Manila Prince Hotel vs.

, GSIS GR 122156; 03 February 1997

FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

ISSUE: WON the Manila Prince may invoke the constitutional principle of “Filipino-First Policy”
under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy?

RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest
the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.
Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

De Leon vs., Esguerra; GR 78059; 31 August 1987

FACTS: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda
of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over
their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant
to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six
years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have
elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of
office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office
by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years
had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office
of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent
with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the proclamation of the 1987 Constitution retroacts from the date of the plebiscite?

RULING: The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it
took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No.
58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The thrust of the dissent is that the
Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was
actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its
proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be
effective on the very day of the plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the
Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear,
unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in unanimously approving (by
thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So
that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on
the date of the plebiscite.

Gold Creek Mining Corp., vs., Rodriguez; GR 45859; 28 September 1938

FACTS: Petitioner alleges that it owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim in the barrio of Gomok,
Itogon, Benguet, Mountain Province, and located on public lands. (That said claim was located
on January 1, 1929; perfected by virtue of Acts of Congress providing such unpatented mining
claims.) Petitioner filed an application for patent with respondents the area of 4.5 hectares.
However, respondents refused to issue such. Petitioner alleges that it is entitled as a matter of
right to the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law. That petitioner
by itself and its predecessors in interest has been in continuous and exclusive possession of the
land. Respondents on the other hand allege that the Constitution provides that “natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated.” Thus, they are
not only under no obligation to approve the application, but actually duty bound to prevent such
issuance.

ISSUE: WON the term “natural resources” should be interpreted to include all mineral lands?

RULING: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to
be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It
is clear that the foregoing constitutional provision prohibits the alienation of natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land. It seems likewise clear that the term “natural
resources,” as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands
which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The
reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provision itself. It first declares that all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural resources of
the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that “their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution.” Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were
declared to be the property of the State. And as only “agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain” were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands
which at the time the constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public
domain, do not come within the prohibition.

A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws
upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and
opinion in its adoption.

Francisco, et al., vs., House of Representatives, et al.; GR 160261; 10 November 2003

FACTS: On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the Court for violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The House Committee on
Justice subsequently dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., First District,
Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines Sur, filed another verified
impeachment complaint with the Office of the Secretary General of the House against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel
of the judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various infrastructure
projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment. Attached to the second
impeachment complaint was a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the members of the House of Representatives. The complaint was set to be
transmitted to the Senate for appropriate action. Subsequently, several petitions were filed with
this Court by members of the bar, members of the House of Representatives and private
individuals, asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of
public funds for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. Petitioners contended
that the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice was barred under
Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that “no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

ISSUE: WON the term “to initiate” should be interpreted literally as to bar the second
impeachment of the chief justice?

RULING: To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. Finally, ut magis valeat quam
pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.

In view of these guidelines and considering that the framers intended that the term “initiate”
should be interpreted in its ordinary meaning.

Sarmiento, et al., vs., Mison; GR L-79974; 17 December 1987

FACTS: In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of
the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison
because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of
bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin
Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary
payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment?

RULING: The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in
the Constitution because the fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect
to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but
in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1987 Constitution, as already pointed out, the
clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Petition dismissed.

Aquino, et al., vs., COMELEC and National Treasurer, GR L-40004; 31 January 1975

FACTS: In an original petition for prohibition, petitioners seek to nullify Presidential Decrees Nos.
1366, 1366-A, calling for a referendum on February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and
630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the
referendum question, as well as other related presidential decrees, orders and instructions.
Petitioners contend that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess
any lawful authority under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no
authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. In addition, petitioners
argue that due to the climate of fear generated by Martial Law there can be no true expression
of the people's will and that the period for free debate is too short.

ISSUE: WON the President is empowered by the Constitution to issue the said proclamations?

RULING: Since President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the only incumbent President of the
Philippines at the time the new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention, the
Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except him who shall initially convene the interim.
Assembly. (Sec. 3, Art. XVII, Transitory Provisions). It was the incumbent President Marcos alone
who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081, orders, decrees as well as instructions, and
performed others acts as president prior to the approval and ratification of the new Constitution.
Consequently, he was the incumbent President which the Constitutional Convention had in had
in mind when it provided in Section 3(2), Article XVII. “that all the proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of
the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial
Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National
Assembly.” The same is true with the term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in
Section 9 thereof. The legality of the law-making authority of the President during the period of
Martial Law is expressly affirmed under Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution. This
particular provision is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as
already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.

The problem of constitutional construction raised in the petition is, does the Constitution
contemplate that the interim assembly created by it would meet immediately and forthwith elect
the new President and the Prime Minister? If this question were to be answered in the light of
normal conditions, there could be some plausibility in suggesting an affirmative response, albeit
not altogether conclusive. But no one can ever escape the fact that the Constitution was
formulated and approved under abnormal and exceptional circumstances. The members of the
convention were well cognizant of the fact that the country was then as it still is under martial
law and that normal processes of government have not been in operation since its proclamation.
We must assume that as practical men they knew that the procedure of shifting from the
presidential to the parliamentary system would have to be reconciled with the demands of the
martial law situation then obtaining. Above all it must have been obvious to the delegates that
under martial law, President Marcos had in fact assumed all the powers of government. In other
words, it must have been evident to them from what was happening that the immediate
convening of the legislative body would not be compatible with the way President Marcos was
exercising martial law powers.
It is but proper, therefore, that these transcendental historical facts be taken into account in
construing the constitutional provisions pertinent to the issue under discussion. As I see it, given
the choice between, on the one hand, delaying the approval of a new charter until after martial
law shall have been lifted and, on the other, immediately enacting one which would have to give
due allowances to the exercise of martial law powers in the manner being done by President
Marcos, the convention opted for the latter. To my mind, it is only from this point of view that
one should read and try to understand the peculiar and unusual features of the transitory
provisions of the New Constitution.

Civil Liberties Union vs., Executive Secretary; GR 83896; 22 February 1991

FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON EO 284 is unconstitutional?

RULING: A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose. With this in mind, it is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their
tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should
be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest
intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13,
Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions
in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

Luz Farms vs., Secretary of Agrarian Reform; GR 86889; 04 December 1990

FACTS: On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which
includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Petitioner Luz
Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be
adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law.
Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the
law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and
poultry business. Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop
or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no
more than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land
is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that
it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

ISSUE: WON the assailed provisions of RA 6657 are unconstitutional for including in its definition
of “Agriculture” the livestock and poultry industry?

RULING: The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers in the adoption of the Constitution. Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision
of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. It is generally held that, in
construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself,
but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional
provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the
understanding of the people when they ratified it. The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word “agricultural,” clearly show that
it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government. Hence, assailed provisions are unconstitutional.

Vera vs., Avelino, et al., GR L-543; 31 August 1946

FACTS: The COMELEC submitted its report regarding the national elections to the President and
Congress. The report states that the voting in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan
and Tarlac did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will because of the acts of
terrorism and violence. Consequently, Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero (the
petitioners), who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber. The
petitioners brought an action to compel the respondents to permit them to occupy their seats,
and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

ISSUE: WON the Court has jurisdiction?

RULING:

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. vs., The Land Registration Commission
and the Register of Deeds of Davao City; GR L-8451, 20 December 1957

FACTS: On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate
No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., (RCADI) is
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis
Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. Registry of Deeds Davao (RD) required RCADI
to submit affidavit declaring that 60% of its members were Filipino Citizens. As the RD
entertained some doubts as to the registerability of the deed of sale, the matter was referred to
the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) en consulta for resolution. LRC hold that pursuant to
provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution, RCADI is not qualified
to acquire land in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at leat 60% of the capital, properties
or assets of the RCADI is actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. LRC also denied the
registration of the Deed of Sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such requisite. RCADI’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for mandamus.

ISSUE: WON RCADI may register the property under its name despite the 60% requirement
provided for by the Constitution?

RULING: In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when
the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art.
XIII), was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this
particular form of corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated
tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of at
least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the
existence or not a vested right becomes unquestionably immaterial.