LUISA MARCOS* v. HEIRS OF LATE DR.
ANDRES NAVARRO
GR No. 198240, Jul 03, 2013
FACTS:
Sps. Andres, Sr. & Concepcion Navarro died and left several parcels of
land including the subject lot located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
The spouses were survived by daughters Luisa and Lydia, and the heirs of
their only son Andres, Jr. Sisters discovered the heirs claim exclusive
ownership of the subject lot which they based on an Affidavit of Transfer
of Real Property where Sr. donated to Andres, Jr.
Believing it is forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting
examination. Handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found Andres,
Sr.'s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of
Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. Sisters sued
for annulment of the deed before the RTC.
After the pre-trial, the heirs moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will
violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice was given
to them before the examination was conducted.
RTC disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness and ruled that her supposed
testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the
alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez
to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because
her testimony is not yet needed.
Sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and likewise denied
their MR.
The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another Division
which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
HELD:
SC held in favor of Luisa. We agree that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. A witness must
only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21
to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a
witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a
witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24
disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the
operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein.
SC DENY heirs' motion to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. She has
the qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications
under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be
received as evidence.
DISQUALIFICATION: MENTAL INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY
PEOPLE vs. GOLIMLIM
FACTS:
Private complainant Evelyn Canchela is a mental retardate. When her
mother, Amparo Hachero left for Singapore to work as a DH, she
entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo) sister Jovita
Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, in Sorsogon.
Sometime in 1996, Jovita left home to meet someone, leaving Evelyn
and Golimlim. Taking advantage of the situation, Golimlim instructed
Evelyn to sleep and soon after she laid down, he kissed her and took of
her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife,
he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied,
appellant fell asleep. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what
appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she
scolded her.
Evelyn’s half-sister, Lorna, received a letter from their mother Amparo
instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in QC.
Lorna fetched Evelyn and brought her home with her in Manila. A week
after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister
was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. Upon doctor’s check-up
and ultrasound examination, it was revealed that Evelyn was indeed
pregnant.
Lorna thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn
replied that Golimlim had sex with her while holding a knife. The RTC of
Sorsogon convicted Golimlim for the crime of rape and on appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Evelyn is disqualified as a witness because she is
feebleminded.
HELD:
No. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a
vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted
that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid
objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still
give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified
to.
In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a
departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to the
assessment of Evelyn‘s testimony. It is settled that sexual intercourse
with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape
which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation
in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction.
The fact of Evelyn‘s mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the
Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such
notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the commission of
the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the Information, was
adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a
retardate being diferent from those of a normal person, the degree of
force needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force
which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person may be more
than enough when employed against an imbecile.
ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ
GR No.143439 October 14, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal
case or arson pending before the RTC. The accused was petitioner
Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of
respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the
witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband.
Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against
him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the
motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of the other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial
court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from
further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the
other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This prompted
respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and
setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her
estranged husband on the ground of marital privilege.
HELD: Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The
disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved.
The acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On
the other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and
exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to ofer the testimony
of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.
PEOPLE VS CASTAÑEDA
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where
the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
FACTS:
Victoria Manaloto charged her husband, private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto with Falsification of Public Document alleging that
the latter feloniously counterfeited and forged her signature in a deed of
sale (involved the sale of a house and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership) executed by him in favor of PoncianoLacsmana, to make it
appear that she gave her marital consent to the said sale when in fact
she did not.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the
witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness,
invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are interested,
directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxxxxxxxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his
wife without her consent; nor a wife for or
against her husband without his consent, except
in a civil case by one against the other or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other.
Nonetheless, the prosecution opposed said motion to
disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the
rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for
or against her husband. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was
denied.Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the
Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, seeking set
aside the order of the respondent Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document
filed against private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband
against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
RULING:
YES. The Court held that the case is an exception to the marital
disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the
accused-husband against the witness-wife.
 The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of
Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's
signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that
said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their
conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must
be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the
signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been
made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been
charged against said husband.Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's
breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the
wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case
with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore,
that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one
spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which
completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
 The Court gave a criterion that was cited in Cargill v. State:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon
the is too narrow; and the rule that any ofense remotely or
indirectly afecting domestic within the exception is too broad.
The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY
ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE
CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to
the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by)
one against the other.
 With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be
directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the
efect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is
apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her
insistent eforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks
to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her
husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained
that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. 3. Finally, overriding
considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case.
 Too espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous Neither Juan nor his son Vicente paid any amount for the shares in
precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications against question
his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital
privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
The Razons allege that after organizing the corporation, Enrique Razon
unabashed and complete impunity.
distributed shares previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends, including Juan Chuidian.
ENRIQUE RAZON v. IAC and VICENTE CHUIDIAN
CFI
[Administrator of Juan Chuidian's estate] +
- Enrique Razon owns the shares of stock.
CHUIDIAN v. IAC, RAZON, and E. RAZON, INC.
IAC - Juan Chuidian (deceased father of Vicente Chuidian) owns the
1992 / Gutierrez, Jr. / Relative incompetencies > Dead Man's Statute
shares of stock.
The main issue in these consolidated petitions is the ownership of 1,500
The dead man's statute rule is applicable in this case
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003
IAC excluded Enrique Razon's testimony (see above)
issued on April 23, 1966 and registered under the name of Juan
IAC rulings on the parties' respective MRs
Chuidian.
Razon's MR (asking for reversal of IAC decision) DENIED
Chuidian's MR (asking for delivery of all cash and stock dividends and all
FACTS
the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock) DENIED.
1962 - Enrique Razon organized E. Razon, Inc. (Purpose: bidding for
Razon says that contrary to IAC's ruling, the dead man's statute is NOT
arrastre services in South Harbor, MLA)
applicable.
1966 - Stock Certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon was
Chuidian did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral
issued in Juan Chuidian's name.
agreement between him and Juan Chuidian that the ownership of the
Juan and Vicente Chuidian were elected as E. Razon's, Inc. directors and
shares of stock was actually vested in Razon, unless Juan opted to pay
they were compensated as such.
the same
From 1966 to 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned Juan Chuidian's
Razon was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such
ownership of the shares, nor did Enrique bring any action to have the
testimony
certificate of stock over the shares cancelled.
On the possession of the certificate of stock
Vicente Chuidian's allegation:
ISSUES & HOLDING
The certificate of stock was in the possession of Enrique Razon, who
WON Razon's testimony is within the prohibition of the dead man's
refused to deliver the shares to Vicente Chuidian, until the same was
statute.
surrendered by Enrique Razon and deposited in a Philippine Bank of
Commerce safety box.
NO. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor
IMPORTANT: THIS WAS THE ORAL TESTIMONY OF ENRIQUE RAZON
was it filed upon claims against the estate.
WHICH WAS EXCLUDED BY IAC
[The case was filed by the administrator Vicente Chuidian to recover the
The stock certificate was personally delivered by Juan Chuidian to the
shares of stock.]
corporate secretary of Atty. De Leon [an associate of the Chuidian Law
Therefore, Razon's testimony is ADMISSIBLE.
Office).
WON Razon's oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement
The delivery was made because it was Enrique who paid for all the
with the late Juan Chuidian is sufficient to prove his ownership over the
subscription on the shares.
said 1,500 shares of stock.
The agreement was that Enrique Razon was the owner of the shares and
NO. Who is the owner of the shares of stock? Juan Chuidian.
he would have possession thereof until such time that he was paid
He gets the cash and stock dividends plus pre-emptive rights (as prayed
therefor by the other nominal incorporators or stockholders.
for in the MR at IAC).
Since then, Enrique Razon was in possession of the stock certificate. By
agreement of the parties, it was delivered for deposit with the bank
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
under the joint custody of the parties.
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA
Vicente Chuidian filed a complaint against Razon, E. Razon, Inc., et al.
These were included in his prayer: FACTS
An order to have the defendants deliver stock certificate representing Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a
Juan Chuidian's share in E. Razon's Inc. partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane LPG. For business
Issuance of an order restraining the defendants from disposing of said convenience, Lamberto and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the
shares business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER,
Issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against defendants’ under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Both Lamberto and
properties having possession of the shares. Receivership of the Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the partnership, with the intention
properties of E. Razon's Inc. that the profits would be equally divided between them
The defendants, in their answer alleged the following: The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine
All shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record were fully paid Sy, sister-in-law of Lamberto. Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of
by Razon 1989, his daughter, Lilibeth took over the operations of Shellite without
Said shares are subject to the agreement between the defendants and Lamberto’s consent. Despite Lamberto’s repeated demands for
incorporators accounting, she failed to comply.
The shares were actually owned by and remained in the possession of On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint against Lilibeth with the
Razon RTC. RTC decided in favor of Lamberto. Lilibeth questions the
correctness of the finding that a partnership existed between Lamberto
and Jacinto. In the absence of any written document to show such
partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these
courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto and
his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three (3) years
after Jacinto’s death.
To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE OR
SURVIVORSHIP RULE” under Sec. 23, Rule 130. Lilibeth thus implores
this Court to rule that the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims
against a deceased person (Jacinto).
ISSUE
Whether or not the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE” applies to this case so as to
render inadmissible Lamberto’s testimony and that if his witness,
Josephine.
HELD
No. The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own contradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.
Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim against Lamberto in their
answer before the RTC, and with the filing of their counterclaim, Lilibeth
herself efectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s
Statute”. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or
administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, Lamberto, may testify to occurrences before the death of
the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, Lamberto is not disqualified from testifying as to matters
of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not
having been bought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.
The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute”
for the simple reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a
case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted”. Lamberto ofered
the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between Lamberto and Jacinto. Lilibeth’s insistence that Josephine is
the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an assignor because of the
term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action which
has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of
action has arisen”. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of
Lamberto, latter being the plaintif.
Lilibeth’s reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statue” to defeat
Lamberto’s claim cannot prevail over the factual findings that a
partnership was established between Lamberto and Jacinto. Based not
only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well,
they considered the evidence for Lamberto as sufficient to prove the
formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Testimonial Evidence (Disqualification: Death or Insanity – Dead Man’s
Statute)
BORDALBA vs. CA
G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002
Petitioner: TeresitaBordalba
Respondents: CA
Heirs of Nicanor Jayme (Candida Flores, Emmanuel
Jayme, Dina Jayme Dejoras, Evelia Jayme, Gesila
Jayme)
Heirs of Asuncion Jayme-Baclay(Angelo Jayme-
Baclay, Carmen Jayme-Daclan, EleonoraBaclay
FACTS:
Lot No. 1242 located in Barrio Looc, Mandaue City is part of a parcel of
land originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita
Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition was executed and
disposing the same parcel of land as follows:
1. 1/3 in favor of (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the
deceased spouse of respondent Candida Flores and the father
of respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Geslia, all
surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-
Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay,
EleonoraBaclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of
petitioner TeresitaBordalba; and
3. 1/3 to an unidentified party.
In July 1964, Elena Jayme filed with the RTC an amended application for
the registration of the lot. Elena alleged that the lot sought to be
registered was originally part of a land owned by her late parents,
Carmeno and Margarita; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her
in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot
for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor with her permission.
Nicanor and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said
application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-
judicial partition. The case was dismissed for lack of interest of the
parties. Subsequently, petitioner Bordalba filed with the Bureau of Lands
an application for the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot and
the same was granted.
Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid
patent and original certificate of title, private respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner and spouses GenaroCabahug, Rita Capala
(purchasers of portion of subject lot), and Rural Bank of Mandaue
(mortgagee of portion of subject lot).
Bordalba averred that Lot 1242 was acquired by her through purchase
from her mother who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an
owner since 1947.
The RTC, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner, declared the
patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, Sps. Genaro
and Rita Cabahug as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue were declared
purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; thus upheld as
valid the sale. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the
testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which
touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should
not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead
man’s statute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the dead man’s statute.
HELD:
No. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other
way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of the private respondents and the testimony of their
witnesses in the present case based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition and other documents and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were
properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents
are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other
than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence
was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in
order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no
previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.
The Decision of the CA was affirmed.
Chan vs. Chan
Facts:
Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her,
claiming that respondent husband failed to care for and support his
family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties.
And that he initially agreed to marriage counseling to save their
marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth
Claim Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the
rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a
physician's handwritten note that the husband sufered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife
requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, for the production of the Husband's medical records. The
husband opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. The request of the wife was denied by the
trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Did the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the husband's hospital
records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character
of the physician-patient communication?
Held:
No. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner
wife made the request before trial started. She will have to wait for trial
to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering her husband's hospital records. It is when those records
are produced for examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to
object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure.
It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for
production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant
prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
xxx
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a
limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject of this
case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the
physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130
states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege, according to her, does not cover the hospital records, but only
the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
him— would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without
the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent. (Chan vs. Chan, G.R.
No. 179786, July 24, 2013)
Lacurom vs. Jacoba
Facts:
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintif Alejandro R.
Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against
defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but
Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to
Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.Judge
Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier
judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request
for Inhibition) dated 30 July 2001 which contains words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
anachronism in the judicial process, which are in utter disrespect to the
Court.
Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and
explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001
motion. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,Velasco-Jacoba
claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the
subject Motion, that it was her husband who prepared the same; and
that records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or
actively participate in this case." She recounted that on her way out of
the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped
her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli."She
signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind
faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole
life and future." This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion
which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension
from the practice of law.
Atty. Jacoba asserts the inadmissibility of Atty. Velasco-Jacoba’s
statement pointing to him as the author of the motion in view of the
marital privilege rule in evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the statement of Atty. Velasco-Jacobo is admisibble as evidence
against her husband.
HELD:
Yes. The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived
by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any
conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies
to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
Atty. Jacoba’s answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a
denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at
the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and
monumental”.
3. Testimonial Evidence c. disqualifications iv. privileged
communications
Almonte v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995
This case concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain
evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-à-vis the
claim of privilege of an agency of the Government.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to
annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by Ombudsman
Vasquez, requiring petitioners Rogado and Rivera, as chief accountant
and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce “all documents relating to Personal Services
Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for
the plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin his orders. The subpoena
duces tecum was issued in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that the funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
Petitioners Almonte (former Commissioner of the EIIB) and
Perez (Chief of the EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management Division) denied
the anomalous activities that circulate the EIIB office and they also
moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be ordered to produce
documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB
employers.
HELD:
YES. At common law a government privilege against disclosure
is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic
and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
plaintif cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic
secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, the EIIB’s function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding “illegal
activities afecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting.”
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made
for a privilege resting on other considerations.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition profer that the President
has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for
Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for
being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance
of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of
military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered
by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised
on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be
kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or profering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated
for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to
bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to
the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
covered by executive privilege?
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s
claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear
before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
aforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to
follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive
and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by
a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of