August 30, 2017 contract. Atty.
Atty. Maloloy-on calmed the phone caller and asked her to drop by her office
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223
MS. FLORITA PALMA and MS. FILIPINA MERCADO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City), JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, and Clerk of Court MA. FLORIDA C.
OMELIO, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court, both of the
Island Garden City of Samal,, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On July 8, 2007, a certain Filipina Mercado (Mercado) sent an electronic mail 1 (e-
mail) to the pio@supremecourt.gov .ph regarding an alleged "marriage scam" in
Davao City perpetrated by Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Judges George E.
Omelio (Judge Omelio) and Rufino Ferraris (Judge Ferraris).2 Mercado claimed to
have personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the said judges as she was once a
"fixer".
On March 17, 2008, a certain Fiorita Palma (Palma) also sent an e-mail3 to
the pio@supremecourt.gov.ph complaining about the alleged dishonorable conduct of
respondents Judge Ornelio and his wife, Clerk of Court Ma. Florida C. Omelio (CoC
Omelio ), relative to the solemnization of the marriage of a certain "Echeverria."
Acting thereon, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dispatched an
investigating team to Davao City which found as follows:
Following the only lead given, the investigating team proceeded directly to MTCC,
Davao City.
x x x The investigators asked [Atty. Fe Maloloy-on, Clerk of Court, OCC4 -MTCC,
Davao City] x x x relative to the alleged marriage scam prevailing in Davao City. She
informed the investigators that there were [sic] no reported incident relative thereto
but x x x intimated that there were some rumors x x x [however] no complainants x x x
came forward to complain about such actions of the judges. When x x x asked x x x
[whether] there was a marriage solemnized x x x [involving a certain] Echevarria, she
stated that there was none[.] x x x Atty. Maloloy-on however x x x [recalled] an
incident wherein a lady called up her office and asked whether the copy of the
marriage contract of her child was already [ready] for pick up. When asked about the
name of the parties[,] x x x and the [solemnizing] judge, and the date of
solemnizatioil[,J the caller merely stated that one of the parties' surname [sic] was
Echevarria and it was solemnized by Judge George Omelio on February 29, 2008. x x
x Atty. Maloloy-on searched for the record of such marriage but x x x there was none
ever recorded in MTCC, Davao City. x x x [S]he relayed the information to the phone
caller who x x x got angry and demanded the production of a copy of the marriage
[but t]he phone caller never dropped by her office and was never heard [of] again.
x x x [A]s there was no marriage solemnized [on] February 29, 2008 wherein one of
t11e party bears the surname of Echevarria, [the investigators proceeded] to MTCC,
Island Garden [City] of Samal as Florita Palma mentioned that Judge Omelio was
with his wife when he solemnized the marriage at the house of the parties in Davao
City. The wife of Judge Omelio, Mrs. Florida Omelio is the Clerk of Court ofMTCC,
OCC, Island Garden City ofSamal.
On June 19, 2008[,] x x x the investigators first proceeded to the Local Civil Registrar
of island City Garden of Samal, to investigate x xx. Surprisingly, a marriage was
solemnized in Island Garden City of Samal on [February] 28, 2008 by Judge Virgilio
G. Murcia x x x. The parties' names are Julius Regor M. Echevarria and Khristine
Marie D. Duo. x x x [T]he investigators asked the Assistant Local Civil Registrar [for] a
photocopy of the said marriage contract. x x x ‘Die investigators then proceeded to
MTCC, Island Garden City of Samal to interview Judge Murcia and Mrs. Omelio.
However, Mrs. Omelio was not present and available at that time x x x. Likewise,
Judge Murcia was at MTCC, Davao City to hear inhibited ca-;es thereat.
At MTCC, Davao City, the investigators briefed Judge Murcia of the purpose of the
investigation x x x When asked whether he solemnized the marriage of Echevania
and Duo al Island Garden City of Samal, he stited that he [could not] really remember
the parties considering the munerous marriages he had solemnized in the past. When
[asked] whether the signature on the marriage contract of Echevarria and Duo was
his, he [admitted] that same was x x x his signature. [When] asked whether he was
persuaded by the Omelios into signing a marriage certificate without the parties being
present[,] x x x he replied that it was not possible. He claimed that he [was]
meticulous in the examination of the marriages he solemnizes and he makes sure
that the parties are present when he puts his signature on the marriage contract.
The next day, June 20, 2008 the investigating team x x x proceeded to the address x
x x of Julius Regor Echevarria x x x.
x x x [The investigators chanced upon [Mr. Julius Echevarria at his residence]. When
asked whether he was married on February 28, 2009 at his residence, he positively
affirmed such fact. When inquired who solemnized said marriage, he readily
answered that it was Judge George Omelia. [When] asked how he can positively
state that it was Judge Omelio, he said that he knew Judge Omelio as he was known
in the community, he even gave the investigators a copy of the pictures of the
wedding x x x. [W]hen the investigators x x x asked if he has [sic] a copy of their
marriage contract, Mr. Echevarria immediately presented the same. The investigators
then pointed out that per copy of the marriage it was Judge Murcia who solemnized
their marriage in Island Garden City of Samal and not Judge Omelio. Mr. Echevarria
was quite surprised to learn of such fact as it was his first time to notice the same.
Thereafter, the mother of Julius Echevarria, Mrs. Tita Echevarria, came x x x. The
investigators introduced themselves and stated their purpose. x x x Tita Echevarria
appeared irritated and surprised why they were being investigated and immediately
demanded the basis of such investigation. The investigators readily showed her a
copy of the letter of Fiorita Palma. After reading the letter, Tita Echevarria stated that
she does not know x x x Fiorita Palma. Julius Echevarria however noticed some
similarities in the circumstances of his marriage and that of the one stated in the letter
of Florita Palma, except for some minor [inconsistencies] as to the date of
solemnization and the person accompanying Judge Omelio. He said that the
marriage took place in their house and not anywhere in the Island Garden City of
Samal and it was solemnized on February 28 and not February 29, 2008 and that
Judge Omelio did not have company when he solemnized the marriage. He likewise
stated that he does not know how much was given to Judge Omelio as solemnization
fee as his parents were the one [sic] who paid the same. Mrs. Tita Echevarria
however [asserted] that they are not interested in filing any complaints or x x x willing
to state what they know in an affidavit to be sworn by them. She [begged] the
investigators to just leave them be and suggested that if the investigators [were] really
bent on catching judges doing some anomaly, they should make an entrapment for
that purpose.5
Based on the foregoing findings, the OCA directed Judge Omelio, Judge Virgilio G.
Murcia (Judge Murcia), and CoC Omelio, to comment on the e-mails and on the
report of the investigating team.6
In his Comment,7 Judge Omelio narrated that his neighbors, Librado G. Echevarria III
and Teresita P. Mapayo (the Echevarrias), went to his office at the MTCC, Branch 4,
Davao City, on February 25, 2008, requesting that he solemnize the marriage of their
son Julius Regor [Julius]; that since they wanted a beach wedding, he suggested that
they see Judge Murcia whose court has jurisdiction over the Island Garden City of
Samal; that on February 29, 2008, the Echevarrias invited him and his wife to dinner
at their house for those who were not able to attend their son's wedding on February
28, 2008; and that during said dinner, the Echevarrias requested him to "reenact the
wedding for purposes of picture taking and posterity," 8 to which he acceded.
Moreover, Judge Omelio posited that the e-mail/complaints of Palma and Mercado
should have been disregarded for being unsigned and not under oath; that the
allegations were unfounded and meant only to harass; and, that he did not demand
any amount from the Echevarrias.
For her part, CoC Omelio found nothing wrong with her husband, Judge Omelio,
acceding to the request of the Echevarrias to reenact the wedding; that if at all, the
Echevarrias were the parties in interest, and not Palma, hence the latter had no
reason to file the complaint; and that her only participation was to accompany her
husband to the dinner party.9
Judge Murcia, on the other hand, insisted that his name was never mentioned in the
complaint; and that he was impleaded only because his signature appeared in the
subject marriage contract. Judge Murcia claimed that he solemnized the subject
marriage on February 28, 2008 at about 5:30 in the afternoon in his courtroom; that
the contracting parties, as well as their witnesses, appeared before him; and, that all
the documents in support of said marriage, as well as the corresponding receipts for
the fees, were presented before him.10
Since there were factual issues to be clarified, the Court resolved to redocket the
complaint into a regular administrative matter and to refer the same to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.11
Upon referral to the CA, the Investigating Justice12 directed respondents to submit, in
lieu of their direct testimonies, their affidavits, as well as those of their witnesses.13
CoC Omelio adopted her earlier comment filed with the OCA as integral part of her
Affidavit.14 In addition, she averred that the participation of the Office of the Clerk of
Court (OCC) was only the receipt of payment and its remittance to the Chief
Accountant of the Supreme Court.
Judge Omelio submitted his Affidavit15 where he also adopted his comment earlier
submitted to the OCA as forming part thereof In addition, he reiterated that the
complaints were mere harassment suits and pure hearsay.
Judge Murcia also adopted his comment filed with the OCA as part of his
Affidavit.16 He maintained that he should not have been impleaded as respondent
herein since his name was never mentioned by Palma or Mercado. He contended
that the investigation should focus only on the personalities named in the complaint.
The Investigating Justice then directed the respondents to attend a preliminary
conference and hearing.
Thereafter, the Investigating Justice submitted a Report 17 dated December 15, 2010.
As regards Judge Omelio, the Investigating Justice found him to have trifled with
marriage as a social institution and held him administratively liable, to wit:
The act of respondent Judge Omelio in conducting what essentially was a sham
wedding is, by all accounts, against public law and public policy. In so conducting a
bogus wedding before the public, Judge Omelio had trifled with marriage, an
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family whose nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law x x x. As a jurist, Judge Omelio
ought to know that a judge's power to solemnize marriage is to be exercised in
accordance with law. This includes the appearance before him in his chamber[s] by
the contracting parties x x x where they x x x declare personally that they take each
other as husband and wife x x x. While he has undoubtedly the authority to solemnize
marriages, he had clearly overstepped the bounds of that authority by administering a
fraudulent wedding ceremony; x x x [H]e should have declined the importunings of the
groom's parents to conduct a "reenactment" of the wedding x x x.
x x x Worst, Judge Omelio lied when he declared during his testimony before the
undersigned that he had permitted the other [g]odparents to sign at the back of the
marriage certificate to make it appear that those persons had witnessed the marriage
rites.x x x However, a certified true copy of that marriage contract x x x [revealed] no
such additional signatures of [g]odparents at the certificate’s back page. His belated
disavowal as to this fact in his Manifestation dated 4 November 2010 [was] x x x an
afterthought as he realized his lies upon seeing the actual marriage contract himself.
xxxx
As to the charge that Judge Omelio had demanded monetary considerations in
exchange for solemnizing the marriage of the Echevarrias, there [appeared] no
sufficient evidence that such had been the case. Indeed, both complainants had not
substantiated their claims, contained in their e-mail letters, that respondent Judge and
his wife, co-respondent Mrs. Omelio, had resorted to the unsavory and unlawful
activity of asking money from the parties in order for the judge to conduct the sham
wedding rites. The claims remained as such - just claims without any supporting
evidence to prove them. Thus, as to this particular aspect of the administrative case,
respondent Judge Omelio, and for that matter, his co-respondent, his spouse Mrs.
Omelio, should not be held liable in any way, whether administratively or criminally.
However, for his highly irregular solemnization of a sham marriage, which obviously
arose from his misguided comprehension of the appropriate duties and functions of a
magistrate and the inviolability of marriage as a social institution, Judge Omelio
should be held administratively liable. x x x18
As regards Judge Murcia, the Investigating Justice found no infraction on his part in
solemnizing the subject marriage. Instead, his liability consisted in failing to collect the
necessary solemnization fees, viz.:
There [was] no sufficient evidence to show that respondent Judge Murcia had
solemnized the marriage of the Echevarrias in a manner violative of the Family Code.
Neither was there proof of any corrupt activity that he committed in the course of
solemnizing the Echevarria wedding. However, it [was] apparent, based on the
judicial report of respondent Mrs. Omelio x x x that no marriage solemnization fee had
been paid by the [contracting] parties before the MTCC OCC. x x x This fact [belied]
the claim of Judge Murcia that he had carefully perused the documents of the
Echevarrias and only when he determined that all was proper did he then solemnize
the marriage. Judge Murcia's act of solemnizing the marriage without the appropriate
court documentation as to solemnization fees [constituted] a violation of Supreme
Court Admin. Circular No. 3-2000 x x x.19
Similarly, the Investigating Justice found CoC Omelio administratively liable for failing
to collect the solemnization fees, thus:
The records likewise bear out that Mrs. Omelio had not been truthfully forthcoming in
her claim that her office had duly collected the marriage solemnization fee of ₱300.00
relative to the civil wedding of the Echevarrias. Her x x x Exh. "A-1" indisputably
points to this fact. As it was her duty to collect such fees but did not do so, she should
be held administratively liable as well. Her defense that it was the Echevarrias who
had personally processed the documentation due to urgency [was], to say the least,
passing the buck to said parties. As her act [constituted] a violation of both SC Admin.
Circular No. 3- 2000 and Circular 127-2007, she should be meted a fine in the
amount of Php5,000.00 as well. x x x20
The Court however noted that, in the Report submitted by the Investigating Justice, it
was unclear as to "who between respondent Judges Murcia and Omelio [actually]
solemnized the marriage of the Echevarrias, where was the marriage solemnized - in
Davao City or in the Island Garden City of Samal, and when was the marriage
solemnized x x x."21 Noting that these questions could be answered by Julius and
Khristine themselves, their parents and those who signed the Certificate of
Marriage,22 the Court resolved to refer the matter back to the Investigating Justice for
further investigation, report and recommendation.23
In the Final Report,24 the Investigating Justice manifested that efforts to summon the
contracting parties, Julius and Khristine, and the groom’s parents, proved futile since
they were already working in Abu Dhabi, while the bride’s parents, Danilo J. Duo and
Penegilda D. Duo could not be located at their given address. It was also noted that
the "disinterest of the Echevarrias can be traced as early as from the Report dated
September 10, 2008 by the former Court Administrator, now Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, Jose P. Perez, who noted that the mother of the groom x x x told the
investigating team x x x that ‘they are not interested in filing any complaints or are
they willing to state what they know in an affidavit to be sworn by them x x
x."’25 Nevertheless, the Investigating Justice opined that despite the absence of the
complainants and other witnesses, the issues raised above could still be resolved
based on the documents on hand.
The Investigating Justice noted thus:
The undersigned most respectfully renders the view that despite the absence of the
complainants and witnesses, the evaluation of the documents x x x which are now
part of the records is sufficient basis to resolve the questions set forth in the above.
The evidentiary weight of the documents is not diminished by the absence of
complainants and witnesses because these were obtained and authenticated earlier
by the investigating team x x x. These documents include the Certificate of Marriage
and four colored photographs.
Per page 2 of his Comment x x x, respondent Judge Omelio mentioned his
reenactment of the wedding on February 29, 2008 in the Echevarria residence. Per
transcript of his testimony, Judge Omelio confirmed having reenacted (the role of a
judge) in the wedding of the Echevarria couple.
A careful scrutiny of the documents establishes the following facts:
1. Both respondents Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio solemnized the marriage of
Julius Regor M. Echevarria and Khristine Marie D. Duo. But it is respondent Judge
Murcia whose name and signature appear in the Certificate of Marriage while there
are only pictures to show that respondent Judge George E. Omelio also married the
couple. x x x
2. Per Certificate of Marriage, respondent Judge Murcia officiated the marriage in
MTCC, Branch 2 Babak District, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte on
February 28, 2008 at 5:30 P.M.
3. Respondent Judge Omelio re-enacted the marriage of Regor and Khristine Marie,
in the residence of the Echevarrias, x x x in Monte Maria Village, Catalunan Grande,
Davao City, on February 29, 2008 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening. x x x
Based on the above facts, it cannot be ascertained if respondent Judge Murcia and
his Clerk of Court, respondent Ma. Florida C. Omelio falsified the Certificate of
Marriage. x x x
With regard to respondent Judge Omelio, he could not be held liable for falsification
since he did not have any participation at all in the execution of the Certificate of
Marriage. His re-enactment of the marriage did not include the act of preparation of
the Certificate of Marriage. Without that public document, it is also difficult to render a
finding on whether or not respondent Judge Omelio may be held liable for performing
an illegal marriage ceremony which is punished under Article 352 of the Revised
Penal Code.26
In a Resolution27 dated December 5, 2012, the Court resolved to refer the Final
Report of the Investigating Justice to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a Memorandum28 dated January 15, 2014, the OCA found all three respondents to
have violated Administrative Order No. 125-2007 (AO 125-2007), to wit: Judge
Omelio for solemnizing the marriage without signing the Marriage Certificate; Judge
Murcia for affixing his signature in the Marriage Certificate without actually performing
the marriage; and CoC Omelio for failing to collect the solemnization fee. The OCA
also noted that during the pendency of this administrative matter, CoC Omelio passed
away while Judge Omelio was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits on October 22, 2013 in A.M. Nos.
RTJ-11-2259, RTJ-11- 2264, & RTJ-11-2273. Thus, the OCA recommended as
follows.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended for the consideration
of the Honorable Court that:
1. the complaint against respondent Florida C. Omelio, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Island
Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, be DISMISSED;
2. respondent Judge George E. Omelio, Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Davao City,
Davao del Sur be found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount of
₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of his accrued leave credits; and
3. respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, be likewise found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and FINED in the amount of ₱40,000.00.29
Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
AO 125-2007 dated August 9, 2007 provided for the Guidelines on the Solemnization
of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary and laid down the rules "to enable the
solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary to secure and safeguard the sanctity of
marriage as a social institution."30 The pertinent portions of AO 125-2007 provide as
follows:
Sec. 3. Venue of marriage ceremony solemnized by Judges. - As a general rule, a
marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court
except in the following instances:
xxxx
b. A marriage where both parties submit a written request to the solemnizing officer
that the marriage be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to this effect.
Sec. 4. Duties of solemnizing officer before the performance of marriage ceremony. -
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the parties appear personally and are the same contracting parties to
the marriage;
b. Personally interview the contracting parties and examine the documents submitted
to ascertain if there is compliance with the essential and formal requisites of marriage
under the Family Code; and
xxxx
Sec. 6. Duty of solemnizing officer during the solemnization of the marriage. - The
solemnizing officer shall require the contracting parties to personally declare before
him and in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that the said
parties take each other as husband and wife.
Sec. 7. Duties of solemnizing officer after solemnization of the marriage. - After
performing the marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the marriage certificate is properly accomplished and has the complete
entries, x x x;
b. See to it that the marriage is properly documented x x x
xxxx
Sec. 9. Recording of marriages solemnized and safekeeping of documents. - a. The
solemnizing officer shall cause to be kept in the court a record book of all marriages
solemnized. x x x
b. The solemnizing officer shall cause to be filed in the court the quadruplicate copy of
the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, x x x when applicable,
the affidavit of the contracting parties regarding the request for change in the venue
for the marriage. All documents pertaining to a marriage shall be kept in one file x x x.
Sec. 18. Fees for the Solemnization of Marriage. -For the performance of marriage
ceremony and issuance of marriage certificate and subject to further provisions of AM
No. 04-2-04-SC (16 August 2004) the legal fees in the following amounts shall be
collected:
xxxx
(c) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Shari’a
Circuit Courts- ‘Three hundred (₱12300.00) pesos.
xxxx
Sec. 19. Payment of legal tees in Philippine legal tender. - All fees shall be x x x
properly officially receipted.
Records show that Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio both violated AO 125- 2007.
Although both judges were clothed with authority to solemnize marriages, in this
instance however, they overstepped the bounds of their authority.
As correctly found by the OCA, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in the Marriage
Contract of Julius and Khristine Without actually solemnizing their marriage. Judge
Murcia's claim that the contracting parties personally appeared before him 31 was
belied by the groom himself, Julius. When confronted by the investigating team from
OCA, Julius denied knowing or appearing before Judge Murcia; moreover, he
asserted that he was not married in the sala of Judge Murcia in the Island Garden
City of Samal, but at their residence in Davao City. Julius also narrated that it was
Judge Omelio, and not Judge Murcia, who acted as the solemnizing officer. Julius
even presented pictures which were taken during the wedding at their residence
showing Judge Omelio as the solemnizing officer.
What further militates against Judge Murcia's version was the fact that he claimed in
his Comment32 to have examined "all x x x document[s] in support for a valid
marriage under the Family Code and the corresponding receipt of payment for
marriage solemnization;"33 he also attested that "all the documents were in place and
x x x the appropriate fees were paid." 34 However, during the hearing conducted by the
Investigating Justice, Judge Murcia could no longer recall whether there was a receipt
issued by the court to the payment of the solemnization fee. 35 In addition, it was
unearthed during the proceedings that no solemnization fee was received by the
court, no receipt was issued corresponding therefor, and no remittance to the
Judiciary Development Fund pertaining to said solemnization fee was made. 36 In fine,
it was established that by signing the Certificate of Marriage, Judge Murcia made it
appear that he solemnized the marriage of Julius and Khristine without the
contracting parties and their witnesses personally appearing before him and sans
payment of the solemnization fee.
On the other hand, Judge Omelio's contention that he merely re-enacted the wedding
ceremony of Julius and Khristine upon the request of the groom's parents was
similarly debunked by Julius' admission that it was actually Judge Omelio who
solemnized his marriage with Khristine on February 28, 2008 at their residence in
Davao City. Besides, his defense of reenactment would not justify his infraction.
Interestingly, although Judge Omelio acknowledged said "marriage" as a sham, 37 he
insisted that it was not contrary to law as the same was conducted only for picture-
taking purposes38 because they were not able to do so in the sala of Judge
Murcia.39 As a duly-authorized solemnizing officer, Judge Omelio is expected to know
that marriage should not be trifled with, and its sanctity and inviolability should never
be undermined, especially by such a lame ground as picture-taking. Worse, although
he was supposedly merely doing a re-enactment, Judge Omelio claimed to have
allowed additional witnesses/godparents to affix Murcia. 40 Finally, all the guests were
deceived into believing that Judge Omelio was solemnizing a real marriage and not
just a mere re-enactment.41
"No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State."42 Marriage should not be trivialized, especially by the solemnizing officers
themselves.
Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social institution, which is the
foundation of the family.
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the
bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction.
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a
judicial officer, she is expected to know the law on solemnization of marriages. ‘A
judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.’43
"A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a solemnizing
officer."44 Both Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio were remiss in this regard.
At this juncture, we quote herein the findings of the OCA:
We take note of the fact that Julius Echevarria did not execute an affidavit or testify
during the investigation. However, his statements before the OCA investigators, as
aptly observed by Justice Yap, could still be given evidentiary weight as these were
obtained and authenticated by the OCA investigators who made the discreet
investigation. The result of the investigation was the subject of the OCA
Memorandum to then Chief Justice Puno which already forms part of the records.

It was also established that the solemnization fee of ₱300.00 was not paid as
required under Administrative Circular No. 3-2000. The Report of Collections for the
Judiciary Development Fund for the month of February 2008 submitted by respondent
Florida Omelio to the Supreme Court for the MTCC, Branches 1 and 2 of the Island
Garden City of Samal does not show any payment of the solemnization fee for the
marriage of the Echevarrias. Also, Atty. Fe Maloloy-on, Clerk of Court, OCC-MTCC,
Davao City also informed the OCA investigators that there are no records of the
Echevarria marriage. The records thus contradict respondent Judge Murcia and
respondent Florida Omelio’s testimony that the necessary fee was paid.

It is evident from the foregoing that the action of respondent Judges Omelio and
Murcia have undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social
institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by
law. xxx

xxxx

Unfortunately, respondents Judges Omelio and Murcia trifled with this sacred social
institution. While they have the authority to solemnize marriages, they clearly
overstepped the bounds of that authority.45

We agree with the OCA that the following acts of respondents amounted to gross
misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a serious
charge46 punishable by (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, excluding accrued leave credits; and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office without
salary or other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
(c) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Notably, during the
pendency of this administrative matter, CoC Omelio passed away; hence the
complaint against her should be dismissed. Likewise, during the pendency of this
administrative matter, Judge Omelio had already been meted the penalty of dismissal
from service. In this regard, we find the recommended penalty of ₱40,000.00 each for
both Judge Omelio and Judge Murcia commensurate under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Clerk of Court Florida C. Omelio,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte,
is DISMISSED. Respondent Judge George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Branch
14, Davao City, Davao del Sur, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in
the amount of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of his accrued leave
credits. Respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
2, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and FINED in the amount of ₱40,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October
27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall
within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations
both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon
v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from
his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1
of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts
complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration,
the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in
evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed
by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the
affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having
borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and
that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact,
the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage
has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
 In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration,
he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following
marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside
the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for
his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del
Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may
be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing
officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to
apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law,
in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the
adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. 2 The CA thereby denied her
right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the
law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law
firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the
Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)
children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar
Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled
"AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan,
Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang
Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on
April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which
was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to
Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of
Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E.
Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT
No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and
headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the
office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De
la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the
law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138,
on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged
that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said
properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed
to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the
subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a
receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the
heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have
been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been
madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT
DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS
OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND
LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND
LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO
THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN
THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO
THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG
SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE
148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY
PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY
FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED
BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE
SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW
OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING
PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding
and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death
on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the
RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any
other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect
to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican
Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of
the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not
entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that
should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly,
whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in
the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue
of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce,
even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This
finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for
the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either
spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy
on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119
of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute
or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes
of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per
was void for lack of court approval
sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement of the Civil Code, as follows:
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
otherwise.

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage separation has been granted.
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is
xxxx
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage,
did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and
of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any
such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of
the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215
shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in
articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of
gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took
place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the
grounds raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and
public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna
and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna
and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on
January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted
until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.
Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages
as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab
initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144
of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to
confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative
for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property.
Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence,
would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue
of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This
applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant
such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in
the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the
loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
₱146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded
to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit
amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00. 28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal
funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had
the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna
could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income
derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her
actual contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the
New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where
properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the
New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only
if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry
each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that:
only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint
deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even
if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by
the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were
indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison
was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the
Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April
29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino.
According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was
dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by
plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over
the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the
same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the
name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff
does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired
for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation
and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and
plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was
a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law
firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly
beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because
they were substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any
reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption
that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the
sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11,
2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45, 1 City of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief
filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
Japanese National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A
copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was
validly granted under Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage
with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the
Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part
hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registry of Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is
hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and made an integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and
that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi
Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana,
Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as
Annex ‘D’ and made an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December
2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing
the divorce he obtained and his remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly
authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an
integral part hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to
indicate her surname withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told
at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her
until she can prove bycompetent court decision that her marriage with her
said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and
declared valid, until otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently,
and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the
issuance of a Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’
Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. 2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief,
which was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the following reliefs before the lower
court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after
proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina
T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a
competent court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport
under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage
to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to
petitioner under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and
action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y.
Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in
Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was
obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no
showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of
the Family Code – that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does
not have any causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate remedy
available to the petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority and
jurisdiction of this court to act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is
vested with such authority and jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 15 November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC
granted the motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner
in her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of
the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice,
the Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of
Court for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for
appropriateaction and/or disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of
the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the
ground that petitioner had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is
already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family
Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the
divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence,
petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second
marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered asvalid at this time.
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact
that no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not
make the same valid because such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is
applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative. 6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8
February2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor
respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole
issue of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely
the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason
can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory
relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void
or voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of
divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a
mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect
the legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a
petition for declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration
to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had
yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over
them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter
raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin
the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid
proof of identity," which proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial
recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is
required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of
remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first exhausted all available
administrative remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting
to the special civil action of declaratory relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the
running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now
final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the
issues raised therein.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner
incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first
appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was
toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s
name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was
adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary
requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the name of her
spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall
be made inaccordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the
surname of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she
must present the original or certifiedtrue copy of her marriage contract, and
one photocopy thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a
foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a
Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying
for a passport for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified
true copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration
and the Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must
present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place
where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or
consular mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah
Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband, the applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or
Shari’ah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use her
husband’s surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From the above
provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her
married name, all she needed to present were the following: (1) the original or
certified true copyof her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a
Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and
(3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine
Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is
obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the
Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine
passport under her second husband’s name.1âwphi1 Should her application for a
passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A.
8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of
this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have
the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial
review may be had to the Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE 10
Appeal
In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled
or restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to
the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of
the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions
of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that her application "cannot be said to havebeen
either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved
party entitled to appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8 that her passport cannot
be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the
event of the denial of her application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as
valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact. 10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial
court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, 11 we are still unable to grant
the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or
evidence presented on record of both the national law of her first husband,
Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law.12 Hence,
any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's
recourse to the proper remedies available. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders 1 dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. 9 Respondent and
his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay
Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including
their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which
petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial
support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, 21 dismissing
the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating
respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code,
thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to
all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced
earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its
ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law
(The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his
child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged
failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies
to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not
bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused
herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant
petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court,
consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This
latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the
[Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court
only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the
response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given
set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of
law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family
rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost
for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same
to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the
present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of
justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence
of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is
not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of
the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce
Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on
petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in
light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to
wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said
foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded
in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable
to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to
wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable
under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give
support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation
to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:
"[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international
law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting,
that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case,
the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe
in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is
a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand
the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the
Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the
lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also
assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. 3 On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married
Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with
the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa,
Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent
with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13,
2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay)
dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among
others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to
Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first
marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper
judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that
her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus,
there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January
24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is
therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983,
the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its
Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of
contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is
still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's
argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more
first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was
absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan 15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet
no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first
is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that
while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only
discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence,
prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was
not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the
Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the
criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot
be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without
need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order, 18 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one
be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second
marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family
Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took
place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of
jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted
liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration
of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared
once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of
Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed
by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same
ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at
all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be
considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following
issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of
psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a
second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment
of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the
necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a
second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent
marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability. 19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial
proceedings filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past.
In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before
the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others,
that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by
the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed
with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG
and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order
ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be
the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the
plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this
technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we
had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has
ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it
did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the
petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred
in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. 23 It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with
Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still
subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent
authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her
Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said
Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never
appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her
marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In
other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is
therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of
nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for
bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the
accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and
void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid
and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was
still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-
mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during
the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the
crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently
alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this
case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not
agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. 34 Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without
need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued
that since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code,
then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), 37 instead of
Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find
the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the
declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied
retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the
provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration
of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario
would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are
hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that
the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual
who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been
previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it
not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were
validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to
enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil
Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy
are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
 (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1)
denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of
bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to
prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage
contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen
on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres,
a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules
of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner
and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a
positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that
the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence
as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to
the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law
that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from
the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are
Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of
the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate
that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of
the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported
non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National
Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the
accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent
judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code.
What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar
as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void
ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing
between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is
concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special
bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are
classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties
and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are
present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such
activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy
step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime
of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.