By: Dennie Vieve Idea

New Era University College of Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW I

CASE TITLE FACTS ISSUE DOCTRINE/RULING
MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP
JUS SOLI AND JUS SANGUINIS
VALLES v. COMELEC Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Whether or not Rosalind is an The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian Australian or a Filipino? principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
where she later married a Filipino and has since then doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
participated in the electoral process not only as a citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935
petition for her disqualification as candidate on the Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
ground that she is an Australian. served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts (Phil. Bill of 1902 and Jones Law)
by which the United States governed the country.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the

Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879,
which, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. Hence, by virtue of both laws, Rosalind is
likewise deemed a Filipino citizen being born having
been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born
in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
 JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
REPUBLIC v. SAGUN This is a case about Respondent’s petition for the Whether or not an action or
judicial declaration of her election of Philippine proceeding for judicial
citizenship the annotation of the same on her birth declaration of Philippine
certificate. citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible?
Respondent – a legitimate child; parents are Chinese
national (father) and a Filipino (mother). She did not
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. But at the age of 33, she executed an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but
the document was notarized but was not recorded
and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City.
Petitioner (Republic) argues that respondent’s
petition before the RTC was improper on two counts:
for one, law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate
no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of
Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded
registration of the oath of allegiance with the local
civil registry and its annotation on respondent’s birth
certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar;
hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts
that respondent’s petition before the trial court
seeking a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a
determination and consequent declaration of her
status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed under
our legal system.
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION;
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION
No, the Court held that it has consistently ruled that
there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a
given person is part of our citizenry.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a
specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship
as such pronouncement was not within the court’s
competence.
Moreover, it should be stressed that there is no specific
statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct
filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special
proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to
file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in
the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of
citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent.
Likewise, even if the Court sets aside the procedural
infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is
erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements
for a valid election.
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REPUBLIC v. ONG Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition
for Naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition that he
has been a "businessman/business manager" since
1989, earning an average annual income of
P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said
that he has been a businessman since he graduated
from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify
or describe the nature of his business.
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax
returns for the years 1994 to 1997. Based on these
returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00
for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for
1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On November 23,
2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General,
appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial
court for granting Ong's petition despite his failure
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation as required under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial
courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his
allegation that he is a businessman/business
manager earning an average income of P150,000.00
since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of
his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence
on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the
source of his income. Considering that he has four
minor children (all attending exclusive private
schools), he has declared no other property and/or
Whether or not respondent
Ong has proved that he has
some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation
in accordance with Section 2,
fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law?
Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon
the applicant to show full and complete compliance
with the requirements of law.
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation"
means "not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his
income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His
income should permit "him and the members of his
family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance
with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently
with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization."
It has been held that in determining the existence of a
lucrative income, the courts should consider only the
applicant's income; his or her spouses income should
not be included in the assessment. The spouses
additional income is immaterial "for under the law the
petitioner should be the one to possess some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to
qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the
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bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a
family home, his alleged income cannot be
considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the
Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not
qualified as he does not possess a definite and
existing business or trade.
Court has consistently held that the applicant's
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the
filing of his petition.
A review of the decisions involving petitions for
naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded
from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's
qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the
entire records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public
interest that it has been differently categorized and
given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial
contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization
does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving
the government another opportunity to present new
evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will
not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the
ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently
procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised
in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the
matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x
involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
lower court and admitted by the parties in their
pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered
adequate for the purpose of determining the
correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light
of the law and extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar,
there is even no need to present new evidence. A
careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that
respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a
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REPUBLIC v. KARBASI
EFFECT OF NATURALIZAYION ON ALIEN AND SPOUSE CHILDREN
REPUBLIC OF THE The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the
PHILIPPINES VS. CA,[33] contending that Azucena failed to comply
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA with the income requirement under CA 473. The
BATU(I)GAS OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under
the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to
engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade.
Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income
requirement. And even if she is allowed, her
business is not a “lucrative trade” within the
contemplation of the law or that which has an
appreciable margin of income over expenses in
order to provide for adequate support in the event
of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work.
The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she
owns real property because aliens are precluded
from owning lands in the country.
Whether or not petitioner has
validly complied the citizenship
requirement as required by law Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
to become a naturalized citizen citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
of the Philippines.
"known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation"
to qualify for naturalization.
Republic won the case.
Yes.
CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to
Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove
that they possess other qualifications for naturalization
at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena
applied before the then Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a
5|Page
 Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of
the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s
husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As
the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial
proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos.
He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main

objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished

traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that
of the other.

Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial

scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

NATURALIZATION BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE/LEGISLATIVE NATURALIZATION

CO v. CIVIL Herbert Tan Co was born March 23, 1974. His sister, Whether or not Arlene and It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence
REGISTRAR Arlene Tan Co was born May 19, 1975. In their Herbert are Filipino citizens on the certificate of naturalization of their father to entitle
respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise

6|Page
 parents Con Boon Peng and Lourdes Vhong K. Tba are account of the naturalization of mandated to prove the ff material allegations in the
Chinese citizens. their Father Co Boon Peng? petition:

Co Boon Peng filed an application for his 1. That they are legitimate children;
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the 2. They were born in the Philippines
Special Committee on naturalization under Letter of 3. That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng
Instruction no. 270. His application was granted and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen
he was conferred Philippine citizenship under
PD1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization
and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen
on February 15, 1977.

On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a

petition under the Rules of Court for the correction of
entries in the certificate of birth which was derined
on the ff grounds:

1. Although CA473 and LOI270 are statutes

relating to the same subject matter, they do
not provide the same benefits with respect
to the minor children of the applicant;
2. LOI 270 refers to qualified individuals only;
3. Section 15 of CA473 should not be deemed
and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270

JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
GO v. REPUBLIC Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Whether or not Go’s petition for No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization,
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, the Revised naturalization should be the application must show substantial and formal
Naturalization Law. Aside from his presentation of all granted. compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an
other requirements, petitioner presented, as applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, requirements, establish his or her possession of the
Teresita Go, and Juan Go. qualifications and none of the disqualifications
enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2)
Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric

7|Page
examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no
psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr.
Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that
petitioner’s medical examination results were
normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, said that
he had known petitioner since childhood through his
association with the family in times of celebration.
Teresita described him as a peace-loving person who
participated in activities sponsored by his school and
the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by
profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner
personally.
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for
naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the
qualifications set forth by law. But the CA reversed
and set aside said decision. Hence, this petition.
character witnesses to support his allegations.
In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed the
requirements for character witnesses, namely:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are “credible persons”;

3. That they personally know the petitioner;

4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by
law;

5. That they personally know him to be a person of good
repute;

6. That they personally know him to be morally
irreproachable;

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines;
and

8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the
provisions” of the Naturalization Law.

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits
executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their
own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization
proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence
proving that the persons he presented were credible. In
the words of the CA, “he did not prove that his witnesses
had good standing in the community, known to be honest
and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and
that their word may be taken at face value, as a good
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ADMINISTRATIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
REPUBLIC v. BATUGAS  Ascuzeana Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur.
 Ascuzena was born in Zamboanga del Sur
on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents.
Her primary, secondary, and tertiary
education were taken in Philippine schools
She then practiced her teaching profession
in various schools situated in the
Philippines. In 1968, at the age of 26,
Azucena married Santiago
Batuigas (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino
citizen. They have five children.
warranty of the worthiness of petitioner.”
Furthermore, the background checks done on petitioner
yielded negative results due to the uncooperative
behavior of the members of his household. In fact,
petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview
by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity
to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s failure to state
his former residence in the petition was fatal to his
application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case.
Hence, the petition for naturalization is dismissed
without prejudice.
WON the petition for YES.
naturalization should be
granted? Foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens
may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that:
9|Page
 After all the jurisdictional requirements
mandated by Section 9 of CA 473had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed
to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative
trade.
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to
Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove
that they possess other qualifications for naturalization
at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from
similar laws in the United States which has since been
amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15
of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer
Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.
PROPER PROCEDURE: As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the
procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment
of Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman
must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is
not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship
pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should
be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of
the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect
that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
10 | P a g e
disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying
the petition.( NOTE: in this case, Ascuzena followed such
procedure but it was denied [by ministry of justice] so
she filed the petition for naturalization)

In this case: However, the case before us is a Petition

for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15
of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of
Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and
received evidence of her qualifications and absence of
disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has
granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA.

Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually

exercised her profession before she had to quit her
teaching job to assume her family duties and take on
her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in
order to support her family. Together, husband and wife
were able to raise all their five children, provided them
with education, and have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is
proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative
trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume
teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her,
and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will
not be a charge to the only country she has known since
birth.

judicial declaration of citizenship (not authorized) vs

naturalization proceeding

11 | P a g e

OSG SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATURALIZATION
SO v. REPUBLIC He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Whether or not Edison So did
Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., meet all the qualification
Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he needed to be a naturalized
derives an average annual income of around Filipino citizen.
P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other
benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English,
Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order setting
the petition for hearing. During the hearing,
witnesses of petitioner testified with regard to his
desire of becoming a citizen, which the court granted.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision.
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration
of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial
naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner
believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare
or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second,
the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks
judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a
Philippine citizen based on requirements required under
CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family
The following were laid down by the Court in this case:
What is naturalization? Give the modes of becoming a
citizen by naturalization.
ANS: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting
a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing
him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current
and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien
may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139;
(b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of
a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien.
In a petition for naturalization, it was contended that
the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization
should possess those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and
12 | P a g e
not those set forth in C.A. No. 473. Is the contention
correct? Why?
ANS: No. The qualifications and disqualifications of an
applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand,
Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by administrative act.

State the rationale for the enactment of RA 9139

otherwise known as Administrative Naturalization Law.

ANS: R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure

intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of
degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship
requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus
promoting “brain drain” for the Philippines.

Are the qualifications prescribed under Act No. 473

applicable to RA 9139? Explain.

ANS: No. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are
separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born
aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who
never saw any other country and all along thought that
they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and
loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and

13 | P a g e
traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical and more encouraging which is administrative
rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the
legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing
from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139.
What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribed another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens.
The only implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications
and disqualifications.

Second, if the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139

would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization,
the coverage of the law would be broadened since it
would then apply even to aliens who are not native born.
It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to
aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been
residing here.

Third, applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial

naturalization is contrary to the intention of the
legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in
the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No.
9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and
should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one
who was born here but left the country, though resided
for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the

14 | P a g e
application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we
maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two
laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139
may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A.

No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and
disqualifications set forth therein are maintained. (So v.
Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

State the duty of an applicant for naturalization before

he can be naturalized. Explain.

ANS: In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of

the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her
witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within the
purview of the naturalization law, a “credible person” is
not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and
has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or
whose affidavit or testimony is not credible. What must
be credible is not the declaration made but the person
making it. This implies that such person must have a good
standing in the community; that he is known to be honest
and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value;
as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.

In naturalization proceedings, may the State appeal the

decision even if it did not oppose the petition? Explain.

15 | P a g e
 ANS: Yes. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein
does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently
discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading
the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence
even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the
government can challenge a final grant of citizenship,
with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC
within the reglementary period despite its failure to
oppose the petition before the lower court.

Note:
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of
the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines
can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not
be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it,
and upon strict compliance with the law.

LOSS OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND DENATURALIZATION

LABO v. COMELEC Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Whether or not petitioner was Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated
Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his divested of his Philippine that Philippine citizenship may be lost through
marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized citizenship? naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation
and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign
Said marriage was found to be bigamous and country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his
naturalization made him only a dual national and did He became a citizen of Australia because he was
not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. naturalized as such through a formal and positive
process, simplified in his case because he was married to
an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing

16 | P a g e

REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
TECSON v. COMELEC Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition Whether or not FPJ is a natural
before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due born Filipino citizen?; Whether
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon or not the Supreme Court have
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation jurisdiction over the
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a qualifications of presidential
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according candidates?
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the
citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They
asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the
1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue of the case.
all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter –perhaps the most significant
consideration –is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions,
the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
are none provided.
17 | P a g e
IN RE CHING BAR In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the
MATTER NO. 914 Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to
show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be
allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born
in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as
a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served
as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by
saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; that under
prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of
majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching
the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because
he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was
in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so
when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years
after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the
Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be
relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
PROCEDURE FOR REACQUISITION VIA REPATRIATION/RA 8171
Whether or not he has elected
Philippine citizenship within "a
reasonable time"
No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino
citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen
years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7
year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the
period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years.
(It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s
special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not
enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino;
that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving
this country. The rules for citizenship are in place.
Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he
belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess
it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not
until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with
the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
18 | P a g e
TABASA v. COURT OF Petitioner Joevanie Tabasa was a natural-born citizen
APPEALS of the Philippines. When he was seven years old,
petitioner acquired American citizenship after his
father became a naturalized citizen of the United
States.
When Petitioner came to the Philippines as a
“balikbayan”, he was arrested and detained by an
agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) and thereafter, investigated. It was found out as
reported by the US embassy that petitioner’s
passport has been revoked because he is the subject
of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest. He was
subsequently ordered to be deported back to the US.
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that
he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171),
and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he
cannot be deported or detained by the respondent
Bureau.
ALTAJEROS v. Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to
COMELEC disqualify and deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify
as a natural-born Filipino who
had lost his Philippine
citizenship by reason of political
or economic necessity under RA
8171?
Whether or not the registration
of petitioner’s repatriation with
the proper civil registry and with
the Bureau of Immigration a
He does not. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that
petitioner was a Filipino at birth and that he acquired
American citizenship when he was still a minor. He
cannot claim that he is entitled to automatic repatriation
as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country
due to political or economic necessity.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation
under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children
who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity.
Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of
law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It
was his father who could have been motivated by
economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for
naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his.
The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended
directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove
that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to
political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly
to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the
proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation
19 | P a g e
 made a false representation in his COC that he was prerequisite in effecting
not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San repatriation.
Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered
that he was already issued a Certificate of
Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
RA 9255; CITIZENSHIP REACQUISITION ACT
DAVID v. AGBAY Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Whether or not petitioner may
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, be indicted for falsification for
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines representing himself as a
and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Filipino in his Public Land
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. Application despite his
However, the portion where they built their house is subsequent re-acquisition of
public land and part of the salvage zone. Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application
(MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the
application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a
criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the
petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225.
only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s
repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian
citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to
the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows
dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of
petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary
to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the
retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225
itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2
declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the
second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a
public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time
20 | P a g e
 The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that
petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which
was void ab initio.
An information for Falsification of Public Document
was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the petitioner.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed before
he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was
denied.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES DEFINED
U.S. v. DORR Herein respondents were alleged to have committed Whether the Article published
an offense of writing, publishing and circulating by the respondents is in
scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S. violation of the Art. 292 for it
and the Insular Government of the Philippine directly attacks the U.S.
Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the government and the Insular
Commission. Government of the Phil. Island?
The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom”
issue dated 06 April 1902 as an editorial issue.
of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then
still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While
he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause
for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
The Court ruled that the article in question contains no
attack upon the governmental system of the U.S., by
which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these
Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men who
are entrusted with the administration of the government
which the writer wants to bring disrepute due to their
motives, public integrity, and private morals and
wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not
constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be
in violation of Art. 292.
Distinguishing government and administration:
21 | P a g e
 The editorial is about the appointment of rascal
natives (Filipinos) to important Government positions
by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity).
CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT FUNCTION DEFINED
KBACANI v. NACOCO Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of Whether the NCC is a
the CFI of Manila. Their services were requested by government entity and is
the respondent in a civil case where the latter was exempted from the payments in
involved. They were paid P741. question?
However, the Auditor General disallowed such
payment and directed the petitioners to reimburse
the amounts invoking that the National Coconut
Commission (NACOCO) is a government entity,
hence, exempted from such payments.
the term government is defined as “the institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an independent
society makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the
government is the aggregation of authorities which rule
a society (administration)”.
On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term
‘government’ is used in an abstract sense (e.q. President,
Congress), meaning the existing political system, its laws
and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this sense
that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under
consideration.
Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the
Government of the Phil. Islands” is the government as a
system, however, the article in questions attacks the
‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials who run
it.
The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold
functions of the government namely: constituent and
ministrant. The constituent function refers to the
bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while
ministrant is more on public welfare like public works,
education, charity, health and safety.
From such, we may infer that there are functions which
our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which
are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and
those which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.
22 | P a g e
 Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the
people’s welfare, however, it was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned.

Wherefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not

exempted from the payment of fees in question;
petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.

TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS OBLITERATED

ACCFA v. CUGCO In 1961, a Collective Bargaining agreement was
agreed upon by herein petitioner ACCFA and unions
of CUGCO (respondent). But due to the non-
implementation of such agreement, the respondents
initiated a strike in 1962 and won against ACCFA.
In 9163, ACCFA appealed and while the appeal was
pending, RA 3844 was enacted which turned the
former to ACA which placed it under the Land
Reform Project Administration.
However, notwithstanding the enacted law, the RTC
and CA still ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner
appealed, hence, this case.
Whether or not ASA and AWA No. The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO
can be given sole bargaining 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844
rights with ACA? the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the
government is a governmental function NOT a
proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step
down to deal privately with said unions as it may have
been doing when it was still ACCFA.
The Supreme Court also made a pronouncement which
recognized the growing complexities of modern society
which have rendered the classification of the
governmental functions (ministrant and constituent) as
unrealistic, if not obsolete. Hence, gone are the days
where constituent functions are exclusively performed
by the government and not delegated to private
institutions. In this case, a constituent function is left to
be performed by a private entity like ACA (formerly
ACCFA).

DE FACTO V. DE JURE GOVERNMENT

CO KIM CHAN v. In 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the Whether the governments (PEC YES.
VALDEZ City of Manila and their military commander thereby and RP) established during the
proclaimed that “all the laws now in force in the

23 | P a g e
Commonwealth, including executive and judicial
institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time
being as in the past…and a;; public officials shall
remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully
their duties as before”.
Subsequently, it created the Phil. Executive
Commission (PEC) and the Republic of the Philippines
(RP).
But in 1944, Gen. Douglas McArthur landed in Leyte,
consequently, proclaimed the “Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines”, subject to the
authority of the US Government, will be the sole
authority to govern the Philippines free from
occupation of enemy state and that all the laws,
rules, proceedings will be in accordance with the
laws of the Commonwealth government.
Petitioner filed this complaint because the
respondent judge refused to continue the judicial
proceedings of a civil case involving the petitioner,
on the ground that proceedings and judgments of
the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission (PEC) and the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) established during the Japanese
occupation are nullified.
The Respondent, however, contends that the
government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation were no de facto governments,
Japanese military occupation
were de facto government?
The Court stated the three kinds of a de facto
government.
First, a government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
majority;
Second, that which established and maintained
by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war and
which is denominated a government of
paramount force; and
Third, that established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent
state.
The court said that, the RP apparently established and
organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, In truth
and reality, a government established by the belligerent
occupation or the Japanese forces. It is the same as PEC
and the ultimate source of its authority is the Japanese
forces.
Being a de facto government, all the laws, acts and
judicial proceedings established during the Japanese
occupation are still good and valid, although after the
liberation of Manila. Therefore, the civil case of the
petitioner must be acted upon by the respondent judge.
24 | P a g e
 hence, all their laws, rules and processes are
considered null and void.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President
on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is
the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he
was plagued by problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime
friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the
Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately
ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell
from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap
informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara
that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender.
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the
pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Whether or not Arroyo is a
legitimate (de jure) president.
The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did
not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
REPUBLIC v. Pres. Cory Aquino created the PCGG to investigate Whether the revolutionary NO. The Court ruled that the Revolutionary Government
SANDIGANBAYAN the ill gotten wealth of personalities involved with government is bound by the Bill was not bound by the provisions of the 1973
the Marcoses. of Rights (and/or provisions) of Constitution during the interregnum because during
the 1973 Constitution during the such phase, the directives and orders of the
Along with this, the PCGG created the AFP Graft
revolutionary government were the supreme law since
Board specifically for the corrupt AFP officials during interregnum?
there is no constitution limiting its scope and extent of
the Marcos administration.
authority.
Respondent is one of the first people to be

25 | P a g e
 investigated by the AFP-GB. Therefore, the private respondent cannot invoke his
rights under the 1973 Constitution; the AFPGB did not
Respondent's properties and monies, which were
commit ay violation of his rights.
alleged to be ill gotten, were forfeited and seized by
the AFPGB.

Respondent assails that such seizure is in violation of

his right under the 1973 Bill of Rights. In appealing to
the Sandiganbayan, the latter ruled in favor of the
respondent.

So Republic opposed invoking that the respondent

cannot invoke his rights under the 1973 constitution
because it is not operating anymore during the
interregnum (phase of change from revolutionary
government).

PARENS PATRIAE
GOVERNMENT v. In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in Whether or not the Philippine
MONTE DE PIEDAD the Philippines. The Spanish Government then government is competent to file
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was a complaint against the
received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said respondent bank.
amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then
invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn
invested the amount in jewelries. But when the
Philippine government later tried to withdraw the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the
amount. The government then filed a complaint. The
bank argued that the Philippine government is not an
affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was
not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute
action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance
with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government
being the protector of the rights of the people has the
inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will
promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the
people the government has the right to take back the
money intended for the people.

26 | P a g e
DELA CRUZ v. GARCIA For several months in 2005, then 21-year old Jenie Whether or not the minor child Yes. It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize
San Juan dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old can bear the surname of the the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) deceased? of children, especially of illegitimate children. The State
lived together as husband and wife without the as parens patriae affords special protection to children
benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel to their development. In the eyes of society, a child with
Sto. Tomas Aquino at Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to
2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to
Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique's bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and
parents, gave birth to her minor child Christian dela enter it in his birth certificate.
Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital,
Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the
child's birth, using Dominique's surname Aquino, with
the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in
support of which she submitted the child's Certificate
of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed,
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by
Dominique's father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime
of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his
yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never
been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which
Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting.

INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

RUBI v. PROVINCIAL Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in
BANK the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
Whether or not Section 2145 of No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained
the Administrative Code the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
constitutes undue delegation? Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a
better position to determine whether or not to execute
the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the

27 | P a g e
 province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions
made to that end and for purposes of cultivation of executive departments of subordinate official thereof,
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non- to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very final on questions of fact.
low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped

from the reservation but was later caught and was
placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he
escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of
the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the

provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.

was challenged.

AGUSTIN v. EDU Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He Whether or not the said is EO is The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 valid? exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
which requires all motor vehicles to have early petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is

28 | P a g e
 warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair
of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”.
Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional,
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring
public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights
which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists
to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is
redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative
v. FERTIPHIL CORP powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades
of fertilizers.
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust
Company who applies to the payment of corporate
debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
Whether or not the LOI No. 1465
is an invalid exercise of the
power of taxation rather the
police power?
the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the
due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
only in passing.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote
public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view.
Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the
first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.
Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent
powers of the state but distinct and have different tests
for validity. Police power is the power of the state to
enact the legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty on property in order to promote general welfare.
While, the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as
to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of
police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct,
while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects
29 | P a g e
 After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped
the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI
refused.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages
against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that
LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreasonable oppressive,
invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due process
of law.
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
BASIS
MERRITT v. GOVT The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E.
Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his
work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle
along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a
government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance
was proven to have been negligent. Because of the
incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was
severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so
that he could never perform his job the way he used
to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what
he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to
sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
Whether or not the government
is liable for the negligent act of
the driver of the ambulance.
and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity
of a law enacted under the police power. The power of
taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent
and constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a
robbery for the State to tax the citizen and use the funds
generation for a private purpose. Public purpose does
NOT only pertain to those purpose which are traditionally
viewed as essentially governmental function such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also
includes those purposes designed to promote social
justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban
or agrarian reform.
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of
such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault
nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the
state in the organization of branches of public service and
in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be
30 | P a g e
 sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands
to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
VIGILAR v. AQUINO Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the
construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the
Porac River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle,
Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently
awarded the “Contract of Agreement” by the said
government agency.
By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by
respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of
Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. However,
claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but
petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a
Complaint for the collection of sum of money with
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the
defense that the Complaint was a suit against the
state; that respondent failed to exhaust
Was the doctrine of sovereign
immunity properly invoked?
liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are employed,
is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special
agent nor was a government officer acting as a special
agent hence, there can be no liability from the
government. “The Government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all
its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”
No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Citing their decision in EPG Construction (G.R. No.
131544, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 566), the court said
that it would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable if the respondent is not duly compensated for
actual work performed and services rendered, where
both the government and the public have received
benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of
respondent’s honest toil and labor. The Court further said
that the no government agency or agent can
conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility
against suit, because this principle has limitations
especially when that the ends of justice would be
subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular
31 | P a g e
 administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of
Agreement” covering the project was void for
violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the
proper appropriation and the Certificate of
Availability of Funds.
instance, the State’s immunity from suit. The Court finally
said that in this case, it can’t be an instrument of injustice
by upholding the immunity from suit principle and
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.

Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed the case before
the CA which ruled in their favor, declaring the
contract null and void ab initio but ordered
compensation to Aquino for worked delivered,
subject to Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied
with the CA’s decision, Petitioners then raised the
issue before the Supreme Court seeking complete
dismissal of the case without paying Aquino any
money.

APPLICATION
GATC v. CA The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
the Philippines ratified andagreement which lead to
the Social Health Insurance !etwor"ing and
#mpowerment $SHI!#% program wherein the
program see"s to pro&ide health care to Filipino
families' especially the poor( The Republic of
Germany assigned the GT) as the implementing
corporation for the program' while the Philippines
designated the Department of Health and the
Philippine HealthInsurance Corporation( Pri&ate
respondents' as employed by GT) for the
implementation of theSHI!#' had a misunderstanding
with the Pro*ect +anager of SHI!#( This lead to an
e,changeof letters which was interpreted to be the
resignation of the pri&ate respondents(
Whether or not GTZ enjoys NO. The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a
immunity from suit? local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9,
Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the
State may not be sued without its consent."
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged
in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure

32 | P a g e
 Pri&aterespondents then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal to the labor arbiter( GT) contends that itis
immune from suit as it is the accredited agency of the
Federal Republic of Germany
AGRA v. COA
imperii (imperial authority), especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is
found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if
its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the
functions it is performing.
The state may waive its immunity through a general or
specific law (The special law can take the form of the
original charter of the incorporated government agency.
In this case however, GTZ presented any evidence to
support their claim that they are immune from suit' and
has failed to obtain a certification of immunity from suit
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (If GT) has done
so' then there would be no ambiguity in their claim that
they are immune from suit.
Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The Commission on
Audit (COA) had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the
allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from
the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758.—In
National Electrification Administration v. Morales, 528
SCRA 79 (2007), the order of garnishment against the
NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision was in issue,
and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to
decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims
arising from the implementation of Republic Act No.
6758. We observed therein that “the RTC acted prudently
in halting implementation of the writ of execution to
allow the parties recourse to the processes of the COA.”
In fact, we even stated there that “it is not for this Court
to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be
33 | P a g e

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
CHINA NATIONAL CNMEG and NorthRail entered into Memorandum of Whether CNMEG is entitled to
MACHINERY v. STA Understanding for the feasibility study on apossible immunity precluding it from
MARIA railway line from Manila to La Union ( NorthRail being sued before a local court
Project). CNMEG and NorthRail executed a Contract
of Agreement for the construction of the Phase 1 of
Northrail. The respondents filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Contract and Injunction in the RTC of
Makati. CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss. CNMEG
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Trial Court
did not have jurisdiction over its person as it was an
agent of the Chinese government making it immune
from suit, and the subject matter as the Northrail was
product of an executive agreement.
conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23,
2000.”
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Definition of an
“Incumbent”.—We have defined an incumbent as “a
person who is in present possession of an office; one who
is legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office.”
There is no question that petitioners were not
incumbents as of June 30, 1989. We have likewise
characterized NEA as a GOCC in National Electrification
Administration v. Morales, 528 SCRA 79 (2007). Thus,
Section 5.5 quoted above, issued pursuant to the
authority given to the DBM under Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 6758, was correctly applied by the COA.
Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; Restrictive
Theory; Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive
theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the
act involved—whether the entity claiming immunity
performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions.—In JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 239 SCRA 224 (1994), this Court affirmed
the Philippines’ adherence to the restrictive theory as
follows: The doctrine of state immunity from suit has
undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved
that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean
that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local
courts. The complexity of relationships between
sovereign states, brought about by their increasing
commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive
application of the doctrine. xxx xxx xxx As it stands
now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from
34 | P a g e
suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity
cannot be extended to commercial, private and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Since the Philippines
adheres to the restrictive [China National Machinery &
Equipment Corp. (Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA
189(2012)] theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved—whether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. As held in United States of
America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. [China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189(2012)]

Same; Same; Although China National Machinery &

Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG) claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under
Chinese law.—It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot
claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it
performs governmental functions. Its designation as the
Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no

35 | P a g e

FORMS OF CONSENT
HEIRS OF MENDOZA The case stemmed from an action for specific Whether the Court of Appeals
v. DPWH performance and damages, with prayer for committed a reversible error in
preliminary injunction, filed by Diosdado M. Mendoza ruling that the DPWH has no
(Mendoza), doing business under the name and style juridical personality of its own
of D’ Superior Builders (Superior Builders) against the and that Mendoza’s action was a
defendants Department of Public Works and suit against the State?
Highways (DPWH), et al.
Mendoza was the winning bidder for the construction
of the 15-kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling
Road in Benguet. He was also the winning bidder for
the construction of the 15-kilometer barangay roads
(Sinipsip-Akiki, SinipsipMaalad, and Madaymen) in
Benguet, designated as Package IX of the HADP, with
a bid of ₱10,527,192.14.
During the pre-construction survey, Mendoza alleged
that he discovered that the whole stretch of the 15-
kilometer project had no right-of-way, in violation of
Ministry Order No. 65. He brought the matter to the
attention of the DPWH and UTI but according to him,
it was only resolved on 29 November 1989 when the
precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether
GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to
be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under
Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in
Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-
owned and -controlled corporation without an original
charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued
under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
The doctrine of immunity from suit is anchored on
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it
may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be sued,
either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent
when a law so provides, while there is implied consent
when the State enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation. This Court explained that in order
to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency
entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish
whether the contract was entered into in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, thus:
x x x. However, it must be clarified that when a state
enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean
that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only]
if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
36 | P a g e
 affected landowners and farmers allowed passage at
Mendoza’s risk. Mendoza alleged that the
defendants, conspired to make it appear that
Superior Builders incurred negative slippage of 29%
and recommended the forfeiture of the contract.
The DPWH recommended the rebidding of Package
IX. Package IX was, in effect, canceled together with
the forfeiture of the contract for Package VI. The
DPWH blacklisted the Superior Builders from
participating in any bidding or entering into any
contract with it for a period of one year.
On 2 August 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36 (trial court) issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the defendants from rebidding
Package VI and from awarding Package IX to another
contractor, and to cease and desist from withholding
the equipment of Superior Builders.
SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
DOH v. PHIL PHARMA Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Whether or not the charge
WEALTH INC an Administrative Order providing for additional against the public officers acting
guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at in their official capacity will
ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact prosper.
business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH).
Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth)
submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited drug products,
private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves
its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such
waiver may be implied." Statutory provisions waiving
[s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.
The functions of the DPWH is of governmental functions.
Section 5(d) states that it has the power to "[i]dentify,
plan, secure funding for, program, design, construct or
undertake prequalification, bidding, and award of
contracts of public works projects x x x" while Section 5(e)
states that it shall "[p]rovide the works supervision
function for all public works construction and ensure that
actual construction is done in accordance with approved
government plans and specifications."
The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza
for the construction of Packages VI and IX of the HADP
were done in the exercise of its governmental functions.
Hence, petitioners cannot claim that there was an
implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a
contract.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may
not be sued without its consent.
The doctrine of non-suability - This Court in Department
of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission
discussed:
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that
t)he State may not be sued without its consent, reflects
nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character
of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten
37 | P a g e
including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine.
Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the
procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G
Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH
regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, the
latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine
contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view,
however, of the non- accreditation of respondent‘s
Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS).
Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for
injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial
praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the
award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS
Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to
declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying
responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and
that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff
company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez,
Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to
plaintiff.
rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of
courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. x x
x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty
because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its
nonsuability. We have had occasion to explain in its
defense, however, that a continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss
of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions would be far
greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to
be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is
not to be accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not
say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without
its consent; it's clear import then is that the State may at
times be sued. The State consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law. x xx Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and to have
38 | P a g e
 divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is
not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must still be made between
one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it

consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the
subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law,
either special or general, so provides. On the other hand,
there is implied consent when the state "enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation." However, it
must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract,
it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-
suability. The State "will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,]
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be
implied.""Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity
are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity
is in derogation of sovereignty."

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity. The DOH is

an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or
governmental functions because it has not consented,
either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly,
the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs
functions of governmental character.

EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

39 | P a g e
BANAHAW This case involves Respondents, employees of DXWG-
BROADCASTING v. Iligan City, a radio station which is owned by
PACANA petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),
a corporation managed by Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC).
The DXWG personnel filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, reimbursement of
unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
benefits, and attorneys fees against IBC and BBC.
Later on, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim, was jointly filed by IBC and the DXWG
personnel based on the latter's admission that IBC is
not their employer as it does not own DXWG-Iligan
City. The NLRC granted the Motion with respect to
IBC. BBC filed an MR. The NLRC thereafter issued an
Order for monetary award to which BBC filed a
Motion for recomputation.
However, said motion was denied by the NLRC and
ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days
from receipt of said Order, with a warning that
noncompliance will cause the dismissal of the appeal
for non-perfection. Instead of complying with the
Order to post the required bond, BBC filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, alleging this time that since it is
wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines, it
need not post an appeal bond.
LANDBANK v. RIVERA
Whether BBC is exempt from
posting an appeal bond?
Whether or not the Court of
Appeals correctly adjudged LBP
liable to pay the cost of suit?
GOCCs NOT EXEMPT FROM POSTING BOND
Generally, the government and all the attached agencies
with no legal personality distinct from the former are
exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs)
are not similarly exempted except if it is sued in relation
to its governmental functions. Here, BBC was organized
as a private corporation, sequestered in the 1980s and
the ownership of which was subsequently transferred to
the government. Its primary function is to engage in
commercial radio and television broadcasting. It is
therefore clear that BBCs function is commercial or
proprietary and not governmental.As such, BBC is not
entitled to an exemption from the posting of an appeal
bond.
NO. The Court held:
Rule 142 - Costs
40 | P a g e
Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit. Unless
otherwise provided in these rules, costs shall be allowed
to the prevailing party as a matter of course but the court
shall have power, for special reasons adjudge that either
party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be
divided, as may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed
against the Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise
provided by law.

In Heirs of Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, this

Court extensively discussed the role of LBP in the
implementation of the agrarian reform program.

LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial

support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to
Section 74 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 and Section 64
of RA No. 6657. It is vested with the primary
responsibility and authority in the valuation and
compensation of covered landholdings to carry out the
full implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program. It
may agree with the DAR and the land owner as to the
amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and
may also disagree with them and bring the matter to
court for judicial determination.

As may be gleaned very clearly from EO 229, the LBP is

an essential part of the government sector with regard
to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is,
after all, the instrumentality that is charged with the
disbursement of public funds for purposes of agrarian
reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the
governmental machinery that fixes and determines the
amount compensable to the landowner. Were LBP to be
excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive, function of

41 | P a g e

SUABILITY v. LIABILITY
LOCKHEED v. UP Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Having a charter with which it
Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for can sue and be sued, can UP
security services with respondent UP. In 1998, several funds be garnished?
security guards assigned to UP filed separate
complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of
underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay
for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th
month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions
establishing the compensable amount, there would be
no amount "to be established by the government" as
required in Sec. 6, EO 229.
Moreover, the role of LBP in the CARP is more than just
the ministerial duty of keeping and disbursing the
Agrarian Reform Funds. As the Court had previously
declared, the LBP is primarily responsible for the
valuation and determination of compensation for all
private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject
the land valuation and just compensation for a private
agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP
disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of
just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the
courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to
challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or
to this Court, if appropriate.
It is clear from the above discussions that since LBP is
performing a governmental function in agrarian reform
proceeding, it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit
as provided under Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court.
We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed
in discussing the doctrine of state immunity from suit as
this was never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented
to be sued when it participated in the proceedings below.
What UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds
in its PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly
applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government
and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like
42 | P a g e
 for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid
wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s
fees.
UP v. DIZON University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a
General Construction Agreement with respondent
Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the
construction and renovation of the buildings in the
campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its
first and second billing. However, the third billing
worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid
balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision
ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January
16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration.
The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said
motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco
(Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17,
2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of
record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On
October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the
RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied
UPs petition. The denial became final and executory.
Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for
Whether or not the UPs funds
can be validly garnished?
NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be
subject to garnishment or levy. However, before
execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability
vs. liability of the State
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP
remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a
government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government instrumentality,
the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees
and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section
1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by
Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No.
9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of such
funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special
trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be
aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should
always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of
the UP are government funds that are public in character.
They include the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State
and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A
distinction should first be made between suability and
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 execution despite their previous motion having
already been granted and despite the writ of
execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003,
the RTC granted another motion for execution filed
on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued
the writ of execution on October 4, 2002).
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC
ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA
sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
MONEY CLAIMS
STAR SPECIAL Petitioners, SSWDA Inc., Celso and Manuel were the
WATCHMEN v. owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Puerto
PUERTO PRINCESA Princesa City. Before Puerto Princesa became a city,
the national government established a military camp
in Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command.
In building the command’s facilities and road
network, encroachment on several properties of
petitioners resulted. Petitioners’ property was used
as a road right-of-way leading to the military camp.
This road was named the "Wescom Road." Soon after,
the City of Puerto Princesa decided to develop the
"Wescom Road" because local residents started to
build their houses alongside it.
Is mandamus a proper remedy
to compel the respondents to
pay the just compensation?
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to
be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent
to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that
the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant
is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The execution of the
monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that
a final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP.
Mandamus is NOT the proper remedy to compel the
respondents to pay the just compensation. Mandamus is
a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance
of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law. This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy, and
clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for
the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
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In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an
action for Payment of Just Compensation against the
respondents Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Hagedorn
and the City Council of Puerto Princesa City before the
RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of petitioners.
After the RTC Decision became final and executory, a
writ of execution was issued. The money judgment
amounted was reduced to P12,000,000.00, subject to
the condition agreed by the parties. Petitioners
claimed that respondents paid the initial
P2,000,000.00 but failed to give further payments
after. However, records show that the total
negotiated amount of P12 million was already fully
paid and received by petitioners on the basis of the
certification issued by then City Treasurer of Puerto
Princesa.
Nevertheless, petitioners filed a complaint before the
RTC-Br. 223 against respondents for collection of
unpaid just compensation, including interests and
rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br. 78 Decision. If
also filed complaints before the COA, Ombudsman
and DILG to compel the respondents to pay the
judgment but COA countered that it does not have
jurisdiction over the matter.
The petitioners filed the present petition for
mandamus seeking to direct, command and compel
the respondents to enforce, implement or pay the
petitioners the judgment award of the Decision of the
Quezon City RTC
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty
to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the
case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the
court, officer, board, or person against whom the action
is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator,
it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle
that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
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obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public
or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to
the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs,
but only in matters relating to the public.

The legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA pursuant

to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated
October 25, 2000, which enjoined judges to observe
utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the
issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money
judgments against government agencies and local
government units. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and
settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing
the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to

the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final
decision of the RTC having already validated the claim. As
such, the claimants had no alternative except to first seek
the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.
Considering that the COA still retained its primary

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SOVEREIGNTY
TANADA v. ANGARA On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government
represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the
Philippine Government to submit to its respective
competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such.
On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was
adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO
Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the
WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and
independent national economy, and Sections 10 and
12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.
Whether or not the Resolution
No. 97 ratifying the WTO
Agreement is unconstitutional
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners
should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's
refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any
remedy at all.
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not
unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias
in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy.
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant
and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic
seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.”
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part
of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due
respect to an equal department in government. It
presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith
unless there is convincing proof and persuasive
agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification
of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the
absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not
a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation
47 | P a g e
on the parties. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

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