Sexual Perversion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lee Chun Tuan Jarrod Julian
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy (Adv Seminars and Shorter Thesis)(CAPPE) (with
coursework component)
February 2011
Department of Philosophy
The University of Melbourne

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Newman College

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ii 
 
 Abstract 
The concept of sexual perversion is not a new one, and yet it appears that attempts, both
philosophical and non-philosophical, to provide a coherent and justified account have failed. In this
paper, I explore what the four main accounts of sex and sexual perversion – procreation, love,
communication and plain sex – have to say about sexual perversion and why they run into the
problems that they face.

Following this, I examine the arguments presented by Humber, Priest and Primoratz against
the concept of sexual perversion. While Priest’s and Humber’s arguments seem to provide a
compelling case against the concept of sexual perversion, attacking its logical foundations,
rejoinders are available through the arguments of Baltzly and Kekes. Primoratz’s claim that he has
surveyed the main possible lines that an argument for the concept of sexual perversion could take is
overstated because there remains at least one more option. I argue that the aforementioned accounts
of sex and sexual perversion fail because they fall too sharply along the mind-body divide, either by
privileging the rational purposes that sex can be put to, over and above the physicality of sex, or
because there is too much emphasis on the physicality of sex such that its rational aspects are
overlooked.

With this in mind, I propose a new account of sexual perversion that is premised on a view
of human sexuality that acknowledges the equal importance of both the rational and physical
aspects of human sexuality in the flourishing of the human being. Such an approach, I argue, allows
us to generate a concept of sexual perversion that is largely in line with ordinary usage.

iii 
 
 Declaration 

This is to certify that

(i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the Masters,
(ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
(iii) the thesis is 22,950 words in length, inclusive of footnotes, but exclusive of tables, maps,
bibliographies and appendices.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

iv 
 
 Acknowledgements 
To the Almighty, without whom all this would not have been possible. Thank you for your constant
guidance and the many people that you have sent into my life during this period of reading and
writing.

To my two supervisors, Andrew Alexandra and Igor Primoratz, thank you both for your wonderful,
efficient and effective supervision. Thank you for your insight and comments, without which this
thesis could not have been completed. Thank you too for your encouragement and guidance, and
thank you for being so generous with your time. I will be always grateful.

To my two examiners, Dirk Baltzly and Raja Halwani, for their invaluable advice on how to revise
the thesis and make it better.

To Bill Uren, S.J., thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule for consultation on various
topics pertaining to the thesis. Your guidance and love are greatly appreciated.

And finally to Newman College, the community that sustained me and enriched me during my time
there, my deepest thanks. Thank you all for making my time there a wonderful and life-giving time.
Thank you for providing me with a space where I can call home. You kept me sane throughout the
whole process and that can never be underestimated.

v 
 
 Contents 
 
  
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. iii

Declaration ......................................................................................................................................... iv

Acknowledgements..............................................................................................................................v

Introduction..........................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1 – Against Sexual Perversion ...............................................................................................3

Section 1 – Ordinary Usage .............................................................................................................3

Section 2 – The Philosophical Accounts of Sex and Sexual Perversion .........................................5

Section 2.1 Sex as Procreation .........................................................................................................5

Section 2.2 Sex as Love .................................................................................................................11

Section 2.3 Sex as Communication................................................................................................14

Section 2.4 Plain Sex .....................................................................................................................18

Section 2.5 The Case Against Perversion ......................................................................................21

Chapter 2 – Rehabilitating Sexual Perversion ...................................................................................25

Section 1 – Making a Case for Sexual Perversion .........................................................................25

Section 2 – A New Account Of Sexual Perversion .......................................................................31

Section 2.1 Criteria for Success .....................................................................................................31

Section 2.2 Harmony as an Ideal ...................................................................................................32

Section 2.3 Testing the Account ....................................................................................................41

Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................49

Works Consulted ...............................................................................................................................50

 
 
 
 
 

 
 Introduction 
Sexual perversion as a concept has been with us for a long time and yet if one was asked to
give a definition of what it means for an act to be perverted, one would be hard-pressed to offer a
definition that is coherent and justified. Not only has ordinary usage failed in this regard,
philosophical accounts are charged to have singularly failed as well (Primoratz, “Sexual
Perversion”). Indeed, Graham Priest argued that “the notion of sexual perversion makes no sense”
as the concept rests on a discredited Aristotelian metaphysic (371). These failures to provide a
coherent and justified account, coupled with its heavy condemnatory tones, have led to calls for the
concept to be abandoned and replaced by other more precise terms, such as atypical sexual acts or
atypical sexually immoral acts. Yet hope remains for the concept. While the case against sexual
perversion as presented by Priest, Primoratz and James M. Humber seem to be a strong one, it is
not insurmountable. Not only is Priest’s conclusion overstated, as Dirk Baltzly showed in
“Peripatetic Perversions: A Neo-Aristotelian Account of the Nature of Sexual Perversion”,
Humber’s argument that human nature is an essentially contested concept falls through as well.
Primoratz’s claim that he has surveyed the main possible lines of argument for the concept of
sexual perversion is also a little overstated for there is at least one more option open to us. In this
thesis, I shall attempt to show how if we are willing to view the mental and the physical aspects of
human sexuality as equally important in the flourishing of the human being, an account of sexual
perversion that is largely commensurate with ordinary usage can be given.
My approach shall be thus. This thesis is split into two parts. The first chapter is focused on
setting up the problem of sexual perversion while the second focuses on rehabilitating the concept
of sexual perversion. I begin by examining how ordinary usage of the term “sexual perversion” is
inconsistent before proceeding to examine what Alan Goldman and Primoratz have identified as the
four main accounts of sex – procreation, love, communication and plain sex – and what they have
to say about sexual perversion. Each account however faces its own share of problems in putting
forth their account of sexual perversion, leading Primoratz to argue that it is a concept that should
be jettisoned. It is in this strain that we turn to Priest’s and Humber’s systematic analyses of why
sexual perversion should be jettisoned. From there, I proceed to rehabilitate the concept, starting
first with Baltzly’s rejoinder to Priest before moving on to examine why Humber’s point against
sexual perversion is objectionable. I then show how the previous accounts of sex and sexual
perversion presented earlier come down too strongly on either side of the mind-body divide.
Finally, the last part of the paper demonstrates how a justifiable concept of sexual perversion is
possible if we assume an equality between mind and body where human sexuality is concerned.

1 
 
 Before we begin proper, allow me to note that while the question of sexual perversion is
concerned with the prescriptive enterprise of the philosophy of sex, the descriptive enterprise
cannot be entirely neglected here for the descriptive enterprise informs the prescriptive enterprise.
This is not to say that the descriptive enterprise is the same thing as the prescriptive enterprise; that
would be to commit the is-ought fallacy that Hume had so rightly pointed out. Rather, it is to say
that in order to truly understand where the particular prescriptive account is coming from, an
understanding of its corresponding descriptive account is essential. As we shall see later, it is the
descriptive accounts underlying the prescriptive accounts that are the downfall of the prescriptive
accounts. Thus, some part of this thesis is devoted to discussion of the descriptive enterprise.

2 
 
 Chapter 1 – Against Sexual Perversion 
Section 1 – Ordinary Usage 
For a term like sexual perversion, one might think that turning to philosophy for answers
would be a bit of an overkill. After all, is it not clear which acts are perverted and which are not?
For starters, there is a traditional list of perversions: bestiality, paedophilia, necrophilia, urophilia,
coprophilia, object fetishism, sadism, masochism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, and homosexuality.
The list is obviously incomplete but nonetheless, it is a list that most would agree to, with the
possible exception of the last. Furthermore, most, if not all, would agree that the term is not simply
used descriptively but prescriptively. In other words, the person who has committed the perverted
act faces disapproval, and sometimes, condemnation. Lastly, there seems to be an agreement that
that which is perverted is also unnatural, thereby giving a seemingly objective reason for why an
act is perverted or not.
Yet this is as far as ordinary usage goes. For one thing, as hinted at earlier, homosexuality,
traditionally seen as a perversion, is no longer readily condemned as one in recent times, which
raises the possibility that the other acts on the list are not perversions too. This brings up the next
question: how do we determine what is perverted and what is not? Ordinary usage seems unable to
answer this question, not least because people’s opinions are extremely divided on this issue. When
I was giving a presentation on this topic, I asked my audience which acts they thought were
perverted and which were not. The answers that I got varied widely: some thought that
masturbation was a perversion, some did not think so; some thought that anal sex was perverted,
some did not; some thought that bestiality was more perverted than paedophilia, some thought
otherwise; some did not even think that there was such a thing as perversion. Indeed, even though
they generally agreed that perversion had to do with the unnatural, they could not agree on what
unnatural meant, thus leading to disagreement on the extension of the concept of sexual perversion.
Therefore, pinning down some consistency for ordinary usage seems extremely difficult.
Furthermore, as Primoratz pointed out, though people seem to agree that perversion is a
prescriptive concept, they disagree on exactly the kind and degree of disapproval that is present
(“Sexual Perversion” 245). In cases like object fetishism, the disapproval seems rather minor, if not
altogether morally innocuous. Yet in cases like sadistic rape and paedophilia, the disapproval takes
on a decidedly moral overtone and amounts to condemnation even. In cases like coprophilia and
urophilia, the morality of the act appears not to come as much into it as the simple distastefulness
of such an act. In addition, as pointed out earlier, where people would place certain acts on the scale
of perversion varies, resulting in a rather confused picture of sexual perversion where we are
uncertain as to whether the act in question should be condemned or not, and if so, to what extent,
and if it should be condemned over and above a particular act.
3 
 
 Lastly, while most do agree that the concept of perversion is connected to the idea of the
unnatural, this seems to lead us to make the further connection that what is perverted is that which
is statistically abnormal. Yet as Primoratz rightly points out, while we seem to be ready to allow for
homosexuality to no longer be on the list of perversions due to its ever-increasing prevalence in the
world today, “it is not at all clear that, if we were to make a similar discovery with regard to, say,
necrophilia or bestiality, we would be as ready to declassify it as perversion and come to think of it
as but another unproblematic sexual orientation” (“Sexual Perversion” 246).
Hence, as Primoratz concludes, ordinary usage is “quite unhelpful” in helping us to arrive at
a coherent and consistent concept of sexual perversion. This is where the main philosophical
accounts of sex come in.

4 
 
Section 2 – The Philosophical Accounts of Sex and Sexual Perversion 
Section 2.1 Sex as Procreation 
The oldest and most comprehensive philosophical account of sex and sexual perversion is
probably the traditional account of sex as procreation. Typically associated with its staunchest
proponent, the Catholic Church, this account argues that sex should be understood and evaluated in
terms of its natural, biological purpose, i.e. reproduction. It makes the further connection between
the natural and the moral, arguing that sexual acts are proper and legitimate if and only if it is open
to the value of procreation. Otherwise, it is deemed to be unnatural, perverted and thus, immoral.
For example, Aquinas, one of the preeminent teachers of sexual morality in the Church, defined
“sin[s] against nature” as those sexual acts that are “intrinsically unfit for generation”, i.e. that they
are not open to procreation (Anscombe 34). Under this banner of sin, traditional perversions like
bestiality, homosexuality, necrophilia, and crucially, though certainly not intuitively, contraceptive
sex and masturbation, are captured.
Indeed, the account is arguably the most prohibitive among the four main accounts of sex
and sexual perversion; it certainly has the widest range of prohibitions and carries the heaviest
condemnation. That this is so is unsurprising given that underlying the account is the view that in
itself, the body is suspect and the life of the mind or the soul is to be privileged over that of the
body. For example, Paul, who brought in dualistic, anti-body Platonic thought into Christianity,
preached that “with my mind, [I] serve the law of God but, with my flesh, the law of sin” (New
American Bible Rom. 7.25). Augustine, also a Platonist, thought that human sexuality was fallen,
serving merely to distract us from God because, in being beyond human control sometimes, it stops
us from reaching that freedom of will that God had intended for us (West 29).1 As Anscombe
observes, for Augustine, “intercourse for the sake of getting children is good but the need for sexual
intercourse otherwise...is an infirmity” (33). And while Aquinas was an Aristotelian and thus had a
more moderate view on pleasure (West 20), H. A. Williams nonetheless comments that for
Aquinas, “sexual intercourse between a lawfully wedded man and wife could be without sin only if
the partners at the time of intercourse were both entertaining the rational purpose of procreating
children” (31, emphasis added). In line with Augustine then, Aquinas thought that “intercourse
sought out of lust, only for the sake of pleasure, is sin” (Anscombe 34). Furthemore, even on the
more forgiving, contemporaneous Catholic view, sex cannot be enjoyed simply for the sake of
sexual pleasures and must always be enjoyed within the rational context of the marital act (Paul VI
135-137).

                                                            
1
 To his credit, Augustine was never an all‐out hater of the body and sexuality, and must thus be distinguished from 
the Manicheans, the very group that he was fighting against. While the Manicheans preached total sexual abstinence, 
Augustine argued that there was a divinely ordained place in God’s plan for marriage, procreation and sex. See West 
27‐30.  
5 
 
 In this context then, it is not unexpected that the procreation account views sexual
perversions in an extremely dim light. Aquinas, for example, deems perversions as “the gravest of
sins”, far more grave than acts like rape and adultery which merely deviate from the law of human
reason. For Aquinas, a perverted act is “a violation of [the plan of nature] ... [and] is an affront to
God, the ordainer of nature” (qtd. in West 38). To make matters worse, in his ranking of
perversions, Aquinas places homosexuality near the top, with only bestiality viewed as being more
perverted:

And so, to compare the unnatural sins of lechery, the lowest rank is held by solitary
sin, where the intercourse of one with another is omitted. The greatest is that of
bestiality, which does not observe the due species... Afterwards comes sodomy, which
does not observe the due sex. After this the lechery which does not observe the due
mode of intercourse, and this is worse if effected not in the right vessel than if the
inordinateness concerns other modes of intimacy. (qtd. in West 39)

A few objections come immediately to mind. Firstly, Aquinas’ condemnation of perverted

acts seems overly harsh in places. It certainly seems unintuitive that masturbation and
homosexuality, acts that Aquinas himself conceded as hurting nobody else, are graver sins than
rape and adultery. To further say that homosexuality is only less perverted than bestiality merely
lends insult to injury.
Also, the justification that these acts are perverted because they are an affront to God hardly
seems believable unless one is a believer. If one does not believe in the existence of God, much less
the Catholic version, then it is unclear why one should accept Aquinas’ argument here. Indeed,
many believers themselves have trouble accepting all that the Church teaches on sexual perversion,
finding it overly strict and prohibitive, not to mention unbelievers.
Even if we were to set the issue of God aside and employ a non-theistic version of the
argument however, it still remains unclear that it necessarily is nature’s purpose for us to procreate.
If nature’s purposes are “evident more in the rule than in the exception”, then, Joseph Fletcher
argues, “it would follow that nature’s purpose in sex is much more to contrive intercourse than
conception” (qtd. in Primoratz, Ethics 16-17). This is because of the period of a woman’s life when
she is able to conceive, she is fertile only one out of seven days.
Furthermore, it is not clear that an unnatural act is always an immoral act. As Aquinas
himself concedes, “it is either a slight sin, or none at all, for a person to use a part of the body for a
different use than that to which it is directed by nature… because man’s good is not much opposed
by such inordinate use” (Aquinas 412). Walking on one’s hands might be a worthless endeavour
but it can hardly be seen as an immoral act. Here we have an unnatural, thus ‘perverted’, act which
is also, at the very least, morally permissible. Aquinas tries to circumvent this problem by adding

6 
 
the clause “incompatible with the natural good; namely, the preservation of the species”. This
preservation of the species, according to Aquinas, comprises the reproductive act as well as the
process of raising the child to maturity. Hence, masturbation and fornication are immoral because
the former is not a reproductive act while the latter, though a reproductive act, does not capture the
wider meaning of procreation since fornication would not provide the stable backdrop needed to
raise children properly. Still, it is not clear that anything which is incompatible with the natural
good is necessarily immoral. To continue eating even though one is already full might not be
compatible with the natural good of preserving and improving one’s health, but it hardly seems
worthy of condemnation and of the label of immorality. The same could be said for sex. To practise
sex within the context of a marriage where both spouses are showing and developing their love for
one another in the sexual act and are always open to the value of procreation might be ideal. But
one would be hard-pressed to argue that not living up to this ideal would necessarily warrant
condemnation or at least of the label of immorality, especially in cases where no harm, coercion or
deceit is present.
To overcome these problems, contemporary philosophers like John Finnis and Germain
Grisez have employed and rehabilitated natural law theory, arguing that what is moral is based on
what is natural. However, unlike its predecessor, the notion of natural on this version is not based
on whether our acts are natural per se (say walking on one’s feet instead of one’s hands) but on
whether the act is a reasonable one. In other words, natural law theory is a theory of practical
rationality. As Finnis observes, we are naturally “bias[ed] … towards actually making choices that
are intelligibly (because intelligently) related to the goods which are understood to be attainable, or
at stake, in one’s situation” (“Natural Law” 6). In this way, without appealing to God, we can
conclude that a particular act is unnatural, and thus perverted, if the act is unreasonable.
Finnis’ contention then is that so long as a sexual act is not open to the basic value of
procreation, it is unreasonable, and thus unnatural and perverted. His argument goes something like
this. Though man is a complex being, we can nonetheless recognize within man “a limited number
of basic and controlling inclinations towards a limited number of basic goods” (“Natural Law” 6).
The intellect is also able to recognise “naturally and spontaneously” that each good is “an instance
of a value” such that there are certain basic values that we are all inclined towards, such as life,
health, friendship, and procreation (“Natural Law” 7, emphasis his). For Finnis, these values are
basic in the sense that (i) they are pre-moral values and moral principles are built on them and, (ii)
they are “irreducibly attractive in [their] own right [and] ... are not reasoned to or in need of an
effort of justification”. In other words, the basic values are good simply because they are good and
we know that they are good because of the natural inclinations within us that draw us towards these
basic goods, and thus basic values. Furthermore, these values are all “equally self-evidently
7 
 
attractive” (“Natural Law” 9). Hence, Finnis proposes that the norm that guides our actions is that
in all that we do, we have to remain open to all the basic values. Since procreation is one of these
basic values, Finnis is then able to arrive at a similar set of prohibitions as the morality that he
inherited, condemning acts like masturbation, homosexuality, bestiality, and contraceptive sex as
perverted either because of “an inadequate response, or direct closure, to the basic procreative value
that they put in question” (“Natural Law” 25).2
While Finnis’ account does neatly accommodate the traditional perversions, his account
seems implausible on one fundamental point: that of remaining open to all the basic values. For it is
possible for a person to be in a situation where two or more basic values are ‘competing’ such that
he can only choose to realize one particular value. For instance, suppose my wife and I find out that
I had contracted AIDS due to a faulty blood transfusion procedure. According to Finnis,
procreation, conjugal love and life are three equally basic values. However, in this case, it seems
impossible for us to remain open to all three values at the same time. It seems that we either have to
choose life or we have to choose procreation and conjugal love; remaining open to all three values
at the same time is impossible. Finnis’ norm is thus not always attainable.
One way to get around this problem is to take Finnis’ exhortation of remaining open to the
basic values as to mean that one should give due consideration to the values, rather than that one
can never choose against any of the values. However, Finnis himself hinted that such a course of
action would merely be a disingenuous attempt to rationalise away one’s choice against a basic
value (“Natural Law” 19). In addition, if the point is to simply focus on intention and not execution,
then it is unclear just how Finnis or the Church can defend their prohibitive stance against
contraceptive sex whilst maintaining that the use of the rhythm method is permissible.
Yet this is something that Anscombe undertook to defend in her paper, “Contraception and
Chastity”, arguing that while the intentions of taking oral contraceptives might seem not unlike that
of the rhythm method, there is a distinction between intentions that we must take note of. Intention
can mean “the intentionalness of the thing you’re doing – that you’re doing this on purpose – and
when it means a further or accompanying intention with which you do the thing” (41, emphasis
hers). Hence, contraception and the rhythm method can be alike “in respect of further intention, and
these further intentions may be good, justified, excellent”, say because the couple does not have the
financial resources to bring up the children. However, there is another meaning of intention.
Anscombe points out that “contraceptive intercourse is faulted, not on account of this further
intention, but because of the kind of intentional action you are doing” (emphasis added). For
                                                            
2
 While Finnis conceded that fornication is trivially open to procreation, yet because it does not take place within “an 
assured communio personarum”, i.e. a communion of persons, it is nonetheless perverted because of its “inadequate 
openness to procreation” when understood in the “distinctively intense” Christian manner of understanding 
procreation. See Finnis 24. 
8 
 
Anscombe, contraception is no longer a kind of act “by which life is transmitted, but is purposely
rendered infertile, and so changed to another sort of act altogether”, and is for that reason to be
faulted. The rhythm method, on the other hand, is “[a]n act of intercourse at an infertile time [and]
is a perfectly ordinary act of intercourse” (42). In other words, contraception always causes the
sexual act to be an infertile one, unlike the rhythm method as “not having it next week isn’t
something that does something to today’s intercourse to turn it into an infertile act” unless, as
Anscombe points out, you intend never to have intercourse during fertile periods or you intend not
to have any more children using this means, both of which she thinks are immoral acts (43).
But Anscombe’s argument is crucially flawed in one respect. If the rhythm method is used
because one intends not to conceive, then “qua [one’s] intentional action...what [one does] is
something intrinsically unapt for generation”(Anscombe 42-43, emphasis added)! Indeed, the use
of oral contraceptives and the rhythm method are analogous in important respects. For while the
use of oral contraceptives constitutes an extra step to the sex act, this is in no way importantly
different from that of waiting for the right time to have sexual intercourse, i.e. the rhythm method;
both are steps, separable from the sex act, that are pursued to prevent conception. In contrast, the
use of condoms puts a physical barrier between the sexual organs. Hence, the use of oral
contraceptives is, in this sense, only as guilty of changing the sex act as the rhythm method. If
taking an extra step prior to the sex act in order to prevent conception is considered to change the
sex act, then for all intents and purposes, both the use of oral contraceptives and the rhythm method
are no longer the kind of acts “by which life is transmitted, but is purposely rendered infertile, and
so changed to another sort of act altogether”, and is for that reason to be faulted. If the focus is
supposedly on intention, as Anscombe maintains that it should be (41), then to be consistent, the
procreation account would have to condemn the use of the rhythm method as perverted as the use
of oral contraceptives, which they do not.
Perhaps a more promising ‘innovation’ of Finnis’ argument would be that presented by
Donald Levy. Rather than arguing that one should remain open to all the basic values, Levy
maintains that it is permissible to “deny [oneself] or another one or more of these basic human
goods for the sake of another basic human good” (200). To do otherwise would be unnatural, and
thus perverted. Since pleasure is not included in his list of basic human goods, which are “life,
health, control of one’s bodily and psychic functions, the capacity for knowledge and love”, any
sexual act that is committed for the sole sake of pleasure and contrary to a basic human good is
deemed as perverted (199).
While such an account does circumvent the problem Finnis’ account faced, it is unable to
account for most of the traditional perversions. Priest rightly points out that “[n]one of
homosexuality, buggery, sadomasochism would seem to fall into this category [of perversion]”
9 
 
(363). Furthermore, solitary sexual acts are also not perverted since they “would not seem to
require the actor to deny anyone – including himself or herself – anything”. Priest’s objection
seems pretty spot on. There certainly seems no necessary connection between, say, indulging in
sadomasochism and denying anyone a basic human good; in fact, it could be argued that
sadomasochism could help one to become more at home with one’s body and thereby attain the
basic human goods of being in control of one’s bodily and psychic functions and (mental) health.
Primoratz further points out that necrophilia and bestiality are also not so much cases of
endangering or damaging one’s capacity to love as they are of revealing that one has lost the
capacity to love other people – “Indeed, the former rules out the latter: one cannot endanger,
damage, or destroy something one does not have in the first place”(“Sexual Perversion 253-254). In
this way, sexual acts like necrophilia, bestiality and fetishism are, on this account, not perversions,
which is a problem. As Priest observes, “We noted a certain amount of flexibility as to what one
might classify as a perversion, but this flexibility hardly extends to ruling out paradigm cases
wholesale” (363).
In sum, the arguments presented earlier have failed to present us with a coherent and
justified account of sex and sexual perversion. Setting aside the various particular difficulties each
version faces, a common problem seems to be an unwillingness to make a distinction between
ideals and norms. Each version essentially presents us with a False Dilemma: either an act is ideal
or it is immoral, such that anything which falls short of the ideal of procreation is to be condemned
as perverted. However, this is clearly not the case. Though an act might fall short of an ideal, this in
no way guarantees that it is an immoral act; it could simply be a morally permissible (though not
admirable) act as shown by the earlier example about continuing to eat even though one is already
full. The procreation view thus fails to give us a justified concept of sexual perversion because it
unjustifiably tries to impose an ideal as a norm for everyone to follow.

10 
 
Section 2.2 Sex as Love 
The next account of sexual perversion views sex in terms of love. Though it has had a long
history, it has only been recently given a philosophical treatment by Roger Scruton in Sexual
Desire. For Scruton, “every developed form of sexual desire will tend to reach beyond the present
encounter to a project of inner union with its object”, i.e. sexual desire is not merely aimed at sex
itself, but towards erotic love (93). Like the procreation account, this account views sexual
perversion to be a morally emphatic notion.
Employing a phenomenological approach to human sexuality, Scruton argues that “the three
basic phenomena of human sexual feeling: arousal, desire and love… are purely human
phenomena” (14). For Scruton, sexual pleasure, and thus arousal and desire, is physical as well as
intentional because unlike a mere “[pleasure] of sensation”, it is object-directed and “may be in
conflict with the facts” (emphasis his). This explains why, when one realises that the touch on one’s
back belongs to an interloper and not to one’s lover, the pleasure is instantly extinguished. This is
not so in the case of a pleasure of sensation for even “after being told that what I took for water is
really acid”, the pleasure might nonetheless linger in a diminished form. Therefore, Scruton
concludes that for one to truly enjoy sexual pleasure, one must have an intentional object and the
“caresses” by him are not “the accidental causes of a pleasurable sensation which might have been
caused in some other way”. Thus, sexual pleasure is not merely intentional but also interpersonal.
In addition, as shown by the interloper example, the intentional object has to be a particular
someone. Scruton calls this “the individualising intentionality of desire” (78). In fact, it is not
simply the body that is desired but the other’s personality as embodied in his body, “his ‘being who
he is’” such that we do not simply desire “just any person, answering to whatever [physical]
description” (76).
The upshot of this feature of desire is that one is left vulnerable to the other because one has
revealed one’s desire for the other and he is free to reject or accept you (82). As this vulnerability is
“finally assuaged only in love”, Scruton argues that the aim of sexual desire is not merely sex but
“union with the other”, leading to sexual pleasure, intimacy, and ultimately to erotic love (93). It is
in this vein that Scruton concludes that “every developed form of sexual desire will tend to reach
beyond the present encounter to a project of inner union with its object”.
With erotic love as the sexual virtue, Scruton generates his account of sexual perversion.
For Scruton, perverted acts are “deviations from the unity of animal and interpersonal relation”
(289). What this means is that it is perverted to “detach the sexual urge from its interpersonal
intentionality, and reconstitute it in impersonal, and purely ‘bodily’ terms”. In short, all sexual acts
that are detached from the virtue of erotic love are perverted (293). Impersonal sex is thus perverted
because “[t]he complete or partial failure to recognise, in and through desire, the personal existence
11 
 
of the other is therefore an affront, both to him and to oneself” (289). From here, Scruton proceeds
to underwrite most of the prohibitive sexual morality put forth by the procreation account,
preserving traditional perversions like bestiality, necrophilia and paedophilia. However, unlike the
procreation account, and to his advantage, Scruton argues that contraceptive sex and homosexuality
are not perverted.3 Indeed, Scruton also holds the not-so-unintuitive view that sadomasochistic sex
could potentially not be perverted – it could be non-perverse if “the aspect of pain inflicted and
endured becomes incorporated into the love-play of the partners, and is thereby transcended” (301).
However, Scruton’s account is not free of problems either. Firstly, Primoratz points out that
in order for Scruton to arrive at the conclusion that all impersonal sex is perverted, he has to justify
the claim that in sex, one should treat the other as the unique human being that the other is (Ethics
29). This claim, however, is radically different from the weaker claim that because sex is an
interpersonal experience, we should treat the other party as a human being. While it is true that in
sex, as in our other actions, we should treat others as human beings worthy of respect, i.e. that we
should not treat them as merely means to an end, this in no way justifies the stronger claim that we
should treat others as the particular, unique individual that he is. Indeed, treating the other as a
person is in no way incommensurable with casual sex which, on Scruton’s view, would be
perverted. As A. Ellis points out, there seems to be nothing intrinsically or characteristically
problematic where the motives and consequences of casual sex are concerned (125-137). Just as we
do not think that it is problematic for a man to go down to a basketball court and play basketball
with anyone who he finds there, even though he is not interested in them as particular, unique
individuals with unique sets of skills, it seems at least morally permissible to engage in honest,
aboveboard casual sex where the parties involved treat each other as persons but not necessarily as
the particular, unique individuals that they are.
Secondly, and more importantly, Scruton’s account makes the exact same mistake as the
procreation view in conflating ideals with norms. Indeed, it is only in treating the ideal of erotic
love as a norm that Scruton is able to arrive at his account of sexual perversion. This move,
however, is unjustified for it is not clear that if a sex act is detached from erotic love that it is
therefore necessarily perverted. A case in point would be that of sex between a couple who only got
married because it was an arranged marriage. They have no love for each other but are nonetheless
able to live amicably and simply want to have children. It is not great sex to be sure, but to call it
perverted because it falls short of Scruton’s ideal of erotic love would be too harsh. Scruton’s
account then, like the procreation account, does not allow a space for morally permissible, though
not admirable, sex acts without offering any good justification for it.
                                                            
3
 See Scruton 287 for his argument against viewing contraceptive sex as a perversion and 305 for his argument against 
homosexuality. 
12 
 
 Thus, while Scruton’s account does seem to enjoy some advantages over the procreation
view, not least because of his concessions to homosexuality and contraceptive sex, it nonetheless
faces problems of its own.

13 
 
Section 2.3 Sex as Communication 
The view that sex is a means of communication is a comparatively recent one. Unlike the
procreation and love accounts, this view presents sexual perversion as a morally neutral notion.
Introduced by Sartre, it essentially argues that sex is the communication of a message, such as love,
gratitude, hate, passivity and trust. Solomon’s account is possibly the best of this group of views as
Sartre’s view seems far too pessimistic and dark, arguing that the message that sex communicates is
all about the possession and degradation of the other so as to “gain recognition of one’s own
freedom at the expense of the other”, while Nagel’s innovation of replacing the dark ‘content’ of
Sartre with arousal is far too vague for “we must know arousal of what, for what, to what end”,
which Nagel fails to give in his account (Solomon, “Sexual Paradigms” 87).
For Solomon, sex is the communication between persons of a particular message as “there
can be no strictly private language”(“Sex” 281). Sex is observed to have “its own grammar,
delineated by the body, and its own phonetics of touch and movement” where the equivalent of a
sentence is the gesture. Though it is true that we can communicate simply through words rather
than actions, Solomon argues that “some attitudes, e.g. tenderness and trust, domination and
passivity, are best expressed sexually” (“Sexual Paradigms” 89). Hence, “[w]hatever else sexuality
might be and for whatever purposes it might be used or abused, it is first of all language” (“Sex”
281).
With this view of sex in mind, Solomon generates his account of sexual perversion. Yet as
Primoratz observes, his stance on sexual perversion is somewhat ambiguous (“Sexual Perversion”
249). For while Solomon begins his account of sexual perversion in “Sex and Perversion” as
remarking that it is little more than a “logical category” and that it would be “advisable to drop the
notion of perversion altogether and content ourselves with “sexual incompatibility” or “sexual
misunderstanding””, he nonetheless proceeds to give a definition of sexual perversion as a
“communication breakdown” (282-283). To compound the confusion, in a separate paper, “Sexual
Paradigms”, Solomon argues that sex as a language admits of two kinds of perversions – a deviance
of form and content – linking a breakdown in communication to form rather than to content while
pointing out that “the more problematic perversions are the semantic deviations, of which the most
serious are those involving insincerity, the bodily equivalent of the lie”(90). Hence, his treatment of
sadism in “Sexual Paradigms” is that it “is not so much a breakdown in communication ... as an
excessive expression of a particular content, namely the attitude of domination, perhaps mixed with
hatred, fear, and other negative attitudes” while masochism is the “excessive expression of an
attitude of victimization, shame, or inferiority” (89). Compare this to the seemingly contradictory
way with which he spoke about sadism and masochism in “Sex and Perversion”:

14 
 
 When expressions of domination and dependence turn into actions, they become
sadism and masochism, respectively. If these feelings are not complementary, they
can only be interpreted as a communication breakdown, as sexual incompatibility.
(283-284)

To make sense of this, we have to understand that in “Sex and Perversion”, when speaking
about various perversions like ‘non-complementary’ sadomasochistic sex as examples of a
breakdown in communication, he had inserted the caveat that “[s]exual activities themselves are not
perverted; people are perverted”, i.e. that these activities might or might not be considered
perversions in themselves; it depends “not on the nature of the activity but on the skill and
performance of the participants” (285-286). He then comes to the conclusion that “[a]s a language,
sex has at least one possible perversion: the nonverbal equivalent of lying, or insincerity” (“Sex”
286, emphasis his). Thus, there is no contradiction between the two papers, though he does make
the interesting and potentially confusing comment that “as an art, sex has a possible perversion in
vulgarity” (emphasis his).
With his two-pronged approach to sexual perversion, Solomon seems able to account for
most of the traditional perversions like fetishism, bestiality, sadomasochism and paedophilia. In
addition, because sex is viewed as a language, even a touch of insincerity can be considered a
perversion on this account. For example, Solomon explains how if one were to have a private
sexual fantasy while having sex with another, one would be performing “an innocent semantic
perversion” but if one were to put on a show of tenderness and affection that quickly disappears
when orgasm is reached, one has performed “a potentially vicious perversion” (“Sexual Paradigms”
90). Homosexuality, however, is off the hook because the only difference between homosexuality
and heterosexuality is “the mode of resolution”, i.e. instead of communicating between persons of
opposite sex, homosexuality is the communication between persons of the same sex, and there is
nothing in homosexuality that necessarily affects communication in a negative manner (“Sexual
Paradigms 89). For that same reason, group sex and casual sex are not considered as perversions
either, an outcome that seems advantageous to Solomon’s account of sexual perversion.
However, in allowing vulgarity into the picture of perversion and prizing subtlety over over-
frankness (284-285), Solomon seems to be committed to the idea that an awkward, first sexual
encounter between two teenagers who clearly love each other but who also are just coming to know
and appreciate themselves as sexual beings would be vulgar and thus perverted. Note how he
claims that “[t]here is sometimes nothing less appealing or satisfying, even when one is in a fully
sexual mood, than a too-straightforward sexual encounter, “unadorned” by preliminary
conversation – both verbal and bodily” (“Sex” 285). This description of a “too-straightforward
sexual encounter” can certainly belong to that of the awkward teenage couple. On the other hand, a

15 
 
Don Juan-esque sexual encounter or group sex is to be prized because the former “offers the
compensation and reward of being always fresh and novel” while the latter “offers the rare
possibility of linguistic forms unavailable with fewer voices” that would be impossible with fewer
people (“Sex” 286). Yet one would have thought that if content was indeed more important than
form, as Solomon had earlier maintained, then the content in the awkward teenage sexual encounter
is, because of its honesty and sincerity, more to be prized than the content to be found in the latter
two cases. Furthermore, it could be argued that it is precisely the supposed vulgarity in form that
best expresses the particular content of the former case; the lack of “skill and performance”
(Solomon, “Sex” 286) enhances, rather than takes away, the message of “I love you” where the
awkward teenagers are concerned.
In addition, it is not clear that Solomon’s categorisation of sadism and masochism as the
“excessive expression of a particular content” is acceptable (“Sexual Paradigms” 89). As Levy
points out, “it is hard to see why being excessive in the expression of domination should count as
perversion at all and not count merely as rudeness, perhaps” (194).
More importantly, an account of sexual perversion that views a breakdown in
communication as perverted seems far too inclusive. As Primoratz rightly observes,

This ... implies that much too much in what goes for common, everyday sex among
human beings is actually perverted. In sex, as everywhere else, breakdown of
communication among humans is a very common occurrence. If every case of such
breakdown is to count as perverted sex, the idea of perversion will no longer refer –
as it presumably should – to something uncommon and strange. (“Sexual
Perversion” 249)

This criticism certainly seems true. A breakdown in communication can be as simple as someone
misinterpreting a message, which can happen many times a day. Similarly, in sex, misinterpretation
of messages can occur. For example, a woman saying “no” to her lover’s request for sex could
actually be playing hard to get and wants to have sex. But the man could be a simpleton who is
unaware of the sexual games that people play and genuinely thinks that the woman does not want
to have sex. Then, the woman has to teach the man the ‘rules’ of the game. This certainly takes
away the subtlety and excitement of the sexual encounter, but it hardly seems perverted.
In conclusion, Solomon’s account does seem to enjoy distinct advantages over the
procreation and love accounts in its ability to accommodate homosexuality, group sex and casual
sex as non-perversions. Its willingness to forego the moral character of sexual perversion, leaving it
as a morally neutral notion, also allows it to say that even though an act is considered perverted on
its account, it is not condemned as such. Rather, the label acts more as a descriptive claim, one that
reveals how the act in question has deviated in form and/or content. This is an advantage because

16 
 
even if one disagrees with Solomon in, say, classifying the awkward first sexual encounter as
perverted, at least perverted here does not mean that the act or its participants are condemned,
which is a far more acceptable conclusion than to outrightly condemn the awkward first sexual
encounter as immoral. However, Solomon’s account also faces some tough questions which it
seems unable to answer, not least that it is far too inclusive and would render the term almost
unrecognisable from the way we normally use it. Lastly, like the procreation and love accounts,
Solomon also commits the mistake of conflating ideals and norms such that any sex act which does
not measure up to his ideal of subtlety and sincerity is deemed perverted when it may just be
mediocre sex; it might not be good sex, but that is not to say that it necessarily is bad sex.

17 
 
Section 2.4 Plain Sex 
Advanced by Alan Goldman in his paper, “Plain Sex”, this next account is similar to the
communication view in that it also views sexual perversion to be a morally neutral concept. Where
it is different is its removal of the evaluative dimension of the concept, viewing sexual perversion
to be a purely statistical notion.
Goldman’s view of sex as plain sex is motivated by what he sees as the primary failing
behind the prior three philosophical accounts. He points out that where these accounts are
concerned, sex becomes "merely a means to other separable ends" like procreation, love and
communication" (269). The motivation behind such a move, Goldman charges, lies in an
“accordance with and perhaps derivation from the Platonic-Christian moral tradition, according to
which the animal or purely physical element of humans is the source of immorality, and plain
sex…is an expression of this element, hence in itself to be condemned” (279). This explains why
the previous accounts had tried to extend sexual desire beyond the merely physical to a rational,
and ostensibly nobler, end of procreation, love or communication. However, in doing so, not only
do they romanticise sex and give a distorted picture of what sex is, it also invariably affected the
account of sexual perversion they offered, thus explaining the various problems that these accounts
ran into. Thus, Goldman remarks:

Sexual desire lets us know that we are physical beings and, indeed, animals; this is
why traditional Platonic morality is so thorough in its condemnation. Means-ends
analyses continue to reflect this tradition, sometimes unwittingly. They show that in
conceptualising sex it is still difficult, despite years of so-called revolution in this
area, to free ourselves from the lingering suspicion that plain sex as physical desire
is an expression of our “lower selves,” that yielding to our animal natures is
subhuman or vulgar. (279)

Hence, on his account, Goldman unsurprisingly reduces sex to its barest, physical level such
that “sexual desire is defined to be the desire for contact with another person’s body and for the
pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfil such desire of
the agent” (268). Though sex on this account is still viewed as the means to the end of physical
contact, such a move does not romanticise nor distort what sex is, for the desire for physical contact
with another is, in itself, both a necessary and sufficient condition for a desire to be considered
sexual. Furthermore, while Goldman is aware that his account merely captures sex at “its barest
level”, he argues that “it is worth distinguishing and focusing upon this least common denominator
in order to avoid the false views of sexual morality and perversion which emerge from thinking that
sex is essentially something else” (271).
Sexual perversion then for Goldman is a “merely statistical” notion where to be perverted is
not to deviate “from the reproductive function (or kissing would be perverted), from a loving
18 
 
relationship (or most sexual desire and many heterosexual acts would be perverted), or from
efficiency in communication (or unsuccessful seduction attempts would be perverted)” (284).
However, Goldman is quick to point out that not all statistically abnormal sexual desires and acts
are perverted for “a three-hour continuous sexual act would be unusual but not necessarily
abnormal in the requisite sense”. Rather, it is the “form of the desire itself” that has to be abnormal
(emphasis his). Hence, a perverted sexual desire is that which does not desire for physical contact
with another’s body and yet the fulfilment of which gives rise to the same kind of pleasure that
most human beings experience through physical contact with other persons’ bodies. Furthermore,
presenting perversion in such a non-evaluative manner in no way prevents one from saying that an
act is immoral because there is no necessary connection between morality and perversion. An
immoral, perverted act would remain immoral even if it should one day become widely practised in
society such that it ceases to be statistically abnormal and perverted because the general moral rules
which condemn it would continue doing so regardless of the prevalence of such an act – “the
immorality of an act does not vary with its degree of perversion” (Goldman 285-286).
Goldman does not deny that the concept of perversion is often used in an evaluative
manner, carrying with it morally-loaded connotations, rather than in a purely descriptive manner.
What he does deny is that “we can find a norm, other than that of statistically usual desire, against
which all and only activities that properly count as sexual perversions can be contrasted” (285). To
try and preserve the evaluative dimension would be to commit the same mistake that the means-
ends accounts committed, which is to superimpose an ideal onto sex and making that the norm.
Such a move merely misrepresents sex, thereby distorting its relationship with morality and
perversion. Therefore, on Goldman’s account, an act which is deemed to be perverted now might
not remain so for “it is not true that we properly could continue to consider acts perverted which
were found to be very common practice across societies” (286). Indeed, Goldman’s observation
seems to cohere with our experience of homosexuality. While it was widely deemed to be a
perversion in the past, in recent times, it has become more widely accepted such that an increasing
number of societies today are granting homosexual unions a similar set or the same kind of legal
rights that heterosexual unions enjoy.4 Furthermore, as Goldman rightly observes, if we persist to
view acts which are no longer statistically abnormal and are not immoral as perverted, then we are

                                                            
4
 Some might argue that this observation is problematic insofar as it attributes the wrong reason for the change in 
attitude towards homosexuality. It is not so an increase in occurrence (which is hard to determine in any case) as it is 
an increasing familiarity with homosexuality that is the reason behind such a change. While this line of reasoning is 
definitely possible, perhaps the point of this observation is that when the frequency of an act increases, societal 
acceptance almost inevitably increases. And since we cannot conclusively prove a change in frequency, we can 
nonetheless point to the fact of increasing societal acceptance of homosexuality as a possible indication of a change 
in frequency. In this way, the observation will hopefully be more acceptable to its aforementioned opponents.  
19 
 
simply exhibiting prejudiced moral judgements that are purely “emotive ... without consistent
logical criteria for application”.
However, Goldman’s account of sexual perversion faces its fair share of problems. For
starters, having sexual perversion as a “merely statistical” notion is problematic. As Primoratz
points out, while our current acceptance of homosexuality as a non-perversion does seem to be a
case of how sexual perversion seems to be a statistical notion in that as the practice became more
prevalent, the label has been withdrawn from it, yet “it is not at all clear that, if we were to make a
similar discovery with regard to, say, necrophilia or zoophilia, we would be as ready to declassify it
as perversion and come to think of it as but another unproblematic sexual orientation” (“Sexual
Perversion” 246).
More importantly, if we were to take Goldman’s suggestion of stripping perversion of its
evaluative dimension, leaving it as a mere descriptive concept, it appears that the whole concept
becomes redundant, a thoroughly unintuitive notion. This is because one could simply replace the
term with something like “atypical sexual acts”, and if they are immoral, “atypical immoral sexual
acts”, without losing anything essential. That the term has been traditionally associated with
condemnation and thus difficult to detach completely in ordinary usage only lends more weight to
the argument for dropping the concept altogether. After all, if condemnation is the strongest and
most striking feature of perversion as a concept, then dropping that particular feature while trying
to preserve perversion as a statistical, non-evaluative and descriptive concept seems to make little
sense. It would be far more efficient to simply replace the term altogether, one without a necessary
moral evaluative dimension.
These then are the main reasons why Goldman’s attempt to generate a concept of sexual
perversion is, ultimately, a failure. However, far from it being viewed as a problem that needs to be
circumvented, some philosophers have viewed it as simply sounding the death knell for the concept
of sexual perversion.

20 
 
Section 2.5 The Case Against Perversion 
In this section, we will be looking at some arguments against sexual perversion and why it
should be jettisoned. We first begin with Primoratz who chooses to ‘bite the bullet’ to the objection
that Goldman’s account of sexual perversion leaves us with a redundant concept. We then proceed
to Humber’s and Priest’s analyses of why the attempts to generate a coherent and justified concept
of sexual perversion are doomed.
A Plain Sex proponent,6 Primoratz chooses to bite the bullet to the objection that Goldman’s
account of sexual perversion leads us to the unintuitive conclusion that it is a redundant notion.
Indeed, he argues that we should jettison the concept altogether. For starters, ordinary usage is
inconsistent and confusing. Furthermore, the prior philosophical accounts, which are supposed to
be the four main philosophical accounts of sex, seem to have singularly failed in presenting us with
a coherent and justified concept of sexual perversion. Indeed, as Primoratz observes, though sexual
perversion as a concept does enjoy rich evaluative connotations, “they tend to vary very much, not
only in intensity, but also in quality” (Ethics 65). Thus, though the term has enjoyed a rich and
colourful history, “the term serves no useful purpose” as it can be easily replaced by other
descriptive, non-evaluative terms and should therefore be jettisoned.
While Primoratz’s analysis is undoubtedly methodical in covering a wide range of
philosophical accounts,7 Humber’s and Priest’s analyses attack the logical possibility of generating
and defending a coherent and justified concept of sexual perversion.
Humber’s argument is straightforward enough. As Humber rightly observes, for a concept
of sexual perversion to be successfully defended, the following needs to be done:

(1) recognize the intimate connection which exists between one’s theory of human
nature and his/ her concept of sexual perversion, (2) develop a theory of human
nature (T), (3) show that (T) requires acceptance of a particular definition of ‘sexual
perversion’, and then (4) demonstrate that (T) is more adequate than all theories of
human nature which give rise to different definitions of ‘sexual perversion’. (168)

This enterprise is, according to Humber, one that would frustrate the philosopher because it is a
task that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to complete. This is because human nature is an
“essentially contested concept” (ECC), which simply means that “no one can prove that the concept
of human nature which supports his/ her definition [of sexual perversion] is true” (169).

                                                            
6
 Primoratz actually advances a more minimalist view, Plainer Sex, in Ethics and Sex. See 43‐49. 
7
 It should be noted that Primoratz not only covered the four main accounts of sex, but also the views of Sara Ruddick, 
Sara Ann Ketchum, Marquis de Sade and Michael Slote. See Primoratz, “Sexual Perversion”. 
21 
 
 Though Humber concedes that his claim that human nature is an ECC cannot be defended
in detail, he does offer two reasons why it should be viewed as such. Firstly, he invokes the
following excerpt from W.B. Gallie’s paper on ECCs:

When we examine the different uses of these terms and the characteristic arguments
in which they figure we soon see that there is no one clearly definable general use of
any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use... Now once this
variety of functions is disclosed it might well be expected that the disputes in which
the above mentioned concepts figure would at once come to an end. But in fact this
does not happen. Each party continues to maintain that the special functions which
the term ... ‘work of art’ or ‘democracy’ ... fulfils on its behalf or on its
interpretation is the correct or proper or primary, or the only important, function
which the term in question can plainly be said to fulfil. Moreover, each party
continues to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments,
evidence and other forms of justification. (168, emphasis Gallie’s)

According to Humber then, these observations of the essentially contested nature of democracy and
art are also applicable to the debate surrounding the theories of human nature.
Secondly, Humber points out that Gallie had compared the debate surrounding ECCs to the
competition between rival scientific hypotheses. For Gallie, the crucial distinction between the two
is that the latter is resolvable “because there are acknowledged general methods or principles for
deciding between rival hypotheses” (179). Unfortunately for ECCs, however, no such standard
exists which can help resolve these debates. This too, according to Humber, is observable in the
debate surrounding theories of human nature. For despite the fact that this debate has been going on
for thousands of years, it still has not been resolved. And while this does not mean that people
might not deny all other theories save that of their own, such a denial would merely be another
characteristic of an ECC. More importantly, none of the theories of human nature have been
decidedly shown to be false because “each of the various theories of human nature can be accepted
and defended by someone” (Humber 169). Hence, Humber concludes, since one of the premises
that a theory of sexual perversion relies on, i.e. a theory of human nature, cannot be conclusively
defended, then the theory of sexual perversion itself cannot be conclusively defended and thus, a
coherent and justified concept of sexual perversion is an impossibility.
These observations seem true. Consider how, for example, after centuries of debate, we are
still undecided about the nature of the human being. The dualists contend that the human being is
made up of two kinds of things – the mental and the physical – while the monists claim that the
human being is made up of just one kind of thing – the physical, for the behaviourist, or the mental,
for the idealist. Each party argues that the other parties have got it wrong and that they themselves
have the right answer, and yet unlike their scientific counterparts, there seems no general principle
that we can appeal to resolve the debate. If there were, one would have thought that it would have
22 
 
been resolved by now. Since the debate continues, it follows then to suppose that there is no such
general principle and thus, human nature is an ECC.
To make matters worse, Priest claims that the concept of sexual perversion makes no sense
and “is therefore another notion that needs to be assigned to the scrap-heap of the history of ideas”
(371). Priest’s argument is essentially this. Sexual perversion as a concept is “one of a sexual act
that does not fulfil its natural function, and is, ipso facto, bad.” However, such an idea of sexual
perversion only makes sense if we assume an Aristotelian metaphysic where everything in the
world is teleological and “the natural order and the moral order line up” such that “[t]he virtue
(arete) of anything consists exactly in its fitness to perform its proper function” (365). Indeed, such
a move was made by Aquinas in his attempt to establish what counted as sins against nature and
what did not. As Priest observes, “The alignment is also reinforced for Aquinas by the fact that
nature is created by God, and so must be what He intends. Going against it is therefore impiety”
(365). Crucially however, the Aristotelian metaphysic is a largely discredited one, having been
replaced by a purely causal metaphysic, which has no connection to morality, during the Scientific
Revolution in the seventeenth century. Hence, Priest concludes that “without a theoretical
underpinning of the Aristotelian kind, there is just no reason to suppose that it is bad to use
something for other than what was its Aristotelian end” (366).
Furthermore, attempts to try and save the concept of sexual perversion by replacing
Aristotelian teleology with more current metaphysical systems seem doomed to failure. Priest
identifies two accounts of functionalism that seem compatible with Darwinianism, the prevalent
theory in biology – the aetiological and the dispositional accounts of function.8 However, neither is
able to provide the kind of theoretical underpinning that is necessary for a theory of sexual
perversion. This is because “neither will ground the crucial claim that it is morally bad to use
something for other than its function” (367). For there is nothing wrong in using something other
than for its biological function as defined in Darwinianism. Hence, for example, while body hair
could be argued to have the function of protecting one’s body from the sun, it is surely permissible
to shave one’s head and use the hair for another purpose, say, to sell to someone to make a wig.
Indeed, other attempts to try and provide such an underpinning to sexual perversion via an
analysis of an account of function that is compatible with Darwinianism will also ‘miss the mark’
because “genuine tele having disappeared from the cosmos – or at least our theories thereof –
functions must be analysed purely as some kind of cause and effect” (Priest 367). But “causality is
a morally innocent notion”. For example, hitting a white billiard ball to cause the red billiard balls

                                                            
8
 See Priest 366 for an explanation of the difference between the two accounts.  
23 
 
in the centre of the billiard table to scatter is an event which has no necessary connection to
morality. As Priest concludes, “What causes what, is one thing; what is good and bad, another.”
Finally, even if we were to allow that evolution had some kind of telos, perhaps by arguing
that some behavioural patterns had been selected for in the evolutionary sense, yet “in the light of
modern science, it makes perfectly good sense for things counted traditionally as perversions to be
functional” (Priest 368). Priest gives two examples to back up this claim. Homosexuality could be
argued, via sociobiology, to be a good strategy for “facilitating certain gene transmissions”. And in
the current context of a threat of overpopulation in this world, promoting non-procreative sex could
well be a sensible strategy where evolution is concerned.
In conclusion, there seem to be strong arguments as to why the concept of sexual perversion
should be jettisoned. Not only have the main philosophical accounts offered so far failed in
presenting us with a coherent and justified account, such an account seems logically impossible to
offer because (i) it requires a theory of human nature but that is itself an ECC and can never be
conclusively established, and (ii) the concept of sexual perversion rests on a discredited Aristotelian
metaphysic and even attempts to try and update it seem doomed to failure. However, rejoinders to
these arguments are possible.

24 
 
 Chapter 2 – Rehabilitating Sexual Perversion 
Section 1 – Making a Case for Sexual Perversion 
While Priest was right in pointing out that a successful account of sexual perversion
requires “a notion of naturalness that is morally significant” (Baltzly 4), and thus that it requires a
kind of Aristotelian teleology, Baltzly points out that Priest’s conclusion that all successful
accounts of sexual perversion require an Aristotelian metaphysic is overstated. Baltzly argues rather
that for the eudaimonist framework to work, all it needs is that “there be such a thing as the human
function – a pattern of activity that is constitutive of being a human person – and a corresponding
objective notion of happiness or flourishing which is the result of performing the human function
well” (6). From there, we can determine which dispositions promote or hinder flourishing; the
former are the virtues, the latter, vices. For Baltzly then, sexual perversion is a disposition that is “a
vice just in case it is a disposition that is somehow a matter of choice and in some way inhibits
human flourishing” (9). Perverted acts are then “the kind of acts that agents who have sexual
perversions regularly desire in virtue of being perverted”. Crucially, such a framework provides a
“concept of a telos of human life which is both natural and morally significant [and] does not
presuppose anything like the sense of purpose in nature that Priest claims we can no longer believe
in. It is a moral teleology that seems metaphysically innocuous” (8). Thus, a neo-Aristotelian
account of sexual perversion need not hold on to the discredited Aristotelian metaphysic in order
for it to work.
Baltzly’s argument seems sound here. Though Aristotle’s own arguments about the human
function and the objective notion of happiness are not the most compelling of arguments, Baltzly
points out that there are good reasons to accept the two notions without necessarily bringing in any
of the metaphysical heavy machinery that the previous Aristotelian moral teleology did.
For starters, that there is such a thing as a human function such that “there is a pattern of
activity that is constitutive of being [a human being]” (Baltzly 6) seems pretty indisputable except
to the most hardened existentialist. That we are rational animals seems obvious enough; there are
times when our ‘animal’ nature shows through, for example in our need to eat and rest, and times
when our ‘rational’ nature comes through, for example when we step back and deliberate a certain
course of action instead of acting upon our instincts. We might not all choose to do the exact same
thing when placed in the same situation, say A might choose to play basketball instead of writing
his thesis while B might choose to delay his gratification and write his thesis first, yet there is
nonetheless the pattern of deliberating over whether to do a certain thing or not, a pattern that
distinguishes us from nonrational animals.
Furthermore, while it might seem that the second requirement of there being an objective
notion of flourishing is contestable, because people have different opinions on what things give
25 
 
them pleasure and hence what happiness consists in, this only occurs if we take a short-term view
of happiness. If, however, we were to take a long-term view of happiness or flourishing, then it
seems that we do indeed “often talk as if there is an objective fact of the matter about what well-
being consists in” (Baltzly 6, emphasis his). To illustrate this, Baltzly gives the example of how, in
wishing for a friend’s baby to be happy, one does not simply wish for her to be happy in the short-
term sense of taking drugs; rather, “[w]hat you wish for her is a long-term state of proper
functioning” such that she is not simply happy per se, but that she lives the good life where good
does not necessarily equate to not doing immoral acts but that she lives well (7). This indeed seems
right. While flourishing can take many different kinds of forms, given the multiplicity of talents
and the variety of personalities that man has, there is nonetheless a sense that it is not a subjective
notion and that we can draw some boundaries around it. This in itself is sufficient for us to suppose
that there is an objective notion of human flourishing.
Hence, we can see that the two notions of human function and flourishing are not notions
that presuppose the kind of metaphysic that the original Aristotelian moral teleology did, i.e. that all
things had their natural purpose and that this purpose is morally significant. It is, as Baltzly
maintained, “metaphysically innocuous” (8). Thus, Priest’s conclusion that no account of sexual
perversion can possibly succeed is overstated. The argument works fine against a notion of sexual
perversion that is premised on the original Aristotelian framework, but falls short against such a
revised Aristotelian framework.
Let us now turn to Humber’s argument. Setting aside his claim that concepts of human
nature are essentially contested, there is a good reason why we should continue to pursue a concept
of sexual perversion. As Humber himself admits, “[that concepts of human nature are essentially
contested] does not mean that attempts to formulate and defend theoretical definitions of ‘sexual
perversion’ should not go forward” (169). This is because not all definitions are equally good just
because the debate is endless. This seems obvious enough. For example, just because the nature of
God is arguably essentially contested does not mean that all theories of the nature of God are
equally good. Surely the theory of the Flying Spaghetti Monster is not on the same level as that of
the Catholic, Muslim or Hindu theories of the nature of God. Similarly then, even if we were to
grant that the concept of human nature is essentially contested, this is not to say that all theories of
sexual perversion are equally good – some are just better than others in capturing our moral
intuitions. And just because the debate about human nature has not been solved does not mean that
it cannot be solved. Indeed, discovering which account of sexual perversion is better can help us to
decide which theory of human nature is better. If the output is not good, then chances are that the
input is not good either. Thus, even if human nature is an ECC, the pursuit of a concept of sexual
perversion is not pointless.
26 
 
 Furthermore, contra Gallie, whom Humber had invoked when he was talking about ECCs,
John Kekes argued that “the debates concerning the proper use of ECCs must be capable of rational
resolution” (84). Gallie’s rationale for this inability for rational resolution or “universal agreement”
was that there did not seem to be a general principle with which we can decide between the
contesting uses (183). This is because one of the conditions of an ECC is that its participants are
derived from “an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of
the concept”. However, as Kekes points out, this means that all the participants have a claim to
being the right theory because they all have elements within them that are derived from the
authoritative exemplar. In addition, the exemplar condition fails to do what it was introduced to do
– distinguish an ECC from a radically confused concept. On Gallie’s account, the exemplar
condition ensures that the debate surrounding the concept is not merely a verbal disagreement or a
debate about different concepts bearing the same name, but a debate that is focused on the one
same concept, that historical exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all (168). However, as
Kekes rightly observes, Gallie does not provide us with any means to decide whether a particular
departure from it, as all contesting theories by definition are, is an improvement or a deviation.
Indeed, each will regard its own particular formulation as in keeping with the tradition of the
exemplar while improving it at the same time, arguing then that its competitors’ formulations are
deviations from the exemplar (83). The problem is that it then becomes impossible to decide if a
certain formulation succeeds or fails in exemplifying the original exemplar such that “the contest
could not even begin, for the participants may not be championing different uses of the same
concept, but be using different concepts differently while being unaware that this is what they are
doing.” In this way, Kekes concludes that Gallie’s introduction of the exemplar fails in helping us
to differentiate between ECCs and radically confused concepts (84). Thus, since Gallie’s argument
as to why we cannot obtain a rational resolution to the debate is a logical consequence of his
exemplar condition, and that condition has now been shown to be suspect, his conclusion that we
cannot obtain a rational resolution is now suspect as well.
Indeed, for Kekes, we can obtain such a rational resolution. For Kekes, the debate had
arisen because of a problem that the various contesting uses were trying to solve. Viewed in this
manner, the solution becomes obvious:

The general principle for rationally settling disputes concerning the proper use of
ECCs is that that use should prevail which is most likely to lead to the solution of
the problem that prompted the debate. (85)

Furthermore, since each participant is trying to obtain the solution to the problem, then it is in the
interests of the participants to accept the solution, thus making universal agreement possible.

27 
 
 With this in mind, we can see that even if we were to accept that human nature is really an
ECC as Humber seems to think, it does not mean that the debate surrounding human nature cannot
be resolved rationally. To be fair, Kekes concedes that the debate cannot be resolved conclusively
insofar as no final answer is possible because the answer varies “with the situation in which the
question is posed”, thereby preserving the essentially contested nature of these concepts (88).
However, it is enough for our purposes that the debate can be resolved, for however long a period
of time before the situation changes to the point where a different answer is needed. A theory of
sexual perversion is arguably concerned with moral injunctions, i.e. whether a particular sexual act
should be performed or not, and moral injunctions are liable to change as and when we receive the
relevant information. For example, it is no accident that homosexuality is no longer viewed by a
good proportion of the world as a perversion. With the improvement in our knowledge of human
nature and the world, such as a jettisoning of the Aristotelian metaphysic and replacing it with a
causal one, the traditional condemnation of homosexuality on the basis that it is unnatural no longer
seems as tenable as it used to in the past. That this is so does not necessarily point to the view, as
Humber might think, that therefore any account of sexual perversion is doomed to failure because
our view of human nature might change again in the future, thereby leading to changes in our moral
judgements. It has to be remembered that morality is not simply an abstract topic discussed by
philosophers; its primary purpose is to guide our actions and if we are to wait until we have the
absolute, best answer before we begin teaching, then either we will never teach at all or if any
teaching is done, it will be far too late.
We now turn to Primoratz’s argument. His argument was that since he had covered the main
lines an argument for the concept of sexual perversion can take and they have been found to be
wanting, the concept should be jettisoned. However, Primoratz’s conclusion seems over hasty as
there is at least one more option open for us to explore. To better appreciate this, let us return
briefly to the four main accounts of sex and sexual perversion and Goldman’s objection to the
means-ends accounts.
Goldman had earlier argued that the means-ends accounts had failed because they had
approached sex from the wrong perspective, taking on the Platonic-Christian moral tradition that
viewed the physical side of man as the source of immorality. This explains why they viewed sex as
a means to a rational, ostensibly nobler, end – procreation, love or communication. And if we were
to view it through the lens of the mind-body divide, it appears that the means-ends accounts have
come down too strongly on the side of the mind, choosing to focus too heavily on the rational ends
that sex can be put to such that the rational is privileged over the physical. This does not mean
though that the means-ends accounts do not acknowledge that human sexuality consists of a
physical component. Too heavily is not the same as only. The procreation account, in tying sex up
28 
 
with reproduction, obviously acknowledges the physicality of sex in a biological sense. Scruton’s
definition of perversion as “deviations from the unity of animal and interpersonal relation” is also
an acknowledgement of the bodily dimension of sex (289) while Solomon views sex as a body
language. What Goldman means here rather is that the means-ends accounts make the mistake of
viewing the physicality of sex as something to be denigrated because they view the rational
dimension to be that which gives value to sex, a criticism that seems to me to be spot-on. We have
already seen earlier how the procreation account is decidedly uncomfortable with the idea of
enjoying sex purely for the sake of physical pleasure; it has to be tied up with the more rational
context of a marital act. Similarly, for the sex as love account, sex is good if and only if it is done in
the context of love which is an intentional act; purely physical, impersonal sex is perverted. And for
the communication account, sex is better if it is performed to communicate a message, again an
intentional act; the purely physical aspect of sex, while not necessarily derided, is nonetheless
subjugated to the rational, mental messages that one wishes to communicate.
However, while Goldman was right in his observation of the failings of the means-ends
accounts, it seems that the plain sex proponents, or what I shall call the minimalists, have gone too
far the other way, placing too much focus on the physicality of sexuality so that the rational side is
neglected. To their credit, the minimalists do not have to deny that sex can be meaningful in all the
ways that the means-ends accounts had postulated (Primoratz, Ethics 47). The problem however is
that their account, in taking on a common denominator approach in trying to capture all possible
sexual phenomena, has lowered the bar to the extent that it might as well have been an account of
animal sexuality rather than human sexuality. Since sexual perversion is a human concept insofar as
it is applicable only to human beings, it is unsurprising that the plain sex account is unable to
provide a coherent and justified concept of sexual perversion.
That the minimalists focus far too much on the physical side of sexuality can be seen,
Seiriol Morgan contends, in how the minimalists are unable to articulate as clearly and as fully
certain sexual phenomena as the means-ends accounts can (“Sex” 8-9). For while they can
undoubtedly describe the physical nature of the act, this description is impoverished. Morgan gives
the example of a gay man who patronises a bathhouse so as to be penetrated by an anonymous
person, never seeing the other’s face. On the minimalist account, this would simply be described as
the gay man desiring physical contact with another person. Yet while this description is correct, it
does not capture the richness that the act held for the gay man – he does not simply desire physical
contact per se. Rather, “[his] behaviour is such that it can only be adequately understood if we see
[his] sexual pleasure as mediated by [his] arousal at the sheer anonymity of [his] sexual partners, an
essentially intentional arousal” (9).

29 
 
 With that in mind, let us return to resolving Primoratz’s case against the concept of sexual
perversion. Primoratz had arrived at his conclusion that sexual perversion as a concept should be
jettisoned as he had already surveyed what he views to be the main lines of the possible arguments
for such a concept and found them wanting. Yet after examining the four main philosophical
accounts and finding them to fall rather too sharply on either side of the mind-body divide, there
appears to be one more option for us to explore: a view of sexual perversion that is grounded in a
view of human sexuality where neither its physical nor mental dimension is to be privileged to the
detriment of the other. That the physical and the mental are to be equally prized in human sexuality
is not a new idea. Montaigne, for example, argues that “the body should not be consigned to a
metaphysically and morally inferior category but be recognized as an equal partner of the soul”,
while Spinoza holds that perfection is to be understood “not as the ascendancy of reason over mere
physical impulse but as a single state with both physical and mental aspects of equal intrinsic
value” (West 127, 136).
In the last part of this thesis then, I wish to explore this option and see how far it takes us. In
doing so, I am merely going to take such a view of human nature and sexuality for granted as trying
to establish it as the correct view of human nature and sexuality is far beyond the scope of this
paper. While such an approach will not be able to conclusively establish any account of sexual
perversion, nonetheless, if it does give us an account that largely coheres with our moral intuitions,
then it shows that if there is to be a concept of sexual perversion, it might well look like this, thus
pointing the direction for future research. If however, the exploration turns out to be unsuccessful,
it would still have made a contribution insofar as it shows us that even such an option is not open to
us, thus leaving us either to conclude, together with Primoratz and others, that sexual perversion
should be jettisoned or to examine if there are further options open to us. Ultimately however, I
believe that the new account of sexual perversion offered, though not entirely free from criticism,
does largely cohere with how we ordinarily use the concept.

30 
 
Section 2 – A New Account Of Sexual Perversion 
Section 2.1 Criteria for Success 
Instead of diving straight into the new account, it might be best if we first lay down the
criteria for a successful account of sexual perversion, keeping in mind what we have learnt from the
foregoing discussion.
Firstly, as Priest observes, “[t]he notion of sexual perversion is one of a sexual act that does
not fulfil its natural function, and is, ipso facto, bad” (371). This is typically what most people seem
to ordinarily associate with perversion – that it is unnatural and immoral. The upshot is that for any
account of sexual perversion to be successful, there needs to be a “confluence between natural and
moral ends”. Doing otherwise, i.e. disconnecting the natural from the moral as Goldman and
Solomon did, only succeeded in presenting us with an account that either was at odds with ordinary
usage or led to the unintuitive conclusion that the concept was redundant.
Secondly, a successful account needs to make a distinction between ideals and norms. Not
every act that falls short of the ideal falls short of the norm. Some are permissible while still falling
short of the ideal; some actively hinder one from attaining the ideal but nonetheless are permissible
because they do not transgress the norm. A successful account of sexual perversion needs to be able
to accommodate such a variety of moral evaluation.
Thirdly, a successful account needs to largely cohere with ordinary usage, i.e. how we
would typically classify certain acts as perverted or perverse on the one hand, or as non-perverted
or non-perverse on the other. As Priest observes, there can be “a certain amount of flexibility as to
what one might classify as a perversion, but this flexibility hardly extends to ruling out paradigm
cases wholesale” (363).
These then are the criteria that any account which wishes to be successful needs to fulfil.

31 
 
Section 2.2 Harmony as an Ideal 
Recall that the proposal was to view the mental and the physical aspects of sex as equally
important in human sexuality. For the new account then, the guiding moral ideal is one where both
the mental and the physical aspects of sex are equally prized. I call this ideal, harmony. Here are a
few other features of harmony as an ideal.
While the mind and the body are to be equally prized, each is acknowledged nonetheless to
be different and to have its own particular set of strengths and weaknesses. Each thus has a unique
part to play in my desire to flourish as a human being. The mind, for example, allows me to step
back from the immediate situation, detaching myself from the pressing desires of my body in order
to determine the best course of action, while the body brings me back from the realm of the mind to
address present needs. The upshot is that the relationship between the two is not antagonistic, as
was the case of the philosophical accounts covered earlier, but is complementary instead. The ideal
act thus could either be predominantly mind or body, depending on the situation, but at the same
time, the other is not treated as an inferior but an equal.
For example, I might find myself alone with the girl who I desire and who is profoundly
drunk. Heeding my bodily desires in this instance would obviously not be ideal; the mind has to
come in to help me take a step back from the situation and detach myself from my physical desires
in order to make the morally right decision. Still, it does not mean that my bodily desires are in
themselves to be despised; they are merely expressing what I desire, i.e. her. Such a desire, in itself,
is neither morally good nor bad; it is simply a desire. In such a situation then, the mental aspect of
my sexuality leads me to do the moral thing, which is not to heed my bodily desires. Other times, it
is the physical aspect of my sexuality that helps me to enjoy the pleasures of the moment rather
than worrying over, say, writing my thesis. That too can be ideal, for helping me in building up my
relationship with my partner, without necessarily saying that the mental is to be despised. In this
way, the ideal act acknowledges the inherent traits of both the mind and the body without
necessarily judging that one aspect is metaphysically and morally superior to the other. Just like
how we do not judge a spanner to be superior to another just because it is of the right size in a
certain situation, we do not here judge an aspect of sex, be it physical or mental, to be superior to
the other just because it is better suited in helping one to flourish as a human being. For just as the
other spanner can be of the right size in another situation where the former is not, the other aspect
of sex has the same potential to help one to flourish as a human being in other situations that the
former cannot.
Another feature of the ideal is that both aspects are operating at their peak level. Otherwise,
we could ostensibly have the mind and the body as equals but both are equally operating at half the
potential that they can be and that would obviously not count as an ideal act. For instance, one
32 
 
could perform a sexual act while under the influence of drugs to the point where one is ‘stoned’ and
not in full control of one’s body nor in full awareness of the situation. In such a case, while it could
be a permissible act, it nonetheless is far from an ideal one. Thus, for a sexual act to be an ideal
one, both the physical and the mental aspects have to be performing at their full potential, i.e. that
the strengths of both the mind and the body are fully realised. This does not in any way mean that
we have to employ both our mental and physical capacities to the full in every situation for, as we
have seen in the earlier example with the drunk girl who I desire, sometimes, the situation calls for
the mind to ‘take over’ and the body to ‘sit back’ so that the right decision can be made. What it
does mean though is that both the mind and the body are able to perform to their full potential if
called upon to do so, just like how a car which is well-tuned and well-maintained can perform to its
full potential whereas a car which is poorly-maintained, the analogue of the ‘stoned’ sexual
performer, cannot. Hence, a sexual act which is performed by someone whose only focus in life has
been on his mental aspect of himself and has neglected, perhaps even despised, his physical aspect
would invariably fall short of the ideal of harmony, not only because the mental is prized above the
physical, but also because the full potential of his physical aspect has not acknowledged nor
exploited.
These are the features of the ideal of harmony. Before moving on to explore what would
count as a perverted act on this account, let us first make a distinction between perverse and
perverted. Doing so will allow us to fulfil the second criterion. According to the Macquarie
Essential Dictionary, perverse is defined as the following:

1. wilfully determined or disposed to go counter to what is expected or desired;

contrary. 2. characterised by or proceeding from such a determination: a perverse
mood. 3. wayward; cantankerous. 4. persistent or obstinate in what is wrong. 5.
turned away from what is right, good, or proper; wicked or corrupt. (“Perversion”)

Note how perverse is defined as turning away from what is right or good and also as wicked or
corrupt. But what is turned away from right or good is not necessarily wicked or corrupt. Falling
short of the ideal is not the same as transgressing the norm; an act which falls short of the ideal can
nonetheless be permissible. So while being a couch potato is not ideal, yet to say that it is wicked or
corrupt is too harsh. Similarly, an act like object fetishism may turn one away from that which is
right or good but that is radically different from saying that it is a wicked or corrupt act. That kind
of outright, complete disapproval, i.e. condemnation, is more correctly used to evaluate acts like
sadistic rape. Making the distinction between perverse and perverted then allows us to not only
make a distinction between ideals and norms but also to make a distinction between seemingly
innocuous acts like object fetishism, masturbation and urophilia, and condemnable acts like sadistic

33 
 
rape and paedophilia. Indeed, in having both the perverse and the perverted under the category of
perversion, the new account allows us to have a variety of moral evaluation that the previous
accounts did not enjoy, which in turn allows us to be more precise in our evaluation of sexual acts.
The group of seemingly innocuous acts would simply be charged as perverse because they fall short
of the ideal of harmony while the group of condemnable acts would be condemned as perverted
because they fall short of the norm. This distinction helps us to capture the intuition that some acts,
while bizarre and turned away from the good or right, are nonetheless a far cry from being wicked
or corrupt. The disapproval for perverse acts is thus minimal when compared to the outright
condemnation associated with perverted acts. Indeed, it is more of a warning than condemnation, a
warning that should one choose to perform such an act, he runs the risk of hindering his own
flourishing. This explains why we would think that such acts are morally permissible even though
morally suspect. In this way, the second criterion is fulfilled.
However, to say that all acts that fall short of the ideal are perverse would be too harsh as
well. Falling short of ideals happens all too often. Indeed, note how the Macquarie Dictionary
defines perverse as “turned away from what is right, good, or proper” (def. 5). Hence, to be more
precise, a perverse act is one that turns one away from the ideal while a perverted act is a subgroup
of this class of acts; not only does a perverted act hinder one from reaching the ideal, it is also an
act that transgresses the norm. Thus, unlike the means-ends accounts which allowed for only two
kinds of acts, ideal and perverted, we have, on this account, four possible kinds of acts – the ideal
acts, the acts that fall short of the ideal but do not hinder one from reaching the ideal, perverse acts
which fall above the norm and perverse acts which fall below the norm, i.e. perverted acts. This
classification allows us to be more precise in evaluating sexual acts. We can indicate total and
complete disapproval, i.e. condemnation, by calling the act perverted, or we can indicate that there
is something in the act that is not advisable and would be detrimental for our flourishing but
nonetheless permissible by calling the act a perverse one. Finally, some acts are simply permissible
without being perverse because they have no negative effect on our flourishing. In this way, we do
not make the mistake that the means-ends accounts did in conflating ideals and norms.
On this account then, a perverse act, in turning me away from the ideal, is an act that leads
me to experience myself as having a less-than-harmonious relationship between my mind and body.
For example, I could deliberately indulge in masochistic acts so as to punish my body, thus
experiencing myself as a body that needs to be disciplined, perhaps because it feels ‘dirty’, ‘sinful’
and inferior to my mind.
A non-perverse act that falls short of the ideal is one where I still experience myself as
predominantly mind or body. Such an act could even potentially lead me towards the ideal while
still falling short of it. For example, some forms of masochism can help me to reclaim my body as
34 
 
my own and to be more comfortable in it. Indeed, I might find masochism cathartic as it allows me
to express my negative attitudes towards my body. In doing so, it can help me to accept and thus
overcome these attitudes, hence helping me to move towards a more positive attitude towards the
body.
What would then count as a perverted act on this account? To know this, we would need to
know what constitutes the norm on this account. It should also be noted that hitherto, we have only
looked at the solitary dimension of sexual perversion. This is because in talking about the
relationship between mind and body, it leads quite naturally to focusing on the solitary dimension
of sexual perversion. What then would be a perverted solitary act? To call something a perverted
act is, on this account, to condemn it. But where solitary acts are concerned, so long as they are
self-regarding and do not have a substantial negative impact on others such that it impedes on their
autonomy, such acts, even if they turn one away from the ideal, seem permissible. For example,
while we might concede that masochism is not the most ideal of acts, yet to condemn it as
perverted seems too harsh, not least because the only person who is being harmed here is the person
himself, and not others (in the solitary version at least). If this is right, then it appears that the norm
that guides us is the Kantian principle of humanity –“always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end” (Kant 107, emphasis his). Otherwise, the act is not permissible and liable for condemnation.
Generally speaking however, where solitary sexual acts are concerned, perverted acts seem
less common, if not impossible. This is because it seems that one should be allowed to do whatever
one wants so long as one’s actions do not have negative repercussions on other people’s liberty. It
might not be ideal to be a couch potato and sit in front of a television all day long but it is at least
permissible so long as no one’s ends are being frustrated by me doing so. The new account then
recognises the truth behind the liberal exhortation that one’s negative liberty should be respected.
At the same time, it also recognises the truth behind the means-ends claims that people should be
warned off acts that turn them away from the ideal by allowing for such acts to be termed perverse.
In this way, the new account is able to accommodate, largely, the sentiments of both sides.
A possible objection would be that such an account of perversion where all solitary sexual
acts are not perverted acts is too revisionary an account; ordinary usage does call solitary sexual
acts perverted, like in the case of object fetishism (in the solitary case) and perhaps the viewing of
pornography. However, recall that this new account of perversion makes a distinction between
perverse and perverted such that a perverse act still falls under the concept of perversion. My
contention then is that when the distinction is explained to the masses, they will most likely then
categorise solitary sexual acts as perverse and not as perverted because while they might find an act
like object fetishism to be disturbing and/or unhelpful to one’s flourishing, they nonetheless do not
35 
 
want to categorise it as the same kind of act as necrophilia and paedophilia. So while the account is
revisionary, it does not seem to be overly so. I will talk on this more later.
Hitherto, the new account seems to fare well in evaluating solitary sexual acts, fulfilling the
second criterion, and in some sense, the third criterion with its ability to accommodate both the
means-ends and the minimalist views on the moral evaluation of acts. Still, further testing of the
account will be needed in order to ensure that it truly fulfils the third criterion. Having harmony as
the ideal also fulfils the first criterion. It is human nature that we are minds and bodies, or at least it
is assumed on this account that this is so. Since to flourish as a human being is to be the best that
we can be, achieving this harmony of mind and body would be part of human flourishing; to move
away from it would be to deny a crucial part of our human nature, thus hindering our flourishing
and for that reason, deemed perverse and morally suspect. In this way, harmony is an end which is
both natural and moral.
Since employing harmony as an ideal has worked well for the account in terms of solitary
sexual acts, the proposal is to employ harmony once more as the ideal for interpersonal sexual acts.
Rather than simply exhorting equal status between mind and body however, since this focuses on
the interpersonal dimension of the account, harmony here also exhorts equality between the parties
involved. This means that there is mutual respect and acknowledgement between the parties as
human beings who are equally mind and body, and thus are autonomous beings with their own ends
and should not be treated merely as a means. Since it is the ideal, the parties involved should also
be ‘operating’ at their peak, i.e. that they themselves have achieved the solitary ideal of harmony.
Furthermore, like its solitary counterpart, the ideal interpersonal relationship is also a
complementary one where both are acknowledged to have their own particular set of strengths and
weaknesses and both use these to bring out the best in each other, i.e. to help each other to obtain
the solitary ideal of harmony. What this means is that there must also be a true and deep
appreciation of the other person. There is no illusion or delusion about who the other is, i.e. no
sentimental fantasy or traumatic remembrance of the other. For one can only truly bring out the best
in another if one truly knows the other; if not, one could easily give out bad advice. This then
means that the parties involved also have to be willing to be entirely vulnerable to each other, both
physically and psychologically. Only then can true appreciation happen for if I am holding back my
insecurities and weaknesses from my partner, she will only have a rosy picture of me and will thus
be unable to truly appreciate me for who I really am. This will then hinder her ability to help me
become the best that I can be.
Contrasted to this is the norm. While the ideal relationship is marked by freedom, the
relationship that falls short of the norm is one that lacks such freedom. Perhaps the best picture of
this is a master-slave relationship. The master not only is in charge of the slave, he owns the slave.
36 
 
The slave has no right to choose what he wants to do. And yet, the slave is a person too. And
persons, as Kant argued, are ends in themselves because they are able to will an end for themselves.
Thus the norm for interpersonal acts is the same as that of the solitary one – always treat human
beings as an end and never merely as a means. This is why sadistic rape can arguably be viewed as
the paradigm of sexual perversion. For in sadistic rape, not only is the rapist treating the other
merely as a means to his end, the rapist is only satisfied if the other resists and exhibits the
autonomy that he wants to transgress. It is not enough for the sadistic rapist that the other’s
autonomy is transgressed if the other does not or is not able to defend her right to autonomy, say if
the other was drugged or drunk. Like how the Macquarie Dictionary defines perversion, the rapist
is “wilfully determined or disposed to go counter to what is expected or desired” (def. 1). Sadistic
rape is thus a deliberately contrarian recognition of the other’s right to autonomy and is in that
sense a paradigm of sexual perversion.
Like its solitary counterpart, the interpersonal account also makes a distinction between acts
that merely fall short of the ideal as well as perverse acts, i.e. acts that turn one away from the ideal
but are nonetheless permissible. Given the variety of features on the interpersonal version of
harmony, there are thus a corresponding variety of ways that interpersonal sexual acts can either
fall short of the ideal or lead one away from the ideal. Hence, the sexual act could lead to or exhibit
an inequality in status between the parties, a lack of mutual respect and acknowledgement, a lack of
true and deep appreciation of each other, a lack of total vulnerability between the parties, or a lack
of complementarity in their relationship, i.e. in performing the act, the couple is not helping each
other to obtain the solitary ideal of harmony. The difference between these two kinds of acts and
the perverted act is that these kinds of acts respect the autonomy of the parties involved such that
neither is treated merely as a means to an ends. Hence, consensual sexual acts, where the consent is
valid, are never perverted even though they might be perverse.
To illustrate the difference between perverse acts and acts which merely fall short of the
ideal on the interpersonal account, consider the following scenario. A prudish married couple is
considering the quality of their sex life. Though they love each other deeply, they are nonetheless
unable to enjoy sex fully because of their negative ideas about sexuality, say those of Augustine.
One day however, they decide to give sexuality a chance. So, they try out sadomasochism and to
their surprise, though they were initially hesitant, they find themselves enjoying sex like never
before. Indeed, instead of making them feel ashamed of themselves and their bodies, they feel more
affirmative of themselves and are more at home with their bodies. In such a case, although the
couple has a long way more to go before they can reach that equality of mind and body within
themselves, and thus are far from the solitary ideal of harmony, the particular act of sadomasochism
has nonetheless helped them to move towards this ideal. Thus, it is not a perverse act.
37 
 
 However, suppose one day that the couple’s attitude towards sadomasochism changes. No
longer is it simply used as an act to help them move towards the ideal of harmony. Instead, they
have slipped back into their negative views of the body. Thus, while on the surface, the couple’s
behaviour now and before they started experimenting with sadomasochism is different, there is a
profound similarity in the underlying motivation: now, instead of expressing a negative view of the
body by trying to avoid the sexual act altogether, they choose to express it through sadomasochism.
And while sexual pleasure could indeed be higher, an increase in pleasure does not necessitate a
more benign view towards the body. Indeed, the increase in sexual pleasure could precisely be
because the sadomasochistic act allows them to more fully express their disdain of the body. In
such a scenario, the act would be a perverse one as it leads the couple away from the solitary ideal
of harmony.
A further comment about casual sex might help. While casual sex, by definition, definitely
falls short of the ideal of harmony insofar as the practitioners of casual sex do not truly nor deeply
appreciate the other person (nor do they desire to do so), one would be hard-pressed to thus
proclaim casual sex as perverse, especially if casual sex helps the parties involved to come to a
healthier conception of their own and each other’s sexuality. And this is just what this new account
is able to do. Like sadomasochism, it recognises that there are instances where casual sex can be
perverse insofar as it leads the parties involved away from the ideal and there are instances where
casual sex merely falls short of the ideal and is thus not perverse.
Indeed, it appears that on the new account, depending on the context, one instance of a kind
of act can be perverse, and another instance non-perverse. That this is so is actually an advantage
for the account rather than a disadvantage. On this account, it will not always be possible to
categorically classify kinds of acts, and hence instances of those kinds, as perverse or perverted.
Thus, the account does not provide as clear a moral guide about how to behave sexually as an
account that categorically deems all instances of, say, sadomasochism as perverted. It does,
however, have the advantage of being closer to the truth. Indeed, as Voltaire is supposed to have
said, in response to his host’s invitation to return for another orgy, “To do these things once is to be
a philosopher, but twice a pervert” (Baltzly 12). A couple who is exploring sadomasochism as an
avenue for them to grow in love for each other and for themselves as sexual beings can hardly be
termed perverts, nor their acts perverted or perverse. An account of sexual perversion that thinks
that such an instance of sadomasochism is qualitatively the same as one where the parties involved
are merely indulging in their disdain of their bodies is hopelessly out of touch with the reality of
sexual phenomena and our moral intuitions.
Furthermore, though it might be more convenient if all instances of a kind of act are
categorically deemed to be perverse or non-perverse, such a luxury is something that ethics does
38 
 
not enjoy. After all, as Aristotle points out, any science can only be as clear and accurate as the
subject-matter permits (5). Such clarity in classification can possibly be achieved if ethics is like
mathematics or the natural sciences, but ethics is neither of these. Ethics is the governance of how
we should live our lives and life is an intrinsically tricky and ‘muddy’ thing, hard to get a grip on in
the best of circumstances. Little wonder then that an ethical system that is closer to the truth is one
that seems unable to decide if a kind of act is thoroughly perverse or not. After all, we have seen
earlier how ethical systems that tried to categorise all instances of a kind of act as perverted had
little success in justifying their stance.
Lastly, this account focuses on acts, not dispositions. Baltzly points out that we should
identify sexual perversions with “standing dispositions”, as opposed to acts (12, emphasis his). His
argument is simple: it is not the case that we think that anyone who performs a perverted act is a
pervert, as evidenced by the example of Voltaire earlier. Rather, Baltzly rightly argues that there is
a distinction to be made between sexual curiosity and perversion, defining perversion then as
“dispositions that the agent has – and perhaps acts upon – over a significant period of time”.
Nonetheless, I think there is an argument to be made for viewing perversion in terms of acts rather
than dispositions. This is because one of the primary aims, if not the primary aim, of using this
concept is to determine whether an act is perverted, perverse, non-perverse or non-perverted so that
it can act as a moral guide for us in terms of deciding how to go about our sexual desires. Ergo, a
focus on acts rather than dispositions would be more helpful. The suggestion then is to focus on
acts with the proviso that a single instance of the act is not enough to render the person a pervert, be
the act a perverted one or merely a perverse one. Rather, a person is only a pervert if he has the
corresponding disposition, which could be already present within him and which causes him to
perform the act, or becomes present within him if he commits the relevant perverted or perverse act
over a significant period of time. This second clause is important because there are some agents
whose continence or strength of character is such that they can perform a perverted or perverse act
more times than others and yet still not have the required disposition to be considered a pervert.
Furthermore, though he might be performing the perverted or perverse act repeatedly, he might
simply be an opportunist who performs it not because he has a preference for such an act but
because that is the only way for him to have sex at that point in time. Indeed, to say that someone is
a pervert is to say that he has a settled preference for a certain perversion. An opportunist, on the
other hand, has no such settled preference. In essence then, a perverted act is that kind of act that
causes one to have the corresponding perverted disposition if it is committed over a significant
period of time, where significant depends on the nature of the act itself and the agent’s strength of
character. And the same can be said for perverse acts. This then allows us to accommodate
Baltzly’s point about dispositions while nonetheless keeping the focus on acts.
39 
 
 In sum, it seems that this new account of sexual perversion has fared well thus far. Like its
solitary counterpart, the interpersonal version of the account succeeds in fulfilling the first and
second criteria. Because the interpersonal ideal of harmony subsumes the solitary ideal of harmony,
it provides the morally significant natural norm that the account needs to fulfil the first criterion. Its
distinction between perverse and perverted, as well as acts that merely fall short of the ideal, also
allows the account to distinguish ideals and norms, thus fulfilling the second criterion. It remains
now to test the account against some cases to see if its evaluation of certain sex acts largely coheres
with how we would normally evaluate them, i.e. as perverse, perverted, non-perverse or non-
perverted, and if not, whether it has a good justification for such a move.

40 
 
Section 2.3 Testing the Account 
At first glance, the new account seems to succeed in dealing with the traditional
perversions, either preserving them as perversions or striking them off in keeping with how we
think of such acts today. For example, homosexuality and contraceptive sex are, contra the
procreation account, non-perverse because there seems nothing intrinsically within either act that
turns one away from the ideal of harmony. Once the connection to procreation has been
undermined, there seems no good justification for why these two acts should be viewed as perverse,
much less perverted. For similar reasons, oral sex and anal sex would also not be viewed as
perverse or perverted on this account.
Furthermore, traditional perversions like object fetishism, coprophilia, urophilia, voyeurism,
exhibitionism, paedophilia and necrophilia are preserved on this account, with object fetishism
deemed as a perverse act, the last four condemned as perverted acts, and coprophilia, urophilia
having both perverse and perverted variants. That the last four acts are perverted on this account
seem obvious enough for they are non-consensual (voyeurism, exhibitionism and necrophilia) or if
there is consent present, the consent is not competent and thus invalid (paedophilia).11 It has been
pointed out, for example, by J. P. Rosman and P. J. Resnick that a common motive of necrophilia is
to have sex with a partner who cannot resist nor reject them (Giles 170). Coprophilia and urophilia,
on the other hand, can be both perverse and perverted. In its voyeuristic or exhibitionistic forms,
these acts are perverted. In its consensual forms however, they are perverse because like object
fetishism, the focus becomes not the other person but the fetish, be it an inanimate object, faeces or
urine. Indeed, as James Giles observes, “without the fetish, the fetishist is frequently sexually
impotent” (115). The focus on the other person is thus obscured, preventing one from truly
acknowledging and appreciating the other person.
But it might be objected that such a judgement of object fetishism, coprophilia and urophilia
is too harsh. Distasteful as these practices might be, in their consensual forms, they seem harmless,
morally innocuous and are surely permissible. Yet such an objection fails to appreciate the
distinction between perverse and perverted that has been drawn up on this account. To say that they
are perverse is in no way to condemn them; that kind of judgement is only reserved for perverted
acts where total and complete disapproval is present. Here, the terming of an act as a perversion is
                                                            
11
 Note here that the discussion of exhibitionism and voyeurism here are of exhibitionism and voyeurism proper 
where the activity is performed on unsuspecting persons, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association (Giles 
89). There is thus present an element of coercion. However, there are consensual variants of exhibitionism and 
voyeurism (for example, some instances of performing or viewing a strip tease). In such cases, these acts are, like how 
sadomasochism and bestiality are judged on this account, deemed to be perverse insofar as they inhibit or lead one 
away from attaining the ideal of harmony; insofar as they help one to attain the ideal of harmony, then these variants 
of exhibitionism and voyeurism are not perverse. Strictly speaking however, it appears to me that when speaking of 
exhibitionism and voyeurism in the context of perversion, we should focus on the proper variant of such acts since 
that is what most probably think of when asked about these acts. 
41 
 
merely to serve as a warning to people that these acts can potentially turn one away from the ideal
of harmony, even while being a permissible act. Indeed, not all evaluative judgements are
condemnatory in nature for we do not simply say that some acts are permissible, some non-
permissible and some ideal; we also say that some acts, while permissible, are nonetheless best
stayed away from because of the potential dangers they pose, say talking to strangers if one is a
child or smoking weed. In addition, that we do traditionally think of them as perversions seems to
indicate that there is something about the acts that is morally suspect. In this sense then, the
account’s judgement of these forms of these acts as perverse is in keeping with, and not against,
how we typically think of these acts.
But while the account seems to have succeeded in accounting for the abovementioned acts,
there are more difficult cases.
As we have seen earlier, though sadomasochism is traditionally viewed as a sexual
perversion, on this account, it is not a through-and-through perversion. For one thing, some
instances of sadomasochism can help a couple to move towards the ideal. Such a claim though
might seem unintuitive at first sight. After all, how does whipping someone on the back and yelling
insults at him while he is wearing a dog collar help the couple to develop a more harmonious
relationship? If anything, it seems to promote an inequality in relations between the two as well as
causing them to have a more disdainful attitude towards the body. According to Linda Holler,
however, sadomasochism can indeed help people to reach the ideal of harmony.
In Erotic Morality, Holler argued that sadomasochism, if practiced in the context of consent
and trust, can be “cathartic and transformative” (149). She gives some examples of practitioners
who describe sadomasochism as allowing them to “reconnect with their bodies and feelings”. One
practitioner, Lynda Hart, had even described her experience of sadomasochism as the “reversal of
Plato’s cave in which the body leads the self back into the physical world and the mind obediently
follows”. Furthermore, it appears that sadomasochism is also therapeutic insofar as it allows people
who have had traumatic experiences in the past, especially in their childhood, to relive the past
under controlled circumstances, thus helping one to slowly break free of the patterns of behaviour
that was a result of the traumatic experience (Holler 149-150). As Robert Stoller observes, “the
etiology of sadomasochistic practice is pain experienced previously, particularly in childhood”,
such that “[t]he more severe the pain experienced the greater the need to relive it in a conscious
attempt to overcome its attraction” (Holler 149). Indeed, a practitioner describes her experience of
sadomasochism as something that “cauterizes our hurt, mends our shame, helps clear out the
psychic basement, [and] undo memories of the past” (qtd. in Holler 149). Thus, it seems that certain
forms of sadomasochism can help one to reach the ideal of harmony within oneself.

42 
 
 Yet some forms of sadomasochism can turn one away from the ideal. We have already seen
such an example earlier. Indeed, sadomasochism can also be perverted when practiced within a
context where either there is no consent, thus more accurately termed as sadistic rape, or where the
consent is vitiated due to the presence of coercion. For example, a man could bring a woman to a
deserted island on the pretence that they were simply going to enjoy the view and have a picnic.
Once there however, he threatens to leave her there if she does not agree to have sadomasochistic
sex with him. But as Alan Wertheimer points out, such a move will violate her rights because what
he “proposes not to do for [her is something that he] has an obligation to do for [her]” (188). Hence,
his offer is coercive, thus invalidating her consent, rendering this particular form of sadomasochism
perverted.
Hence, we can see why sadomasochism, as a kind of act, cannot be definitively classified as
perverse, perverted, non-perverse or non-perverted. Some instances are perverted, some are
perverse, some are non-perverse, and some are non-perverted. That this is so might not fit fully
with how we traditionally view sadomasochism given that the notion that sadomasochism is a
perversion is quite prevalent. Nonetheless, the justification offered seems good. Even someone like
Scruton, who is thoroughly conservative, agrees that there are non-perverted forms of
sadomasochism (298). Furthermore, the account does largely capture the notion that
sadomasochism is a perversion by allowing that certain forms of sadomasochism are perverse or
perverted.
Another act that cannot be categorically classified as a perversion is masturbation.
According to J. M. Reinisch, masturbation is typically associated with sexual fantasies where the
fantasies are not about erotic pleasure per se but about a sexual interaction that one wishes to have
(Giles 58). As Giles observes,

In fantasies coupled with masturbation there is, of course, the added element of
autoerotic stimulation, but the pleasure inherent in this stimulation owes its
existence as much to the fantasy as it does to the stimulation. Were the fantasy to
disappear or be replaced by sexually repulsive images or thoughts, it seems more
than likely that the autoerotic stimulation would quickly be felt to be lacking in
erotic pleasure. (59)

Hence, there is a strong, if not quite necessary, connection between masturbation and fantasy.
Undeniably, fantasising is in itself morally unproblematic. If it were otherwise, reading fantasy
novels would be morally problematic. But just as one could be warned against living too much in
the world of make-believe, escaping the harsh realities of life through these novels, one could be
warned against living too much in the world of make-believe that is our sexual fantasy. It is the
same kind of intuition that underlies our reasoning that when choosing between living life through

43 
 
an experience machine, not unlike Robert Nozick’s famous thought experiment, where we are
guaranteed experiences that we desire, and living life in the real world, we should choose the real
world. Choosing otherwise is not an impermissible decision insofar as doing so does not prevent
others from obtaining their own ends. Nonetheless, it seems a morally suspect decision such that
we would warn off anyone from doing such a thing. Similarly, if one is afraid or fed up of facing
rejection in real life and indulges in masturbation and sexual fantasy to the point that one refrains
from real life sexual interaction, masturbation becomes morally problematic. In this sense then,
masturbation can be a perverse act because it proves to be a hindrance to the formation of healthy
sexual relationships with another person.
This is not to deny that masturbation can be a healthy practice. W. R. Stayton observes that
“[t]here is little question today that autoeroticism is healthy, desirable and probably important to
attaining mature adult sexual responsivity” (qtd. in Giles 112). Indeed, if masturbation is a coping
mechanism that helps one to overcome a failed relationship and thus helps one on the way to
developing a healthy sexual relationship with another, then it can help one to reach the ideal instead
of turning one away from it. Still, it cannot be denied that there are times that coping mechanisms
become the whole world for the agent instead of helping the agent to move on back to the real
world. People with obsessive compulsive disorders are a good example. Thus, even though
masturbation can be a healthy practice, it also can be a perverse act.
Such a judgement of masturbation, though not as extreme as that of the procreation and love
accounts, might nonetheless be objected to as one that is still too harsh. Primoratz might point out,
for example, that masturbation is “much too elementary, general and frequent a type of sexual
behaviour to be classified as mere deviation”(Ethics 45). However, trying to tie perversion to
statistical normalcy has been shown to be fatally problematic for an account of sexual perversion.
In addition, just as with object fetishism and consensual coprophilia and urophilia, judging
masturbation to be perverse in no way condemns it as a perverted act. It is still a permissible act. In
calling it perverse, the account is simply warning people of the risks of performing such an act.
Lastly, just as with sadomasochism, not all instances of masturbation are perverse; only some are.
Thus, though it might not fit entirely with the common perception that masturbation is morally
innocuous, it nonetheless fits such a notion largely.
Somewhat surprisingly, bestiality does not appear to be a through-and-through perversion
on this account. According to C. J. Williams’ and M. S. Weinberg’s study on zoophilia in men,
many of their subjects, when queried on what made a particular animal more desirable than another,
pointed to the human-like qualities of the animal, in effect anthropomorphising their animals (Giles
113). Giles also observes that “the animals often used in sexual activity are ones whose genitals are
not too distinct from those of human beings or whose bodies symbolize the genitals of human
44 
 
beings” (113). What these observations seem to indicate is a tendency to use bestiality as a
substitute for real-life human sexual interaction, not unlike how masturbation can be used in a
perverse manner. As Giles points out, in zoophilia, “fantasy and symbolism seem to play a crucial
role” (92). In this sense then, bestiality hinders one from forming healthy sexual relationships with
other human beings and is perverse. In this way, the account seems to capture, in some part, the
common perception of bestiality as a perversion.
However, it might not be perverse if it is performed out of sexual opportunism. Just as it is
said that heterosexual sailors in the past who were on long voyages turned to homosexual acts in
order to obtain sexual pleasure, young males out in the rural countryside working on farms have
been said to turn to bestiality for the same reason. In such a case then, the act seems to merely fall
short of the ideal rather than turn one away from the ideal because the agent is not using it to escape
from the reality of sexual interaction but merely as a tool to abate his sexual frustration. If so, then
it does not seem to necessarily hinder him from building up healthy sexual relationships with other
human beings in the future. There might perhaps be a strong connection between bestiality and a
diminished ability to form healthy sexual relationships with other human beings, which might well
explain why we normally think of bestiality as a perversion. But a strong correlation is not a causal
relation. Thus, on this account, bestiality would not necessarily be perverse, especially if performed
out of sexual opportunism.
Again, as with sadomasochism and masturbation, how bestiality is evaluated on this account
does not fit entirely with how we normally view the act and again, the same rejoinder can be made:
the justification offered seems to make sense while the view that it is a perversion is still largely
captured on this account. Indeed, while it might be more advantageous if the account had
condemned bestiality as perverted, we have seen how doing so for the procreation and love
accounts was not enough to save the accounts.
But while one might accept that our views regarding sadomasochism, masturbation and
bestiality are largely captured on this account, it might be objected that the account leads us to
condemn two seemingly non-perverted acts as perverted – rape and sexual harassment. For if the
norm is constituted by the principle of humanity, then rape and sexual harassment, by definition,
transgresses the other person’s autonomy and thus would be condemned as perverted on this
account. Yet while these acts are surely immoral, ordinary usage does not seem to obviously
condemn them as perverted. Thus, the new account seems to generate some conclusions that are at
odds with ordinary usage and is poorer for it.
Indeed, the objection can be said to be more general than that. For on this account, all non-
consensual sex acts would be deemed as perverted. Rape and sexual harassment, where sexual
harassment is viewed in its precise technical and legal context of education and the workplace, are
45 
 
merely two instances of such acts. However, for our purposes, let us focus on just these two
instances of non-consensual sex. In the end analysis, it seems to me that whatever is said here of
these two instances can be easily extrapolated to include all other instances of non-consensual sex.
Let us first deal with the objection of rape. While the notion that rape is not a perversion is a
strong one, yet its converse, that rape is a perversion, is not exactly a weak one either. Consider
how, for example, when one finds out that someone that one knew was a rapist that one of the
arguably common exclamations, verbalised or not, is “Pervert!” If a pervert is someone who
performs perverted (or perverse) acts, then the notion that rape is a perverted act is not exactly
uncommon either. Indeed, unless an extensive empirical study is done of how people around the
world perceive rapists and whether they think that such people are perverts, there seems no way for
such a discussion to be settled conclusively. There are some who think that rapists are perverts and
there are some who do not. Appealing to intuition in this case seems to result in a deadlock.
Nonetheless, the important point to take note of here is that the view that rapists are perverts is not
altogether counterintuitive, which would be the case if one tried to say that necrophilia, for
example, is not a perversion. Thus, that this account would consider rape to be a perverted act is not
altogether problematic.
Dealing with the issue of sexual harassment is not as simple however. This is due not least
to the fact that it is a cluster term and refers to a whole variety of acts, from the prototypical quid
pro quo sexual harassment to wolf-whistling, comments on one’s dressing and body, caresses on
one’s shoulders and other various unwelcome sexual advances. And while various philosophers
have tried to give a definition for sexual harassment, it is far from clear that any one definition is
adequate. In fact, some like F. M. Christensen have argued that the concept itself should be
jettisoned. Be that as it may, we can nonetheless recognise that within this concept, a variety of acts
are captured that can be very broadly broken down into the following kinds: “attempted or actual
extortion of sexual favors, bodily contact of a sexual nature, and sexual expressions of any kind:
jokes, insults, propositions, passing comments, visual displays, facial expressions, etc” (Christensen
1). These acts are acts of sexual harassment because they are acts that the receiver finds
objectionable and would rather not receive. The harasser, in not caring for the receiver’s end of not
being harassed, can be seen to be treating the receiver merely as a means to his end and is therefore
performing a perverted act.
That this is so is not exactly unintuitive however. Consider quid pro quo sexual harassment
for example. In the form of a sexual threat, say, that the boss threatens to fire an employee if she
refuses to have sex with him, such an act would be considered perverted on the new account
because the other’s consent is coerced and invalidated. The same could be said of a coercive sexual
offer. For example, though the boss assures the employee that she is free to decline his sexual
46 
 
advances and that no harm will befall her, she might nonetheless fear that her career opportunities
at the company are from then on limited if she did in fact decline his offer. In such cases, we do in
fact tend to think that authoritative figures who abuse their power to obtain sexual favours from the
people under their charge are perverts. At the very least, as with rape and rapists, the view that such
people are perverts and their behaviour perverted is not necessarily counterintuitive either.
The case of a non-coercive sexual offer is, however, more complicated because the other’s
autonomy could well be respected. Suppose a student is offered benefits to which she is not
otherwise entitled, say a professor offers her a higher grade in her thesis if she agrees to sleep with
him, and she would rather have that option instead of getting the grade she deserves. He further
reassures her that she can freely make her choice without the possibility of a backlash. Here, her
consent is not invalidated because she is not coerced. Such a case would then not be deemed
perverted on the account because she is not treated merely as a means to the professor’s end.
Though this does look like a typical example of quid pro quo sexual harassment, it is debateable
whether such a case is truly a case of sexual harassment per se for it is an offer that the receiver
does not consider objectionable but preferable even. If sexual harassment is defined as an act that
the receiver finds objectionable, then such an offer is not a case of sexual harassment and would not
be counted as perverted on the new account.
But what of sexual advances, verbal or otherwise, that are considered as sexual harassment
but not instances of the quid pro quo variety? Though these advances are still unwanted, one would
be hard-pressed to say that in all cases, just one instance is enough for the act to be considered
perverted. This is because it is practically impossible to know in advance whether a particular act is
going to be objectionable. As Christensen points out, “one cannot safely ask first whether a certain
kind of sexual communication will be found offensive, since even doing that “involves sex” and
may be “unwanted”” (5, emphasis his). Indeed, someone who is new to a culture might unwittingly
behave in a manner that women in that culture find to be harassment. Yet this same behaviour
might not be viewed in such a manner in his native country. To then say that this was a perverted
act on the basis of this one instance seems too harsh. Rather, it seems that it is the sexual advance
that is deliberately done in the knowledge that it offends the other, say because she has told or
implied clearly that she finds such behaviour objectionable, that is perverted as her ends have been
deliberately frustrated by the ends of the harasser.
Such a view might seem harsh but again, ordinary usage is not necessarily against the idea
that sexual harassment is perverted. For example, frotteurism, which is the rubbing of oneself
against another person without her consent, is an example of an unwanted sexual advance that is
normally viewed as a perversion. And while it is not perhaps common to call men who persistently
wolf-whistle at women or caress their shoulders and backs, even though they know that this
47 
 
behaviour is objectionable to the ladies, perverted, it is not a rare view either. Indeed, that they do
such acts in the full knowledge that the other will be offended indicates a desire to deliberately
frustrate the other’s end, not unlike the sadistic rapist. Furthermore, the point to remember is that
this account largely accommodates our notions of what counts as a perversion and what does not in
evaluating sexual threats, coercive sexual offers and frotteurism as perverted.
Yet one could object to this last claim, i.e. that the account largely accommodates our
notions of what counts as a perversion and what does not, especially given how the account’s
treatment of rape and sexual harassment is far from perfect. The objection is more fundamental –
who is this “we” that I am appealing to when I contend that the new account largely accommodates
our notions of sexual perversion? Admittedly, ordinary usage of the concept of perversion is rather
nebulous, as established in the first chapter of this thesis. Like sexual harassment, what is
considered as perverse or perverted in one culture might not be deemed so in another culture. Rape
and sexual harassment are clear examples of this. In my own conversations, I have found that most
of my own friends would consider rapists and sexual harassers as perverted while some others
would disagree. Furthermore, the whole distinction between perverse and perverted is something
that seems alien to ordinary usage; people just do not seem to make such a distinction for to them,
perversions are simply perverted acts. To then make the claim that this new account then largely
accommodates how we ordinarily use the concept seems rather disingenuous.
However, given how nebulous ordinary usage is where sexual perversion is concerned, one
would be hard-pressed to find a philosophical account of sexual perversion that can fully
accommodate ordinary usage. And while philosophers like Primoratz might argue that this simply
shows that the concept of sexual perversion should be jettisoned, that conclusion seems to me to be
far more unintuitive than to accept an account that, while making certain key revisions to the
understanding of the concept, nonetheless is able to preserve quite a few of common intuitions
regarding sexual perversion. Acts that are generally thought of these days as not perverse, like
homosexuality, contraceptive sex, anal sex and oral sex, are viewed as such on the account, while
acts that are generally thought of as perverse or perverted, such as object fetishism, coprophilia,
necrophilia and paedophilia, are preserved on the account. And though the new account seemed to
have difficulty in conclusively classifying acts like sadomasochism, masturbation and bestiality as
always perverse or perverted, this is an advantage as it makes sense of the intuition that sometimes
even a seemingly perverse act can be performed for the betterment of the people involved. In this
way, the third criterion of a successful account of sexual perversion can be said to be fulfilled, not
perfectly, but largely.

48 
 
 Conclusion 
To sum up, this paper has explored the concept of sexual perversion, examining the
attempts of the four main accounts of sex and sexual perversion to provide a successful account of
sexual perversion. Their failure to do so, coupled with several logical problems that the concept
faces, has led to calls for it to be jettisoned. Yet the arguments presented against the concept of
sexual perversion can be circumvented while the means-ends and the minimalist accounts were
observed to share the common feature of coming down too heavily on either side of the mind-body
divide in their approach to human sexuality. The suggestion then was to explore if an account of
sexual perversion that is premised on a more harmonious view of the mind and the body would be
more successful. That this is so can be seen by how the new account is able to fulfil the three
criteria that a successful account of sexual perversion needs – it is able to provide an idea of the
natural that is morally significant, makes a distinction between ideals and norms, and its evaluation
of particular sex acts seems to largely cohere with our notions of which acts should be considered
perverted and which should not. Though the new account could not capture in entirety our views
regarding perversion, when compared to its competitors, the new account has fared a fair bit better
in doing so, not least because it is able to preserve the evaluative dimension of the concept while
still making a distinction between ideals and norms. A major spanner in the works however is that
the account assumes a theory of human nature that is contestable. While I think that such a
conception is closer to the truth than its rival theories, nonetheless, if this account of sexual
perversion is to be accepted, then more work has to be done on this area of philosophy.

49 
 
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53 
 
Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s:
Lee, Chun Tuan Jarrod Julian

Title:
Sexual perversion

Date:
2010

Citation:
Lee, C. T. J. J. (2010). Sexual perversion. Masters Advanced Seminar & Shorter thesis,
Department of Philosophy, The University of Melbourne.

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/11343/36374

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Sexual perversion

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