?

A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature of the accused has been previously marked
and bracketed as Exhibit "J-1" and identified by this witness your Honor. In Exhibit
"K" Mr. Witness, there appears to be a signature on the lower portion. Whose
signature is that?

A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we request now your Honor, because apparently the signature identified by
the witness has not been bracketed and marked, may we request that the same be
bracketed and marked as Exhibit "K-l".

COURT

Bracket and mark.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q Again in Exhibit "L" there is a signature on the lower portion. Whose signature is
that?

A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature in Exhibit "L" has been marked and bracketed
as Exhibit "L-1" and identified by this witness as that of the accused. In Exhibit "M"
there appears to be a signature on the drawer portion, whose signature is that?

A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature identified by the witness has been marked and
bracketed as Exhibit "M-1" and identified by the witness. In Exhibit "N" there appears
to be again a signature, whose signature is that?

A Miss Ivy Lim.

Q May we manifest for the record that the signature identified by the witness has
been marked and bracketed as Exhibit "N-1" and properly identified by this witness.
In Exhibit "O" there appears to be again a signature. Whose signature is that?

A Signature of Miss Ivy Lim sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we manifest that the signature of Miss Ivy Lim identified by the witness has been
marked and bracketed as Exhibit "0-1" and identified by this witness. Your Honor, I
am ready to continue, however, as I see the grim face of my fellow colleague waiting
for their time and considering that I have further documents to ask from this witness, I
pray for continuance your Honor.

COURT

Any objection?

A TTY. ALCUDIA:

No objection your Honor.14

Nowhere in the records did Lim deny that the signature on the 11 checks were hers
nor claim that her signatures thereon were forged. She cannot be heard now to
complain that unauthenticated checks cannot prove that she was the same person
who issued them.

Raising the defenses of denial and alibi, Lim insists that she was abroad when she
supposedly signed the 10 checks in the presence of prosecution witness Enriquez on
July 29, 2003, as shown by a certification from the BID that she left the country on
July 21, 2003 and returned on October 29, 2003. While the prosecution failed to
refute such evidence, the MeTC correctly noted that (1) the unresolved issue is when
these checks were issued and delivered to BPHI, and (2) the fact that the checks
were issued is not an issue, as the existence of the checks and signatures of the
accused on these checks are uncontroverted.15
There is nothing in the direct testimony of Enriquez which states that the checks
were personally signed by Lim before him on July 29, 2003, for he only said that the
checks were issued in BPHI's office at Morse corner Edison Streets in Barangay San
Isidro, Makati.16 The wrong information was elicited from Enriquez' cross examination,
which may have been based on the date when the promissory note was
acknowledged before a notary public:17

ATTY. ALCUDIA:

We will proceed.

Q You have identified the Promissory Note, Exhibit "D", did you not Mr.

Enriquez?

A Yes, sir.

Q And as stated here this was issued July 29, 2003, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is it not a fact that it is your claim that the checks subject of this complaint

were issued and tendered to you also on July 29, 2003?

A Yes, sir.

Q All checks?

A Yes. Sir.18

At any rate, what is material in B.P. Blg. 22 cases is the date of issuance of the
checks which appear on their face, and not the exact date of the delivery or signing
thereof. This can be gleaned from the fact that the offenses punished in the said law
are not committed if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from
date of issue.

Concededly, the criminal action for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.19 With respect to the civil aspect of a B.P. Blg. 22 case,
Lim would do well to remember that when an action is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts.20

As can be gleaned from the Complaint-Affidavit dated October 5, 2005, the action of
BPHI is not only meant to prosecute Lim for issuing bouncing checks to secure
payment of loan as evidenced by a promissory note where Lim signed as a co-
maker, but also for recovery of the amounts covered by said checks intended as
payment of the loan. Lim does not specifically deny the genuineness and execution
of the promissory note, let alone sets forth what he claims to be the facts. Moreover,
such instrument no longer needs to be authenticated because Lim stipulated on the
existence of the promissory note and her signature thereto, as shown in the
Preliminary Conference Order21 dated March 28, 2007.

Against Lim's claim that the promissory note was not presented, identified and
testified on during trial, the transcript of stenographic notes show otherwise, as it was
made an integral part of the Complaint-Affidavit, which in turn was presented,
identified authenticated and testified on during trial. Pertinent portion of the transcript
of stenographic reads:
ATTY. DELA ROSA: [Private counsel of BPHI]

Q Mr. Witness, why do you say that these checks were drawn and issued by the
accused in this case?

ATTY. ALCUDIA: [Counsel of accused Lim]

Same objection, no basis.

COURT:

Objection overruled. We have now the basis. Objection overruled,

Q Why do you say that?

A: The checks were drawn and issued to us in payment of the Promissory Note, sir.

Q Were you present when these checks were issued and executed?

A Yes, your Honor.

ATTY. DELA ROSA

Q Where were the checks issued?

A In Makati, sir.

Q Where, what particular place?

A It is in our office at Morse corner Edison Streets in Barangay San Isidro, Makati.

Q In connection with this case Mr. Witness that you are testifying before this
Honorable Court, do you remember that you have executed a Complaint Affidavit
insofar as this case is concerned?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you Mr. Witness the original copy of the Complaint Affidavit which
is attached to the record of this case and which has been previously marked as
Exhibit "A" which Complaint Affidavit consist of five (5), no four (4) pages. Please
examine this Affidavit or Complaint Affidavit Mr. Witness and tell us what is the
relation of that Complaint to the Complaint Affidavit that you have mentioned.

A This is the Complaint Affidavit I subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Henry
Salazar.

Q Now, in this Complaint Affidavit there appears to be one of the affiant Juanita
Enriquez. Who is this Juanita Enriquez?

A I am sir.

Q Do you affirm and reaffirm the truthfulness and correctness of this Affidavit
Complaint before the oath that you have taken before this Honorable Court?

A Yes. Sir.22

Significantly, Lim's counsel admitted during cross-examination that the prosecution

has presented, identified and testified on the subject promissory note, thus:

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
Before we proceed, may we request to be allowed access to the prosecution's
Exhibits "D" and "U" which witness testified on during direct examination? Your,
Honor, we have been presented a document which is original document designated
Promissory Note but we note this is not marked document by the prosecution.
Nevertheless, we can proceed if private prosecutor will stipulate and commit that this
document is the original of the document that has been provisionally marked as
Exhibits "D" and "D-1".

COURT:

You can commit Mr. Private Prosecutor?

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

We admit your Honor. What happened here is that the exhibit was marked in the
photocopy. I think after making a comparison.23

Anent the civil aspect of the B.P. Blg 22 cases, her defense of lack of consideration
for the checks fails to persuade. Apart from having admitted the authenticity and due
1âwphi1

execution of the promissory note, Lim also failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the disputable presumptions24 that there were sufficient
considerations for the said contract which she signed as a co-maker, and for the
negotiable instruments consisting of 11 checks issued under her name as security for
the payment of the loan. Besides, as a co-maker who agreed to be jointly and
severally liable on the promissory note, Lim cannot validly claim that she hardly
received any consideration therefor, as the fact that the loan was granted to the
principal debtor, her sister Benito, already constitutes sufficient consideration.

All told, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the RTC
decision, which upheld the conviction of Lim for 10 counts of violation ofB.P. Blg. 22
and her civil liability for the face value of the 11 checks.

The elements of violation ofB.P. Blg. 22 are as follows:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value;

2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reasons, ordered the
bank to stop payment; and

3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for payment of the check
in full upon its presentment.

All the foregoing elements were established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution, as thoroughly discussed by the MeTC:

As to the first element, the Court finds that the checks were issued for value.
Accused is the co-maker of the promissory note (Exhibit "D") wherein she voluntarily
bound herself to be jointly and severally liable with Rochelle Benito, her sister, to
Blue Pacific Inc. for the amount of ₱605,000.00 plus interests. Accused is also a
signatory to the eleven checks issued, along with her sister, in favor of Blue Pacific.
These checks constitute the means for payment of the promissory note signed by the
accused and her sister. It is undisputed that the co-accused, Rochelle Benito was
able to travel to the United States. The expenses incurred for the said travel came,
undoubtedly, from the proceeds of the said loan albeit the accused did not personally
received the proceeds thereof. Although there was no personal receipt of the
proceeds by the accused, it is undisputed that the principal objective of the accused,
the processing and travel of her sister to the United States was accomplished. The
accused then stood to benefit from the loan. The allegation of human trafficking,
fraud and payment remains allegations as no evidence was presented to the Court to
prove [them]. The pieces of evidence presented, testimonial and documentary, show
that this is a business transaction between Blue Pacific and the accused.

As to the second element, except for Exhibit "G", the evidence shows that the ten
(10) checks were presented for payment and subsequently dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed". The check dated May 29, 2004 with check number 0105461 in the
amount of ₱67,617.65 was not presented for payment, and hence to criminal liability
attached thereto.

As to the third element, Exhibit "Q", the demand letter dated May 18, 2005
addressed to Ivy Benito Lim and signed by Juanito Enriquez was undisputedly
received by the accused Ivy Lim as shown in Exhibit "Q-6". The distinctive strokes in
writing the name "Ivy" and the flourish of the stroke in writing "im" in the latter part
thereof, compared with the signatures appearing on all the checks shown that these
signatures were made by one and [the] same person. No evidence was presented by
the defense to refute the sending, receipt and existence of the signature of accused
Ivy Lim in Exhibits "Q" and Q-6".25

Be that as it may, a modification of the fine of ₱676,176.50 imposed by the MeTC is

in order because it appears to exceed the ₱200,000.00 limit under Section 1 of B.P.
Blg. 22 which provides for the penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days
but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court." Instead of imposing a lump sum fine, the proper penalty should be a fine
of ₱67 ,617 .65 [face value of each check] for each of the Ten (10) counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Big.22 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Finally, the actual damages in the amount of ?743,794.15) representing the face
value of the Eleven (11) checks, which the MeTC awarded to BPHI shall further incur
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until
fully paid, in line with Nacar v. Gallery Frames, Inc.26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 27, 2014 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 36204 is AFFIRMED with MODICATION:

(l) IVY LIM a.lea. IVY BENITO LIM is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of SIXTY-
SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTEEN PESOS AND 65/100
(₱67 ,617 .65) for each of the Ten (10) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 346643 to 346652, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code; and

(2) With regard to the civil aspect of these cases, she is hereby ORDERED
to PAY the private complainant Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. the total amount
of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY-FOUR PESOS AND 15/100 (₱743,794.15) of the present cases,
plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from date of the filing of the
Informations on May 22, 2006 until finality of this Decision, and six percent
(6°/o) interest per annum from such finality until fully paid. She is,
likewise, ORDERED to PAY the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 218958

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
EDILBERTO NORADA y HARDER, and AGUSTIN SEVA y LACBANES, Accused
EUGENE VILLANUEVA y CANALES, Accused-Appellant
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Eugene Villanueva y Cañales (appellant) seeks in the present appeal, the reversal of
the January 14, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00686 which affirmed with modifications the July 21, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, convicting him of the complex crime of
attempted Kidnapping with Murder.

The Antecedent Facts:

In the afternoon of February 12, 2004, Police Inspector Bonifer Gotas (PI Gotas),
Precinct Commander of Precinct VI, Bacolod City received a report that a dead
person was recovered in a sugarcane field at Vi11a Angela Subdivision. The
deceased was identified as Reggie Pacil y Nojas (victim), a 42-year old bachelor and
was the school principal of the Alijis Elementary School in Valladolid, Bacolod City.

During the investigation, PI Gotas was informed that the victim was killed at the
Taculing Court Apartelle. An inquiry from a roomboy revealed that in the evening of
February 11, 2004, three men on board a Suzuki multi cab rented and spent some
time at Room 106 of the apartelle. PI Gotas inspected the room and saw bloodstains
scattered inside and on its wall. He was informed that one of the occupants of the
room was Edilberto Norada y Harder (Norada). Days after the incident, Norada was
arrested followed by appellant Villanueva and Agustin Sevay Lacbanes (Seva).

Rosalina Pacil (Rosalina), mother of the victim, testified that the latter received a
monthly salary of ₱12,837.00 as school principal. Rosalina further testified that
appellant was a friend of her son. Appellant frequently visited their house since the
victim finances the former’s fruit buying and selling business. On February 11, 2004,
appellant was in their house waiting for the arrival of the victim. The victim arrived
early in the evening with a Canadian friend, Ray Truck (Truck). Not long enough, the
victim and appellant left, leaving behind Truck. That was the last time Rosalina saw
her son alive.

In his Post Mortem Autopsy findings, Dr. Eli Cong (Dr. Cong), the medico-legal
officer of the Bacolod City Health Office, found lacerated wound and contusion
hematoma on the body of the victim and gave the cause of death as "Uncal
Erniation, secondary to contusion hemorrhage brain parietal area, a secondary.
Fracture with laceration of the skull parietal area, head, secondary to trauma by blunt
instrument head, contusion hemorrhage, multiple"3 which could have been caused by
a blunt instrument like a piece of wood.

Appellant admitted that he was a close friend of the victim. His narration of the event
which served as his defense and synthesized by the courts below is as follows:

x x x On February 8, 2004, he met Reggie Pacil [who] told him that he will treat him
to a disco on February 11, 2004 to celebrate in advance his forthcoming birthday. Mr.
Pacil instructed him to look for a car that they can hire to be used for that occasion.
When he met the accused Edilberto Norada[,] a taxi driver[,] who is an old
acquaintance the following day, he told him to look for a car. Norada succeeded in
leasing a red Suzuki multicab owned by Cecile Pioquinto, a girl friend of the accused
Agustin Seva.

On February 10, 2004, [a]ccuscd Villanueva x x x and his coaccused Edilberto

Norada, took the car from the house of Cecile Pioquinto. At that time, the accused
Agustin Seva was in the house of Pioquinto. He paid rental in the amount of
₱2,000.00 for the use of the car.

Leaving behind the car and Norada, Villanueva x x x went to Valladolid to fetch
Reggie Pacil. Reggie Pacil was not in his house so he waited for him until about 7:30
in the evening. When Pacil arrived on board a taxi, he was with his friend from
Canada a person named Ray Trnck. He and Pacil took that same taxi for Bacolod
City while the Canadian was left behind in Pacil’s house.

Eugene Villanueva further declared that they met Edilberto Norada at a designated
place in the Golden Field Complex but instead of proceeding directly to a disco
house, Pacil suggested that they first find a place to spend the rest of the night.

Reggie Pacil rented a room in the Taculing Court Apartelle and said that they will
wait there for Pacil's other friends who will be joining them. As they were waiting, the
two of them drank beer while Norada stayed outside of the room. At about 2:00 in the
morning, the friends of Pacil was (sic) not able to arrive, so Villanueva x x x decided
to go out alone. Pacil, however, would not allow him to leave. Villanueva x x x at that
time x x x was beginning to realize that Pacil was intending to use him. When he held
Pacil’s hand to enable him to leave, he slipped and fell on the floor. Pacil placed
himself over him and as they struggled, Edilberto Norada entered the room. Norada
tried to pacify them but he was boxed by Pacil. Norada left and returned with a piece
of wood and he hit Pacil on the head several times. Pacil fell unconscious. There was
blood flowing out of Pacil’s head so he and Norada panicked. They wrapped Pacil in
a bedsheet and loaded him on the Suzuki multi-cab. They went around Bacolod City
not knowing what to do. Eventually they dumped the body of Pacil at Villa Angela
Subdivision.4

The testimony of accused Norada, on the other hand, was summarized by the trial
court as follows:

Accused Edilberto Norada declared that he and Agustin Seva for sometime, have
been hatching to organize a kidnap for ransom group in Bacolod City. This plan did
not materialize as they have no money to fund the operation. Later, in 2003, he met
Eugene Villanueva, a security guard of the Riverside Hospital. Eugene Villanueva
revealed that he is a close friend of Reggie Pacil, a schoolteacher at the town of
Valladolid. Reggie Pacil has a friend, a Canadian national named Ray Truck.. This
Ray Truck has plenty of money x x x. The three (3) of them, namely, himself, Agustin
Seva and Eugene Villanueva, made a plan to kidnap Ray Truck.

To carry out their plan, accused Norada revealed that they rented the car of Cecile
Pioquinto, who ·.vas the girlfriend of the accused Seva. They also rented a room at
the Taculing Court Apartelle. The accused Villanueva would bring both Reggie Pacil
and the Canadian Ray Truck at the Apartelle on the evening of February 11, 2004
and they will then execute their kidnap plan.

On the appointed day, Accused Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in
the house of Pacil in Valladolid but only Reggie Pacil came. Ray Truck remained in
the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid. The non-appearance of Ray Truck made
them change their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil as they were
convinced that Rey Truck will pay ransom for his release. They decided that the
kidnapping will take place as soon as Reggie Pacil fall asleep.

Inside their rented room in the Taculing Court Apartelle, Seva, Villanueva and Pacil
[drank] liquor. Norada x x x slept [in] the car in the garage of the Apartelle.

In the early morning of the following day Norada said that Villanueva woke him up
and told him that Pacil was already asleep. They began tying up Pacil but somehow
he woke up and resisted. Norada said that he hit Pacil [on] the head with a piece of
wood. Pacil was rendered unconscious only briefly and he again struggled. Norada
hit him again and this time Pacil stayed motionless but snoring. Then Scva taped the
mouth of Pacil while he and Villanueva tied x x x his hands and feet. They wrapped
Pacil [in] a blanket, and loaded him into the car. Then they dumped his body at Villa
Angela subdivision. Thereafter, they parted ways. x x x:5

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC gave probative value to the narration of Norada respecting the conspiracy
to kidnap the victim and how he was killed. The RTC further ruled that the killing was
attended by treachery and abuse of superior strength. The court a quo ratiocinated
that:

In the present case, the crime of Kidnapping was only in its Attempted Stage as the
offenders only commenced the execution of the felony directly by ove1i acts but they
failed to perform all the acts of execution x x x by reason of the resistance of Reggie
Pacil. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal detention us a single felony such that all other offenses committed by
reason of or on occasion of it are absorbed by it by express 1rnmclatc of the law. But
the absorption rule will not apply when the Kidnapping is c.mly ·Attcn1ptcd or
Frustrated, as Article 267 docs not so provide. [W]hen kidnapping is attempted or
Frustrated mid another crime is committed arising out of the same act of attempted
or frustrated kidnapping, the provision of th9 ordinary complex crime under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code shall apply. An ordinary complex crime under Article 48 is
committed when a single act results to two or more grave or less grave felonies. The
act which constituted as an attempt to kidnap was also the sane act that caused the
death of Reggie Pacil. x x x

It should be stressed that the Information against the accused fully and completely
alleges the commission of the crime of Murder, with the killing of the victim qualified
by treachery and abuse of superior strength.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act produces two
(2) or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the graver offense shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The maximum penalty for
Murder is death but since the penalty of death had already been abolished, the
penalty is Reclusion Perpetua.6

Thus, on July 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which
stated:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds all the three (3) accused, namely,
Eugene Villanueva Y Canales, Edilherto Norada Y Harder and Agustin Seva Y
Lacbanes, GUIL Y beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Attempted
Kidnapping with Murder, all as conspirators and all as Principals by Direct
participation, All of them are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with all its accessories.

By way of civil liability, the three (3) above-named accused are held solidarily liable
to pay to the heirs of the late Reggie Pacil the sum of Php1,950,967.20 as
compensatory damages; the sum of Php50,000.00 as death indemnity. And to Mrs.
Rosalina Pacil, the accused are solidarily liable to pay the amount of Php50,000.00
as moral damages.7

Norada did not appeal his conviction. Seva filed a Notice of Appeal but the same was
denied for having been filed out of time. Hence only the appeal of appellant
Villanueva will be resolved in this proceedings.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Like the trial court, the CA gave probative weight to the sworn statement of Norada
and sustained its admissibility considering that its contents were reiterated
affirmatively in open court thus transposing it as a judicial admission. The CA
rejected appellant's plea of self-defense for his failure to prove the element of tin
lawful aggression arising from the victim. Thus the CA did not find any reason to
reverse the RTC Decision. Hence, on January 14, 2015, the CA rendered its assailed
Decision with the decretal portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 21 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 50, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City, in Criminal Case No. 04-26009 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
As modified, all three accused are held solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim
the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages,
Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages and Php25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Interest on all damages awarded is imposed at the rate of 6%) per annum from date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.8

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court.

Our Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious,

The crime of kidnapping was not

satisfactorily established

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659. The crime has the following
elements:

(1) the accused is a private individual.;

(2) the accused kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and

(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;

(b) it is committed by simulating public authority:

(c) any serious physical injuries arc inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made or;

(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.9

"The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s
liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and
for whatever length of time."10

The totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to sufficiently establish the offense of
kidnapping in this case. There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to establish , or
from which it can be inferred that appel1ant and his cohorts intended to actually
deprive the victim of his liberty for some time and for some purpose. There was also
no evidence that they have thoroughly planned the kidnapping of the victim. There
was lack of motive to resort in kidnapping the victim for they were bent to kidnap his
friend Truck. The fact alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then and there
tying his hands and feet, based on Norada’s account, was not determinant of intent
to actually detain the victim or deprive his liberty. As such, the trial court was
indulging in speculation when it held that the victim "will either be taken away or
simply be kept in the hotel and thereafter ransom will be demanded from the
Canadian Ray Truck for his release."11 Courts should not indulge in speculation no
matter how strong the guilt of the accused. Hence since the offense of kidnapping
was not sufficiently established, the trial court erred in holding appellant liable for
attempted kidnapping.

There is no unlawful aggression on

the part of the victim hence the
justifying circumstance of self-defense
is untenable.

There is no dispute that the victim was killed. Appellant however, invokes the
justifying circumstance of self-defense to exculpate himself. By invoking self-defense,
appellant in effect admitted his part in killing the victim. However, before the plea of
self-defense may by appreciated, appellant must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following indispensable elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part 9f the appellant.12 "In self-defense
and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition
sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-
defense and defense of strangers are unavailing because there would be nothing to
repel."13

The courts below correctly found that appellant failed to discharge the burden of
proving unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Both the RTC and the CA, held
that his version of the event was not only uncorroborated but crude and clumsy
prevarication. We agree that appellant's evidence relative to unlawful aggression fell
far short of being "clear and convincing." His claim of having been boxed by the
victim did not show that he suffered any injury and no allegation on what part of his
body was hit. More importantly, the punching if it was true, did not place the life of
appellant in danger. Thus, appellant's claim of self-defense deserves no merit at all.

Treachery did not attend the killing.

However, we cannot agree that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
killing. According to the trial court, "it was necessary for the accused to subdue [the
victim] and they attempted to perform this act in a treacherous manner, tying up the
victim] while he was asleep. [The victim] however, resisted and this prompted the
accused to hit him inflicting serious injuries on his person that caused his
death."14 Clearly, this is the only context in which the trial court appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the appellate court concurred with this
finding without laying any basis or explanation for its concurrence.

Contrary to the findings of the courts below, our review of the evidence shows that
the killing of the victim was not attended by treachery.

"Treachery cannot be presumed [for] the circumstances surrounding the [killing] must
be proved as indubitably as the crime itself."15 Treachery is present "when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make."16 "To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the
employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the
offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party;
and (2) the offender's deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or
manner of execution."17

Indeed, the victim was struck on the head by Norada with a piece of wood which
resulted to his death. However, the records is bereft of any evidence that appellant
and his co-accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to
ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the victim to
defend himself.18In People v. Antonio,19 it was held that "[i]t is not only the sudden
attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate
adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose." Similarly, in People v.
Catbagan,20 the Court ruled that "[t]reachery cannot be considered when there is no
evidence that the accused had resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of
the killing or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation, calculation or
reflection." In the present case, the mode or manner of the attack on the victim did
not appear to have been consciously and deliberately adopted.

Conspiracy was established among

the accused.
As regards the matter of conspiracy, we note that the appellate court did not make
any discussion or a finding of fact on the presence of conspiracy among the accused
despite holding them solidarily liable for the payment of damages. However, we take
this' opportunity to tackle this issue following the principle that an appeal throws the
whole case wide open for review.

We find that conspiracy in killing the victim was duly established. "Conspiracy may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among them."21 In the
case at bar, the evidence showed that appellant did not prevent Norada from striking
the head of the victim with the piece of wood. When the latter fell unconscious with
blood oozing from his head, appellant even helped in wrapping the body with a
bedsheet and loaded him on the Suzuki multi-cab. To completely end the life of the
victim, they did not bring the victim to the hospital despite his still being alive but
instead, dumped the body in a sugarcane field at Villa Angela Subdivision. These
acts of appellant during and after the killing indubitably show that he acted in concert
for a joint purpose and a community of interest with his co-accused in killing the
victim. Thus applying the basic principle in conspiracy that "the act of one is the act
of all," appellant is guilty as a coconspirator and regardless of his participation, is
liable as co-principal.22

No abuse of superior strength.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is "present if the

accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of superior
strength.23 However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was
perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case.

The crime committed was homicide.

Considering that none of the circumstances alleged in the information, i.e., treachery
and abuse of superior strength was proven during the trial, the same cannot be
appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. Appellant can only be held liable for
homicide. Under .Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed for the crime of
homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of the absence of any mitigating circumstance
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence should
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period which has a duration
of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months, while the minimum should be within the range of prision
mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Thus, appellant should suffer an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Anent appellant's civil liability, the Court finds a need to modify the same to conform
to recent jurisprudence.24 The court modifies awarded amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity by the CA by reducing it to ₱50,000.00. Anent the award of moral
damages, the CA correctly imposed the amount of ₱50,000.00. The award of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is deleted in view of the failure of the prosecution
to prove that the killing was attended by treachery and abuse of superior strength.

With respect to actual damages, the parties stipulated the amount of ₱40,000.00 for
the funeral, burial and other incidental expenses and dispensed with the presentation
of proof thereof: However prevailing jurisprudence dictates an award of ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, when no documentary evidence of
burial or funeral expenses is presented in court.25 Hence, we award ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

As to the deletion of the indemnity for loss of earning capacity by the CA, we restore
the award by the RTC of the sum of ₱1,950.967.26 as unearned income as
appearing from the Pay Slip26 submitted in evidence which the CA plainly overlooked.
The figure was arrived at based on the net earning capacity of the victim, to wit:
 Net earning 2/3 x (80-age of the victim at the time of death)
capacity = x (Gross Annual Income less the Reasonable
and Necessary Living Expenses27

The victim was 42 years old at the time of his death. His annual gross income was
₱154,044.00 computed based on his monthly income of ₱12,837.00. His necessary
1âwphi1

living expenses is deemed to be 50% of his gross income. His life expectancy is
assumed to be 2/3 of age 80 less 42, his age when he was killed. Thus using the
above formula, the indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the victim is
₱1,950,967.26.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLYGRANTED. The Decision dated January 14,

2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00686 is
hereby VACATED and SETASIDE. A new one is entered as follows:

1) appellant Eugene Villanueva y Canales is hereby found GUILTY of the

crime of Homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

2) appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts:

a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages; and,

d) ₱1,950,967.26 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity.

In conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all the monetary awards for
damages at the rate of 6% perannum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice