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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. OF 2016
IN
SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2 OF 2015

IN THE MATTER OF:-

In Re: Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality …Petitioner

VERSUS

Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind …Respondent

AND
IN THE MATTER OF :-

All India Muslim Personal Law Board


A Society registered under the
Societies Registration Act
Through its Working Secretary
Maulana Md. Wali Rehmani
having its office at
76A/1, Main Market,
Okhla Village, Jamia Nagar,
New Delhi - 110025 …Applicant

APPLICATION FOR IMPLEADMENT

To
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India
and his companion judges of the
Supreme Court of India.
The humble application of the
above named Applicant

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH

1. That the present suo motu writ petition has been registered by this

Hon’ble Court for considering the rights of Muslim women in issues

concerning marriage, divorce and maintenance and whether the

current practices under Muslim Personal Law regarding marriage,

divorce and maintenance are violative of Part III of the Constitution.


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2. The Applicant is a registered society established to protect and

preserve Muslim Personal Laws. It strives to uphold the traditional

values and ethos of the Muslim Community and promotes essential

values of Islam and also a national ethos amongst Muslims. The

members of the society are Muslim scholars (ulemas), Muslims

intellectuals and professionals from different disciplines.

3. The Applicant organization was established in April 7, 1973 and the

main aims and objectives of the Applicant organization are inter alia

as follows:-

(a) To take effective steps to protect the Muslim Personal Law in

India and for the retention, and implementation of the Shariat

Act;

(b) To strive for the annulment of all such laws, passed by or on

the anvil in any State Legislature or Parliament, and such

judgments by Courts of Law which may directly or indirectly

amount to interference in or run parallel to the Muslim

Personal Law or, in the alternative, to see that the Muslims are

exempted from the ambit of such legislations.

(c) To promote awareness among Muslims about the laws and

teachings of, and rights conferred and duties cast

by Shariah in the sphere of their family and social life, and to

publish and disseminate literature for that purpose;

(d) To publish and popularize the personal laws of Muslims as

laid down by Shariah and to prepare a comprehensive


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framework for their implementation on and observance by the

Muslims;

(e) To set up an ‘Action Committee’ as and when needed, for

safeguarding the Muslim Personal Law through which

organised countrywide campaign is taken up in order to

implement decisions of the Board;

(f) To constantly keep watch, through a committee of Ulama and

legists, over the state or Central legislations and Bills; or Rules

framed and circulars issued by the government and semi

government bodies, to see if these, in any manner, affect the

Muslim Personal Law;

(g) To promote good-will, fraternity, and the feeling of mutual

cooperation among all sects and schools of thought among

Muslims, and to generate the spirit of unity and co-ordination

among them for the common goal of safeguarding the Muslim

Personal Law;

(h) To scrutinize the ‘Mohammedan Law’ as now in force in India,

in the light of Shariah and to arrange for an analytical study of

the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence while keeping in

view the new issues and to search for their proper solution

based on the Quran and Sunnah, sticking to the principles

of Shariah under the guidance of those well-versed

in Shariah and Islamic jurisprudence;


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(i) To set up delegations and study teams; organize conferences,

seminars, symposia, public meetings and undertake tours and

to publish and disseminate suitable literature, as and when

needed, to bring out newspapers, periodicals, and newsletters

and to perform all other acts as may be necessary, for

achieving the aims and objectives of the Board in general.

4. That this Hon’ble Court while pronouncing the judgment in the case

Prakash & Ors v. Phulavati & Ors., 2015 (11) SCALE 643 on

October 16, 2015 directed that a separate Public Interest Litigation

be registered and placed before the appropriate Bench as per the

order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to consider the rights of

Muslim women as there was no safeguard against arbitrary divorce

and second marriage by Muslim men during currency of their first

marriage. While directing registration of a separate matter, this

Hon’ble Court also directed that notice be issued to the Attorney

General and National Legal Services Authority, New Delhi and also

gave liberty to the counsel appearing in Prakash & Ors v. Phulavati

& Ors. (supra) to assist this Hon’ble Court, for either view point.

5. That, in accordance with the aforesaid direction, the present matter

was registered as Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2 of 2015. It is

submitted that since the present matter involves a question of

Muslim Personal Laws, the view of the Muslim Community must also

be considered.

6. That since the one of the primary objectives of the Applicant

organization is to take effective steps to protect the Muslim Personal


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Law in India and to prevent any interference in the observation of the

Muslim Personal Laws, it wishes to put forth its views before this

Hon’ble Court for the adjudication of the questions which have arisen

in the present matter.

7. The Applicant submits that issue of Muslim Personal Law is cultural

issue; it is inextricably interwoven with religion of Islam. Thus, it is

the issue of Freedom of conscience, guaranteed under Article 25

and 26 read with Article 29 of the Constitution of India.

8. That the Applicant organization has a working committee of

41 members comprising of Ulema (Muslim scholars) representing

various schools of thought and professionals from different fields.

The Applicant has been tirelessly working towards preserving the

Personal Laws of the Muslim Community and in view of the fact that

it is an organization constituted by various Muslim scholars

(including women), it is imperative that the Applicant be made a

party to the present proceedings.

9. That a similar application has been preferred by another

organization, namely, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, which is working for the

protection of Islamic Culture, Tradition and Islamic Heritage. The

said application being I.A. No. 1 of 2016 in Suo Motu Writ Petition

(C) No. 2 of 2015 has been allowed by this Hon’ble Court vide its

order dated February 5, 2016. A copy of the order dated February 5,

2016 passed by this Hon’ble Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 2 of 2015 is appended hereto and marked as Annexure A-1

[Page No.22].
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10. That the Applicant organization submits that since the questions

involved in the present Suo Motu Writ Petition are concerning the

Personal laws of the Muslim Community in India, view point of every

such organization must be considered before any order is passed by

the Hon’ble Court in this regard.

11. That, in view of its aims and objectives of protecting Muslim

Personal Law, the Applicant organization wishes to bring forth its

view point before this Hon’ble Court in the present matter and

accordingly, submits as under:-

A. That the questions being examined by the Hon’ble Court in the

present case have already been examined by this Court in

Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, (1997) 3

SCC 573.

B. That in Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India,

(1997) 3 SCC 573, inter alia the following issues were

considered by this Hon’ble Court:-

i. Whether Muslim Personal Law which allows Polygamy

is void as offending Articles 14 and 15 of the

Constitution;

ii. Whether Muslim Personal Law which enables a Muslim

male to give unilateral Talaq to his wife without her

consent and without resort to judicial process of courts,

is void as it offends Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the

Constitution
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iii. Whether the mere fact that a Muslim Husband takes

more than one wife is an act of cruelty

While considering the above issues this Hon’ble Court

declined to entertain the abovementioned issues stating that

these were matters wholly involving issues of State Policies

with which the Court will not ordinarily have any concern. The

Hon’ble Court also held that these issues are matters which

are to be dealt with by the legislature.

C. That this Hon’ble Court in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir,

(1981) 3 SCC 689, has held that the Part III of the Constitution

does not touch upon the personal laws of the parties. This

Hon’ble Court also observed that the High Court in applying

the personal laws of the parties could not introduce its own

concepts of modern times but should enforce the law as

derived from recognized and authoritative sources. It is

submitted that since Part III of the Constitution does not touch

upon the personal laws of the parties, this Hon’ble Court

cannot examine the question of constitutional validity of the

practices of marriage, divorce and maintenance in Muslim

personal law.

D. That the Justice Gajendragadkar in State of Bombay v.

Narasu Appa Mali (AIR 1952 Bom 84), observed as follows:

“The Constitution of India itself recognises the

existence of these personal laws in terms when it deals

with the topics falling under personal law in item 5 in the


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Concurrent List—List III. This item deals with the topics

of marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption;

wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition;

all matters in respect of which parties in judicial

proceedings were immediately before the

commencement of this Constitution subject to their

personal law. Thus it is competent either to the State or

the Union Legislature to legislate on topics falling within

the purview of the personal law and yet the expression

“personal law” is not used in Art. 13, because, in my

opinion, the framers of the Constitution wanted to leave

the personal laws outside the ambit of Part III of the

Constitution. They must have been aware that these

personal laws needed to be reformed in many material

particulars and in fact they wanted to abolish these

different personal laws and to evolve one common

code. Yet they did not wish that the provisions of the

personal laws should be challenged by reason of the

fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the

Constitution and so they did not intend to include these

personal laws within the definition of the expression

“laws in force.” Therefore, I agree with the learned Chief

Justice in holding that the personal laws do not fall

within Art. 13(1) at all.”

This view has been noticed by this Hon’ble Court in

Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, (1997) 3


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SCC 573. In view of the position that provisions of personal

laws cannot be challenged by the reason of fundamental

rights, it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court cannot consider

the constitutional validity of the practices of marriage, divorce

and maintenance in Muslim personal law.

E. The foundational sources of personal law are their respective

scriptural texts. The Mohammedan Law is founded on the

Holy Qur’an and Ahadith of the Prophet of Islam and thus it

cannot fall within the purview of the expression “laws in force”

as mentioned in Article 13 of the Constitution of India, and

hence its validity cannot be tested on a challenge based on

Part III of the Constitution. The personal law of Muslims has

not been passed or made by a legislation.

F. That Article 44 of the Constitution of India stipulates that the

State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil

Code throughout the territory of India. It is submitted that

Article 44 which envisages a Uniform Civil Code is only a

directive principle of state policy and is not enforceable.

Further, this Article by necessary implications recognizes the

existence of different codes applicable to different religions in

matters of personal law and permits their continuance until the

State succeeds in its endeavor to secure for all citizens a

Uniform Civil Code. It is submitted that the framers of the

Constitution were fully conscious of the difficulties in enforcing

a Uniform Civil Code and thus they deliberately refrained from


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interfering with the provisions of the personal laws and laid

down only a directive principle.

G. That if this Hon’ble Court lays down special rules for Muslim

Women in matters concerning marriage, divorce and

maintenance, it would amount to judicial legislation. It is

reiterated that while considering these very issues in

Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, (1997) 3

SCC 573, this Hon’ble Court had itself declined to entertain

the matters by taking the view that these issues were to be

dealt with by the legislature and not judiciary. It is submitted

that this Hon’ble Court has held in a plethora of judgments that

the judiciary cannot usurp the functions of the legislature.

H. That this Court in Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal,

(1992) Supp (1) SCC 323, held as follows:-

“It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope

of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when

the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.

The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the

legislation for the very good reason that it has no power

to legislate. The power to legislate has not been

conferred on the courts. The court cannot add words to

a statute or read words into it which are not there.

Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words

used by the legislature the court could not go to its aid

to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide


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what the law is and not what it should be. The court of

course adopts a construction which will carry out the

obvious intention of the legislature but could not

legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at

naught legislative judgment is subversive of the

constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities.”

It is submitted that the rights of Muslim Women are already

protected by virtue of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on

Divorce) Act, 1986. The constitutional validity of the Muslim

Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 has been

upheld by this Hon’ble Court in Danial Latifi & Anr. v. Union of

India, (2001) 7 SCC 740. In such a scenario, if this Hon’ble

Court prescribes other parameters to govern the rights of

muslim women, it will amount to judicial legislation, which is

not permissible.

I. That the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,

1986 provides for the rights of muslim women in matters of

divorce and maintenance. In view of such clear provisions, if

this Hon’ble Court frames fresh provisions, it will amount to

judicial legislation and will be violative of the doctrine of

separation of powers.

J. That the issues involved in the present petition have already

been considered by this Hon’ble Court in Ahmedabad Women

Action Group v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 573 and in

Danial Latifi & Anr. v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740.


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K. Even otherwise, the matters in consideration are essentially

questions of State policy which cannot be entertained by this

Hon’ble Court as they fall within the realm of the legislature.

L. The whole discourse on Uniform Civil Code is marked with

number of illusions. The first illusion is that a common civil

code will help the cause of national integration as observed by

Chief Justice, Y.V. Chandrachud in Shah Bano’s case (1985

SCR (3) 844) - “by removing disparate loyalties to law which

have conflicting ideologies”. Then Mr. Justice Sahai in Sarla

Mudgal’s case (1995 SCC (3) 635) has also observed “a

unified code is imperative both for protection of the oppressed

and promotion of national unity and solidarity.” Apart from

these observations made by the Apex Court in judgments

dealing with the issues of personal laws, the constituent

assembly debates on the enactment of Article 44 of the

Constitution reveal that all the participants in the debate

favouring the Uniform Civil Code were of the view that Uniform

Civil Code is necessary for national integration. Therefore, the

basic question is whether the Uniform Civil Code is imperative

for the national unity and solidarity. If one looks at the major

events of the 20th Century in which two devastating world wars

occurred; one cannot fail to notice that the warring armies on

both sides of defence were governed by the uniformity of laws

in the personal matters viz., family matters. In other words, the

allies on one side and their opponents on the other were all

Christians and governed by the same system of family laws.


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The fact that there was uniformity of laws which applied to

them did not prevent the world wars. In other words, the

uniformity of laws was totally irrelevant in achieving unity or

solidarity between the two warring fractions. Then in the

decade of 1980, the most disastrous war was fought between

two Muslim nations viz., Iran and Iraq. Again both the warring

nations were predominantly Shia Muslims and were governed

in the matter of family laws by the same principles emanating

from the Muslim Law as applicable to Shias. Uniformities of

law amongst the Iraqis and Iranians did not form the bond of

unity and solidarity. The historical instances can be multiplied

to show that uniformity of laws is not the ingredient to achieve

unity or solidarity.

M. Coming to our own country, in the year 1954/55, Hindu Code

Bill was passed with the professed object to apply uniform civil

laws to all Hindus in the matters of marriage, divorce,

succession, maintenance, adoption, etc. It is well known that

the Hindu Law is also divided into several schools of law viz.,

Mitakshara, Dayabaga, Murumakkathayam and Aliasantana

which prevail in different parts of the country. A valiant attempt

was made to unify some of the principles of the different

schools of law on some of the issues, but it did not and could

not unify the different views of different schools of Hindu Law

on many other issues. Section 4 of the Hindu Marriage Act,

1955 in terms saves customary laws of Hindus, inter alia, on

the issue of divorce. Yet, in the common perception, it is


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believed that the Hindu Code Bill has unified the Hindu

Personal Law on all the subjects. The question is has the

Hindu Code Bill succeeded integrating the Hindu society in

real terms. Are they not the caste divisions which still exist and

have the caste become extinct in India? Is the untouchability

non-existence? Are there no grievances of Dalits of

discriminatory treatment? In other words, the perception of

uniformity of personal laws has failed to achieve the

integration amongst the different sections of the Hindu society.

Though Sikhs and Jains have been brought under expanded

definition of “Hindu” given under the different laws applicable

to Hindus on the above subjects, there is a rise in demand

among the Sikhs and the Jain communities to recognise their

own different personal laws. Therefore, the demand of the

Uniform Civil Code and the premises on which Article 44 of

the Constitution of India is based is totally erroneous. It is

nothing but a mere myth / illusion. One wonders how a

Uniform Civil Code could be conducive to national unity when

uniform laws for crimes, contracts and constitutional rights

could not promote the same all these years.

N. Now let us examine the converse of the proposition that

diversities of laws impeach national unity or even worse that it

will lead to disintegration of the Nation. Taking the legal

culture prevailing into two western democracies viz., the

United States of India and United Kingdom. It is well known

that in both these countries, there is no uniformity of the


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personal laws. In U.S., one finds that each State has its own

laws relating to marriage and divorces and they differ widely in

many particulars. The diversity in U.S. in personal laws is

based on the region in which a U.S. citizen leaves / cohabits,

but the fact remains that there is no uniformity of laws. It has

never been heard that U.S. is facing the threat of

disintegration because of the diversities in the personal laws

based on the regional differences. Looking to U.K., it is well

known that the Scottish Law in the matters of personal matters

differs from the Laws of England. Though there is a talk for

Scotland becoming independent from U.K., the grounds on

which Scotland seeks independence from U.K. is not on the

basis of the difference in the personal laws. Therefore, there is

no foundation that diversities of the laws will lead to

disintegration of the Nation.

O. It is necessary to examine other two co-related questions:

i. Is there a genuine public demand for Uniform Civil

Code?

ii. Is the Uniform Civil Code practical?

Dealing with the first question, the fact is that though an

attempt was made to unify the majority community i.e. Hindus

in the matters of personal laws by enacting the Hindu Code in

1954-55, in effect there are number of issues on which there is

no uniformity amongst the different sections of Hindus. One

glaring instance is Section 4 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955


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which saves customary law of divorce. It is also well known

that extra-judicial divorce granted as per the customary law is

recognised. There are number of tribes in India who are

governed by their own customary personal laws. One may

also refer to Article 371A and Article 371G of the Constitution

of India make special provisions with respect to the State of

Nagaland and the State of Mizoram respectively provide that

notwithstanding the Constitution, no Act of Parliament shall

apply to religious or social practices of Nagas and Mizos. Thus

religious or social practices of Nagas and Mizos are saved

and any enactment of the Uniform Civil Code cannot apply to

them. This clearly shows that there is a great desire on the

part of the people of India to organise their affairs in the

personal matters by the law which they readily accept and

which they hold dear to their heart.

P. Turning to Special Marriage Act,1954 which is parallel law

dealing with civil marriages contains a provision that once a

marriage is solemnised under the provisions of the Special

Marriage Act,1954, such marriage shall be governed in the

matter of succession by the provisions of Indian Succession

Act,1925. Section 19 of the Special Marriage Act provided

that the marriage solemnized under that Act of any member of

the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) shall be deemed to affect

his severance from such family. Section 21 of the Special

Marriage Act provided for succession to property of parties

married under that Act and in explicit terms stated that the
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Succession would open as per the provisions of the Indian

Succession Act, 1925. Therefore, the intention of the

parliament was to make uniform law of succession to all

parties who married under the said Act. However, the

parliament enacted Act No. 68 of 1976 whereby Section 21A

was added to the Special Marriage Act of 1954 which nullified

the effect of Section 19 and 21 of the Special Marriage Act

and clearly stated that in case of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and

Jains marrying under that Act, Section 19 and 21 shall not

apply. The result was that by introducing Section 21A, Hindu

Personal Laws of Undivided Family / Coparcenary property

and Succession is revived. This is the step taken by the

Parliament to move away from the concept of Uniform Civil

Code. This clearly shows that even the Hindus, Sikhs,

Buddhists and Jains are not in favour of enacting the Uniform

Civil Code.

Q. It is humbly submitted that there is no public opinion for the

enactment of Uniform Civil Code nor it is practical. The

political discourse however, is motivated by disinformation that

it is only the Muslims who are opposed to the enactment of the

Uniform Civil Code.

R. There is no clarity about the shape and effect of the proposed

Uniform Civil Code which at present is not in existence. When

enacted, whether it will do away with the preferential treatment

accorded under the fiscal laws like Income Tax Act and the

Wealth Tax Act etc., in the matters of assessment to Hindu


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Undivided Family (HUF). The Supreme Court has held that

'there need not be more than one male member to form an

HUF and the tax benefits in such a case should be levied on

the joint family and not on the male as an individual. The

Government suffers a huge economic loss on account of the

amendment to the law recognizing Hindu Undivided Family

(HUF) as a separate entity. Ex-Chief Commissioner of

Income-Tax, T.C.A. Ramanujam stated –

“Surprisingly, the Government carries out any amount of

amendment to the Hindu law without looking into the

revenue loss caused by the recognition of the HUF as a

separate taxable entity. The HUF may be a boon to the

taxpaying Hindu. But it is definitely a bane to

government revenues.”

The question is whether the provisions of the Income Tax Act,

1961 relating to the preferential treatment method of

assessment of HUF will be done away with to achieve

uniformity amongst all the citizens? Is there any such public

demand? There are State laws relating to the agricultural land

ceilings which also give a preferential treatment to the land

holdings by the HUF. Is there any public demand to remove

such discriminatory treatment given to majority community?

The question is will such Uniform Civil Code do away with

such preferential treatment of the land holdings to HUF under

diverse State laws relating to land tenures of the agricultural

lands and the holding of the agricultural lands.


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S. It is well recognized that there is distinction between matters

which concern personal and family affairs and those which

concern commercial relationship, civil wrongs, etc. The law on

the area of personal and family affairs is primarily determined

and influenced by social, moral and religious consideration. It

is a matter of freedom of conscience and personal liberty and

life for every group of people to organize their affairs in the

personal and family matters by rules and regulations which

they hold sacred and dear to their heart. Any forcible

imposition of alien rules and regulations on such people will

have the repercussions of alienating them from the

mainstream. It is therefore necessary to show respect and

understanding of prevailing diversities of laws and this

principle was kept in mind in enacting Article 371 A and 371 G

of the Constitution of India. There are groups of Articles

making Constitutional provisions to the effect that no act of

parliament in respect of religious and social practices of

Nagas and Mezos shall apply to the State of Nagaland and

the State of Mizoram. Therefore, it is with a view to respect the

diverse customs followed in the State of Nagaland and in the

State of Mizoram. Further, it is stated that Tribals, who form 8

per cent of the population, are governed by customary tribal

law: Among the Santhal and Bhil tribals, women cannot hold

property. Any attempt to pass the Uniform Civil Code will fail

as the provisions thereof cannot apply uniformly throughout

the territory of India.


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12. The Applicant has not filed any other or similar application on similar

issue before this Hon’ble Court or any other Court in the country.

PRAYER

It, is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may

graciously be pleased to:-

(a) Allow the Applicant to be impleaded as party Respondent in Suo

Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2 of 2015; and/or

(b) Pass such other or further order or orders or such directions as this

Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and

circumstances of the case and to meet the ends of justice.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE APPLICANT AS IN DUTY


BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.

Filed by:-

EJAZ MAQBOOL
Advocate for the Applicant

DRAWN BY:-
Mr. Ejaz Maqbool, Advocate
Ms. Rashda S. Ainapore, Advocate
Ms. Akriti Chaubey, Advocate

SETTLED BY:-
Mr. Yusuf Hatim Muchhala
Senior Advocate

New Delhi
Dated: 16.03.2016
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. OF 2016
IN
SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2 OF 2015

IN THE MATTER OF:-

In Re: Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality …Petitioner


VERSUS
Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind …Respondent

AND
IN THE MATTER OF :-

All India Muslim Personal Law Board


A Society registered under the
Societies Registration Act
Through its Working Secretary
Maulana Md. Wali Rehmani …Applicant

AFFIDAVIT

I, Md. Wali Rahmani, S/o. Son of Late Mr. Syed Minnatullah Rahmani , aged
about 72 years, having my office at 76A/1, Main Market, Okhla Village, Jamia
Nagar, New Delhi - 110025, do hereby solemnly affirm and state as under:-

1. That I am the Working Secretary of the Applicant which is filing the


present Application for Impleadment and as such I am well conversant
with the facts and circumstances of the case and competent to swear
the present Affidavit on behalf of the Applicant.
2. That I have gone through a copy of the Application for Impleadment
and I state that the contents thereof are true and correct to my
knowledge and belief.
3. That the annexures attached to the Impleadment Application are true
copies of their respective originals.

DEPONENT
VERIFICATION

Verified at New Delhi on this 15th day of March, 2016 that the contents of the
above Affidavit are correct and true to the best of my knowledge, belief and
nothing material has been concealed therefrom.

DEPONENT
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ANNEXURE A – 1

ITEM NO. 7 COURT NO.1 SECTION PIL (W)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

SM W (C) NO. 2/2015

IN RE: …Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

MUSLIM WOMEN’S QUEST FOR EQUALITY …Respondent(s)

Date: 05/02/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. K. SIKRI
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI

For Petitioner (s) Attorney General for India (NP)

For Respondent (s) Mr. Huzefa A. Ahmadi, Sr. Adv.


Mr. Ejaz Maqbool, Adv.
Ms. Akriti Chaubey, Adv.
Mr. Faraz Maqbool, Adv.
Mr. C. George Thomas, Adv.
Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

ORDER

Heard.

I.A. No.1 of 2016 (Application for impleadment) is allowed and the

applicant be added as party respondent to this petition. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,

learned Attorney General is directed to assist us in this matter in terms of

our order dated 16.10.2015. Newly added respondent is free to file an

reply affidavit within six weeks.

Sd/- Sd/-
(Shashi Sareen) (Veena Khera)
AR-cum-PS Court Master

// TRUE COPY //

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