BOOK REVIEW

(not exceeding 1500 words)

SUBMISSION DATE: 01 March 18

Book Review: Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-
Soviet Eurasia
Authors: Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton.
Adelphi book Series The International Institute for Strategic Studies

The book review will examine the Book Title: Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis
and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. The authors, Samuel Charap is Senior
Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at The International Institute for Strategic Studies based in the
Institute’s Washington DC and Timothy J. Colton is Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of
Government and Russia Studies, Harvard University.

The book “Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-
Soviet Eurasia” is a complete in-depth analysis on the Russia Ukraine conflict which authors
traced the root of the problems that started since after the end of the cold war until the
conflict erupted in 2013 and the conflict still prolong until today. In the book, the authors
have used the game theory to state his arguments and make an analysis. The authors central
argument of the book is the result of the crisis has become worst from the ‘zero-sum policy’
before the conflict started in 2013 and 2014 to the ‘negative sum game’ where all the parties
involved (The US, EU, Russia, Ukraine and the former Soviet Union states members later
called as “in-betweens”) were suffered net lost and encountered difficulties to solve the
conflict (Page 23). The authors traced back the events that took place which led to the crisis;
the failure of the West to incorporate Russia into NATO and EU after the collapse of Soviet
Union in the 1990s; the expansion of NATO and EU to the eastern bloc; the colour revolution
in former Soviet Union member states and the domestic problem in Russia. The authors used
the game theory to state his arguments and make an analysis. This book is important in
relation to the study on Russia-Ukraine conflicts as the authors have made suggestions to
solve the problem.

Many scholars were argued that there are two reasons why Russia intervened in
Ukraine. Firstly it is because of the frustration of Russia over an external threat from the
expansion of the NATO and EU (Page 21). John M Mearsheimer put the blame on the west
for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the Russian government will not tolerate on the
expansion of the NATO and EU expansion (Mearsheimer, 2014). It aligns with the Realist
view that states will continue to conquer and expand their power for their survivability. As
Thucydides wrote, “The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must”
(Betts, 2013) show how Russia as a great power used their military power to intervene
Ukraine even though Ukraine was a sovereign country. Secondly, some scholars argue that
the conflict was from the internal threat to Russia internal politics that caused Russia to
intervene Ukraine domestic politics (Page 25). (Stephen, 2014) and (Sestanovich, 2014) have
blamed President Putin and his extreme ideology as the reason for the intervention. Both the
Russia and western bloc have different interests towards the “in-betweens” and there were in
competition with each others after the end of cold war. With the fall of the Soviet Union, it
has opened up a vacuum in Eastern Europe for both West and Russia to fill in the gap. While
Harry Kissinger view that Ukraine should not join NATO and the country should be given a

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liberty to choose a government that fits with Ukrainian spirit. He blamed both West and
Russia on the conflict (Kissinger, 2014).

From the perspectives of the authors, Russia-Ukraine crisis was a competition

between Russia and West over the former Soviet Union members. All the six former Soviet
Union members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in the
Eastern were caught between the Western and Russia pursue to influence these states. The
authors laid down how the US, NATO, EU, and Russia implemened zero-sum policies after
the second world war until the Ukraine crisis. The authors also highlighted many cases
involving Russia and West as a result of NATO and EU enlargement for example Kosovo
War, Georgia War and Orange revolution in Ukraine (Page 78-91).

As mentioned at the above, the authors main argument in the Russian Ukraine conflict
is a zero-sum policy producing a negative sum result (Page 21 and 151). It is the game where
all the states involved in the conflicts like the US, NATO, EU, Russia, the states “in-
betweens” and Ukraine itself were lost in the conflict. The worse country affected in the
conflict was Ukraine which suffered the most. It is estimated about 10,000 Ukrainian died
during the conflict, Ukraine has lost Crimea to Russia and over 2 million population in
Crimea have been displaced (page 157) and the economics of the state were disrupted (Page
21). Russia even though gain a Crimea territory but the economic repercussion and sanction
imposed had affected their own economy (Page 22). On the EU side, the consequences of the
conflict are from counter-sanctions imposed by Russia and the possible direct threat from
Russia and possible gas interruption by Russia. The US also has increased the budget in
relations to the European security. The relations between US and Russia were also
deteriorated since the crisis began.

The authors have mentioned that the failure of the west to include Russia after the
cold war ended in NATO. Instead, NATO has expanded to the East. As a result, it has created
a contest between Russia and the Western bloc over the former Soviet Union states where the
authors used many times which refers these states as “in-Betweens” (Page 26 &27) and
“periphery”. The “In-betweens” refers to the former Soviet States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova while “periphery” refers to the states along the Russia border
such as Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania and
Yugoslavia which were dominated by the Soviet Union during cold war era but not part of
the Soviet Union. After the end of cold war, the contest was level but later the contest has
reached high when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and the introduction of EU’s Eastern
Partnership policy in 2009.

The authors argue that the rivalry between the West and Russia over Ukraine because
of the three “geo”. First is “geo-strategic” which means “the standard-issue realpolitik with
special attention to attaining influence over particular countries or areas”. Second is “geo-
economics” which means “the projection of power over territory using economic means” and
lastly “geo-idea” reasons which mean “policies to spread normative conceptions of the good
and the right beyond national borders” (Page 30).

The authors cited that “great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their
home territory”. The expansions of the NATO and EU to the Eastern bloc have a great
concerned to the Russian Government (Page 25). Therefore Russia will continue to use its
power to pressure the states ‘In-betweens” as long as these states continue to join the West.

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 The authors analyse the predicaments the states that joined the Western bloc
immediately after the collapsed of Soviet Union before Russia’s resurgence and the states
who are wanted to join the Western bloc after the Russia Resurgence (Page 78). The former
that joined the west before Russia’s resurgence did not receive much resistance from Russia.
These states such as Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have joined NATO in 1999. Later
in March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have
joined NATO and in the same year in May 2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined EU. However, the states who wanted to join
the Western bloc after the Russia resurgence like Georgia and Ukraine had conflicts resulted
in a war with Russia.

In Chapter Three, Breaking Points, the authors discussed the sanctions that were
imposed to Russia. This is the reactions from the US and EU to show their protest on the
annexation of Crimea back to Russia. Later Russia responds back and imposed a ban on the
products from EU.

The authors refer Russia-Ukraine conflict as “soft coercion” rather than Soft power.
The definition of the soft power by Joseph Nye is “The ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than through coercion”. From the definition, the soft power could not be
applied in the conflict since the intervention of Russia into Ukraine did not fit with the
definition. The authors further explained the establishment of the inter-regional and cultural
department under President Putin with the aim to enhance cooperation with former Soviet
neighbours. However, this department was secretly financed the NGO and pro-Russian
separatist to organise a protest in Ukraine (Page 81&82).

At the end of the book, the authors suggest all countries involved Russia, US, and
West to arrange some sort European-Eurasian order that they had before to serve as a
connection between the western bloc and Russia (Page 181). The authors suggest all parties
must “make painful compromises” (Page 183). The West should recognise that their model
will not work in Ukraine compared to East Central Europe. Likewise, Russia needs to accept
that the former Soviet states are truly sovereign state and Russia need to respect the
sovereignty of the states.

In conclusion, the book had provided the insight evaluation and detailed analysis of
the Russia-Ukraine conflicts. It has provided an excellent explanation the root of the
problems from both sides the West and Russia perspectives. The authors successful
highlighted and explained the event leading up to the conflict and the reasons why the
conflict has arisen, lessons learned that can be drawn from the conflict and the possible
measured that can be taken to solve the conflict. Even though there is no solution yet to this
conflict as the problem is still unresolved.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Charap, S., & Colton, T. J. (2016). Everyone Loses. The Ukraine Crisis and the
Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. Taylor & Francis Limited.

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 Henry Kissinger, “To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” Washington Post,
March 5, 2014,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-
ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-
d34c451760b9_story.html.

Michael Rühle, “NATO and the Ukraine Crisis,” American Foreign Policy Interests
37 (2015): 80, doi: 10.1080/10803920.2015.1038925.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault”. Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 93 (No. 5 ), pp. 1-12.

Motyl, A. (2013). Yanukovych must go Ukrainians will protest as long as his corrupt
regime exists. Foreign Affairs.

Nye, J. S. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1) (March 1): 94–109.
doi:10.1177/0002716207311699. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699.

Sharyl Cross (2015) NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine

conflict: Managing Black Sea Security and Beyond, Southeast European and Black Sea
Studies, 15:2, 151-177, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017.

Stephen, S. (2014). “How the West Has Won”. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, no. 6 (2014):
172,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/2014-10-17/faulty-
powers.

Stephen M. Walt (2014), “No Contest: Obama Gambled that U.S. Power Would
Trump Russia’s Interest in Ukraine. He was Wrong.” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/no-contest/.

Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Conflict After the Cold War, ed. Richard K.
Betts (Boston:Pearson, 2013), 70.