Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016 Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No.
l vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's
parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing
said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers
were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and
respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of
June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows
in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around
3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that
there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the
wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of
same early morning of June 1, 1972;
Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much
less signed any papers or documents in connection with the
procurement of a marriage license;
Considering the shortness of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the
pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required
for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment
the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1,
1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly
issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even
date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;
ISSUE:
WON the marriage has no marriage license.
HELD:
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. [32]
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license.[33] As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil
Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except marriages of
exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same
Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage
to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his
alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the
same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil
Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article
47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as
husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from
obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit
of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-
year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
The five-year period should be the years immediately before
the day the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years, and
continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as
to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition
to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
FACTS:
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of
the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married
in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is
Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. [8]
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several
real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila.
the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance
in their Answer,[19] stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware
that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the
fact that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law
husband and wife - a relationship which was terminated upon
execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement,
Luis and Severina were described as single and they
acknowledged that they were living together as common-law
spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the
properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis already
received his share in the properties [20]and is estopped from
denying the same.[21] After the termination of their cohabitation
in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married
one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa
was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina. [22] It
was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The
Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No
Record of Marriage[23] (between Luis and Severina) from the
Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics
Office.
ISSUE:
WON there was a marriage between Luis and Severina.
RULING:
Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law
in effect at the time of its celebration[68] on December 28, 1966.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53[69] of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character,[70]renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). It sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning: x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character.
In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's
marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein
that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article
77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be
disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis'
failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's
lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until
Severina's death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled
with her.[94] All those years, he never presented himself to be
the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa,
knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any
other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to
Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted
a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the
validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had
presented.
"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a
clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well."
Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28,
2008
FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married in Pasay City through the execution of a sworn affidavit
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with
a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7,
1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was
a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not
accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were
not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition
that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa
is void ab initio?
RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for
lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn
affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper
because they started living together five months before the
celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license
shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediments to marry each other…
“ it means that a five years period computed back from the date
of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the
years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is
unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least,
for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. He submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on
September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. On his part, Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on
an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s
wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was
alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it
is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside
his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy
counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did
display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the
wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was only done by one
party, the bride, NOT by both parties. More importantly, the
elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing
officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
Garcia v. Receio, G.R. No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002
FACTS:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an
Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a
decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the
Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an
Australian citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage
with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting
October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998,
Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior
marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce
obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry
Garcia. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the
marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both parties
can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in
Australia ipso factocapacitated him to remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to
receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot
conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the
court grant Garcia’s prayer to declare her marriage null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that
under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry
Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the
following basic legal principles; a marriage between two
Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained
abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
Rep. vs. Cipriano Obrecido III, GR No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children.
Wife went to US to work and later became a US citizen.
Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained
divorce and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for
authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The
SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed
a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did
not present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and had remarried.
Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private
respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong
Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the
Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada,
USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore
Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983,
stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that
Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and
he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the
petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his
own representation before the court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
Republic vs. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005, 470
SCRA 508
Facts:
1. On 25 March 1997, Respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a
complaint in the RTC for the nullity of marriage with his
wife Fely, on the ground that after the celebration of their
marriage, he found his wife “hot-tempered, nagger and
extravagant”.
2. Then in 1984, Fely left the PH for the US leaving all their
five children to Crasus. After a year, she sent a letter to
respondent re seeking divorce but the latter disregarded
the request.
3. In 1985, respondent learned that Fely got married to an
American.
4. In 1987, Fely went back to the PH with her new husband;
respondent did not bother to talk to her because he’s
afraid that he might not bear the pain and sadness.
5. At the time the complaint was filed, it has been 13years
since Fely left and abandoned respondent and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
6. Respondent alleged that Fely has psychological
incapacity to perform marital obligations set forth in the
FC.
7. In 1997, Fely refuted all the allegation about her, instead,
argued that her hot temperance was due to her
husband’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment, hence, the reason why she left
the country was for financial reasons.
8. She further invokes that although she left, she continued
to give support to her children. She also explained that
after the divorce, she was naturalized as an American
Citizen, hence, her status re marriage is governed by her
present nationality.
9. After both parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs, the
RTC gave them opportunity to present evidence.
10. On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
declaring the marriage of respondent and Fely null and
void ab initio due to Fely’s psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support.
Crasus also adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him; and that his wife committed
bigamous marriage.
11. Petitioner Republic assailed the RTC’s decision saying
that it was contrary to law and evidence, hence, filed an
appeal to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the
earlier decision of the RTC – citing article 26 of the FC –
saying that “to condemn plaintiff to remain shackle in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this
Court finds abhorrent”.
12. With such, Petitioner Republic seek an appeal in the SC
on the ground that abandonment by and sexual infidelity
of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
RULING:
1. What constitute a psychological incapacity?
1. Citing Santos v CA, the Court stated that
“psychological incapacity refers to no less than a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage”.
2. The only evidence presented by Crasus was his
testimony which is put in question for being self-serving.
The evidence is not enough to convince the Court that
Fely had such grave mental illness that prevented her
from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
3. It is worthy to emphasize that Art 36 contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that
hurt and embarrassed respondent and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment
of respondent; her marriage to an Am citizen; and even her
flaunting of her American family may be indeed manifestations
of her alleged incapacity, nonetheless, the root cause for such
was not identified. If the root cause f the incapacity was not
identified, then, it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects
the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen,
over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction
of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove
as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a
naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina.
He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work
commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to
find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert
returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January
2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry
her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office
to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied
considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial
recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied
since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of
the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to
Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree
HELD: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the
right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative
intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his
foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of
evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it
registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order
recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
void.
SANTIAGO V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage
on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos
faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty,"
while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. The
prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner
married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that
she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos
in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of
Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos
long before the celebration of their marriage."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her
marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a
marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration
of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and
Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five
years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the
absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their
marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held
thus: Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her
co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused
wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her
marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do.
The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage.
Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null
and void in these proceedings.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction
was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She
attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former
had not known of the previous marriage of Santos. Similar to
the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution
witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of
Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate
court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the
validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently,
the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.
ISSUES: WON a crime of bigamy has been committed and if
the marriage is valid without a license.
HELD: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second
spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the
accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if
the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused.
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's
knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown
by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos
was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws,
they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his
true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible
witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent
testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife
of Santos.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage
between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage
license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that
their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in
more or less in February 1996 and that after six months of
courtship, she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos
had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to
their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she
was residing in the house of her in-laws, and her children from
her previous marriage disliked him. On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that
sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold
her piglets.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago,
contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they
were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus
face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying
Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they
had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law;
and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
CAPILI V. PEOPLE
FACTS: In September 1999, James Capili married Karla
Medina. But then, just three months later in December 1999,
he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of
the second marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004,
Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action
filed by Karla Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with
Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage
between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to
dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the second
marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage
never took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to
speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy
case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second
marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are
present. The crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is
already immaterial if the second (or first marriage,
see Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The
outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing
to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy
case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason
to believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply
contract a second marriage without having such first marriage
be judicially declared as void. The parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia
Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and
without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes
cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He
further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has
been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity.
Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the
first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and
void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
MONTANEZ V. CIPRIANO
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married
Socrates Flores (Socrates). On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio V.
Cipriano (Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with
Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
The RTC rendered its decision declaring the marriage of
Lourdes with Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy
against Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to reveal to
Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her first
marriage to Socrates had already been declared void ab initio
in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to
her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. She also averred
that she had contracted her second marriage before the
effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the existing law at that
time did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as
a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
Hence, the RTC granted the motion to quash.
ISSUE: Was the RTC correct in quashing the information for
bigamy?
HELD: [see elements of bigamy in Capili v. People] The felony
is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a
second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with
Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same
had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent
authority. Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in
2003.
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial,
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court
already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256
of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
“The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.” GRANTED.
REPUBLIC V. TAMPUS
FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L.
Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days thereafter, or
on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left
respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned.
The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news
from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a
petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the
purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-
three (33) years without any kind of communication from him,
she firmly believes that he is already dead.
ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead
HELD: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death
can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
(1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
(2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As
such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods
prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee
spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance,
she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other
than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further
efforts to find her husband. She could have called or
proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek
the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by
the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the
status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP
who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore,
Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her
purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents,
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and
degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of
his death.
REPUBLIC V. SARENOGON
FACTS: On November 4, 2008, the respondent, Jose
Sareñogon, filed a petition before the RTC of Ozamiz to
declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie Sareñogon.
The petitioner testified that they got married and had lived
together as husband and wife for a month only because he left
to work as a seaman, while his wife, Netchie, went to
Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie and likewise had no
idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to
contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned home after
his contract expired, then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and
friends about her whereabouts but they also did not know
where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his
wife, Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the
RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article
41 of the Family Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel
Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande. These
two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the
Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that
they had no information regarding Netchie’s location. On
January 31, 2011, in the RTC’s decision found that Netchie
had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for
Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA
for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of evidence. The CA
saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65
is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of presumptive
death judgment from the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article
41 (FC) was complied with.
HELD: No. This requisite needs the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based upon these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort. At the case at bar, the
respondent, Jose Sareñogon, failed to satisfy the required
“well-founded belief” standard. The respondent’s pathetically
anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below
the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by
jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired form alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s
whereabouts, Jose Sareñogon did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met
in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing
Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of
the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor
did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined, and
unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years, and
naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays, or
municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the
specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his
search.
CASTILLO V. DE LEON CASTILLO
FACTS: On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo
(Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to
Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended
that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a
member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said
that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting
when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio.
The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not
obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity
of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long
as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and
existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the
fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to
Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and
upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the
RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized
in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law
since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were
celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA
ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
ISSUE: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.
RULING: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato
is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless,
the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion
that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
DOMINGO vs. CA
FACTS: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad
A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
They were married on November 29, 1976 unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April
25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing. She came to
know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlinda sued for bigamy.
Since January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia while he has been unemployed and
dependent. Out of her personal earnings, she purchased
properties amounting to P350k, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto. In June 1989, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman and he
had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent.
The petition prayed that 1. temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; 2. their marriage be declared null and void and of
no force and effect; and 3. Delia Soledad be declared the sole
and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of
their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-
fact—Moises Avera, her brother
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should
only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required for
the purpose of remarriage. It is necessary for the protection of
the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his
partner was not lawfully married thus free from being charged
with bigamy.
The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated while the
former’s previous marriage was still subsisting, thus, bigamous
and void ab initio.
Law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes.
There is no need for a separate action of partition of property
because it will simply be the necessary consequence of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Vitangcol v. People (GR No. 207406, 13/01/16)
Doctrine:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If
they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial
declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
the nullity of the first marriage.
Facts: On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G.
Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union were three (3) children.
After some time, Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was
previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July
17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with
the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a
criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in
this case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with
no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the
marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality
of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal
dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime
of bigamy.
Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to
petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves
the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from
the bigamy charge.
Held: No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has
no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is
true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage
license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through
mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven
(7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to
have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even
when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
Carino v. Carino (GR No. 132529, 02/02/01)
Facts: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao
Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a
second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988,
prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and
he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after
his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to
claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of
P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum
of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4
was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n
SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage
license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed
that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s
funeral.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be
invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
Held: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void
due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage
between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same
has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by
SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy;
she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages
and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her
exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full
benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is
likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to
marry each other for there were no impediments but their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the
FC which provides that everything they earned during their
cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by
each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each
party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
Republic v. Molina (GR No. 108763, 13/02/97)
Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo got married in 1985 in Manila.
During the early years of their marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility, observed from his
tendency to spend time with his friends and squandered money
with them, his dependency from his parents for financial aid
and dishonesty in matters involving finances. Roridel became
the sole breadwinner of the family. She then resigned her job in
Manila and went to Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a
week later. The couple is separated in fact for more than 3
years.
Roridel filed a petition to have their marriage void under Article
36, citing Reynaldo's psychological incapacity. She presented
evidence consisted of her own testimony, of her two friends, a
social worker and a psychiatrist. Reynaldo did not present any
evidence and appeared only during the pre-trial. The RTC
granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. Solicitor
General appealed to the CA. CA denied the appeals and ruled
in favor of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities
constitute psychological incapacity.
Held: NO. There is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to
be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in
the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI must be (a)
medically or clinically identified (b) alleged in the complaint (c)
sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the
decision; 3) it must be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage; 4) it must be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; 5) it must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the marital obligations of
marriage; 6) the marital obligations must be embraced by
Articles 68 to 71, and Articles 220, 221 and 225 in regard of
parents and their children; 7) interpretation by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic of Church
of the Philippines, although not binding, should be given great
respect; and 8) the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.
Marcos v. Marcos (GR No. 136490, 19/10/00)
FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and
they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null
and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the
Court of Appeals
ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological
examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case
show psychological incapacity.
HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition since qua non for such declaration.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects”
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
Castillo v. Republic (GR No. 214064, 06/02/17)
Facts: Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually,
became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol
discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former
girlfriend. The couple’s relationship turned tumultuous after the
revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled. They got married and were blessed with two
childåren.
However, after thirteen years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering.
Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling
and stopped any communication with him. Felipe’s
irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not
communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a
period of not less than ten years without any reason, constitute
a severe psychological disorder.
Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
which was granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented
warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held: Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established
as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his
spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did
not emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself.
Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that
Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged
personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable.
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening
disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was
medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are
not evidence.
The petition for review was denied.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA (GR No. 119190, 16/01/97)
Facts: Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi
were married as evidence by their marriage contract. From
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for
sexual activity to no avails. Medical examinations showed that
both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capable of sexual
conduct. Gina was still a virgin at the time of the
medical examination. Gina filed a motion for declaration of
nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner
Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme
Court citing that it was she and not he that had the problem
regarding sexual intimacy.
Issue: Whether or not non-desire of sexual consummation be
an indicator of psychological incapacity?
Held: The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft
of merit. Since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Aligned
with this is the essential marital obligation, “the procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the
sexual act was indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.
Noel Buenaventura v. CA and Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura (GR No. 127358, 27/10/04)
Facts: This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel
Buenaventura where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel
Lucia Singh Buenaventura, were both psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The lower court found that petitioner was merely
under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived Private
Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable
to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a
father. Moreso, he had no inclination to make the marriage
work such that in times of trouble, he’d rather choose to leave
his family than reconcile with his wife.
Issues:
1. Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower
court, the marriage between Buenaventura and Singh
may be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to the psychological incapacity of
the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to the
aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage
as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore
a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological
incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
2. Based on the above definition of psychological
incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts
was negated. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same.
Carating-Siayngo v. Siayngo (GR No. 158896, 27/10/04)
Facts: Manuel Siayngco contracted a marriage to Juanita C.
Siayngco on June 27, 1973. Since they could not have their
own child, they adopted a baby boy in 1977 and named him
Jeremy. On September 25, 1997, respondent Manuel filed for
the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout
their marriage, he was constantly embarrassed by his wife’s
outbursts and overbearing ways, that his wife’s obsession with
cleanliness is irritating and he is wounded by the lack of
support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge
from his wife. That her psychological incapacity arose before
marriage, is permanent and incurable. On her answer, Juanita
alleged the contrary. Psychiatric evaluations were presented as
well as testimony of witnesses and the evidences presented
failed to support the alleged psychological incapacity of the
respondent, thus, petition was denied by the RTC.A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and was denied. The
CA reversed the RTC decision relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation made finding that Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant in
the case.
Held: It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals where the court
declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. Sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that this is a manifestation of a
disordered personality present even at the time of the
celebration of marriage.
The report of expert showed root cause of petitioner Juanita’s
behavior is not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her
in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by
him, and her inability to conceive. An unsatisfactory marriage is
not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The petition for
review was granted decision of CA was reversed and
set aside.
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te (GR No. 161793, 13/02/09)
Facts: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te
in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in
their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close
friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It
was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu
that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and
she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena
proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’
home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage
license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and
stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay
at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they
have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives and they then parted
ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latter’s psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Held: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, and allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to
live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of
others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering;
she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats
of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 203284 November 14, 2016NICOLAS
S. MATUDAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN
B. MATUDANDEL CASTILLO,
J.
NATURE OF THE ACTION:
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
Nicolas Matudan and Marilyn Matudan were married in 1976.
They had four children. In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad.
From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her.
Shehad not been seen nor heard from again. Nicolas inquired
from the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her
whereabouts. In 2008, Nicolas filed for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was
alleged that Marilyn never provided financial support to the
family and never communicated with them. Furthermore,
Nicolas stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the
respondent and never had a fight with her. The only reason he
was filing the case was because of Marilyn’s abandonment.
Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals denied that the
existence of Marilyn’s psychological incapacity. Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not abandonment warrants a finding of
psychological incapacity thereby a ground for declaring the
marriage void.
RULING:
No. The court denies the petition. The landmark case of Santos
v. Court of Appeals taught us that psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and(c) incurability. Thus,
the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved." In this connection, the burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to
Republic v. Court of Appeals, or the Molina case. While the
petitioner professed psychological incapacity, he could not
establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and
testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter
Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological
evaluation report on the psychological condition both petitioner
and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's
psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's
account, since Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
Mallion v. Alcantara
GR No. 141528October 31, 2006
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Editha
Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the
petition. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another
petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging
that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity
bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of lack of marriage license?
Held:
Res judicata applies. Mallion is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity of
marriage. When the second case was filed based on another
ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action which is
prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage
had no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly
admitted the same when he did not question the absence of a
marriage license.
Republic v Olaybar
Article 50 and 51
Republic v Olaybar G.R.189538
Facts
Respondent requested CENOMAR finding that she is married
to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national. Thus she filed a
petition for Cancellation of Entries in Marriage Contract.
The court granted the petition in favor of the respondent
The petition for the reconsideration of the assailed marriage
contract on the grounds that:
- There was no clerical spelling, typographical and
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it fall
within the provision of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
- Granting the cancellation of all entries in the wife
portion of the marriage contract is, in effect, declaring
the marriage void ab initio
Issue
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage.
Held
Yes. Aside for the certificate of marriage, no such evidence
was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of
such existence.
SC emphasized that it was not the nullification of the marriage
that respondent sought but it was the correction of the record
of such marriage to reflect the truth. Otherwise stated,
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof,
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any
way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.
GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN 702 SCRA 707, July 31, 2013
FACTS:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of
the Estate of Eliseo.
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
Elise, his daughter, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other.
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth
signed by Eliseo as her father.
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous.
Whether or not elise may impugn such marriage even after
the death of her father.
HELD:
Void. YES. It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void
marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the
ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her
marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the
fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in
April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to
a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent
the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino
testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear
nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of
marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged
by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to
say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since
she was “naturally plump” or fat. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of
the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case
for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953.
Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954
on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their
marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such
pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando
on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does
not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an
annulment of marriage.
SARAO VS GUEVARRA 40 OG 15 SUPPL 263
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married and on the same
day, plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge of defendant. The
later showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening.
Although he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for
his organ, she complained of pains in her private part later that
night. Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter
offensive to the smell coming from defendant’s vagina.
Every attempt to have carnal access to his wife
proved to be futile because she always complained of pains in
her genital organs.
Upon the advice of the physician, defendant’s uterus
and ovaries were, with consent of the plaintiff removed due to
the presence of a tumor. The removal of said organs rendered
defendant incapable of procreation.
Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the
operation, he lost all desire to have access with his wife and
thus filed this complaint for annulment of marriage on the
ground of impotency.
ISSUE:
WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical
impotency.
HELD:
No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed.
RD:
Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase ‘physically
incapable of entering into the married state’ as with the
capacity to procreate. Impotency is not the ability to procreate
but the ability to copulate. Defect must be one of copulation
and not of reproduction. Bareness will not invalidate the
marriage.
The removal of the organs rendered her sterile but it
by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It would
appear that it was the memory of this first unpleasant
experience with her that made him gave up the idea of having
carnal knowledge of her.
Defendant was not impotent at the time she married
the plaintiff for the existence of tumor did not necessarily
render her incapable of copulation.
Plaintiff also contends that his consent of the marriage
was procured through fraud in that the defendant did not reveal
to him that she was afflicted with a disease in her sex organs.
According to the Court, this contention in untenable since fraud
is not alleged in the complaint and has not been proved at the
trial.
Emilio Tuason vs CA and Victoria Tuason
G.R. No. 116607
10 April 1996
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Ponente: Puno
Facts:
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married
petitioner Emilio Tuason. Due to the series of physical abuse
against the respondent, the petitioner’s use of prohibited drugs,
cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and
giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use
and incurring of bank debts without the respondent’s consent,
respondent filed a petition for annulment or declaration of
nullity of their marriage in 1989 before RTC Makati on the
ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further
dissipation.
Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was thereafter
scheduled to present his evidence on 11 May 1990. Counsel
for petitioner moved for a postponement to 8 June, however,
petitioner failed to appear. On 29 June 1990, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and
awarding the custody of common children to respondent. No
appeal was taken.
Thereafter, on 24 September 1990, respondent filed “Motion
for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties” which was
opposed by petitioner on 17 October. On the same day,
petitioner filed a petitioner from relief of judgment of the 19
June 1990 decision. The trial court denied the petition on 8
August 1991 which was affirmed by the CA on July 1994.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether a petitioner for relief from judgment is warranted
because the decision of the Court is null and void for violation
of petitioner’s right to due process.
2. Whether in the absence of the petitioner in the hearing, the
court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene
under Art. 48 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: a final and executory judgment of the RTC may be
set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence with petitioner showing meritorious
cause of action. In the case at bar, the decision of nullity had
already become final when petitioner through his counsel failed
to appeal during the reglementary period despite petitioner
eventually justifying his absence due to medical reasons.
Further, the failure of the counsel to inform petitioner of
adverse judgment to enable him to appeal is an inexcusable
negligence and not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid
and regular on its face. Similarly inexcusable is the counsel’s
failure to notify the court of petitioner’s confinement. Petitioner
cannot claim he was deprived of due process by the Court.
Petitioner likewise insists he has a meritorious defense by
citing the Family Code which provides that in actions for
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting
officer shall intervene for the state. He contends that when he
failed to appear at the hearing, the trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and
inquire as to the reason for his nonappearance. Because the
Constitution is committed to the preservation and strengthening
of the family as a basic social institution, Art. 48 and 60
provides that a prosecuting officer shall intervene if a
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint to prevent
collision. It cannot be applied to the case at bar because the
petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by filing
several pleadings and cross-examination of the witnesses.
Held: The petition is denied.
Espiritu vs. CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita
works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post.
They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they
went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also
got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named
Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo
pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it,
she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them
with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines
sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the
children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded
to the mother.
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children,
the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern and that
even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be
separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The
presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child
under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the
time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over
7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred
to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She
was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her
mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been
trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care
which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the
other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and
her illicit relationship had already caused emotional
disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the
daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was
reinstated to their father.
SUSAN LIM-LUA V. DANILO LUA CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW
SUSAN LIM-LUA VS. DANILO LUA
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a
declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for support
pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to
P500,000.00 per month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings
from salaries and dividends in several companies and
businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code,
stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of
judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of
P250,000.00.
The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family for
their sustenance and well- being in accordance with family’s
social and financial standing.
The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support
and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive support is unconscionable
and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent
MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the
monthly support to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer
questioned by both parties.
The controversy between the parties resurfaced when
respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision indicated
that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the
value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance
and advances are given to the petitioner and his children.
CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by
the husband be considered advances which may be properly
deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and
the two children.
Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80
from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife,
Susan Lim Lua and their two children.
ISSUE:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent
may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to the
petitioner and her children.
RULING.
The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume
payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by
him. Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be
allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite
for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80
(rendered by the CA).
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
MANGONON V. CA
FACTS:
1) On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner
was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19
years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was
annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
2) 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the
annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica
and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of
her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin
daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them.
3) Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with
her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the
Long Island University and Western New England College.
Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education because of the following:
a) The average annual cost for college education in the
US is about US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more
or less, for both Rica and Rina
b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support
each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a total of
US$6,000 per year.
c) Unfortunately, petitioner’s monthly income from her 2
jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give
general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required
college educational support.
d) Neither can petitioner’s present husband be
compelled to share in the general support and college
education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with
petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to.
e) Worse, Rica and Rina’s petitions for Federal Student
Aid have been rejected by the U.S.
Department of Education.
4) On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon
filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a
Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati
5) Petitioner averred that demands were made upon
Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, for general support
and for the payment of the required college education of Rica
and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a
settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico
and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to
be financially well-off.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable
for her granddaughter’s educational support
HELD:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in
the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina,
petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their children’s college education but being restricted
by their financial income- respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support
to his granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been
established that respondent Francisco has the financial means
to support his granddaughters’ education.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereto.
The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his
obligation to give support. Respondent Francisco and
Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to
how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and
Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should
move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
universities. Thus, he may give the determined amount of
support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the
family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case
since there are circumstances, legal or moral, between
respondent and petitioner which should be considered.
Respondent Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of
school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given
his various business endeavors, thus the amount of support
should be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver
and to the necessities of the recipient.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of
support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and
Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent
Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente
lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant
to this Decision.
**Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already
been done with their education by the time of the promulgation
of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente
lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered
college until they had finished their respective studies.
NOTES:
(respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial,
Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline
stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping,
brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority
stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart
from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in
turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is
likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla
Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad.
)
** What is SUPPORT ‘PENDENTE LITE’
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper
action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or
final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may
be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the
financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support
thereof.
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993
Domingo vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being
married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon
Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for support and
subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina
sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with
another woman and he was disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause

denotes that final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A
person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to
show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of

the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State. As a
matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or
herself whether or not the marriage is void.