People of the Philippines

Vs
Romeo Jalosjos
G.R. 132875, February 3, 2000

Facts:

Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national

penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. The primary argument of the
movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls
this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Ruling:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House
of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
Tirol vs Comission on Audit
G.R. No. 133954, Aug. 3, 2000

FACTS:

During Victoriano Tirol’s capacity as the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII, he
and some officials of the Lalawigan National High School in Eastern Samar entered into a
contract with Fairchild Marketing and Construction in the total amount of P80,000. Upon filing
of complaint by the Teachers and Employees Union, COA investigated the transaction and found
that there was malversation of public funds. Instead of a competitive public bidding, the purchase
of certain supplies and equipment was done through a negotiated contract, which resulted in an
overprice of P35,100. Tirol’s main allegation is that the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV)
and check were previously reviewed by his subordinates before he approved and signed them.
Said act, therefore, only constitutes a ministerial act on his part. But the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas rejected Tirol’s defense because had he carefully scrutinized the
documents he would have discovered that the purchases were made without competitive public
bidding. Moreover, the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a reasonable mind from
accepting the claim that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the performance of his
functions. Accordingly, it was recommended that petitioner and co-petitioners be indicted for
violation of Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended for entering into a contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government. An information was subsequently
filed with the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioner and two others with the aforementioned
offense. In his comment, the Solicitor General contends that there was a conspiracy of silence
and inaction and because of that petitioner was guilty of negligence. He further asserverates that
it is beyond the ambit of the Court's authority to review the power of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting and dismissing a complaint filed before it. In his Reply, petitioner states that the
petition does not involve a review of the factual finding of the Ombudsman but rather its
conclusion based on undisputed facts.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the issue is a question of law, and may therefore, be reviewed by the
Supreme Court

HELD:

From the pleadings, it is clear that the questions raised by the petitioner are questions of
fact rather than of law. What petitioner wants to happen is for the Supreme Court to review the
evidence and determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no conspiracy existed
among the accused. The rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to petitioner because the
petitioners in the said cases were indicted and submitted themselves to trial before the
Sandiganbayan, which convicted them for the offense charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the
judgment against the petitioner becasue there was no evidence that the Government suffered
undue injury. And in Magsuci, the reversal by the Court of the judgment of conviction was based
on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and that there has been no intimation at all that he
had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acia. In
both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy, while in this case, there is
only the claim of peitioner that he acted in good faith and that there was no conspiracy. The
Ombudsman believes otherwise and the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of
the said Office. Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in
relation to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which has been declared
unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its advice and consent. Also, there is no right of appeal available since the Section
mentions only appeals from all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court also found that the petition was in fact a modified form
of forum shopping as shown in the other case filed.