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Mora Adong
a. Facts:
Cheong Boo died intestate in Zamboanga. Cheong Seng Gee and the Mora Adong,
together with her daughters – Payang and Rosalia, expressed their respective claims
over the estate of the deceased. Cheong Seng Gee alleged that he’s a legitimate child of
Cheong Boo who married his mother, Tan Dit, in China in 1895. The Mora Adong, on the
other hand, claims a right over Cheong Boo’s estate on the ground that she had a
Mohammedan marriage with the latter in 1896. The lower court recognized Seng Gee as
Cheong Boo’s legitimate child but did not consider the alleged Chinese marriage
between the deceased and Tan Dit due to insufficient evidence. As for Mora Adong, the
court ruled that only Rosalia and Payang have rights over the estate as legitimate
children, since the Mohammedan marriage is not valid under Philippine laws since their
solemnizing officer, an Imam, did not have the authority to solemnize marriage. Both
parties appealed.
b. Issue:
i. WON the Chinese marriage is valid
ii. WON the Mohammedan marriage is valid
c. Held:
i. No. Cheong Seng Gee failed to present sufficient evidence to justify his claim. He
merely presented an alleged matrimonial letter and some witnesses whom the
judge noted to be strongly biased. Moreover, there was an inconsistency
between his statements and the testimonies of some credible witnesses. While
he claimed that Cheong Boo stayed in China for one year after the alleged
marriage with Tan Dit, the witnesses testified that Cheong Boo was in Jolo at
that time.
ii. Yes. The lower court erred in rendering the Mohammendan marriage as invalid.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of the then marriage law, any priest or minister of any
denomination may solemnize marriage. Since an Imam is a minister of the Islam
religion and Islam is a denomination, the marriage between the Mora Adong
and Cheong Boo should be considered as valid.
2. Patalin
a. Facts:
Patalin et al. were charged with robbery with multiple cases of rape. They were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced with the penalty of death. The
ratification of the Constitution paved the way for the abolition of the death penalty. The
sentence of Patalin et al was then reduced to reclusion perpetua. However, the death
penalty was re-instigated.
b. Issue:
WON Patalin et al. gained a vested right against future re-imposition of the death
c. Held:
Yes. While Art 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
such general rule is still subject to exceptions. One of which is that laws may be allowed
to have retroactive effect is it is favourable to the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent. In the present case, to impose the death penalty on Patalin et al would be
violative of the right they acquired when the death penalty was abolished.
a. Facts:
The SSSEA-PAFLU’s registration certificate as a labor organization was cancelled by the
Registrar of Labor Organization for failure to provide the necessary requirements. SSSE
subsequently attached said requirements in a letter, but the registrar found out that
those submitted by SSSEA were wrong, hence the suspension of SSSEA’s registration
proceeded. SSSEA alleged that such action by the Secretary of Labor is violative of their
right to freedom of assembly.
b. Issue:
WON the cancellation of SSSEA’s registration certificate was violative of the latter’s right
to freedom of assembly
c. Held:
No. The prescription of registration is not limitation to freedom of assembly but merely
a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations.
In the case at bar, the cancellation of SSSEA’s registration certificate would not result to
its dissolution or non-existence. However, their juridical personality would be
4. Cui
a. Facts:
Cui, a consistent scholar of the Arellano University College of Law, transferred to Abad
Santos University where he graduated. To comply with the requirements for the Bar
Examinations, he requested Arellano University for his official scholastic records. The
latter however, refused to give him his records until he refunds the scholarship grants
awarded to him by the school, pursuant to a waiver Cui had previously signed stating
that he shall refund the total amount of his scholarship grants if he transfer to a
different school.
b. Issue:
WON the waiver signed by Cui is valid and binding
c. Held:
No. Such waiver is contrary to public policy, hence should be considered null and void.
After all, as incorporated in Memorandum 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools,
the main purpose of scholarship grants is to reward merit to deserving students with
whom the society has established interest.
5. Rosales
a. Facts:
Rosales leased their property to Orellana for period of 3 years. On the third year,
Rosales advised Orellana to vacate the leased property on the ground that the time of
their agreed terms has already lapsed and that Orellana violated their contract by
subleasing the property. Orellana contended that they had a verbal agreement of 10
years and that Rosales was aware of the sublease. Orellana consequently filed an action
for the continuance of the lease. Rosales on the other hand subsequently filed an
unlawful detainer complaint against Orellana. Orellana motioned for dismissal of the
ejectment case claiming that earlier action filed by him should be decided first.
b. Issue:
WON the ejectment case may precede the case filed by Orellana even though it was
filed on a later date
c. Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court applied Stare Decisis in deciding the case at bar. Said doctrine
states that when one case is decided in one way, then another case involving exactly the
same point at issue must be decided the same way. The case at bar involves exactly the
same issue as that of Pardo vs. Encarnacion. In the Pardo case, the ejectment case
proceeded. It was held that the lesee’s supposed right to a renewal of the lease may be
decided on the ejectment case, hence the suit filed by the lesee was set aside.
6. Nactor
a. Facts:
Spouses Melchor allowed Guillermo Nactor to build a shanty in their property to ensure
that there won’t be any illegal settlers in the premises while they were away. Instead of
looking after the property, however, Nactor allowed his relatives to informally settle in
the property of the Melchors. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint. Nactor et
al. subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on June 24, 1985 but such was
denied on the ground that said motion lacks merit and was filed late – the last day for
appeal being June 23, 1985.
b. Issue:
WON the motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed on June 24, 1985
c. Held:
No. Pursuant to the periods prescribed by the Rules of Court, if the last day is a Sunday
or a legal holiday, it shall be moved on the next day provided that the next day is not a
Sunday or a legal holiday. In the case at bar, the last day to appeal – June 23, 1985 – falls
on a Sunday, hence the following day – June 24 – shall be considered as the last day. It
should be noted however that the motion was denied not only because of timeliness
but also for lack of merit.
7. Bellis
a. Facts:
Before the death of Amos Bellis, a citizen of Texas, he executed two wills – one for his
Texas properties and one for his Philippine properties. When the project of partition
was filed, Bellis’ illegitimate children opposed, claiming that they were deprived of their
legitimes. The lower court however overruled such opposition and applied the laws of
Texas (which do not provide for legitimes for illegitimate children) in accordance to Art
16 of the Civil Code.
b. Issue:
WON the Texas laws shall apply.
c. Held:
Yes. Art 16 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary successions shall be governed
by the national laws of the testator regardless of where it was situated. Amos Bellis is a
citizen of Texas and he was also domiciled there, hence the laws of his nation shall
8. Brimo
a. Facts:
Judicial administrator Miciano filed a scheme of partition over the estate of Joseph
Brimo, a citizen of Turkey. Andre Brimo, brother of the deceased, was excluded in the
partition even though he is one of the instituted legatees. This is in pursuance to the
condition provided in the second clause of Joseph’s will which states that Philippine laws
shall apply.
b. Issue:
WON Philippine laws shall apply in the partition
c. Held:
No. The second clause of Joseph Brimo’s will is an “impossible condition,” hence shall be
disregarded and considered as void. The testator’s national law was expressly ignored –
a clear violation of Art 16 of the Civil Code. It was held that Texas laws shall then be
9. Leuterio
a. Facts:
Imperial placed second in an oratorical contest held in Naga City. Days after the
announcement of winners, Imperial contested the results after finding out that one of
the judges, Delfin Rodriguez, committed a mistake in calculation which resulted to her
being second instead of first. Upon the refusal of the Board of Judges to amend their
decision, Imperial brought the case to the court. Despite the opposition of the judges of
the contest, the court still declared Imperial as the first place winner of said oratorical
b. Issue:
WON the court has the power to modify the decision of the Board of Judges in the
aforesaid oratorical competition
c. Held:
No. It is the unwritten law in contests like the one in question that the decisions of its
judges should be considered as final and unappealable. Moreover, it should be noted
that no rights to the prize may be asserted by the contestants as they only have the
privilege to compete for the prize and the attainment of such prize is not a demandable
right unless and until they are proclaimed as winners.
10. UE
a. Facts:
Jader was a student of UE College of Law who failed one of his subjects. Nonetheless, his
name appeared in the list of candidates for graduation. Upon finding out later on that
he still has a deficiency, he sued UE for moral and exemplary damages.
b. Issue:
(a) WON UE should be held liable for moral damages
(b) WON UE should be held liable for exemplary damages
c. Held:
(a) No. Jader should not be awarded with moral damages as if he was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar exams. He brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has already satisfied all the requirements before preparing for the
(b) Yes. According to Art. 20 of the Civil Code, if a person’s negligence caused damage
to another, he shall indemnify the latter for the same. UE failed to perform its duty
to inform Jader of his academic status, hence negligently causing damage to him
when they included his name in the list of candidates for graduation, rendering
Jader undue inconvenience and false hope.
11. Radio Comms
a. Facts:
Dionela received a telegram containing defamatory words through Radio Comms.
Dionela alleged that said words caused him undue embarrassment and adversely
affected his business considering that other people found out about it. Radio Comms, on
the other hand, contended that those words were a private joke between its employees
and were not addressed to Dionela, hence were not defamatory. The lower court ruled
that said words were undoubtedly libellous. Moreover, there was sufficient publication
of such words as the telegram was open to be viewed by third parties. It was also held
that Radio Comms failed to take the necessary precautions to protect their client.
b. Issue:
WON Radio Comms has civil liability arising from the libellous act committed by its
c. Held:
Yes. As a corporation, Radio Comms may only act through its employees, hence the acts
committed by its employees shall be deemed to be the cats of Radio Comms as well. To
let Radio Comms escape liability would deprive those who are availing of their services
of an adequate remedy. Radio Comms clearly violated Arts 19 and 20 by not exercising
utmost care in rendering their services, thereby causing undue damage to Dionela.
12. Wassmer
a. Facts:
Wassmer and Velez decided to get married. However, just 2 days before the ceremony,
Velez left a not postponing the marriage. He was never heard from again afterwards.
This prompted Wassmer to file for moral and exemplary damages. Velez counteres that
there are no provision of law which renders a breach of promise to marry is an
actionable wrong.
b. Issue:
WON Velez should be held liable for moral and exemplary damages
c. Held:
Yes. Art 21 of the Civil Code provides that a person who causes injury to another in a
manner contrary to morals or good customs shall compensate the latter for the damage
In the case at bar, while it is indeed true that mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong, Velez caused unnecessary inconvenience and embarrassment to
Wassmer since arrangements for the marriage had already been finalized and a lot of
people has come to know about it. Such act done by Velez is contrary to morals and
good customs – a clear violation of Art 21.
13. Hermosisima
a. Facts:
Cagigas was involved in an intimate relationship with Hermosisima who was almost 10
years her junior. Upon learning that Cagigas is conceiving a child, Hermosisima allegedly
promised the former that he will marry her. However, Hermosisima married a certain
Romanita Perez. This prompted Cagigas to file a complaint for moral damages, alleging
that Hermosisima seduced her, in addition to support for their child. Hermosisima
expressed willingness to support the child but denied ever having promised Cagigas
b. Issue:
WON Hermosisima should be held liable for moral damages
c. Held:
No. For a claim for moral damages to prosper, it must be proven that Cagigas was
seduced. However, it does not appear that seduction transpired considering that
Hermosisima is 10 years younger than Cagigas. It was also found out that Cagigas
“surrendered herself” to Hermosisima and that she wanted to have a child with him
even before they get married.
14. Batarra
a. Facts:
Marcos allegedly lured Batarra to engage in sexual relations with him by promising
marriage to the latter. When Marcos did not fulfil his promise, Batarra filed a complaint
to recover damages for breach of promise to marry.
b. Issue:
WON Marcos should be held liable for damages considering his breach of promise to
c. Held:
No. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Moreover, it has been
held that seduction did not transpire as it does not appear that Batarra is below 23
years of age. Batarra also participated voluntarily in the act, hence she may not recover
15. Tanjanco
a. Facts:
Tanjanco and Santos were involved in an intimate relationship. During the course of
such relationship, Tanjanco had been repeatedly pleading Santos to engage in sexual
relations with him. Santos finally agreed upon Tanjanco’s promise of marriage. Santos
eventually got pregnant. Tanjanco, on the other hand, did not fulfil his promise and left
Santos. Santos filed a suit to compel Tanjanco to recognize their child in addition to
moral and exemplary damages, alleging that Tanjanco violated Art 21.
b. Issue:
WON Tanjanco violated Art 21 by not marrying Santos
c. Held:
No. For Tanjanco’s act to be considered as a violation of Art 21, it must be proven that
Santos was seduced. However, it was held that seduction did not transpire as Santos
regularly maintained voluntary sexual relations with the defendant – a conduct which is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.
16. Gashem
a. Facts:
Gashem, an Iranian national, promised to marry 22 year-old Gonzales. The eventually
decided to live together even before the marriage. However, Gashem’s attitude
changed as he began maltreating Gonzales. He subsequently breached their marriage
agreement, even admitting that he was already married to someone else. This
prompted Gonzales to file for damages.
b. Issue:
WON Gashem is liable to pay for damages considering the forgoing reasons
c. Held:
Yes. Gashem violated Art 21 of the Civil Code by deceitfully promising Gonzales of
marriage just for the latter to engage in sexual relations with him. It does not appear
that Gonzales would consent to carnal knowledge with Gashem had he not made the
said promise. Gashem’s action is clearly contrary to good customs and morals.
17. Lim Sio Wan
a. Facts:
Lim deposited to Allied Banking Corp a money market placement, whose maturity is in
31 days. Deborah Lee Santos pre-terminated the money market placement without the
consent and knowledge of Lim Sio Wan. The money was then transferred to the account
of FCC in Metrobank through forged indorsement. FCC deposited said money to
Producers Bank. Sio Wan then demanded for the placement but she was informed that
it was already preterminated. She denied knowledge about it and consequently filed for
its recovery. The lower court held that Metrobank and Allied Banking should be liable
for the said incident. However, it was argued that Producers should reimburse the said
money due to its apparent unjust enrichment.
b. Issue:
WON there was an undue enrichment on the part of Producers Bank
c. Held:
Yes. Pursuant to Art 22, there is an unjust enrichment when a person is unjustly
benefitted and such benefit was derived at the expense of or with damage to another.
In the case at bar, Lim’s money market placement was deposited to Producers Bank’s
account. This clearly shows that Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of
Lim, hence it must reimburse both Allied Bank and Metrobank the amount the two are
ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.
18. Ledesma
a. Facts:
Delmo, a candidate for Magna Cum Laude, was the treasurer of the Student Leadership
Club of the West Visayan College. The Constitution and By-Laws of the said club
authorizes the treasurer to disburse its funds to students for financial aid. Without
knowing that said Constitution was not yet approved, Delmo extended loans to students
of their school using the funds of the club. This prompted Ledesma, the president of the
West Visayan College, to ban Delmo from receiving any awards from the school for the
latter’s apparent violation of the rules and regulations. Delmo appealed to the Bureau of
Public Schools who then ordered Ledesma to give Delmo whatever award or recognition
due to her. However, such order fell on deaf ears.
b. Issue:
WON Ledesma is liable for damages pursuant to Art 27 of the Civil Code
c. Held:
Yes. Art 27 of the Civil Code provides that any person who suffers material loss for the
non-performance of a public servant’s duty may file an action for damages. The blatant
disregard of the order of the Bureau of Public Schools clearly indicated abuse of power,
arrogance and oppression on the part of Ledesma, therby affecting Delmo.
19. Bernaldes
a. Facts:
Nicacio and Jovito Bernaldes boarded one of the buses of the Bohol Land Transpo. The
bus then fell off a deep precipice causing the death of Nicacio and serious physical
injuries to Jovito. The driver of the bus was then charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide but was acquitted. Subsequently, the parents of Nicacio and Jovito
filed a separate civil action against Bohol Land Transpo on the ground of culpa-
b. Issue:
WON a civil action for damages may be filed against Bohol Land for its apparent breach
of contract after the criminal action against its employee has been disposed, even
though Bernaldes did not reserve a right for a separate civil action
c. Held:
Yes, in pursuance to Art. 31 of the Civil Code which states that when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the criminal act committed, such civil action
may prosper independently. In the case at bar, it is clear that the civil action against
Bohol Land Transpo is based on its failure to ensure the safety of its passengers while
onboard their bus – an act clearly distinct and exclusive of the criminal libality of its
driver arising from the latter’s negligence.
20. Ponce de Leon
a. Facts:
Jikil Taha sold a motor launch to Timbangcaya. However, the former allegedly forcibly
took the launch from the latter. This prompted Fiscal Ponce de Leon to order Madella to
impound the motor launch. It was later on found out that said launch was already in the
possession of Delfin Lim. In compliance with Fiscal De Leon’s order, Madella took the
launch from Delfin without any warrant.
b. Issue:
WON Fiscal and Madella should be held liable for damages suffered by Lim and Jikil Taha
c. Held:
Yes. The warrantless seizure of the motor launch is violative of Lim and Taha’s
constitutional rights, as no public servant has the right to enter the premises of another
without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. Pursuant to Art 32 of the Civil
Code, a person whose consti rights were violated is entitled for actual and moral
damages. Morover, there were no laws authorizing provincial fiscals to issue a search
warrant at the time when the act complained of was committed, hence even if Fiscal
Ponce acted in good faith, he shall not be exempt from liability. However, since Madella
merely complied with the order of his superior, he may be deemed exempted from
21. Ver
a. Facts:
Gen. Fabian Ver ordered various intelligence units of the AFP to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against underground houses of known communist-terrorists. This caused Aberca
et al., who were detained at the time when the privilege for the writ of habeas corpus
was still suspended, to file for damages because their consti rights were allegedly
violated. Ver and the other respondents consequently invoked their alleged immunity
from suit because they were merely performing their duties.
b. Issue:
WON the plaintiffs are entitled to file for damages due to the apparent violation of their
consti rights
c. Held:
Yes. What was merely suspended in the case at bar is the right to seek release by virtue
of the writ of habeas corpus. This does not entail that the other rights of the accused are
also suspended; hence, they may still file for recovery of damages under Art 32 if their
consti rights are violated. Moreover, Ver et al., may not invoke immunity as the violated
Art 32 of the Civil Code. Such provision does not exclude them from liability as only
judge are conferred by such exception (provided that the latter does not violate any
penal laws).
22. Yakult
a. Facts:
Roy Camaso was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines.
Yakult’s driver was then charged with reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries. Camaso’s father subsequently filed for a separate civil action against Yakult and
its driver. Yakult contended that such civil action cannot be filed independently of the
reckless imprudence case in accordance with Art 33, especially since no reservation was
expressly made.
b. Issue:
Can it prosper?
c. Held:
Yes. Although Camaso has not reserved his right to a separate civil action, his case was
filed before the presentation of evidence for the prosecution of the criminal case and
the judge was duly informed about it, hence no damages was awarded in the criminal
case. It should be noted that the purpose of reservation is to prevent the offended party
from recovering twice. In the case at bar, such purpose was not met, hence Camaso’s
filing of a separate civil action may still be considered.
23. Consing Jr.
a. Facts:
Consing Jr and his mother represented to Plus Builders Inc that they own a lot in Imus,
Cavite. PBI subsequently bought the lot from them. PBI later on found put that the lot
does not really belong to Consing Jr. The former was then ousted by the lawful owners
of the said lot. Despite repeated demands, Consing Jr and his mother refused to return
the amount paid by PBI. Consing Jr subsequently filed an action for Injunctive Relief,
claiming that he was merely an agent of his mother hence under no obligation to PBI.
PBI, on the other hand, filed a complaint for Damages and Attachment against Consing
and his mother. PBI also filed a complaint for estafa against Consing Jr while the cases
were still pending. Consing jr contested that the earlier cases were prejudicial to the
estafa case
b. Issue:
c. Held:
No. For a pending civil action to be considered as prejudicial to a criminal action, it must
meet 3 requisites: (1) its facts must be intimately related to the criminal action, (2) it
must be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused and (3) its jurisdiction
must be lodged to another tribunal. In the present case, these requisites were not met,
especially since the pending cases is irrelevatnt to Consing Jr’s guilt or innocence in the
estafa case.
24. Macadaeg
a. Facts:
Minority stockholders of Republic Saving Bank filed a complaint against certain officers
of the same bank and a certain Consuelo Salazar-Perez, alleging that the respondents
conspired to falsify certain public and commercial documents. Such falsification made
way for fraudulent transactions with regards to certain parcels of land among Republic
Savings Bank, Beneficial Financing Corp, Salazar-Perez and Top Service Inc. Top Service
subsequently filed an action to “quiet the title” of the property in question against
b. Issue:
WON the case filed by Top Service is prejudicial to the determination of the falsification
c. Held:
No. One of the requisites for a civil case to be considered as a prejudicial question to a
criminal case in accordance with Art 36 of the Civil Code, is that it should be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the case
at bar, the falsification is about the fraudulent disbursement of the funds of Republic
Savings Bank. The validity of the transfers of ownership over the land is but an incident.
The determination of which would not determine the innocence or guilt of the accused
in the falsification case. Moreover, the civil case between Top Service and Salazar-Perez
alone. Republic Savings Bank has no participation therein; hence the former cannot be
used as a prejudicial question to the latter.
25. Zapanta
a. Facts:
b. Issue:
c. Held:
26. Te
a. Facts:
b. Issue:
c. Held:
27. Pimentel
a. Facts:
b. Issue:
c. Held:
28. Moya Lim Yao
a. Facts:
Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese citizen, applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as
a non-immigrant. A bond was filed in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake that Lau
Yuen Yeung would depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay. A month before the expiration of her visa, she married Moy
Ya Lim Yao, an alleged Filipino citizen. The Commissioner of Immigration ordered for the
confiscation of her bond, her arrest and immediate deportation. Lau Yuen Yeung,
however, admitted that: (1) she could not speak nor write either English or Tagalog, she
could not name any Filipino neighbour with a Filipino name, and that she did not know
the names of her brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law.
b. Issue:
WON Lau Yuen Yeung shall be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her
marriage with Moya Lim Yao
c. Held:
Yes. Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 provides that an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, whether native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipino provided that
she does not have any of the disqualifications provided under Section 4 of the same law.
The court held that it is no longer necessary for said alien to prove in a judicial
proceeding that she has all of the qualifications. The foregoing also applies to an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as a Filipino citizen. Hence, in
the present case, Lau Yuen Yeung was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao who is a Filipino citizen.
29. Burca
a. Facts:
Zita Ngo Burca was a Chinese citizen born in Surigao possessed an Alien Certificate of
Registration. She then married Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen. Zita Ngo then
petitioned for the cancellation of her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration by
virtue of her marriage with Florencio.
b. Issue:
WON Zita Ngo Burca may be considered as a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage
with Florencio Burca
c. Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that an alien woman married to a Filipino must first file a
petition for citizenship in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition, wherein she must
declare that that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law. While the
Supreme Court considered the present petition as one for naturalization, Zita Ngo failed
to comply with two of the essential requirements needed for naturalization –
declaration of present and former residences and the affidavit of at least two credible
30. Marcos
a. Facts:
On March 1995, Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte, then filed a Petition for
Disqualification with the Commission on Elections against Marcos, alleging that the
latter did not meet the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution being
five months short of the required period. Montejo claimed that Marcos was in fact a
resident of Tolosa, Leyte and not of Tacloban, hence must be disqualified. Marcos
contended that she is domiciled in Tacloban, Leyte since childhood. She further asserted
that she always intended to return to Tacloban whenever absent and that she has never
abandoned said place as her residency.
b. Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos may be considered as a resident of Tacloban, Leyte
c. Held:
Yes. Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. For one, the
domicile of origin of Marcos is Tacloban, Leyte and such may only be lost when there is
actual removal or change of domicile and an intention of abandoning it. It was also
evident that she chose Tacloban as her domicile of choice. It should also be noted that
she obtained a residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte.
31. Star Paper
a. Facts:
Star Paper Corporation implemented a policy which provides that employees are not
allowed to marry each other. If such occasion arises, one of them should resign. Due to
such policy, Ronaldo Simbol and Wilfreda Comia, former employees of Star Paper, were
forced to resign. Likewise, Lorna Estrella was also prompted by Star Paper to resign on
the ground of the former’s alleged immorality for getting pregnant out of wedlock.
b. Issue:
WON the policy of Star Paper banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employees.
c. Held:
Yes. Star Paper failed to show how the marriages of aforesaid former employees could
be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule
without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of
tenure. The questioned policy is clearly an invalid exercise of management prerogative.
32. Duncan
a. Facts:
Tecson was an employee of Glaxo. Inclueded in his contract of employment is his
obligation to disclose to the management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing companies. It
was also stated that should management find that such relationship poses a prossible
conflict of interest, the employee must resign from the company, transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position or preparefor employment outside of the
company after 6 months.
Tecson eventually entered into a romantic relationship with an employee of Astra, one
of Glaxo's competitors. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him
several times of the conflict of interest but the marriage still proceeded. Glaxo then
transferred Tecson to a different sales area. After his request against the transfer was
denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee. The National
Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid.
b. Issue:
Whether or not the policy of Glaxo prohibiting its employees from marrying employees
of any competitor company is valid
c. Held:
Yes. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the company. Glaxo possesses the right
to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. They even reminded Tecson several
times about the said policy.
33. Cagandahan
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. She was
then diagnosed of having a medical condition where those afflicted possess secondary
male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones. According to
her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person. She filed a petition for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such
that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
c. HELD:
Yes. The SC held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, which makes
gender classification at birth inconclusive, the determining factor would be what he
thinks of his/her sex upon reaching the age of majority. In the case at bar, Cagandahan
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is a strong basis for him to be considered as such.