091818
MEYER V. NEBRASKA
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under
a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students
that had not yet completed the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
creating legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not
reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska
statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not
yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the
conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the
liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within
the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from
bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage
the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state.
Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak
other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be
protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably
regarded as harmful.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the
interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state
may permissively regulate.
PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS
Citation. Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were
protected by a preliminary restraining order prohibiting appellants from
enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their
children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a
parent’s or guardian’s right to decide the mode in which their children are
educated. State’s may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does
not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish
and maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a
private organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and
military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting
appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act
required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a
public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary
restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected
liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the
competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be
destruction of the appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all
schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a
proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a
liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC.,
petitioner,
vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS,
respondents. G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
Facts: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and
Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public
Instruction.”
As contended by PACU, the Act is unconstitutional because of the following
reasons: 1) The act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as
teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; 2) it
will also deprive the parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency; and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute towards unlawful delegation of legislative powers.
Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed every
citizen the right to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said
right.
On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters
does not contain justiciable controversy and thus does not need court decision
or intervention; 2) petitioners are inestoppels to challenge the validity of the
said act; and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of
Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private
schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate
instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction
given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly-authorized
representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools
and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the
same.”
Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.
Held: No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.
The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private
schools for the development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude of
students. The court found no justiciable controversy. The power of the courts to
declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require
the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As
such, judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.
Thus, the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question, such as that
provided by the petitioner. On this phase of the litigation, the court conclude
that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the
petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Education.
ANTONIO VILLEGAS VS ABELARDO SUBIDO
109 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Women Workers
Facts: Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of
91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still
have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under
Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such
appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is against
Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that putting
women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and
placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and
constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino
womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been
set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be
confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioner.
HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not
on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in
this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he
appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work
outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition.
A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule
justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power,
not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of
the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents
entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no
presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of
such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they
are devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be
permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity
of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute.
Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all
pains to avoid.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment
of contracts.
RULING: First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
GUINGONA, JR. VS. CARAGUE G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation
(with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA
6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by
PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize
the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.
HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it
does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and
for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment,
to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It
is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
59 SCRA 54 – Political Law – Primacy of the Constitution over Contractual Rights
FACTS: Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an
employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member
of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being
enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership
in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be
a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from
EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop
agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the
INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in
1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which
notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-
membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt
from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close
shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional
and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such,
an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there
is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his
employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the
majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a
union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions
and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes
the workers’ right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the
primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY
286 SCRA 109 – Political Law – Free Enterprise
FACTs: The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential
Decree No. 232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid
integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry
in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants
in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory
scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant
operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93
which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply
for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which
is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and
unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition
among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and
the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA
to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have
repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective
regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art.
12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the
public interest so requires.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights –
Equal Protection – Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related
laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27
was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in
favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of
their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also
enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A.
6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke
that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not
be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for
they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In
short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program
because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws
(PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners
may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash.
Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form
of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform
program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the
law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong
to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the
courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that
Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a
power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed
upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine
just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees,
then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not
agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative
body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall
be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a
concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
PLDT VS NTC (190 SCRA 717)
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs National Telecommunications
Commission
190 SCRA 717 [GR No. 88404 October 18, 1990]
Facts: On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was enacted otherwise known
as “An Act Granting Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a franchise to
establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications.”
Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the original corporate name, which was changed to
ETCI with amendment of the articles of incorporation in 1964. Much later,
“CELLCOM Inc.” was the name sought to be adopted before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, but this was withdrawn and abandoned.. On May 13,
1987, alleging urgent public need, ETCI filed an application with public
respondent NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to construct, install, establish, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone system and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in
the Southern Luzon regions, with prayer for provisional authority to operate
phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with
motion to dismiss, however NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC provisional
authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system
initially in Metro Manila subject to terms and conditions, one of which is that
ETCI and PLDT shall enter into an interconnection agreement for the provision
of adequate interconnection facilities between applicant’s cellular mobile
telephone switch and the public switched telephone network and shall jointly
submit such interconnection agreement to the commission for approval ETCI
admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than 40% of the
outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos
reacquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold
more than 40% of their shares to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present
stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964, ETCI had increased
its capital stock from Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in 1987, from Php360,000
to Php40,000,000.
Issue: Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares of stock to the new
stockholders amount to a transfer of ETCI’s franchise which needs
congressional approval pursuant to RA 2090.
Held: No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the grantee of the franchise,
which is the corporation itself and refers to a sale, lease or assignment of that
franchise. It does not include the transfer or sale of shares of stock of a
corporation by the latter’s stockholders.
The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by another law, in
section 20 (h) of the Public Service Act (CA 146). Pursuant thereto, the public
service commission (now NTC) is the government agency vested with the
authority to approve the transfer of more than 40% of the subscribed capital
stock of a telecommunications company to a single transferee.
In other words, transfer of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC
approval, not congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a
series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The approval of the
NTC may be deemed to have been met when it authorized the issuance of the
provisional authority to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the NTC of the
transfers. In fact, the NTC order of November 12,1987 required ETCI to submit
its present capital and ownership structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion
before the NTC, dated November 8, 1987 or more than a year prior to the grant
of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in its capital stock
from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock transfers made by its
stockholders.
A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by
stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise
itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or
transfer of which requires congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the
shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not,
however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In
other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to
another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists
as long as the corporation as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not
thereby invalidated by the transfer of shares. A corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right to continuity
or perpetual succession.
Pamatong vs. Comelec
Prefatory Statement:
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies
(COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for
President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called
"Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general, and
a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated
elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots
while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices,
would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed
against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the
COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate
should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of
disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional
provision?
CASE DIGEST
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities
for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The
COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional
and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he
has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such
a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like
the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give
rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be
regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as
operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and
phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights
may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected
to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek
elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated.
Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations
are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt
from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with
bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.
The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of
the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal
and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine
the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international
lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a
high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only
requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the
day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.
VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO
CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN
GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID,
ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to
furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for
the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received
the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying
that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to
do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire
upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda
Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not
settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were
alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest
they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to
closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to
the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right
to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that the government agencies have
no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern
because the Constitution guarantees access to such information. The Court also
held that a citizen does not need to show any legal or special interest in order to
establish his or her right to information, and that the State bears the burden of
proving that the information is either exempt from disclosure by law or that it is
not of public concern.
Facts: Valentin Legaspi, a citizen of the Philippines, had requested information
from the Civil Service Commission regarding the civil service eligibility of
sanitation employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Commission
rejected the request asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information.
Legaspi then instituted an action asking the Court to compel the Civil Service
Commission to provide the information.
Decision Overview
The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III,
Sec. 7) constitutions recognize the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. Further, they specify that information shall be provided,
subject only to limitations provided by law.
While the Solicitor General interposed a procedural objection challenging the
requester’s standing in this petition, the Court ruled that, in this case, the people
are regarded as the “real party in interest” and the requester, as a citizen
interested in the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special
interest in the result. [p. 2] Further, government agencies have no discretion to
refuse disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern because the
Constitution guarantees access to information of public concern, a recognition
of the essential nature of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
The government agency denying information access has the burden to show
that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the information has been exempted by law from the obligation of disclosure.
Here, the information was of public concern because it is the legitimate concern
of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility
are occupied only by eligible persons, and the Civil Service Commission failed to
cite any law limiting the requester’s right to know. Thus, the Court ordered the
Civil Service Commission to provide the information.
This case expands expression because it upholds the individuals right to request
information from governmental agencies and places the burden of proof on the
government to justify any refusals to provide access to information.
TANADA VS. TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
FACTS: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern,
a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would
have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they
need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that
publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
RULING: Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern
and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and
enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated.
The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The
publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general
applicability” is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one man—
Marcos—are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The
generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive
notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary
constructive notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance
will not even mitigate the crime.
Right to Information (Access to Public Records)
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs.
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.
FACTS:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal
Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the
same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the
Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court
to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and
order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse
access to official court records but that the same is always subject to reasonable
regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further
asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of
its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not
serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to
gratify private site or promote public scandal.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for
investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal
Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the motion
was denied by the Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he
recommended the exoneration of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on
the inspection of the docket books infringe upon the right of individuals to
information.
RULING: No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain
conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that
the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The
access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the
times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.” However, restrictions
on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order.
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
39 Phil. 660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro
were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence
from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in
Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain
plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of
“very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was
later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf
by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had
been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145
of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes
undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their
liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who
else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but
the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the
law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees
of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can
adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things:
“. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Discussions: A generally accepted principle of international law, should be
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then
the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty.

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180,
petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security,
the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
Ruling/s: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In
this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
“does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.”

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged
in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away
or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer
assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an
action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally

accepted principles.

U.S. v. Pompeya G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915
o police power of the state
o "general welfare" clause
FACTS: This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of
the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the
municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without
justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said
municipal ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts
charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal
ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the
Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of
action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving
citizens of their rights therein guaranteed
HELD:
Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No.
1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident
of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder
when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and
good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by
giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The
amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such
service, and who refuse to render the same.
The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the
law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the
central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from
adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and
good government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive
man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the
idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the
peace and good order of his community.
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act
No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully
authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the
Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are
constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons
affected thereby.
Is there a cause of action?
The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the
municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under
18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the
president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in
the law.
"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered."
AGUSTIN VS. EDU [88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979]
Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states
that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning
devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on the owner’s
choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to
have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national
Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such
contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be
suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not
necessary because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can
be use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction
violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh, oppressive
and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become
instant millionaires because of such law.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit.
Held: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise of police
power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote
the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of instruction is
intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such
contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also
failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said
letter of instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it
should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the
other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the
implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the
standards given as stated in our Constitution that “the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the land.
In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle
owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD
provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law.
Petitioner’s allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is
deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
The restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is
lifted making the said law immediately executory.
US v GOMEZ JESUS
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Victor Manuel Gomez appeals from his conviction for possession of cocaine with
the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). Gomez
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress cocaine
seized during a search of a car he was driving. The district court denied the
motion, concluding that Gomez lacked standing to challenge the search of the
car. We affirm Gomez's conviction.
The Honorable Elsijane T. Roy, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
On August 18, 1992, an Arkansas State Trooper stopped a car driven by Gomez
near Little Rock, Arkansas, for going 63 m.p.h. in a 55-m.p.h. zone. Gomez, who
spoke little English, produced an Illinois driver's license and a vehicle
registration listing a different name. An insurance document showed that
another individual was insured on the car. The officer gave Gomez a warning
ticket. Gomez appeared nervous as the officer issued the warning ticket and
Gomez's signature on the ticket did not match the one on the driver's license.
The trooper ran a radio check, which revealed a criminal history of two prior
drug offenses. The officer asked Gomez for permission to search the car, and it is
disputed whether Gomez voluntarily agreed to the search. Upon searching the
vehicle, the trooper discovered 39.3 pounds of cocaine concealed in a secret
panel in the car's back seat and arrested Gomez. Gomez then claimed he owned
neither the car nor the cocaine, and later said another individual had given him
permission to use the vehicle.
Gomez was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than five
kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Before trial, Gomez
moved to suppress the cocaine seized during the search of the car, alleging he
did not give free and voluntary consent to the search. The government argued
Gomez lacked standing to challenge the legality of the search because Gomez did
not own or have permission to use the car. Magistrate Judge John F. Forster, Jr.
filed a Report and Recommendation, ruling that Gomez did not freely and
voluntarily consent to the search, but that he lacked standing to challenge the
search. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation that
Gomez's motion to suppress be denied. Following a two-day trial, a jury
convicted Gomez. Gomez argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
Although factual determinations related to standing should be reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard, Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership v.
City of St. Paul, 924 F.2d 741, 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct.
2853, 115 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1991), we review a district court's ultimate
determination of a denial of a motion to suppress de novo. United States v.
Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1993).
Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted
vicariously, we must first determine whether Gomez had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized. Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 138-44, 99 S.Ct. 421, 427-430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); United
States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 1984). I
f a defendant fails to prove a sufficiently close connection to the relevant places
or objects searched he has no standing to claim that they were searched or
seized illegally. United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1991). T
he defendant moving to suppress has the burden of proving a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130-31 n. 1, 99
S.Ct. at 423 n. 1; United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991). F
actors relevant to the determination of standing include: ownership, possession
and/or control of the area searched or item seized; historical use of the
property or item; ability to regulate access; the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the search; the existence or nonexistence of a subjective
anticipation of privacy; and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of
privacy considering the specific facts of the case. Sanchez, 943 F.2d at 113.
This case is very similar to Sanchez, in which the First Circuit ruled that the
defendant did not have a sufficient expectation of privacy in a vehicle he was
driving and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search of the car. Id. at
114. Sanchez "was driving alone on a long trip at a great distance from the
vehicle's owner," had only casual possession of the car, and no direct authority
from the owner to use it. Id. at 113. The court found the defendant's lack of
authority from the owner of the car and his denial of an interest in the drugs
contained within the car crucial to its determination that defendant lacked
standing. Id. at 114.
Likewise, Gomez has failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the car. He testified he did not own the car, and the owner did not give him
permission to use it. Indeed, he testified he did not even know the owner of the
vehicle, and some unidentified third party told him the owner had given
permission for its use. Similar to Sanchez, Gomez's alleged authorization to use
the car, combined with his denial of an interest in the cocaine found in the car,
do not amount to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. Therefore, he
has no standing to challenge the legality of the search.
Gomez's assertion that the government may not contest his standing because it
adopted contradictory positions with regard to his interest in the cocaine is
unavailing. Gomez urges us to apply Morales, in which a panel of this court
rejected the government's challenge to a defendant's standing despite the
defendant's failure to prove he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a motel
room. 737 F.2d at 763. Morales concluded that the government took
inconsistent positions at trial and on appeal concerning the defendant's
disclaimer of knowledge of the motel room key. Id. Gomez's case, however, is
distinguishable from Morales. First, the government raised the standing issue in
a timely manner when Gomez moved to sup press the evidence before trial.
Second, the government did not change its position between the suppression
hearing and trial. Gomez, not the government, adopted inconsistent positions.
When Gomez was first stopped by the state trooper, he denied any interest in
the cocaine, but later in an effort to establish standing, he testified he knew
secret compartments in the car contained cocaine. The government contended
throughout the pendency of the proceedings that Gomez smuggled cocaine in a
car belonging to another person. We find nothing in the record to support a
conclusion that the government waived its challenge to Gomez's standing.
Accordingly, we affirm Gomez's conviction.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its
members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on
June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City
Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory
powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement
that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels
and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They
claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room,
a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack
of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license
of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio: "The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of
police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to
which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard
of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically
in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to
license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale
of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining
the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice
every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority
in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle,
unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of
the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is
no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."
BUCK V. BELL
Facts of the case
Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental
institution. Her condition had been present in her family for the last three
generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates of
institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of society."
Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to
determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.
Question
Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to
due process of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes
made clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved
but on the process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur
until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could
be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of
Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after
"months of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to
satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best
interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in
order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough."
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN
G.R. No. L-3708; May 18, 1953; 93 Phil. 68
Ponente: Bautista Angelo
Doctrine: Inherent powers of the State; Police Power; The national economy
FACTS: In August 20, 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land in Manila.
Esteban paid 3/4ths of the purchase price and they constituted a mortgage over
one of the parcels to secure the payment of the balance.
However, the war broke out and somehow, Esteban was not able to pay the
balance of the purchase price on the due date and so, on August 2, 1949, Rutter
instituted an action to recover the balance with the CFI.
Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint but as a defense, he claimed
that his obligation was a pre-war obligation covered by the moratorium
embodied in R.A. No. 342.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that “all debts and other monetary
obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract
creating the same or any subsequent aggreement affecting such obligation to
the contrary notwithstanding, shall not due and demandable for a period of
eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor
by the Philippine War Damage Commission.”
The CFI ruled in favor of the debtor Esteban. This brings us to the sole issue
raised by petitioner on appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 342, which declared a moratorium on certain pre-war
obligations, is unconstitutional for violation of the Constitutional provision
prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
HELD: Yes. R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are generally constitutional
Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are not new: “For some 1,400
years western civilization has made use of extraordinary devices for saving the
credit structure, devices generally known as moratoria. The moratorium is
postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the
medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the
sovereign power.”
Such laws were often passed during or after times of financial distress such as
wars and disasters. Similar laws were passed in some US states after the civil
war and they have been declared constitutional. Some laws however, were
declared unconstitutional where the period of moratorium prescribed is
indefinite or unreasonable.
The argument that moratorium laws impair the obligation of contracts does not
hold water. It is justified as a valid exercise of the state of it's police power.
In the US case, Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, it was held
that:
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .
xxx
Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner
otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection that the
performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of
injurious practices. . . .
. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to
a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
end.
Thus the “true test” of constitutionality of a moratorium statute “lies in the
determination of the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that
such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of
the constitution.”
R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional for being unreasonable
The moratorium law, enacted in 1948, came on the heels of executive orders
likewise declaring moratoriums. With its 8 year moratorium period, it is clearly
unreasonable for creditors who have to “observe a vigil of 12 years” to collect
on debts which have become demandable as early as 1941. And the injustice is
more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay
interest during the operation of the relief.
The court also noted that the reconstruction is paying off and that the
Philippines is headed to better times. Hence the Supreme Court declared R.A.
No. 342 unreasonable and oppressive and hence, null and void and without
effect.
Disposition: Esteban was ordered to pay the balance with interest at the rate of
7% per annum with 12% attorneys fees.
US vs TURIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of
Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the
respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit
from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the
slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for
human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given
by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of
Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his
dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation
of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the
state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and
penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would
tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it
will defeat the purpose of the law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if
ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, The
Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of
carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic
that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also
said that these animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental
use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid
exercise of police power
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the
inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking
of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare
and public interest.
UNITED STATES V. CAUSBY Citation. 22 Ill.328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L.
Ed. 1206 (1946)
Brief Fact Summary. Respondents claim that their property was taken, within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft
flights over their house and chicken farm.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner
is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end
of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, Discussion. The national emergency, World War II, meant that the airport,
and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above which was not previously used by large planes, would be the home to large
the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by bombers. The use of the airspace above Respondents’ home and farm was not a
problem previously, because the flights were sporadic and not nearly as loud as
the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942,
the bombers.
and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six
months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The
United States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the
property, and have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production
had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In
the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement
over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the val
ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The
United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.

Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment?

Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the
easement and whether the easement was permanent or temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the
sky above the land. However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given
the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court
noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the
present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights
over the Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be
a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of
the property taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to
have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then
landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of the line of
demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the
value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.

Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and hold
that there has been no taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This
is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the desire to avoid
confusion.