74 Phil.

Reports 840
G.R. No. 48321
August 31, 1946
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands

FACTS
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940. The opposition of the Director of Lands is
based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that maybe confirmed under
the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had
acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders
and decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496).

ISSUE
Whether the applicant is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the
provisions of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141).

RULING
No. Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a
decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain (Sections 48 and 49 of CA No. 141).The sale of the lot to the applicant should
have been declared null and void. Judgment is reversed and the application for registration
dismissed, without costs.

The standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of
the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant,
except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since the time of
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest.

DISCOURSE
The standing presumption is that all lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest.
 146 SCRA 509
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME Plywood and
Venner Co., Inc.

FACTS
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corporation represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe, five parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before
the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The land sought to be registered is a
private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether
with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc. has introduced more than P45,000,000
(million) worth of improvements. The ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when
theMunicipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the
town site of Maconacon Isabela.

The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed Court of First Instance in favor

of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.

ISSUES
1. Whether the land is already a private land.
2. Whether the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies.

RULING:
1. YES. It was already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law.

2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had
a perfect right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares.