Balag v Senate G.R. No.
234608, July 3, 2018 The court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a
On Sept. 17, 2017, a first year law student of University of
Sto. Tomas, died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the
Aegis Juris Fraternity.
On Oct 11, 2017, Chairman of Senate Committee on Public
Order and Dangerous Drugs, issued a subpoena Ad
Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him to
appear and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry.
Another subpoena Ad Testificandium was issued on Oct 17,
2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day,
requiring him to attend the legislative hearing on Oct. 18,
2017.
On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing. In the
recourse of the proceedings, at around 11:29 in the
morning, Senator Poe asked the petitioner if he was the
President of AJ Fraternity but refused to answer the question
and invoked his right against self-incrimination. He was
asked more than twice by Senator Poe and Lacson but still
refuse to answer and again invoked his right against self-
incrimination. Senator Poe then moved to cite him in
contempt, seconded by Sens Villanueva and Zubiri.
Issue:
Won respondent senate committees acted with grave abuse
of discretion in conducting the legislative inquiry and citing
petitioner in contempt.
Held:
No. The petition is moot and academic. The court ordered in
the interim the immediate release of petitioner pending
resolution dated Dec 12, 2017. Thus, petitioner was no
longer detained under the senate’s authority.
The senate is a continuing institution. In the conduct of its
day-to-day business, the senate of each congress acts
separately and independently of the senate of the congress
before it. Due to the termination of the business of the
senate during the expiration of one congress, all pending
matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the senate are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that congress.
limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be
imposed by the senate pursuant to its inherent power of
contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Sec 21 Art VI
of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting
inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of
persons appearing in or affected therein.
An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will
amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any
person’s right to liberty. Thus, the court must strike a
balance between the interest of the senate and the rights of
persons cited in contempt during legislative inquiries. The
balancing of interest requires that the court take a conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation. These
interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of
his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives
on the other.
The court finds that the period of imprisonment under the
inherent power of contempt by the senate during inquiries in
aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. As
legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the
recalcitrant witness likewise ends.
Judicial Review f President’s Veto Power

GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452)
FACTS: Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking the
constitutionality of presidential veto of sec. 55. Sec. 55 of
the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989
Sec.55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase of
recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced
by congress: no item of appropriation recommended by the
president in the budget submitted to congress pursuant to
art. VII, sec. 22 of the constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this act shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the presided in the budget shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this act.
Dec. 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for
FY 1989. Dec 29, 1988; president signed the bill into law but
vetoed 7 special provisions and sec 55 which is a general
provision. The reason of the president in vetoing such
section is because it violates Art 6, Sec 25 (5) of the
constitution. Furthermore, sec 55 not only nullify the
constitutional and statutory authority of the president, but
also the senate president, speaker of the house, chief
justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. Feb. 1989; congress mentioned in
a resolution that the veto by the president of sec. 55 is
unconstitutional which means sec. 55 will be in effect. Apr.
1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar
provision was vetoed by the president. It appears in the
general appropriations act of 1990. Instead of sec. 55, such
provision was located in sec. 16 of the said bill. It must be
noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the “use of savings”
appears in sec. 12, separate and apart from sec. 55;
whereas in the 1990 appropriations act, the “use of savings”
and the vetoes provision have been comingled in sec. 16
only, with the vetoed provision made to appear as a
condition or restriction.
The petitioners cause is anchored on the following:
1. The president’s veto power does not Cover provisions,
that she exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec
55 (FY 89) and sec 16 (FY 90) because they are provisions
2. When the president objects to a provision, she cannot
item-veto but instead veto the entire bill
3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions
4. The power of augmentation in art. 6, sec. 25 (5) of the
constitution has to be provided for by law, which means the
congress has also the power to determine restrictions
The veto power of the president can be found in art. 6, sec.
27, of the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the president of sec. 55
of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its
counterpart sec. 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill, which
are all provisions, is unconstitutional and without effect.
DECISION: Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential
veto is constitutional.
RATIO: The argument that the president may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be
the subject of a separate veto. The same argument also
overlooks the constitutional mandate that such provision is
only limited in its operation to some particular appropriation
which it relates as stated in art. 6 sec. 25 (2) of the
constitution.
The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in the
executive. The legislative has the affirmative power to enact
laws; the chief executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the
legislature. It follows that the chief executive must find his
authority in the constitution. Thus, such act of the president
is constitutional and does not hamper with the legislative
function.
Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a 4. NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE
condition or restriction of an appropriation while allowing PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF
the appropriation itself to stand. For this rule to apply, ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
conditions or restrictions should be such in the real sense of
the term, not some matter which is more properly dealt with
in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an
appropriations bill must exhibit a connection with money
items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditureWith this, sec. 55 (FY 89) and sec. 16 (FY 90) are
held to be inappropriate conditions. They are general law
measures more appropriate for separate legislation. They do
not show the necessary connection with a schedule of
expenditures. Considering that sec. 55 (FY 89) and sec. 16
(FY 90) are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the
president.
If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy
laid down by the constitution is crystal clear. A presidential
veto may be overridden by the votes of 2/3 of members of
congress as stated in art 6, sec 27 (1) of the constitution.
SEC. 28.
1. THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND
EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE
SYSTEM OF TAXATION.
2. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE
PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND SUBJECT
TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY
IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS,
TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND OTHER DUTIES OR
IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT.
3. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND
PERSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO,
MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS,
BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND
EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
TAXATION.