Barry J. Zimmerman (Auth.), Barry J. Zimmerman, Dale H. Schunk (Eds.) - Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achi PDF

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Barry 1. Zimmerman Dale H. Schunk
Editors
Self-Regulated Learning
and Academic Achievement
Theory, Research, and Practice
Springer-Verlag
New York Berlin Heidelberg
London Paris Tokyo Hong Kong
Barry J. Zimmerman Dale H. Schunk
Doctoral Program in Educational School of Education
Psychology University of North Carolina
Graduate School and Chapel Hill, NC 27514
University Center of the U.S.A.
City University of New York
New York, NY 10036
U.S.A.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Self-regulated learning and academic achievement: theory, research,
and practice / Barry 1. Zimmerman, Dale H. Schunk, editors.
p. cm. - (Springer series in cognitive development.)
Includes bibliographies.
I. Motivation in education. 2. Academic achievement. 3. Self

-control. I. Zimmerman, Barry 1. II. Schunk, Dale H.
III. Series.
LB1065.S46 1989
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The ultimate goal of the educational system is to shift
to the individual the burden of pursuing his own education.
JOHN W. GARDNER
Former Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare
Series Preface
For some time now, the study of cognitive development has been far and
away the most active discipline within developmental psychology. Although
there would be much disagreement as to the exact proportion of papers
published in developmental journals that could be considered cognitive, 50%
seems like a conservative estimate. Hence, a series of scholarly books to be
devoted to work in cognitive development is especially appropriate at this
time.
The Springer Series in Cognitive Development contains two basic types of
books, namely, edited collections of original chapters by several authors, and
original volumes written by one author or a small group of authors. The
flagship for the Springer Series is a serial publication of the "advances" type,
carrying the subtitle Progress in Cognitive Development Research. Volumes in
the Progress sequence are strongly thematic, in that each is limited to some
well-defined domain of cognitive-developmental research (e.g., logical and
mathematical development, semantic development). All Progress volumes are
edited collections. Editors of such books, upon consultation with the Series
Editor, may elect to have their works published either as contributions to the
Progress sequence or as separate volumes. All books written by one author or
a small group of authors will be published as separate volumes within the
series.
A fairly broad definition of cognitive development is being used in the
selection of books for this series. The classic topics of concept development,
children's thinking and reasoning, the development of learning, language
development, and memory development will, of course, be included. So,
however, will newer areas such as social-cognitive development, educational
applications, formal modeling, and philosophical implications of cognitive-
developmental theory. Although it is anticipated that most books in the series
will be empirical in orientation, theoretical and philosophical works are also
viii Series Preface
welcome. With books of the latter sort, heterogeneity of theoretical perspective

is encouraged, and no attempt will be made to foster some specific theoretical
perspective at the expense of others (e.g., Piagetian versus behavioral or
behavioral versus information processing).
C. J. Brainerd
Preface
There are nearly 1,000 self-hyphenated words in the English language (English &
English, 1958) that describe how individuals react to and seek to control their own
physical, behavioral, and psychological qualities. People are clearly fascinated with
understanding and regulating themselves-a characteristic that many philosophers,
theologians, and psychologists believe most distinguishes humans as a species.
Recently the search for self-understanding and self-regulation has turned to learn-
ing and academic-achievement processes. As an organizing concept, self-regulated
learning describes how learners cognitively, motivationally, and behaviorally pro-
mote their own academic achievement. Theories that can deal effectively with all
three dimensions of students' ability to learn by themselves are needed in order to
solve such difficult contemporary educational problems as inadequate facilities and
high student dropout rates. As a topic of research, self-regulated learning challenges
cognitive theorists to explain why and how students learn on their own; conversely,
it challenges motivational and behavioral theorists to explain what students need to
know about themselves and academic tasks in order to learn independently.
This book grew out of a series of symposia held at several annual meetings of the
American Educational Research Association. The papers of the participants at the
first symposium were published in 1986 in Contemporary Educational Psychology.
Because of time constraints, these initial accounts focused on selected aspects of self-
regulated learning. Our goal in organizing the book was to provide a forum in which
comprehensive descriptions of self-regulated learning theories could be presented
along with supporting evidence.
This goal led to several decisions that shaped the book's form. First, we wanted
an integrated series of chapters that would survey the field rather than a collection
of disparate descriptions of individual programs of research. To achieve this, an
organizational structure for each chapter was provided to guide the contributors.
The use of a common format gave cohesiveness to the book, making it appropriate
as a text for graduate and advanced undergraduate students in such fields as educa-
x Preface
tion, psychology, public health, and behavioral medicine. Second, we wanted each
chapter to focus not only on theory and research in self-regulated learning but also
on instructional practice. Authors were asked to give specific examples of how
teachers or parents might apply their proposed procedures to youngsters with self-
regulation deficiencies. Third, we wanted the text to be of value to a broad spectrum
of readers. The contributors represent a diversity of theoretical traditions - operant,
phenomenological, social cognitive (learning), volitional, Vygotskian, and con-
structivist. By presenting such a range of viewpoints, the common features of self-
regulated learning approaches emerged clearly and distinctively.
Finally, we wanted a lively book that would be readable by an audience interested
in the field of education but without necessarily having a background in self-
regulated learning. The contributors were asked to address their chapters to such an
audience, and we were delighted in the success they achieved: Not only were the
chapters readily understandable and interesting, but they also laid out important
new theoretical ground.
In closing, there are many people who deserve credit for making this book possi-
ble. First and foremost, we wish to express our gratitude to our contributors. Their
conscientiousness and good spirit made our job as editors personally and profession-
ally rewarding. Second, our series editor, Charles 1. Brainerd, deserves special com-
mendation. His encouragement, editorial suggestions, and support were invaluable
in making this book a reality. Third, to our wives, Diana and Caryl, your patience
and understanding were greatly appreciated. Finally, we would like to acknowledge
our great debt to Albert Bandura whose pioneering work in the field of self-
regulation was our inspiration.
Barry 1. Zimmerman
Dale H. Schunk
Prologue
For reasons that were at once political, practical, and philosophical, the concept of
self-reliance is deeply embedded in our nation's history. This virtue was to be culti-
vated personally to enhance erudition and civility as well as promote economic sur-
vival. A notable example of self-regulation among early Americans was Benjamin
Franklin who wrote prolifically on this topic. His Autobiography (Benjamin Franklin
Writings, 1987) is replete with examples of processes designed to increase his
learning and self-control. For example, he used self-recording techniques in order
to develop 13 virtues such as temperance, order, and resolution. He kept a little
book in which he allotted a page for each virtue. Every evening, he recorded the
date and frequency of a transgression against each of the vouchers for that day.
By examining his records over a span of time, he could judge his progress in becom-
ing more virtuous.
In addition to self-recording, he set daily goals for himself.
I determined to give a Week's strict Attention to each of the Virtues successively. Thus in the
first Week my great Guard was to avoid even the least Offense against Temperance, leaving
the other Virtues to their ordinary Chance, only marking every Evening the Faults of the Day.
Thus if in the first Week I could keep my first Line, marked T, clear of spots, I suppos'd the
Habit of that Virtue so much strengthen'd, and its opposite weaken'd, that I might venture
extending my Attention to include the next, and for the following Week keep both Lines clear
of Spots. (p. 1387)
Franklin sought to improve his writing through the self-selection of models and
through enactive efforts to imitate the author's prose.
About this time I met with an odd volume of the Spectator. ... I thought the Writing was
excellent, & wish'd if possible to imitate it. With that View, I took some of the Papers, &.
making short Hints of the Sentiment in each Sentence, laid them by a few Days, and then
without looking at the Book, try'd to compleat the Papers again, by expressing each hinted
Sentiment at length ... Then I compar'd my Spectator with the Original, discover'd some of
my faults & corrected them. (p. 1319)
xii Prologue
In addition to teaching himself to write, Franklin credited this procedure with

improving his memory and his "arrangement of thoughts" (p. 1320). The latter two
metacognitive outcomes have been called memory and rehearsal and planning and
organization respectively in contemporary research.
These examples of Franklin's personal use of specific self-regulation strategies to
increase what he termed "self-reliance" in the eighteenth-century language revealed
how a poor printer's apprentice could acquire exemplary competence, erudition,
and personal virtue despite humble beginnings. Self-regulation empowered
individuals with limited formal education and meager material resources to succeed
in America on a scale unattainable elsewhere.
References
Benjamin Franklin Writings. (1987). New York: Literary Classics of the United States.
English, H.B., & English, A.C. (1958). A comprehensive dictionary of psychological alld
psychoanalytical terms. New York: McKay.
Contents
Series Preface ........................................ vii

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Prologue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Chapter 1 Models of Self-Regulated Learning and

Academic Achievement ................................ .
Barry J. Zimmerman
Chapter 2 Operant Theory and Research on Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . 27

F. Charles Mace, Phillip J. Belfiore, and Michael C. Shea
Chapter 3 Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement:

A Phenomenological View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Barbara L. McCombs
Chapter 4 Social Cognitive Theory and Self-Regulated Learning . . . . . . . . 83

Dale H. Schunk
Chapter 5 Self-Regulated Learning: A Volitional Analysis 111

Lyn Como
Chapter 6 Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement:

A Vygotskian View .................................... 143
Mary McCaslin Rohrkemper
xiv Contents
Chapter 7 The Constructivist Approach to Self-Regulation

and Learning in the Classroom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 169
Scott G. Paris and James P. Byrnes
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 201

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 209
Contributors
Phillip J. Belfiore Department of Special Education, Mountaintop Campus,

Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18018, U.S.A.
James P. Byrnes College of Education, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

20748, U.S.A.
Lyn Corno Box 25, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027,
U.S.A.
F. Charles Mace Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers

University, Piscataway, NJ 08854, U.S.A.
Barbara L. McCombs Mid-Continent Regional Educational Laboratory, 12500

East Iliff Ave., Suite 201, Aurora, CO 80014, U.S.A.
Scott G. Paris Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

48109, U.S.A.
Mary Rohrkemper Department of Human Development, Bryn Mawr College,

Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, U.S.A.
Dale H. Schunk 037 A Peabody Hall, School of Education, University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514, U.S.A.
Michael C. Shea Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers

University, Piscataway, NJ 08854, U.S.A.
Barry J. Zimmerman Box 445, Doctoral Program in Educational Psychology,

Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York,
New York, NY 10036, U.S.A.
1. Models of Self-Regulated Learning
and Academic Achievement
Barry J. Zimmerman
Research on self-regulated academic learning has grown out of more general efforts
to study human self-control or self-regulation. Promising investigations of children's
use of self-regulation processes, like goal-setting, self-reinforcement, self-
recording, and self-instruction, in such areas of personal control as eating and task
completion have prompted educational researchers and reformers to consider their
use by students during academic learning. In this initial chapter, I will discuss self-
regulation theories as a distinctive approach to academic learning and instruction
historically and will identify their common features. Finally, I will briefly introduce
and compare six prominent theoretical perspectives on self-regulated learning-
operant, phenomenological, social cognitive, volitional, Vygotskian, and cognitive
constructivist approaches - in terms of a common set of issues. In the chapters that
follow, each theoretical perspective will be discussed at length by prominent
researchers who have used it in research and instruction.
Contributors to this volume share a belief that students' perceptions of themselves
as learners and their use of various processes to regulate their learning are critical
factors in analyses of academic achievement (Zimmerman, 1986). This proactive
view of learning is not only distinctive from previous models of learning and
achievement, but it also has profound instructional implications for the way in
which teachers plan their activities with students and for the manner in which
schools are organized. A self-regulated learning perspective shifts the focus of
educational analyses from student learning abilities and environments at school or
home as fixed entities to students' personally initiated strategies designed to improve
learning outcomes and environments.
The Emergence of Theories of Self-Regulated Learning

In order to appreciate the unique qualities of self-regulated learning approaches to
student achievement, a brief historical overview of several theoretical models that
have guided previous efforts to reform American education will be presented. Each
2 B.J. Zimmerman
of these prior efforts to improve our nation's schools has been guided by a distinctive
view of the origins of students' learning and how instruction should be organized to
optimize their achievement. These views grew out of public perceptions of emerging
national goals at the time and shortcomings of the existing educational system in
meeting those goals.
Changing Views of the Causes of Student Learning

and Achievement
During the post-World War II period, instruction in American schools was heavily
influenced by mental-ability conceptions of student functioning. Thurstone's (1938)
development of the Primary Mental Abilities Test was widely hailed as providing
the definitive factorial description of the full range of student abilities. Once
properly tested, students could be classified and placed in optimal instructional
settings such as reading groups in elementary school or achievement tracks in
secondary schools. Teachers were asked to gear their curriculum to the ability level
of each group of students they taught. Cronbach (1957) presented a formal analytic
framework for determining the potential benefits of matching the right type of
instruction to each student ability or interest, which he termed an AT! formulation,
an acronym for Aptitude (ability or attitude) by instructional Treatment Interaction.
The label referred to Cronbach's suggested method for statistically analyzing the
results, an analysis of variance model. This formulation prompted educational
researchers to investigate scientifically many instructional innovations, such as
matching instructional procedures, to student ability groups. Although interest in
this analysis of instructional effectiveness continues to the present, the research
generated by AT! analyses has been generally considered to be disappointing (e.g.,
Bracht, 1970).
During the early 1960s, social environmental formulations of student learning
and achievement rose to prominence. The zeitgeist for reform was fueled by Hunt's
(1961) and Bloom's (1964) influential books on the importance of early experience
on children's intellectual development and by Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty.
Educational reformers focused their attention on "disadvantages" in the intellectual
environment of the home of poor children (e.g., Hess, 1970), and the disparity
between this home environment and the curriculum and atmosphere of schools.
Given evidence of lower self-esteem by lower-class children (e.g., Rosenberg,
1965), humanistic psychologists and educators like Holt (1964), Rogers (1969), and
Glasser (1969) proposed a variety of reforms designed to make school more relevant
and less threatening to them. They recommended less reliance on grading for pro-
motion, more flexible curricular requirements, more concern about students' social
adjustment, and more efforts to involve the parents and families of students in the
schools. Head Start was begun as an effort to provide for disadvantaged children's
lack of exposure to the "hidden curriculum" provided by the home of middle-class
youngsters, and the Follow Through Program (US. Office of Education, 1973) was
1. Models of Self-Regulated Learning 3
developed soon thereafter for children in the primary grades to capitalize on the
intellectual gains expected from Head Start experiences. The instructional goal of
this reform movement was to compensate for intellectual deficits and differences of
disadvantaged children through the use of innovative teaching methods and types of
curricula.
Declining measures of national achievement and disillusionment with the results
of national efforts to eliminate the effects of poverty prompted a new wave of educa-
tional reform during the middle 1970s. The decline was widely attributed to declines
in educational standards during the 1960s. These standards pertained to the number
of courses required in the curricula of both high schools and colleges, the stringency
of testing for school entrance, promotion, and graduation, and the qualifications for
hiring teachers. A significant marker of this movement to improve the quality was
the reestablishment of many basic core curriculum requirements at Harvard Univer-
sity (Fiske, 1976).
Many schools at all levels followed this "Back to Basics" lead and began to limit
student selection of electives. Several national boards were commissioned to evalu-
ate the quality of instruction in the United States by such groups as the Carnegie
Foundation and by the Secretary of Education. They published reports such as the
Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) that were
generally critical of the (1) quality ofteaching, (2) curriculum requirements, and (3)
achievement standards. In addition, studies that have compared the achievement of
American students to those in other countries have revealed lower levels in the
United States (Stevenson, Lee, & Stigler, 1986). These reports have begun a new
wave of educational reform aimed at raising standards in all three areas at the state
and local level. Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness of these recent
efforts to improve the quality of student learning and achievement, concerns have
already been raised about the effects of higher standards on increasing the dropout
rate in schools, increasing the costs of hiring qualified teachers, and diminishing the
vertical mobility of underprivileged youngsters whose language and culture are
different from that of the middle class (e.g., Shanker, 1988).
Each of these educational reform movements rested on important assumptions
about how students learn. The mental-ability movement assumed that student
mental functioning was broad in its impact on academic achievement and relatively
stable despite changes in grade and age. It was the task of educators to tailor their
instructional methods to this important characteristic of students. In contrast, the
social environmental view assumed that students' background was relatively
unchangeable. Minority children could not and should not be asked to shed their
ethnic and cultural identities in order to learn in school. Instead, it was the task of
teachers and school officials to make the children's instructional experiences adap-
tive to their unique needs. The instructional standards approach put the weight of
responsibility on teachers and school officials for maintaining standards of quality.
These educational reformers assumed that high standards in schools would ensure
optimal teaching and student academic achievement.
Each of these reform movements was based on instructional theories that viewed
students as playing primarily a reactive rather than a proactive role. That is, students
4 BJ. Zimmerman
were not theorized to initiate or substantially supplement experiences designed to

educate themselves. Instead emphasis was placed on the role of teachers and other
educators to adapt instruction to each student based on his or her mental ability,
sociocultural background, or achievement of educational standards. In contrast,
self-regulated learning theories assume that students (1) can personally improve
their ability to learn through selective use of metacognitive and motivational strate-
gies; (2) can proactively select, structure, and even create advantageous learning
environments; and (3) can playa significant role in choosing the form and amount
of instruction they need.
Theories of self-regulated learning seek to explain and describe how a particular
learner will learn and achieve despite apparent limitations in mental ability (as tradi-
tionally assessed), social environmental background, or in quality of schooling.
These theories should also be useful in explaining and describing why a learner
might fail to learn despite apparent advantages in mental ability, social environmen-
tal background, or quality of education.
Defining Self-Regulated Learning

Before turning to these theories, it is important to establish: (1) Precisely what is
self-regulated learning, and (2) How can self-regulated learners be identified? In
contemporary terms, students can be described as self-regulated to the degree that
they are metacognitively, motivationally, and behaviorally active participants in
their own learning process (Zimmerman, 1986). More precise definitions than this,
however, tend to vary on the basis of a researcher's theoretical perspective. Most
definitions require the purposive use of specific processes, strategies, or responses
by students to improve their academic achievement. Scholars from cognitive orien-
tations, such as constructivists, prefer definitions counched in terms of covert
processes, whereas behaviorists prefer definitions in terms of overt responses. In all
definitions, students are assumed to be aware of the potential usefulness of self-
regulation processes in enhancing their academic achievement.
A second feature of most definitions of self-regulation is a self-oriented feedback
loop during learning (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Zimmerman, 1988). This loop refers
to a cyclic process in which students monitor the effectiveness of their learning
methods or strategies and respond to this feedback in a variety of ways ranging from
covert changes in self-perception to overt changes in behavior, such as replacing one
learning strategy with another. Researchers favoring phenomenological views
depict this feedback loop in covert perceptional terms such as self-esteem, self-
concepts, and self-actualization. (See McComb's description in this volume.) In con-
trast, researchers holding operant views favor overt descriptions in terms of self-
recording, self-reinforcement, and self-controlling actions. (See discussions by
Mace, Belfiore, and Shea in this volume.)
The third common feature of all definitions of self-regulated learning is a descrip-
tion of how and why students choose to use a particular self-regulated process,
strategy, or response. Theorists greatly differ on this motivational dimension of
self-regulated learning. Operant theorists argue that all self-regulated learning
responses are ultimately under the control of external reward or punishment contin-
gencies. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, view students as motivated primar-
ily by a global sense of self-esteem or self-concept. Theorists between these two
poles favor such motives as achievement success, goal accomplishment, self-
efficacy, and concept assimilation. The ability of self-regulation theories to explain
student motivation as well as learning distinguishes them from other formulations
and should make them particularly appealing to educators who must deal with many
poorly motivated students.
A question of equal importance to viable definitions of self-regulated learning is
why students do not self-regulate during all learning experiences. None of the the-
ories of self-regulated learning presented in this volume describes self-regulated
learning as merely a capacity or stage of development, although several assume that
a developmental capacity underlies it. Instead they assume that self-regulated learn-
ing involves temporally delimited processes, strategies, or responses that students
must initiate and regulate proactively. Therefore, students often may not self-
regulate during their learning when they could, and the proposed theories seek to
explain this outcome as well as the reverse.
Each of the theories focuses attention on different factors for student failures to
self-regulate when learning. Most formulations assume that very young children
cannot self-regulate during learning in any formal way. Although both cognitive
constructivists and Vygotskians assume that most children develop a capacity to
self-regulate during the elementary-school years, they differ in their belief about the
initial cause ofthis incapacity (see discussion by Paris and Byrnes and by Rohrkem-
per in this volume). Constructivists of a Piagetian orientation assume young chil-
dren's egocentrism is a critical factor limiting self-regulation, whereas Vygotskians
stress the importance of young children's inability to use language covertly to guide
functioning. Constructivists who favor Flavell's view (1979) tend to emphasize limi-
tations in young children's metacognitive functioning as the primary factor for their
incapacity to self-regulate during learning.
When children reach an age when self-regulated learning processes should have
emerged developmentally, their failures to use these processes are attributed usually
to one or more of three factors:
(1) Students may not believe that a known self-regulation process will work, is
needed, or is preferable in a particular learning context.
(2) Students may not believe that they can successfully execute an otherwise
effective self-regulation response.
(3) Students may not be sufficiently desirous of a particular learning goal or out-
come to be motivated to self-regulate.
Cognitively oriented theorists tend to stress the importance of students' perceptions
of the usefulness of various strategies as the key factor in their willingness to use
them. For example, research by Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, and Lodico (1985) has
shown that teaching primary-school children to recognize the successfulness of
using memory strategies (in addition to teaching the strategies themselves) helps to
motivate these youngsters to use them.
6 B.J. Zimmerman
Social cognitive theorists give special attention to the second explanation for stu-
dent failures to use known self-regulation processes. They have studied the role of
perceptions of self-efficacy in motivating students to use particular self-regulated
learning strategies. Schunk has described evidence (Schunk, Hanson, & Cox, 1987)
that even when students observe a self-regulated strategy demonstrated by a model,
they may not be motivated to imitate if the model is perceived as dissimilar to them.
(Schunk reviews research on self-efficacy in this volume.)
Finally, most theorists assume that student efforts to self-regulate often require
additional preparation time, vigilance, and effort. Unless the outcomes of these
efforts are sufficiently attractive, students may not be motivated to self-regulate. For
example, a study strategy of rewriting class lecture notes to emphasize a teacher's
main themes and key words can be expected to improve students' understanding of
the course material and future test scores. Whether the effort is worthwhile may
depend on the importance of the test or perhaps the lateness of the evening! Theo-
rists differ, however, over the type of outcomes they emphasize: Operant
researchers prefer extrinsic outcomes, whereas other researchers tend to prefer
intrinsic ones such as self-perceived success or mastery.
Theories of Self-Regulated Learning

Theories of self-regulated learning can be usefully analyzed in terms of assumptions,
descriptions, and constructs for a common set of issues or questions. In seeking to
explain what it means to be self-regulated as a learner, theorists must consider:
(1) What motivates students to self-regulate during learning?
(2) Through what process or procedure do students become self-reactive or self-
aware?
(3) What are the key processes or responses that self-regulated students use to attain
their academic goals?
(4) How does the social and physical environment affect student self-regulated
learning?
(5) How does a learner acquire the capacity to self-regulate when learning?
Each of the theories of self-regulated learning can provide answers to these critical
questions, and these answers will be compared and contrasted next.
Operant Views of Self-Regulated Learning

Following the environmentalist principles of B.E Skinner and adapting his
behavioral technology for personal use, operant researchers have produced one of
the largest and most influential bodies of research on self-regulation. Their studies
of self-reinforcement and self-recording, which began during the late 1960s, have
been extended to a wide variety of areas of human functioning such as smoking (e.g.,
McFall, 1970), weight control (e.g., Stuart, 1967), as well as academic performance
(e.g., Broden, Hall, & Mitts, 1971). Their preference for the use of single-subject
research paradigms and time-series data was particularly suitable for use by
individuals seeking greater self-regulation. Instructing people to self-record not
only was a reasonable compromise with practicality (because it was often difficult
to monitor adults across settings), but it also opened covert events to operant investi-
gation and control. Initially termed "covert operants" or "coverants" by Homme
(1965), private events were assumed to follow the same behavioral principles as
public behavior. In support of these assumptions, operant researchers (e.g., Shapiro,
1984) revealed considerable "reactiveness" by subjects who self-recorded and self-
reinforced although the interpretation of these effects remains controversial.
MOTIVATION TO SELF-REGULATE
The focus of this controversy is the question of the ultimate source of motivation
during self-regulation. Operant theorists contend that a person's self-regulatory
responses must be linked methodologically to external reinforcing stimuli. Self-
regulation responses are thus viewed as "interresponse control" links (Bijou & Baer,
1961), which are chained together to achieve external reinforcement. Therefore, if
self-reinforcement in the form of earned coffee breaks helps a student succeed on an
important test, the breaks will be continued. However, should these self-
administered coffee rewards fail to improve test performance, operant theorists
assume that this form of self-reinforcement will be discontinued or "extinguished."
In the view of Mace, Belfiore, and Shea (this volume), self-reinforcers function as
discriminative stimuli that guide further responding rather than as reinforcing ends
by themselves.
SELF-AwARENESS
Operant researchers emphasize the importance of self-monitoring or self-recording

as valuable in becoming self-regulated as learners. Self-awareness per se is not
generally discussed because it cannot be observed directly; however, these
researchers are very interested in an important behavioral manifestation of self-
awareness, namely, self-reactiveness. Thus, it might be said that operant researchers
use a behavioral-environmental method for stimulating self-awareness that involves
a recording action that produces an environmental stimulus, a physical record. This
process meets formal operant criteria of acceptance because it involves observable
events.
KEY SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES
Mace and his colleagues (this volume) described three major classes of self-regu-
latory learning responses: self-monitoring, self-instruction, and self-reinforcement.
The importance of the self-monitoring has already been discussed. The interest in
self-instruction by operant theorists can be traced back to John Watson's (1924)
8 B.J. Zimmerman
hypothesis that thought is actually covert speech. Although few contemporary

behaviorists contend that thinking requires laryngeal contractions, they have
demonstrated that teaching self-instructions and accompanying nonverbal actions is
an effective way of improving functioning in a wide variety of academic areas.
Unlike other theorists, such as Vygotsky (1962), who view self-directed speech as
a precursor to thinking, operant theorists view it in stimulus-response terms. Mace
et al. (1989) (this volume) defined self-instructional statements as "discriminative
stimuli that occasion specific behaviors or behavioral sequences that will lead to
reinforcement" (p. 35). In their view, self-instructive statements are written or oral
stimuli that are memorized and produced when cued by specific task or environment
features. They subsequently function as personally mediated links that guide
responding in settings or situations where external reinforcers are weak or lacking.
Often self-instructive statements will explicitly indicate the appropriate responses
and resulting consequences.
The third key process, although labeled self-reinforcement, is argued to be a
misnomer. Unlike cognitive behaviorists, Mace and his operant colleagues stress the
need to externally consequate self-reinforcing responses. These responses are not
assumed to acquire true "self" sustaining value, but rather are believed to be sus-
tained by immediate and/or delayed external contingencies, such as social surveil-
lance or increased status. Therefore, operant researchers would require that
teachers who allow their students to self-reinforce for completion of assignments
should have a backup contingency for failures to adhere to stringent reward criteria.
SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS
Of all the theorists about self-regulation, operant researchers are the most explicit
about linkages between self-functioning and the immediate environment. Internal
processes are defined in terms of their manifestation in overt behavior, and the func-
tional relationship between such behavior and environment are the focus of the
operant approach. This environmental linkage is very advantageous in developing
effective instructional intervention procedures.
How DOES A LEARNER ACQUIRE A CAPACITY TO SELF-REGULATE?
Operant theorists have devoted relatively little attention to developmental issues

of self-regulation, but instead have emphasized the role of external factors in learn-
ing to self-regulate. The key instructional methods they have employed in their
training are modeling, verbal tuition, and reinforcement. Initially, external cues
and contingencies are imposed, and then self-regulation responses are gradually
shaped. Finally, external cues are faded, and short-term reinforcers are thinned
gradually. To operant theorists, the key factors leading to a capacity to regulate one's
own learning are the presence of effective models of and external contingencies for
self-regulative responses.
Phenomenological Views of Self-Regulative Learning

Phenomenologists were perhaps the first theorists to appreciate the great impor-
tance of self-perceptions to human psychological functioning. These perceptions
were assumed to be organized into a distinctive identity or self-concept that
influences all aspects of behavioral functioning including academic learning and
achievement. Human experience was assumed to be filtered through a reactive self-
system that could distort the incoming information either positively or negatively in
accordance with one's self-concept. Herein lay the seeds of student academic
problems: Academic failures could be reinterpreted as successes or as irrelevant to
one's future. The latter is perhaps even more detrimental because it could diminish
subsequent motivation to learn.
Although phenomenological approaches were quite successful in promoting many
educational reforms during the 1960s, such as expanded curricular choices and
decreased student testing, the heuristic quality of theory was criticized because of
the assumptions of the subjectivity of measures and the monolithic nature of stu-
dents' self-concepts (e.g., Mischel, 1968; Wylie, 1968). More recent scientific
efforts have avoided these restrictive assumptions, focusing instead on objective
measures of domain-specific self-concepts, and have found support for a self-system
that is differentiated and hierarchically organized (e.g., Marsh & Shavelson, 1985).
Phenomenologists assume that the ultimate source of motivation to self-regulate

during learning is to enhance or actualize one's self-concept. According to McCombs
(this volume), the basic role ofthe self during learning is to generate motivation to
approach and persist in learning activities. This occurs through evaluations of the
personal meaningfulness and relevance of learning activities relative to perceptions
of one's competencies and goals.
According to McCombs, self-system structures are divided into global and
domain-specific forms. A global self-concept refers to learners' image of themselves
as self-regulated learners, which is founded on the beliefthat they possess the neces-
sary knowledge, skills, and abilities. It is assumed to transcend a single context and
may have futuristic quality of what one might become through learning (e.g., Hig-
gins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1987). A domain-specific self-concept is defined as
individuals' perceptions of their ability to direct and control their motivation, cogni-
tion, affect, and behavior in particular domains, as when learning mathematics,
science, or English. These self-perceptions are assumed to determine how students
will self-regulate when learning in that domain.
In McCombs's model (this volume), affective reactions playa key role in motiva-
tion. If self-perceptions are unfavorable, negative affect such as anxiety will result
and will diminish motivation. This affect will be manifested in helplessness,
avoidance, or withdrawal from the learning task and context. In contrast, if self-
perceptions are favorable, a student will display not only confidence during learn-
10 B.J. Zimmerman
ing, but intrinsic motivation. That is, he will persist in his efforts to learn even when
the external context does not require it.
SELF-AwARENESS
Unlike operant theorists, phenomenologists assume that self-awareness is an

omnipresent condition of human psychological functioning. People do not have to
be taught to be self-aware or self-reactive; they are so by nature. However, phe-
nomenologists do see personal defensiveness as a key factor that can inhibit or
distort self-perceptions. Students who doubt their ability to learn will become
anxious and may avoid learning situations or develop elaborate rationalizations for
potential failures. In support of this analysis, McCombs (this volume) cites evidence
(Davis, Franzoi, & Markwiese, 1987) that high self-consciousness is related to a
desire for self-knowledge, and low self-consciousness is related to self-defense.
Educators can promote self-awareness by diminishing or possibly eliminating
defensiveness. McCombs (this volume) has recommended engaging students in self-
monitoring and self-evaluation as ways of promoting greater realism, or what is
described often as "knowing yourself." Specifically, she has suggested that teachers
might train students to keep track of what they are "thinking and feeling while learn-
ing" in order to increase their subjective awareness of their accomplishments.
KEy SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES
Historically phenomenologists have stressed the importance of perceptions of self-

worth and self-identity as key processes in psychological functioning. In her model
of the self-system, McCombs (this volume) has categorized these as self-system
structures, which in tum affect an extensive network of more specific self-regulation
processes like self-evaluation, planning, goal setting, monitoring, processing,
encoding, retrieval, and strategies.
She places particular emphasis on the role of self-evaluation in self-regulated
learning. Self-evaluations are made of task requirements against personal needs for
competence and control and against self-system structures. These self-evaluations
eventually lead to students' use of other self-regulation processes, like planning and
goal-setting, which, in reciprocal fashion, affect students' self-system structures and
processing.
Phenomenologists give less emphasis to the objective nature of the social and physi-
cal environment than they do to learners' subjective perception of it. In her recom-
mendations for improving students' self-regulated learning, McCombs (this volume)
focuses primarily on how a teacher might dispel youngsters' self-doubts by helping
them see relevance in learning activities, countering negative self-evaluations of
competence and control, and setting realistic learning goals. Similar to Rogers'
(1951) client-centered therapy, her methodology is student centered in the sense that
the teacher must judge the effectiveness of her activities on the basis of students'
perceptions rather than external criteria. Also in accordance with phenomenologi-
cal traditions, McCombs stresses the importance of teacher encouragement in
promoting student self-confidence in learning.
McCombs (this volume) views self-regulated learning as determined by the develop-

ment of underlying self-processes. During the primary and middle school years,
students' perceptions of academic competence become more differentiated. A
global sense of self-esteem or self-worth is assumed to emerge around age of 8 years
old (Harter, 1987). Before this age, children fail to distinguish mood from interest
and have trouble making self-judgments of ability (Nicholls & Miller, 1984).
For students who are deficient in self-knowledge and self-regulatory processes,
McCombs (this volume) recommends interventions that focus on self-system
processes. She has outlined specifically how self-system processes underlying each
of these three steps can be strengthened (Chapter 3, this volume). Although
phenomenologists like McCombs have taken an activist role in promoting students'
self-regulated learning, their focus is on directly improving self-perceptions as the
key to enhancing overt performance.
Social Cognitive Views of Self-Regulated Learning

Albert Bandura's social learning theory has guided extensive research on social fac-
tors in self-regulation (e.g., Bandura, Grusec, & Menlove, 1967; Bandura &
Kupers, 1964). In the most recent version, now labeled as social cognitive theory,
Bandura (1986) has elaborated further his triadic account of human functioning,
which focuses on the separate but interdependent contributions of personal,
behavioral, and environmental influences. This theory, which was initially deve-
loped to explain modeling influences on human functioning, directs researchers to
bidirectional relationships between social and cognitive events.
In applying this triadic account to self-regulated learning, Dale Schunk (this
volume) argues that students' efforts to self-regulate during learning are not deter-
mined merely by personal processes, such as cognition or affect; these processes are
assumed to be influenced by environmental and behavioral events in reciprocal
fashion. For example, self-recording of recollections of dates when preparing for a
history test will influence both students' environment (i.e., it creates additional
study materials) and their intrapersonal processes (i.e., failures may create anxi-
ety). These outcomes are assumed in tum to influence subsequent self-recording and
perhaps one's choice of memory strategies.
In the initial version of his social-learning theory, Bandura (1971) hypothesized that
outcome expectations determined one's motivation. He argued that people are moti-
12 B.J. Zimmennan
vated by the consequences that they expect to receive for behaving rather than by the
actual rewards themselves. He distinguished this essentially cognitive position from
that of operant theorists who favored treating consequences as environmental
events. Although expected outcomes had explanatory advantages over actual out-
comes (e.g., Baron, Kaufman, & Stauber, 1969; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp, 1966),
they could not explain easily a student's unwillingness to attempt tasks on which a
model could succeed (Zimmerman, 1987).
In 1977, Bandura postulated the existence of a second motivational construct,
which he termed self-efficacy. He reasoned that outcomes a model receives may not
be personally sought if one views that model as more able than oneself. Bandura
defined self-efficacy as the perceived ability to implement actions necessary to
attain designated performance levels, and launched a program of research to estab-
lish their predictiveness of motivation, particularly in personally threatening or
difficult circumstances. Schunk (1984) has reviewed extensive research indicating
that students' self-efficacy measures were related to their choice of tasks, persis-
tence, effort expenditure, and skill acquisition.
SELF-AWARENESS
According to social cognitive theory, self-awareness involves one or more of a num-

ber of self-perceptive states, such as self-efficacy, that emerge from specific self-
observation responses. Schunk suggests that self-observation is most helpful when
it focuses on the specific conditions under which learning occurs, like the time,
place, and duration of performance.
Student self-observations can be aided by self-recording using diaries, progress
worksheets, or behavioral graphs (e.g., Zimmerman, 1988). Research (e.g.,
Shapiro, 1984) has established that the regularity and proximity of self-recording
are critical to the accuracy of self-observational responses. Ultimately, success
in self-regulated learning is dependent on the accuracy of self-observation because
this process provides the necessary information to guide subsequent efforts to
self-regulate.
Bandura (1986) has identified three subprocesses in self-regulation: self-

observation, self-judgment, and self-reaction. These subprocesses are not assumed
to be mutually exclusive, but rather to interact with each other. Self-observations are
assumed to prompt learners to self-evaluate, and these cognitive judgments, in turn,
are assumed to lead to a variety of personal and behavioral self-reactions.
Self-judgments refer to comparisons of existing performance levels, as self-
observed, with one's learning goals. The type of description that social cognitive
theorists give to goal setting illustrates the distinctiveness of their triadic approach.
Unlike less environmentally oriented cognitive approaches, social cognitive
researchers devote particular attention to contextual properties of students' goals,

such as their specificity, difficulty level, and proximity in time (Zimmerman, 1983).
Unlike operant theorists, Schunk (this volume) gives weight to such personal factors
as the importance of goals and performance attributions. Goals that are unimportant
or outcomes that are not attributable to one's own ability or effort are unlikely to
produce self-reactive effects.
Schunk has identified two major classes of self-reactions, one personal and the
other environmental. Evaluative motivators refer to personal feelings of satisfaction
or dissatisfaction. Tangible motivators refer to self-administered stimuli or conse-
quences, like work breaks, food, or new clothes, that are made contingent upon task
completion or success. Self-reactions also include reciprocal adjustments in self-
observation or self-judgment. For example, students' success in learning may indi-
cate that systematic record keeping is no longer needed or that achievement goals
should be changed.
Social cognitive theorists have focused their program of research on relationships

between such specific social processes as modeling or verbal persuasion and various
self-regulation processes. In addition, environmental factors, such as the nature of
the task and setting, have been systematically studied.
Modeling and enactive mastery experiences have been shown to be particularly
influential on students' perceptions of self-efficacy achievement. Coping models
who overcome adversity to triumph can increase observers' sense of efficacy to the
point that they might try it for themselves (Schunk, Hanson, & Cox, 1987). Personal
enactive mastery experiences are believed to be most influential in determining self-
efficacy perceptions. Schunk (1989) describes a wide variety of explicit training
procedures for various self-regulation processes, including self-verbalization, self-
attributions, and proximal goal-setting.
How DOES THE LEARNER ACQUIRE A CAPACITY TO SELF-REGULATE?
Social-cognitive theorists assume that self-regulation is not a skill that automati-

cally develops as people get older, nor is it passively acquired during environmental
interactions. Although specific learning is assumed to be needed to self-regulate,
various subprocesses of self-regulated learning are affected by children's develop-
ment. Schunk (1989) cites a number of developmental changes that have been shown
to affect self-regulation, such as age differences in ability to understand language,
knowledge bases, and capacity to make social comparisons and ability attributions.
Young children have trouble responding to complex instructions, comparing them-
selves accurately to others, and making ability attributions. He recommends that
training in self-regulated learning should take into account developmentallimita-
tions of children.
14 BJ. Zimmerman
Volitional Views of Self-Regulated Learning
Early theological and philosophical conceptions of volition focused on the impor-

tance of human will power. For example, St. Augustine viewed the will as the key
human faculty: "We are nothing but wills. Will permeates many other psychological
activities. Even before sensation, there is an intention, a form of will" (Watson,
1963). Descartes argued that the will played a key role linking thought and action:
Will was believed to direct action (Watson, 1963).
Although the will was derived initially from theological assumptions of divinely
endowed Free Will, it was envisioned as a distinct faculty by the Wurzburg School
in Germany, which was interested in the psychology of human acts. According to this
view, people's wills were assumed to be manifested in their intentions to act. A
prominent member of the Wurzburg group, Narziss Ach, perfected a structured
instrospection methodology for studying the intentional nature of experience and
offered a detailed account of volition that focused the role of selective attention
(Misiak & Sexton, 1966).
Ach's theory was challenged subsequently by Kurt Lewin (1926), who questioned
whether intentions could be distinguished from needs. By equating intentions and
needs, Lewin was able to explain volition within a classic motivational theoretical
framework without additional assumptions. However, recent research on learned
helplessness (Seligman, 1975) has convinced Julius Kuhl (1984), a contemporary
German theorist, that volition is distinct from motivation. He contends that moti-
vated subjects can become distracted by task-irrelevant thoughts. Volitional
processes, which Kuhl discusses primarily in terms of an action orientation, are
assumed to guide action under demanding performance circumstances. Como (this
volume) prefers to discuss volition in terms of overt and covert processes of self-
control.
The issue of motivation is a complex one, which must be considered at several

levels. At the most general level, volition theorists assume the existence of a covert
psychological force or forces that control action. At a more specific level, Kuhl
assumes that people's motivation to self-regulate is determined by their value and
expectancy for achieving a particular goal. In his view, these motivational processes
are distinctive from volitional processes. As Como (this volume) expresses it: "Moti-
vational processes mediate the formation of decisions and promote decisions whereas
volitional processes mediate the enactment of those decisions and protect them" (p.
114). Therefore, learners' decisions to use volitional control strategies are prompted
by perceptions of such impediments to their learning goals as distractions or com-
peting-action tendencies. However, Como cautions that although intentions to act are
derivative of motivational factors such as expectancies of success and outcome, voli-
tion "escalate(s) the intention to learn and steer involvement along" (p. 115).
SELF-AwARENESS
Kuhl (1984) assumes that "a sufficiently high degree of awareness is a prerequi-
site for obtaining access to volitional strategies" and that "access to the full reper-
toire of volitional strategies is provided only if the current intention is a self-
regulated one" (p. 127). Clearly, self-awareness plays a key role in his account of
volition. However, not all types of self-awareness are conducive to volitional con-
trol: Action-oriented cognitions enable the learner to screen out competing-action
tendencies and remain focused on the current intention, whereas state-oriented cog-
nitions are preoccupied with emotional states or feelings of doubt. Kuhl assumes
that people can be classified on the basis of their dominant cognitive orientation,
which he views as an ability like characteristic, and has developed a scale to measure
these two orientations.
Kuhl (1984) has identified three types of state orientations that can interfere with
action-control: ruminating, extrinsic focus, and vacillating. Ruminating is the ina-
bility to screen out thoughts of prior failures; extrinsic focus is a preoccupation with
future rather than immediate outcomes; vacillating results from insecurity when
deciding courses of action. These thoughts can intrude between the formation of an
intention and its expression in behavior. Como (this volume) has suggested that cog-
nitive monitoring techniques can assist learners to resist these state-oriented cogni-
tions, and Kuhl (1984) has described specific attention-control strategies that can
shift a learner's focus from self-states to task actions.
Kuhl (1984) has identified six volitional control strategies, which Como (this
volume) has placed in a larger framework. According to Como's analysis, three of
Kuhl's strategies, namely, attention control, encoding control, and information-
processing control, can be subsumed under a generic category, control of cognition.
Kuhl's incentive escalation strategy is viewed as a subvariety of motivation control.
One remaining strategy, emotional control, rounds out Como's superordinate
category, labeled covert processes of self-control. Como subsumes the remaining
strategy, environmental control, in her category, overt processes of self-control.
This analysis reveals the highly metacognitive quality of volitional accounts of
self-regulation: Only one of Kuhl's six categories was environmental in nature, and
it is assumed to be controlled by metaprocesses. Furthermore, volitional approaches
are distinguished by their focus on strategies that affect learners' intentions (a cogni-
tive construct) rather than their learning per se. For example, the use of such
attention-control strategies as diverting one's eyes from off-task stimuli or tuning out
excess noise preserves initial intentions to learn rather than to improve learning
directly. Emotional-control strategies such as self-instructions to relax are assumed
to sustain intention so that difficult parts of a task can be learned. Motivational-
control strategies involve boosting one's intent to learn by imagining positive or
negative consequences of success or failure.
16 BJ. Zimmerman
In Como's view (this volume), students' volition to learn can be increased by changes
in the task itself or in the setting where the task is completed. These changes may
involve such things as asking permission to move away from noisy peers, acquiring
the use of aids such as a calculator, or by surrounding oneself with hardworking or
supportive peers, teachers, or parents.
Although volitional theorists recognize the impact of the environment on emo-
tions and motivation, they view it as secondary to cognitive factors. For example,
Kuhl (1984) argued that environmental control can be increased if mediation of
action control is improved. In his three-factor model, Kuhl hypothesizes that an
unexpected failure (the key environmental event) instigates various volitional-
control processes. Failures are assumed to interrupt automaticity and to trigger self-
awareness, a critical condition for volitional processes to occur. However, the
environment does not determine the learners' assertiveness or helplessness per se
(p. 113). Instead these reactions are assumed to be a product of the learners' voli-
tional orientation (action versus state) and their outcome expectations. In contrast,
Como (this volume) explains these reactions in terms of self-control strategies.
Kuhl (1984) regards a person's action-control or state-control orientation as the

"ability to commit oneself to a non-dominant action tendency and to control the
execution of this tendency in spite of the strong press of a dominant need" (p. 122).
Describing and assessing one's action-control orientation as an "ability" rather than
as a "process" implies a relatively low degree of malleability. However, both Kuhl
and Como (this volume) have taken an activistic stance and have suggested various
ways that volition might be increased: They have recommended training subjects to
use the six volitional subprocesses involved in self-regulation that were described
above. In Chapter 5 (this volume), Como identified students' use of various voli-
tional control strategies in their comments during cooperative learning. Although
little experimental training research has been conducted to date, Kuhl (1981) has
asked state-oriented subjects to test explicit hypotheses and has concluded that these
hypotheses prevented dysfunctional cognitions from impeding performance.
However, which of the six subprocesses were strengthened by this procedure
remains unknown as well as whether such training would change subjects' action or
state-orientation score on Kuhl's test.
Vygotskian Views of Self-Regulated Learning

Researchers interested in the role of speech during self-regulation have been
attracted by the work of Lev Vygotsky. The publication of a translation of his 1934
text Thought and Speech in 1962 brought this early Soviet psychologist to the atten-
tion of English-speaking developmental psychologists and educators. Their interest
centered on two specific features emphasized in Vygotsky's theory: (1) inner speech
as a source of knowledge and self-control and (2) social interactions between adults
and children as a vehicle for conveying and internalizing linguistic skill.
A number of prominent psychologists have incorporated Vygotsky's ideas in their
work. For example, Meichenbaum (1977) developed a procedure for teaching self-
instruction to children with various learning deficiencies that involved overt imita-
tion of adult speech initially and then covert use of this speech without adult support.
Bruner (1984) developed the concept of ideational scaffolding to describe an adult's
efforts to provide additional structure during the early phases of learning a new con-
cept or skill. Palincsar and Brown (1984) developed a procedure for teaching reading
comprehension that was built around a Vygotskian notion of reciprocal teaching in
which teachers switch roles with students in small groups as they acquire compe-
tence. As these applications suggest, Vygotsky's theory is distinctive from other
views of self-regulation presented in this volume by its emphasis on linguistically
mediated social agents in children's development and in the functional role of inner
speech.
Vygotsky provides relatively little formal description of the specific processes that
motivate learners to self-regulate. Although he distinguished task-involved and self-
involved types of inner speech, he cautioned against assuming that each had separate
effects on learning and motivation. By self-involved inner speech, he meant motiva-
tional and affective statements that are used to improve self-control. Task-involved
inner speech referred to problem-solving strategic statements that are used to
increase task control. In his view, both task-involved statements and self-involved
statements can influence motivation.
Vygotsky was influenced also by the Marxist dialectical notion that the objective
environment is a codeterrninant of human functioning with human mental
processes. He believed that the functional value of human knowledge acquired from
social interactions in naturalistic contexts was self-evident, and this belief con-
tributed to his unwillingness to rule out the effects of task-involved statements on
human motivation. Mastery of the environment was viewed as an individual and
collective goal, and self-directive speech enabled individuals to achieve this goal.
SELF-AWARENESS
Vygotsky devoted relatively little attention to self-awareness during his relatively

short life of 38 years. However, his student, A.N. Leont'ev (1959, 1975) built a
theory of action on Vygotskian principles that did focus on this issue. Leont'ev dis-
tinguished between operations, which are assumed to be unconsciously triggered by
contextual conditions of a task and actions, which are assumed to be directed by an
individual's goals. After an action is fully internalized, it functions as an automatic,
routinized operation unless a problem should arise when carrying it out. If this
occurs, Leont'ev assumed the individual will shift back to functioning at a goal-
directed action level.
18 B.J. Zimmennan
Vygotsky (1962) describes a similar shift during learners' transition from external
to inner speech. He hypothesized that egocentric or transitional speech increases
when learners are faced with difficulties. Egocentric speech, although overt, is
assumed to have a self-directive, not a social function. To Vygotsky, egocentric
speech is a manifestation of the process of becoming aware, and he maintained that
egocentric speech assisted learners to plan solutions to problems. In support of this
assumption, Rohrkemper found in her own research that variations in task difficulty
affected the form and nature of reported inner speech by students (e.g., Rohrkem-
per, 1986; Rohrkemper & Corno, 1988).
KEy SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES

The key process in self-regulation is egocentric speech, which Vygotsky (1962)
defined thus: "The child talks only about himself, takes no interest in his interlocu-
tor, does not try to communicate, expects no answers, and often does not even care
whether anyone listens to him" (p. 15). Although initially acquired from adult exter-
nal speech, egocentric speech has a self-directive function. Vygotsky viewed
egocentric speech as a transition from external to inner speech control, which Rohr-
kemper (this volume) describes as "thinking in pure meanings." Inner speech and
external speech were viewed by Vygotsky (1962, p. 131) as opposite ends of a
bidirectional sociolinguistic process: External speech involves turning thought into
words, whereas inner speech involves turning words into thoughts. When speech
becomes internalized, self-direction is possible.

Vygotsky viewed the role of the social environment on a child's development as pre-
eminent. A youngster's mental functioning was assumed to be derived from earlier
verbal activity with an adult. Each individual child's self-regulatory skill was
believed to be a product of multiple social encounters with others. Although
Vygotsky theorized that human thought had social origins, he believed that inner
speech enabled man to alter his environment and to control his destiny. Once inter-
nalized, knowledge was assumed to have a dynamic of its own-compelling efforts
to self-regulate. One can describe Vygotsky's view of the relationship between the
environment and self-directive speech in the Hegelian terms favored by Marxists:
The physical and social reality of the immediate environment (a thesis) can be coun-
teracted by inner speech processes (an antithesis) and produce newly adaptive level
of mental, physical, and social functioning (a synthesis).
How DOES A LEARNER ACQUIRE A CAPACITY To SELF-REGULATE?

Vygotsky (1962) described the process of development of self-regulation in terms of
internalization. He suggested that social interactions between children and adults
provide the content for what is being internalized by the youngsters. At birth, human
infants are controlled by the physical properties of sounds (a first signal system), but
through repeated exposure to the word meanings of other persons, the words acquire
meaning independent of their stimulus properties (i.e., a second signal system).
Children's first step toward self-directed action occurs when they begin to use the
means that adults have used to regulate them (primarily speech) in order to regulate
themselves. Thus, self-regulation begins at an interpersonal level through contact
with adults, and it is gradually internalized by children. Eventually, through the
mediation of inner speech, children can exercise self-direction at an intrapersonal
level.
Cognitive Constructivist Views of Self-regulated Learning
The origins of this view are diverse, however, the work of two individuals is widely
cited as seminal: Fredrick C. Bartlett and Jean Piaget. His research on adult memory
for common stories led Bartlett (1932), a British psychologist, to the conclusion that
the key underlying mnemonic process involved reconstructing cohesive accounts
from underlying schemas and incoming contextual information-not merely recall-
ing previously stored information. A schema refers to a plan, plot, or outline that
specifies the relationship between a number of component ideas or concepts
(English & English, 1958). Bartlett called attention to nonrandom errors over recall
trials, which he felt revealed that learners tended to embellish or "sharpen" informa-
tion associated with the plot of the stories and leave out or "level" information that
was not. His account convinced many people that analyses of human memory
needed to focus on learners' formation and use of schemas.
From his research on young children's intellectual development, a Swiss episto-
mologist, Piaget (1926, 1952), also concluded that children formed schemas during
learning, even very young infants who are engaged in repetitive sensorimotor suck-
ing of a rattle. Piaget credited children with forming schemas through twin
processes called assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation refers to children's
absorbing information, such as the sensory qualities of rattles, and accommodation
refers to changes that were made in existing schemas (e.g., when a rattle of a new
color was encountered). These schemas were not assumed to be static but rather to
undergo qualitative improvements in their structure and flexibility during develop-
ment.
Both Bartlett and Piaget advanced the notion of a cognitive schema as the underly-
ing basis for human learning and recall, and both ascribed a major role to logic and
conceptual coherence in the formation of these schemas. In their view, human
experience was formed into schemas, often in idiosyncratic fashion, and psychologi-
cal analyses should focus on those constructions and that constructive process. Paris
and Byrnes (this volume) have adopted the notion of a theory as the basis for con-
structive representation instead of a schema; nevertheless, they assume that stu-
dents construct personal theories of learning in accordance with principles derived
from the work of Bartlett, Piaget, and others. These constructivist views of cogni-
tive functioning presume that learners play an active personal role during learning
and recall, a view with a particular implication for self-regulation.
20 B.J. Zimmennan
Cognitive constructivists generally do not view motivation as a separate process,

but rather, assume that a human motive to construct meaning from experience is
inherently compelling. Paris and Byrnes (this volume) have asserted this belief as a
historical principle of constructivism: There is an intrinsic motivation to seek infor-
mation. Piagetian scholars (e.g., Sigel, 1969) use the notion of cognitive conflict to
convey their assumption that information that cannot be assimilated readily
(because it conflicts with existing schemas) is noxious. This unpleasant state forces
learners to make cognitive accommodations in order to regain their cognitive
equilibrium. However, there is a growing awareness that constructivist researchers
may need to incorporate additional motivational constructs to explain self-regulated
learning in naturalistic contexts. For example, Paris and Byrnes (this volume) have
included a theory of effort as well as notions of personal agency and control in their
constructivist theory of self-competence in order to answer questions of motivation
to self-regulate (see Key Self-Regulation Processes below).
SELF-AwARENESS
This is a critical dimension of self-regulation to Piagetian constructivists. Egocen-

trism severely limits young children's ability to understand the motives and perspec-
tives of others (Piaget, 1932, 1970). Children's thinking does not become fully
logical (i.e., operational) until the children can integrate their perceptions of them-
selves and the world with those of other people. The most sophisticated levels of
self-regulated learning cannot occur until the child enters Piaget's highest period of
formal operations in which personally created hypotheses can be tested systemati-
cally. Flavell (1979) describes this level of functioning, using the prefix meta-, to
convey the idea that human cognitive functioning becomes monitored and con-
trolled at a higher cognitive level.
Paris and Byrne (this volume) describe developmental changes in children's self-
awareness in some detail. They summarize research indicating that young chil-
dren's perceptions of academic competence are unrealistically high when they enter
school (Benenson & Dweck, 1986; Stipek, 1981); however, during the late ele-
mentary and early junior high school grades, they decline (Eccles et aI., 1983;
Simmons, Blyth, Van Cleave, & Bush, 1979), become more domain specific
(Marsh, 1986) and more accurate, according to their teachers (Harter, 1982). Paris
and Byrne (this volume) attribute these changes in self-awareness in part to develop-
mental changes in children, such as an increased ability to differentiate between aca-
demic and social competence (Stipek & Tannatt, 1984) and between effort and
ability (Nichols, 1978), and to normative feedback, grades, and social comparative
information gained in school.
According to Paris and Byrnes (this volume), self-regulated learning is multifaceted.

Students are hypothesized to function as "scientists," who construct theories to regu-
late four components of their learning: self-competence, effort, academic tasks, and
instrumental strategies. One of these components, instrumental strategies, is evi-
dent in most constructivist accounts of learning. Instrumental strategies refer to
deliberate mental and physical "actions" by the learner to process information as
well as to manage time, motivation, and emotions. Students' theory of strategies
involves knowledge about what strategies are (i.e., declarative knowledge), how
they are used (i.e., procedural knowledge), and when and why they should be used
(i.e., conditional knowledge). The latter two forms of knowledge are often labeled
as meta-cognitive by other theorists.
In a departure from classical constructivist traditions, which focused mainly on
competence, Paris and Byrnes (this volume) developed their multifaceted account to
explain self-regulated performance as well. This goal was achieved by including
component theories of self-competence, effort, and academic tasks as well as strate-
gic knowledge. Students' theory of self-competence was hypothesized to involve
perceptions of personal ability, agency, and control, and to answer the question, Can
I self-regulate? Students' theory of effort, which focused on their interpretations of
success and failure as well as their intentions and actions, was hypothesized to
answer the questions, Why should I self-regulate? or How much effort should I
expend on this task? Finally, students' theory of academic tasks, which involved
perceptions of the goals, structure, and difficulty, sought to answer the question,
What is needed to learn this task?
A number of Piagetian scholars have advocated instructional procedures that seek to

increase cognitive conflict through use of discovery learning tasks (e.g., Smedslund,
1961) or social conflict learning groups (e.g., Murray, 1972). Discovery learning
procedures involve presenting a learner with unexpected outcomes, such as seeing
a metal blade bend when heated over a flame and then return to its original position
as it cools. Social conflict procedures refer to giving two or more students with
different viewpoints or cognitive levels the same problem-solving task and requiring
them to agree on an answer. Although both of these instructional techniques have
been found to be effective, Piagetians have not yet developed direct measures of
students' cognitive conflict (see Zimmerman & Blom, 1983).
Paris and Byrnes (1989) devote considerable attention to the influence of class-
room climates as well as teachers' attitudes and behavior on children's self-regulated
learning, particularly such public practices as student evaluations, ability grouping,
and teacher praise. However, the instructional procedures they recommend do not
appear designed to create social-cognitive conflict per se. Instead, Paris and Byrnes
suggest a variety of teaching procedures, such as direct strategy instruction, peer
tutoring, and cooperative learning, as well as their own Informed Strategies for
Learning and Reading and Thinking Strategies Programs, to help learners to reflect
upon and reconsider their views. Their constructivist orientation to instruction is
most evident in their assumptions that failure promotes disequilibrium and that
teaching students to cope with it can improve self-regulated learning.
22 B.I. Zimmerman
How DOES A LEARNER ACQUIRE A CAPACITY To SELF-REGULATE?
Piagetian constructivists emphasize developmental changes in children's stage of

cognitive development as critical to an ability to self-regulate learning. In Piagetian
fashion, Paris and Byrnes (this volume) assume that self-regulatory strategies that
were initially constructed as overt actions with concrete learning tasks become
internalized to form mental representations. When fully integrated, strategic
knowledge can be used flexibly to construct solutions to future problems.
In addition, Paris and Byrnes (this volume) have adopted Werner's (1957)
orthogenetic notions of progressive differentiation and simultaneous hierarchical
organization to explain children's development of theories of self-regulated learning.
For example, children's global sense of self-competence is assumed to become
organized hierarchically when they can differentiate ability from effort as causes of
their academic performance. Similar changes are assumed to occur in youngsters'
theories of effort, academic tasks, and instructional strategies.
Conclusion
The ultimate importance of the individual student in accounts of learning and
achievement has been emphasized by American educators for many years. Unlike
previous models that have spurred educational reform, theories of self-regulation
place their focus on how students activate, alter, and sustain specific learning prac-
tices in solitary as well as social settings, in informal as well as formal instructional
contexts (Zimmerman, 1986). These theorists believe that learning is not something
that happens to students; it is something that happens by students. They assume that,
for learning to occur, students must become proactively engaged at both a covert as
well as an overt level. Their research has evolved to the point where detailed theoret-
ical accounts of self-regulated learning and academic development can now be
offered and appreciated. In an era in which student self-regulation often seems
alarmingly absent, theories that can offer direction as well as insight to educators
into the processes of self-regulated learning may be of particular merit.
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2. Operant Theory and Research
on Self-Regulation
F. Charles Mace, Phillip J. Belfiore, and Michael C. Shea
Introduction
Any account of self-regulation or self-control according to a particular theoretical
perspective must begin with a discussion of what its proponents mean when they
speak of self-regulation. Most theories of self-control advance a view of human
behavior that is to one degree or another self-determined. It is a view much like the
relationship between a pilot and his airplane, where the pilot is the "self" who per-
forms some operation from "within" to direct or control the plane's course or
behavior. Beginning with this assumption obligates these theorists to describe,
speculate, or otherwise account for the operations performed by the self, be they
cognitions or exercises of free will, of which self-regulated behavior is believed to
be a function.
Operant psychology's starting point is somewhat different. When operant theo-
rists speak of self-control they are generally referring to one of two things: The first
is an attempt to provide a natural-science account of phenomena our common
experience refers to as commitment, delay of gratification, or impulsiveness.
Experimentally, this is done by demonstrating functional relationships between
observable environmental events and behavior that might ordinarily be assigned one
of the above discriptors (e.g., Boehme, Blakely, & Poling, 1986; Epstein, 1984;
Green & Snyderman, 1980; Logue, Pena-Correal, Rodriguez, & Kabela, 1986;
Rachlin & Green, 1972). Alternatively, theoretical accounts of these behaviors have
been derived through logical extension of the methods and products of a natural
science of behavior (e.g., Skinner, 1953). In either case, the objective is to under-
stand, in terms amenable to scientific inquiry, certain ways of behaving that have
traditionally attracted mentalistic explanations.
The second meaning that operant theorists assign to self-control is the actions of
individuals that alter the environment at one point in time and that make more or
less probable certain actions of theirs at a later point in time (see also chapter by
28 Ee. Mace, P.l. Belfiore, and M.C. Shea
Zimmerman in this volume). Behaviors such as setting an alarm, counting calories,

and taking a limited supply of cash on shopping trips illustrate means by which
individuals playa role in controlling their behavior through environmental conse-
quences. The important point is that a person's behavior, as part of the environment,
can change the environment and, as a result, the probability of his or her own
behavior. Thus, operant psychologists consider self-controlled behavior to be like
most other behavior, ultimately controlled by the environment.
Our goal in this chapter is to provide an overview of operant psychology's view
of self-regulated behavior and the evidence to support it. The focus, by way of exam-
ple and literature reviewed, will be on self-regulation of social and academic
behaviors in educational settings. We will describe and review research on the
key subprocesses in operant self-regulation and discuss their implications for
acquiring and maintaining self-regulated behavior. We begin first, however, with a
brief overview of general operant theory from which the operant view of self-control
is directly derived.
General Operant Theory

B.F. Skinner, the progenitor of operant psychology, sought simply to apply the
methods of natural science for the study of behavior (Skinner, 1979). This required
direct measurement of the subject matter and the variables of which it could be a
function under well-controlled conditions. Years of laboratory research with
animals resulted in the discovery of orderly relationships between the behavior of
organisms and specific environmental variables (Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Skinner
1938). The principles of behavior derived from animal research were found to be
general across most species, including humans, although the complexity of behavior
varied widely with phylogeny (Catania, 1984).
Skinner's subject matter was operant behavior, or behavior that is commonly
referred to as volitional (see Comas' definition of volition in this volume). Operant
behavior is behavior whose occurrence depends on the environmental consequences
it produces. A behavior becomes more likely to occur through positive reinforce-
ment, that is, if it results in sustenance, physical comfort or arousal, or events that
historically have been paired with these (e.g., social stimuli, money, material
goods, etc.). For instance, teacher praise supplied contingent on a student's
improved test scores may increase the likelihood of good performance in the future.
Likewise, behavior becomes more probable through negative reinforcement, that is,
when it discontinues or averts both physical discomfort and associated events and
withdrawal of sustenance or other positive reinforcers. For example, a student who
discontinues disruptive behavior and resumes seatwork in response to a teacher's
stare may be more likely to engage in seatwork during subsequent work periods,
thereby avoiding an aversive gaze, as a result of negative reinforcement. Thus it can
be seen that the primary goal of an operant analysis of behavior is to identify the
consequences that a given behavior produces: those necessary for the acquisition
and maintenance of a particular behavior and/or those maintaining behaviors that
may compete with more socially desirable responses.
2. Operant Theory and Research on Self-Regulation 29
Events antecedent to behavior may also influence the probability that a given
behavior will occur. Antecedent stimuli that are predictive of reinforcement for
behavior are referred to as discriminative stimuli. These stimuli acquire their control
of behavior as a result of their presence being associated with a comparatively
higher rate of reinforcement and their absence a comparatively lower rate of rein-
forcement. As a result, individuals are much more likely to emit a particular
behavior or behaviors when one or more discriminative stimuli is presented because
of the increased likelihood of reinforcement. For example, when a teacher asks the
class a question and calls on a students, the probability is much higher that a correct
answer will result in praise than when the answer is blurted out or provided at a later
time. Students with this history learn to provide answers at specific times and not
others (i.e., when answers are likely to result in teacher approval).
The known principles of behavior are many and far too complex to present here.
What is important for our discussion of self-regulation is the designation of two
classes of controlling stimuli: those that occur antecedent to and as a consequence
of behavior. Key subprocesses of self-control from the operant perspective center
around how individuals alter antecedent and consequent stimuli to regulate their
own behavior. The following sections provide an overview of the important ele-
ments of the operant view of self-control followed by a discussion of the major sub-
processes of self-regulation that have received the most attention from operant
theorists and researchers.
The Operant View of Self-Regulation

When students, teachers, and others engage in self-control, they are choosing
among alternative courses of action. Typically, this choice involves foregoing or
postponing an immediate reward and, instead, behaving in a manner that will result
in a different (and often greater) reward at a later point in time (Brigham, 1982;
Rachlin, 1974). The choice could alternatively be one of enduring an immediate
hardship in order to avoid greater hardship or obtain a greater reward at a future
time. Examples might include the student who studies for a geometry exam rather
than attend a school dance, the teacher who completes a lesson plan late at night to
avoid a chaotic lecture the next day, and the first-grader who persists in his phonics
assignment despite temptations from his peers to converse and giggle.
The critical features of self-control from the operant perspective then involve
(a) choosing among alternative actions, (b) the relative reinforcing value ofthe con-
sequences for the response alternatives, and (c) the temporal locus of control for the
alternatives (i.e., immediate vs. delayed consequences) (Brigham, 1982; Rachlin,
1974). The importance of (a) is common to all theories of self-regulation, for
without multiple options the description of self-control does not apply. The combi-
nation of (a) and (b) alone, however, does not represent self-control but, rather,
reflects the individual's preference for one consequence over another. Such a situa-
tion would not require a person to exert control over her behavior, only to respond
to the more attractive alternative. It is the addition of (c), foregoing an immediate
reinforcer in favor of a delayed one, that causes us to invoke the term self-control.
30 EC. Mace, P.J. Belfiore, and M.e. Shea
Thus, rather than socialize, the student computes hypotenuse lengths, rather than
sleep the teacher prepares the lesson plan, and rather than engage in disruptive
interaction with peers the first-grader remains on-task.
Key Subprocesses of Self-Regulation

Although selecting a delayed consequence over an immediate one is the hallmark of
self-regulation, there are many things an individual can do to increase the probabil-
ity of emitting self-regulated behavior. These actions leading to self-controlled
behavior are part of the self-regulation process. Operant researchers have analyzed
the self-regulation process into subprocesses that include self-monitoring, self-
instruction, and self-reinforcement. Much of this research has focused on develop-
ing procedures that promote self-regulation and analyzing the factors that make var-
ious procedures effective. Procedures are often combined to form a self-regulation
program that can be taught to students with and without handicapping conditions in
order to reduce the students' dependence on instructional and behavior management
programs that are entirely teacher managed (Rosenbaum & Drabman, 1979).
Self-Monitoring
The initial and sometimes sole component of self-regulation programs is self-
monitoring. Self-monitoring (SM) refers to a multistage process involving the obser-
vation and recording of one's own behavior (Mace & Kratochwill, 1988; Nelson,
1977; Shapiro, 1984). The first step of the process requires the child to be aware of
or discriminate the occurrence ofthe target behavior that is to be controlled. As with
all events, the reliability of this discrimination depends, in part, on the salience and
consistency of the stimuli being observed as well as the experience one has in mak-
ing the discrimination. In the second stage of SM, the individual records some
dimension of the target response such as its frequency, duration, or latency.
Observations and recordings of one's own behavior are usually structured by the
use of a data sheet or a mechanical recording device. Students are generally trained
to use standard behavioral-assessment methods to accurately self-monitor their
behavior. (Readers unfamiliar with behavioral a~sessment methods are referred to
Ollendick and Hersen [1984] and Shapiro [1987] for comprehensive discussions.
Among the more common SM methods are (a) narrations, (b) frequency counts,
(c) duration measures, (d) time-sampling procedures, (e) behavior ratings, and
(f) behavioral traces and archival records. In general, (a) through (d) are considered
direct assessment methods (i.e., they assess behavior as it occurs) whereas (e) and
(f) are indirect methods that record information at a point in time distant from the
occurrence of the behavior (Mace & Kratochwill, 1988). The selection of an SM
method is usually determined by factors such as compatibility with the target
response, functioning or developmental level of the st.udent, the degree of reactivity
desired, and practical considerations.
Narrations are written descriptions of the individual's behavior and perhaps the
context in which it occurs that, by nature, are best suited for older students of nor-
mal intellectual ability. These accounts vary in their degree of structure from com-
pletely open-ended to very specific requests for descriptions of antecedents,
behaviors, and consequents (e.g., Bell & Low, 1977). Narrations may be useful for
a student to record his or her activities during study periods. Frequency counts are
useful to record the number of times one or more discrete responses occurs during
a given time period. The technique is commonly used because of its simplicity;
however, it provides no information about when during the SM period each behavior
occurred. Responses such as the number of mispronounced words in a foreign-
language discussion group are suited to measurement by frequency counts. Duration
measures record the amount of time a behavior or chain of behaviors occurs (e.g.,
study time), which may be important information for behaviors that vary considera-
bly on this dimension. Time-sampling methods divide observation periods into
smaller time intervals (e.g., 10, 30, or 60) and record either the number of times a
behavior occurred during each interval or assess the behavior on an occurrence/
nonoccurrence basis for each interval. Time-sampling is useful to record behaviors
such as time on-task during various academic activities.
As an indirect SM method, behavior ratings call for estimations of the degree to
which one or more dimensions of behavior occurred during a given time period.
Rating categories vary in their specificity and length of observation interval (e.g.,
never, seldom, sometimes, or often during the day, vs. < 2, 3-5, 6-8, or > times
during each class period). This method has been used to estimate the occurrence of
such behaviors as out-of-seat, cooperative play, and accuracy of manuscript letter
strokes. Although behavior ratings are convenient to use, SM accuracy and reac-
tivity diminish as specificity decreases and the observation interval increases (Nel-
son, 1977). Finally behavioral traces and archival records are permanent products
or byproducts of behavior that exist independent of their formal assessment, which
an individual may observe and self-record. For example, worksheet scores may be
an indirect measure of on-task behavior or home study, nurse records as a measure
of stomach complaints (Miller & Kratochwill, 1979), and fingernail length as an
indicator of nailbiting (McNamara, 1972). Although potentially accurate measures
of behavior, traces and archival records generally have a limited effect on the reac-
tivity of SM because these measures are usually temporally distant from the target
behavior (see following section on reactivity).
REACTIVITY OF SM
The SM methods described above have been used widely in educational settings to
transfer responsibility of behavior assessment from the teacher to the student.
Beyond their value as an assessment strategy, however, SM methods have been
employed because of their potential as a behavior-change agent. Self-observation
and self-recording introduce stimulus conditions into the environment that can
change how subjects respond to existing reinforcement contingencies. This ten-
dency for behavior to change as a result of self-observation and self-recording is
referred to as the reactivity of self-monitoring (see also Schunk's discussion in this
volume). Some studies have found reactive effects for SM to exceed those achieved
by obtrusive teacher assessment of behavior (e.g., Hallahan, Lloyd, Kneeder, &
32 EC. Mace, P.l. Belfiore, and M.C. Shea
Marshall, 1982), suggesting that the mechanism may be similar but more powerful
than the reactivity that accompanies direct observation (cf. Kazdin, 1979).
The reactive effects of SM have been extensively documented in numerous studies
beginning in the 1960s. SM reactivity has been shown to generalize across a wide
variety of academic, social, vocational,and clinically aberrant behaviors with nor-
mal and handicapped children and adults, and across virtually all clinically relevant
settings (Mace & Kratochwill, 1988). In academic settings, for example, SM has
increased adaptive behaviors such as time on-task (Workman, Helton, & Watson,
1982), rate of assignment completion (Morrow, Burke, & Buel, 1985), accuracy of
manuscript letter-writing strokes (Jones, Trap, & Cooper, 1977), and conversational
skills (Gajar, Schloss, Schloss, & Thompson, 1984). Similarly, SM has proven effec-
tive in reducing maladaptive behaviors such as out-of-seat (Sugai & Rowe, 1984),
inattentive/disruptive behaviors (Christie, Hiss, & Lozanoff, 1984), and nervous
tics (Ollendick, 1981). A further therapeutic advantage of SM is its potential contri-
bution to maintenance and generalization of the effects of other interventions. For
example, Fowler (1986) found peer monitorng of students' behavior was effective in
reducing classroom disruption and nonparticipation. Effects were maintained after
peer monitoring was discontinued by having students self-monitor their compliance
with classroom rules.
VARIABLES AFFECTING THE REACTIVITY OF SM

Although reactive effects of SM have been widely documented, several investigators
have reported mixed results or a lack of reactivity altogether (e.g., recent studies by
Shapiro & Ackerman [1983] and Shapiro, Browder, & D'Huyvetters [1984]). Such
inconsistent findings have stimulated considerable research into the variables affect-
ing the reactivity of SM. Subjects in most of these studies self-monitored one or
more behaviors under multiple SM conditions to determine which variations of SM
resulted in the greatest reactivity. We should note that this literature reflects
research with subjects of various ages and handicapping conditions; thus, conclu-
sions regarding school-age populations should be made with caution. The following
is a brief summary of this research that may be supplemented by numerous compre-
hensive reviews (e.g., Haynes & Wilson, 1979; Mace & Kratochwill, 1988; Nelson,
1977; Shapiro, 1984).
Motivation to alter the self-monitored response appears to affect the degree to
which SM is reactive. In studies with smokers, only those subjects who volunteered
for the habit-reduction study or indicated motivation to stop smoking were success-
ful in decreasing smoking with SM (Lipinski, Black, Nelson, & Ciminero, 1974;
McFall & Hammen, 1971). We might speculate that motivation to improve aca-
demic performance may be a critical factor in SM reactivity for academic
behaviors.
Valence of the target behavior often determines the direction and extent of
behavior change. Several studies have shown that negatively valenced behaviors
decrease and positively valenced behaviors increase when self-monitored (e.g,. Nel-
son, Hay, & Carstens, 1977; Willis & Nelson, 1982). Further, some researchers
have found reactivity to be greater for positively valenced behaviors than for
behaviors with a neutral or negative valence (Litrownik & Freitas, 1980).
Experimenter instructions and surveillance provided prior to and during SM can,
in certain cases, influence the magnitude of reactivity. Modest reactivity due to
experimenter-assigned valences have been reported (Nelson, Lipinski, & Black,
1975); however, experimenter-induced expectancies have had negligible effects on
reactivity (Nelson, Kapust, & Dorsey, 1978; Piersel, 1985). In one study, reactive
effects of SM were increased substantially by the experimenter's surveillance of sub-
jects during a vocational task (Belfiore, Mace, & Browder, in press).
liming of self-recording in relation to the occurrence of the target behavior can
affect the degree to which SM is reactive. For example, Bellack, Rozensky, and
Schwartz (1974) reported greater weight loss when subjects monitored their food
intake prior to eating than after a meal. Similarly, Gottman and McFall (1972) found
self-monitoring "urges" to speak in class more reactive than recording actual com-
ments. Further, Frederickson, Epstein, and Kosevsky (1975) found continuous and
immediate SM to produce greater reactivity than intermittent self-recording (e.g.,
at the end of the day).
Reactivity may also depend on the nature of the target behavior and recording
device. In general, self-recording discrete, overt, nonverbal behaviors results in
greater reactivity than monitoring verbal behaviors or private events (Harmon, Nel-
son, & Hayes, 1980; Hayes & Cavior, 1977). In addition, monitoring actual aca-
demic productivity produces greater change than self-recording attentional or
on-task behavior (Harris, 1986). Several studies have also demonstrated that reac-
tivity is greatest when SM occurs using an obtrusive SM device such as wrist-worn
or hand-held counters (Maletzsky, 1974; Nelson, Lipinski, & Boykin, 1978), visible
data sheets (Broden, Hall, & Mitts, 1971; Piersel, 1985) and audible cues to self-
record behavior (Heins, Lloyd, & Hallahan, 1986).
Finally, goals,feedback, and reinforcement have been shown to facilitate the reac-
tive effects of SM. Ror example, Kazdin (1974) reported that providing subjects with
a performance standard when self-monitoring as well as frequent performance feed-
back resulted in the largest increase in the use of target pronouns. Likewise, observa-
ble reinforcement for the self-monitored response appears to be critical to reactive
SM (Lyman, Richard, & Edler, 1975; Mace & Kratochwill, 1985; Mace, Shapiro,
West, Campbell, & Altman, 1986).
OPERANT VIEW OF SM REACfIVITY
The operant explanation for reactive SM has been shaped by operant theory's
general view of self-regulated behavior as well as the large literature on the variables
responsible for the reactivity of SM. The question for operant theorists is, "How
does SM affect the relationship between behavior and its controlling consequences?"
The answer to this question rests on analyzing the functional relationships among
variables in the SM process, the target behavior, and the consequences that ulti-
mately control the target behavior.
34 EC. Mace, P.J. Belfiore, and M .C. Shea
SM variables antecedent to the target behavior may serve as discriminative

stimuli, setting events, or rules that set the occasion for more or lesser performances
of the target response (cf. Nelson & Hayes, 1981). Examples of discriminative
stimuli are obtrusive recording devices, audible prompts to self-record, and feed-
back on prior responses. These discriminative stimuli may evoke behavior at levels
sufficient to yield reinforcement (e.g., 20 out of 25 math problems completed). Set-
ting events, on the other hand, such as teacher surveillance during self-monitored
study periods may alter the probability of the target response because of the
increased likelihood of "good" behavior being reinforced under these conditions.
Setting events are stimuli that do not occasion behavior by themselves but, rather,
establish other events as discriminative stimuli or reinforcers for particular
behaviors (Michael, 1982; Wahler & Fox, 1981). Finally, variables such as instruc-
tions and performance standards may function as rules describing the delayed con-
tingencies of which the target behavior is subject (Mallott, 1984). Rules can
occasion behavior by indicating the response to perform and its likely outcome. For
example, a teacher may state to the class, "Everyone who completes all homework
assignments this week will be eligible for the field trip on Friday."
Self-recording responses, on the other hand, occur as a consequence of perfor-
mance of the target behavior. The literature cited above indicated that reactive
effects are greatest when continuous and immediate records are made of the target
behavior (Frederickson et al. 1975). Several theorists believe that the act of record-
ing one's own behavior provides an immediate consequence for the target behavior
that strengthens or mediates the relationship between the target behavior and the
delayed consequences that ultimately control it (Baer, 1984; Mace & West, 1986;
Malott, 1984; Nelson & Hayes, 1981; Racklin, 1974). That is, a student who self-
monitors completion of each page of a seatwork assignment provides an immediate
consequence for the academic response that may strengthen the relationship
between seatwork and the grade received at a later point in time. Baer (1984)
describes the relationship as follows:
Formerly, they look like stimuli in a chained schedule: They are direct and immediate con-
sequences of a necessary initial performance; they mark the correct completion of that initial
performance and set the occasion for a subsequent performance that can now lead to the
reinforcers or avoid the punishers in those rearranged contingencies that the self-controlling
person is attempting to use. By doing so, they support that initial performance (p. 212).
Hayes and Nelson (1983) offer some empirical support for the operant viewpoint
in a study with undergraduate students that compared (a) self-monitoring face
touches, (b) contingent external cuing (contingent on face touching a cue appeared
stating, "Please don't touch your face"), (c) non contingent external cuing on a fixed-
time schedule, and (d) a no-treatment control group. The SM and external cuing
conditions reduced face touching to comparable levels suggesting that the reactive
effects of SM are similar to those produced by external cues presented either antece-
dent or consequent to the target response. Thus, if these findings generalize to
school-age populations, we might expect reactive effects to be similar as a result of
measurement of on-task behavior via a teacher's direct observation and the student's
self-monitoring.
Self-Instruction
Another major subprocess of self-regulation studied extensively by operant theo-

rists is self-instruction (SI). We should note at the outset that operant self-instruction
differs in many respects conceptually and procedurally from cognitive-behavioral
self-instruction advanced by Meichenbaum and others (see Rohrkemper's discussion
in this volume). From the operant perspective, the SM process can provide dis-
criminative stimuli for regulating the level of one's own behavior in accordance with
reinforcement standards, whereas SI provides discriminative stimuli that occasion
specific behaviors or behavioral sequences that will lead to reinforcement.
SI statements generally correspond to one of two types of discriminative stimuli.
First, the individual may arrange the environment so as to come into contact with
one or more discriminative stimuli that set the occasion for desired behavior. These
stimuli may be verbal or nonverbal and have the capacity to occasion behavior
because performing that behavior in the past has resulted in reinforcement. For
example, a girl may place her milk money or a written reminder next to her lunchbox
at night to help her "remember" to take the money to school. The money or the note
is likely to occasion taking the money to school because doing so in the past was
necessary to have milk during recess. By arranging the environment in this manner,
the girl has instructed herself to comply with the school rule. The second type of SI
statement takes the form of rules that individuals use to govern their own behavior.
Skinner (1969) defined a rule as a set of discriminative stimuli that describe contin-
gencies. An SI statement of this type would specify both the response to perform and
the consequence for doing so. For this reason, operant theorists have characterized
some forms of self-instructed behavior as rule-governed behavior (Zettle & Hayes,
1982).
The first type of SI statement is illustrated in a study by Kosiewicz, Hallahan,
Lloyd, and Graves (1982), which employed SI procedures to improve a learning-
disabled student's handwriting. The child was trained to overtly guide his copying of
words and passages with self-verbalized instructions. The SI sequence, listed on a
card on the student's desk, consisted of the following: (a) Say aloud the word to be
written; (b) say the first syllable; (c) name each of the letters in that syllable three
times; (d) repeat each letter as it is written down; and (e) repeat steps b through d
for each succeeding syllable. During training, this sequence is established by provid-
ing praise for completion of each step. When training is completed and the student
consistently performs the SI sequence, praise following each step is discontinued,
and the sequence is maintained by the consequences for accurate handwriting. As
with SM, the SI process takes the form of a chained schedule in which each step in
the sequence sets the occasion for the succeeding step and, at the same time, perfor-
mance of the step is reinforced by the opportunity to perform its successor (Baer,
1984; Catania, 1984). Thus, by performing each response in the SI sequence, the
student can regulate her own behavior to maximize the likelihood of reinforcement
for completing the sequence.
Many applications of SI incorporate the use of rules to promote self-regulated
behavior. For example, Swanson and Scarpati (1985) taught mildly handicapped stu-
dents a comprehensive SI strategy to improve their reading comprehension and
36 EC. Mace, P.I Belfiore, and M.e. Shea
spelling. Students learned to respond to and later generate a sequence of questions,

directions, and rules that facilitated performance on assignments and exams. The
following samples represent key components of the SI sequence for reading compre-
hension: (a) "How do I understand the passage before I read it? First, I need to look
at the title, then skim the passage for new words and circle them. Second, I need to
underline people's names and words that show action." (b) "I need to ask myself,
Who, What, Where, and How? before I read." (c) "Now, from my lesson yesterday,
if I forget these steps, I won't remember what the passage is about. Yesterday I didn't
underline words so I could not answer the question about what happened" (Swanson
& Scarpati, 1985, p. 30). While reading passages, students used a list of written
instructions or symbols to prompt them to follow the SI sequence.
The example above illustrates the combination of the two types of discriminative
stimuli to form an SI procedure. The SI statements in (a) and (b) specify problem-
solving responses to perform. Initial compliance with these steps was likely estab-
lished via the consequences the teacher provided for performing or failing to per-
form each step. However, as the students' academic cores improved, compliance
with the SI procedure is likely to maintain as a result of the consequences for
improved performance (in this case points exchangeable for privileges and money
were awarded for correct answers). By contrast, the SI statements in (c) represent
rules for behaving that not only specify what to do but also indicate the likely conse-
quences for each act. The initial effectiveness of these SI statements is less depen-
dent on the students' direct experience with the consequences for SI compliance.
Rather, a history of reinforcement for rule compliance is generally sufficient to
establish the rule as a discriminative stimulus for problem solving (Skinner, 1969;
Zettle & Hayes, 1982).
Although numerous studies have found SI interventions useful for teaching stu-
dents and teachers to improve a wide range of academic and social behaviors, some
notable failures of SI have stirred controversy and debate. Bomstein and Quevillon
(1976) published one of the first well-controlled SI studies. Three hyperactive
preschool boys were removed from the classroom and provided massed SI training
to increase their time on-task. Dramatic improvement in the student's on-task
behavior was reported when the subjects returned to the classroom. However, two
studies attempted systematic replications of Bomstein and Quevillon's (1976) proce-
dures with Head Start children and slightly older students (ages 7 to 8) and reported
effects that were neither socially meaningful nor durable (Billings & Wasik, 1985;
Friedling & O'Leary, 1979).
Bomstein (1985) and Billings and Wasik (1985) speculated about the reasons why
some studies failed to replicate Bomstein and Quevillon's (1976) findings while
other research has yielded comparable results (e.g., Burgio, Whitman, & Johnson,
1980). A plausible explanation appears to be that initial changes in the students'
behavior subsequent to SI training alters the environment in a manner that may
change how the subjects' teacher and peers respond to them. We could suppose that
prior to SI intervention the teacher and peers may have attended to disruptive
behavior in a variety of ways that reinforced it. Improved behavior may not only
reduce the opportunity to reinforce disruptive behavior but may also result in con-
siderable positive attention, which may encourage its recurrence. If such an effect
occurred, it would quite likely operate inconsistently across studies and thus explain
some of the mixed findings.
From an operant perspective of self-regulation, inconsistent findings such as those
reported by Friedling and O'Leary (1979) and Billings and Wasik (1985) are to be
expected when procedures like SM and SI focus primarily or exclusively on manipu-
lation of antecedent stimuli. As noted above, antecedent stimuli acquire the capacity
to occasion behavior (i.e., become discriminative stimuli) when responding in the
presence of the stimuli increases the probability of reinforcement. Instructions,
regardless of their clarity, specificity, and logical sequence have no intrinsic control
of behavior without a historical link to reinforcement. We may expect many students
to initially comply with SI statements without adequate reinforcement for compli-
ance due to their history of reinforcement for instruction following. However, this
effect is likely to be short-lived unless other environmental changes result from the
students' improved behavior that serve to reinforce it. Recognition of the primary
role reinforcement plays in behavior change and maintenance has led many operant
theorists to recommend that effective reinforcement contingencies for the target
behavior be included in all self-control interventions (Gross & Wojnilower, 1984;
Jones, Nelson, & Kazdin, 1977; Mace et aI., (1986).
Self-Reinforcement
Self-reinforcement (SR) describes a process in which a person, often after satisfying

a performance standard, comes into contact with a stimulus following the occur-
rence of a response that, in turn, results in an increase in the probability of the occur-
rence ofthe response subject to the performance standard. We prefer this definition
because it is descriptive of the process and avoids labeling (a) stimuli as reinforcers,
(b) the relationship between the stimulus and target behavior as contingent, (c) the
spatial locus of the "reinforcer"; and (d) the source controlling the integrity of the
SR sequence. These features of the process set apart the operant view of self-
reinforcement from other perspectives.
We can understand self-reinforcement from the operant viewpoint by first distin-
guishing it from other theoretical positions. A view held widely among cognitive-
behaviorists is that individuals can and do reinforce their own behavior (Bandura,
1976; Kanfer, 1977) (see also Schunk's discussion of evaluative motivation in this
volume). Cognitive theorists consider the SR process to be one of true reinforce-
ment. Individuals are believed to regulate their own behavior by making access to
freely and continuously available reinforcers contingent on responses that meet or
exceed self- or externally-imposed standards for performance (Bandura & Mahoney,
1974). Moreover, the spatial locus of the reinforcer may be private events, in the
case of thoughts or feelings, or public events in the case of material or social
rewards. Many cognitive-behavioral theorists consider self-administered verbal,
imaginal, or tangible rewards to be functionally equivalent to external contingen-
cies, thus promoting a view that individuals can and do provide much of the rein-
forcement for their own behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1971; Kanfer, 1977; Thoresen &
Mahoney, 1974).
38 Ee. Mace, PJ. Belfiore, and M.e. Shea
OPERANT VIEW OF SELF-REINFORCEMENT
Operant theorists have questioned whether SR procedures constitute a true rein-

forcement process (Catania, 1975; Goldiamond, 1976; Rachlin, 1974; Skinner,
1953). We can illustrate this concern with some practical examples: Consider the
student who has been taught the following SR procedure. After completing the
workbook exercises in each math unit, the child sets a performance goal that is at or
above her previous math-unit test score. The student takes the math exam and
awards herself two points for meeting her goal plus one point for each point of her
test score that exceeds her goal. During recess, the student exchanges her points for
a variety of back-up reinforcers such as games, snacks, and free time. Using this
procedure over the course of a semester improved the student's math test scores by
15 percentage points.
Did the student reinforce her superior test performance by awarding herself points
for attaining her goals? In order for this example to be a case of true reinforcement,
both the points and back-up reinforcers must be freely accessible to the student and
be awarded contingent on meeting the performance standard. Further, the contin-
gent relationship between test scores and self-awarded points must increase the
probability of high test scores. On the surface, these conditions may appear to hold,
thus satisfying the criteria for true reinforcement. Yet, an operant analysis of the
case would raise the following questions. Is the student really free to access points
and back-up reinforcers noncontingently? What happens if points and back-up rein-
forcers are claimed without meeting the performance standard? How is the SR
sequence learned and maintained? What will happen to the student's test perfor-
mance if the SR sequence is not monitored and enforced by the teacher? Such ques-
tions are likely to reveal that the teacher maintains the SR sequence by (a)
scheduling times for study, testing, and reinforcer access, (b) monitoring the
accuracy of the student's self-evaluation and awarding of points and reinforcers, and
(c) punishing "cheating" or violation of the SR rules. In this situation, reinforce-
ment may be self-administered but the conditions for its delivery are controlled by
the teacher.
There are other examples in which the contingencies that control maintenance of
the SR sequence are less obvious. We may observe a student reliably do his home-
work within an hour after arriving home from school. After homework, his next
activity may be to prepare a snack, telephone friends, read a novel, or watch televi-
sion, which the student may describe as "rewards" for completing his homework.
Although the SR sequence may be followed consistently, we may question whether
the "rewards" actually reinforce homework completion. In order for us to consider
the "rewards" as reinforcing homework behavior, the baseline level of homework
completion must depend on the contingent access to rewarding activities. For most
students, however, the contingencies that control homework completion are related
to how teachers and parents respond to this behavior as well as the positive relation-
ship between studying and grades.
If the student would continue to do his homework without the "rewards;' what
then accounts for maintenance of the SR sequence? An operant account would
center on the consequences for following and failing to follow the SR sequence. For
example, the work-play sequence may be positively reinforced because (a) the con-
ditions may be more favorable to concentrate on schoolwork immediately after
school, and/or (b) the student is able to engage in reinforcing activities in the even-
ing without the encumbrance of homework. Further, the student may have
experienced various negative consequences for attempting homework at other times
(e.g., late at night or just before a social engagement) that may have initially estab-
lished the work-play sequence and continue to maintain it.
These examples help to illustrate that SR for operant theorists is a misnomer
(Catania, 1975; Goldiamond, 1976; Nelson, Hayes, Spong, Jarrett, & McKnight,
1983; Skinner, 1953). The self-administered stimulus that follows the target
response is not considered a reinforcer because its access does not depend on the
occurrence of the behavior. In laboratory studies, response-independent reinforce-
ment consistently decreases response rates (Nevin, 1974), reflecting the importance
of the dependency between response and reinforcer. The establishment of most SR
sequences may be traced to externally imposed contingencies that either do not per-
mit free access to reinforcing stimuli (e.g., teachers are unlikely to permit access to
recess without prior engagement in academic work) (Catania, 1975) or they pro-
mote an efficient path to obtain delayed consequences (Baer, 1984; Malott, 1984;
Skinner, 1953). In the latter case, SR effects may be attributed to the provision of
immediate consequences for a target response that mediate or strengthen the rela-
tionship between behavior and the delayed consequences that control it (Nelson
et aI., 1983).
SELF-REINFORCEMENT RESEARCH
Several literature reviews have evaluated the empirical evidence to support use of
the term self-reinforcement (Gross & Wojnilower, 1984; Jones et aI., 1977; Mace &
West, 1986; Martin, 1980; Sohn & Lamal, 1982). We will briefly summarize the
findings of these reviews here and refer readers to the sources cited above for
detailed discussions.
Support for viewing SR procedures as examples of true reinforcement is limited
because, in most studies, the effects of SR are confounded with other external vari-
ables. First, the immediate reinforcement history of subjects in many SR studies is
experience with externally managed reinforcement programs. For example, many
classroom studies preceded or contrasted SR conditions with formal or informal
token or social reinforcement programs that leave unclear whether contrast or
sequence effects may have affected student performance during SR (Drabman,
Spitalnik, & O'Leary, 1973; Kaufman & O'Leary, 1972; Santogrossi, O'Leary,
Romanczyk, & Kaufman, 1973). For example, Bowers, Clement, Fantuzzo, and
Sorensen (1985) assessed the attending behavior of 8- to ll-year-old boys with
learning disabilities under self- and external-reinforcement conditions. For some
subjects, differences between self-reinforcement and teacher-administered rein-
forcement were apparent only when self-reinforcement preceded external reinforce-
ment, suggesting the effect may have been due to the contrast between the two
reinforcement conditions presented in that order.
40 F.e. Mace, P.I. Belfiore, and M.e. Shea
Second, perfonnance standards in some SR studies are established by teachers or

experimenters (e.g., Humphrey, Karoly, & Kirschenbaum, 1978) whereas in other
studies students set their own performance standards (e.g., Wall, 1983). Self-
administration of rewards is then determined by the students' performance relative
to the standard (see also Schunk's treatment of this issue in this volume). This prac-
tice is problematic because several studies have shown that performance standards
can improve student behavior independent of SR programs (e.g., Kazdin, 1974).
Moreover, performance standards imply that reinforcers cannot be accessed without
meeting the criterion. Yet, it is essential that subjects understand that they are free
to obtain reinforcers regardless of their performance of the target behavior (Bass,
1972; Catania, 1975). Unless these conditions are satisfied, what appears to be SR
may actually be self-administered consequences that are controlled by an external
agent.
Third, students in most SR studies experience surveillance by teachers or other
authority figures that may influence their SR practices (e.g., Belfiore et aI., in
press). For most students, teachers are well-established discriminative stimuli for
certain behavior patterns and may discourage unearned consumption of reinforcers.
A fourth type of external confound is instructional sets and external contingencies
on the self-reinforcing responses. In many SR studies, students are provided defini-
tions of the target response and informed of the available reinforcers and the rules
for self-administration of reinforcers (e.g., Salend & Allen, 1985). Other studies
include specific contingencies for accurate SR (e.g., Drabman et aI., 1973). Such
external constraints on the SR process limit inferences regarding the self-deter-
mination of behavior.
A final external confound COncerns the presence of external contingencies on the
target behavior in addition to SR. Most classrooms arrange contingencies for aca-
demic work and social behavior that often operate concurrently with SR programs
(e.g., Kaufman & O'Leary, 1972). In addition, effects may be supplemented by
natural contingencies that accompany improved behavior such as grades, privileges,
attention, and avoidance of aversive consequences. Although extraneous contingen-
cies also hamper clear interpretation of other types of research, however, as external
sources of control, their presence in many SR Studies makes it difficult to attribute
behavior change to self-determined contingencies.
Operant research on SR has investigated two major hypotheses: (a) When access
to reinforcers is freely available, will individuals administer them contingent On
their own behavior? and (b) Do self-administered consequences function as discrim-
inative stimuli for behavior controlled by delayed environmental contingencies?
With regard to hypothesis (a), Bass (1972) observed that the notion of self-rein-
forcement runs counter to the Premack principle (Premack, 1959). Bass contended,
"There is no reason to believe that individuals will switch from emitting high prob-
ability behavior to emitting low probability behavior in order to administer them-
selves rewards that they already possess and can administer to themselves in any
event" (p. 196). Instead, Bass believed that individuals would consume unearned
reinforcers if they knew there were no aversive consequences for doing so. He
exposed different groups of fifth-grade students to different reinforcement histories
for compliance with a non-academic, laboratory-type task prior to an SR condition.

Children with a history of reinforcement for noncompliance with instructions con-
sistently awarded themselves money without meeting their own criteria for rein-
forcement compared to subjects without this history. In a similar vein, Wall (1983)
found that fifth-grade students free to determine their own standards for perfor-
mance within reinforcement contingencies set for themselves increasingly lenient
standards for completing language-arts work units over a six-week period. Jones and
Ollendick (1979) reported that third- and fourth-grade, low SES students' self-
rewarded arithmetic performance dropped sharply with low external performance
demands. Many other studies have similarly reported that children inflated their
records of their performance to obtain unearned reinforcers when aversive conse-
quences were not applied for "cheating" (e.g., Hundert & Batstone, 1978; Speidel &
Tharp, 1980).
Several studies have tried to assess the discriminative or feedback properties
of SR procedures. Nelson et al. (1983) compared a work-reward and a reward-
work sequence using standard SR procedures. Both sequences increased the num-
ber of workbook questions attempted over a control condition, although the reward-
work sequence resulted in more accurate answers. Obtaining similar effects from
either sequence suggested that SR may have a discriminative rather than a rein-
forcement function.
Two studies by Hayes and his associates found SR effects to be dependent on pub-
licly known performance goals. In the first study, Hays et ai. (1985) found that SR
produced no effects when subjects' self-determined goals and contingencies were
private. However, when subjects wrote their goals on paper and the experimenter
read each person's goal aloud, self-administration of rewards produced a sharp
increase in correct answers on a reading quiz. The second study similarly found
that SR procedures that included goal setting were ineffective without public-
performance feedback (Hayes et aI., 1986). Public feedback with goal setting and
SR likewise failed to improve performance. Together, these findings suggest that
social contingencies apart from the SR procedure had ultimate control of behavior.
The act of self-administering rewards may have strengthened the relationship
between the target behavior and the social contingencies that controlled it. As Hayes
et ai. (1986) state, "One possibility is that goal setting works not because it sets a
self-standard, but because it sets a social standard. . .. Thus, goal setting might
establish a socially available standard against which [subjects'] performance can
be evaluated" (p. 35). Results consistent with this interpretation have also been
reported by Castro, de Perez, de Albanchez, and de Leon (1983) and Mace and
Kratochwill (1985).
Viewed collectively, the operant studies on the SR process answer some questions
and raise many others. We share the conclusion of several other authors that there
is little evidence to support the view that individuals regulate their own behavior by
making their access to freely available reinforcers contingent on meeting perfor-
mance standards. Across several studies, subjects consistently consumed rein-
forcers noncontingently when they were aware that there were no negative
consequences for doing so. In other studies, a consistent temporal relation between
42 EC. Mace, P.J. Belfiore, and M.e. Shea
behavior and self-administered rewards could be explained by numerous uncon-

trolled external variables.
Operant theorists, on the other hand, have argued that self-administered conse-
quences, especially when coupled with feedback and performance standards, have
a "mediational;' "cuing;' or "discriminative" function. Thus, operant theorists say,
SR serves to strengthen the relationship between behavior and the delayed conse-
quences of which the behavior is a function. In our view, research findings thus far
neither confirm or contradict the operant explanation. This is not surprising when
we consider how slippery Jerms like "mediation" and "cuing" are. A necessary step
in the further development of operant theory on self-regulation is to specify the oper-
ant processes that link behavior to its delayed consequences. For example, Baer
(1984) suggested the process is similar to a chained schedule. This hypothesis is
valuable because it is testable and it corresponds to a known behavioral phenome-
non. If the analogy holds, we need to learn which sequences of stimuli produce the
most effective chain and why some stimuli, like self-administered consequences and
public goal setting, seem to facilitate SR effects more than others.
Although much research is needed to provide a full account of self-regulation from
the operant perspective, existing theory and research offer specific direction for the
development of self-regulation programs in educational settings. The following
section summarizes the major variables that appear to promote self-regulation and
illustrates their application with a hypothetical case.
Case Illustration of Operant Self-Regulation

Operant theory and research has identified several factors that appear to be central
to the development and maintenance of self-regulated behavior. First, the response
to be self-regulated should be discriminable. SM methods should be adopted that
help an individual notice when and how many target behaviors have occurred.
Second, the environment should be arranged to include several salient discrimina-
tive stimuli that set the occasion for desirable behavior. Likewise, discriminative
stimuli that occasion maladaptive behaviors should be eliminated or reduced in
number wherever possible. Third, discriminative stimuli for desirable behavior
should be arranged in an effective instructional sequence that makes it clear what
behaviors should be performed, when each behavior should be performed, and
what should be done if an incorrect response occurs. Fourth, the immediate and
delayed consequences for emitting and failing to emit the target behaviors should be
explicitly stated. Frequent verbal Or nonverbal reminders of these consequences
should be provided. Fifth, each step in the self-regulation process should be fol-
lowed by an immediate consequence that is likely to strengthen performance of
the step and prompt performance of the next step in the sequence.
The following hypothetical case illustrates how these key elements can be com-
bined to create a comprehensive self-regulation program. Our hypothetical student
is Art, a fourth-grade boy of average intellectual ability. He has an experienced
teacher who is generally skilled at instruction and classroom management. The
teacher uses a variety of instructional methods and media for most subjects and
attempts to individualize instruction where possible. Since the beginning of the

school year, Art's academic performance and conduct have deteriorated steadily. His
average grades on homework, seatwork, and tests have dropped from B's to D's and
F's in reading and math. Although his overall grades are poor, the pattern of his per-
formance is very inconsistent within and across assignments that cover essentially
the same material. Art's academic performance appears to be related to his frequent
misconduct in the classroom. Several times throughout the day Art is observed to be
out of his seat without permission, teasing his classmates, talking loudly and calling
out during work periods, and generally off-task during assignments and lectures.
The first step in developing a self-regulation program is for the teacher to solicit
Art's cooperation with the program. In addition to describing the program to Art,
operational definitions of Art's target behaviors will be provided to Art so that he
understands clearly which of his behaviors are to be increased and which are to be
decreased. In Art's case, target behaviors to increase are the percentage of assign-
ment and test items answered correctly and the number of class periods per day with
"good behavior." Target behaviors for Art to decrease included unauthorized out-of-
seat behavior, talking out of tum, and teasing his classmates.
The teacher will train Art to use a comprehensive self-monitoring procedure.
Training will include definition of the target behaviors and repeated practice using
the SM device. A list of "good" behaviors and "misbehaviors" to be self-monitored
will be taped to Art's desk. Designated "good" behaviors include sit in seat, work on
the assignment, raise hand for questions or help, look at and listen to the teacher
when the teacher speaks, and answer the teacher's questions. Art's list of "mis-
behaviors" include out-of-seat, talking out-of-turn, and teasing or disrupting class-
mates. During seat assignments and tests, Art will record his completion of each step
in the problem-solving sequence (see discussion of self-instruction below) on an SM
form. The SM form lists each SI step and has a space to record its completion for
each problem attempted. Art will also be able to record his score on each assignment
or test at the top of the SM form. A second SM form will be used to record Art's
classroom conduct. The form will list the targeted misbehaviors across the top of the
sheet and list half-hour blocks of time along the left-hand side of the form. Art will
self-record each occurrence of the inappropriate behaviors in the half-hour time
blocks. If no inappropriate behaviors occur in a time clock, Art will place a cartoon
sticker of his choice at the end of the time block indicating a "good behavior" period.
The accuracy of Art's SM will be checked randomly by the teacher and points
deducted for inaccuracies.
Art will also be taught to use a self-instruction procedure when completing assign-
ments and tests. The teacher will specify an ideal problem-solving sequence for Art
to follow for each type of reading and math problem. A sample SI sequence for divi-
sion problems (e.g., 483 divided by 7) might consist of the following steps:
(a) Determine the greatest number of times the first two numbers of the dividend
are divisible by the divisor and write this number (6) above the second number
in the dividend (8)
(b) Multiply this number (6) by the divisor (7) and write the product (42) under the
first two numbers of the dividend (48)
44 Ee. Mace, P.I Belfiore, and M.e. Shea
(c) Subtract this product (42) from the first two numbers of the dividend (48)
(d) Write the third number of the dividend (3) next to this difference (6)
(e) Determine the greatest number of times the number in d (63) is divisible by the
divisor (7) and write this number (9) above the third number in the dividend (3).
These steps may be written and/or illustrated by color enhancing each step in a
sample problem. Art may read each step aloud or to himself.
The final portion of the self-regulation program would specify the contingencies
for improved behavior and involve Art in the self-administration of consequences.
On a weekly basis, Art and his teacher should agree on performance standards for
his academic work and classroom conduct that will result in gradual improvement.
Art will grade his own papers within 10 min after completing the entire assignment
or test (with random accuracy checks by the teacher) and award himself 5 points for
each assignment and 10 points for each test in which his score meets or exceeds the
standard. Answers to the problems will be obtained from the teachers. In addition,
Art will also deduct 5 points for each half-hour period without good behavior below
his daily goal. Point totals for the day are self-recorded in a daily report card that Art
takes home and has his parents sign. At the beginning of each week, Art and his
parents should agree on a privilege that Art can earn ifhe meets his daily goals 4 out
of 5 days. To remind himself of his goal, Art can make a sign designating his reward
for the week and post it in a conspicuous location.
To summarize, Art will observe the following self-instructed learning sequence:
(a) Read the problem (silently or aloud)

(b) Read each problem solving step
(c) Write the answer to each step in the appropriate location
(d) Record completion of each SI step on the SM form
(e) Write the final solution
(f) Grade the assignment/test using the teacher's answer sheet
(g) Record the number correct on the SM form
(h) Award himself points for meeting or exceeding his performance standard
(i) Self-record his daily point total on his report card
(j) Exchange points for back-up reinforcers.
In practice, not all of these self-regulation procedures may be necessary to produce

satisfactory improvement in Art's behavior. The goal would be to use the minimum
number of components necessary to initially achieve the performance goals and
maintain performance over time.
Summary
This chapter reviewed the basic tenets of the operant theory of self-regulation.
Operant theorists view self-regulated behavior to be like all operant behavior, a
function of its consequences. Behavior becomes self-regulated when individuals
arrange the environment in a variety of ways to alter the probability oftheir behavior
producing reinforcing or punishing stimuli. These arrangements can be considered

subprocesses of operant self-regulation and include self-monitoring, self-instruc-
tion, and self-reinforcement. Using self-monitoring, individuals can learn to better
discriminate occurrences of their behavior and its relation to environmental conse-
quences. The techniques of self-instruction and self-reinforcement promote self-
regulation by providing discriminative stimuli and immediate consequences for
chains of behaviors that ultimately lead to reinforcing environmental consequences.
There is considerable research that calls into question the view that humans control
their behavior by contingently supplying private or public reinforcers. However, the
operant view of self-regulation whereby the techniques of self-control strengthen the
relationship between behavior and its delayed consequences has only preliminary
empirical support. At this stage, the processes of "mediation" and "cuing" are not
well understood. Further progress in an operant formulation of self-control will
depend on more specific theoretical explanations of these processes that may be
subjected to experimental analysis.
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3. Self-Regulated Learning and Academic
Achievement: A Phenomenological View
Barbara L. McCombs
My purpose in this chapter is to present recent theoretical and empirical work

regarding the contribution of a phenomenological view to our understanding of self-
regulated learning and how best to enhance students' development of self-regulated
learning capacities. I want to take you on an excursion through what has been said
by some of our most distinguished theoreticians about the self-the self as a primary
phenomenon, an experience of the experiencing self, that permeates and directs
human behavior. The excursion will begin with a look historically at the roots of the
"scientific"l search into self and its associated phenomena. The evolution of these
roots to the present time will then be explored as the means to understanding current
theoretical positions and how they are converging on our increased knowledge ofthe
role of self phenomena in all of human behavior, and particularly human behavior
in learning contexts. As we proceed, we will explore answers to the following ques-
tions: How can properties ofthe self (including its structure and processes) contrib-
ute to our understanding of its role in initiating and regulating the chain of events
leading to effective, self-regulated learning? How do the properties of the self fur-
ther define the nature of the cognitive and affective activities students engage in
while in learning situations? Can our understanding of the self-system and its opera-
tions help us provide more effective educational environments and practices to
maximize student motivation and learning?
Theoretical Overview
Let's begin, then, with a look at what is generally meant by a phenomenological
view and how this view can be defined in the context of self-regulated learning.
Phenomenology is a philosophical position and a methodology for validating the
I"Scientific" is in quotes because of the ongoing debate within the scientific community regarding what
constitutes science as concept and method.
52 B. L. McCombs
"truth" of this position. The methodology is based on the philosophical assumption

that the experience of consciousness and of self are real and can be systematically
studied and verified. Such self-phenomena as perceptions, cognitions, and emo-
tions related to the self or external events are considered primary influences on the
way information is processed, interpreted, and acted upon. In the context of self-
regulated learning, a phenomenological perspective is one that accepts the primacy
of self-phenomena in directing and regulating learning behaviors; it favors a person-
referenced over a performance-referenced account of self-regulated learning
processes and activities.
Historical Background
The term phenomenology was coined in the middle of the eighteenth century by
European philosophers (Misiak & Sexton, 1973). Although various doctrines were
encompassed within the phenomenological movement, the common core was the
method - a systematic and full exploration of consciousness and the objects of cons-
ciousness, or, in other words, all that is perceived, imagined, doubted, or loved.
This method explored consciousness in three phases: intuiting, analyzing, and
describing. Fundamental assumptions underlying this exploration were the inten-
tional and directional characteristics of consciousness, the recognition that "cons-
ciousness is always consciousness of something;' and the ontological priority of
consciousness in making possible the apprehension of all other forms of being that
compose reality (Jennings, 1986; Misiak & Sexton, 1973; Rosenberg, 1986).
In the phenomenological method, introspective observations are given rigorous
analysis and careful description (Jennings, 1986; Mays, 1985). "First-hand" subjec-
tive accounts are assumed to be valid and are directed at the self as experimental sub-
ject or at the external world. Because of the primacy or ontological priority of
consciousness in all perception, cognition, and affect, the phenomenological study
of consciousness provides the information base both for building theory and for
deciding whether various theories give an adequate account of the actual
experiences of consciousness, the actual "facts of perception" (Jennings, 1986;
Mays, 1985).
Phenomenology began as a reaction to deterministic and naturalistically oriented
theories of human behavior. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is credited with advanc-
ing phenomenological psychology as a response to prevalent "world view
philosophies;' He argued that these philosophies (a) ignored the essential nature of
reality as being unable to exist apart from the conscious experience of beholding it,
and (b) instead contended that psychological phenomena could be reduced to and
understood by the laws of physical phenomena (Jennings, 1986). Husserl was con-
vinced that philosophies that "equated" consciousness with physical nature-correl-
ating mental and physical events - could not provide a full understanding of human
nature. He recommended that phenomenological analyses precede experimental
studies as a way to apprehend and delineate the essential acts of consciousness (Jen-
nings, 1986; Misiak & Sexton, 1973).
Husserl was a catalyst for growing dissatisfaction with the logical positivism base
of psychological theorizing and the physical sensation limits this base placed on the
3. Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement 53
conception of experience (Spiegelberg, 1972). With phenomenology, the self and a

range of new phenomena and new interpretations in psychology were "allowable"
objects of scientific inquiry. Heidegger also advocated a union between psychology
and philosophy during the 1920s by arguing for the necessity of a phenomenological
approach to the understanding of human existence based on the uniqueness and
primacy of our experience of "being" (McCall, 1983; Spiegelberg, 1972). His
"hermeneutic" phenomenology allowed an interpretive approach to defining human
existence by our relations not only to other beings, but also to Being itself and its
fundamental characteristics (McCall, 1983; Spiegelberg, 1972). During the 1930s,
Husserl's student, Marvin Farber, however, was credited with bringing phenome-
nology to America by founding the International Phenomenological Society
(Misiak & Sexton, 1973).
Two early indigenous phenomenologists in America were Donald Snygg and his
collaborator, Arthur Combs. In the 1940s Snygg presented his view of the "phe-
nomenal self' as the world within an individual that is maintained and enhanced by
a relatively permanent "perceived self" (Misiak & Sexton, 1973). Other "self the-
orists" who appeared around this time included Carl Rogers, Rollo May, Abraham
Maslow, and Viktor Frankl (Misiak & Sexton, 1973; Spiegelberg, 1972).
Slowed down by the rise of Skinnerian and other behaviorist theories in the 1950s
and 1960s, phenomenology is, according to Jennings (1986), again attracting ever-
growing attention. This reemergence reflects more than an appreciation for subjec-
tive self-report data, but also a concern with understanding and experimentally
studying the essential character of consciousness (Jennings, 1986). There is a grow-
ing literature on the significant role of self phenomena, and in particular, the self-
concept as one of the most important and significant regulators of behavior (Markus
& Wurf, 1987). Let's now take a look at the current phenomenological view as
expressed by some of our more noted theoreticians and empiricists.
Current Views
According to Misiak and Sexton (1973), a phenomenological approach is defined
thus:
In the broadest sense, any psychology which considers personal experience in its subject mat-
ter, and which accepts and uses phenomenological description, explicitly or implicitly, can
be called phenomenological psychology. It is contrasted with psychology which admits only
objective observation of behavior and excludes introspection and phenomenological descrip-
tion in its methodology. (p. 40)
In fact, Nicholls (1987) argues that approaches that take a "technical" orientation to
human affairs of necessity have to abandon" ... anything of metaphysical comfort
and moral significance, (thereby) reducing the value of psychology for answering
questions about how we should conduct our lives" (p. 2).
This "chastising" of dominant theories of human motivation and behavior can also
be heard in the words of philosophically oriented psychologists like Daniel Robin-
son. Robinson (1987) maintains that current psychological theories discount the
importance of self phenomena, particularly the explanatory value of "agency" in
54 B.L. McCombs
motivation and behavior. He argues that notions of determinism still underly cur-
rent theories-even the self-actualization theory of Abraham Maslow and the
social cognitive theory of Albert Bandura - in the sense that basic needs or social
conditions are seen as more causal than "authentic" agency. Authentic agency is
the full expression of self as a self-defined and self-disciplined agent that seeks
full self-expression under the standards of self-perfection. Humans are defined as
"authentic" to the degree they self-select and define those external influences that
appear most nurturing of self (see Schunk in this volume for an alternative view
of Bandura's theory). In keeping with this view, Giorgi (1985) argues that "a radi-
cal shift in perspective [in scientific research] is necessary to do justice to human
phenomena" (p. vii). He believes that phenomenology clarifies psychology's foun-
dation as a human science and allows greater fidelity to conscious phenomena than
traditional science.
Sameroff (1987) has criticized both the passive person-active environment
models underlying behavior modification and other Skinnerian approaches and the
active person-passive environment models of Piaget and Chomsky for the limits
they have placed on understanding. He contends that what is needed is a transac-
tional model-an active person-active environment model-in which individuals
change reality and these changes affect the behavior of individuals, in a dynamic
developmental process in time between individuals and their social context (see
Mace, Belflore, & Shen in this volume). Similarly, Gardner (1987) has recently
taken a more "phenomenal" perspective on human development and has expressed
dissatisfaction with prevailing modular views of intelligence as separate informa-
tion-processing systems. He states, "From a phenomenological perspective, we
individuals do not feel like a number of different systems; there is the perception of
a unified entity, with a sense of self and with a single consciousness (p. 6)."
Howard (1986) contends that because humans are continually and actively
involved in their own process of "becoming;' they can be influenced, positively or
negatively, by how the sciences, particularly psychology, view them. He argues for
the subjective, personal, and intuitive side of research as a way to understand fully
the unique volitional and self-determined nature of human functioning. Thus the
science of psychology must begin with an analysis of humans and their characteris-
tics and then agree on the techniques, procedures, and designs that are most
appropriate to understanding their characteristics-not the reverse, as happened
with the acceptance of logical positivism as the philosophical base for psychology.
Howard further argues for an active agency model of self-creation through meaning-
ful actions in pursuit of the agent's goals, plans, and intentions-a model also advo-
cated by Harre and Secord (1972) and more recently by Manicas and Secord (1983).
Howard (1986) believes this type of model can give us knowledge regarding human
possibilities as causal and interpretive beings. Human volition is viewed as a gener-
ative structure that is goal directed, purposeful, or teleological in nature-a struc-
ture that gives entities their causal force, with self as the agent who "wields the
power of personal agency." (See Como's chapter for further information about
volitional processes.)
With these general trends in current theorizing in mind, let's tum to self theorists'
views on the nature and purpose of self-phenomena in self-regulation.
Theories About the Self
William James was one of the first American psychologists to develop ideas and
theories regarding the self (Brownback, 1982). James distinguished between self-
feelings, self-love, and self-estimation. To him, self-feelings conveyed worth or sta-
tus and equated to self-esteem; self-love referred to will and actions toward self-
preservation; self-estimation referred to intellectual judgments based on more
objective assessments of competency. James's notions encompassed the affective,
motivational (volitional), and cognitive aspects of self.
Among contemporary theorists, the self is viewed as the active constructor of cog-
nitive representations and understanding of an objective world. For example, Rosen-
berg (1986) argues that this is possible because the self is both a "self-conscious"
subject of experiences and the object of them. That is, the self can "know itself" in
two ways: as a position in social space and as a causally potent spatiotemporal
natural object. In this sense, the self is a dynamic center, always in a state of becom-
ing, an agent and the product of its own creation (Westphal, 1982).
Harter (1987) has theorized about and empirically studied self development and
the self-system's role in motivation and achievement from a structural and process-
oriented (functional) perspective. Her work has been particularly influenced by the
theories of James and Cooley-particularly James's notion that self-esteem is
directly related to the ratio of one's successes to one's aspirations in specific domains
(domain-specific evaluations of the importance of these domains), and Cooley's
notion that self-worth is based on our perceptions of what significant others think of
us. In Harter's (1985, 1986, 1987) view, self-evaluations are primary determinants
of affect, motivation, and achievement. Individuals' evaluations of competence and
significant others' attitudes determine self-worth to the degree they are considered
important in specific domains.
From a developmental perspective, there is general agreement that one's judg-
ments about the self are both global and domain-specific. In Harter's (1985) work,
for example, six self-domains have been found to be relevant in pre-adolescent
learners: scholastic competence, athletic competence, social competence, social
acceptance, physical appearance, and behavior/conduct. In addition to these
domains, Harter has also identified three other domains relevant to adolescents: job
competence, romantic appeal, and close friendship. The concept of one's global self-
esteem or self-worth emerges about mental age eight and is operationalized and
measured by its own independent set of items that assess how much one likes oneself
as a person (e.g., Some teenagers are often disappointed with themselves, but Other
teenagers are pretty pleased with themselves. Whis is most like you?) It is further
predicted by the discrepancy between domain-specific judgments and attitudes
about the importance of success in each domain, as well as by perceived social
support. Harter (1986) contends that global self-concept is not the sum total of all
the evaluations that are made about the self. Rather, it is a function of how important
students view these different domains and/or doing well in these domains as well as
the support available from significant others.
In recent research with elementary- and middle-school children, Harter (1987)
found that the importance one attaches to being competent in a particular domain
56 B.L. McCombs
and the support one perceives is available from significant others were relatively
independent determinants of global self-worth. In addition, she found that although
self-worth has some small direct effects on motivation, its influence is primarily
mediated through affect, thus supporting the position that self-worth is not
epiphenomenal- a secondary phenomenon caused by something else. Developmen-
tal changes noted in primary- and middle-school children were predominantly in
their perceptions of the importance of particular domains and dominant sources of
support. She also found that children below the age of eight do not have a consoli-
dated concept of worth as a person (i.e., general self-worth items did not form a
separate factor nor did the items systematically cross-load on other factors) and do
not distinguish mood from interest (i.e., items focusing on the degree to which one
is happy or sad were not distinguishable from items tapping the degree to which one
liked or wanted to engage in specific activities).
The active, self-initiated nature of children's development of self-knowledge is
emphasized by Ruble (1987). Her work supports the view that self-development is
a self-defined and constructed process of information seeking, motivated by age-
related needs and interest. In her research, Ruble has documented that children are
maximally sensitive to certain kinds of information during relatively circumscribed
time periods. She states, " ... the kind of information available at the time of height-
ened interest in or susceptibility to relevant information is important because once
a conclusion about the self is formed (e.g., as incompetent in school), subsequent
information processing is likely to be selective and behavioral choices restricted"
(p. 262). This work thereby illustrates the primary and important influence self-
evaluative processes and existing self-structures have on the way information is
processed and acted upon.
Eccles (1983, 1984) assumes that a person's interpretations of events are more
powerful determinants of actions than the events themselves. She has postulated
that once self-concepts are formed, they guide the perception of the value of learning
activities, expectations for success, and achievement behaviors like persistence and
performance. As individual's self-perceptions, needs, and goals playa major role in
the personal value he or she attaches to a particular learning task. Also cited as con-
tributing to the overall value of the task are variables such as the importance of doing
well (attainment value), the inherent and immediate enjoyment expected from
engaging in the task (intrinsic or interest value), and the perceived importance of the
task for some future goal (utility value). These variables mediate students' choices
about whether they will engage in the types of activities (e.g., self-regulated learn-
ing processes) that promote task mastery. Other important mediators discussed by
Eccles (1983) include individuals' sex-role identity and values, and the perceived
cost of success or failure, such as the perceived effort required, the perceived loss
of valued alternatives, and the perceived psychological cost of failure (e.g., loss of
self-esteem). The personal value students attached to a task is thus one variable that
influences their motivation and use of self-regulated learning strategies.
Higgins's (1987) "self-discrepancy theory" considers the specific kinds of discom-
fort or emotional problems associated with particular types of belief incompatibil-
ity. This theory posits three basic domains of the self: (a) the actual self, or the
self-state representations of attributes you or another person believe you actually

possess; (b) the ideal self, or the self-state representations of attributes you or others
would like you, ideally, to possess; and (c) the ought self, or the self-state represen-
tations of attributes that you or others believe you should possess. Crossing these
three domains with the "own"/"other" dimensions yields six basic types of self-state
representations. Our own and others' beliefs about our "actual self" are said to
be the basis of our self-concept; the other combinations (ideal/own, ideal/other,
ought/own, ought/other) are "self-guides" that motivate and direct our behavior.
As Higgins states, "Self-discrepancy theory postulates that we are motivated to
reach a condition where our self-concept matches our personally relevant self
guides" (p. 321).
In Higgins's (1987) framework, each type of discrepancy reflects a particular type
of negative psychological situation that, in tum; is associated with specific emo-
tional or motivational problems. The two basic kinds of negative psychological
situations are: (a) the absence of actual or expected positive outcomes and (b) the
presence of actual or expected negative outcomes. These situations lead to
dejection-related or agitation-related emotions, respectively. Data supporting this
theory indicate that discrepancies between one's actual and ideal self are better
predictors of self-esteem (feelings of worth) than global self-concept (how we define
ourselves). In this view, affective reactions to self-evaluations that yield discrepan-
cies between what we are and want to be are primary determinants of motivation to
achieve our self-goals.
Highly consistent with the preceding frameworks-while at the same time provid-
ing an intuitively appealing integration of both our current and historical under-
standing of self phenomena - is the recent theorizing of Markus and her colleagues,
which emphasizes the motivational role of the self-system in basic striving for
desired self-conceptions and self-fulfillment (Markus & Nurius, 1987; Markus &
Sentis, 1982; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Ruvolo & Markus, 1986). This theory suggests
that individuals' images of their self in future situations become part of their working
self-concepts and, as such, these images provide a specific self-relevant form and
direction to motivation. Of particular interest in Markus's work is the notion of
"possible selves" - cognitive manifestations of enduring goals, aspirations, fears,
and threats that exist within an individual's self-system. Self-structures are defined
as generalizations derived from prior experience, which can define past, present,
and future (possible) selves, and which can help in the integration and explanation
of our own behavior. It is the possible selves that provide the plans and strategies for
the future- that put the self in action. In this view, individuals will control and regu-
late their behavior because of investments in future plans by their possible selves.
Ruvolo and Markus (1986) contend that possible selves have two functions: an affec-
tive function of making one feel good or bad, and a motivational function of creating
incentives and guiding actions.
In addition, Markus and Wurf (1987) have emphasized the dynamic and mul-
tifaceted nature of self-concept - a schema that is both a structure and a process and
that can present the self as both "known" and "knower." Self-concept is seen as
domain-specific and global, with different degrees of "accessibility." What is termed
58 B.L. McCombs
the "working self-concept" is the accessible self-concept of the moment, a continu-

ally active and shifting array of self-conceptions that are tied to the prevailing cir-
cumstances. Markus and Wurf argue that there are direct ties between
self-structures (what individuals think, feel, and believe about themselves) and self-
regulation. This position is based on the generally accepted view that self-regulated
behavior is directed toward some goal. The first step in self-regulation, then,
becomes goal selection, which is determined singly or jointly by (a) expectations
about self-competencies and task outcomes; (b) affective factors such as needs,
motives, and values; and (c) desired self-conceptions that represent general life
goals, which have been personalized into particular goals and behaviors. As goals
are selected, they give form and direction to the second step in self-regulation, plan-
ning, and strategy selection. Finally, in the performance execution and evaluation
step, self-monitoring and self-evaluation processes assist in the maintenance of
attention, comparison of actual and desired goals, and attempts to reduce perfor-
mance discrepancies.
In further discussing research on the role of the self-concept in self-regulation,
Markus and Wurf (1987) contend that self-concept is seen as a critical variable in
how smoothly self-regulatory processes function-their effectiveness, efficiency,
consistency, and so forth. The facilitative or debilitative effects of self-focusing,
however, are cited as evidence that finer distinctions are needed between the struc-
tural and functional aspects of the self. Markus and Wurf suggest that the resolution
may lie in distinguishing the I (process-oriented agent, dynamic aspects of self) and
the me (structural and descriptive content of the self). In their model ofthe dynamic
self-concept, it is the working self-concept - the accessible self-representations-
that regulates individuals' ongoing actions and reactions. They state, " ... the struc-
tures active in the working self-concept are the basis on which the individual initi-
ates actions and also the basis for the observation, judgment and evaluation of these
actions" (pp. 314-315). In tum, the contents ofthe working self-concept are deter-
mined by the individual's self-motives in conjunction with social circumstances. In
this view, then, self-regulation is more determined by dynamic self-structures than
by the lor agenic and volitional characteristics of self.
According to Markus and Wurf (1987), the dynamic structural aspects of the
working self-concept shape and control two broad classes of behavior: intrapersonal
processes (self-relevant information processing, affect regulation, motivational
processes) and interpersonal processes (social perception, social comparison, seek-
ing out and shaping interactions with others). The regulation of affect involves
defending the self against negative emotional states, which may be motivated by
goals for self-consistency and self-enhancement. That is, individuals will strive for
consistent and positive self views and will regulate negative affect to protect these
self views. Finally, the nature of self-concept structures is seen as both continuous
and stable, while at the same time as dynamic and capable of change. Thus, a trait-
state view of the self-system is posited.
I believe that to extend fully the preceding theoretical framework to encompass
the phenomenological perspective requires several refinements and additions. First,
the distinction between the experience of self and its operation suggests that the
creative and self-generated aspects of self are separate from what is created-even
if what is created is a complex and dynamic hierarchical structure. The concept of
"authentic agency" as described by Robinson (1987)-the self-determined and voli-
tional aspects of self-cannot be equated with the structures or with the self-creative
and self-defming processes that build these structures. In many ways, this agrees
with the suggestion of Markus and Wurf (1987) of separating the I and me aspects
of self. It is not clear, however, whether this separation of the process and structure
is sufficient, for it leaves out our experience of being and of self. The question of
"who" is creating the self-structures needs to be distinguished from "what" is created
and "how" the resulting structures are created. There is no question that much
progress has been made in our understanding of the "what" (structures) and the
"how" (processes) that make up the self-system and the development of both. I
believe that the phenomenological perspective can continue to assist us in furthering
our understanding of the sense of agency and volitional nature of the "who" aspects
of self as both the knower and the known.
What the phenomenological perspective can add is this: The "who" aspects of self
are important to our understanding of how best to enhance not only students'
development of positive self-concepts, perceptions of self-worth, and competence,
but also their beliefs about their locus of responsibility, degree of self-determination,
and sense of agency in creating positive possibilities for self-development and self-
regulation. A structural cause for the development of these beliefs appears to be
insufficient for fully explaining the nature of the self-phenomena as we experience
it. Furthermore, there is growing support for our continued exploration in this area.
For example, researchers who have been identified as supporting cognitive and
information processing interpretations oflearning recognize the important role self-
phenomena play in not only positive motivation and affect for learning, but in learn-
ing itself. Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, and Pressley (in press) state, "The self system
is important because it appears to underlie the development of a metacognitive sys-
tem and helps determine the quality of academic achievement" (p. 10). They argue
that the self-system provides the necessary motivation and affective states for help-
ing students become self-regulated and self-determined, whereas the metacognitive
system provides the means to reach that goal. Interventions to enhance self-
regulated learning thus need to focus on the development of both systems - the self-
system and the metacognitive system.
In summary, then, this theoretical overview has led us through the historical
background of the phenomenological perspective in psychology. We have seen the
philosophical assumptions underlying the validity of self-phenomena and the
methodology that is appropriate for systematically studying these phenomena. We
have also taken a look at the evolution of phenomenological views about the nature
of the self from early to present self-theories. We saw in these current theories the
recognition of the primacy of self-system structures and processes in self-regulation,
and an understanding of the global and domain-specific structural organization of
the self-system as well as its dynamic and relatively stable characteristics. Further,
we saw a recognition that self-system structures and the processes that support the
building of these structures develop over time via individuals' interactions with their
60 B.L. McCombs
social/physical environment. We heard a consensus among current self theorists

regarding the self's continual and active role in its own becoming-an active agent
model of self-definition. Finally, we saw the role self-system structures and
processes play in self-regulation in general and self-regulated learning in particular,
and the importance of self-evaluations of personal agency and learning competence
to the development and execution of self-regulated learning behaviors, cognitions,
and affect. Let's tum next to a delineation of specific self-system structures and
processes in self-regulated learning and how these can be assessed from a
phenomenological perspective.
Self-System Structures and Processes

in Self-Regulated Learning
Just as self-development is a generative and active process, so is learning, with the

self playing a key role in generating hypotheses, interpretations, predictions, and in
the processing and organization of information (Wittrock, 1987). The self's basic
role in the learning process is to generate the motivation to approach and persist in
learning activities-as a function of evaluating the personal meaningfulness and
relevance of learning activities relative to individual goals and beliefs about one's
competencies and abilities. As Wittrock (1987) has stated, motivation is a function
of one's beliefs and" ... above all, it is the belief in one's self, as a teacher or as a
learner" (p. 13). We know from the preceding section and from literature reviewed
elsewhere (McCombs, 1986, 1987a) that our beliefs are organized in self-structures
and are formed by a variety of self-processes. Self-structures represent our personal-
ized and self-defined conceptualizations of self-attributes-organized as a global,
relatively stable self-concept and as domain-specific conceptualizations of our
attributes in specific areas relevant to our lives at particular periods and moments
in time. It is the purpose of this section to explore the phenomenological perspective
to understanding and assessing self-system structures and processes relevant to self-
regulated learning.
Self-System Structures
Self-system structures can be classified, then, as either global or domain-specific
conceptualizations individuals generate regarding their attributes - including their
self-concept, self-image, and self-worth. These structures are formed over time, as
individuals develop from infancy into adulthood through interactions with the social
and physical environment. Information acquired about the self as a result of interac-
tions with the external context is transformed and modified cognitively to fit unique
experiences of self or being, including individual perceptions of needs and goals of
self-development. As individuals change and develop, their conceptualizations of
themselves change and develop such that more enduring and permanent aspects of
self can structurally be thought of as existing separately from the more dynamic and
changing aspects of self.
Global self-concept in the context of self-regulated learning can be defined as

individuals' beliefs and perceptions of their ability to direct and control their cogni-
tion, affect, motivation, and behavior in learning situations in general. In large part,
it is both a learner's belief that he or she possesses the necessary knowledge, skills,
and abilities for the self-regulation of learning and an image of him- or herself as a
self-regulated learner. For example, one might assess this self-view by asking stu-
dents to express their degree of agreement with statements such as "I believe I can
work independently to achieve my learning goals." Thus, a global self-concept in this
context is one that incorporates self-beliefs as well as self-goals or values regarding
self-regulated learning. In the sense discussed by Markus, it may even include the
"future possible self" as a self-regulated learner.
Domain-specific self-concept in the context of self-regulated learning can be
defined as individuals' beliefs and perceptions of their ability to direct and control
their cognition, affect, motivation, and behavior in a particular type of learning situ-
ation or context (e.g., specific content areas and/or instructional approaches). Items
such as "I believe that in performing this mathematics problem I will be able to keep
myself from getting discouraged and giving up" could be used to assess domain-
specific self-concept. Thus, as individuals approach a learning task, situation, and
content domain, critical to their effectiveness are their beliefs and images of them-
selves as self-regulated learners, able to direct and control their learning processes
competently in that domain and context. Again, it is their "working self-concept;'
which is accessible at any given time, that structures their plans and strategies and
puts the self in action.
Self-System Processes
Just as self-system structures are global and domain-specific, so are self-system
processes. In recent reviews (McCombs, 1986, 1987a), I have found considerable
consensus regarding the importance of the following self-system processes in moti-
vation and self-regulated learning: self-awareness, self-evaluation, judgments
regarding the importance of specific competencies, expectations for success or
failure, self-development goals, and evaluations of the personal significance of the
task as assessed against these goals and the outcomes of other self-processes.
Widespread agreement exists that a particularly important process in self-
regulated learning is self-evaluation, particularly as this process relates to judg-
ments of personal control and competence in general and in specific situations (e.g.,
Baird & White, 1982, 1984; Bandura, 1977, 1982; Connell & Ryan, 1984; Coving-
ton, 1985; Harter, 1982, 1985; Harter & Connell, 1984; Maehr, 1985; Oka & Paris,
1985; Schunk, 1984; Showers & Cantor, 1985; Wang, 1983; Wang & Lindvall,
1984; Wang & Peverly, 1986; Zimmerman, 1985; Zimmerman & Pons, 1986). Self-
evaluations are also important as they relate to (a) understanding the self and the
learning tasks (Baird & White, 1982, 1984; Connell & Ryan, 1984); (b) learning out-
comes (Bandura, 1977; Wang & Lindvall, 1984); (c) one's own and others' expecta-
tions (Eccles, 1984; Schunk, 1984); (d) the importance of the task and of doing well
(Eccles, 1983; Harter, 1985; Showers & Cantor, 1985); and (e) the cost or effort
required (Eccles, 1983; Paris, Newman, & Jacobs, 1985).
62 B.L. McCombs
From the phenomenological perspective, self-system processes important to self-

regulated learning can be defined as those aimed at creating beliefs in one's personal
competence and control in learning situations; defining self-relevant learning and
self-regulation goals and expectations; attending to and monitoring self-states,
expectations, and goals; and regulating and directing affect, motivation, and
behavior. The causal relationships between these self-system processes and the self-
system structures active in students' abilities to be self-regulated learners can be
delineated as shown in Figure 3-1.
As students approach a learning task, they evaluate their perceptions of task
requirements against their personal needs for competence and control (self-
development and self-determination), and their personal self-system structures
(self-views, values, beliefs, and goals)-as well as against their judgments about
their competence and control capabilities to perform that particular learning task.
Outcome expectancies for success or failure are then formed. The result of these
processes, if positive, leads to positive affect (e.g., confidence) and the motiva-
tion to approach the learning task and to put in the effort and persistence required
to succeed in the task. On the other hand, if these evaluations are negative, nega-
tive affect (e.g., anxiety) will result and the basic motivation will be to avoid
the learning task and the expenditure of any effort or persistence. Success is
the likely outcome of positive self-evaluations, affect, and motivation; failure is
the likely outcome of negative self-evaluations, affect, and motivation. For example,
let's take the case of a seventh-grade student who has just been assigned a set
of math word problems in which he must decide on the appropriate mathemati-
cal operations to be used to solve each problem. The student iistens to the teacher
explain what is to be done and starts to work. As he looks at the problems, his
immediate reaction is, "Wow, these really look hard!" This perception of task
requirements will then influence his evaluation of his ability to solve the prob-
lems competently, will determine whether positive or negative affect is gen-
erated, and whether he. will have the motivation to apply the effort and persist-
ence required. (See Paris & Byrnes in this volume for a constructivist view of task
requirements. )
Abilities and other individual difference variables are assumed, of course, to play
a role in this causal process. However, internal perceptions, interpretations, and
expectancies primarily determine motivation and performance because of the
primacy of self-system needs and goals. The model is thus intended to be an internal-
process model whose variables operate independently of other individual difference
variables. Individual differences such as ability exert an important influence; they
are, however, relatively independent of internal perceptions and interpretations
(Bandura, 1986; McCombs, 1987b). For this reason, the importance of attending to
the causal phenomenological process conceptualized here is emphasized in terms of
conceptualizing instructional implications and their applications - topics I will be
addressing in the final two sections of this chapter.
Let's tum now to a look at some of the current literature supporting the structural
and functional role of self-phenomena in self-regulated learning.
Continuous Self-Evaluations, Planning, Goal Setting, Monitoring
...,
til
!!.
'i"
Global and Domain

Specific Knowledge Expectancies
Structures of, e.g., Self-Evaluations for Success/
i[
of, e.g., Failure
• Self-Identity
• Self-Worth • Competence
• Self-Values/Goals • Control
i
• Self-Concerns • Importance JJ'
~
1:1
Cl-
~
~
2.
n
- - - - - - - - - - _________ J
Continuous Use of Processing, Encoding, Retrieval, Strategies ~
::r
~.
S
(1)
a
Self-Reinforcement Learning- Task-
L -__________________________________________ ~I Processes
Outcome Performance 1011
..
1 - - -......
Evaluations Outcomes
FIGURE 3-1. Preliminary causal model of the role of the self-system in motivation and learning.
8i
64 B.L. McCombs
Supporting Literature
My purpose here is to highlight recent findings that provide substantiation for the
importance of self-phenomena - both structure and process - for an increased
understanding of self-regulated learning. Let's begin by taking a look at evidence in
support of the role of self-system structures in self-regulated learning.
Organization and Structure of Self

In defining the structure of self-knowledge, many theorists now agree that the self
is a compound set of multiple, hierarchically organized cognitive structures or
schemata - influenced by developmental, racial, and gender differences - that exert
a powerful influence on attention, organization and categorization of information,
recall, and judgments about others and events (Byrne, 1984; Byrne & Shavelson,
1986, 1987; Graham, 1988; Marsh, 1986; Marsh, Cairns, Relich, Barnes, 1986;
Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Shavelson & Bolus, 1982; Shavelson, Hubner, & Stan-
ton, 1976). As individuals grow and develop, they begin to define themselves in part
by information they receive about their capabilities to manipulate and control
objects in their environment (e.g., "If I hit this ball, I can make it roll.") as well as
information they receive from significant others (e.g., "Johnny's such a tall, strong
boy."). Markova (1987) points out that self-knowledge is achieved through making
decisions and doing, and that knowledge in general is gained through self-
knowledge.
As individuals develop from infancy into adulthood, they increasingly see them-
selves as a locus of causality, and engage in progressively higher-order syntheses of
their multiple systems of self-identification, with a reciprocal coordination and
integration of fundamental self-system processes (Connell & Ryan, 1984). What this
means is that as a child develops and grows, information being learned about the self
from his or her interactions with physical objects and other people becomes more
consolidated as well as more differentiated into areas or domains of self-knowledge.
If the child consistently sees that she can successfully master physical activities, for
example, the child will come to see herself as physically competent. Similarly, as the
child learns that praise from mother comes when he consistently behaves according
to her rules, the child will come to see himself as able to direct and regulate behavior
toward external standards. According to Connell & Ryan (1984), self-regulation
develops with the development of the self-with the internalization of selected
external standards and the development of self-control and competence. Develop-
ment is a gradual process of internalizing self-regulation knowledge and skills
through observation, direct teaching, and feedback from others. (See Rohrkemper
in this volume for Vygotsky's description of internalization.) In this sense, then, as
the child accumulates more consistent knowledge about the self as self-controlled
and self-directed, his or her concept as being capable of self-regulation develops. As
Markus and Nurius (1987) point out, however, without well-defined views of
the self in particular future situations the self-concept cannot guide and regulate
one's behavior.
Supporting the general and specific nature of self-judgments, Gottfried (1985)

reports high correlations between domain-specific competence (e.g., academic
competence) and intrinsic motivation in that domain, using fourth- and seventh-
grade students. She argues that just as self-concept is differentiated into school sub-
ject areas, so are competence evaluations and intrinsic motivation. Byrne and
Shavelson (1986) report, however, that the hierarchical structure of self-concept
weakens with increasing age. That is, in a comparison of data from preadolescents
with late adolescent children, correlations were found to be weaker between self-
concept constructs for older children. Although general self-concept remained at the
apex, descending to academic and then subject-specific self-concept, for older
students, self-concept became more differentiated, with correlations among the
self-concept facets (English and Math Self-Concept with General Self-Concept)
decreasing with increasing age.
The measurement of self-concept and the validation of general and specific areas
in which individuals define themselves has important implications for how we
assess individuals' capabilities and competencies in learning situations. In a recent
review by Byrne (1984), self-concept (SC) was found to be characterized as:
organized, multidimensional, hierarchical, stable, developmental, evaluative, and
differential. These characteristics refer to the fact that (a) people categorize the vast
information they have about themselves and relate these categories to one another;
(b) people organize information about themselves hierarchically, with perceptions of
behavior at the base, moving up to inferences about the self in certain domains (e.g.,
academic-English, science, history, mathematics), and then to inferences about the
self in general; (c) one's general self-concept is stable, changing little over time, but
as one goes down the hierarchy, self-concept becomes increasingly situation specific
and less stable; (d) as people develop from infancy into adulthood, self-concept
becomes increasingly multifaceted (organized into domains of relevance to the
individual); (e) people both describe and evaluate themselves, as when they say, "I
am happy" and "I do well in mathematics"; and (f) people can differentiate their
general and domain-specific self-concepts from other constructs such as personal or
academic achievement. She states: "In general terms, SC is our perception of our-
selves, in specific terms, it is our attitudes, feelings and knowledge about our abili-
ties, skills, appearance, and social acceptability" (p. 429). Byrne contends that for
individuals to maintain an overall positive self-concept, they must balance their poor
performance in one domain with good performance in another. Fleming and Court-
ney (1984), however, take the point further. They state that in addition to distin-
guishing our measurement of global and domain-specific self-concept, we need to
distinguish self-awareness (self-consciousness) from self-evaluation (self-esteem).
They consider self-concept to be a more general term that subsumes self-esteem;
that is, self-concept is self-descriptive whereas self-esteem is self-evaluative.
The need for both global and domain-specific assessments of self-system struc-
tures and processes has received wide support from multidimensional and hierarchi-
cal self-concept theorists (e.g., Byrne & Shavelson, 1986; Fleming & Courtney,
1984; Harter, 1985; Hoyle, 1986; Marsh, 1986). Harter (1982, 1986) argues for
assessing dimensions of the self-system as well as domains within these dimensions
66 B.L. McCombs
that have meaning in the life of the individual. Within her framework, dimensions
refer to constructs such as perceived competence, anxiety, and motivational orienta-
tion in the classroom; domains refer to areas such as scholastic competence, social
competence, and athletic competence. In addition to these domain-specific areas of
assessment, Harter argues for an independent assessment of individuals' global self-
worth. She maintains that global self-worth is best assessed by having individuals
think about their global worth as a person - by tapping these feelings directly rather
than inferring them from a sum or average of responses to a large array of items tap-
ping a diverse self-concept content (as is done in the Coopersmith or Pier-Harris
self-concept measures). Overall, Harter contends that global self-worth appraisals
are somewhat independent of the specific self-evaluations in discrete domains-the
whole is more than the sum of its parts. Fleming and Courtney's (1984) research
supports this position and suggests that global and domain-specific measures are
differentially important depending on the criterion variable of interest. For exam-
ple, the domain-specific self-concept of School Abilities was found to be related
to grade-point average, whereas the global measure of self-esteem was related to
measures of personal adjustment (e.g., anxiety, depression). By assessing both
global and domain-specific evaluations, then, a much richer picture of self-system
variables emerges.
The need for state and trait measures of both global and domain-specific self-
system constructs is a position I have argued recently (McCombs, 1986), but that
also has support from others in the field (Anderson, 1987; Bandura, 1982; Mischel,
1977; Nyquist, 1986; Spielberger et al., 1983). For example, Anderson's (1987)
work suggests that our processes of self-inference are active and dynamic (states),
but can lead to self-concept stability (traits) via self-maintaining cognitive strategies.
Bandura's (1982) work also suggests that need for state measures, in that proximal
self-perceptions have been shown to bear a closer relationship to action than remote
ones. My own work (McCombs, 1987b) in the area of designing and validating a bat-
tery of primary motivational variables (global and domain-specific, trait and state
evaluations of competence and control) shows that trait and state measures have
differential relationships to other self-system processes (expectancies, intentions)
and somewhat different factor structures, suggesting separate and differential con-
tributions to an understanding of underlying causal relations among self-system
variables. That is, in a study of first-term reenlistment decisions of Army enlisted
personal, global-trait evaluations were found to be most predictive of expectancies
regarding future career success whereas domain-specific states were most predic-
tive of intentions to remain in a particular job or career field. In addition, factor ana-
lyses revealed different factor structures for state and trait versions ofthe global and
domain-specific measures.
Recent work on "possible selves" and their structural properties by Markus
and her colleagues (Inglehart, Markus, & Brown, 1987; Inglehart, Wurf, Brown
& Moore, 1987) supports the view that possible selves have a cognitive (structur-
ing) and an energizing (perseverance) influence on behavior. Results of a study
with medical students indicate that possible selves (defined as the degree to which
3. 'Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement 67
play focused on medicine as their only future career) continue to predict aca-
demic performance for four to six years after they are measured (Inglehart, Mar-
kus, & Brown, 1987). Not only did these possible selves affect thinking by provid-
ing a clear goal, but they also motivated individuals to persevere in pursuing
their goals, as measured by higher ratings of possible career satisfaction and attrac-
tiveness by students who focused on medicine as their future career. Self-system
structures incorporated both goals and enduring representations of goal attainment.
Inglehart, Wurf, Brown, & Moore, (1987) have argued that the very process of
working toward important and valued self-goals itself enhances well-being and
positive affect.
Other researchers are investigating the central role of self-structures in learning.
For example, Srull and Gaelick (1983) argue that the self is a "cognitive prototype"
with a core that can be a fixed reference point to guide the processing of new infor-
mation. In a study with college students, a feature-matching approach was used in
assessing students' self and other similarity judgments. Students were asked how
similar others were to themselves or how similar they were to others on pairs of
personality-trait adjectives (e.g., intelligent-witty). This method was found to be an
effective way to examine both general self-processes and individual differences as
well as to investigate the nature of the self and how it operates in a social context.
Taylor (1987) also reports that in a study with late adolescents, both self-knowledge
and the use of self-concept were important in individuals' abilities to self-monitor
and regulate their behavior. Individual differences in self-monitoring were,
however, found to be related to differences in both personality predispositions (sen-
sitivity to internal vs. external cues) and development of metacognitive structures
and processes.
The importance of self-reference in motivation and achievement is highlighted in
a study by Reeder, McCormick, and Esselman (1987). In a prose-recall task with
undergraduate students, self-reference reading orientation (':.\s you read this pas-
sage, continually ask yourself whether this passage describes you") was compared
with other-reference (':A.s you read this passage, continually ask yourself whether
this passage describes Princess Diana"), linguistic (':.\s you read this passage, con-
tinually ask yourself whether there are any misspelled words in this passage"), and
control ("Read this passage") orientations. Self-reference produced better recall
than other-reference or control when students were working on tasks that were not
too difficult. Reeder et al. argue that self-reference tasks are highly motivating, lead-
ing to greater involvement and interest, and greater elaboration and deeper process-
ing. The self acts as a complex knowledge structure or framework for providing
internal cues at the time of encoding and retrieval of information. Further, they
found that the benefits of self-reference are not limited to narrative material that is
most easily associated with the self.
From this brief review, then, we can see that self-system structures playa central
role in the organization and processing of information, in the generation of positive
affect, and in the regulation of behavior. Let's turn next to recent work on self-
system processes found to be important in self-regulated learning.
68 B.L. McCombs
Self-System Processes and Self-Regulation
As we saw in the theoretical overview at the beginning of this chapter, self theorists
generally assume that behavior is motivated, at least in large part, by inherent self-
fulfillment or self-development goals and goals for self-determination or personal
control. From a phenomenological perspective, we strive for these goals in a self-
defined and self-disciplined fashion, as active agents molding and creating our self-
concepts by the continual engagement of processes that support the accomplishment
ofthese goals. We engage in self-monitoring and self-evaluation processes to support
our self-awareness, self-definition, and abilities to regulate and control our own self-
development process. As we grow and develop, learning tasks and experiences can
provide opportunities for the acquisition and application of self-system processes
for directing and controlling learning processes and behaviors. In effect, the
development of self-system structures and processes is assumed to be the fundamen-
tal phenomenon that explains the development of self-regulation. In the process of
self-development, increasing capabilities emerge for regulating and controlling
affect, motivation, and behavior-all in support of self-development and self-
determination goals.
Now, what does the research literature have to say in support of these points? Let's
begin with some recent research by Salovey (1987). Ofthose self-system processes
identified as important to self-regulated learning, Salovey highlights the centrality of
self-evaluation processes to attention, memory, affect, and behavior. In a study with
college students, Salovey examined a model ,that assumes mood-evoking
experiences change the way students organize information about themselves and
evaluate themselves. Findings indicated that because self-beliefs are evaluative in
nature, they may be closely linked to affect in memory such that when particular
moods are induced, they provide particularly effective cues for the recall of self-
evaluative information. This is in keeping with Covington and Omelich's (1987)
recent evidence supporting the view that anxiety can be interpreted as "failure-of-
self phenomenon." For less intellectually able students, in particular, anxiety was
found to be related to an anticipated loss of esteem at failure that, in turn, interfered
with performance by means of blockage mechanisms. Similarly, Curtis and Elkin
(1987) report the importance of affective elaboration in maintaining erroneous
beliefs and suggest that the affective elaboration system may dominate the cognitive
evaluation system in that affective impressions were found to be more durable
over time.
The primary importance of self-evaluative processes related to personal compe-
tence and control has been stressed by Nicholls (1983, 1984). He argues that stu-
dents' level of intrinsic motivation will be higher when they are mastering tasks they
want to do-tasks consistent with their personal needs and goals. Dweck (1986)
takes a similar position, pointing out that motivation can be adaptive or maladaptive
as a function of its goal orientation. If students have learning goals, they will seek
to increase their competence (knowledge and skills); if they have performance
goals, they will seek to gain favorable judgments of their competence or to avoid
negative judgments. Thus, goals aimed at self-development rather than approval of

others contribute to more positive and adaptive motivational patterns that can
underlie self-regulated learning.
Recent work by Harter (1986) focuses on the relationship between perceived com-
petence, affect, and motivational orientation in classroom settings. In a develop-
mental study, she reported that elementary and junior-high-school students who
perceived themselves as more competent had higher intrinsic motivation (self-
reported preference for challenging work, incentive to work to satisfy their own
interests, preference for independent mastery attempts). Further, path coefficients
from competence to affect to motivation was stronger for older students, suggesting
the increasing role of self-evaluative processes in the regulation of affect and moti-
vation. Based on the results of several studies, Harter (1986) stated, " ... it is not
only the valence of one's emotional reaction (positive vs. negative) which is critical
in mediating one's motivational orientation, but the specific affect itself (self-
emotion or externally directed emotion)" (p. 39). Thus it is students' development
of self-evaluation processes that leads to the development of self-affects of pride and
shame and, in tum, an internal, self-directed motivational orientation.
A study by Abrahams, Wageman, and Harackiewicz (1987) with high-school stu-
dents provides further support for the role of perceived importance to self in affect
and motivation for academic tasks. Positive feedback was found to raise interest
only when a student cared about doing well on the evaluated task. They stated,
"Competence valuation predicts both an affective involvement in attaining compe-
tence and heightened responsivity to competence information" (p. 1). When stu-
dents were given task-focused feedback (information regarding their scores on the
task), interest was raised compared with normative feedback on how they were
doing relative to others. In addition, the presence of performance-contingent
rewards and an achievement orientation raised competence valuation and enhanced
enjoyment. Similarly, in a recent study with college students Epstein, Stokes, and
Harackiewicz (1987) found that task interest was a function of students' affective
states, which, in tum, were a function of individuals' interpretations of subjective
competence cues or expectancies about how well they would do on academic tasks.
These findings suggest that students have to be aroused affectively, which results
from valuing competence and engaging in positive self-evaluations, to be opti-
mally motivated.
Manderlink and Harackiewicz (1984) have suggested that for effective self-
regulation, individuals need to direct their behavior at minimizing the discrepancy
between their current performance level and their goals. Goal achievement
enhances feelings of competence and also positively affects intrinsic motivation for
the task. Their evidence indicated that competence feedback benefits existing
intrinsic motivation by strengthening beliefs of personal control over goal attain-
ment. These feelings of personal causality are believed to be a more important deter-
minant of continued intrinsic motivation than perceptions of competence. On the
other hand, self-efficacy may be more critical than self-determination in initiating
task interest. (See also Schunk's description of the role of self-efficacy in this
70 B.L. McCombs
volume.) They further suggest that, after competence has been sufficiently devel-
oped, feelings of personal control and self-determination may be more relevant to
self-motivation and intrinsic interest.
Individuals' need to maintain positive self-beliefs has been stressed by a number
of researchers. Moore and Tesser (1987) argue that this need is primary in the way
individuals will choose to "engineer" their behavior to be consistent with their self
beliefs. Karabenick (1987) further suggests that students' help-seeking behavior is
determined first by whether they perceive that help will preserve their sense of self-
esteem. If these evaluations are positive, help-seeking will then contribute to their
use of learning strategies. Thus he contends that level of self-esteem and needs for
competence and control may well underlie students' use of help-seeking and other
learning strategies. Results from his study with college students indicate that
individual differences in self-esteem and needs to protect the self were not only
related to help-seeking and the use of other cognitive strategies, but also to the types
of strategies used (elaboration vs. rehearsal). That is, students with low self-esteem
chose to use less effective strategies (e.g., rehearsal) as a way to protect themselves
in the event of failure.
In addition to self-evaluation processes, Harter (1982) lists two other self-system
processes important to self-regulated learning: self-observation and self-reward.
She contends that all three processes require attending to self as an active agent in
engaging these processes and as an object or cognitive construction. Connell and
Ryan (1984) identify a slightly different set of self-system processes that support
one's striving to be competent and self-determined in academic situations: specific
and global self-evaluations, processes for coping with anxiety, processes for under-
standing locus of control for successes and failures, and motivational processes for
initiating and sustaining goal-directed and task-involved activity. Connell and Ryan
contend that these processes are in support of one's striving to be competent and self-
determined. Still other self-system processes that are metacognitive in nature
include self-perception or self-awareness (Eccles, 1983; Schunk, 1984) and self-
monitoring and checking (Wang & Lindvall, 1984; Zimmerman & Pons, 1986).
It is recognized, however, that students' abilities to capitalize on self-reference
strategies depend on self-awareness and self-monitoring processes. Figurski
(1987a,b) suggests that the development of self-awareness and other-awareness is
dependent on the ability to manipulate one's perspective. He states (1987a), " ... if
we can not consider the experience of the other, then we can never be objective
toward ourselves. The ability to manipulate perspective toward the self is also the
ability to manipulate perspective toward others" (p. 200). An egocentric to allocen-
tric developmental sequence is reported, and the argument is made for nonlabora-
tory, phenomenological approaches to understanding self-awareness (Figurski,
1987b). Findings are reported that self-awareness is related to affect when the
current activity is perceived as voluntary. Self-awareness is seen as antecedent to
self-evaluation and affect in the development of self-system processes. In addition,
self-awareness is considered to be a state, whereas self-consciousness is considered
a trait variable.
Further work on self-awareness processes by Davis, Franzoi, and Markwiese

(1987) suggests that for individuals high in self-consciousness, there is a desire for
self-knowledge. For individuals low in self-consciousness, however, there is a desire
for self-defense. Davis et al. argue that this finding supports the notion of an under-
lying motivational component in self-awareness rather than a more automatic
model. In fact, such differences in private self-consciousness may be due to what
Rhodewalt (1987) describes as self-handicapping behaviors of students with low
self-esteem. He reports that students engage in strategic acts to protect their self-
image or self-esteem and that" ... attributions playa determining role in motivating
self-handicapping; attributing success to ability or failure to lack of effort appear to
be the preconditions to self-handicapping when entering evaluative situations"
(p. 7). One frequently used self-handicapping strategy is for students to discount the
importance of certain academic tasks so that, in the face of failure, they can protect
their self-esteem.
Thus we see from the foregoing selected review that self-evaluation processes are
among the most important in the developing self-system for acquiring self-knowl-
edge and maintaining a sense of self-esteem. Students' processes of self-awareness
and self-monitoring contribute significantly to their self-determination and self-
development goals. Therefore, students' development of these self-system processes
provides a basis for the development of capability for self-regulation. In the final
sections of this chapter, we will complete our excursion by looking at the implica-
tions of what we have learned for enhancing the development of self-regulated learn-
ing capacities in students.
Implications for the Development of Self-Regulated Learning

Recent work on self-development has revealed a close link between the development
of self-system structures and processes and the development of self-regulated learn-
ing capacities. It is clear, however, that for some students, development in both
these areas is impeded by environmental or genetic factors. How can our under-
standing of self-phenomena help us enhance students' development of self-regulated
learning capacities?
Self-Regulated Learning as a Product of Self-System Development

We have already looked at evidence that self-regulation develops naturally with the
development of self-concepts and self-processes such as self-awareness, self-
monitoring, and self-evaluation. When we look at the self-regulation steps spelled
out by Markus and Wurf (1987), there are clear implications for the role of self-
development in students' abilities to execute each step. Let's look at these steps in
more detail from a phenomenological perspective.
At the first step in self-regulation, goal setting, students must not only be able to
select goals, but also to define what is important to them. Defining what is important
72 B.L. McCombs
to them requires that students know themselves and have realistic expectancies for
what they can accomplish. They need to have a sense of things they enjoy, their
interests, needs, and values; they need some level of self-awareness and self-
acceptance. On the basis of these self-understandings, students are equipped to
generate and select personally meaningful and relevant self goals. They are also able
to assess their possibilities for success or failure, generate outcome expectations,
and commit to pursuing their goals. It is their self-knowledge and abilities to think
about and evaluate personal relevance and importance that is the essential first step
in generating enduring commitments to and positive affect toward goal attainment.
Of fundamental importance, however, is that students also understand their basic
individual responsibility for defining themselves and taking an active role in their
own self-development. They must understand their sense of agency and volition in
making choices about how best to direct and regulate their affect, cognition, motiva-
tion, and behavior. In other words, they must have an image of themselves as self-
directed and self-regulated learners.
During the second step in self-regulation, planning and strategy selection, stu-
dents have the opportunity to put themselves in action, to make personal plans, to
select the appropriate strategies for accomplishing learning goals expressive of their
more general self-development and self-determination goals. In specific learning
situations, the personally meaningful and relevant goals students have selected for
mastery, accomplishment, or growth in knowledge and skills have the purpose of
forming and directing the kind and nature of planning activities and strategies
selected. At this step, it is critical that students have developed the level of metacog-
nitive knowledge (including self-knowledge) and processes for engaging in effective
planning and strategy selection.
The final step of self-regulation, performance execution and evaluation, requires
the development of both self-monitoring and self-evaluation processes. To put the
self in action, students need to direct and maintain their attention appropriately,
evaluate their progress relative to desired goals, regulate and control their affect,
and execute the actions necessary for reducing the performance discrepancies
between actual and desired goals. Again, the development of self-awareness, self-
monitoring, and self-evaluation processes is critical to effective performance execu-
tion and evaluation in a self-directed and self-regulated sense. For students lacking
in self-knowledge and self-regulation processes-for developmental, experiential,
or genetic reasons - interventions will help to enhance or supplant existing self-
values, capacities, and skills. It is to the topic of interventions we will tum next.
The Problem of Developmental Lags and Disabilities

Students may lack adequate self-system structures and processes necessary for
self-regulated learning for a variety of reasons. Areas that may be problematic for
a student can include:
Generation or creation of competence and control beliefs about learning in general
and in specific learning situations or domains
Understanding the locus of responsibility for learning and self-development

Creation of "possible selves" and self-goals in general as well as specifically in the
area of self-regulated learning
Definition of relevant and feasible learning and self-regulation expectations
Attention to and monitoring of self-states, expectations, and goals
Regulation and directing of affect, motivation, learning processes and outcomes
'" : As I have argued elsewhere (McCombs, 1984, 1986, 1987a), interventions may be
suggested in some or all of these areas. Students may need to develop their sense of
agency, beliefs in their personal worth, and feelings of self-confidence in approach-
ing novel or difficult learning tasks. Students may need to be assisted with self-
awareness, self-definition, and self-evaluation capabilities before they can develop
skills for the self-regulation of their own learning. Strategies for changing, challeng-
ing, or discounting erroneous beliefs and "affective tags" that accompany these
beliefs may also be required (Covington & Omelich, 1987; Curtis & Elkin, 1987;
Harter, 1986). In many ways, these interventions can be thought of as enhancing
student motivation, and hence, provide the "opening" for self-regulation goals to
emerge. As Ames (1987) has stated: "Enhancing motivation, therefore, involves
changing or modifying how students think-getting students to adopt different
achievement goals, attend to different types of information, process information
differently, and interpret performance feedback differently" (p. 1). And-from the
phenomenological perspective-it may mean getting students to generate their own
meanings, goals, and strategies for learning.
Nicholls (1987) argues convincingly that not only should we confront students'
expectations and explanations of success, but also their ''value correlates." By this he
means that without a concern for values, students do not learn to delineate, respect,
and understand their own and others' ethical positions. Nicholls further suggests
that students should be encouraged to express their own views about what they are
and should be doing in school. These views should then provide a basis for what is
done in education. He states: "Our concern, it seems, has been to figure out how to
get students to work harder; not to devise ways to help them make their lives more
productive' [emphasis mine] (p. 4). Nicholls and others (e.g., Ames, 1987; Gold-
berg & Hill, 1987; Harter, 1986; Kowalski, Stipek, & Daniels, 1987; Stipek &
Daniels, 1987) are increasingly emphasizing changes in classroom practices and
approaches, including changes in teacher and parent orientations, in the nature of
learning tasks, and in the provision of inherently meaningful tasks that challenge
students to learn or compete.
What is most needed, from the phenomenological perspective, are interventions
that focus on positive self-development and a sense of agency or personal responsi-
bility for actively participating in that self-development. Environmental modifica-
tions that are in line with this goal are certainly needed and helpful; what is also
needed, however, are interventions that focus on modifying and enhancing student
perceptions, self-evaluations, interpretations, affect, motivation, and self-regulated
learning processes. Students must be able to see the self-possibilities from learning
experiences - possibilities for growth and development of their unique capabilities
74 B.L. McCombs
and skills. They need to understand their relationships to and responsibilities to

themselves and others as well as to the social and environmental context. Students
need to understand that part of being human is to create and discover positive possi-
bilities for their overall growth in intellectual, physical, social, and spiritual realms.
They need also to understand that this growth will be a function of unique situa-
tional, dispositional, and developmental factors-all of which must be taken into
consideration in selecting realistic and meaningful goals. Finally, they must under-
stand that commitment to positive and responsible self-goals is a basic key to posi-
tive self-development.
In summary, the phenomenological perspective suggests that the best way to
enhance our self-regulated learning capacities is to understand the importance of our
belief in ourselves as self-regulators. The problem is that many of us don't believe
it, don't want to be responsible for our own self-regulation, or don't know how.
Phenomenology as a method and philosophical system helps us understand the
primacy of our own perceptions and thinking about ourselves and the world in being
able to direct and regulate our behavior. It helps us understand how to help students
know their worth, their competencies, their abilities to choose and be in control,
and their responsibilities for generating the will to learn. We will move next to how
these understandings translate into a specific intervention approach to help foster
self-regulated learning capacities.
Application of Phenomenological Approach

In spelling out a specific approach to enhancing the development of self-regulated
learning capacities from a phenomenological perspective, let's begin with a close
look and analysis of a particular student and his problems in class from the teacher's
and student's perspectives.
Description of Student Problem

ThACHER'S PERSPECTIVE
Mrs. Martin has been a sixth-grade teacher for 10 years. She is sensitive to student
learning needs and individual differences, and is proud of her ability to provide
special assistance to her students. Jeff, however, has been a real challenge to her. He
is an outgoing II-year old, active and full of energy, and generally in happy and posi-
tive spirits. The problem is that Jeff is struggling with his schoolwork, seems to have
trouble concentrating and following directions, and frequently has to be
reprimanded for talking to classmates during a lesson. He becomes easily frustrated
when he doesn't understand new science and math concepts and has been calling
himself "stupid." From his previous class performance, she knows he has the ability
to do well and master materials at his grade level. When Mrs. Martin works with
Jeff independently, she notices that he gives up easily and becomes angry with him-
self. She has tried giving him easier work to build his confidence, encouraging him
to use better study strategies, and talking with his parents. She has not succeeded
and concludes that Jeff is "lazy" and doesn't want to be responsible for his own
learning.
STUDENT'S PERSPECTIVE
Jeff has always liked school and done well- that is, until this year. Recently things
have been harder, or at least they seem much more difficult to understand. And
besides, nothing is really interesting and he doesn't understand why he has to learn
the things Mrs. Martin says he does. The subjects don't mean anything to him and
he can't understand why he has to know about "Ohm's Law" and "borrowing frac-
tions." Even if these things are important, it doesn't make sense to him why he has
to do "a million" problems in math or copy sentences from a book. It's much more
fun to play with his friends at recess or talk to them during class. And - the way Mrs.
Martin explains things is hard to understand. He's beginning to feel that he's "stupid"
and it's no use even to try. His parents seem to be "on his back" a lot lately about his
grades and he can't understand why they just don't let him have fun. School is a real
drag and he can't understand how what he is learning is going to help him later on.
Jeff has developed doubts about his learning abilities in general, and math and
science abilities in particular. His feelings and attitudes about his abilities to do well
and take responsibility for his learning are negative, and his motivation to try is
decreasing with every failure experience.
Description of Intervention Approach

What do we know about Jeff from Mrs. Martin's and Jeffs perspective? How can
what we know about the development of self-system structures and processes be
integrated with these perspectives to help define an appropriate intervention
approach? Let's start with what we know about the development of self-system struc-
tures and processes, applied specifically to Jeffs problem.
First, we know from a developmental perspective that Jeff is at a critical stage in
which he is beginning to defme enduring and relatively stable global concepts of
himself as well as specific concepts of his abilities in math and science. His frustra-
tions with his performance in these subjects are causing him to doubt his domain-
specific abilities. These doubts have not yet seriously impacted his global sense of
personal worth, but they are contributing to low interest and motivation to attempt
and persist in learning activities in these areas. To preserve his self-worth, he has
directed his efforts to areas he knows he is competent in and can exercise some
degree of personal control. He is unable to see the personal relevance and meaning-
fulness of learning activities, and has not reached the point where he can develop
personal learning goals on his own. He has not developed an image of himself as a
self-regulated learner-a possible self that can successfully direct progress toward
his learning goals.
Second, we can infer that Jeffs development of necessary self-system processes
for self-awareness, self-monitoring, and self-evaluation and is incomplete. He seems
76 B.L. McCombs
to need help with countering negative evaluations of his competence and control in
specific learning situations, and with managing and controlling negative affect and
motivation to pursue academic tasks in particular subject domains. He further needs
help with strategies for defining realistic self-expectations, accepting his strengths
and limitations, and rewarding himself for reaching self goals. Most of all, he needs
to understand his role as active agent in creating positive possibilities. To achieve
these possibilities, however, he needs help both in modifying his own perceptions,
interpretations, and beliefs and in seeing the purpose and value of learning activities
relative to his own interests and goals.
Based on the foregoing, the following intervention steps are suggested:

(1) Validate Jeffs worth as a person and acknowledge his negative feelings and self-
doubts in response to new learning. This can be done by simple, consistently
used statements in which Mrs. Martin (a) tells Jeff she sees him as smart and
capable of learning new things and (b) explains to Jeff that many students start
doubting themselves when the work becomes more difficult.
(2) Describe the nature of learning as a student-generated process of attaching
meaning to learning tasks, monitoring and evaluating one's own feelings and
learning progress, and rewarding oneself for accomplishing learning goals. Mrs.
Martin may use contrasting examples of what happens when students themselves
take the responsibility for getting involved in a task, rather than relying on the
teacher or materials. She can tell Jeff that it is always a good idea to ask her to
explain or show him how what he is learning will be important to him later. She
can also use examples to show how keeping track of what you are thinking and
feeling while learning, and rewarding yourself with praise or other external
rewards when you accomplish a learning goal, are very important to taking
responsibility for your own learning.
(3) Present Jeff with values-clarification exercises in which he can be helped to
define his personal interests, values, and goals as well as define images of future
"possible selves" in general and in specific subject domains. These exercises can
be simple and fun to do, such as asking Jeff to list the things he likes to do and
rank them from most to least liked. When he has finished his list, she can talk
to him about how he can use his imagination to "see himself' accomplishing his
interests.
(4) Provide skill training in the steps of goal-setting and in the implementation of his
goals. Mrs. Martin can explain how sequential goals are important to helping
Jeff get to where he wants to go. She can start with a goal of great interest in
demonstrating the steps and then use the process for a more immediate goal such
as getting a better grade in math. She can draw up an agreement with Jeff, using
the goal of his choice, and help him develop timelines for accomplishing this
goal.
(5) Give Jeff training in strategies for generating personal relevance and meaning in
learning activities. Mrs. Martin will have to assist for topics that are "far afield"
from Jeffs interests by showing relevance to his short- and long-term goals and
interests. Let's say that Jeffs immediate goal is to get a B on his next math test.
He chose this goal after deciding that math can help him reach his longer-term
goal of playing on the school's softball team. Mrs. Martin could help Jeff by
showing him how his math grades are linked to eligibility for the team.
A more detailed description of how these steps might be implemented is beyond

the scope of this chapter. In my own work, however, I have defined the content,
instructional strategies, skill-training format, and implementation procedures that
have proven to be effective in motivational interventions of this type (cf. McCombs,
1984). In addition, the realities of the classroom context require that teachers also
meet needs of the larger classroom of students with similar problems. Thus, in the
example presented here, strategies that allow the teacher to work with both Jeff and
similar students are required along with standardized procedures for testing and
assessing students' self-development needs.
The preceding self-directed intervention strategies should work hand in hand with
classroom practices that emphasize learning rather than competitive performance
goals. In addition, teachers' appreciation for the value of students' own perceptions,
interpretations, and values in the learning process is essential. Teachers need to
understand their roles as learning managers and facilitators in helping students
define themselves, their self and learning goals, and in providing meaningful struc-
tures for learning unfamiliar or seemingly irrelevant information in particular sub-
ject domains. And-most important-teachers must provide a positive classroom
climate in which students learn to value themselves and their capabilities and in
which their natural tendencies to be self-regulated learners can best emerge.
Summary and Conclusions
Phenomenologists believe that the development of students' natural tendencies for

self-regulation depends on the development of self-system knowledge structures and
the processes of self-awareness, self-monitoring, and self-evaluation. Self-regula-
tion also depends on the development of students' self-concepts and self-images as
active agents, responsible for the regulation of learning behaviors (cognition, affect,
motivation) as well as learning outcomes. This view contributes to our understand-
ing of the development of self-regulated learning capacities because of its focus on
the primacy of self-phenomena, and particularly the "I" or volitional self, in this
development and the recognition that self-regulation develops naturally with self-
system development. Many students, however, need interventions specifically
aimed at the development of positive self-views of themselves as competent, fol-
lowed by specific training in self-regulation processes in order for self-regulation
to emerge.
What, then, is some promising research and development work that should be
studied further? From a basic research perspective, additional work is needed on the
agenic and volitional aspects of the self and how these phenomena can be effectively
studied. Research should be directed at understanding of not only the "what" (self-
structures) and "how" (self-processes) aspects of self, but also the "who" (self-
78 B.L. McCombs
determination, volition, agency) aspects that are active in directing and regulating
learning. From the applied research perspective, additional work is needed on defin-
ing and evaluating interventions for modifying and challenging negative and errone-
ous student perceptions, interpretations, expectations, and beliefs that impede their
progress toward self-development and self-determination goals. Research on the
types of strategies that are most effective for students at different ages and stages of
development, the unique nature of these strategies from the students' own perspec-
tives, and how these strategies can best interface with classroom practices and
teacher and parent-training programs is necessary. These are our challenges as
researchers and practitioners for better understanding the role of self-phenomena in
self-regulated learning and for identifying effective methods for fostering positive
possibilities for student growth and development.
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4. Social Cognitive Theory and
Self-Regulated Learning
Dale H. Schunk
Current theoretical accounts of learning view students as active seekers and proces-
sors of information (Bandura, 1986; Pintrich, Cross, Kozma, & McKeachie, 1986).
Learners' cognitions can influence the instigation, direction, and persistence of
achievement-related behaviors (Brophy, 1983; Como & Snow, 1986; Schunk, 1989;
Weiner, 1985; Winne, 1985). Research conducted within various theoretical tradi-
tions places particular emphasis on students' beliefs concerning their capabilities to
exercise control over important aspects of their lives (Bandura, 1982; Como & Man-
dinach, 1983; Covington & Omelich, 1979; Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 1979).
This article focuses on self-regulated learning, or learning that occurs from stu-
dents' self-generated behaviors systematically oriented toward the attainment of
their learning goals. Self-regulated learning processes involve goal-directed cogni-
tive activities that students instigate, modify, and sustain (Zimmerman, 1986).
Students' cognitions include such activities as attending to instruction, processing
and integrating knowledge, and rehearsing information to be remembered, as well
as beliefs concerning capabilities for learning and the anticipated outcomes oflearn-
ing (Schunk, 1986). The topic of self-regulated learning has recently entered the
research literature, but it fits well with the notion that, rather than being passive
recipients of information, students contribute actively to their learning goals and
exercise a large degree of control over the attainment of those goals.
My plan for this chapter is initially to present a theoretical overview of self-
regulated learning. The conceptual focus is based on Bandura's (1986) social-
cognitive learning theory. I then summarize the key subprocesses involved in self-
regulated learning, along with research bearing on each subprocess. Implications of
this view for how aspects of self-regulation are developed and acquired are dis-
cussed. The chapter concludes with an example of how social-cognitive principles
can be applied in a learning context to enhance students' achievement cognitions and
behaviors.
84 D.H. Schunk
BEHAVIORS
ENVIRONMENTAL
VARIABLES
~ COGNITIONS
............---~)O~ PERSONAL FACTORS
FIGURE 4-1. Human functioning as reciprocal interactions between behaviors, environmen-

tal variables, and cognitions and other personal factors.
Theoretical Overview
Social-Cognitive Theory
RECIPROCAL INTERACTIONS
Bandura's (1986) social-cognitive learning theory views human functioning as

reciprocal interactions between behaviors, environmental variables, and cognitions
and other personal factors (Figure 4-1). I will exemplify this reciprocity with an
important construct in Bandura's theory: perceived self-efficacy, or beliefs concern-
ing one's capabilities to organize and implement actions necessary to attain desig-
nated performance levels. Research in achievement settings shows that students'
efficacy beliefs influence such achievement behaviors as choice of tasks, persis-
tence, effort expenditure, and skill acquisition (Schunk, 1989). In turn, students'
actual behaviors modify their efficacy beliefs. For example, as students work on
tasks they note their progress toward their learning goals (e.g., completing work-
book pages, finishing sections of a term paper). Such progress indicators convey to
students that they are capable of performing well, which enhances self-efficacy for
continued learning.
The interaction between self-efficacy and environmental factors has been shown
in learning disabilities research. Many learning-disabled students hold a low sense
of efficacy for performing well (Licht & Kistner, 1986). Individuals in students'
social environments may react to students based on attributes typically associated
with them rather than based on what students actually do. Teachers often judge
learning-disabled students as less capable than nondisabled students and hold lower
academic expectations for them, even in content areas where learning-disabled stu-
dents are performing adequately (Bryan & Bryan, 1983). In turn, teacher feedback
can have an impact on self-efficacy. Persuasive statements (e.g., "I know that you
can do this") can raise students' efficacy beliefs.
Students' behaviors and classroom environments influence one another in many
ways. Consider a typical instructional sequence in which the teacher presents infor-
mation and asks students to direct their attention to a nearby chart. Environmental
influence on behavior occurs when students turn their heads without much con-
4. Social Cognitive Theory 85
scious deliberation. Students' behaviors often alter the instructional environment. If

the teacher asks questions and students give the wrong answers, the teacher may
reteach some points rather than continue the lesson.
ENACfIVE AND VICARIOUS LEARNING
Learning is a change in behavior or behavioral potential brought about by interven-

ing experiences. In this reciprocal interaction view of human functioning, experi-
ences may be enactive (actual performances) or vicarious (observing models,
watching TV, reading). Enactive learning involves learning from the consequences
of one's own actions (Bandura, 1986). Actions that result in successful consequences
tend to be retained, whereas those that lead to failures are discarded. Complex skills
typically involve some enactive learning. Aspiring golfers, for example, do not sim-
ply watch professionals; rather, they engage in much practice and receive corrective
feedback from qualified instructors. In school, students often learn some subcompo-
nents of a complex skill and not others. Student guided practice gives teachers the
opportunity to provide corrective feedback as necessary.
What differentiates social cognitive theory from earlier reinforcement theories is
not that people learn by doing but rather the mechanism used to explain such learn-
ing. Skinner (1953), for example, postulates that skillful performances are gradually
acquired by reinforcing successive approximations of the target behavior (shaping).
Cognitions may accompany behavioral change but they do not influence it. Social-
cognitive theory contends that behavioral consequences, rather than strengthening
behaviors, serve as sources of information and motivation. People selectively
process information; they engage in cognitive activities (e.g., rehearsal) that assist
learning of successful behaviors. People are motivated to learn behaviors that they
value and that they believe will lead to rewarding consequences.
Much human learning occurs vicariously by observing others, reading, watching
television, and listening to the radio. Vicarious learning accelerates learning and
saves us from personally experiencing negative consequences. We learn that
poisonous snakes are dangerous by reading books rather than experiencing the
unpleasant consequences of their bites.
Cognitive-skill acquisition often combines enactive and vicarious learning. In
mathematics, for example, students learn operations by observing the teacher
demonstrate their application. Students perfect their skills through practice and
teacher feedback. As with enactive learning, response consequences of vicarious
learning inform and motivate. Observers are more apt to try to learn those modeled
behaviors that lead to successful outcomes than those resulting in failures. The
belief that modeled behaviors will prove useful can lead people to attend carefully
to models and cognitively rehearse their actions.
LEARNING AND PERFORMANCE
Social-cognitive theory distinguishes between learning and performance of previ-

ously learned behaviors. By observing models, people can acquire knowledge that
86 D.H. Schunk
they may not demonstrate (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). Some school activities
(review sessions) involve performance of previously learned skills, but much time
is spent on cognitive learning. Students acquire declarative knowledge in the form of
facts, scripts (e.g., events of a story), and organized passages (e.g., Gettysburg
Address). Students also acquire procedural knowledge-concepts, rules, algorithms
-as well as conditional knowledge, or knowledge of when to employ forms of
declarative and procedural knowledge and why it is important to do so (Paris, Cross,
& Lipson, 1984; Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983). These forms of knowledge often
are not independent; competence in long division requires knowing mathematical
facts, how to apply the algorithm, and when to apply it. My point is that declarative,
procedural, and conditional knowledge can be acquired but not demonstrated when
learning occurs. Students might learn that skimming is a useful procedure for acquir-
ing the gist of text but not employ that knowledge until they are at home reading a
newspaper (see Paris and Byrnes, this volume).
Modeling
Modeling refers to cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes that derive from
observing others. Models are individuals whose behaviors, verbalizations (of
thoughts), and nonverbal expressions are attended to by observers and serve as cues
for subsequent modeling (Schunk, 1987). Modeling is an important means of acquir-
ing skills, beliefs, and novel behaviors (Zimmerman, 1977).
The value of modeling was recognized as far back as the ancient Greeks, who used
mimesis to refer to observational learning from others' behaviors and from abstract
models exemplifying literary styles (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978). Early in this
century, psychologists debated whether modeling was instinctual or could be
described in associationist principles. Miller and Dollard (1941) explained modeling
as a process whereby observers were provided with behavioral cues, performed
matching responses, and were positively reinforced. With repeated reinforcement of
imitative behavior, imitation could become a secondary drive.
Bandura postulated that modeling may reflect acquisition of new behavioral pat-
terns (observational learning), strengthening or weakening of behavioral inhibitions
(inhibition-disinhibition), or performance of previously learned behaviors due to
prompting (response facilitation). Observational learning occurs when observers
display new behaviors that prior to modeling had a zero probability of occurrence
even with motivational inducements in effect. Modeling also can strengthen or
weaken inhibitions for performing previously learned behaviors. Observing models
perform threatening or prohibited activities without negative consequences can lead
observers to perform the behaviors themselves; observing models punished for per-
forming actions may inhibit observers' responding. There also are behaviors that
people have learned but do not perform because of insufficient motivation rather
than prohibitions. Modeled actions can serve as social prompts, as when one emu-
lates the behaviors of high-status models to obtain approval.
SUBPROCESSES
Observational learning through modeling is hypothesized to comprise four sub-

processes: attention, retention, production, and motivation (Bandura, 1986).
Observer attention to relevant environmental events is necessary for them to be
meaningfully perceived. Retention activities include coding and transforming
modeled information for storage in memory, as well as cognitively rehearsing infor-
mation. There is debate whether knowledge ultimately is stored in memory only in
verbal form as propositions (i.e., units of information) or also in the form of images;
however, much evidence shows that representing knowledge in imaginal form is an
important aid to learning (Shepard, 1978). Production involves translating visual
and symbolic conceptions of modeled events into overt behaviors. Motivational
inducements for action can result from direct, vicarious, and self-produced
experiences.
Thefimctional value o/behavior-whether it results in success or failure, reward
or punishment-exerts strong effects on observer modeling. Modeled behaviors are
more likely to be performed if they have previously led to rewarding outcomes than
if they have reslllted in punishment, regardless of whether individuals have
experienced the consequences directly or vicariously. People also act in accordance
with their internal standards of conduct; they behave in ways they find acceptable
and avoid dissatisfying activities.
INFORMATIONAL FUNCTION
Vicarious consequences convey information to observers about the functional value

of behaviors (Bandura, 1986). Observing competent models perform actions that
result in success conveys information to observers about the sequence of actions one
should use. Most social situations are structured so that the appropriateness of
behaviors depends on such factors as age, sex, or status. By observing modeled
behaviors and their consequences, people formulate outcome expectations, or
beliefs about the outcomes of one's actions. Vicarious consequences create outcome
expectations concerning which behaviors are likely to be rewarded and which may
be punished.
Perceived similarity between model and observer is hypothesized to be an impor-
tant source of information for determining behavioral appropriateness and formulat-
ing outcome expectations (Schunk, 1987). Festinger (1954) hypothesized that,
where objective standards of behavior are unclear or unavailable, observers evaluate
themselves through comparisons with others, and that the most accurate self-
evaluations derive from comparisons with those who are similar in the ability or
characteristic being evaluated. In general, the more alike observers are to models,
the greater is the probability that similar actions by observers are socially appropri-
ate and will produce comparable results. Model attributes often are predictive of the
functional value of behaviors. Similarity ought to be especially influential in situa-
tions where observers have little information about functional value. Modeled
88 D.H. Schunk
behaviors on tasks that observers are unfamiliar with or those that are not immedi-
ately followed by consequences may be highly susceptible to influence by attribute
similarity.
MOTIVATIONAL FUNCTION
The motivational effects of vicarious consequences theoretically depend in part on

perceived self-efficacy. Similarity to models constitutes an important source of
vicarious information for gauging one's self-efficacy. Observing similar others suc-
ceed can raise observers' self-efficacy and motivate them to try the task themselves,
because they are apt to believe that if others can succeed, they can as well. Observ-
ing similar others fail can lead people to believe that they lack the competence to
succeed, which can dissuade them from attempting the behavior. Model attributes
often are predictive of performance capabilities. Similarity is highly influential in
situations where individuals have previously experienced difficulties and hold
doubts about performing well.
Subprocesses of Self-Regulated Learning

Social-cognitive theory views self-regulation as comprising three subprocesses:
self-observation, self-judgment, self-reaction (Bandura, 1986; Kanfer & Gaelick,
1986; Karoly, 1982). These subprocesses are not mutually exclusive but rather inter-
act with one another. While observing aspects of one's own behavior, one may judge
them against standards and react positively or negatively. One's evaluations and
reactions then set the stage for additional observations, either of the same
behavioral aspects or others.
These subprocesses also do not operate independently of the learning environ-
ment; environmental influences can assist the development of self-regulation. This
point is important, because educators are increasingly advocating that students be
trained to self-regulate their academic performances (Paris et aI., 1983; Zimmer-
man, 1985).
A social cognitive model of self-regulated learning is portrayed in Figure 4-2. It
is assumed that students enter learning activities with such goals as acquiring
STUDENT BELIEFS SELF-REGULATORY PROCESSES
• Observation
• Learning Goals
• Judgment
• Self-Efficacy
• Reaction
FIGURE 4-2. Social-cognitive model of self-regulated learning.

knowledge, learning how to solve problems, flnishing workbook pages, and com-
pleting science experiments. Students will differ in how efficacious they feel about
being able to attain those goals (Schunk, 1989). This sense of self-efficacy for
learning can be influenced by such factors as students' abilities, prior experiences,
and attitudes toward learning, as well as by instructional and social factors (e.g.,
teacher's presentation of material, classroom reward structure). Efficacy is further
influenced by the self-regulation process; students who evaluate their progress
toward learning goals as satisfactory are apt to feel confldent about continuing to
improve their skills.
Self-Observation
ASSESSMENT FEATURES
People cannot regulate their own actions if they are not fully aware of them.
Behavior can be assessed on several dimensions. While writing a term paper, stu-
dents may assess their work on quality (e.g., whether they have stated important
ideas), rate (whether they will flnish the paper by the due date), quantity (whether
the paper will be long enough), and originality (whether they have integrated ideas
in unusual fashion). These same features can be employed with other skills; for
example, motor (how fast one runs the loo-meter dash), artistic (how original are
one's pen-and-ink drawings), and social (how comfortable one feels while attending
social functions).
FUNCTIONS OF SELF-OBSERVATION
Observing one's behaviors can inform and motivate. The information gained from
self-observation is used to determine how well one is progressing toward one's goals.
Self-observation is most helpful when it addresses the speciflc conditions under
which the behaviors occur. Such information is valuable in establishing a program
of change. Students who notice that they accomplish less when they study with a
friend than when they are alone may establish a new routine of studying by them-
selves.
Self-observation also can motivate behavioral change; keeping a record of what
we do will occasionally prove surprising. Many students with poor study habits are
astonished to learn that they waste much study time on nonacademic activities. Self-
observation can motivate one to embark on a program of change, although desire
alone usually is insufficient. Sustained motivational effects also depend on people's
outcome and efficacy expectations. For students to attempt to change their study
routine they need to believe that if they do alter their habits they will accomplish
more (outcome expectation) and that they can change those habits (self-efficacy).
CRITERIA FOR AsSESSMENT
Self-observation is aided with the use of self-recording, where instances of the

behavior are recorded along with such features as the time, place, and duration of
90 D.H. Schunk
occurrence (Karoly, 1982). In the absence of recording, one's observations may not
faithfully reflect one's behaviors due to selective memory.
Two important criteria for self-observation are regularity and proximity. Regular-
ity means that behavior is observed on a continuous basis-hour by hour, day to
day-rather than intermittently. Nonregular observation provides misleading
results. Proximity means that behavior is observed close in time to its occurrence
rather than long after it (e.g., recall at the end of the day what one did during that
day). Proximal observations provide continuous information to use in gauging goal
progress (see Mace, Belfiore, & Shea, this volume).
Self-Judgment
The self-judgment subprocess refers to comparing present performance level with

one's goal. Self-judgments can be affected by such factors as the type of standards
employed, the properties of the goal, the importance of goal attainment, and the
attributions made for one's performance.
ABSOLUTE AND NORMATIVE STANDARDS
Learning goals may be cast as absolute or normative standards. Absolute standards

are fixed. Students whose goal is to complete six workbook pages in 30 minutes can
gauge their progress against this absolute standard. Grading systems often are based
on absolute standards (e.g., 90 to 100 = A, 80 to 89 = B).
Normative standards of judgment, which are based on the performances of others,
can be acquired by observing models (Bandura, 1986). Social comparison of one's
performances with those of others is an important source for determining the
appropriateness of behaviors and evaluating one's performances (Masters, 1971;
Veroff, 1969). Students have numerous opportunities to compare their work with
that of their peers. Absolute and normative standards can be employed in concert,
as when students have 30 minutes to complete six pages and they compare their
progress with peers to gauge who will be the first to finish.
Standards inform and motivate. In learning settings, comparing one's perfor-
mance with standards is informative of one's progress toward the goal. Students who
complete three pages in 10 minutes realize that they finished half of the work in less
than half of the time. Standards also can motivate. The belief that one is making
progress toward one's goal can enhance self efficacy for performing well, which can
sustain motivation. This holds true whether goals are absolute or normative. Stu-
dents who find a task easy and realize that they set their (absolute) goal too low may
set it higher on the next task. With respect to normative goals, knowing that similar
others performed a task can promote self-efficacy because students are apt to believe
that if others could succeed, they can as well (Schunk, 1987). This belief enhances
motivation to perform at the comparative level.
GOAL PROPERTIES
Goals exert their behavioral effects through their properties: specificity, difficulty
level, proximity (Bandura, 1982; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). Goals that
incorporate specific performance standards raise efficacy for learning because
progress toward an explicit goal is easy to gauge. General goals (e.g., "Do your
best") do not enhance motivation. Goal difficulty refers to the level of task profi-
ciency required as assessed against a standard. Although students initially may
doubt whether they can attain goals they believe are difficult, working toward
difficult goals can build a strong sense of efficacy. Goals also are distinguished by
how far they project into the future. Proximal goals, which are close at hand, result
in greater motivation than distant goals. It is easier to gauge progress toward a prox-
imal goal than toward one that is temporally distant.
Goal setting is especially influential with long-term tasks. For example, many stu-
dents have initial doubts about writing a good term paper. Teachers can assist by
breaking the task into short-term goals (e.g., select a topic, conduct background
research, write an outline). Students should feel more efficacious about accomplish-
ing the· subtasks, and attaining each subgoal helps develop their overall sense of
efficacy for producing a good term paper.
IMPORTANCE OF GOAL ATTAINMENT
Self-judgments are affected by the importance of goal attainment. When individuals

care little about how they perform at an activity, they may not assess their perfor-
mance or expend effort to improve (Bandura, 1986). Judgments of goal progress are
made for valued goals. Occasionally, goals that originally hold little value become
more important when people receive feedback indicating that they are becoming
more skillful. Novice piano players initially may hold ill-defined goals for them-
selves (e.g., play better). As piano skills develop, people may set more specific goals
(learn to play various pieces, practice two hours per day) and are more likely to judge
their progress relative to these goals.
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTIONS
Attributions, or perceived causes of outcomes (successes, failures), can influence

performance expectancies, behaviors, and affective reactions (Weiner, 1985).
Achievement outcomes often are attributed to such causes as ability, effort, task
difficulty, and luck (Frieze, 1980; Weiner, 1979). Children view effort as the prime
cause of outcomes and ability-related terms as closely associated, but with develop-
ment a distinct conception of ability emerges (Nicholls, 1978). Ability attributions
become increasingly important influences on expectancies, whereas the role of
effort declines in importance (Harari & Covington, 1981). Success achieved with
great effort should raise self-efficacy less than if minimal effort is required, because
the former implies that skills are not well developed (Bandura, 1982).
92 D.H. Schunk
With respect to affective reactions, people take more pride in their accomplish-
ments when they attribute them to their abilities and efforts than when they attribute
outcomes to other persons. People also are more self-critical when they believe that
they failed due to personal reasons (e.g., low effort) than when failure was due to
circumstances beyond their control. Whether goal progress is judged as acceptable
will depend in part on its attribution. Students who attribute their successes to
teacher assistance may hold a low sense of efficacy for performing well, because
they may believe that they cannot succeed on their own. They may judge their learn-
ing progress as deficient and be unmotivated to work harder because they believe
that they lack the ability to perform well.
Self-Reaction
EVALUATIVE MOTIVATORS
Self-reactions to goal progress exert motivational effects on behavior (Bandura,

1986). The belief that one is making acceptable progress can enhance self-efficacy
for continued improvement. This belief, along with the anticipated satisfaction of
accomplishing the goal, sustains students' motivation to complete the task. Negative
evaluations will not necessarily decrease motivation if individuals believe they are
capable of improving (Schunk, 1989). If students believe that they have been lack-
adaisical and that enhanced effort will promote progress, they are apt to feel effica-
cious and redouble their efforts. Motivation will not improve if students believe that
they lack the requisite ability to succeed and that no amount of effort will help them
to perform better (Schunk, 1982).
Instructions to people to respond evaluatively to their performances can affect
motivation; people who believe that they can perform better persist longer and
expend greater effort (Kanfer & Gaelick, 1986). Whether people are instructed to
respond evaluatively or do so on their own, the same level of performance can be
evaluated positively, neutrally, or negatively, depending on one's goals. Some stu-
dents are content with performing at a B level in a course, whereas others are satis-
fied only with an A. Assuming that people believe they are capable of improving
their performances, higher goals lead to greater effort and persistence than do lower
goals (Bandura & Cervone, 1983).
TANGIBLE MOTIVATORS
In daily activities, people routinely make such consequences as work breaks, new
clothes, and nights on the town contingent on task progress or goal attainment.
Unlike reinforcement theories contending that consequences alter behavior, social-
cognitive theory postulates that the anticipation of consequences (outcome expecta-
tions) enhances motivation. Self-administered consequences· can motivate
individuals even when external contingencies are in effect, and the former typically
are as effective as the latter (Bandura, 1986). Grades are given at the end of courses,
yet students set subgoals for accomplishing their coursework and reward and punish
themselves accordingly.
Tangible consequences also constitute an important influence on self-efficacy.
External rewards are likely to enhance self-efficacy when they are tied to students'
actual accomplishments. Telling students that they can earn rewards based on what
they accomplish can instill a sense of efficacy for learning (Schunk, 1989). As
students then work at a task and note their progress, this sense of efficacy is vali-
dated. Receipt of the reward further validates efficacy, because it symbolizes
progress. When rewards are not tied to quality of performance, they actually may
convey negative efficacy information; students might infer that they are not
expected to learn much because they do not possess the requisite capability.
Literature Review
A detailed review of self-regulation research appears in Bandura (1986). Much of
this research has focused on the application of subprocesses in therapeutic contexts
(e.g., coping with fears, weight loss). This research will not be summarized because
my purpose in this chapter is to show how principles of self-regulation can be
applied to academic learning settings.
For the past few years, I have been conducting research using social cognitive
theory as the conceptual focus. This research, although not primarily directed
toward teaching students to become self-regulated learners, has examined how many
of the variables discussed in this chapter influence students' motivation, self-
efficacy, and learning. The subjects in most of these students have been elementary-
or middle-school students who previously experienced difficulties learning the aca-
demic content (e.g., mathematics, comprehension) and who enter with low skills
and perceived efficacy. The studies combine skill instruction with treatments
designed to enhance self-efficacy by conveying to students that they are making
progress in learning. Instructionally relevant cognitive activities and positive
efficacy beliefs are important self-regulated learning processes.
Subjects initially are pretested on self-efficacy, skill, and persistence. To assess
self-efficacy, testers briefly show subjects samples of the academic content (math
problems, reading passages and questions). For each sample, subjects judge their
certainty of solving problems (answering questions) like those shown; thus, subjects
judge their capabilities for solving different problems (answering different ques-
tions) and not whether they can solve particular problems (answer particular ques-
tions). In some studies, testers also have assessed self-efficacy for learning by
having subjects judge their capabilities to learn how to solve (answer) different types
of problems (questions). On the skill test, subjects decide whether to solve (answer)
each of several problems (questions) and how long to work on them, which provides
a measure of persistence. Treatment procedures are subsequently implemented in
conjunction with a multi session instructional program on the content-area skills.
This program includes teacher instruction, student guided practice, and student
94 D.H. Schunk
independent practice; the latter allows for assessment of motivational effects as stu-
dents work alone without teacher monitoring. Subjects are posttested on completion
of the instructional program.
Self-Observation
The effects of self-recording have been studied extensively (see Mace, Belfiore, &
Shea, Chapter 2, this volume). Self-recording is useful for systematically observing
aspects of one's behavior, and can have reactive effects on behavior (Broden, Hall,
& Mitts, 1971).
Sagotsky, Patterson, and Lepper (1978) had fifth- and sixth-grade students peri-
odically monitor their performances during mathematics sessions and record
whether they were working on appropriate materials. Other students set daily per-
formance goals, and students in a third condition received self-monitoring and goal
setting. The self-monitoring component significantly increased students' time on
task and mathematical achievement, whereas goal setting had minimal effects. The
authors note that, for goal setting to affect performance, students initially may need
training on how to set challenging but attainable goals.
Schunk (1983d) provided subtraction instruction to elementary-school children
who had failed to master subtraction operations in their regular classrooms. One
group (self-monitoring) reviewed their work at the end of each session and recorded
the number of workbook pages they completed. The effects of monitoring proce-
dures were investigated more generally by including a second group (external
monitoring), who had their work reviewed at the end of each session by an adult who
recorded the number of pages completed. In a third condition (no monitoring), chil-
dren received the instructional program but were not monitored and did not receive
instructions to monitor their work.
The self- and external monitoring conditions led to significantly higher self-
efficacy, skill, and persistence on the posttest compared with the no-monitoring
condition. The two progress-monitoring conditions did not differ on any measure.
The benefits of monitoring did not depend on children's performances during the
instructional sessions, because the three treatment conditions did not differ in
amount of work completed. Monitoring of progress, rather than the agent, enhanced
children's perception of their learning progress and efficacy for continued improve-
ment. In the absence of monitoring, children may be less sure about how well they
are learning.
Self-Judgment
MODELING
An important means of acquiring self-evaluative standards is through observation of

models. Bandura and Kupers (1964) exposed children to a model demonstrating
stringent or lenient standards while playing a bowling game. Children exposed to
high-standard models were more likely to reward themselves for high scores and
less likely to reward themselves for lower scores compared with subjects assigned
to the low-standard condition. Davidson and Smith (1982) had children observe a
superior adult, equal peer, or inferior younger child set stringent or lenient standards
while performing a pursuit rotor task. Children who observed a lenient model
rewarded themselves for lower scores than those who observed a stringent model.
Children's self-reward standards were lower than those of the adult, equal to those
of the peer, and higher than those of the younger child. Similarity in age might have
led children to believe that what was appropriate for the peer was appropriate for
them as well. With ability-related tasks, children may take relative estimates of abil-
ity into account in formulating standards.
Observing models can affect children's self-efficacy and achievement behaviors.
Zimmerman and Ringle (1981) exposed children to a model who unsuccessfully
attempted to solve a wire-puzzle problem for a long or short period and who verbal-
ized statements of confidence or pessimism. Children who observed a pessimistic
model persist for a long time lowered their efficacy judgments. Schunk (1981)
provided children deficient in division skills with cognitive modeling or didactic
instruction, followed by practice opportunities. The model verbalized operations
while applying them to problems. Cognitive modeling led to higher division skill,
but both treatments enhanced self-efficacy equally well.
Perceived similarity to models ought to be especially influential with ability-
related tasks, especially when observers have experienced difficulties and possess
doubts about performing well. Schunk and Hanson (1985) had elementary-school
children who had encountered difficulties learning subtraction with regrouping
observe videotapes portraying a peer-mastery model, a peer-coping model, a
teacher model, or no model. In the peer-model conditions, an adult teacher repeat-
edly provided instruction, after which the peer solved problems. Teacher-model
subjects observed videotapes portraying only the teacher providing instruction; no-
model subjects did not view videotapes. All children judged self-efficacy for learn-
ing to subtract and participated in an instructional program.
This study also investigated the effects of mastery and coping models. Coping
models are often employed in therapeutic contexts to reduce avoidance behaviors in
fearful clients (Thelen, Fry, Fehrenbach, & Frautschi, 1979). Unlike mastery
models who perform faultlessly from the outset, coping models initially demon-
strate the typical difficulties of observers but gradually improve their performances
and gain confidence. Coping models illustrate how coping behaviors and positive
thoughts can overcome difficulties. Coping models may be especially beneficial
with students who have difficulties learning academic content, because they may
perceive their typical performances as similar to those of coping models.
The peer-mastery model easily grasped operations and verbalized positive achieve-
ment beliefs reflecting high self-efficacy and ability, low task difficulty, and positive
attitudes. The peer-coping model initially made errors and verbalized negative
achievement beliefs, but gradually performed better and verbalized coping state-
ments (e.g., "I need to pay attention to what I'm doing"). Eventually, the coping
96 D.H. Schunk
model's problem-solving behaviors and verbalizations matched those of the mast-

ery model.
Observing a peer model enhanced self-efficacy and skill better than observing a
teacher model or no model; the teacher-model condition promoted these outcomes
better than no model. No differences were obtained between the mastery and coping
conditions. It is possible that children focused more on what the models had in com-
mon (task success) than on their differences (rate oflearning, number of errors, type
of achievement beliefs). Although subjects' prior successes in subtraction were
limited to problems without regrouping, they had these experiences to draw on and
may have concluded that if the model could learn, they could as well.
Schunk, Hanson, and Cox (1987) employed a similar methodology but used a task
(fractions) on which children had experienced few prior successes. Children viewed
videotapes portraying peer mastery or coping models learning to solve fraction
problems. Viewing coping models led to greater perceived similarity in competence,
higher self-efficacy for learning, more rapid problem solving during the instruc-
tional program, and higher posttest self-efficacy and skill, compared with observing
mastery models.
GOAL SETTING
Allowing students to set learning goals can enhance their commitment to attaining
them, which is necessary for goals to affect performance (Locke et aI., 1981).
Schunk (1985) also found that self-set goals promote self-efficacy. Sixth graders
classified as learning disabled in mathematics received subtraction instruction and
practice over sessions. Some children set performance goals each session, others
had comparable goals assigned, and children in a third condition did not set or
receive goals. Self-set goals led to the highest posttest self-efficacy and subtraction
performance. Children in the two goal conditions demonstrated greater task motiva-
tion during the instructional sessions (number of problems completed) compared
with no-goal subjects. Self-set children judged themselves more confident of attain-
ing their goals at the start of each session than did subjects in the assigned goals con-
dition. Allowing students to set their learning goals enhanced self-efficacy for
attaining them.
To test the idea that proximal goals enhance achievement behaviors better than
distant goals, Bandura and Schunk (1981) presented children with sets of subtraction
material. Some children pursued a proximal goal of completing one set during each
instructional session; a second group was given a distant goal of completing all sets
by the end of the last session; a third group was advised to work productively
(general goal). Proximal goals heightened motivation during the instructional pro-
gram and led to the highest posttest subtraction skill and self-efficacy. The distant
goal resulted in no benefits compared with the general goal. These findings support
the idea that when students can gauge their goal progress, the perception of
improvement enhances self-efficacy. Assessing progress toward a distant goal is
more difficult, and uncertainty about one's learning will not instill high self-efficacy
for improving one's skills.
Schunk: (1983c) tested the effects of goal difficulty. During a division training pro-
gram, children received either difficult (but attainable) or easier goals of completing
a given number of problems each session. To preclude children from perceiving the
goals as too difficult - which would have stifled motivation - half of the subjects in
each goal condition were told directly by the adult trainer that they could attain the
goal ("You can work 25 problems"). The other half received social comparative
information indicating that other similar children had been able to complete that
many problems. Difficult goals enhanced motivation and led to higher posttest divi-
sion skill; direct goal-attainment information promoted self-efficacy.
SOCIAL COMPARISON
Social comparison conveys normative information that is used to assess one's capa-
bilities. Schunk: (1983b) compared the effects of social comparative information
with those of goal setting during long-division instructional sessions. Half of the
children were given performance goals each session, whereas the other half were
advised to work productively. Within each goal condition, half of the subjects were
told the number of problems that other similar children had completed-which
matched the session goal- to convey that the goals were attainable; the other half
were not given comparative information. Goals enhanced posttest self-efficacy;
comparative information promoted motivation during the sessions. Subjects given
both goals and comparative information demonstrated the highest posttest division
skill. These results suggest that providing children with a goal and information that
it is attainable increases efficacy for learning, which contributes to more productive
performance during instructional sessions and greater skill acquisition.
ATTRIBUTIONAL FEEDBACK
Students' judgments about goal progress are tempered by their performance attribu-
tions. The development of self-regulated learning is facilitated by providing students
with attributional feedback. Students who attribute difficulties to low ability are apt
to hold a low sense of efficacy and not expend additional effort. Being told that one
can achieve better results through harder work can motivate one to do so and convey
that one possesses the necessary capability to succeed (Andrews & Debus, 1978;
Dweck, 1975). Providing effort feedback for prior successes supports students' per-
ceptions of their progress, sustains motivation, and increases efficacy for further
learning (Schunk:, 1989).
The timing of attributional feedback also is important. Early task successes con-
stitute a prominent cue for formulating ability attributions (Schunk:, 1989). Feed-
back that links early successes with ability (e.g., "That's correct. You're really good
at this.") should enhance learning efficacy. Many times, however, effort feedback for
early successes may be more credible, because when students lack skills they
realistically have to expend effort to succeed. As students develop skills, switching
to ability feedback better enhances self-efficacy.
98 D.H. Schunk
These ideas have been tested in several studies (Schunk, 1982, 1983a, 1984b;
Schunk & Cox, 1986). Schunk (1982) found that linking children's prior achieve-
ments with effort (e.g., "You've been working hard.") led to higher task motivation,
self-efficacy, and subtraction skill, compared with linking future achievement with
effort ("You need to work hard."). Schunk (1983a) showed that ability feedback for
prior successes ("You're good at this.") enhanced self-efficacy and skill better than
effort feedback or ability-plus-effort feedback. The latter subjects judged effort
expenditure during the instructional program greater than ability-only students.
Children in the combined condition may have discounted some ability information
in favor of effort.
To investigate sequence effects, Schunk (1984b) periodically provided one group
of children with ability feedback, a second group with effort feedback, and a third
condition with ability feedback during the first half ofthe instructional program and
effort feedback during the second half. This latter sequence was reversed for a
fourth condition. Ability feedback for early successes, regardless of whether it was
continued, led to higher ability attributions, posttest self-efficacy and skill, com-
pared with effort feedback for early successes.
Schunk and Cox (1986) presented subtraction instruction to middle-school stu-
dents classified as learning disabled in mathematics. While solving problems, stu-
dents received effort feedback during the first half of the instructional program,
effort feedback during the second half, or no effort feedback. Each type of feedback
promoted self-efficacy and skillful performance better than no feedback; first-half
feedback enhanced students' effort attributions. Given students' learning disabilities,
effort feedback for early or later successes likely seemed credible because they
realistically had to expend effort to succeed. Over a longer time, effort feedback for
successes on the same task could lose its effectiveness; as students become more
skillful they might wonder why they still have to work hard to succeed. (Attribu-
tional effects also are discussed by Paris & Byrnes, this volume.)
Self-Reaction
REWARD CONTINGENCIES
Rewarding consequences inform and motivate (Bandura, 1986). As students work at

a task, they learn which behaviors lead to successful outcomes and which result in
failures. Such information guides future behavior. The anticipation of attaining
desirable outcomes can motivate students to engage in a task and persevere
(McGraw, 1978).
Reward contingencies are important influences on students' self-efficacy and
assist the development of self-regulated learning (Schunk, 1989). Rewards are likely
to enhance efficacy when they are tied to students' actual accomplishments and thus
convey information about goal progress. Receipt of the reward also symbolizes
progress. When rewards are offered merely for task participation, students may not
experience a comparable sense of learning efficacy. Such rewards actually may con-
vey negative information; students might infer that they are not expected to learn
much because they do not possess the requisite capability.
Schunk (1983e) provided elementary-school children with division instruction

and practice opportunities. One group (performance-contingent reward) were told
that they would earn points for each problem solved and that they could buy prizes
based on the monetary value of the points. A second group (task-contingent reward)
were told that they would receive prizes for participating. The effects of reward
anticipation were disentangled from those of reward receipt by allowing students in
a third condition (unexpected reward) to unexpectedly choose prizes on completion
of the project. Performance-contingent rewards led to the greatest task motivation
and the highest posttest division self-efficacy and skill. Offering rewards for partici-
pation led to no benefits compared with merely providing instruction.
Schunk (1984a) compared the effects of performance-contingent rewards with
those of proximal goals. Of central interest was whether combining rewards with
goals would provide a clearer standard against which to gauge progress and thereby
heighten children's efficacy more than either treatment alone. Children received
division instruction and practice over sessions. Some were offered rewards based on
their actual performances, others pursued proximal performance goals each ses-
sion, and children in a third condition received rewards and goals. The three condi-
tions led to equally high motivation during the sessions, but combining rewards with
goals resulted in the highest self-efficacy and division performance.
Implications for Development and Acquisition

Self-regulation does not automatically develop as people become older, nor is it pas-
sively acquired from the environment. The subprocesses of self-regulated learning
are altered during development, and interventions differ in their effects on the
acquisition of self-regulatory skills. The implications of social-cognitive theory for
development and acquisition are discussed in this section.
Developmental Considerations
MODELING
Children's abilities to learn from models depend on developmental factors (Bandura,

1986). Young children have difficulty attending to modeled events for long periods
and distinguishing relevant from irrelevant cues. The ability to process information
effectively also improves with development. Children develop a more extensive
knowledge base to help them comprehend new information, and they become capa-
ble of using memory strategies. Young children may encode modeled events in terms
of physical properties, whereas older children represent information symbolically
(e.g., language). Information acquired through observation cannot be performed if
children lack the requisite physical capabilities. Production also requires translating
into action information stored in memory, comparing performance with memorial
representation, and correcting performance as necessary. Young children are highly
motivated by the immediate consequences of their actions. As children mature, they
are more likely to perform modeled actions that they find personally satisfying.
100 D.H. Schunk
SOCIAL COMPARISONS
The ability to use comparative information effectively depends on higher levels of

cognitive development and experience in making comparative evaluations (Veroff,
1969); therefore, Festinger's (1954) hypothesis may not apply to children younger
than age 5 or 6. Such children are characterized by what Piaget termed centration,
or the tendency not to relate two or more elements in thought, and egocentrism,
which refers to the "self" dominating one's cognitive focus and judgments (Higgins,
1981). These cognitive characteristics do not mean that young children cannot
evaluate themselves relative to others; rather, that they do not automatically do so.
Children show interest in comparative information in the early elementary-school
years and increasingly use such information to help form self-evaluations of perfor-
mance capabilities (Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980; Ruble, Feldman, &
Boggiano, 1976). By the fourth grade, children's performances on motor and learn-
ing tasks are influenced by peers' performances, whereas the behaviors of younger
children are affected more by direct adult social evaluation (e.g., "You're good
at this.").
Although young children engage in social comparison, the meaning and function
of comparative information change with development, especially after entering
school (Masters, 1971). Preschoolers actively compare at an overt physical level
(e.g., amount of reward). Mosatche and Bragonier (1981) found that preschoolers'
social comparisons primarily involved establishing how one was similar to and
different from others, and competition that seemed to be based on a desire to be bet-
ter than others but that did not involve self-evaluation (''I'm the general; that's higher
than the captain.").
The development of social comparisons is a multistep process (Ruble, 1983; Suls
& Sanders, 1982). The earliest comparisons primarily involve similarities and
differences but shift to a concern for how to perform tasks. Although first graders
engage in peer comparison, it often is directed toward obtaining correct answers.
Providing comparative information to young children may increase their motivation
more for practical reasons than for acquiring information about personal capabili-
ties (Ruble et aI., 1976). Telling young children who fail at a task that most other
children also do poorly may not alleviate the negative impact of failure. After first
grade, interest increases in determining how well peers are doing, and comparative
information is used to evaluate one's capabilities (Ruble & Flett, 1988).
GOAL SETTING
Developmental considerations impact goal-setting and self-evaluative capabilities.

Young children have short time frames of reference and may not be fully capable of
representing distant outcomes in thought. Proximal goals fit well with lesson plan-
ning in elementary classrooms; teachers plan activities around short blocks oftime.
Development produces the capacity to represent longer-term outcomes in thought
and to mentally subdivide distant goals into a series of short-term ones.
The process of comparing performances with goals to determine progress is
affected by developmental factors. Children can easily misjudge their capabilities;
they may overestimate or underestimate what they can do. Progress misjudgments
are especially likely when children learn some component subskills of a task but not
others. In mathematics, students often employ buggy algorithms, or erroneous
strategies that result in problem solutions (Brown & Burton, 1978). Because buggy
algorithms produce solutions, employing them can instate a false sense of compe-
tence. There also are students who, because they solve problems accurately but are
unsure of whether their answers are correct, do not feel efficacious. Feedback to stu-
dents concerning their learning progress is important when students cannot deter-
mine it on their own.
ATTRIBUTIONS
Important developmental changes occur in children's attributions (Frieze, 1980;

Nicholls, 1978). Very young children view effort as the prime cause of outcomes;
the concepts of effort and ability are intertwined. With development, a distinct con-
ception of ability emerges. Ability attributions become increasingly important
influences on performance expectations, whereas effort as a causal factor declines
in importance (Harari & Covington, 1981).
Developmental changes also occur in children's conceptions of intelligence, which
affect students' choices of learning goals, achievement beliefs, and behaviors
(Dweck & Bempechat, 1983). The "entity" theory holds that intelligence is a stable,
fixed trait, and is manifested in one's performances. One cannot become smarter,
although everyone is capable of learning. The "instrumental-incremental" theory
postulates that intelligence comprises one's knowledge and skills and can be
expanded through one's efforts. In this view, becoming smarter is synonymous with
acquiring knowledge and skills. Although children implicitly understand both
theories by the late elementary-school years, they tend to adopt one or the other
consistently in achievement contexts. Research is addressing how these views
develop and how instructional and social factors affect them (Dweck, 1986).
Acquisition of Self-Regulatory Skills

Many students acquire self-regulated learning strategies in the course of school
instruction; for some, however, strategy learning is problematic. Researchers are
increasingly emphasizing strategy training that includes instruction and practice in
applying a strategy, training in self-regulated implementation and monitoring of
strategy use, and information on strategy value and on the range of tasks to which
the strategy can be applied (Brown, Palincsar, & Armbruster, 1984). Each ofthese
components can enhance students' self-efficacy for continued skill improvement.
Training procedures that require extensive cognitive activity by learners can teach
them to self-regulate their performances and convey information about the useful-
ness of a strategy and their capabilities for applying it (Borkowski & Cavanaugh,
1979). An appropriate procedure is self-instructional training (Harris, 1982;
Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979). During the cognitive modeling phase, a student
observes a model verbalize the appropriate rules and procedures while performing
a task. The model then verbally instructs the student while the student performs the
102 D.H. Schunk
task (overt guidance), after which the student generates overt instructions while per-
forming (overt self-guidance). The student next whispers the instructions while per-
forming (jaded self-guidance), and eventually performs the task silently (covert
self-instruction). Types of statements that typically are modeled include: problem
definition (e.g., "What is it I have to do?"), focusing of attention ("I need to pay
attention to what I'm doing."), planning and response guidance ("I need to work
carefully:'), self-reinforcement ("I'm doing fine."), self-evaluation (')\m I doing
things in the right order?"), and coping statements ("I need to try again when I don't
get it right."). (See also Rohrkemper, this volume, for additional discussion of the
self-regulatory role of inner speech.)
Strategy Instruction in the Classroom

This section exemplifies how social-cognitive principles can be applied to foster
self-regulatory skills in the context of strategy training. Initially I will discuss some
recent research projects that 10 Mary Rice, Paula Cox, and I have conducted. I then
will provide educational implications of this work by describing how procedures can
be implemented in classrooms.
Research Evidence
Learning strategies are systematic plans that improve the encoding of information
and task performance (Paris et aI., 1983). Use of learning strategies improves
performance on the task at hand and can generalize beyond the learning context
(Pintrich et al., 1986). Strategy instruction is an effective means of promoting self-
regulated learning and perceived efficacy (Corno & Mandinach, 1983; Schunk,
1986). Such instruction makes salient to students the rules and steps that improve
performance and conveys that they are capable of applying them. The beliefthat one
can apply a strategy to improve learning instills in learners a sense of personal con-
trol over achievement outcomes, which can raise self-efficacy.
One means for helping students learn to use a strategy is to have them overtly
verbalize the steps in the strategy as they apply them. There are several ways that
overt verbalization can enhance self-regulated learning (Schunk, 1986). Verbaliza-
tion helps students attend to important task features and disregard irrelevant ones.
As a form of rehearsal, verbalization assists coding and retention of information.
Verbalization also promotes monitoring, as when students must detect and integrate
information needed to solve problems (Diefenderfer, Holzman, & Thompson,
1985).
Verbalization seems most beneficial for students who typically perform in a
deficient manner (Denney, 1975). Benefits have been obtained with children who
do not spontaneously rehearse material to be learned, impulsive subjects, learning-
disabled and retarded students, and remedial learners (Schunk, 1986). Verbal-
ization may help such students work at tasks systematically (Hallahan, Kneedler,
& Lloyd, 1983). Verbalization may not facilitate performance when children can
adequately handle the task demands. Verbalization even can hinder children's per-
formances, because it constitutes an additional task and can distract children from
the primary task.
To test the effects of verbalization, Schunk and Rice (1984) presented language-
deficient children in grades two through four with listening-comprehension instruc-
tion. Half of the children in each grade verbalized strategic steps prior to applying
them to questions; the other half applied but did not verbalize the steps. Strategy
verbalization led to higher self-efficacy across grades, and promoted performance
among third- and fourth-graders but not among second graders. The demands of
verbalization, along with those of the comprehension task itself, were too complex
for the youngest subjects. These children may have focused their efforts on the com-
prehension task, which would have interfered with strategy encoding and retention.
In a follow-up study (Schunk & Rice, 1985), children in grades four and five with
reading-comprehension deficiencies received instruction and practice. Within each
grade, half of the subjects verbalized a strategy prior to applying it. Strategy verbali-
zation led to higher reading comprehension, self-efficacy, and ability attributions
across grades. The latter finding suggests that strategy verbalization may enhance
self-efficacy through its effect on ability attributions.
In the Schunk and Cox (1986) study, some students verbalized aloud subtraction-
solution steps and their application to problems (continuous verbalization), others
verbalized aloud during the first half of the instructional program but not during the
second half (discontinued verbalization), and those in a third group did not verbal-
ize. Continuous verbalization led to higher posttest self-efficacy and skill than dis-
continued and no verbalization, which did not differ. When instructed to no longer
verbalize aloud, discontinued-verbalization students might have had difficulty inter-
nalizing the strategy and not used covert instructions to regulate their performances.
They also may have believed that, although the strategy was useful, other factors
(e.g., effort, time available) were more important for solving problems.
Strategy instruction does not ensure that students will continue to use the strategy
when not required to do so. To promote continued strategy use, researchers suggest
providing students with strategy-value information on how strategy use can improve
performance (Borkowski & Cavanaugh, 1979; Brown, Campione, & Day, 1981;
Paris et al., 1983). Some ways to convey strategy value are to instruct children to use
the strategy because it will help them perform better, to inform them that strategy
use benefited other students, and to provide them with feedback linking strategy use
with performance improvements. Strategy-value information promotes strategy
maintenance and better performance (Ringel & Springer, 1980).
Two experiments showed that strategy-value information also enhances self-
efficacy (Schunk & Rice, 1987). In both studies, children were given instruction on
finding main ideas. Children in the first experiment received specific strategy-value
information, general information, specific-plus-general information, or no
strategy-value information. The specific information was linked to the task at hand;
the general information conveyed the value of the strategy on all reading tasks. In the
second experiment, children received strategy-effectiveness feedback, specific
strategy-value information, or feedback-plus-specific information. The feedback
104 D.H. Schunk
linked children's improved performances with use of the comprehension strategy. In

each study, the combined treatment enhanced self-efficacy and skill better than the
other conditions, which did not differ.
Educational Implications
The research that Jo Mary Rice and I have conducted has been with elementary-
school remedial readers. These students regularly receive instruction in small
groups. As part of their regular instruction, students are taught basic reading, read-
ing comprehension (e.g., main ideas, sequencing, details, inferences), and listening-
comprehension skills.
We have applied many of the ideas discussed in this chapter. In this section, I will
exemplify the application of comprehension-strategy modeling, guided practice,
overt verbalization, strategy-value information, strategy-effectiveness feedback,
attributional feedback, and independent practice. Each of these procedures can be
easily implemented with regular instructional practices. Given that our subjects
have reading-skill deficiencies and hold a low sense of efficacy for improving their
skills, we have used procedures that are designed to enhance students' self-efficacy
by conveying to them that they are improving their skills and making progress
toward the goal of becoming better readers.
The context for these applications is reading-comprehension instruction on find-
ing main ideas. The instructional material consists of a training packet that includes
several reading passages, each of which is followed by multiple-choice questions
tapping comprehension of important ideas. The passages are drawn from different
sources and are similar to those typically used by children's remedial teachers. Chil-
dren work on this packet during each of the instructional sessions.
The sessions are administered by an adult member of our project staff. At the start
of each session, the trainer distributes the instructional packet. On a nearby poster
board is printed a five-step reading comprehension strategy, as follows:
What do I have to do? (1) Read the questions. (2) Read the passage to find out what it is mostly
about. (3) Think about what the details have in common. (4) Think about what would make
a good title. (5) Reread the story if I don't know the answer to a question.
After distributing the packet, the trainer points to the poster board and models the
application of the strategy by verbalizing, "What do I have to do? Read the ques-
tions:' The trainer reads aloud the multiple-choice questions for the first compre-
hension passage while children follow along, after which she points to and verbalizes
steps (2) and (3). The trainer explains that details refer to bits of information and
gives some examples, and states that while she is reading the passage she will be
thinking about what the details have in common. She then reads the passage aloud.
The trainer points to and verbalizes step (4), and explains that trying to think of a
good title helps to remember important ideas in a story. She states some of the
details in the story, explains what they have in common, and makes up a title. The
trainer then reads aloud the first question and its multiple-choice answers, selects
the correct answer, and explains her selection by referring to the passage. She
answers the remaining questions in the same fashion.
Following this modeled demonstration, the trainer instructs children to repeat

aloud each step after she verbalizes it. She then says, "What do I have to do? Read
the questions." After children verbalize these statements, she selects one student to
read the questions aloud. When this child finishes, the trainer instructs children to
repeat after her steps (2) and (3). The trainer then calls on a different child to read
the passage aloud, after which she asks children to repeat step (4) after her. A third
student is selected to think of a title for the story and explain his or her answer. The
trainer then calls on individual children to read aloud each of the questions with its
answers and to answer that question. If a child answers a questions incorrectly, the
student repeats step (5) and rereads enough of the passage to answer the question
correctly. When students stumble on a word, the trainer prompts with contextual
and phonetic cues.
This instructional format is used during the first session. The format for subse-
quent sessions is identical except that the trainer does not model strategies and chil-
dren do not verbalize each step prior to applying it. Instead, she refers to steps at the
appropriate places and occasionally asks children to verbalize them.
Strategy-value information can be delivered at various times during the instruc-
tional sessions. At the start of each session, for example, the trainer might point to
the poster board and say, "Today we're going to use these steps to answer questions
about main ideas:' To link the strategy with the task at hand, she then might remark:
Using these steps should help you whenever you have to answer questions about main ideas,
because most children like you find that using these steps helps them whenever they have to
answer questions about main ideas.
The general value of the strategy can be conveyed in similar fashion by the trainer
remarking:
Using steps like these should help you whenever you have to answer questions about passages
you've read, because most children like you find that using steps like these helps them
whenever they have to answer questions about passages they've read.
At the end of each session, the trainer can reemphasize the value of the strategy
for the task at hand (or in general) by remarking, "Remember that using these steps
should help you whenever you have to answer questions about main ideas (passages
you've read)."
Strategy-effectiveness feedback can be delivered periodically to each child during
each instructional session. For example, after a child correctly answers a compre-
hension question, the trainer provides performance feedback (e.g., "That's cor-
rect."), after which she delivers such effectiveness-feedback statements as:
You got it right because you followed the steps in the right order.
Answering questions is easier when you follow these steps.
You've been answering a lot more questions correctly since you've been using these steps.
Do you see how thinking about what the details have in common helps you to answer ques-
tions?
Since you've been thinking about what would make a good title you've been answering a lot
more questions correctly.
Effort-attributional feedback can be delivered to students following their con-
certed efforts to answer a question (e.g., "That's correct. You got it right because you
106 D.H. Schunk
really tried hard:'). As children's skills improve, ability feedback (e.g., "You're good
at answering these questions.") may seem more credible.
As with all strategy training, it is important that students maintain their use of the
strategy over time and generalize its application to other contexts. A good means for
fostering maintenance and generalization is to teach the strategy using multiple
tasks. This often entails showing students how to make minor modifications in the
strategy. For example, in teaching reading for details we altered the strategy as fol-
lows:
What do I have to do? (1) Read the questions. (2) Read the story, and (3) Look for key words.
(4) Reread each question, and (5) Answer that question. (6) Reread the story if I don't know
the answer.
Another means is to provide students with periods where they work on reading
tasks independently. Independent practice also builds self-efficacy. When students
successfully complete work on their own, they are likely to attribute the successes
to their own abilities and efforts rather than to outside assistance.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that social-cognitive principles are

useful for fostering self-regulatory skills among students. Social-cognitive theory
postulates that self-regulation includes three subprocesses: self-observation, self-
judgment, self-reaction. Observing one's behaviors can inform and motivate. The
information gained is used to determine how well one is progressing toward learning
goals. Observation of progress helps to instill a sense of self-efficacy for continuing
to improve one's skills. Self-efficacy, along with the anticipated satisfaction of
attaining the goal, can sustain students' motivation.
I also have discussed how various treatment procedures can teach students to
observe, judge, and react to their learning progress. Influential procedures include
progress monitoring, observation of models, goal setting, social comparison,
attributional feedback, reward contingencies, and strategy training. In addition to
addressing self-regulatory skills, each of these procedures also conveys information
to students about how well they are learning academic skills. The belief that one is
capable of learning is an important part of the self-regulation process.
This chapter also has addressed developmental considerations and the importance
of instruction aimed at fostering self-regulation in students. Although the processes
whereby such skills are acquired are constrained by students' level of development,
even young children can benefit from instruction designed to teach observation and
evaluation of progress toward learning goals. I have tried to show the educational
implications of social-cognitive theory by providing a detailed example of compre-
hension-strategy training with remedial readers.
As evidenced by this volume, the many perspectives on self-regulated learning
have created a significant research base. Much exciting research will occur in the
future. I believe that social-cognitive theory has an important role in this area, and
I hope that this chapter will increase the likelihood of this role being fulfilled.
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5. Self-Regulated Learning: A Volitional Analysis
Lyn Como
This chapter attempts to characterize the role of volition in self-regulated learning

(SRL). Most conceptions of SRL include aspects of volition and may even be based
in part on volitional data, but the construct of volition generally remains implicit
or at most peripheral in operational definitions of SRL. Modern theories of voli-
tion are mentioned, if at all, in passing. As theory and research advance, however,
the volitional aspects of SRL demand clarification, and contemporary researchers
will benefit from an understanding of this relatively unfamiliar body of work.
Educational psychologists need also to envision points of connection between voli-
tion theory and classroom educational practice. This chapter seeks to accomplish
these objectives.
There are some points of clarification to make at the outset. First, I shall follow
the lead of an earlier paper in which Ellen Mandinach and I (Como & Mandinach,
1983) defined SRL to emphasize our continuing interest in the acquisition of
academic-subject-matter knowledge in school. We also used terms consistent with
information-processing theory to convey a modern psychological orientation that
involves higher-level orchestrating and control processes in the control of concentra-
tion, motivation, and affect: Our definition of SRL was "an effort put forth by stu-
dents to deepen and manipulate the associative network in content areas, and to
monitor and improve that deepening process" (p. 95).
Implicit in this early definition are two assumptions that are important for the
present analysis. First, we assume that the act of self-monitoring in part serves a pro-
tective or control function. It aids concentration, motivation, and affect while it aids
performance, protecting the learner from outside or internal intrusion. The capacity
to readily protect one's own psychological states is the operational heart of what is
meant by volition in the contemporary view of the term. More will be said on this
point shortly.
112 L. Como
Our early definition also assumes that students vary in SRL, and vary in the need
to use SRL, depending on a number of personal and environmental factors, includ-
ing cognitive ability and environmental conditioning. We do not, however, equate
SRL with either acquired or native intelligence, nor do we believe it is merely
the result of instrumental conditioning or internal motivators such as perceived
efficacy. SRL is thus better defined as the internalization of learning and task-
management strategies, coupled with the ability to mobilize and maintain them
when situations demand (see Corno, 1986, 1987). This recent reformulation of our
early definition thus makes volitional processes explicit and places SRL in a larger
theoretical context.
Ongoing research with colleagues at Teachers College and elsewhere reflects our
continuing concern with effective classroom learning and the manner by which
concentration, motivation, and affect are directed and maintained in academic
tasks. One lesson these research efforts have taught us is that school and classroom
learning in particular are situations that demand mental control. Classroom-
observation studies have documented the numerous distractions and competing
attentional stimuli that exist when students perform academic tasks together in
groups (see e.g., Evertson & Green, 1986). Observational data fail to convey,
however, the diversity of capabilities, motives, and goals that exist in the minds of
individual students, the varying levels of commitment to goals students have, or the
ways that classroom settings and teacher behavior may subtly undermine students'
best intentions. These are factors of equal importance in explaining learning varia-
tion in school (Calfee, 1981).
To learn in a classroom setting, in short, is to be able to concentrate and move
through academic tasks in the face of many potential distractions: There are
environmental factors such as inappropriate tasks and peer intrusions, and personal
factors such as confusion and changing interests or goals. We view the ability to
maintain concentration in the face of obstacles as volitional. The volitional aspects
of SRL are therefore those mechanisms that kick in to control concentration and aid
progress in the face of environmental and personal obstacles to academic learning.
They are metacognitive, metamotivational, and meta-affective processes, for they
protect and control all of these psychological states. In our framework, volition is
seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for SRL, and is given special status as
the key to learning efficiency (Corno, 1986).1
The section that follows presents some general theory on volition and considers
the importance of volition in research on academic self-regulation. Subprocesses of
volition within the academic-learning domain are then identified and exemplified.
Related research is discussed; there are several lines of investigation currently ongo-
ing in educational psychology that have important connections to volitional aspects
of SRL. And finally I describe some research directed specifically at a better under-
standing of volition in academic settings and how it may be developed.
'A more colloquial expression that approximates our operational definition of volition is to say that a
student who has volition is resourceful.
5. Self-Regulated Learning 113
A Modern Theory of Volition and Its Importance

in Education and SRL
A Brief History
The construct of volition has fared poorly in the history of psychology. Early
twentieth-century debates among German psychologists questioned its theoretical
necessity. Some theorists equated volition with motivation, and argued that the lat-
ter was more inclusive. Others found volition either derivative of basic processes
such as emotions or simple cognitions, or simply the manifestation of instrumental
conditioning. In part these problems were tied to the ambiguities of the colloquial
meaning of volition as "willpower" or strength of will.2 Modem volition theory dis-
entangles volitional processes from this notion of mindless sacrifice for the moral
good, and emphasizes the practical utility of volitional strategies when intentions
are attenuated.
For the past 50 years or so the term volition has appeared rarely in psychological
research reports and related writings on education (Snow, 1986). The current
revival is attributable in large part to efforts by a West German psychologist named
Julius Kuhl. Kuhl has made a convincing case for resurrecting an early, unconven-
tional theory by Ach (1910). Ach handled the definitional difficulties of volition by
distinguishing it from motivation: Motivation creates the impulse or intention to
act; volition controls intentions and impulses so the action is carried out. The
processes are viewed in Ach's theory as interrelated but conceptually distinct and
suggestive of different points of intervention. Kuhl adds that volition can be recon-
ceptualized within a general information-processing theory and operationalized as
various learned volitional or "action control" strategies (see Kuhl, 1985).
Kuhl's Theory and its Utility for Educational Psychology

Kuhl's position has been articulated in an edited volume along with supporting
research (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985). This work examines volitional processes in
many domains of everyday life (from overeating to coping with tragedy) but does not
focus on academic learning per se. The volume is also highly technical and most of
the reported research follows a social-psychological model that seems artificial
when compared to the more representative methods currently popular in education
(see e.g., Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984). In another paper (Como, 1986) I have dis-
cussed Kuhl's theory in the particular case of academic self-regulation, but his posi-
21t is fitting that Germany again offers us the construct of volition when her debates did away with it
in the first place. Lest we think for a moment, however, that issues of will are somehow culturally linked
to Germany, I hasten to point out that early essays on the Puritan Ethic spoke of willpower as "proof' of
divine worth. Witness Cotton Mather, who said we should "Prove virtue by denying pleasure." A "no
pain, no gain" view of volition is not what modem volitional theory posits, however, as we shall see
below. In addition, our all-American favorite, John Dewey, wrote an essay on interest and volition that
also denigrates this sense of the term (see Dewey, 1974).
114 L. Como
tion bears repeating here because the ideas are complex and evolving, and most
researchers are (quite wisely) reluctant to return to discarded theoretical constructs
if there is a simpler convincing viewpoint. My own readings of Kuhl have persuaded
me that there is both theoretical and functional utility to a revival, particularly in
the case of academic learning.
Kuhl (1985) conceptualizes volition after Ach (1910) as a series of "action control
processes;' that is, "postdecisional, self-regulatory processes that energize the main-
tenance and enactment of intended actions" (p. 90). Although Kuhl's theory is
general, the specific intended actions of concern here are concentrating and working
toward the completion of academic tasks. That volitional processes are "postdeci-
sional" is the distinguishing point between volition and motivation: Volitional
processes come into play after the decision is made to learn or complete an academic
task. Most motivational processes underlie or precede the decision to learn or com-
plete a task-these include the weighing of success and outcome expectancies, the
assessment of value, and so on. They promote the intent to learn (Snow, 1988). A
student brings in volition once there is a commitment to learn, and volition protects
that commitment to learn and concentrate from competing action tendencies and
other potential distractions. Again, motivational processes mediate the formation of
decisions and promote decisions whereas volitional processes mediate the enact-
ment of those decisions and protect them.
According to Kuhl, volitional control will be necessary under certain conditions.
There is no assumption that all classroom tasks make volitional demands; indeed,
some tasks may obviate the need for volition by special or intrinsic design (see e.g.,
Lepper & Malone, 1987). The hypothetical conditions under which volition will be
called upon include the following:
(a) When students are required to complete tasks and are not free to choose other
actions, other interests and subjective goals may compete with the intent to work
and attention is divided.
(b) When there is sufficient "noise" in the general classroom environment students
can be distracted from goals to complete tasks.
(c) When tasks are repetitive students compare prior performances on similar tasks
to current situations; visions of poor performance may obstruct or interfere with
the wish to take action. That is, students may be "held up" by a rising sense of
self-consciousness (Weiner, 1986).
(d) When students believe themselves able to complete a given task (i.e., have a crit-
icallevel of "perceived self-efficacy;' Bandura, 1977; see Schunk, this volume)
volition will be called into play.
The first two conditions are located in the task environment. The latter two are
person factors that may vary among individuals, but these may be influenced by the
task environment as well. For example, extreme task difficulty would be hypothe-
sized to increase self-consciousness and decrease perceived efficacy.
Conditions like these characterize many classroom tasks and so provide fertile
grounds for a mantle of volitional control. Again, the distinction between motiva-
tion and volition is clear: Motivational factors such as perceived efficacy shape
intentions and fuel task involvement. Volition, there partly because intentions are
fragile, escalates the intention to learn and steers involvement along.
PRACTICAL UTILITY
Now, why this distinction is practically useful in education is immediately evident.

We need only to consider what life in classrooms would be like without student voli-
tion to realize its worth. In addition, many able enough students come to education
intending and even eager to learn but because oflimited volition take little away from
school experiences. Teachers speak of the problem in specific cases, but it exists in
whole classrooms and schools as well. The so-called "motivational" problems in
America's urban schools are well documented and growing (Cuban, 1984; Goodlad,
1984). The fact that teachers and scholars tend to classify volition together with
other motivational problems is mainly out of convention and does little to help us
deal with either. Factors that influence the intention to learn may be less amenable
to educational intervention than the post-decisional, volitional factors I shall
describe.
UTILITY FOR ThEORY AND RESEARCH
Why volition is useful from the standpoint of scientific psychology is perhaps less
self-evident but no less important. First, as Snow (1986) has argued, reintroducing
the volitional construct deepens our psychological theory. It becomes necessary in
the case of human performance under complex task situations like education to
account for interactions among basic cognitive, conative, and affective functions
(p. 33) (Snow & Farr, 1987). This ancient tripartite distinction between functions of
the mind reflects a network theoretic view with distinctive but interacting elements.
What Snow and Farr (1987) take to constitute conation are precisely the processes
Kuhl defines as motivation and volition. These account together for "purposive
striving;' and both make important contributions to complex human performance
beyond the influence of cognition and affection.
Along these same lines, social psychologists like Albert Bandura have recently
chosen to complicate and enrich their theories of behavioral change with cognitive
motivational processes (Bandura, 1986). The evolution of a process-theoretic view-
point in social psychology permits a healthy alignment with Soviet psychologists,
who have long posited the internalization of other-regulation as a keystone in
cognitive-social development (Zimmerman, Chapter 7, this volume; Vygotsky,
1962; Wertsch, 1979). When one believes, as Bandura (1974) does, that humans are
"partial architects of their own destinies" (p. 867), there is no need to side
philosophically with determinism or free will. Instrumental contingencies become
internal and so regulate action; but humans also consciously apply appropriate
instrumentalities as situations demand (see Zimmerman, Chapter 7, this volume).
Having volition can then be seen as the ability to mobilize and maintain self-
regulatory strategies when situations demand, not simply as manifesting learned
contingencies. Within the SRL domain, volition is mobilizing and maintaining those
116 L. Como
particular strategies that get the most from the information-processing system we
have as it is working-strategies that keep us intending to learn as we learn, that
bring us through this or that academic task. Volitional processes are for this reason
of a higher order or "meta"-level; they insure the smooth running of an easily
crashed information-processing system (Corno, 1986).
The reintroduction of volition to theory and research in educational psychology
may also be important in light of the evidence that motivation has risen in stature
as a phenomenon of interest to educational researchers over the past decade (see
Ames & Ames, 1984). Theoretical contributions from American psychologists like
Bernard Weiner, Albert Bandura, and Edward Deci have fueled solid lines of con-
tinuing research on attributions, self-efficacy, and the educational environments
that directly affect self-regulation processes. Because none of these motivation the-
ories focuses on postdecisional processes that protect the intent to learn, the particu-
lar problem of volition goes unaddressed. One reason to rectify this situation is
because it seems potentially easier to teach students volitional control strategies like
those I shall describe than to intervene in their prior reinforcement histories (which
shape both attributions and self-efficacy), or to make the kinds of changes in public-
school education that allow students and teachers more equivalent control (Grannis,
1975). This is of course an empirical question, which is the final reason to revive
volition in educational research-to spawn research that might resolve this and
other debates.
Kuhl's Research: A Representative Study

Because Kuhl's theory is central to my analysis, readers need exposure to his
research. I have already indicated that most of the published research is not particu-
larly relevant to academic tasks performed by children (but see Kuhl & Kraska
[1988] for examples of unpublished pilot studies on developmental features ofvoli-
tion in children). His methods and questions are more closely aligned with research
in personality-social psychology so one must stretch to the application. I will
nonetheless describe a representative study by Kuhl (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984) in
the interest of linking his work to future research in education.
The study by Beckmann and Kuhl (1984) was based on Kuhl's theory, described
by the authors as follows:
Kuhl ... postulated that the presence of sufficient motivation and sufficient ability alone are
not enough for the actual performance of an intended action unless the action consists of mere
routine behavior or is controlled by external forces. When a person intends to perform a cer-
tain action, he or she is often subject to various external and/or internal forces which arouse
alternative action tendencies. To ensure that the intended action rather than one of the com-
peting action tendencies will be executed, the former has to be selectively strengthened and
protected against interference until it is performed. In his theory of action control, Kuhl
(1984) presumes that the efficiency ofthe process of action control is affected by two differ-
ent states of the organism, i.e., action vs. state orientation. (p. 226)
Action versus state orientation is conceived by Kuhl as a dispositional factor deter-

mined by interacting forces within the person and the situation. Kuhl (1981) demon-
strated, for example, that extended exposure to uncontrollable aversive events cou-
pled with a tendency to focus on these events results in an inability to act that defines
state orientation. In contrast, when subjects are asked to think aloud while solving
problems, they can be oriented by the situation toward action.
Kuhl has designed and tested a questionnaire that assesses this dispositional
tendency systematically. The questionnaire, called the Action-Control Scale (ACS),
includes subscales in the psychology of behavioral performance, response to failure,
and method of decision making. Each sub scale consists of 20 items that have been
tested in a number of empirical studies in Kuhl's laboratory. Internal consistency for
the subscales exceeds .70 (Cronbach's alpha), and correlations between total scores
and several other personality measures (e.g. test anxiety, self-consciousness, and
achievement motivation) appear moderately positive (generally < .40).
One item from the ACS performance subscale reads, "When I've finished an
excellent piece of work;' (either) "I like to do something else for a while;' or "It
makes me want to do some more in the same area:' One item from the failure scale
reads, "When my work is labeled 'unsatisfactory;" (either) "Then I really dig in" or
'~t first I am stunned." An item from the decision scale reads, "If I had work at
home" (either) "I would often have problems getting started" or "I would usually
start immediately." Each subscale contains items asking the subject to provide
information about several different domains of activity, including work, leisure, and
social activity.
In the research with Beckmann, 20 German university students were recruited to
participate in a study investigating methods for finding an apartment; only students
who were currently looking for housing were included. The students completed the
ACS and then rated the perceived attractiveness of 16 potential apartments on a
scale of 1 to 12. The 16 apartments varied in attractiveness according to a list of
features (bathroom, rent, etc.) the subjects themselves had previously discussed
with experimenters as either "required" or "desirable:' The list was expected to cre-
ate conflict because these required and desirable features were never present at once
(e.g., all required features, none desirable, etc.). Ratings were obtained at two
different times (following "tentative" and "final" decisions) and these served as
repeated measures-dependent variables.
It was found that action- but not state-oriented subjects increased attractiveness
ratings following initial decisions. The tendency to escalate the attractiveness of a
preliminary decision was predictably more likely for subjects scoring higher on the
decision subscale of the ACS, who would theoretically be working to put intentions
into practice before being overcome by further information. These subjects would,
in the author's words, see the decision alternatives in a way that "facilitated arriving
at a decision ... quickly without much conflict." State-oriented subjects, on the
other hand, would be more inclined to process more information and thereby have
more difficulty reaching a decision in a timely fashion (p. 234).
Although the nature of this representative study is outside the domain of class-
room research, the methods used seem relevant for future research in classrooms.
First, the ACS scale is an individual difference measure that may prove useful in
classroom studies if a version of it were devised that proved valid and reliable for
118 L. Como
that purpose (see section on "Individual Differences in Volition" for more discussion
of this possibility). Second, classroom experiments could be designed to investigate
relationships between student ACS scores and their performance under different
academic tasks at different grade levels. Tasks could be designed or selected, for
example, to create decision conflicts as was done here, or to request that students
think aloud as was done in Kuhl (1981), or simply to observe the use of volitional
strategies by students of different ACS types. Creative educational researchers will
find ample seeds for interesting ideas in a close reading ofKuhl's work (see also Kuhl
& Kraska, 1988; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985). A second avenue researchers might
travel leads to volitional strategy instruction.
The Volitional Subprocesses of SRL

Elsewhere (Como, 1986) I have defined and exemplified Kuhl's six strategies of vol i-
tional control as they might appear in school settings, reflecting the metacompo-
nents of SRL. Table 5-1 presents a revised list of these strategies, one I now offer in
the interest of theoretical specification.
A close examination of Kuhl's six volitional strategies (marked in the table with
asterisks) shows several of these to be efforts to control aspects of the self covertly.
Attention to and encoding of information, for example, when raised to a metacogni-
tive level becomes a form of cognitive self-control. Similarly, by consciously con-
trolling emotion and thinking ahead to positive or negative outcomes, an individual
can manage the affective and expectancy aspects of a task. How to engage in success-
ful covert self-control has been a focus of so-called cognitive interventions in the
field of clinical psychology (see Meichenbaum, 1977). Another way of viewing voli-
tional strategies, then, is as metalevel, task-management strategies that facilitate
learning indirectly (see Dansereau, 1985; Thomas, Strage, & Curley, 1988, for simi-
lar views).
The manner by which Kuhl's work connects to the larger strategy training litera-
ture deserves some comment here. Like all learning and task-management strate-
gies, volitional strategies are hypothetically "trainable." Kuhl's own research does
not examine this question, however, so much as it experimentally manipulates
strategy use and assesses the conditions under which volition will be called into play
in "real world" situations (see Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984). An important issue with
respect to the ultimate "trainability" of these strategies is that these are subtle
aspects of mental functioning that vary among learners and may be disrupted (at
least temporarily) if interfered with. Although there is a certain parallel in learning
strategy training (see McKeachie & Pintrich, 1985; Weinstein & Mayer, 1986), voli-
tional strategies may be less amenable than most cognitive strategies to a quick fix,
because like other metalevel processes, they have strong developmental roots
(Flavell, 1970; Kuhl, 1985; Kuhn & Ho, 1980). That is, volition is believed to
develop later in childhood based on a growing awareness of one's own functioning,
including cognition, motivation, and affection. And this developmental process is
heavily influenced by socialization practices in the home and elsewhere (Kuhl &
TABLE 5-1. Categories of Volitional Control and Specific

Volitional Control Strategies
I. Covert processes of self-control
A. Control of cognition
1. Attention control a
2. Encoding controla
3. Information-processing control*
B. Emotion control a
C. Motivation controla
1. Incentive escalationa
2. Attribution
3. Instruction
II. Overt processes of self-control: Environmental control a
A. Control of the task situation
I. Task control
2. Setting control
B. Control of others in the task setting
1. Peer control
2. Teacher control
a Volitional strategies identified by Kuhl (1985). Kuhl equates
motivation control with incentive escalation, and does not distin-
guish the subprocesses of environmental control.
Kraska, 1988). It therefore seems likely that successful volitional strategy training
will require the kind of naturalistic, guided, or participant modeling and evidence
of utility that has come to characterize more effective forms of cognitive strategy
training as well (Collins, Brown, & Newman, 1987; Como, 1987; Kiewra, 1988;
McKeachie, Pintrich, & Lin, 1985; Paris & Byrnes, this volume; Pressley, Bor-
kowski & O'Sullivan, 1983).
The second major category of strategies shown in Table 5-1 involves efforts to
control the self by controlling one's environment. Modifying or adapting tasks so
people may work more effectively within them has been a focus of human factors
research in organizational psychology as well as studies of motivation in education.
With only the general category of environmental control, however, Kuhl confounds
changes one might make in tasks themselves with manipulations of other people
who are part of the task situation. Although I am cognizant of the risk of overspecifi-
cation, I find utility in distinguishing these factors. In conceptualizing what a
student might do, for example, to reduce excessive task demands it helps to differen-
tiate efforts to simplify or streamline a task from efforts to seek assistance from a
teacher or to hush up a distracting peer (Como, 1986).
I would like now to give a brief example of each of the strategies in Table 5-1 as
they might be observed in classroom tasks. Examining the covert self-control strate-
gies first, such actions as diverting one's eyes from the class clown or tuning out
excess noise would be instances of attention control. What we mean by encoding
control is selectively thinking about those aspects of a task that facilitate completion.
Thus students can opt to rehearse material only on which they will be tested, and
120 L. Como
may mentally plan the steps for completing a task. Information-processing control
is, in Kuhl's (1985) terms, the "definition of stop rules for information processing"
(p. 106). A student who processes information efficiently (or makes decisions effi-
ciently) will quickly assess steps needed to perform a task and then get down to busi-
ness, thus "optimizing the motivational power of the intent" to learn (p. 106). One
may also, as Waters and Andreassen (1983) suggested, avoid using strategies that
overtax the information-processing system, or may elect "time out" from the task for
a brief period as a way of regrouping and refreshing oneself. This suggests a differ-
ent view of so-called "off-task behavior" (see also Dyson, 1987; Grannis, 1975).
To control affect, students may protect the intent to learn by inhibiting or altering
detrimental emotional states like worry. Thus, emotion control may involve using
positive inner speech during task engagement: "I can't worry about this; I can't get
irrational:' It might also include admonishing oneself in an effort to produce suffi-
cient gUilt to carry one through, or converting an unpleasant emotion to a pleasant
one. A student might turn the anxiety associated with waiting for test results into
other pleasurable activities by consciously thinking of interesting and relaxing
things.
In a differnt vein, Kuhl's category of motivation control involves generating
thoughts that have the effect of raising the intent to learn in one's hierarchy of com-
peting intentions. When students have the feeling that motivation is too low to com-
plete a task, they can think about what will happen should they fail or should they
succeed. In some publications, Kuhl calls this incentive escalation (see Kuhl, 1984).
Zimmerman and Pons (1986) use the term self-consequences to represent both
imagined and actually arranged outcomes (see p. 238 below). Both of these terms are
more descriptive than motivation control because motivation control may subsume
several other subprocesses just as control of cognition does. In fact, our research at
Teachers College has identified some of these other motivation-control processes.
In addition to incentive escalation (or control of outcome expectancy 'and value), a
student can control motivation by attribution ("I know this material;' or "I failed but
I can succeed next time if! study:') and by self-instruction ("I missed most ofthese;
reread closely and take notes."). There are also variations on the themes of each of
these subprocesses that will be illustrated later on.
The overt processes of self-control are, by definition, environmental control
strategies. These are more easily observable than the covert strategies, and probably
more amenable to natural development in the environments of home and school, as
well as to direct intervention (Kuhl, 1984). They include both changes to be made
in the task situation (the task itself or the task setting, such as where the task is com-
pleted), and changes in other individuals who support the task (i.e., typically,
teachers and peers). Kuhl characterizes environmental control unidimensionally as
manipulations similar to those that mark clinical self-control therapy-individuals
can arrange environmental contingencies to help themselves complete difficult
tasks. But if a student sets proximal subgoals to acquire in lieu of more distal out-
comes, or provides valued self-rewards, or imposes a personal form of penance for
dawdling (i.e., actually arranges environmental contingencies rather than simply
imagining them), these are changes that gain control of the task or task outcome.
Controls in the task setting are something different, and would involve such things
as asking permission to move away from noisy peers, or to use a calculator, word
processor, or other equipment in the interest of efficiency. As Kuhl points out, stu-
dents may also subtly manipulate intentions by surrounding themselves with hard-
working peers, or asking a good friend to provide needed social support or to avoid
talking about past failures. These efforts and attempts to obtain extra assistance or
special favors from teachers fall into the subclass 1 have labeled control of others in
the task setting (see also Wang, 1983). Again, these environmental control strategies
may be used as a means of self-control- control of concentration and affect as well
as behavior.
Related Research on SRL

Several lines of contemporary educational research are more or less directly related
to academic self-regulation and, by definition, volition. Three types of studies
reflect the range of research on SRL in academic settings. First, there is descriptive
research aimed at identifying and documenting self-regulatory strategies used by
students during regular academic tasks. Some of these strategies are volitional.
Second, there is correlational research relating self-regulation (including volitional
strategies) to student-aptitude profiles, task factors, and performance outcomes like
academic achievement. These studies distinguish SRL from general aptitude factors
and document its independent contribution to the variability in school performance
outcomes for different types of tasks. Third, there is experimental research in which
tasks are designed to elicit or teach students various forms of self-regulation and per-
formance is compared to that of control groups receiving different tasks. Studies like
this seek to devise task and instructional conditions that promote self-regulation and
to assess resultant performance relative to comparable controls. We can consider
each type of research in turn.
Descriptive Studies
Four different studies illustrate this category ofresearch. First, Dyson (1987) con-
ducted an in-depth analysis of the "spontaneous talk" of eight elementary students
during language arts periods taught by the same teacher. Audiotapes were obtained
of children interacting with their peers in the completion of writing assignments.
These verbal protocol data were combined with participant observation records to
conceptualize student collaborative effort. Although Dyson's research examined
many aspects of student social-cognitive interaction in language arts, her results pro-
vide evidence of the value of peer control ("I was sitting here"), self-attribution ("I
know that"), and anticipating audience reactions to one's own written work (e.g.,
noting that something might be "hard" for readers provides an incentive to rewrite).
Data like these show students spontaneously using self-regulatory strategies that are
volitional in nature to complete school tasks effectively, and document the impor-
tance of active mental effort to effective written work.
122 L. Como
In a different vein, a descriptive study by Johnston (1985) documented the lack

of effective self-regulation in the academic efforts of students with assessed read-
ing disabilities. Johnston also used a case analysis method. He held interactive
assessment sessions with three adult males in which he elicited think-aloud reports
and oral reading performance. The think-aloud protocols included spontaneous
introspection and retrospection. In addition to the conceptual problems readers
of these transcripts displayed, Johnston noted extensive use of what he called
"compensatory coping strategies." These forms of coping allowed the subjects to
function in society as largely illiterate but failed to overcome the problem of illiter-
acy. Included in the strategies were bluffing, avoiding the teacher, listening for
oral instructions, and related self-defeating thoughts. These so-called coping stra-
tegies were ineffective in the long run and accompanied by negative affective
responses (debilitating anxiety and stress) as well. One message here is that over-
coming the problem of adult reading difficulty may well require positive self-
management strategies in addition to improved reading skills. Some of these strate-
gies involve ways of effectively coping with failure through self-attributions, again
a form of motivation control.
Still another type of descriptive study was conducted by Rohrkemper (1986),
who interviewed elementary school students of different abilities as they com-
pleted math problems that varied in level of difficulty. Her research interest was
in examining "inner speech" accompanying problem solving under easy and more
difficult conditions. Eighty-four students, balanced by mathematics ability and
sex, were sampled from an urban school system. Inner speech was assessed using
a structured questionnaire/interview method that asked students to identify things
they might "say to themselves." Categories of statements included motivational
remarks as well as "strategic self-instruction" (e.g., "I take my time and try to
figure the problem out"; "I make a plan;' etc.). The strategic self-instruction
reflected some aspects of motivation control previously defined. Results showed
students used adaptive inner speech to regulate task performance irrespective
of individual differences in age, ability, and sex. There were differences in the
amount and type of inner speech, depending on task difficulty: Less inner speech
occurred in difficult tasks, and more self-related (as opposed to task-related) speech
occurred during easy tasks. Again, the point is that self-regulatory statements did
occur spontaneously among students at this age level who differed in aptitude
profiles for learning mathematics. Inner speech is discussed in greater depth by
Rohrkemper (this volume).
A final descriptive account derives from data by Leinhardt and Putnam (1987),
who produced videotapes of fifth-grade students as they learned about astronomy
under different instructional treatments. The videotape data again show spontane-
ous use of strategies that would be considered self-regulatory: One student said, in
an interview during which he viewed a videotape of his class lesson in mathematics,
"Well, I was thinking about ... what she was saying because it was something new
so I had to keep my eyes on it 'cause this is on our MAP test ... it's kind of important"
(p. 575). This is a clear instance of encoding control.
Correlational Studies
There is correlational work of a cross-national nature, as well as other U.S. research

related to self-regulation (see Jan Simons & Beukhof, 1987). For example,
Schneider, Borkowski, and Kerwin (1985) compared the performance of91 Ameri-
can and 102 German fourth graders on tests of metamemory, intelligence, and
strategy use on a recall task. These researchers also obtained data on attributions
and self-concept. Although the two samples did not differ on intelligence, they did
differ in significant ways on some of the other variables measured. Specifically,
statistical causal modeling showed German students employing taxonomic organi-
zation and rehearsal strategies more than American students on the recall tasks used
in this study; appropriately applied strategies were also causally related to perfor-
mance outcomes. There were different patterns of variables found to predict per-
formance in the two samples, however; the results were complex. Nonetheless,
appropriately deployed strategy use-or encoding and information-processing
control-was the key to effective performance in this study, and strategy use was
related in both samples to the kinds of cognitive-motivational factors measured.
Another correlational study was conducted by Zimmerman and Pons (1986), who
developed a structured interview for measuring SRL. Eighty students from higher
and lower tracks of a suburban high school were asked "to indicate the methods they
used to participate in class, to study, and to complete their assignment" (p. 617). The
interview included specific examples from classroom learning, homework, and
studying for tests. Student responses were coded by trained coders into various
categories of self-regulated and non-self-regulated learning. At least 5 of the 14
categories of SRL identified by these authors reflected volitional strategies I have
defined. There were, for example, instances of students rearranging the task envi-
ronment to make learning easier, seeking information and social assistance, select-
ing out more from less important material to study, and imagining or actually
arranging positive and negative outcomes for working.
Results showed the frequency of SRL strategy use to significantly distinguish
higher from lower achievers. Of the nine strategies correlated most strongly with
student prior achievement, five were clearly volitional in nature. Most important,
regression analyses showed self-reported use of SRL strategies to account for 36%
to 41 % of the variance in both verbal and quantitative standardized test scores, over
and above percentages accounted for by socioeconomic status (parent level of
education) and sex. In short, these SRL interview data appeared to relate strongly
to academic achievement and to make contributions independent of related aptitude
factors. This study is particularly significant in that it provides a contribution from
the standpoint of the measurement of SRL, as well as strong empirical evidence of
the practical and theoretical value of the construct (see also Zimmerman, this
volume; Zimmerman & Pons, 1988).
A final correlational study of interest was conducted by Blumenfeld and Meece
(1988), who categorized middle-school science lessons by difficulty level, type of
social organization, and procedural complexity using field observations. These
different lesson types were then distinguished by the extent to which they produced
124 L. Como
or lessened involvement and cognitive engagement, as reported by 191 students in

questionnaires and interviews. The student self-report data again included questions
about SRL strategy use during the lessons observed. Only one of these questions-
regarding help-seeking-was volitional. Interestingly, although the strategy-use data
in this study were significantly related to students' perceptions of lesson involve-
ment, they were unrelated to performance outcomes such as test scores and grades.
The authors provide several possible explanations for these results, including a lack
of correspondence between what is demanded in lessons and what is tested, and a
lack of ability to employ strategies when tested. This latter hypothesis raises the pos-
sibility that volitional strategies are most predictive of performance outcomes, and
these were generally not included on the questionnaire.
Other results of this study showed students reported more "high level" strategy use
in cognitively demanding tasks and tasks that did not involve materials manipulation
and carrying out extensive procedures. Relationships between task dimensions and
teacher behavior were examined qualitatively, and it was concluded that "teacher
behaviors can modify cognitive task objectives or complement them to influence
students' engagement" (p. 242). This finding has important implications for the
prospective inculcation of SRL in students during regular classroom instruction,
which are that coordination of teacher and task seems in order when changes in stu-
dent engagement are a target.
Experimental Studies
Three experimental studies illustrate the range of work in this area. A semester-long
study by Shapiro (1988) was conducted with a sample of 156 remedial mathematics
students in a large urban college. The treatment was a specially prepared textbook
designed to provide worked examples of algebra problems of the sort students
encountered in their remedial coursework. These problems were accompanied by
strategic problem-solving statements and metacognitive and related volitional
prompts in early lessons of the text. Strategies and prompts were "faded" in later
lessons and substituted with space for students to provide same for themselves.
Homework assignments as part of the text, criterion-referenced and standardized
posttests were dependent measures. The text was randomly assigned to classes in an
experimental group and a traditional text was used by classes in a comparable con-
trol group taught by the same instructors. Nested ANOVAs controlling for teacher
differences showed results favoring the treated group to be statistically significant
(effect sizes were approximately .4 for all measures). Thus it appears from this study
that students can be taught to use the cognitive and volitional strategies that mark
SRL in basic algebra, and that strategy use results in higher achievement. This study
dealt with all the obstacles confronting experimental field research and still
produced solid supportive results; moreover, it demonstrates that strategy use can be
learned through textbook instruction alone, and does not necessarily require teacher
intervention.
A second study by Mandinach (1987) examined aptitude-instructional treatment
interactions in the acquisition of strategic planning knowledge and self-regulatory
skills in an intellectual computer game. Forty-eight urban junior-high-school stu-

dents were given after-class instruction in a novel computer program-solving game.
Instruction varied in that students either (a) explored the game's parameters with
minimal intervention by an instructor-that is, they used a "discovery learning"
approach, or (b) received modeled examples of "better" moves along with instructor-
guided practice and gradually faded prompts. Students representing different levels
of assessed ability were randomly assigned to treatments, and attended several
individual sessions with the experimenter. A variety of process and outcome mea-
sures were obtained, ranging from "hard data" such as computer-generated response
latencies, error patterns, and game scores, to transfer tasks and qualitative field
notes, student drawings, and spontaneous verbalizations. A combination of latency
data and student self-statements were used as indicators of self-regulation, including
volitional strategies.
Results showed higher-ability students to significantly outperform lower-ability
students on game-performance measures and transfer tasks. Higher-ability students
also gave more evidence of self-regulation, on average, than lows. Interestingly, all
students, regardless of ability, performed best in the participant-modeling treat-
ment; yet the modeling group did not differ significantly from the discovery group
on the performance measures obtained. Lower-ability students, in particular,
benefitted by the modeling as their performance was markedly lower in discovery
learning. Mandinach concluded from these data that ability differences influenced
the degree to which these students were able to profit from the instruction provided
for this computer game, and that while use of self-regulatory strategies was related
to ability differences, these were not the exclusive province of those who were most
able. Some higher-ability students never displayed evidence of self-regulation as
measured here. Unfortunately, analyses of volitional strategies were not conducted
separately from those of other SRL strategies.
Mandinach (see Mandinach & Linn, 1986, 1987) did conduct a qualitative case
study of the higher-ability students she considered "superstars" by virtue of their
performance on this task, and found extensive use of self-regulation and strategic-
planning knowledge to define the work efforts of these individuals. Thus again it
appears that SRL strategies can be learned by a particular form of instruction target-
ing specific academic tasks, but this study adds the caveat that more able students
will use the strategies more readily. Because a "read only" version of instruction was
not provided in this study, we have no way of knowing whether a guided-modeling-
computer text akin to Shapirds math textbook would produce similar results to the
experimenter-directed instruction used here.
A final experimental result derives from a line of research by Scardamalia and
Bereiter on the teaching of elementary writing and composition (Scardamalia &
Bereiter, 1983a, b, 1985). This work, like Shapiro's and Mandinach's, exemplifies a
style of educational research in which instructional treatments are devised based on
analyses of the underlying cognitive skills necessary to perform a particular task as
reflected in protocols of "experts" at work. Also like Shapiro and Mandinach,
Scardamalia and Bereiter used an instructional approach involving the modeling of
expert strategies and guided performance, with gradually reduced support. These
126 L. Como
authors focus on instruction in the planning, writing, and revising phases of written
composition; each phase is taught separately, initially with teacher-learner inter-
action, and later the student goes "solo." Students are given examples of statements
they can say to themselves to aid with idea generation and improvement processes
in writing; many of these statements are self-regulatory or volitional in nature
(Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1985). Think-aloud protocols are obtained following
instruction, when students actually produce written work, and the quality of written
products is compared to that of students working under comparable control condi-
tions. Several related experiments are reported in the articles cited above, all of
which demonstrate significant effects favoring elementary students instructed in the
manner described. Effects appear on the quality of strategies reflected in protocols,
on time spent in planning, and on the quality of text produced.
In sum, there is a method of successful instruction cornmon to all these
experimental studies. This type of instruction has also been used successfully in
reading by Palincsar and Brown (1984), and written about elsewhere (see Corno,
1987; Marx & Walsh, 1988). The evidence seems to indicate that several investiga-
tions are converging on important conditions under which self-regulatory skills can
be learned. Collins, Brown, and Newman (1988) single out work by Palin scar and
Brown and Scardamalia and Bereiter (along with Schoenfeld, 1985) as examples of
this form of instruction. Elsewhere, I (Corno, 1987) have listed some of the different
names being used for this type of instruction, and indicated a personal preference for
the most descriptive: "participant modeling instruction" (after Bandura, 1977).
Collins, Brown, and Newman (in press) use the term, "cognitive apprenticeship;'
and write:
There are two key reasons for [Scardamalia & Bereiter's] success. First ... their methods
help students build a new conception of the writing process. Students initially consider writ-
ing to be a linear process of knowledge telling. By explicitly modeling and scaffolding expert
processes, they are providing students with a new model of writing that involves planning and
revising. Most children found this view of writing entirely new .... Moreover, because stu-
dents rarely if ever see writers at work, they tend to hold naive beliefs about the nature of
expert 'writing ... Live modeling helps convey ... struggles, false starts, discouragement,
and the like. Modeling also demonstrates for students that in evolving and decomposing a
complex set of goals for their writing, expert writers often treat their own thoughts as objects
of reflection and inquiry . ... (p. 13)
The result is budding self-regulation. It remains to be shown whether or not voli-

tional and other self-regulatory strategies can be learned in the absence of live or
video modeling in subjects other than basic algebra, and the extent to which live
models are necessary with younger samples of students (see also Brown, Collins, &
Duguid, 1989).
I have in this section illustrated the range and types of research currently on-
going in the area of SRL and how it intersects with the ideas offered on volitional
control. Again, this is not a comprehensive review; it is intended to expose readers
to good examples of work in the area, and to integrate some otherwise dispa-
rate studies.
Examining Volitional Strategies in Classroom Tasks

A key question in the study of SRL continues to be, What aspects of self-regulation
are most relevant for academic work, and how can these be taught to students who
might benefit from them? Research on the kinds of strategies more effective learners
use during academic tasks helps to answer the first part of this question. The second
part is being addressed by studies that explore the ways students use and acquire self-
regulatory capabilities naturally, through socialization and modeling, and studies
that inculcate strategies by direct training or more naturalistic instruction, like those
previously discussed.
I have described the several lines of work that touch upon volitional aspects of self-
regulation indirectly. My colleagues and I at Teachers College are also directly
examining volitional strategies in classroom tasks, beginning with a microanalysis of
descriptive data in a few small sample studies, and moving to experimental designs.
Our strategy in the descriptive studies has been to control enough task variables so
volition would, in theory, be important to success, and to search for evidence of
volitional-strategy use by students as they complete tasks. We assume, following
Kuhl (1985), that different task conditions (i.e., products, operations, and
resources; see Doyle, 1983) will influence student use of volition.
In one 6-week study, Jennifer Panagiotopolous (1986) collected data from 21 fifth
graders in a self-contained public school classroom in the Bronx, New York. The
researcher was a Teachers College doctoral candidate who was also a regular class-
room teacher. Students in the sample were heterogeneous in ethnicity and slightly
above average grade-level norms on standardized achievement tests. Kuhl's four con-
ditions for volition were represented specifically in the tasks designed for this study
in that the work was required academic work that demanded student attention
during the time allotted; it was also familiar work, at an appropriate difficulty level
(tasks involved alphabetization, dictionary use, simple arithmetic, etc.). And
finally, peer distraction seemed likely as students worked cooperatively in small
groups.
The cooperative task condition used Slavin's (1983) Student Teams-Achievement
Divisions, in which teams cooperate in the completion of predesigned objectives-
based materials. Teams were formed as recommended by Slavin, namely, balanced
for academic performance, sex, and ethnicity. Students completed the same
materials in 30-minute sessions, all of which were audiotaped and later transcribed.
These data are verbal protocols that reflect task management as well as task-
completion processes.
Our interest was in the extent to which students enlisted volitional control strate-
gies to complete assigned tasks as a group, under otherwise regular classroom con-
ditions. The intent was to see which, if any, of the strategies average fifth graders
had sufficiently internalized (through their own experiences) to call forth without
prompting. We could then use those strategies as scaffolds for teaching students
other strategies, which might, because they are more subtle, require direct develop-
ment or training.
128 L. Como
Because individual differences among students were likely, a reference battery of

measures was administered prior to the study for use as a classification device.
Reliable indicators of student fluid and crystallized ability were obtained using a test
of analytical reasoning (Raven, 1958), and the verbal and mathematics subscales of
the California Achievement Test (CTB/McGraw-Hill, 1977), respectively. In addi-
tion, to obtain a measure of motivation, perceived competence was assessed using
Harter's (1979) Perceived Competence Scale for Children, which measured cognitive
and general-competence subscales.
There are two major aspects of this data base of interest. First, transcripts from all
six cooperative sessions were coded to classify data into categories reflecting the
average way in which the students worked in groups. Independent coders reached
100% agreement when classifying each segment of the transcript as "main task" and
"alternative task." Agreement reached 92% in classifying "main task" remarks as
either task "management" or "completion" activities. Task-management activities
involved the kinds of moves that have been identified as volitional control strategies
- tracking and gathering information for completing the task, moving oneself and
other students along in their respective roles, checking progress, handling distrac-
tions, motivating oneself and others, and the like. Completion activities were moves
made to actually do the task, such as subtracting or adding out loud during math
tasks and repeating the alphabet aloud during alphabetization. A third main task
category was defined as "instruction;' to show the amount of times that one student
instructed another.
Primacy of Task-Management Activity

Figures 5-1 and 5-2 below present mean percentages of verbal activity categorized
in this way for all cooperative sessions in language and math. It can be seen that
students were involved in alternative tasks 20% to 25% of the time, and instructing
one another less than 5% of the time. By far the bulk of their main task work was
Task Management (65.4%)
Instruction (4.1 %)
Task Completion (5.2%)
Alternative Task (24.So,b)
FIGURE 5-1. Mean percentages of engagement activity during cooperative, whole-class

learning in language (from verbal protocols).
Task Management (67.0%)
Instruction (2.6%)
Task Completion (8.7%)
Alternative Task (21.6%)
FIGURE 5-2. Mean percentages of engagement activity during cooperative, whole-class

learning in math (from verbal protocols).
classifiable as management activity - regardless of subject area. Some two-thirds of

the total time was spent in managing the task at hand. Moves to complete the task
that were verbalized (students were specifically asked to say their answers out loud)
amounted to 5% to 9% of the time, with the larger percentage being in math.
These data demonstrate that audiotranscripts of classroom group work can pro-
vide one source of evidence for student volitional control. The evidence is limited,
however, to internalized control strategies, and does not permit access to metacogni-
tive knowledge of any given strategy. Critical-incident or stimulated-recall inter-
views and/or carefully designed student questionnaires are necessary for tapping
metacognitive awareness. The data are also limited to those students who verbalized
most often, and so do not indicate what anyone student is capable of.
A second aspect of the data of interest is segments of verbal protocols that reflect
volitional-control strategies. We culled the protocols with the goal of locating seg-
ments that illustrate the use of various volitional strategies identified by Kuhl and
listed in Table 5-1. Our research team cross-coded the transcripts until we reached
agreement on categorizations. The intent was to show students using volitional con-
trol in a group setting, to move the task along. I begin with an illustration of the types
of volitional strategies identified in these data. We can also conceptualize some of
the important roles students assume when learning cooperatively. In particular, our
data provide a different way of viewing the roles of task master and instructor in
cooperative-learning activities. Finally, because these students have been classified
by ability and perceived competence, we may also see which types of students were
more inclined here to use volitional control. Hypotheses may then be derived for
future, more comprehensive examinations of individual differences in volitional
control.
Types of Strategies Identified

Sections from a representative transcript in mathematics show these students used
several volitional strategies to move the task along. The groups were given answer
130 L. Como
sheets for the task, and told to check and help each other. The question, then, is
what task-management strategies could be observed apart from checking and merely
helping one another? Witness the array of comments below:
Anne: Come on, let's work. You work.
Paul: Okay. Eight times five is ...
Honey: Five times eight ...
Paul: Is forty.
Anne: Don't tell him! He has to work it himself.
Honey: Okay.
Anne: Five times eight is ...
Paul: ... is forty.
Paul: It's forty! It's right. It's right!
Anne: Oh, yeah!
Paul: Five times one is five plus four is nine.
Sal: Gotta round it to the nearest ten.
Paul: That too.
Sal: Zero times five. What's zero times five?
Anne: How did you get nine hundred for that?
Sal: Ten. Zero.
Paul: Why'd you ask me if you knew? You don't know how to do nine
hundred?
Anne: I don't understand. Wait a minute. Ms. Panagiotopoulos! I can't under-
stand this. I did all of this.
Sal: Where's Honey? Honey, you got the answers? Let me see ...
Ms. P: Whds got the answers in your group?
Sal: Her.
Anne: Me.
Honey: Me.
Anne: You want to sit next to me?
Paul: Naw, you give me your paper.
Sal: Paul, you know that. You know it, Paul.
Paul: I know it, but ... I forgot we add the two.
Sal: My God, you're on number five. Well, I'm only on number six.
Honey: You better stop, Sal.
Anne: Eight times six? Oh yeah. Forty-eight. Why are you asking me? Why
don't you ask yourself? Count on your fingers. Oh, I hate this so much.
Paul: I love it so much. Oh, this is very nice.
Anne: I like it and I hate it.
This passage shows a prevalence of environmental control strategies. Peer control is
used here by Paul, Sal, and Anne to keep themselves on task. These students in
essence successfully protect their own time by warding others off ("Why'd you ask
me ... ?). Getting hold of the answer sheet is one way to check oneself. Paul uses
knowledge of successful results to self-motivate ("It's right!"). Anne also uses
information-processing control when she urges everyone (herself included) to work.
Anne's comments reflect self-attributions, attempted teacher control, and emotion

control as well.
We see that when students work together in groups they use a number of different
techniques to keep one another (and thereby themselves) going-some more
encouraging, or more "psychologically sound;' than others. The use of informed
feedback, self-attribution, and specific suggestions for how to attack a task are all
constructive ways of motivating oneself and others (see Brophy, 1987). Some stu-
dents use these techniques spontaneously in groups. Also, we learn that Anne, who
used self-attribution, emotion control, and instruction as motivational tools, is aver-
age in ability and high in perceived competence. Paul is high in ability and low in
perceived competence; he self-motivates, brings emotion to the task, and uses peer
control. Sal, who evidences peer control as well, is of average ability and low
perceived competence.
Obviously, little can be made of these individual difference data except to look
across other segments of the transcript for similar patterns and relationships that
make sense. Discernable patterns might be used to form hypotheses for future inves-
tigations. A more immediate implication of these data is that strategies used by a
few students in group work like this are simultaneously observed by the others,
creating the possibility for vicarious learning through observation of a model (Ban-
dura, 1986). One could also envision a computer programmed to help students make
different types of motivational statements to themselves when they falter, hesitate,
or express negative emotions.
Two Leadership Roles in Cooperative Learning: Active Steps

to Insure One's Own Learning
A second excerpt from a mathematics transcript paints another picture. In this

session, Honey assumes a leadership role we call "task master": She tries hard to
move the group along:
Honey: (To the group) He does all of it. Do all of it. Do the first, no, do the first
row and then you check it. Do the next row and then you check it. No,
don't do that. Do the first row, okay?
Michelle: Right?
Honey: Five is four, two, five, three, one. Right. Now do that. I said do the
whole row. You checked it?
Phillip: Yeah.
Honey: You sure? Everything's right?
Phillip: Every single thing.
Honey: Check it. 'Kay? This is wrong.
Phillip: Yeah, that's wrong.
Michelle: Wait a minute. Let me just do the last one.
Honey: Hurry, hurry, hurry, hurry.
Phillip: Right? You check it? No, you didn't check it.
132 L. Como
Honey: Now, say the numbers. Start from the beginning. Say the numbers and
he'll see if it's right or wrong. 'Kay? No, no, no, no! Like this, watch.
'Kay? Number four, two, three, one. Right. Let's don't say nothing 'cause
we might get in trouble with this. (Honey just had Michelle answer two
questions for her.)
One interpretation of Honey's behavior is that it reflects her internalization of the
wayan authority behaves. Persons in authority cajole, badger, direct, entrap ("You
sure? Everything's right?"), and model ("Like this, watch.") to get something done.
Parents, teachers, and employers act this way all too often, and Honey has learned
to do it well. She recapitulates it for us when placed in an authoritative role. Honey
was assessed as high in ability and average in perceived competence.
Here volition is the cognitive-behavioral manager, the executive controller that
moves us through tasks by controlling our motivation. Control over motivation pro-
tects the intent to learn. Children can internalize the motivation control strategies
used by parents and other authority figures and call them up themselves when
managing their own tasks. Indeed, it can be argued that social interactions are the
developmental experiences necessary for the flowering of volitional control (see
also Kuhl & Kraska, 1988). Most important here, however, is the fact that by manag-
ing others, Honey also manages herself. Her active efforts at task management pro-
tect her own intention to concentrate, for it is difficult to get distracted when you are
the task master. Precisely how students learn or develop volition from early social
interactions with authority figures and, possibly, older siblings, and how the more
positive, caring forms of motivation control (incentive escalation, attribution,
instruction, etc.) might be distinguished from cajoling and badgering are interesting
questions for future research. Noddings (1984) has argued that teachers can model
the "caring" aspects of motivation at the same time that they teach subject matter.
This suggestion certainly deserves systematic investigation.
The transcripts from our study also contain some examples of students identified
as exceptional "teachers." Since part of the ethic of cooperative learning is helping
others, some students naturally assume a teaching role (see Webb, 1983). As with
the role of "task master;' assuming a teacher role during cooperative learning is
another active way students may protect their own concentration. Insuring that
everyone understands the task and carries out actions to complete it also insures that
you understand and contribute. A close examination of the remarks made by one of
these identifiably good "teachers" provides a second example of how to use an active
role during cooperative learning to insure one's own learning as well.
Shpresa, a girl of average ability and average perceived competence, was told by
others that she was a good teacher. The following are examples of Shpresa's teaching
in math and language:
Shpresa: Wait, Wait, you did it wrong.
Henry: Who me?
Shpresa: The directions say you must, you must write your estimate and multi-
ply, then you must write the answer.
Henry: I got it right. No doubt about it.
Jackie: So, shut up.

Shpresa: No, you round, you round to the nearest hundred.
Henry: You check.
Michelle: Eight times five?

Shpresa: You're supposed to know that, Michelle. The fives are the easiest. It's
forty, right? You have to write the zero first right over here. Okay, now.
One times five.
Michelle: One times five.
Henry: Shpresa, let me have the answer sheet. The teacher made a mistake.
Shpresa: I know she made a mistake on, uh, four.
Shpresa: You see? Would you be quiet? I wrote it easier for her. Eight times three
so I wrote three eights. Eight plus eight is sixteen ...
Ms.P: Maybe she can't see your handwriting because you're sitting on that
side.
Michelle: Eight and seven you can't do. Okay.
Shpresa: How'd you get that? How'd you, how'd you get twenty-five?
Ms.P: Good teacher! Wow!
Salvatore: Four. Six. Shpresa's a good teacher. Did you hear that?
Shpresa: Okay, Michelle. Okay, listen. You have to all, all's you have to do is add.
You estimate to the nearest ten thousand. If it says, listen urn, if it says,
if it says like six thousand by itself. You can't estimate to the nearest ten,
you just have to leave six thousand.
And in language:
Shpresa: Come here. I'll, I'll help, do you understand?
Dina: No.
Shpresa: Okay, come here. Come sit here.
Shpresa: Come here. See? You know, the shwa sound.

Salvatore: (Gasps) You got the answer sheet?
Dina: Shpresa, is this nit or night?
134 L. Como
Shpresa: I can't tell you.

Salvatore: Night. She don't know her long i's and everything. She don't ...
Shpresa: You have to look over here. You have to look and you'll see, you'll see
the things that uh, uh. Okay.
Salvatore: I'm doing that.
Shpresa: It says over, you could see it over here, the shwa sound. The shwa's like
this way. Where's the shwa? Where is it?
Salvatore: You're a good teacher.
(Shpresa laughs.)
Shpresa: Okay. Joseph, you did pretty good on it. Do you know what to do,
Adriano?
Adriano: Huh?
Shpresa: You almost finished?
Adriano: No.
Shpresa: You don't have to rush, you can take your time.
At the beginning of the passage, Shpresa uses knowledge of results and direct
instruction to control Henry's actions ("Wait, you did it wrong. The directions
say ... "). In so doing, she concurrently repeats the task's directions to herself.
Later, in response to Michelle's question, Shpresa is at first admonishing with her
attributions ("You're supposed to know that ... "), but quickly offers some concrete
suggestions that simplify the task (task control) and encourage Michelle on to the
next item. When Henry asks for the answer sheet because he suspects a teacher
error, Shpresa shows him that she has already identified the error herself. This sets
her up as·an authority over and above the instructional role she takes on here. Task
control by simplifying the task for another student is again evident when Shpresa
says, "I wrote it easier for her;' and describes why this is so. This models the strategy
of simplifying the task as a way of gaining control. The teacher also suggests the
strategy of changing the setting to gain control when she encourages Shpresa to
move closer to the student she is helping. The remainder of this excerpt shows
Shpresa modeling self-checking, task simplification, motivation by incentive
("Come here, I'll help ... "), repeating directions, and positive reinforcement.
Again, these important instructional actions provide solid models of strategies the
other students can use while insuring Shpresa's own involvement at the same time.
If more students could learn to become "task masters" and "teachers" in cooperative
learning, there might be fewer lapses in task-oriented behavior. This is not to suggest
that every student try to be "Chief;' but rather that there is room for more than one
leader, and that the leadership roles in cooperative learning are protective of one's
own task-related behavior as well as of others'.
Individual Differences in Volition

We can only speculate about individual differences based on the data from this
study. Yet it is interesting to note that in examining the students who assumed leader-
ship roles during cooperative learning, a pattern did emerge. Six of the 21 students
in this sample tended to assume either the task master or instructor role in the pro-
tocols obtained; they also tended to be consistent in the role assumed. That is,
Honey and Anne, for example, were task masters in all sessions observed; Shpresa
and Louis were always instructing. Although the tendency to assume these roles did
not appear to be related to ability measures in our data - among the six students, all
ability levels were observed -little can be made of this finding because previous
research on cooperative learning has found higher-ability students to display more
helping behavior and instruction than lower-ability students (Webb, 1983). Per-
ceived self-competence was high, on average, among the six students observed in
our study. Assuming task-master or instructor roles in cooperative learning may thus
be related to one's perceived ability to perform in school. This is an hypothesis that
derives directly from Kuhl's theory, which assumes perceived ability to be one
necessary condition for volitional control. The precise nature of this relationship
sorely needs delineation. It may be nonlinear or curvilinear, for example, and this
makes theoretical sense. We do not see indications here that "task-master" profiles
differed from those of "instructors" in our data, although that, too, would be an
interesting question for future research.
Our individual-difference data are typical of those obtained in classroom-research
studies-standardized ability and motivation measures. It would be interesting to
add a version of Kuhl's action-orientation scale to this data base. Kuhl finds positive
correlations between his measure and standardized assessments of test anxiety and
achievement motivation on the order of the personality coefficient. Because the
action-orientation scale is specifically designed to tap into a personality factor
related to behavioral indicators of volition, its validity should exceed that of other
measures in predicting volitional strategy use in classroom tasks. A revised action-
orientation scale that includes only items pertaining to classroom or academic tasks
and that is valid and reliable for use by a younger population would provide a contri-
bution to research in this area. My own hunch based on knowledge of the students
in our small sample who assumed leadership roles is that such scores would be
predictive of these tendencies, more so than the kinds of individual difference
measures we obtained.
Summary
Data from this study provide just one narrow lens for viewing volitional strategies.
Indeed, individual volition is less necessary in theory when completing cooperative
tasks than when working alone because students protect each other's work efforts in
the way I have described. The real need for volition arises when there is no one avail-
able but oneself to get a job done (in Kuhl's terms, when the task is not controlled
by external forces). Individual accounts of volitional strategy use are clearly needed
to extend the empirical base for the kinds of arguments made here (see "A Unified
Agenda for Future Research" below). Nonetheless, the students in this study were
not uniformly oriented toward completing the main task when working coopera-
tively in groups (see Figures 5-1 and 5-2). Also, the cooperative tasks produced the
136 L. Como
kinds of peer distractions expected - there was a good deal of bantering among
students coded as "alternative-task" behavior.
Perhaps the primary limitation of verbal-protocol data is the possibility that the
most expressive students are the ones displaying strategy use. Zimmerman and Pons
(1986) handled this problem by attaching a 4-point scale to their interview protocol
that asked students to rate the frequency of strategy use. This measure was a better
predictor of student performance than counts of strategies mentioned in the inter-
view. A computer could also elicit this kind of rating; but, to overcome a verbal bias
in cooperative audiotranscripts, a kind of stimulated-recall interview might be
necessary. That is, the audiotape could be played back to students who varied in
verbal fluency and they could be asked about their thoughts during the session. This
is a labor-intensive data-collection method, however, and not devoid of problems in
its own right (see Clark & Peterson, 1986).
A Unified Agenda for Future Research

There are several agenda items for future research on volition in academic learning.
First, more evidence is needed that students use volitional strategies in regular
classroom tasks, and that they do so deliberately. We need to know if students
use these strategies when working individually, when the possibility of 'joint
control" (Grannis, 1975) is absent. We need to follow the leads of studies like
Zimmerman and Pons's (1986; 1988) in learning how best to measure this kind of
strategy use in individual tasks, and we need a better understanding of the conditions
under which volition is called upon by students. Some types of tasks might require
more volition than others; for example, when the task holds little intrinsic interest
for students, or when the task is psychologically difficult to complete (perhaps
because not completing it is reinforcing somehow). More controlled study of
individual differences in volition is a logical next step, as are studies of how voli-
tional control develops naturally in real-world environments. At the time of this
writing, one study (Bullock & Liitkenhaus, 1988) was located that examined voli-
tional development in toddlers in laboratory play and work tasks. Results showed
predictable shifts in volition-related behavior as children approached three years of
age. These shifts were related to apparent self-involvement, self-regulation, and
cognitive change as well.
Beyond the descriptive research, it will be important to demonstrate the utility of
volitional control in classroom tasks. What important educational outcomes does
the use of volitional strategies predict? My argument is that task engagement and
timely task completion are important outcomes of the task-management aspects of
volition previously described. Some of the SRL research described supports this
view (e.g., Blumenfeld & Meece, 1988; Zimmerman & Pons, 1986). Related
research has repeatedly made the powerful linkage between class engagement and
academic achievement (Berliner, 1979). But what other pay-off might there be to
having volitional control in class (see Rohrkemper & Como, 1988)? And what are
the downside risks?
Finally, we need experimental studies in which volition is manipulated to improve

educational outcomes. Can Kuhl's (1981) induction of "action orientation" by asking
subjects to think aloud while solving programs be replicated with younger students
in a natural classroom setting? And what of my suggestion that computers could be
programmed to remind users to self-reward, to press on to the next item when too
much time has elapsed, to rehearse, self-check, and the like? What effects might
exposure to such a "pseudo-parent" have on student learning by computer? Will this
kind of volitional modeling be internalized for later use? Can students who lack voli-
tion be "taught" it under these conditions? Or is social interaction with a human
model who demonstrates volitional strategy use under difficult conditions important
for some learners?
LaVergne Trawick, a doctoral student at Teachers College, is conducting disserta-
tion research with minority students in a remedial counseling program at a local
community college. Her study will offer instruction in positive self-speech and
environmental control strategies that aid in the management of academic work. Stu-
dents will role play with Trawick the things to do when facing a final exam, when
choosing between a dinner date and homework, when concentration buckles during
class, and so on. These role-play scenes will be used as vehicles for delivering
instruction in volitional strategy use and as measurement procedures for assessing
the extent to which the strategies have been learned as well. Researchers might also
design classroom tasks that differentially demand volitional strategy use by stu-
dents. And teachers who wish to aid the development of academic volition may be
able to use "high-demand" tasks systematically in their teaching.
Summary and Conclusion

In this Chapter I have tried to bring the construct of volition and volitional strategies
into sharp focus in conceptions of self-regulated learning. I have argued that voli-
tional strategies are implicit in most assessments of self-regulated learning, and that
these strategies are sufficiently important, both in theory and empirically, to be
made explicit. Scientific theory is enriched by clearer concepts and integration in
an area that too often lacks these dimensions, namely, so-called cognitive
approaches to motivation and learning. Research is embellished by the possibilities
of different and better assessment procedures and more interpretable relationships
among complex, interactive constructs.
Moreover, in the area of volitional control in particular, practical implications
abound. In point of fact, conscious use of the identified volitional strategies can
assist individuals in protecting their best-laid plans, whether they be to produce
written work while teaching graduate courses and raising children, to keep the mind
on a teacher's agenda when other interests loom large, or to modify deleterious
addictions. When I have publicly discussed theory and research on volitional strate-
gies, I have found repeatedly that people want to learn them. Perhaps, by under-
standing the common underpinnings of cognitive-behavioral therapies and cognitive
strategy training in schools, and by integrating social cognitive theories of motiva-
138 L. Como
tion and volition in self-regulated learning, we might begin to account for and ulti-
mately redress the problem of underachievement in education.
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6. Self-Regulated Learning and Academic
Achievement: A Vygotskian View
Mary McCaslin Rohrkemper
We have all encountered the frustration of "hard" learning. It is a common

experience. Some of us are able to cope with it, whereas others are not. The ability
to take charge offrustration and maintain the intention to learn while enacting effec-
tive task strategies in the face of uncertainty-taking charge of one's motivation,
emotion, and thinking-is what I call adaptive learning. I refer to this process as
adaptive learning rather than self-regulation because I want to stress inter- rather
than intra-individual states; a Vygotskian perspective highlights the role of the
social/instructional environment in the development of adaptive learning. By social!
instructional environment I refer to parents, teachers, tasks, and peers that students
influence and are influenced by as they engage in learning, be it about themselves,
their community, or two-digit division.
I argue that a Vygotskian perspective of self-regulated learning is one that stresses
socialization processes and that the internalization of the social!instructional
environments of home and school must be considered if we are to fully understand
adaptive learning in students' classroom performance. A specific learning event is
not isolated from prior experience; present intrapersonal consequences can be
related to former and ongoing interpersonal influences.
In this chapter I will first outline the context of emergent Vygotskian theory in the
Soviet Union of the 1920s, because a theory about social mediation and the histori-
caJ nature of consciousness demands a historical perspective. Second, I will focus
on three interdependent concerns within a Vygotskian perspective that are especially
relevant to the development of adaptive learning: (a) multiple functions of language,
(b) internalization processes and the nature of change, and (c) methodology and unit
of analysis. Third, I will briefly describe three lines of recent research in develop-
mental, clinical, and educational psychology that inform Vygotskian ideas. Finally,
I will provide a detailed analysis of reported inner speech, which is at once the
mechanism for the internalization of the social/instructional environment and the
vehicle for adaptive learning. In the analysis I will illustrate the influences of home
and school and the functions of task difficulty in reported inner speech.
144 M. McCaslin Rohrkemper
Historical Context of Vygotskian Theory

A discussion of Vygotsky necessarily involves a discussion of Marx because
Vygotsky was an avowed Marxist and his theory can be seen as one attempt to
operationalize the Marxist analysis of social change. Three tenets of Marxism-
concerning language, consciousness, and the process of change-will be discussed
briefly as their extensions figure prominently in Vygotsky's thinking. First, Engels'
(1890) theory of human evolution proposed that language developed as a result of
human activity and the need for cooperative labor. Language distinguishes man
from animal (for extended discussion, see Slobin, 1966).
Second, Marx defined consciousness as a property ofthe human brain that was the
result of a gradual accumulation of small quantitative changes, which account for a
qualitative change (see also, Gray, 1966). Furthermore, consciousness is an active
constructor of experience and organizes and controls behavior. It is the ability to
control one's behavior that frees the individual from specific situations. One is able
to anticipate, plan, and direct one's actions toward non-immediate goals. For Marx,
this ability to plan, to imagine, and to formulate a course of action before implemen-
tation was peculiar to humans (see Marx, 1867).
The third basic Marxist tenet is the dialectic process. The dialectic is that process
by which contradictions are seen to merge and transcend into a higher truth. The
dialectic implies growth; there is a hierarchical ordering in thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis. As extended by Marx and Engels, it informs how to change the world, not
merely interpret it (Marx, 1844; Marx & Engels, 1888).
In the aftermath of the October 1917 revolution, the new Soviet government faced
the task of extensive reorganization. In revolutionary times total rejection of the sta-
tus quo is status quo. In the Soviet Union, however, the situation was more complex
because of the embodiment of the Marxist doctrine sketched above. The doctrine has
obvious appeal to a new government faced with the task of reeducating a huge
peasant class in order to shape it into vosepatanii novova Sovetskovo cheloveka, the
character of the new Soviet man. Such a person would need to cope with rapid
change while simultaneously instigating that change.
We return to Vygotsky, who arrives on the scene in 1924 at the Second Psy-
choneurological Congress in Leningrad. The prevailing psychological view at that
time did not attend to subjective experience. Vygotsky nonetheless challenged the
dominant view by speaking of the relation between conditioned reflexes and cons-
cious human behavior. On the strength of his remarks, he was invited to join the
Institute of Psychology in Moscow. His partnership there, with Luria and Leontiev,
which Luria referred to as the troika, continued until Vygotsky's death a decade
later. It is during this time that Vygotsky formulated his ideas on the social media-
tion of learning and the role of consciousness, within a decidedly Marxist perspec-
tive. Luria (1979) recalled:
... in Vygotsky's hands, Marx's methods of analysis did serve a vital role in shaping our
course. Influenced by Marx, Vygotsky concluded that the origins of higher forms of conscious
behavior were to be found in the individual's social relations with the external world. But man
is not only a product of his environment, he is also an active agent in creating that environ-
6. A Vygotskian View of Self-Regulated Learning 145
ment. . .. We needed, as it were, to step outside the organism to discover the sources of
specifically human forms of psychological activity. (p. 43)
Hence, by going "outside the organism" Vygotsky went beyond the biological
processes that he believed to dominate only at birth and examined the individual's
mediation of experience, an experience that is at once cultural- in that it represents
socially structured tasks and tools- and historical, in that it reflects the "storehouse"
of what we today call "semantic knowledge" (language-based information), "learn-
ing to learn" strategies and procedures (e.g., rehearsal, elaboration), and "metacog-
nitive awareness" (conscious monitoring of one's cognitive strategies). Luria (1979)
discusses this storehouse as having" ... enormously expanded man's powers, mak-
ing the wisdom of the past analyzable in the present and perfectible in the future"
(p. 44). The contrast between Luria's image of the realm of psychology and current
information-processing theorists' dispassionate and bounded discussion of the func-
tion of metacognition may provide the reader with some feeling for the social/politi-
cal context of Soviet psychology.
Vygotsky's Theory of Language

THE SECOND SIGNAL SYSTEM
The ultimate focus of this discussion is on the functions of inner speech. Engels'
theory of the evolution of language is the starting point. Engels posited that com-
municative, social language evolved from and with human labor and was peculiarly
human-it is what distinguishes man from animal. Similarly, Pavlov (1927) made
the critical distinction between what he termed the "first" (perceptual) and "second"
(linguistic) signal systems. Pavlov observed the abrupt nature of human conditioning
and the nongeneralizability of animal classical conditioning data to humans. He
hypothesized that the second signal system was the cause of differences between
human and animal learning and that, whereas in one sense speech has removed man
from reality, in another, " ... it is precisely speech which has made us human" (as
quoted in Slobin, 1966, p. 112).
Thus, for Pavlov, as for Engels, speech was peculiar to humans, and, in interaction
with the first signal system (perception), allowed mastery of the environment as
opposed to control by its stimulus properties. Language, then, is responsible for the
human ability to direct and mediate behavior. The mediational and self-directive
role of the second signal system became the cornerstone of Vygotsky's research
and theorizing.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DIRECTIVE LANGUAGE
At birth the human infant is controlled by the physical properties of the environ-
ment, by the first signal system. Initially, the child reacts to words not by their
meanings, but by their sounds, that is, by their physical stimulus properties. As the
child's language develops, words gradually acquire meaning independent of their
stimulus properties. After repeated exposure to word meanings by other persons in
their social/instructional environments, children subsequently become able to

expose themselves to word meanings, and thereby direct their own behavior. Thus,
the child acquires the facility to direct and control her own behavior as well as com-
municate with others through language. Vygotsky was concerned with the multiple
functions of semantic, meaningful language-of the second signal system-with
how this occurs naturally and acquires two distinct functions: communication with
others and self-direction (see also, Zivin, 1979).
The developmental sequence of the two functions of language, communication
with others and self-direction, is from social or interpersonal to self-directive or
intrapersonal. The implications of this progression are critical. Not only does
language acquire two distinct functions, but the source of self-directive inner speech
is the social environment. Sources of both types of speech - external communication
and internal self-direction - reside in the second signal system, that is, in the cul-
tural, historical, social language environment.
The structure and function of each type of speech differ, however. Inner speech,
in contrast to the grammatically correct communicative speech, is more economi-
cal. As it branches off communicative (external) speech, ultimately the "speech
structures mastered by the child become the basic structures to his thinking"
(Vygotsky, 1962, p. 51). Inner speech, then, is the opposite of external speech.
External speech involves turning thought into words, whereas inner speech involves
turning words into thought (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 131). Inner speech is thinking in pure
meanings and is the link between the second signal system of the social world and
the thought of the individual. Because of the evolution of language, from first to
second signal system, Vygotsky could claim (as quoted by Leontiev & Luria, 1968,
p. 342) that by mastering nature we also master ourselves.
CONTRASTING PoSITIONS
Vygotsky's theoretical interests in language development are frequently confused

with the interests of two colleagues, Luria and Piaget, who were also working on
language development in the 1920s and 1930s. Vygotsky differed from Luria in the
area of focus and methodology and from Piaget in theory development and data
interpretation.
In contrast to Vygotsky, who focused on the semantic and self-directive capacity
of the second signal system, Luria focused on the child's transition from the first to
the second signal system. Thus, Luria examined the stimulus properties oflanguage,
those impulse qualities that also can regulate behavior through sound and condition-
ing, and designed conditions that would elicit a transition from one signal system to
the other. His research methods involved a degree of intrusiveness and direct
experimental manipulation. In contrast, Vygotsky's studies were confined to obser-
vations of what he considered naturally occurring self-directive speech, what Piaget
called "egocentric" speech, which consists of words spoken aloud in the presence of
others. It resembles social or communicative speech, but does not require a response
or even the attention of a listener.
It is probably fair to say that Vygotsky's theorizing about the emergent dual func-
tion oflanguage owes much to his disagreement with Piaget (1983) on the source and
function of egocentric speech. Although Vygotsky felt Piaget had revolutionized

child study, he disagreed with Piaget's basic premise: that the earliest forms of
thought are autistic, with logic occurring sometime later, and egocentric speech the
connective link. Vygotsky's disagreement fueled a line of research that replicated
Piaget's clinical method and setting, but added difficult elements that would frus-
trate the child so that "by obstructing his free activity we made him face his prob-
lems" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 16). Results indicated that children's egocentric speech
increased when faced with difficulties.
Vygotsky, like Piaget, interpreted this as support for the premise that speech is an
expression of the process of becoming aware. Vygotsky also maintained, however,
that egocentric speech becomes an instrument in the seeking and planning of a solu-
tion to a problem. It is self-directive. In contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky did not consider
egocentric speech ultimately to be "corrected" and, thus, to disappear, but rather to
be the transition between external and inner speech. It already serves the function
of inner speech, but remains similar to social speech in its structure. As inner speech
develops, egocentric expression decreases because "behind the symptoms of dissolu-
tion lies a progressive development, the birth of a new speech form;' that is, inner
speech (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 135). Thus, the progression of multiple functions of
language from social to egocentric to inner speech.
Dynamics of Change: Processes of Internalization

SOCIAL NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The sequence of language development, from interpersonal and communicative

with others to intrapersonal and self-directive, squarely locates the emergent capac-
ity for "self"-regulation in the interpersonal realm. Vygotskian theory adheres to
cultural-historical evolution and the development of consciousness; thus the role of
the social environment is preeminent. Vygotskian theory (Luria, 1969) " ... con-
ceives of mind as the product of social life and treats it as a form of activity which
was earlier shared by two people (originated in communication), and which only
later, as a result of mental development, become a form of behavior in one person"
(p. 143). The psychology of the individual is a multiplicative product of his social
encounters. Hence, adaptive learning begins in the social world.
EMERGENT INTERACTION
"Emergent interaction" has been coined by Wertsch and Stone (1985) to capture the
dynamics of internalization of the interpersonal realm in the Vygotskian perspective.
An understanding of the emergence of self-directive inner speech requires an
appreciation of emergent interaction, the process of internalization that integrates
the important social/instructional environments in the child's experience-the
interpsychological, cultural world-with the child's natural developmental pro-
cesses. Internalization, then, is not replication or mere "introjection" of the exter-
nal. Rather, it is inherently social and interactional, and at its core is the mastery of
signals -language.
This conception of internalization embeds the individual within her culture; it

blurs the distinction between self and other that is more readily accepted in main-
stream American psychology. Within a Vygotskian framework, the interplay of the
social/historical and the natural in the formation of consciousness informs ques-
tions about the relationship between social cognition and intrapersonal awareness
and understanding. The individual is intricately a part of the perceived social world;
thus self-knowledge is not independent of knowledge of others. One could argue,
then, that reports about self are not interpretable without a context of "perception of
others" within which to analyze them; nor is a student's specific intrapersonal
approach and response apparent in a learning situation without understanding the
interpersonal influences of home and school. The efficacy of this argument is
demonstrated in the final section ofthis chapter, "Emergent interaction and adaptive
inner speech: An illustration;' which traces the sources and nature of reported inner
speech of one sixth-grade student.
EDUCATIONAL ApPLICATIONS
The stress on social and emergent interaction is obviously compatible with the
social/political goals of the Soviet Union of the early twentieth century. It is compat-
ible with educational goals in the United States as well. Vygotsky's constructs have
been gladly received in the educational community, most notably his notion of the
"Zone of Proximal Development:' Vygotsky identified this zone as a sort of "gap" or
the difference between what a learner cannot do alone yet can do with help from a
teacher or more capable peer. The basic tenet of this construct is that tasks that
learners can initially do only with assistance, they come to do independently as
they incorporate the structure or the "scaffolding" (Palincsar & Brown, 1984) of
the assistance.
Vygotskian theory is a theory about fundamental change through the internaliza-
tion of the social/instructional environment. It at once empowers the social/instruc-
tional environment and the individual, a provocative formula for education. A
Vygotskian perspective is inherently political. This is not unique to Vygotsky-all
psychological theories are inherently political. Perhaps the construct of self-
regulation simply magnifies the broader issue. One need consider the extent to
which enhancing the development of self-regulated learning is for the purpose of
individual empowerment, to free the individual from the immediate environment by
enabling self-direction and planfulness, or to merely energize for the purpose of
greater, introjected, "other" control.
It seems especially problematic that educators remain unaware of this, because
a bits-and-pieces approach in the classroom in the belief that one is politically
"neutral" often results in applications that are anything but neutral. The cooperative
group of homogeneous high-ability learners is a frequent and obvious example.
Hence, one cannot simply implement tools like the "Zone of Proximal Develop-
ment" or "inner speech" without an understanding of the emergent interpsychologi-
cal developmental premise that underlies them. Educators' decontextualization
of such concepts does not promote an informed understanding of motivated class-
room learning.
Methodological Issues and the Unit of Analysis

METHODOLOGICAL DEMANDS OF VYGOTSKY'S 'THEORY
The study of naturally occurring self-directive inner speech that originates in the
interpersonal realm within a theoretical framework of "emergent interactionism;'
places considerable demands on the researcher to design informative methodology.
It is seldom achieved now, with all the technical advances in tools and accrued wis-
dom of the past 60 years. It was not readily obtained by Vygotsky, either. A recurring
argument among Vygotskian scholars concerns inconsistencies in Vygotsky's
research in meeting the demands of his theory. Davydov and Radzikhovski (1985),
among others, have distinguished "between Vygotsky the methodologist and
Vygotsky the psychologist."
Vygotsky the methodologist did not readily accept elicited behavior as indicative
of behavior that occurs naturally. He opposed subjective and introspective reports
and would not directly ask a subject to report her thoughts. He did manipulate task
structures, however, and would change a task to increase its frustrating potential,
thus requiring self-directive speech. Vygotsky's rejection of direct-questioning tech-
niques meant that he confined his research on self-directive inner speech to observa-
tions of egocentric speech in difficult, novel, or frustrating task conditions. Because
he considered egocentric speech to be self-directive speech on its way inward, he had
to infer the dynamics of inner speech from these observations.
Vygotsky the psychologist voiced concern about the false dichotomy that charac-
terized much of psychology at the turn of the century and continues today. He antici-
pated present-day attempts to integrate "will" with "skill" (see Como & Mandinach,
1983; Como & Rohrkemper, 1985; Paris, 1988; Rohrkemper & Bershon, 1984;
Rohrkemper & Como, 1988) when he wrote (Vygotsky, 1962):
We have in mind the relation between intellect and affect. Their separation as subjects of
study is a major weakness of traditional psychology since it makes the thought process appear
as an autonomous flow of "thoughts thinking themselves;' segregated from the fullness oflife,
from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker. . . . [The
present approach] demonstrates the existence of a dynamic system of meaning in which the
affective and the intellectual unite .... It permits us to trace the path from a person's needs
and impulses to the specific direction taken by his thoughts, and the reverse path from his
thoughts to his behavior and activity. (p. 8)
Thus, although Vygotsky's own research did not address the interplay ofthe affective
with the intellectual, he recognized the need to examine their organization-that is,
their dialectical integration-and the futility of examining either facet in isolation
from the other and from their emergent interactional origins with the social/instruc-
tional environment.
UNIT OF ANALYSIS
Vygotsky's concern with the integration of the affective and intellectual did not lead
him to a concern with the structure and nature of tasks that would afford that
integration. What is now seen as a major shortcoming in Vygotsky's theorizing likely
stems from his shortcomings as a methodologist. Although Vygotsky used difficult

tasks to stimulate egocentric speech, he did not appreciate their theoretical implica-
tion, and instead viewed them as a discrete tool.
Vygotsky (1962) had set out to establish a unit of psychological analysis that
differed from the elemental approach that "analyzes complex psychological wholes
into elements" (p. 3). He posited instead the notion of unit, " ... a product of analy-
sis, which, unlike elements, retains all the properties of the whole and which cannot
be further divided without losing them" (p. 4). Vygotsky believed that the basic unit
of verbal thought that met these requirements was word meaning.
Wertsch (1985), like Zinchenko (1985), claims that developments within semi-
otics have challenged the position of word meaning as the basic unit of analysis
in psychology, and offers instead the construct of "activity" that embodies tool-
mediated, goal-directed action. Wertsch (1985) maintains that the construct of
activity applies "to the interpsychological as well as the intrapsychological plane,
and it provides an appropriate framework for mediation" (p. 208).
This perspective is consistent with implications of recent work on the role of task
difficulty and the form and dual nature of reported inner speech that integrates the
affective with the intellectual (Rohrkemper, 1986; Rohrkemper & Bershon, 1984;
Rohrkemper, Slavin, & McCauley, 1983). These studies indicated, as Vygotsky
(1978) would predict, that tasks that do not require striving do not challenge, and
therefore, do not enhance the development of self-directive inner speech. In each
study, reported inner speech was an integral element of tool mediation and main-
tenance (or transformation) ofthe goal, but best understood with knowledge of the
perceived task that afforded its employment.
Tool-mediated, goal-directed action as the basic unit of analysis is consistent with
Vygotsky's discussion of the study of internal processes. His concern with the limits
of introspection and subjective report led him to consider ways to externalize inter-
nal processes, "connecting it with some outer activity;' because only then would
objective functional analysis be possible (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 132). It is perhaps use-
ful to once again consider the distinction between Vygotsky the methodologist and
Vygotsky the theoretician. Here we see that his research methods embodied the
notion of task to allow examination of self-directive speech rising to the occasion of
tool mediation. In this instance, however, Vygotsky the theorist failed to rise to the
occasion of his methodology.
Recent Research Related to Self-Directive Inner Speech
Much current research informs constructs posited by Vygotsky. This volume illus-
trates the key place self-direction and self-regulation occupy in present educational
and psychological theory and practice. In this section, three areas of research related
to inner speech are noted. No attempt is made to be exhaustive; rather, the goal is
to highlight the emergence and refinement of inner speechlike constructs from three
perspectives in psychology: developmental, clinical, and educational.
Developmental Psychology
Within a developmental perspective, the quality of children's thinking changes over
time from initially being embedded in physical action to ultimately being strategic
and abstract. Some important questions for researchers within this tradition concern
differences between types or stages of thought, transitions between stages, and
regression to kinds of thinking that are less sophisticated than what is possible. Paris
and Byrnes (this volume) discuss additional developmental considerations.
TRANSPOSITION RESEARCH
Transposition problem tasks were designed to understand the quality of young chil-
dren's problem-solving strategies as compared with older children and adults. These
studies (e.g., Stevenson, 1970) repeatedly showed that young children (and animals)
use identification strategies that indicate the associative nature of their thinking.
They fail to use their knowledge strategically. In contrast, older children and adults
use more sophisticated relational strategies, indicating the qualitative changes that
occur as children's thinking develops. Hence, associative thinking is considered
more primitive and usually less efficient than the types of cognitive strategies that
emerge with development. A researcher within a Vygotskian tradition would likely
note as well the transition from the first to the second signal system and the emer-
gence of self-directive speech during this period.
MEDIATIONAL DEFICIENCY
What happens when children who developmentally should possess and enact more
sophisticated cognitive strategies do not use them? Mediational-deficiency research
(e.g., Kendler & Kendler, 1962) examines those situations in which children's think-
ing, as indicated by their responses to problems, does not appear to live up to the
sophistication of their language. In these cases, thought is not being mediated or car-
ried by language, and conversely, thought is not informing language. The apparent
lack of a relationship between thought and speech is called a "mediational" defi-
ciency. Within a Vygotskian framework, the child is functioning outside the inter-
face between thought and speech and, therefore, is not engaging in self-direction.
From a Piagetian perspective, the child is engaging in "merely verbal learning;'
without understanding or operative knowledge.
PRODUCTION DEFICIENCY
A more frequent problem that emerges in developmental investigations concerned

with the presence and use of cognitive strategies is "production deficiency" (e.g.,
Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Production deficiency
refers to those situations when the individual possesses a cognitive skill but fails to
produce or use it when it would be helpful or more efficient. This area of research
began with memory-list experiments comparing memorization strategies used by
children and adults. A protypicallist in these studies might be: desk, hat, sandwich,
chair, coat, apple, blackboard, shoes, milk. Persons indicating production defi-
ciency are those who possess all necessary concepts and language and understand
relationships that are relevant, but do not think to enact this strategic knowledge
when learning the list. Instead they engage in rote repetition: the less efficient and
more primitive associative strategies of young children. In Vygotskian terms, they
do not engage in the level of thinking that their capacity for self-direction affords.
Clinical Psychology
Concern with inappropriate behavior and maladaptive "internal dialogues" under-
lies a program of research by Meichenbaum and colleagues that operationalizes one
way to influence what individuals "say" to themselves-their inner speech-and
their subsequent behavior (Meichenbaum, 1977; Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979;
Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971). Meichenbaum has outlined an instructional
design for internalization that is appropriate for clinical settings and also informs
larger educational contexts.
PROGRAM COMPONENTS
Meichenbaum's program, called Cognitive Behavior Modification, combines ele-

ments of functional language development, socialization processes, cognitive
strategy training, and principles of behavior modification. It has three basic inter-
dependent components. First, cognitive behavior modification provides active
instruction in what to say to yourself in given situations, that is, what inner speech
is facilitative, stressing that inner speech is an internal dialogue, not a monologue.
The therapist/teacher actively models coping by "thinking aloud" strategies that help
overcome adversive affect and maintain the intention to reach a goal. The therapist/
teacher also actively models mastery and "thinks aloud" mastery strategies so the
individual knows what the goal looks like when it is achieved and can have some
insight into the kinds of covert self-talk and thinking required to attain it. Second,
appropriate behavior is taught simultaneously with facilitative internal dialogue.
Third, the therapist/teacher directly reinforces and supports self-reinforcement of
congruence between internal dialogue and subsequent behavior.
INSTRUCfIONAL DESIGN
The ultimate goal, internalization of the internal dialogue instruction, or in Vygot-

skian terms, of the socialization of inner speech, begins with direct instruction and
guided demonstration by the therapist/teacher or more capable peer. A reasonable
task is selected, one that the individual is unable to accomplish alone, but can do
with assistance. In Vygotskian terms, it is within the individual's Zone of Proximal
Development. Instruction within the individual's zone changes as the individual
acquires expertise, so that shifts in directness occur and degree of support is fluid.
Ultimately the therapist/teacher withdraws the instructional props through syste-
matic fading procedures.
Meichenbaum's research program operationalizes and refines Vygotskianlike

constructs; it has produced much supportive evidence in clinical and educational
settings. It lends support as well to the efficacy of integrating the affective and the
intellectual in adaptive learning. Meichenbaum's work provides supportive illustra-
tions of Vygotsky's theory of functional language and self-directive inner speech,
and the social origins of that self-directive inner speech, at least as one remedial
source when the individual's self-direction is found not adaptive, or wanting. For
educational applications of self-verbalization, see also Schunk (this volume).
Educational Psychology
Research in classrooms within an educational psychology tradition focuses on class-
room learning as it occurs "naturally;' as in a developmental tradition, and as it can
be changed, as in a clinical tradition. Researchers have examined students' naturally
occurring inner speech as a function of task variables, such as novelty, difficulty, and
structure, and as a function of individual difference variables, such as age, ability,
gender, and attitude toward learning (e.g., Ames, 1984; Anderson, 1981; D:.\.mico,
1986; Peterson, Swing, Braverman, & Buss, 1982; Rohrkemper, 1986). Investiga-
tors have also attempted to change students' naturally occurring inner speech.
Studies have focused on motivational components, cognitive strategies, and their
combination (e.g., Como, Collins, & Capper, 1982; Dweck, 1975; Pressley &
Levin, 1983; Schunk, 1981).
The research program described here attends to reported inner speech as a func-
tion of task difficulty, type of social/instructional environment, and individual
differences among learners. It can be considered an elaboration of a Vygotskian
perspective that incorporates insights from attribution theory (e.g., Weiner, 1985),
information-processing theory (e.g., Simon, 1969), social-learning theory (e.g.,
Bandura, 1977), and socialization research (e.g., Baumrind, 1971). This discussion
highlights the implications of emergent interaction for the nature of students'
reported inner speech during classroom learning.
CONCEPTION OF CHANGE
One way to conceptualize "emergent interaction;' or the dynamics of change that

involve school-aged children, is to consider the cooccurence of developmental
processes with a change in socialization. Thus, children experience an increase in
the number of social/instructional environments in their lives at about the same time
that they become capable of being in control of themselves rather than controlled by
the stimulus properties of the social/instructional environment.
Exposure to an increased number of social/instructional environments requires
adaptive learning, that facility to take charge of one's self and one's learning in the
face of uncertainty and frustration. Some social/instructional environments are
more informative and/or congruent, and thus facilitate adaptive learning better than
others. Striking inconsistencies between home and school can occur, as, for exam-
ple, in the different norms surrounding helping behavior, usually valued at home yet
often considered cheating in school (Good, personal communication, 1988). And
some learners are better able to handle the transition to multiple social/instructional
environments, recognizing and coping with similarities and differences, than
are others.
It is useful to consider the differences in social/instructional environments stu-
dents experience because they not only make demands on students, but they are also
simultaneously sources of empowerment as students internalize and mediate their
experiences (Halperin, 1976; Rohrkemper, 1984; 1985). As students acquire more
experience in school they begin to see it as a social/instructional setting distinct
from home. At the same time, they develop an increasing facility with the second
signal system and emergent capacity for self-direction. One hypothesis to emerge
from this scenario concerns the extent to which the capacity to integrate the home
and school social/instructional environments is an important determinant of the
development of functional inner speech and, hence, adaptive learning.
THE FUNCTION OF INNER SPEECH IN ADAPTIVE LEARNING
Inner speech guides thought and action in nonautomatic "effortful" (Posner, 1979)
cognition. Two types of inner speech have been identified that reflect concern with
the integration of the affective and the intellectual (Rohrkemper, 1986; Rohrkemper
& Bershon, 1984; Rohrkemper, Slavin, & McCauley, 1983). Self-involved inner
speech reflects control over the self through enhancing motivational and affective
statements. Task-involved inner speech reflects control over the task through
problem solving, strategic instructional statements afforded by the task, and modifi-
cation of the task if necessary and possible. Together, self-involved and task-
involved inner speech enable adaptive learning by allowing students to modify the
task or the self, and by enabling them to initiate and transform tasks.
Results indicate that students differ in the fluidity of their reported inner speech,
the sophistication of the task-involved strategies that they can employ, and in the
types of affective and motivational configurations that enable them to persevere.
These findings are consistent with the data described in the developmental and clini-
cal domains. Interest here, however, concerns the origins of these individual differ-
ences through the process of emergent interaction.
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that, even given developmental and task
differences, the sources of task-involved inner speech are more readily identifiable
and homogeneous and tied to specific school learning or, if found lacking, to student
ability level. In contrast, sources of self-involved inner speech are likely more
varied, reflecting multiple influences from home, school, and peers. An example
may be helpful. The following were excerpted from interviews with two sixth-grade
girls discussing how they handle the "hard stuff" in math. Their reports are typical
for their age group when reporting inner speech associated with difficult tasks.
It should be kept in mind, however, that these students were discussing their
approaches to coping with learning stress in general. Inner speech involves turning
words into thought; here we have compounded the process by requesting the path-
way to be made prototypical and then communicative for others. Thus, the density
and structural differences that are theorized to characterize inner speech have been
stereotyped and diffused in the translation. The reports are, nonetheless, informa-
tive in that they provide clues about the functions of inner speech.
A lot of times I get sick of things so I just want to stop. And I do ... I always, whenever I'm
working and I just get sick of working and I just stop because I can't stand it anymore. I think
of things that are, I like to do. Like in school, I'm going to play with my friends. I think, "Urn,
all the things that are fun that we do, and stuff. But I have to get this done and right before
I can go and do that."
Compare this student's self-involved, strategic use of fantasy, combined with real-
world contingencies to keep her on task, with her classmate's strategies. Whereas
the first student's reported inner speech indicates that learning was a means to the
goal (fun time with friends), the second student's reported inner speech indicates
motivational and emotional supports that are enabling, that are the means to the
goal of learning. See Como (this volume) for other examples of self management
strategies.
Well, I think I'm going to get them all wrong. And I kind offeellike I have to get up and walk
around and think about it. I feel like I have to stop and work on something else for a little bit.
I might get up and work on spelling for a minute 'cause that's pretty easy and I don't have to
think about it, 'cause spelling I just know the answers and they're right there. I can think about
the math and what I'm going to do .... [It's time for a break] when I get pretty frustrated and
think to myself you can't do this and I start tearing, I start biting my pencil then I know I have
to get up and do something else. I just I get so frustrated with it I can't think ... I start to fiddle
with my hands, go like that. I know I have to do something else. 'Cause I really get mad. I
don't take a real long [break] time, maybe just ten minutes. Then I come back to work again.
Just to get it out of my mind for a minute.
Both students conclude with similar procedural or algorithmic task-involved

strategies to reach solution. Their self-involved paths to that solution illustrate the
range and complexity of self-directive inner speech and its dynamic interplay with
one's general comprehension of oneself as a learner. The examples underscore the
question of internalization, and in so doing, move us away from locating the psycho-
logical solely within the individual. We look instead to the nature of the multiple
social/instructional environments that, through emergent interaction with the
individual, result in unique learner constructions and reconstructions of self-
direction. Thus, understanding how a student copes with present learning frustra-
tion involves some understanding of how prior and ongoing socialization influences
of home and school have been internalized.
We look as well to the specific events that allow this development, to the types of
tasks that stimulate inner speech. As stated earlier, tasks that do not require striving
do not challenge and therefore do not provide the opportunity for the development
of adaptive inner speech. Similarly, tasks that are too prescriptive do not allow
students to learn about themselves as learners and therefore do not enhance the
development of self-directive inner speech (see also, Rohrkemper & Como, 1988).
One implication of this interplay between task demands and the development of
adaptive, functional inner speech concerns how to design tasks that will enhance the
integration of self-involved and task-involved inner speech so that each is mutually
supportive. A concern with classroom task is emerging in the educational literature
(see Mergendollar, 1988). How patterns of inner speech associated with task
difficulty inform differences associated with task structures is one important ques-
tion for educational practice.
In sum, students differ in their affective and intellectual strategies for coping with
differing tasks. What distinguishes a Vygotskian orientation from the traditional
developmental, clinical, and educational perspective is interest in the emergent
interaction between the developing individual and the changing contexts of his
multiple social/instructional environments. This internalization process, in inter-
action with tasks that are challenging and informative, results in unique construc-
tions of self and fluidity of functional inner speech, and hence, adaptive learn-
ing. The perspective sketched here, highlighted in the illustration that follows,
attends to interpersonal influences on intrapersonal experience, namely, self-
directive inner speech.
Emergent Interaction and Adaptive Inner Speech:

An Illustration
This section is excerpted from a case study of the internalization of multiple
social/instructional environments, as manifested through reported inner speech. In
this excerpt, the relationship between inter- and intrapersonal perception and
reported inner speech while actually engaged in problem solving is examined in one
student's coming to cope with learning frustration. One purpose is to illustrate the
embeddedness of self-directive inner speech in the interpersonal influences of home
for one 12-year-old, 6th-grade, moderate-ability, female student, "Nora." A second
purpose is to illustrate the dynamics of adaptive inner speech.
The Social/Instructional Environment of Home

EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTFUL LEARNING AND EFFORTFUL PERFORMANCE
Nora's mother describes a home where each family member has diverse roles and
varied experiences and each has a profile of accomplishments. In this family, per-
sonal "achievement" is multifaceted, something the mother intentionally models
because "wherever we are, we adapt to wherever we are."
')\dapt" in this situation roughly translates into "do the best you can." Effort is
highly valued and effortfullearning is emphasized more than ready learning associ-
ated with ability, so much so, that Nora's mother is concerned that Nora does not
"earn" her way because "she learns easily and doesn't need much study." There is no
premium on high native ability.
Effortful performance is distinct from effortfullearning in Nora's family. Effortful
performance essentially concerns acting responsibly. It is always expected. Indepen-
dent of the difficulty of the task, be it frustrating or boring, you are to apply a "Let's
get to it" attitude and do the task responsibly and as best you can. This approach to
responsible behavior means that in Nora's family certain mistakes are "OK" (e.g.,
those that occur in spite of sustained effort, or that are due to legitimate lack of
awareness), whereas others are not (e.g., those due to lack of sustained effort, or
failure to act responsibly). Suggestions for improvement are confined to the motiva-
tional and self-management domains. Morality is intertwined with effort, self-
awareness, self-reliance, and the golden rule. Given the high value home places on
effortfullearning, one hypothesis that emerges is that sanctioned mistakes followed
by effort may well be the most valued behavior.
PERCEPTION OF NORA
Nora's mother describes her in terms of personality and values, as "coming into her
own groove":
I don't see intellect ... I think her strong points are knowing who she is right now, who she
really is. I can't help repeating this, but her morals are really very strong now, and she doesn't
care about the kids, being trendy .... You know, she doesn't need to go along with the tide.
She's just a good kid. She's just a normal twelve-year-old kid .... She's just enjoying life.
Nora's teacher agrees and it made her mother, "really feel good. Like rve done my job right
to have grown up this kid."
The Social/Instructional Environments of Marble School

Nora attends a neighborhood K-6 elementary school, "Marble;' located in a city of
nearly 60,000. There are three distinct messages about the relative value of effort,
ability, and achievement for 6th-grade students at Marble. Although the primary
purpose of this excerpt is to illustrate the interpersonal influences of home on Nora's
intrapersonal experiences in school, home influences are best interpreted within the
context of the multiple social/instructional environments afforded by school. By
necessity, however, discussion of norms held by Nora's principal, teacher, and
classmates will be brief. Readers are referred to the case study for more complete
discussion.
PRINCIPAL EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTFUL ABILITY
Marble School is located in a school district whose motto is "one year's growth for
every child" as defined by scores on the standardized achievement tests admin-
istered each spring. Marble's principal expects to exceed district-level goals. Accord-
ingly, she has created a school climate in which high ability combined with effort
that results in high standardized achievement-test scores receives the highest
acclaim.
TEACHER EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTFUL ACHIEVEMENT
Nora's teacher values successful, effortful, achievement. In this classroom, like

Nora's home, effort is always expected. An important difference, however, is the
linking of effort to outcome. At home, effort per se, independent of outcome, is
required. For Nora's teacher, effort is defined in large part by the outcome because
tasks are believed appropriately structured so that, with effortful cognition, stu-
dents will successfully learn. Thus, at home one can evaluate one's effort by the value
and intention that underlie the process; in this classroom the outcome of effort must
be known to determine its value.
CLASSMATE EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTLESS ACHIEVEMENT
Nora is in 6th grade. And for these sixth-grade students, ability is defined by rate.
As Stipek (1984) and others have discussed (Ames, 1988; Nichols, 1984), by sixth
grade, students are well ensconced in a compensatory perception of ability and
effort such that more expended effort indicates less expendable ability. Effort takes
time. Amount of time spent on task is a public index of effort readily available to
students as well as classroom researchers. Only these sixth graders are not apt to
equate "time on task" with motivation or opportunity to learn; rather, they are more
likely to infer level of ability. Hence, the fourth effort/ability message in Nora's
social/instructional worlds emerges: Effort is inversely related to ability; one's
personal worth is defined in large part by one's ability. Albeit by a differing route, the
students arrive at a hierarchy similar to their principal's. Nora's teacher's and, espe-
cially, her mother's "codes for goodness;' based as they are in effort, the controllable
aspect of learning, define the "also rans."
Nora
ACHIEVEMENT PROFILE
Nora is an '',N' student, who consistently receives the highest-level "effort/conduct"

ratings on her report card. Her teacher describes her as of "moderate ability" and
"positively motivated" relative to her peers.
INTERPERSONAL AND INTRAPERSONAL PERCEPTION LINKAGES
Nora was interviewed about her perceptions of four, hypothetical, moderate-ability

female classmates doing a math assignment. Each student was either effortful and
ultimately successful; effortful and ultimately unsuccessful; effortless and ulti-
mately successful; or effortless and ultimately unsuccessful. After each vignette,
Nora was asked first to describe the portrayed event; predict the hypothetical
character's inner speech during the described process and after the result was
known; and predict what was going to happen next. She was then asked which
character she was most like in general, when work was difficult, and when it
was easy. Nora saw each character as unique, but she prioritized the effort cue
in each vignette. Effort overwhelmed outcome. The data described here concern
only one character, Margaret, portrayed as effortful and ultimately successful,
whom Nora saw as most like herself when the work was difficult. In describing
Margaret, Nora said:
She takes a long time to do her stuff. At first, she doesn't understand it, but then, she finally
figures it out. She thinks she is going to do ok on her test.
Margaret's predicted inner speech is similar, moving from an initial concern with her
confusion to concerns about the obtained grade. It also discounts the difficulty of the
task, thereby reconstructing a "hard-won" learning perception into a merely success-
fullearning perception:
At first .... "I don't think that I understand this. It seems really hard, and I might not get it
right. I might not get a good grade on this. " Later, when she figured it out she would say that,
"This wasn't very hard and I made it through."
Nora predicts that Margaret's" ... Mom's going to be really proud of her, because
her mom knows that she's not very good at math, and she tries her best." Nora volun-
teers home involvement. There were no questions in the interview nor in casual
conversation that asked for discussion of home.
Nora compares herself with Margaret when confronting difficult tasks, because of
their similarities in rate: "I try to get my work done. I don't usually finish when it's
time." She reportedly remains task-focused when she is coping with difficult tasks,
rather than becoming undone with detrimental self-involved inner speech: "[I think]
just about the problems. Ijust think of what I'm going to do when they come up, how
I'm going to figure them out." Her account of how she is going to "figure them out"
consisted of task-involved strategies aimed at understanding the work and self-
reliance. Nora breaks problems into steps, goes on when stuck and then returns if
there is time; if not, then on another occasion.
Nora also admired Margaret the most of the four characters, because "she seems
to be a person who's into her own ... she's not into a group. A person who doesn't
want to make up or doesn't hang around with a lot of people. She ... she's not ....
very bright .... " Nora is her mother's child.
INNER SPEECH DURING TASK ENGAGEMENT
Nora's self-perception and retrospectively reported inner speech indicated she likely
took an adaptive approach to learning. That is, she appeared "hardy" when con-
fronted by frustration, and thus able to modify the task or herself when confronting
that frustration. Of primary interest were the adaptive strategies that Nora engages
in that allow her to continue to strive. Nora's internalization of home values indi-
cated that she would likely engage in self-managing, self-involved inner speech to
keep trying, especially after a mistake, and to keep it in perspective, especially if
feeling frustrated. Her understanding of classroom routines and procedures indi-
cated she likely would report general, heuristic, task-managing task-involved inner
speech that would include going on and then coming back to a problem, and using
available resources.
Finally, Nora's understanding of mathematics (as an ''P;.' student and one who
scored a 9.0 grade equivalent on the standardized achievement test) indicated she
likely would report more sophisticated task-involved inner speech that would
include problem reformulation and concerns about conceptual representation in
addition to algorithmic procedures. How Nora would integrate these multiple tools,
embedded as they are in differing aspects of her social/instructional worlds, was of
particular interest.
Nora participated in an individual problem-solving interview that included atten-
tion to reported inner speech associated with problem difficulty and student con-
struction and reconstruction of the experience. A math problem set (14 problems)
was designed with the classroom teacher so that the student would likely confront
problem difficulty as it was intended: relatively easy, moderately difficult, or highly
difficult problems. In practice, however, problem difficulty is coconstructed by the
student and the task; thus, although Nora experienced a range of problem difficulty,
specific problems were not necessarily experienced as intended.
Resources were available and Nora was told to use them if she wished. They
included extra pens, paper, ruler, the classroom math text, and a math book not used
in their class. Nora was instructed to read each problem aloud and trained in the
"Think Aloud" method, which required her to say her thoughts aloud while working
on the problems. She was observed and tape recorded. When finished, and using her
worksheet, Nora was asked to assess problem difficulty, recall her inner speech, and
to predict how well she had done. One week later, Nora was again asked to recall her
inner speech, how she felt about the experience, and how well she had done. The
data reported here will be limited to illustrations of Nora's typical inner-speech
reports during each of the three levels of problem difficulty: relatively easy, moder-
ately difficult, and highly difficult problems.
When confronting relatively easy problems, Nora immediately began the algo-
rithmic solution. She did not reconstruct or reformulate the problems in a metacog-
nitive task-involved sense; rather, the problem was perceived as a whole and the
already-known solution strategy employed. Reported inner speech was confined to
the algorithmic procedures associated with the task, and appeared concurrent with,
and sometimes subsequent to, Nora's writing. She did not report any engagement in
self-involved inner speech, be it reflective, directive, or evaluative. Solution times
with these problems were less than 30 seconds.
Afterward, Nora wasn't able to elaborate on the easy problems. They were easy
"because ... I don't know ... [they're] easy for me." Nora also identified the easy
problems as boring "because I already know them. And sometimes I like to move
on." She recalled no unreported inner speech when solving the easy problems.
Problems defined as moderately difficult were not necessarily evenly experienced
by Nora. The following are excerpts from her reported inner speech during 2 objec-
tively defined moderate difficulty problems that Nora later described as hard. It
seems that one of the reasons the problems were recalled as among the most difficult
was because Nora recognized them as something she had either done before or as
similar to something already done and she was unable to complete them with cer-
tainty. Thus, her transformations of the problems were limited to plausibly correct
transformations, and she had the added burden of performance expectations due to
prior exposure.
In each case, as instructed, Nora first read the problem. She then reread a
segment.
I did this on a SAM [district level mastery tests] ... [slowly rereads problem] ... so, take 2
into 2,000 [continues with algorithm] ... 2 goes into 4 two times, and bring down the ... 2
times 2 is 4, and oh ... do it on another paper [scrap paper, picks up where left off] ... 2
... [rereads part 1] I'm just going to do the same thing I did ... [continues algorithm] bring
down the one, 2 doesn't go into one ... That is [pause] how many were badly damaged by the
storm. [Now on step 2 of the word problem: sketches circle] How do you divide a circle 2,418
times? ... put that into a fraction. You can reduce it. No, you can't. [pause] I got this one
wrong, too. I don't believe we just did this and I don't know how to do it. [To interviewer:]
Can I think, and then can I say what I thought later? [pause, continues with algorithm] ...
Now, I just need to figure out what 7/8ths is a number of. Well, it's not I [sighs, "oh God;' con-
tinues with algorithm, inserting numbers in circle diagram. Looks at interviewer:] This is
going to be wrong, but ... 3/8ths can't be reduced ... make a better circle [redraws circle] 3/8
is like 1/3. I'm going to make a guess and say 912. OK. [Problem-solving time: 8 min, 36 s]
There are several points to underscore in this report. First, Nora recognizes the
problem as something familiar. The familiarity likely increases anxiety, however, as
evidenced in Nora's subsequent self-beration. Nonetheless, upon recognition, Nora
rereads the problem slowly and begins solution attempts. She deals with the
problem subparts, identifying where she will begin. She then copies the problem on
another piece of paper, a sort of "fresh start" strategy, as she advises in an earlier
interview. Nora then reconstructs the problem and transforms the representation
into a drawing that she later, laughingly, described as not helpful because she
couldn't divide it into so many pieces.
Nora's report indicates she comprehended the limits of her reconstruction during
problem solving as well. The task-involved dialogue that ensues, where she directs
herself to a procedure, then corrects that direction, is immediately followed by
chagrined self-involved reflection. It is noteworthy, however, that Nora takes con-
trol of the interview parameters and then reengages in task-involved strategies. She
is aware of how she feels, but she is not undone by those feelings. Nora continues to
try-to a point. She then closes the problem, anticipating error, by taking a guess.
Later, Nora diagnosed her difficulty as due to starting the problem wrong and then
not being able to think another way. She (correctly) expected to get this problem
wrong, but noted that she "finished:' Compare Nora's reported inner speech with a
similarly difficult problem:
[Rereads problem segment. Quickly looks back to earlier problems.] Oh, ok ... lover 8 and
5 over .... they have to be changed to the same denominator so the common denominator is
2, and [pause] oh, wait, this is just like the first one! Ys and %, so the common denominator
is 2. And then .... What did I do the first time? [pause] Oh my God, I did it wrong the first
time. Oh. 2 x 4 is 8, oh, yeah, [continues algorithm] ... So it would be .... and then take
the 2 into 15, because its an improper fraction .... So ... the fraction would be 11 take away
2, plus 7, is 9 and ~ .... that would be [pause] oh no [pause] oh, oh [pause] you have to
borrow ... make this .... you have to make that a common denominator ... that's the same
as ... [pause] ~ [sigh]. [Problem-solving time: 4 min, 45 s]
Nora reformulates the problem and, unlike the earlier example, a result of the
reformulation is recognition. Nora's self-involved inner dialogue indicates that she
realizes the limits of familiarity and the difference between recognition and under-
standing. Again there is evidence of task-involved correction, but the perceived
general "success" of the task-involved strategies precludes any intrusion of debilitat-
ing self-involved inner speech. Nora later described her problem with this as
algorithmic error: "I just ... somehow I got 6 goes into 10 evenly." Nora (correctly)
predicted her answer would be wrong.
As each of these examples indicate, when coping with moderately difficult tasks,
even those that she feels she "should know;' Nora remains task involved. Task
involvement includes the more routinized algorithmic procedures and the more
directive problem reformulations and procedural corrections. Nora is aware of
herself as a problem solver, but does not let negative self-perceptions interfere with
task reengagement. At some point in situations of continued difficulty, however, she
seems to recognize the limits of sheer effort and changes task goals from understand-
ing to completion.
When confronted with highly difficult problems, Nora attempted either to get
information to make them more comprehensible or she transformed them into
something that was comprehensible:
[After rereading the problem twice, looking at interviewer] What's "points"? [Selects math
text not used in class, opens to "perimeter;' moves lips, closes book.] I don't know how to do
that one, so I am going to move on to number 9. [Problem-solving time: 2 min, 50 s]
As the report indicates, Nora could not make the problem comprehensible. She con-
sulted potential resources in an instrumental way, and, when this was not helpful,
she diagnosed that she did not understand and moved on. In the follow-up interview,
Nora indicated that she knew she had "never seen" it before, but found the problem
interesting because it had some words she understood, but others she wasn't sure of.
She looked in the math text, but the examples it used did not match the problem, so
it was not helpful (the text provided figures, the problem called for constructing a
figure).
Nora's transformation strategy is evident in another highly difficult problem:
[Reads "ratio" as "radio"] What? [Rereads problem] ... ok. [Rereads second part of problem]
70 kg ... umm ... 1:50. [rereads] 70 kg. 1:50. Oh. I'm still thinking about the problem ...
70 kg. 70 kg I can lift. 70. I'm going to think this one with my brother. My brother is about
70 and he can lift 50 pounds. [Sighs, begins multiplication algorithm] I'd say 50. [On to part
2:] I can lift (pause). I can lift Michael [brother], who is 70 kg. KG! Oh, my, ok. 50 kg and
70 kg. [Problem-solving time: 7 min, 0 s]
In this instance, Nora radically transformed the problem into operations and charac-
ters she could understand. She wrote in her brother and changed the demands of a
ratio problem (An ant can lift 50 times its mass. If it were the same for humans, what
could a person whose mass is 70 kg lift) to what amounts she and her brother could,
in fact, lift. When describing her thinking in the follow-up interview, Nora recalled:
Well, I started thinking about it, and I didn't know how to do it that way, I didn't even know
a way to do it, so I just compared it with my brother, because my brother is about 70 kilo-
grams. [She switched strategies] because it was taking too long, I did it. It was taking too long,
and there was no way I knew how to do it.
Interestingly enough, when discussing which problems were the most difficult,
Nora did not name either of these. Rather, her subjective experience of the most
difficult problems were those that she knew something about yet required effortful
cognition that was not necessarily going to result in solution. Problems that she did
not recognize as something she "ought" to understand did not elicit stressful self-
involved inner speech. Rather, they appear to take on the qualities of puzzles-
interesting and lacking accountability.
RECONSTRUcrION OF THE PROBLEM SOLVING INTERVIEW
One week later, Nora reported feeling "OK" during, and "tired and happy" after, the
interview. She recalled saying to herself, "I can go on if it is too hard and some of
them are really hard and some easy." She estimated that she got about "half right,
half wrong;' thought overall it was "pretty hard;' and only liked it a "little bit."
Closing Comments
UNIT OF AcrIVITY
Wertsch's (1985, p. 208) notion of the basic unit of psychological analysis as "tool-
mediated, goal-directed action" receives support in this illustration. Inner speech
differentially mediates tasks. And tasks differentially mediate inner speech. Nora's
reported inner speech is most schoollike when she is engaged in solving problems of
moderate difficulty. Her reported inner speech is also most homelike when engaged
in these tasks. In contrast, too-difficult tasks do not engage self-directive speech in
the same way. They are beyond Nora's self-expectations; she does not have the
strategies to make the problems accessible and thereby accountable.
Too-easy tasks do not require effortful cognition. Thus, Nora does not engage self-
directive inner speech. At most the reported inner speech consists only of reflective
or evaluative components. Task-involved reflective ("It's an addition problem;' fol-
lowed by automatic procedures) or evaluative ("That's an easy one") inner speech by
itself does not facilitate the continued development and refinement, and therefore
power, of task-involved inner speech. And self-involved reflective ("rve done this
before") or evaluative ("I did that fast") inner speech by itself does not promote self-
knowledge that enhances coping with tasks that are stressful.
The level of task difficulty that appears to promote the engagement of both task-
involved and self-involved inner speech is the moderately difficult task. Moderately
difficult tasks afford the integration of the affective and the intellectual in the media-
tion of goal-directed action and, hence, the development of adaptive learning.
EMERGENT INTERAcrION
As her mother said, Nora has "come into her own;' yet she is clearly embedded
within her culture, intricately a part of multiple social/instructional environments.
Nora's self-knowledge, her intrapersonal awareness, is best understood within the
context of interpersonal influences, perceptions of others, and her own develop-
mental processes. She has uniquely negotiated, integrated, and reconstructed the
social/instructional environments she encounters as she copes adaptively with the

demands of classroom learning.
IMPLICATIONS FOR A VYGOTSKlAN PERSPECTIVE AND EDUCATION
Inner speech can be understood as a function of self-direction, developed through

emergent interaction with social/instructional environments, that is engaged by
tasks that require tool-mediated, goal-directed action. Hence, emergent interaction
between the developing individual and the multiple social/instructional environ-
ments of her experience, and the opportunity to expand and build upon one's
knowledge through the use and refinement of self-directive tools, underlie the
development of adaptive learning. It begins in the social, interpersonal world.
A Vygotskian perspective is at once empowering and challenging. It demands
much of educators. One important implication for education appears to be the design
of classroom tasks that will enhance the integration of the affective and the intellec-
tual in students' self-directive inner speech and, thus, engage adaptive learning.
Another implication is that we must carefully scrutinize the social/instructional
environments that we design because these settings are not merely "places" for
education, but are an integral part of the educative process. Finally, the Vygotskian
perspective suggests that we need to consider the implications of student adaptive
learning and plan for the challenges it will provide so that we may rise to the occa-
sion of our students.
Acknowledgments. This work is dedicated to the memory of Hugh V. Perkins,

Professor Emeritus of the Institute for Child Study of the University of Maryland.
Perk challenged and took issue with nearly every idea in this chapter and supported
the effort to convince him otherwise.
The case-study illustration in this chapter is part of the Adaptive Learning Study
and is excerpted from'~ Case of Emergent Interaction and Adaptive Inner Speech."
It was supported in part by the Junior Leave Program of Bryn Mawr College and a
Spencer Postdoctoral Fellowship. Interview transcription costs were undertaken by
the Center for Effective Elementary and Middle Schools of Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity. The author would like to thank Thomas L. Good, Jere Brophy, Kathy Carter,
Lyn Como, Nedra Fetterman, and Dale Schunk for their comments on an earlier
version. Special thanks to John Rohrkemper and Robert Russell for their help along
the way.
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7. The Constructivist Approach to Self-
Regulation and Learning in the Classroom
Scott G. Paris and James P. Byrnes
Some students thirst for learning. They seek challenges and overcome obstacles
sometimes with persistence and sometimes with inventive problem solving. They
set realistic goals and utilize a battery of resources. They approach academic tasks
with confidence and purpose. This combination of positive expectations, motiva-
tion, and diverse strategies for problem solving are virtues of self-regulated learners.
We seek to understand and nurture the development of these attitudes in order to
prevent students from rejecting the values of education, devising shortcuts to com-
plete assignments, and setting minimal performance goals.
This volume includes a variety of chapters that seek to understand self-regulated
learning from different theoretical perspectives. Our charge is to articulate a cogni-
tive constructivist account of self-regulated learning. On the one hand, a construc-
tivist account is a theory of students' competence, that is, what they know and are
capable of doing in the classroom. On the other hand, self-regulated learning within
this account is concerned with enhancing academic performance and adapting to
school. Therefore, our chapter combines theories of competence and performance.
Using the metaphor of children as scientists, we consider how students construct
theories of their academic competence, effort, tasks, and strategies. Each of these
theories embodies the principles of constructivism that we outline initially. As chil-
dren acquire progressively refined concepts of their academic learning, they inte-
grate this information into an emerging theory of self-regulated learning that
becomes a functional guide for their own performance.
In the first section, we outline the principles of a constructivist account of cogni-
tion and learning. In the second section we illustrate these principles in students'
construction of a theory of self-regulated learning. In the third section, we trace the
developmental integration of knowledge and actions in self-regulated learning and
how instruction facilitates the organization of information. Next we consider adap-
tive learning, in particular, how students cope with failure. As we bridge a theory of
competence with a theory of performance, we identify a variety of psychological
170 S.G. Paris and J.P. Byrnes
constructs such as self-efficacy, metacognition, and attributions that help us under-

stand how students construct theories of self-regulated learning.
Principles of a Cognitive Constructivist Approach

Some readers may react to the phrase constructive cognition with a response, "What
other kind is there?" During the past 100 years, however, psychology has witnessed
a variety of alternatives. One extreme is characterized by a structuralist approach to
cognition that emphasizes innate categories of knowing and concepts that are
imposed by individuals upon the world. These include fundamental properties of
perceptual relations (Gibson, 1966), the structure of language (Chomsky, 1965),
and basic categories such as numerosity and animacy (Keil, 1982). The polar oppo-
site of structuralism is usually considered to be empiricism. The empiricist
approach to cognition emphasizes how experiences imprint the structure of the
world into the minds of individuals. In this approach, cognition is a passive process
devoted to copying the structure of the objective world and children are viewed as
realists with relatively accurate views of the world. Both of these extreme positions
offer alternatives to a constructivist perspective.
A variety of structuralist and empiricist theories of learning have been offered
during the twentieth century, along with many hybrids. For example, associationis-
tic, behavioral, and reinforcement theories have been derived from the empiricist
tradition (Fodor, 1975). Conversely, linguistic, perceptual, and comparative the-
ories of learning can often be traced to structuralist traditions. But cognitive con-
structivist accounts, like Piaget's theory, mix elements of these different positions in
order to describe the interaction between the progressive competence of the organ-
ism and the opportunities provided by the environment. Constructivist approaches
describe how people transform and organize reality according to common intellec-
tual principles as a result of interactions with the environment.
There are several distinctive roots of a constructivist approach to self-regulated
learning. One path can be traced to Gestalt theories of perception that have empha-
sized principles of closure, organization, and continuity. The Gestalt principles
reveal that cognition imposes organization on the world and people do not interpret
bits of data separately. A second tradition to constructivism comes from the forerun-
ners of cognitive psychology. For example, Bartlett's (1932) research on memory and
communication illustrated how adults supply missing information consistent with
their background knowledge. Like the Gestalt principles of perception, memories
and communication become more, and not less, organized with progressive recon-
structions. Bartlett (1932) demonstrated that subjects interpret what they hear and
remember according to their schemata and expectations.
A third tradition springs from theories of intellectual development. Beginning
with Baldwin and Binet in the nineteenth century and continuing with Piaget's
pioneering work, many scientists have espoused the view that intellectual develop-
ment is a result of adaptations to environmental pressures. Adaptation is indicated
by the development of more sophisticated ways to represent and organize informa-
7. The Constructivist Approach 171
tion. Theories of intelligence also fostered the idea of levels or stages of knowledge
where children are found capable of inducing new regularities about the world
around them with the onset of each new stage. Several developmental theories
attempt to describe the progressive, novel representations and rules constructed by
children as they develop (e.g., Carey, 1985; Case, 1985; Keil, 1984; Siegler, 1983;
Sternberg, 1984).
A fourth tradition to cognitive constructivism can be traced to the work of
Vygotsky (1962, 1978). Vygotsky articulated a theory of dialectical materialism that
transformed consciousness into a socially mediated experience. (See also Rohrkem-
per's discussion of this view in this volume.) This emphasis on interpersonal
guidance and social reconstruction that promotes self-regulation is an important
complement to psychological theories that emphasize the individual's construction
of reality.
These four sources of self-regulation are well known, but it is important to point
out that theories of cognitive development, because they describe both change and
continuity, have provided the foundation of constructivism applied to education.
There is no established list of constructivist principles that describe development,
learning, or education. In fact, we might derive different lists from each of the four
traditions just noted. But in order to provide a basis for our examination of self-
regulated learning in classrooms, we propose the following list of six principles as
commOn historical themes to constructivism.
1. There is an intrinsic motivation to seek information. All theories of constructi-

vism emphasize the role of an active organism who acts upon the environment rather
than simply responds to it. From birth to death, people seek information and
attempt to reconcile discrepancies between the data they confront and their existing
levels of understanding. They are impelled to action by internal and external forces.
Organizing data and adapting to changing conditions are inherent principles of an
active organism.
2. Understanding goes beyond the information given. All accounts of constructive
cognition emphasize the importance of going beyond literal or figurative data
(Bruner, 1972). People impose order on their perceptions and generalize their
actions to different objects and settings. According to Piaget (1954), preschoolers
frequently amalgamate events in idiosyncratic and haphazard arrangements, reason~
ing that he labeled syncretic, juxtaposed, and transductive. One task of schooling and
development, usually evident by adolescence, is the use of inductive and deductive
reasoning. Piaget emphasized the importance of children's inventions and abstrac-
tions so that they could be freed from constraints of immediate experience.
However, the child's construction of reality can also bring distortions and misunder-
standings by imposing their OWn meaning or invented relations onto eventS.
3. Mental representations change with development. Constructivist accounts
emphasize that experiences are abstracted and stored as mental representations.
Some of these are generalized representations, but many may be specific to particu-
lar tasks or domains. Piaget described the time lags between domain-specific
representations as decal age arguing that all these representations have the same
172 s.o. Paris and J.P. Byrnes
structure. Modern information-processing theorists, however, describe them as
instances of domain-specific knowledge with distinct structures. Most construc-
tivist accounts agree that the form of mental representation changes with develop-
ment from something that is initially based on sensorimotor representations and
perception. Representations then become based on symbols and imagery that have
some physical resemblance to the original stimulus. Later, mental representations
become propositional and perhaps linguistic. Still later, mental representations can
be abstract and based on arbitrary signs such as mathematical formulas, symbolic
logic, or graphic illustrations.
4. There are progressive refinements in levels of understanding. Constructivists
emphasize that understanding is never final. Fundamental categories are not disco-
vered, nor is reality copied in the mind. Instead, there is a constant equilibration
between current knowledge and new input. Some of these progressive refinements
are stimulated by intrinsic reorganization or reflection. Other refinements are
stimulated by physical experience, social guidance, or new data. Piaget (1952)
described this dialectical process as assimilation and accommodation, whereas
Vygotsky (1962) described it as reflection and refraction.
5. There are developmental constraints on learning. Constructivist accounts place
a premium on cognitive readiness. This is not just maturational readiness, but a
threshold for learning that is established by previous knowledge and experiences.
Some characterize these constraints as the tension between structure and function
because performance limits are due to lack of knowledge, which in turn may be
impaired by certain limits on performance. It is precisely this interaction between
the individual's potential and actions that is at the heart of constructivism. Vygotsky
characterized this tension as a "zone of proximal development" in which readiness
is defined as the difference between what an individual can do independently and
what can be accomplished with the help of an adult or competent peer.
Historically, there has been a great deal of research aimed at disassembling com-
plex tasks and showing that apparent constraints on learning disappear when the sit-
uation is engineered to make problems easier (e.g., Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983).
Constructivists argue that the task has been changed appreciably. Some of the con-
straints are the independent reassembly of these different aspects of the task and self-
regulated learning such as identifying a goal, making a plan, integrating informa-
tion, and evaluating the outcome. Nearly all constructivist accounts, however, agree
that social mediation, task complexity, and rate of acquisition vary with age.
6. Reflection and reconstruction stimulate learning. Although many constructivist
accounts acknowledge the importance of social guidance and direct instruction from
others, the primary emphasis is placed upon the intrinsic motivation to reexamine
one's self, behavior, and knowledge. Reflection develops in school-aged children
from autonomous self-correcting behavior and internalized feedback from other
people. Students begin to examine reasons for their success and failure and they
begin to form concepts about their own competence in different domains. In a sense,
they are building theories that are a combination of naive psychology of human
action coupled with hypothesis testing about a wide variety of concepts. They begin
to ask, "What am I able to do? What is the purpose of this task? What can I do to
solve this problem? Does it matter ifI succeed? Should I try hard? What do I already
know about this task?" Such examinations of the task at hand and one's ability to
solve it reflect an emerging theory of self-regulated learning. Consistent with most
constructivist accounts, this theory will be functional and adaptive within specific
contexts, cultures, or settings.
These six principles are not intended to be an exhaustive list, but they do highlight
important components of many constructivist approaches. These are evident in a
considerable amount of contemporary research on students' academic achievement
and self-regulated learning. Although other theoretical perspectives may entertain
some of these same principles, we believe that the developmental focus in these con-
structivist tenets are clear cut and useful for understanding dynamics of classroom
learning and education.
Emerging Theories of Self-Regulated Learning
The predominant metaphor in Piagetian theory characterizes children as young

scientists who formulate and test hypotheses about the world. The notion of theory
proves to be a useful framework for considering self-regulated learning. Theories
consist of a knowledge component and an action component. The knowledge com-
ponent concerns the organized framework of concepts that the scientist constructs
and employs to make sense of data (Nagel, 1961; Wartofsky, 1968). For a physicist,
this might be concepts of "force" and "mass" and their interrelations. For a child in
a learning environment, this might include concepts of "self;' "teacher;' "math;' and
"grades." The knowledge component reflects developmental competence. Theories
also include an action component consisting of procedures for formulating and test-
ing hypotheses, acquiring new data, and solving problems; that is, ongoing theory
construction and refinement (Laudan, 1977). The action component reflects perfor-
mance. Hence, the metaphor of children as theory-building scientists relates compe-
tence and performance in learning situations.
Wellman (1988) and Carey (1985) propose the following characteristics of the-
ories that we adopt in this chapter. First, theories consist of a network of interrelated
concepts; that is, an isolated concept does not make a theory. Second, theories make
specific ontological distinctions. Thus, they specify the kinds of things relevant to
the domain. Third, theories provide explanations of data. Such characteristics dis-
tinguish theories from other cognitive constructions such as individual scripts, con-
cepts, or opinions.
Carey (1985) has differentiated the metaphor of theory change into two notions
of knowledge restructuring. She refers to one form as the "weak sense" in which
knowledge is transformed in a continuous refinement of information. Here, the
same concepts are simply reorganized. She contrasts this with knowledge restructur-
ing in the "strong sense;' in which there is a radical shift in understanding: Here,
both concepts and their organization change. We believe this metaphor is useful for
understanding children's self-regulated learning because there is a continuous flow
of information that contributes to children's beliefs about themselves and academic

tasks. The confederation of beliefs permit radical restructuring of students' self-
perceptions in school because children's perceptions of their own abilities, the tasks
they confront, and the strategies they use undergo fundamental changes as students
progress in school.
We consider self-regulation to be multifaceted and comprised of several compo-
nents. In particular, we suggest that children have a general, overarching theory of
self-regulation, which is comprised of four component theories: self, effort, aca-
demic tasks, and instrumental strategies. We consider the component domains to be
theories and not just concepts because each represents the organization of many con-
cepts that students use to interpret and explain their own behavior. Additionally,
these theories have a proactive influence on expectations, attitudes, and effort as
well as a retroactive role in personal explanation.
Within the constructivist metaphor of "child as theorist;' self-regulation consists
of organization and adaptation. New data are integrated with mental schemata in a
constant tension between assimilation and accommodation. It would be maladaptive
for a child to abandon completely and immediately a theoretical perspective regard-
ing some aspect of the learning environment on the basis of new evidence that seems
to contradict current theories. For example, consider highly talented individuals
who have a strong sense of self-competence. Even such individuals experience peri-
odic failure in their area of expertise, but it would be maladaptive to alter their per-
ceptions of competence following isolated instances of failure. Conversely, it would
be just as inappropriate for individuals to maintain a rigid conceptualization after
repeatedly encountering anomalous data. A more adaptive response would be to
retain as much of the old theory as possible while successfully accounting for the
anomalous data. As we shall see, these competing tendencies are reflected in the
progressive, incremental changes observed in children's theories.
A Theory of Self-Competence
A central feature of children's educational experiences is the understanding of their
own academic abilities. Years of workbooks, tests, social comparisons, and external
evaluations provide continuous data for children to ascertain their relative strengths
and weaknesses in the classroom. During elementary school, there is a progressive
fit between these external markers of competence and children's constructions of
their own ability. Although there are many attributes of the self that are relevant to
children's perceptions of their own competence in classrooms, we shall focus on
children's beliefs about ability, agency, and control.
ABILITY
Research has shown unmistakably that children's perceptions of their academic

abilities decline precipitously during school (Nicholls, 1984). Children enter school
with positive views of their own competence, perhaps even grandiose evaluations of
their abilities (Benenson & Dweck, 1986; Nicholls, 1978; Stipek, 1981) but by ages
11 to 12, they lower their self-perceptions of competence considerably. Junior high

school apparently brings a dramatic decline in ratings of self-perceived ability,
perhaps because of changes in schools and classes with new peers that increase
social comparisons (Eccles et aI., 1983; Simmons, Blyth, van Cleave, & Bush,
1979). These declines are often more evident for girls than for boys and greater in
some subjects such as math than others.
What accounts for these substantial changes in self-perceptions of academic
ability? One factor is the developmental change in the way children conceptualize
academic abilities. Most young children do not differentiate academic and social
competence. For example, in an interview study, Stipek and Tannatt (1984)
observed that 40% of preschool children referred to social behavior when they were
asked to explain which of their classmates was smart. Yussen and Kane (1985)
reported that 76% of first graders claimed that sharing was a quality that distin-
guished between average and smart people. Blumenfeld, Pintrich, Meece, and Wes-
sels (1982) found that second graders who received a great deal of criticism from
teachers about their conduct also had lower perceptions of their ability. Thus, until
ages 8 to 9, many children confuse academic ability and social behavior in their per-
ceptions of competence.
In addition to the developmental changes in children's understanding of academic
competence, there are also changing criteria for assessing competence. For exam-
ple, young children believe that completing a task indicates mastery and mastery is
good evidence of competence. But it is interesting that preschool children do not
accept failure as evidence of incompetence, partly because they believe that greater
effort will overcome the failure. Young children are influenced greatly by social
praise and believe they are competent if they receive positive evaluations and praise
from other people. Grades, tokens, and rewards given in the classroom provide dis-
tinctive information about performance. For example, Stipek and Daniels (1988)
found that children in highly academic kindergartens, where evaluative feedback
was very salient, rated themselves at the same level of competence as fourth
graders. In other words, the availability of social-comparison information lowered
their self-perceptions of competence. In general, however, self-ratings of compe-
tence are not related to grades until third or fourth grade (Nicholls, 1978). Similarly,
self-ratings of competence are not highly correlated with teacher-ratings until the
fifth grade (Harter, 1982).
A variety of evidence, however, reveals that self-perceptions of competence
depend heavily on grades by fifth or sixth grade (Blumenfeld, Pintrich, & Hamilton,
1986). Social comparisons and external evaluations gradually replace effort as the
basis of self-perceived competence. By fifth or sixth grade, academic grades and
report cards become very important. By fourth or fifth grade, self-perceived compe-
tence is sharply differentiated by subject area. For example, Marsh (1986) found
that verbal and math self-concepts were highly correlated in second and third grade,
but unrelated in fifth and sixth grade. This domain specificity indicates that students
distinguish their competence in different tasks and receive different patterns of
evaluations by subject area. (See McCombs in this volume for further discussion of
the domain specificity issue.) This helps students to maintain differentiated self-
concepts as opposed to generalized high or low feelings of adequacy. MacIver (1987)

found evidence of this compensation. Students who believed they were competent
in math had positive self-perceptions because they were relatively better in math
than in other subjects.
The development of children's concepts of their own abilities is striking. Until
second grade, most children believe that effort can compensate for ability and that
effort and practice lead to greater ability. Certainly the tasks of school, teachers'
praise, and the lack of normative evaluations facilitate this optimistic approach to
self-competence. By fourth or fifth grade, however, there is increasing emphasis on
social comparison, grades, normative feedback, and a growing realization that
effort does not compensate entirely for ability. Some students become cynical about
the payoffs for trying hard and develop a negative attitude about their own abilities.
Stipek (in press) suggests that these negative self-perceptions of competence might
be fostered by practices such as ability grouping and normative evaluation that could
be prevented or minimized by more innovative techniques. It is clear though that
both developmental changes in understanding and educational practices contribute
to students' theories of their own ability.
AGENCY
The notion of personal agency has been articulated in detail by Bandura (1986). In
attempting to bridge the gulf between cognitive and action theories, Bandura states
candidly: "Thought affects action through the exercise of personal agency. People
use the instrument of thought to comprehend the environment, to alter their motiva-
tion, and to structure and regulate their actions" (p. 1). Personal agency means that
people take responsibility for their actions and ascribe success and failure to the
goals they choose, the resources they mobilize, and the effort they expend. Per-
ceived self-efficacy is a critical component of personal agency because perceptions
of their ability to behave in a particular way establish their expectations and motiva-
tion. Children who judge themselves to have high self-efficacy choose challenging
tasks and persist in the face of failure (Schunk, 1986). Bandura (1986) cites a variety
of evidence to show that perceptions of self-efficacy can influence performance on
a range of cognitive and physical tasks. (See Schunk, this volume, for a current
review of this literature.) The basic axiom of agency is that a strong belief in one's
ability to use specific actions effectively enhances successful performance. High
self-efficacy also brings pride, satisfaction, and positive affect.
What kinds of factors promote positive beliefs in personal agency? One factor is
success. Practice at a task with continued success brings feelings of mastery and
satisfaction and the belief that similar tasks can be mastered easily in the future
(Stipek & Hoffman, 1980). A second factor is observational learning. When stu-
dents observe peers engaging in a new behavior, they will be more inclined to emu-
late the behavior if they believe they can do it successfully. Thus, self-efficacy leads
to beliefs in the appropriateness of the behavior as well as the expectation that the
individual can, with reasonable effort, successfully imitate it (Schunk, 1984). A
third factor critical for classroom learning is social persuasion. Teachers who per-
suade students that they have the ability to use particular strategies in a better way
will encourage learning (Paris, 1986). The construction of a belief in personal
agency depends on the interpretation of success. But task mastery, observation, and
persuasion by others that students have the capability and that success is due to their
intelligence and hard work are the foundations of agency beliefs that contribute to
self-competence.
Some researchers consider perceptions of efficacy or agency to be generalized
perceptions of ability, perhaps synonymous with domain-specific self-concepts. But
others, such as Skinner, Chapman, and Baltes (1988) consider agency beliefs as the
specific expectations that people hold about the likelihood of achieving desired out-
comes given their available means. Thus, agency beliefs reflect the link between self
and means whereas control beliefs refer to the link between self and a goal. Means-
goal beliefs reflect the instrumental connection in this triadic framework. Based on
factor analyses of interviews with children, Skinner, Chapman, and Baltes (1988)
contend that these three sets of beliefs are independent contributors to children's
self-regulated learning.
CONTROL
Control beliefs are the expectations that individuals hold about the likelihood that
they can attain desired outcomes. Partly because of the interactive nature of control,
there is less distinctive evidence to support these sets of beliefs as independent fac-
tors and psychological theories. Skinner et al. (1988) argue that traditional measures
of control, such as locus of control, really measure means-goal beliefs and that
generalized conceptions of control have not been assessed adequately. We believe
that children do construct beliefs about the control they can exercise in their
environments. Certain outcomes become desirable or unattainable based on their
beliefs, which contribute directly to their theories of ability and effort. Independent
goal selection and motivation to pursue goals is unlikely unless students have strong
beliefs that they can control their actions to obtain those goals. As we shall see later,
maladaptive learning often results from erroneous beliefs that students cannot con-
trol their access to legitimate goals of education.
Skinner (1985) reviewed studies showing that subjective-control experience is not
an exact representation of actual contingency relations. Few children and only a
minority of adults make accurate judgments of control because, for the most part,
people recognize, select, and integrate information consistent with the belief that
they have control. More importantly, depending on actual contingency relations,
highly active individuals systematically underestimate or overestimate the amount
of control they have. Less active people (e.g., depressives) are more likely to
view outcomes as independent of their actions and, hence, are more often realistic.
Thus, children's activity levels would contribute substantially to their perceptions
of control.
A theory of self-competence has many facets and attributes. Markus and Nurius
(1986) suggested that people envision multiple selves that are possible: "Self-
schemas are constructed creatively and selectively from an individual's past
experiences in a particular domain. They reflect personal concerns of enduring

salience and investment, and they have been shown to have a systematic and perva-
sive influence on how information about the self is processed" (p. 955). Thus, the
creation of potential developmental goals in self-actualization reflects the principles
of constructive cognition outlined earlier. Students amalgamate available data about
their ability as they draw evidence from teachers, peers, and self-interpretations of
their own behavior. They organize this information into coherent representations of
who they are and who they want to become. These perceptions can be distorted by
many factors, but a theory of self-competence that emerges in childhood begins to
solidify and become less mutable by adolescence. Children's beliefs about their aca-
demic abilities, their agency or self-efficacy to create change, and their beliefs about
the control they exert over desired outcomes are all important components of the
construction of self-competence.
A Theory of Effort
A child's theory of effort provides answers to questions such as "Why should I try
hardT' or "How hard should I tryon this problem?" The answers to these questions
yield a network of constructed beliefs and attitudes about effort. Young children's
theories of academic ability are tied to their theories about effort. Until the ages of
7 to 8, many children believe that trying hard leads to improvements in ability. Thus,
high effort leads to high ability. Dweck and Elliott (1983) characterized young chil-
dren as "incremental theorists" because they believe that intelligence is a direct con-
sequence of effort. But by 12 years of age, children change their theories of
intelligence and become "entity theorists" because they believe that people have a
fixed amount of intelligence that is unaffected by their degree of effort.
The transition from an incremental to an entity theory of intelligence appears to
be predicated on the differentiation of ability and effort by school children
(Nicholls, 1978). For example, by about second grade, children distinguish between
easy and difficult tasks and are able to adjust their effort accordingly (Nicholls,
1980). Children gradually become able to attribute their successes and failures more
accurately to internal causes such as ability and effort versus external causes such as
luck and other people (Weiner, 1986). Trying hard begins to take on a negative
characteristic as children distinguish ability, effort, and outcomes. They begin to
recognize that success with greater effort indicates lower ability and thus high effort
becomes a sign of low ability.
In addition to developmental improvements in accuracy, children's theories of
ability and effort begin to include affective reactions with attributions. For example,
Weiner (1986) notes that children who attribute success to their own ability feel
pride, whereas when they attribute failure to their own ability they feel shame. Like-
wise, when they attribute success to their own effort, they feel proud of their hard
work. But when they attribute failure to low effort, they feel guilty. When other peo-
ple attribute failure to low ability they may feel pity for the student, whereas when
they attribute the students' failure to low effort they may feel anger. Thus, distinctive
emotions become attached to the attributions for success and failure by students and
other people.
As children construct theories of effort that are distinct from their theories of abil-
ity, they encounter many opportunities to form erroneous concepts and distorted
theories. There are four well-known examples in the literature that we cite. First,
Marsh (1986) has shown that students develop a tendency to accept responsibility
for their successes while blaming failures on other people or external circumstances.
He labels this phenomena the Self-Serving Effect or SSE. This concept of academic
success illustrates the distortion in the child's theory that promotes self-worth and
encourages further effort while exempting students from self-deprecation for
failure.
A second distortion in children's theories of effort concerns the well-known
phenomena of learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Stu-
dents give up trying to control their outcomes when they believe that further effort
is futile. This belief can be a product of repeated failure experiences, low expecta-
tions for success, extreme task difficulty, or high anxiety (Nicholls, 1983). For
example, poor readers often resign themselves to low levels of comprehension and
fail to exercise useful strategies because they believe they will be unsuccessful (John-
ston & Winograd, 1985). The beliefs that students cannot control success and that
effort is useless are serious distortions in students' personal theories that diminish
learning and positive affect.
A third factor that influences children's theories of effort involves the classroom
climate and instructional dynamics. For example, teachers' praise has a strong
influence on children's theories of effort and ability. If teachers praise randomly
selected students for their high ability, other students lower perceptions of their own
ability. Pintrich and Blumenfeld (1985) found that teachers' praise was highly cor-
related with students' self-perceptions of ability but not effort at second and sixth
grade. Work criticism was highly correlated with their effort. Thus, teachers' praise
leads to students' hypotheses of who is smart but teachers' criticism leads to
hypotheses about who is lazy.
The fourth factor concerns the provision of assistance. Teachers routinely provide
a great deal of assistance to young students. When they hold incremental theories of
learning, wherein effort leads to greater self-perceptions of ability, such assistance
is valuable. However, as their concepts of intelligence change and they differentiate
effort and ability, teacher assistance becomes a negative indicator of ability. For
example, Weinstein and Middlestat (1979) found that teachers assisted low-ability
students more than other students in the classroom, which was taken as evidence
that they had poor ability. But children's theories of effort and assistance become
more finely tuned as they progress through school. For example, Nelson-Le Gall
and Glor-Scheib (1985) found that elementary-school children seek help in
mathematics more often than in reading. Thus, students' theories of effort reflect the
usefulness and legitimacy of assistance in different domains. When attributions of
success to assistance do not decrease self-perceived ability, help-seeking and high
effort are more likely to occur.
Children's theories of effort reflect constructive principles outlined at the begin-

ning of the chapter. They infer causes for their success and failure, often errone-
ously, which leads to specific affective reactions and influences future investments
of effort. These attributions are often distorted in line with previous schemata and
may be derived from limited evidence. The distortions are often self-serving in
order to protect students' feelings of competence and self-worth. Their theories of
effort also reflect emerging differentiation of constructs like ability, effort, and out-
comes and begin to show a consideration of interactive factors. For example, stu-
dents begin to evaluate the degree of effort that is appropriate under different
circumstances. In a sense, they calculate the cost/benefit ratios of effort on different
tasks so that effort becomes efficient and economical depending on their expecta-
tions for success and the value of the task and outcome (Feather, 1982). With age,
children's theories of effort become more informed by external data such as teachers'
praise and behavior and more differentiated according to academic domains. The
consequence developmentally is that young children channel their initial enthusias-
tic undifferentiated effort into particular tasks where they expect success and derive
satisfaction. Thus, theories of effort help guide self-regulated learning to optimize
feelings of self-worth while minimizing costs of work and emotional stress. (See
Schunk, this volume, for additional discussion of attributional influences on self-
regulated learning.)
A Theory of Academic Tasks

Children begin school with a naive view of what they will learn and how long that
it will take. As they encounter changing academic tasks and methods of evaluation,
they form more definitive concepts about the nature of schooling and the tasks they
confront. The theory of tasks is critical because it interacts with theories of self-
competence and effort. In this section, we consider two aspects of students' theories
of academic tasks: the goals they choose and the structure of tasks.
GOALS
Self-regulated learning requires that students choose appropriate goals as the objects
of their effort. Unfortunately, young children begin school with little notion of dis-
crete task goals. For example, many 5-year-olds do not know that reading involves
decoding print rather than telling a story about the pictures. Johns (1984) reports
that many 12-year-olds still do not understand the goals of reading as the construc-
tion of meaning from text. Instead, beginning and poor readers often focus on word
calling, decoding, and literal interpretation of text without elaboration and integra-
tion of the ideas involved (Baker & Brown, 1984; Paris & Jacobs, 1984).
In a similar vein, young children do not understand the goals of writing as learning
the rules of composition for self-expression (Scardmalia & Bereiter, 1986). Nor do
most elementary-school children understand that the goal of mathematics is to
understand relationships among numbers (Resnick, 1987). Instead, they focus
attention on the activities that define the domain such as worksheets and drill exer-
cises. Thus, mathematics often becomes a dreary set of procedures to be followed

in a mindless fashion rather than a set of principles to be understood. In reading,
writing, and mathematics, this concept of academic tasks as memorizing and repeat-
ing ritualized procedures interferes with a conceptual understanding of the task and
the goals of learning.
Within the classroom setting there are many goals that can be adopted. Nicholls
(1983) distinguishes "task-involved" from "ego-involved" goals. Task involvement is
intrinsically motivating wherein students seek to master tasks for the satisfaction it
brings. In contrast, ego-involved goals depend on social comparison and the
enhancement of one's status by comparison to unsuccessful others. Competitive
classrooms promote ego goals, which in tum promote attributions of success to abil-
ity (Ames & Ames, 1984; Rosenholtz & Simpson, 1984). Although competition
breeds success and perceptions of high ability among some students, it is devastating
to the motivation and self-competence of many other students (Covington, 1983).
For example, Elliott and Dweck (1988) conducted a study to determine how
different goals influence students' performance. Learning goals in which individuals
try to increase their competence were predicted to promote mastery-oriented
responses to failure. Performance goals, on the other hand, in which individuals
seek to gain favorable judgments of their competence or to avoid negative judgments
from others, were predicted to produce learned helplessness. Elliott and Dweck
(1988) observed the predicted differences on measures of task choice, performance,
and spontaneous verbalizations. When students with low self-perceptions of ability
were given performance goals, the authors observed strategy deterioration, attribu-
tions of failure to ability, and negative affect that mimic the kind of learned helpless-
ness observed in classrooms.
Children's concepts of academic tasks influence their learning goals. An emphasis
on classroom competition and procedures fosters a view of schooling in which
students perceive tasks as busy work and focus on task completion rather than
thoughtful engagement (Doyle, 1983). When teachers focus students' attention on
management procedures and a code of conduct in the classroom, they promote a
superficial, noncognitive engagement in academic tasks (Blumenfeld, Hamilton,
Bossert, Wessels, & Meece, 1983). These activities encourage students to construct
theories of academic tasks that lead to minimal and hasty engagement in learning.
Indeed, a theory of tasks as work-to-be-accomplished circumvents rather than pro-
motes learning.
STRUCTURE OF THE TASK
Many academic tasks have predictable structures that children learn as they
progress through school. Reading is perhaps the best example. Children confront a
variety of expository and narrative text forms from their earliest encounters with
literacy. Yet, it takes years for them to develop a concept of the structure of text. For
example, Bransford, Stein, Shelton, and Owings (1981) found that good, but not
poor, readers in the fifth grade could describe differences between poorly formed
and well formed stories. Similarly, when asked to make good paragraphs by arrang-
ing a string of sentences, only 20% of seventh graders paid attention to the cohesion
produced by pronouns and conjunctions (Garner & Gillingham, 1987). Thus, an
understanding of the structure of well-formed text may not be apparent or readily
articulated until 12 to 13 years of age.
There are many kinds of text structures that students learn about including linear,
causal, hierarchical, and lists of features or attributes (Calfee & Chambliss, 1987).
However, the most well-researched text structure is narrative story grammar
(Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Meyer & Rice, 1984; Stein & Glenn, 1979). Story
grammars describe categories of events in episodes such as initiating events,
actions, consequences, and outcomes that are arranged in canonical structures. By
12 to 13 years of age, children become aware of these categories and their structural
relations and use this knowledge to guide their study and recall. For example, Stein
and Policastro (1984) asked 8-year-olds and adults to classify prose passages as
stories or nonstories to see if children discriminated the defining components of
stories. Children's concepts of stories were less flexible than adults because they
classified passages as stories only when they conformed exactly to a prototypical
structure. For example, children would not categorize a passage as a story unless it
had a definable ending. Thus, children's understanding oftext cohesion, story struc-
ture, and the nature of reading develop considerably during their first six to seven
years of formal instruction.
Routine Procedures
There are two critical characteristics of children's theories of task structure. First,
they search for problem isomorphs. As students become familiar with academic
problems, they recognize and classify worksheets, basal reading lessons, social-
studies passages, story problems, and other traditional academic tasks. Recognition
of the similarities in structure and classification of tasks elicits particular strategies
and goals. The second characteristic is the construction of algorithms. Most aca-
demic tasks elicit a high degree ofproceduralization from students. As they classify
tasks, they transfer habitual procedures, partly because of economy of effort and
partly because of cognitive accuracy. Many students develop effective problem-
solving strategies for completing workbook assignments, oral reading, story
problems, and other tasks. However, many other students develop maladaptive
strategies to minimize task involvement. For example, by fourth or fifth grade,
most students learn that many questions on reading tests can be answered without
reading the passage and that it saves time to try to answer the questions before read-
ing the passage. Teachers promote the use of mindless procedures through their
emphasis on compartmentalized tasks and subjects in school. Thus, both good and
bad intentions motivate children to search for algorithms and procedures to accom-
plish tasks quickly.
One ofthe best examples of how children's impoverished theories lead to misappli-
cation of procedures is in their construction of "buggy algorithms" in mathematics
(Brown & Burton, 1978; Resnick, 1987). For example, when children are con-
fronted with subtracting a larger number from a smaller number, they often fail to
borrow appropriately from the next column and, instead, simply subtract the
smaller number from the larger. This erroneous procedure compensates for the lack
of conceptual understanding of the numbers represented by different places in the
multidigit number. Actually, children are quite clever in the algorithms they
produce. If they cannot subtract from zero, many of them simply subtract zero from
the larger number and leave it unchanged. In fact, "buggy algorithms" often reflect
a variety of well-practiced procedures that are inappropriately applied to unfamiliar
problems. Thus, well-learned addition principles or partly learned subtraction prin-
ciples are often mixed together when students are given difficult subtraction
problems that require borrowing (Resnick, 1987).
Clearly, children's theories of academic tasks depend on years of experience.
As they become more familiar with repeated activities, they can recognize prob-
lem isomorphs and classify them appropriately, thus eliciting appropriate problem-
solving strategies. By 12 to 13 years of age children recognize the structure of
various texts and apply relevant strategies to them. However, in reading, mathe-
matics, and other subject areas, children often devise "buggy algorithms" or syn-
cretic sets of procedures applied erroneously to difficult problems. The motiva-
tion for inventing these faulty procedures is partly a best-guess procedure of apply-
ing well-practiced procedures to new situations. Although the misapplied proce-
dures are sometimes humorous, they can lead to enduring maladaptive patterns of
learning and motivation.
A Theory of Strategies
Self-regulated learning is intentional and resourceful; students must learn to use a
wide variety of strategies independently in the classroom. Some strategies organize
information processing whereas other strategies help to manage time, motivation,
and emotions (Weinstein & Mayer, 1986). Some strategies are performed mentally
and some are external tactics such as note-taking. Some strategies are specific to
situations and tasks whereas other strategies can be general heuristics. Despite the
variety of learning strategies, certain characteristics are shared among them (see
Paris & Lindauer, 1982). First, strategies are deliberate actions performed to attain
particular goals. Second, they are invented or generated by the person and involve
both agency and control rather than compliance or mindless rule following. Third,
strategies are selectively and flexibly applied; they involve both cognitive skill
and motivational will. Fourth, strategies are often socially assisted tactics for
problem solving that become independent, especially when related to academic
learning tasks. Fifth, although strategies are important trouble-shooting tactics
and are often consciously applied or shared, the preferred developmental fate
of strategies involves both automatization and transfer to a variety of tasks (Pressley
& Levin, 1987).
Some strategies develop early and the rudiments of strategic behavior are evi-
dent long before children begin school. Wellman (1988) argues that 2- to 5-year-old
children develop a rich variety of strategies that are frequently used for remem-
bering objects and events. From daily tasks, like searching for toys and remember-
ing to brush one's teeth. emerge fundamental concepts of strategies that include an
understanding thai strategies are goal-directed. instrumental, and depend on
personal effort or agency (Paris, Newman, & Jacobs, 1985). During school years,
children's strategies reflect advances in cognitive development . For example,
elaborate techniques for remembering. communicating, and attending develop
between 5 and 12 years of age (Brown, Bransford. Ferrara, & Campione, 1983;
Paris & Lindauer, 1982). School experiences also cultivate specific strategies
for reading, writing, computing, studying, and taking tests (Pressley & Levin.
1987; Weinstein & Mayer, 1986). Thus, cognitive development, practice with
academic tasks, and specific instruction all facilitate the development of cognitive
strategies for academic learning.
What kinds of information do children include in their theories aboUi strategies?
First, children develop an awareness of what strategies are (declarative know/edge).
There is a conceptual understanding of the function s and purposes of a repertoire of
strategies. For example, 5-year-olds understand that rehearsal facilitates memory
(Weissberg & Paris, 1986). Students who are taught process-writing approaches
understand that planning and revising are critical strategies for composing
(Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1986). Second , students understand how to use strategies
(procedural know/edge). They develop procedural knowledge about the requisite
actions. Repeated practice with procedures for solving tasks in school may give rise
to explicit procedural knowledge as well as a conceptual understanding of strategies.
However, proceduralization can often foster faulty theories. For example, young
children often develop mistaken notions about a simple strategy like skimming.
Seven and 8-year-old childre n sometimes believe that skimming means saying as
many words as possible as quickly as possible. Thus, they say that skimming is
pronouncing all of the little words s uch as a, the, be, 10, the, and at. Older children
realize that skimming should focus on important words that describe the content of
the passage. Successful students also learn that critical information is located at par-
ticular points in a passage so they use their knowledge about task structure to guide
their use of a strategy like skimming to search for relevant information at the begin-
ning and end of the passage. These kinds of procedural knowledge are built upon a
theory of tasks and depend to some extent on practice and guidance from others.
A third component of children's theories of strategies is conditional know/edge, or
knowing when and why strategies are effective. This aspect of strategy understanding
may be fundamental for children's spontaneous transfer of appropriate strategies.
For example, Paris, Newman, and McVey (1982) found that children who received
explanations about the importance and utility of memory strategies continued to use
them without instructions, whereas other children reverted to their previous non-
strategic behavior and lower levels of recall. O'Sullivan and Pressley (1984) also
found that children who received explanations regarding when and why to apply
effective strategies for a paired-associate task performed significantly better than
children who were simply taught to use the method . Pressley, Ross, Levin, a nd
Ghatala (1984) found that conditional knowledge helped children choose between
more and less efficient strategies. Finally, Fabricius, and Hagen (1984) observed
that children who attributed successful recall to their card-sorting strategies con-
tinued to use the strategies in subsequent tasks to facilitate memory.
Most research on cognitive strategies during the 1970s and 1980s emphasized the
importance of children's understanding declarative, procedural, and conditional
knowledge for effective maintenance and generalization of the tactics. The develop-
ment of strategic reading appears to depend on student's progressive understanding
of the nature and usefulness of strategies that aid comprehension (Paris, Lipson, &
Wixson, 1983). But strategic behavior involves more than simply knowledge or
metacognition about strategies. Children's theories of strategies must be joined with
their theories of self-competence, effort, and academic tasks in order to be
manifested in self-regulated learning. Knowledge needs to be translated into action
with appropriate intentions and volitional control (Como, Chapter 5, this volume).
The convergence of multiple theories of academic learning and strategies is evi-
dent in the "Good Strategy User" model discussed by Borkowski, Pressley, and their
colleagues. For example, Borkowski, Johnston, and Reid (1987) synthesize strate-
gies, metacognition, and motivation in three kinds of knowledge acquired by chil-
dren. First, they argue that children acquire specific strategy knowledge that
includes declarative and procedural knowledge about a range of cognitive processes.
For example: "(a) a strategy's goals and objectives, (b) the tasks for which this
procedural information is appropriate, (c) its range of applicability, (d) the learning
gains expected from consistent use of the strategy, (e) the amount of effort associated
with its deployment, and (f) whether the strategy is enjoyable or burdensome to use"
(pp. 151-152). Second, they argue that general strategy knowledge is acquired that
reflects the degree of effort necessary to apply strategies successfully. This is like the
theory of effort discussed earlier that interacts with specific tasks and strategies.
Third, children acquire relational strategy knowledge that helps them to compare
various strategies so that they can select appropriate tactics in the face of changing
task demands. These three types of knowledge are orchestrated by "Metamemory
Acquisition Procedures" (Pressley, Borkowski, & O'Sullivan, 1985). These proce-
dures help children to fill in gaps in instructions, monitor strategy effectiveness, and
switch strategies when necessary. The "Good Strategy User" model, like the compo-
nent theories of self-regulated learning, develops throughout schooling and coin-
cides with other cognitive changes, practice, and direct instruction. Students who
have more articulated theories of effective learning strategies consistently score
higher on measures of academic achievement and learning.
Summary
Our review has shown that children acquire a great deal of information about their
own abilities, the nature of tasks they confront in classrooms, and how they manage
their effort and strategies to accomplish particular goals. These theories are often
analyzed separately by researchers and they may be discrete initially for young chil-
dren. But a central task of development is to integrate the information about the vari-
ous components that influence self-regulated learning. Cognitive constraints on
language and information processing may affect the development of children's the-
ories of cognitive processes. Children's theory building is also constrained by task
specificity. Children's early experiences with reading, writing, and arithmetic that
require intentional learning and self-regulated behavior may be limited to a few
formal tasks, settings, and people. Thus, the data available for theory building may
not be representative and may take on distorted significance. This is why children's
initial theories may be task specific. As a consequence, children need to develop
theories of context specificity and generalizability to accompany each of the compo-
nent theories we have described. Because these theories are necessarily interactive,
they help to coalesce different pieces of data regarding appropriate actions in differ-
ent settings.
Children's Organization of Data and Theories

In this section we consider the developmental course of integration of information
and the role that instruction plays in promoting better theories of self-regulated
learning.
Developmental Changes
Werner's (1957) orthogenetic principle characterizes development as progressive
differentiation and simultaneous hierarchical organization. These trends are
reflected in children's theories of self-regulated learning. For example, children's
theories of ability and effort are initially indistinguishable. When infants want a
desired object, they move more actively, thrash their arms and legs, and perhaps cry
or vocalize. Effort is expended, but not in an instrumental or flexible manner. In the
same vein, young children who want to learn to play the piano may strike the keys
vigorously or children who want to read books may turn the pages and make up a
story as they look at the pictures. They believe that effort and practice will lead to
increases in ability with little understanding of the kinds of strategies and knowledge
that promote skill development. Their perceptions of tasks, learning, and intelli-
gence all confound ability and effort by assuming that they are the same or that they
enhance one another.
By 8 to 10 years of age children distinguish ability and effort. They realize that
some tasks require more effort and that low-ability students may profit more by try-
ing hard. There are interactive trade-offs between ability and effort in their theories.
By 10 years of age, children also realize that (a) trying hard is perceived as a sign of
low ability, (b) success with high effort is less valued than effortless success, and
(c) failure with effort is a devastating indication of poor ability (Nicholls, 1978). We
believe that children recognize their talents and weaknesses in academic learning by
early adolescence and begin to show strong preferences for investing their effort
when it is least risky or threatening to self-esteem and when it is most likely to lead
to task mastery and success. In this fashion, children's progressive theories of their
ability and effort in academic domains influence their choices of tasks and motiva-
tional vigor (Eccles & Wigfield, 1985).
There are other undifferentiated concepts in children's theories. For example,
children often form global perceptions of their academic competence. Students who
receive praise from teachers, who are members of high-ability groups, and who
receive positive evaluations perceived themselves as able students. They are also
viewed positively by their classmates. General feelings of self-competence based on
standards of conduct and classroom status nurture positive expectations for learning
(Pintrich & Blumenfeld, 1985). Indeed, until 7 to 8 years of age children often have
exaggerated expectations of their own abilities for learning. They believe that
difficult tasks can be mastered quickly and that, with effort, nothing is beyond
their grasp.
A final· confusion exhibited by young students is their lack of differentiation of
academic tasks. They rarely perceive distinctive goals for these tasks nor do they
understand how task structure influences learning. Until 8 to 10 years of age, chil-
dren do not appreciate different reading goals nor adjust their behavior to different
types of text. The eventual compartmentalization of the curriculum facilitates chil-
dren's emerging knowledge about academic tasks, but it is often unclear to students
during the first few years of schooling.
Besides the feature of progressive differentiation, a second general feature of chil-
dren's theories is their search for simple rules. A constructivist account of develop-
ment focuses on an active organism who is constantly looking for parsimonious
explanations of data. Students follow these principles as they search for procedures
for handlirig academic tasks. Many of these procedures are taught directly to stu-
dents, but there is a strong risk that children abstract a set of work procedures rather
than a conceptual understanding of the task. Besides the threat of adopting an overly
rigid set of procedures, young students also run the risk of inventing faulty proce-
dures. Buggy algorithms are invented as parsimonious methods of transferring
familiar skills to new problems. They often fail because they are based on erroneous
concepts of the task or are designed to circumvent cognitive engagement. For exam-
ple, students often learn to skim without constructing meaning, calculate in rote and
inappropriate ways, and compose essays by telling everything that is known about
the topic (Resnick, 1987; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1986).
The developmental trend from the search for procedures to the invention of
algorithms (that mayor may not work) parallels a similar course in language
development in which young children overregularize language by the induction of
rules and only later learn the exceptions to them (Karmiloff-Smith, 1986). An
important part of the development of theories of self-regulated learning then is the
search for regularities and the commission of mistakes that can be subsequently
improved. Failure is fundamental to any constructive account of cognition because
it provides opportunities for children to recognize mistakes and rectify their under-
standing accordingly.
A third developmental trend is the shift in children's explanations of their own
behavior. This parallels the development of causal reasoning during childhood
described by Piaget. Children seek explanations of their own behavior and abilities,
but they often reason from contiguous and temporal events to causal relations.
Young children also focus on single-factor explanations so that they are more likely
to attribute successful learning to an easy task, assistance from another person, dili-
gent effort, or any other single cause. Interactive theories that explain success, for
example, in terms ofless effort required on an easy task when someone provides help
are unlikely to appear until late childhood or adolescence. Part of the difficulty
involves consideration of multiple factors simultaneously and part of the problem
involves the trade-offs among different factors. These aspects of information
processing are difficult as well for children on conservation problems, balance-scale
problems, and other tasks (Siegler, 1985).
Children's explanations of their emerging theories have been analyzed in several
different frameworks. For example, Wellman (1988) describes the child's emerging
theory of mind as based on a growing appreciation of mental states and terms and
growing insight into one's own behavior. Weiner (1986) describes increased differen-
tiation and coordination of attributions and affect that help students understand the
reasons for their successes and failures. Reflection or metacognition provides
another avenue of insight for children's explanations of their own behavior (Paris &
Winograd, in press; Yussen, 1985). All of these theories emphasize a dawning
awareness of theories of self-regulated learning by ages 5 to 6 that becomes progres-
sively better organized and articulated by adolescence.
A fourth hallmark of children's self-regulated learning is the development of selec-
tive and flexible actions. This reflects, in part, better theories of cognitive strategies.
Children who acquire more declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge
about strategies can apply them with more control (Paris, Wasik, & Thrner, in
press). As metacognitive monitoring improves during elementary-school years,
children also monitor their own learning more effectively. They become aware of
different criteria and standards for performance in different settings and they can
adjust their effort accordingly. They also learn to set realistic goals and to attach
values to the task and outcome. There is a reciprocal determinism between children's
theories of self-regulated learning and their own behavior because they are mutually
informative (Bandura, 1986; Schunk, this volume).
A fifth hallmark of the developmental integration of children's theories is the
progressive internalization of knowledge. As children come to know more about
themselves and the tasks oflearning, they transform the knowledge from an external
plane of action to a plane of mental representation. Piaget, for example, described
self-regulation as proceeding through a developmental sequence of autonomous,
active, and finally conscious regulation. Vygotsky described the development as
proceeding from an inter- to intrapsychological plane of functioning. To our
knowledge, all constructivist accounts of cognition emphasize the internalization of
actions that are derived from experience and social guidance. (Rohrkemper, this
volume, discusses internalization of speech.) Thus, theories of self-regulated learn-
ing are coconstructed in social interactions in which other people stimulate chil-
dren's organization of data relevant to their perceptions of themselves as learners
(Schunk, 1987). We turn now to the important role of instruction in fostering chil-
dren's theories.
How Instruction Promotes Theory Development
Children's theories of self-regulated learning are formed in classrooms. They are

influenced by the classroom climate as well as teachers' attitudes and behavior. We
have already seen how public evaluations and social comparisons are reflected in
ability grouping, teacher praise, and normative feedback. Classrooms that foster
comparisons of achievement on single dimensions can inhibit positive self-percep-
tions of competence and learning in many students (Rosenholtz & Simpson, 1984).
Because traditional instructional techniques often lead to the formation of self-
deprecating or self-defeating theories of learning among children, there have been
many instructional innovations offered to promote children's learning and motiva-
tion (Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, & Pressley, in press).
One type of innovative instruction has emphasized direct instruction and explana-
tion of learning strategies. If children's theories are incomplete or erroneous, then
direct instruction may help them modify their views. For example, Paris and his col-
leagues have taught third and fifth-graders a variety of thinking strategies to be used
before, during, and after reading (Paris, Cross, & Lipson, 1984; Paris & Oka, 1986).
In a similar vein, Duffy and his colleagues have trained teachers to provide more
explicit explanations of the strategies they taught their third- and fifth-grade stu-
dents in traditional basal reading lessons (Duffy et al., 1986; Duffy et al., 1987).
These researchers found that teachers could provide more cogent explanations of
learning strategies that improved children's awareness and use of the tactics.
A second type of instructional innovation emphasizes peer tutoring and dialogues
about learning. For example, Palincsar and Brown (1984) used reciprocal teaching
in which students take turns acting as tutor and tutee as they paraphrase, question,
summarize, and predict meaning while reading. Poor readers in seventh grade
simultaneously read the passages, discussed the meaning they constructed, and
monitored the use of the strategies with their classmates. Other methods based on
Socratic discussions, apprenticeship models, and dialogical learning all help stu-
dents to construct more articulate and organized theories of their academic learning
(Collins & Stevens, 1983; Schoenfeld, 1984).
A third category of innovative instruction involves cooperative learning. For
example, Stevens, Madden, Slavin, and Farnisch (1987) demonstrated that students
who work cooperatively in reading and writing activities in the classroom can sig-
nificantly increase their academic learning and achievement. The cooperative
dynamics include group discussion, argument, and coconstruction of appropriate
learning strategies. As students question their own views as well as those of their
peers, they promote disequilibrium and reconsideration of their own theories
(Webb, 1982).
Each of these innovative instructional techniques, then, reflects the core princi-
ples outlined in the initial section of the chapter. They all emphasize learners who
are actively seeking and organizing data relevant to their own behavior. Each
method encourages students to develop an explicit understanding of the tasks and
strategies they confront. They all promote increased metacognition. They all
differentiate attributions of success and failure to the interaction of multiple factors.
Dialogues and discussions are used to stimulate reflection and reconsideration of
one's views and they all promote internalization of the actions performed initially
with practice, guidance, or hesitation. Finally, each of these instructional methods
is designed to fit individual needs. Effective instruction must match and extend chil-
dren's theories of learning so that it is meaningful to them.
An Example of Instruction that Promotes Theory Building about Reading
It is difficult to capture the richness of effective instruction in a narrative account of

dynamic classroom interactions, but we would like to share our experiences helping
teach students about reading comprehension strategies in classroom settings. In
1980, Paris and his colleagues began a series of studies to help students use thinking
strategies for reading. The intervention was motivated by theories of metacognition
and effective strategy use derived from studies on children's memory conducted by
Brown, Hagen, Borkowski, Flavell, Paris, and others. These models of strategy
instruction emphasize components of both informed and self-controlled strategic
behavior. Thus, the initial project was designed to teach students declarative,
procedural, and conditional knowledge about reading in explicit classroom dia-
logues (Paris et aI., 1984). In subsequent projects we devoted more attention to
promoting children's theories of self-regulated learning because we realized that
explanations of strategies were only part of effective instruction.
The projects have been labeled "Informed Strategies for Learning" and "Reading
and Thinking Strategies" and have been tested and revised for grades three to eight.
The instruction was designed to be conducted by regular classroom teachers with all
the constraints of a normal teaching schedule. In order to avoid the time and the
expense of professional training seminars, the ideas were incorporated into class-
room materials for teachers and students. Current versions of the program include
instructional modules of age-appropriate strategies for enhancing comprehension of
text. The strategies are taught two to three times per week for 3 to 6 months during
the school year. The instruction is designed as a supplement to the regular basal
reading program.
The key features of the instruction have been compared to "cognitive coaching"
and have been described in other papers (e.g., Paris, 1986; Paris, Lipson, & Wixson,
1983; Paris & Winograd, in press). One feature of the instruction is the explicit
description of strategies that are provided by teachers. Large posters illustrate
metaphors such as "Be a reading detective" that facilitate the explanation of cogni-
tive processes involved in reading. A second feature is the use of group discussions
and peer interactions to promote dialogues about thinking. Students need to be
involved in active debate and conflict resolution about the importance of different
strategies for reading. Third, the instruction includes immediate practice by apply-
ing strategies to authentic and varied examples of text. The practice is not relegated
to individual seat work and repetitive drill, but instead focuses on teacher guidance
and feedback so that students read, write, and talk about the processes of thinking
as well as the content of what they are reading. Fourth, the instruction explicitly
encourages internalized and independent use of the strategies. Strategies are prac-
ticed in the content areas and transfer is explicitly encouraged so that the strategies
become self-regulated and not simply teacher directed.
How does cognitive instruction promote the development of theories of self-
regulated reading? We will describe how instruction addresses the emerging the-
ories of children. First, let us consider children's theories of reading strategies. The
group discussions reveal children's understanding of various tactics for reading so
that this information is shared among teachers and students. The confusion and
buggy algorithms revealed by other research are often evident in these discussions.
For example, we have heard many students describe "finding the main idea" as a
strategy of underlining the first or last sentence in each paragraph. Some students
believe that skimming means moving your finger quickly across the page. Many 10-
to 12-year-olds think that rereading is a strategy only used by poor readers who
aren't smart enough to understand the passage the first time. In order to counteract
this erroneous concept, one teacher we know distributed certificates labeled
"License to Reread" to foster better understanding of the appropriateness of the
strategy. Or consider summarizing. Most 8- to 10-year-olds believe that summariz-
ing a passage is telling everything you know about it and teachers often do not
explain the difference between summarizing and retelling. A key feature of exem-
plary instruction (e.g., Palincsar & Brown, 1984; Winograd, 1984) is the provision
of specific rules for summarizing text.
Because children reveal their confusion about strategies in interviews and class-
room discussions, the instruction is designed to provide clear explanations about
what reading strategies are, how they are applied, when they should be used, and
why they are important. Both teachers and students are explicitly taught declarative,
procedural, and conditional aspects of strategic reading. The information is
organized according to strategies that readers can use before, during, and after read-
ing so that it is easy to understand. Metacognition is promoted so that students can
make better judgments and choices for strategies to use in particular situations.
A second key feature of children's emerging theories is their understanding of the
task of reading. As we observed 8- to 12-year-olds discuss the nature of reading, it
became apparent that many children regard reading as decoding the words and get-
ting through the passage. This linear and literal orientation to text is often accompa-
nied by a theory of reading tasks as a sequence of drill exercises associated with the
basal reader. Too many students do not understand the connections between reading
and writing, the constructive aspects of comprehension, and the relation between
reading instruction and learning in content areas. We tried to explain a conceptual
orientation to print and a focus on meaning for students in the program. For exam-
ple, literal, inferential, and personal meaning were explicitly described and students
were encouraged to generate creative and aesthetic responses to text. Personal
involvement with text and selective use of strategies was encouraged rather than an
emphasis on multiple-choice questions or right answers. It is important to emphasize
that strategies were not taught as rigid procedures or algorithms, but instead, were
described as optional learning tactics selected by students to match the demands of
particular tasks. Genre, purpose, difficulty, and interest were varied in order to help
students understand the flexible nature of strategic reading.
Third, children's theories of effort for reading were addressed by explaining
that effort is necessary and important for strategic reading. As we watched teachers
and students alike attempt to proceduralize the instructed strategies and turn
them into routinized skills, it became apparent that thoughtful and flexible effort
needs to be addressed directly. Thus, we encourage teachers to focus on "effec-
tive effort;' which involves students managing the selection of appropriate goals
and strategies as well as managing their time, motivation, attributions, and emo-
tional reactions to text.
Although our projects began as attempts to increase students' metacognition, it
became apparent that there was a strong effect on children's self-perceptions of their
reading abilities. When strategies are made more sensible and students are success-
ful using them, they display more confidence and self-determination. In terms of a
theory of self-regulated learning, students increased their understanding of their
agency and control by adopting personal standards and making appropriate attribu-
tions to their effort and strategy selection. Pride and satisfaction were derived from
these theories and we have had numerous teachers describe children who became
more motivated to read by learning about thinking strategies.
We collected data on a variety of measures that have shown that students improve
their metacognition and strategic reading by virtue of this kind of instruction (Paris
et aI., 1984; Paris & Jacobs, 1984; Paris & Oka, 1986). Unfortunately, we do not
have data that chart progressive changes in students' theories of reading, motivation
to read, and attitudes about reading. Nor do we have data on changes among teachers
who learn more about reading strategies. However, our observations and anecdotal
evidence suggest that a powerful mediator of strategic reading is the child's con-
fidence in the use of a growing repertoire of strategies. Understanding enhances
motivation; better theories of strategic reading enhance self-regulated learn-
ing. Conversely, confusion, misunderstanding, and inappropriate theories of read-
ing lead to maladaptive strategies and motivation. Poor readers with a history
of unsuccessful learning seem to derive great benefits from cognitive instruction
on self-regulated learning (e.g., Cross & Paris, 1988; Duffy et aI., 1987) and we
believe that this is partly due to the development of better theories of reading and
self-regulated learning.
Adaptive Learning
Cognition and behavior are regulated throughout life, but self-regulated learning in
academic settings is a relatively late accomplishment fully attained perhaps in
adolescence after ten years of formal schooling. We have tried to describe the
characteristics of self-regulated learning and the knowledge that children acquire
about it. The result is academic expertise in which students know what to do and
how to be resourceful.
Students who strive, seek goals that involve mental risks, and can learn from their mistakes
-students who have the capacity to respond flexibly and proactively to stressful situations
and also to initiate tasks that challenge their own abilities-these are students who assume
control of their own learning. (Rohrkemper & Como, 1988, p. 299)
Academic expertise and self-regulated learning fosters achievement through

enablement and empowerment. Students who acquire effective problem-solving
strategies are enabled to be independent learners. They know how to make effective
plans before engaging a task, they know how to monitor their own performance, and
they know how to review and correct their work. They understand task-specific
rules and generalizable heuristics. They know when to transfer strategies and when
to seek help. The cognitive and metacognitive skills that they possess enable them
to master new and challenging tasks in school. At the same time, these students have
positive perceptions of their own competence. They see themselves as the agents of
their own learning who have control over the choice of strategies and volition to
achieve their intended goals. They are optimistic learners in the goals they set and
in their attributions of success to their own efforts and investment of energy in
appropriate tactics (Paris, Wasik, & Turner, in press). They are task-involved and
derive a sense of satisfaction and pride from their own efforts and mastery judged
against their personal standards rather than social comparison. Self-regulation is
thus enabling and empowering for continued learning.
But what about inevitable failure? How do students adapt to obstacles and interfer-
ence? Cullen (1985) described the responses of Australian elementary school chil-
dren to failure. She found four characteristic reactions. First, some students sought
to remove obstacles with their own efforts. They used effective strategies or called
upon other resources to solve the problems. A second group of students also coped
well with failure, but did so primarily by seeking help from other people. These
adaptive responses to failure are consistent with suggestions made by Rohrkemper
and Como (1988). For example, when problems are difficult or unfamiliar they sug-
gest that students can change the task, change themselves, or change the situation.
If students encounter difficulty while reading they might (a) reread the directions or
use context, (b) gather more knowledge or change the learning goals, and (c) seek
assistance from teachers or peers. Schools provide many occasions when perfor-
mance demands exceed available resources. That is precisely why challenging tasks
require students to stretch strategies and resources in an adaptive manner.
But Cullen (1985) also noted that many students developed maladaptive reactions
to failure. One group reacted with anger and aggression to failure. These hostile
emotions can be directed at peers or teachers or internalized as self-directed hostil-
ity. A second group reacted with anxiety and depression. They appeared withdrawn,
passive, and apathetic because the fear of failure or the anxiety produced by the task
inhibited effort and recruitment of effective learning strategies. These emotions,
either hostility or withdrawal, are common when distractions interfere with learn-
ing. When peers, noise, or excessive anxiety take attention away from the task, self-
regulation deteriorates.
Learning to cope with failure may be a necessary condition for self-regulated
learning and academic success (Covington, 1987). Children's theories of self-
regulated learning fail when boredom or frustration inhibit action. "Boredom is
the stress of tedium, just as frustration is the stress of difficulty" (Rohrkemper &
Como, 1988, p. 298). Self-regulated learners have the skills and desire to combat
boredom and frustration but it takes practice and assistance to develop these tactics.
It is essential that inevitable failures become constructive experiences from which
students can learn to solve problems independently. Indeed, failure without insight
can be defeating in the same way that success without understanding does not
promote future learning. Chronic success and mindless failure are to be avoided in
the classroom because neither provides the opportunities for students to develop
effective coping strategies. (See Como, this volume, for further discussion of
student adaptiveness.)
We believe that failure can help to refine and embellish children's theories of self-
regulated learning because failure promotes disequilibrium. New concepts and new
behavior must be generated to deal with failure, whether it is due to overwhelmed
resources, distractions provided by others, or negative expectations and emotions.
The distinctions between counseling, coaching, and teaching become blurred
because effective interventions to help children cope with failure address motivation
and metacognition as students are encouraged to reflect upon new ways to solve
their problems. Academic learning is motivated and affective; it is "hot cognition"
in the classroom that fuses skill and will (Paris, 1988). Thus, regulation provided by
others and students themselves must integrate aspects of motivation and cognition.
That is precisely why we think children's emerging theories of self-regulated learn-
ing are an appropriate framework to view success and failure in classrooms. They
integrate thoughts and feelings that students use to form intentions and realize
their goals.
Summary
In this chapter we have described how children understand factors that affect their
self-regulated learning. As children progress through school, they learn a great deal
about the goals and structures of academic tasks and useful strategies for solving
them. They also develop a differentiated understanding of their own ability and
effort that is relevant to success and failure. We have characterized their develop-
ing knowledge in terms of a multicomponent theory of self-regulated learning to call
attention to the diverse and integrated aspects of their understanding. We believe
this theory is a bridge between the child's emerging competence and academic per-
formance and includes both structural and functional elements. Throughout the
chapter, we have illustrated how students' theory building reflects fundamental prin-
ciples of a constructivist account of cognition that is consistent with Piaget,
Vygotsky, Bartlett, Binet, and other historical foundations of constructive cogni-
tion.
It is difficult to specify the beginning and end points of students' theories of self-
regulated learning. We suspect that the roots of self-regulated learning can be found
in the intentional actions of infancy. But we also believe that theories of self-
regulated learning can continue to be developed and refined throughout the life
span. As people acquire more information about their own learning in new domains
with new problems, they will organize that information and modify their theories
of their academic competence, effort, tasks, and strategies. Simultaneously, they
will adapt their behavior to their developing theories of self-regulated learning. We
hope this integrated perspective provides a unified account of multiple aspects of
children's knowledge about their own learning. We further hope that it promotes
multidimensional research and an integration of different psychological constructs
so that we can reassemble and study the many factors that influence children's learn-
ing and development.
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Author Index
Abrahams, S., 69, 78 98-99, 107, 114-115, 126, 121, 131,

Abramson, L.Y., 179, 195 138, 153, 165, 176, 188, 195
Ach, N., 113-114, 138 Barnes, J., 64, 80
Ackerman, A., 32, 49 Baron, A., 12, 22-23
Adler, T.F., 23, 196 Bartlett, F.C., 19,23, 170, 195
Allen, E.M., 40, 49 Bass, B.A., 40, 45
Altman, J., 33, 48 Bastone, P., 41, 47
Ames, c., 73, 78, 116, 138, 153, 158, Baumrind, D., 153, 165
164, 181, 195 Beach, D., 151, 165
Ames, R., 116, 138, 181, 195 Beckmann, J., 113, 116, 118, 138-139
Anderson, L., 153, 164 Belfiore, P.J., 4, 7, 33, 40,45,54,90,94
Anderson, S.M., 66, 78 Bell, D.R., 31,45
Andreassen, C., 120, 140 Bellack, A.S., 33, 45
Andrews, G.R., 97, 107 Bempechat, J., 101, 108
Armbruster, B. B., 10 I, 107 ~enenson, J., 20, 23, 174, 195
Asamow, J., 101, 108, 152, 165 Bereiter, c., 125-126, 140, 180, 184,
187, 198
Berliner, D.C., 136, 138
Baer, D.M., 7, 23, 34, 35, 39, 42, Bershon, B., 149-150, 154, 166
45 Beukhof, G., 123, 139
Baillargeon, R., 172, 196 Bijou, S.W., 7, 23
Baird, J.R., 61, 78 Billings, P.C., 36-37,45
Baker, L., 180, 195 Black, J.L., 32-33, 47-48
Baltes, P.B., 177, 199 Blakely, E., 27, 45
Bandura, A., 11-12, 22, 37, 45, 61-62, Blom, D.E., 21, 25
66,78,83-85,87-88,91-94,96, Bloom, B.S., 2, 23
202 Author Index
Blumenfeld, P.c., 123, 136, 138, 175, Carr, M., 78, 189, 195
179, 181, 187, 195, 198 Carstens, e.B., 32, 48
Blyth, D.A., 20, 25, 175, 199 Carver, e.S., 4, 23
Boehme, R., 27, 45 Case, R., 170, 195
Boggiano, A.K., 100, 109 Castro, L., 41, 46
Bolus, R., 64, 82 Catania, A.C., 28, 35, 38-40, 46
Book, e., 196 Cavanaugh, J.e., 101, 103, 107
Borkowski, J.G., 78, 101, 103, 107, 1I9, Cavior, N., 33, 47
123, 140, 185, 189, 195, 198 Cervone, D., 92, 107
Bomstein, P.H., 36,45 Chambliss, M.J., 182, 195
Bossert, S.T., 181, 195 Chapman, M., 177, 199
Bowers, D.S., 39, 45 Chinsky, J., 151, 165
Boykin, A.R., 33, 48 Chomsky, N., 170, 195
Bracht, G.H., 2, 23 Christie, D.J., 32,46
Bragonier, P., 100, 108 Ciminero, A.R., 32, 47
Bransford, J.D., 181, 184, 195 Clark, C.M., 136, 138
Braverman, M., 153, 166 Clement, P.W., 39,45
Brigham, T.A., 29, 45 Collins, A., 119, 126, 138, 189, 195
Broden, M., 7, 23, 33, 46, 94, 107 Collins, K., 153, 165
Brophy, J., 83, 107, 131, 138 Connell, J.P., 61, 64, 70, 78, 80
Browder, D.M., 32-33,45,49 Cooper, J.O., 32, 47
Brown, A.L., 17,24,101,103,107, 126, Como, L., 14-16, 18,24,28,83, 102,
140, 148, 166, 180, 184, 189, 191, 107, 111-113, 116, 118-119, 126,
195, 197 136, 138, 140, 149, 153, 155,
Brown, D.R., 66-67,80 165-166, 185, 192-194, 198
Brown,J.S., 101, 107, 119, 138, 182, 195 Courtney, B.E., 65-66, 79
Brownback, P., 55, 78 Covington, M.V., 61, 68, 73, 79, 83,91,
Bruner, J.S., 17,23, 171, 195 101, 107-108, 181, 193, 195
Bryan, J.H., 84, 107 Cox, P.D., 6, 13,24,96,98, 103, 110
Bryan, T.H., 84, 107 Cronbach, L.J., 2, 23
Buel, B.J., 32,48 Cross, D.R., 83, 86, 109, 189, 192,
Bullock, M., 136, 138 196-197
Burgio, L.D., 36, 46 CTB/McGraw-Hill, 128, 138
Burke, J.G., 32, 48 Cuban, L., 1I5, 138
Burton, R.R., 101, 107, 182, 195 Cullen, J.L., 193, 195
Bush, D.M., 20, 25, 175, 199 Curley, R., 1I8, 140
Buss, R., 153, 166 Curtis, R., 68, 73, 79
Byrne, B.M., 64-65, 78
Byrnes, J.P., 5, 19-22,62,86,98, 119,
151 D'Amico, A., 153, 165
Daniels, D., 73, 80, 82, 175, 199
Dansereau, D., 1I8, 138
Cairns, L., 64, 80 Davidson, E.S., 95, 107
Calfee, R., 112, 138, 182, 195 Davis, M.H., 10,23,71,79
Campbell, C., 33, 48 Davydov, V.V., 149, 165
Campione, J.e., 103, 107, 184, 195 Day, J.D., 107
Cantor, N., 61, 82 de Albanchez, D., 41, 46
Capper, J., 153, 165 Debus, R.L., 80, 97, 107
Carey, S., 170, 173, 195 de Leon, E.P., 41, 46
Author Index 203
Denney, D.R., 102, 107 Fodor, J.A., 170, 196

de Perez, G.C., 41, 46 Fowler, S.A., 32, 46
Dewey, J., 138 Fox, J.J., 34, 49
D'Huyvetters, K., 32, 49 Frautschi, N.M., 95, 110
Diefenderfer, K.K., 102, 107 Frederickson, L.W., 33-34, 46
Dollard, J., 86, 108 Freitas, J.L., 33, 47
Dorsey, B.L., 33, 48 Friedling, C., 36-37, 46
Doyle, W., 127, 138, 181, 196 Frieze, I.H., 91, 101, 108
Drabman, R.S., 30, 39-40, 46, 49 Fry, R.A., 95, 110
Duffy, G.D., 189, 192, 196 Futterman, R., 23, 196
Duguid, P., 126, 138
Dweck, C.S., 20, 23, 68, 79, 97, 101,
108, 153, 165, 174, 178, 181, Gaelick, L., 67, 82, 88, 92, 108
195-196 Gajar, A.H., 32, 46
Dyson, A.H., 120-121, 139 Gardner, H., 54, 79
Garner, R., 182, 196
Gelman, R., 172, 196
Eccles, J., 20, 23, 56, 61, 70, 79, 175, Ghatala, E.S., 5, 23, 184, 198
186, 196 Gibson, J.J., 170, 196
Elder, I.R., 33, 47 Gillingham, M.G., 182, 196
Elkin, R., 68, 73, 79 Giorgi, A., 54, 79
Elliott, E.S., 178, 181, 196 Glasser, W.L., 2, 23
Engels, F., 144, 165 Glenn, C.G., 182, 199
English, A.C., 19,23 Glor-Scheib, S., 179, 197
English, H.B., 19, 23 Goff, S.B., 23, 196
Epstein, J.A., 69, 79 Goldberg, M.E., 73, 79
Epstein, L.H., 33, 46 Goldiamond, I., 38-39, 46
Epstein, R., 27, 46 Good, T., 153
Esselman, E.D., 67, 81 Goodlad, J., 115, 139
Evertson, C.M., 112, 139 Goodman, J., 152, 166
Gorsuch, R.L., 82
Gottfried, A.E., 65, 79
Fabricius, W.V., 184, 196 Gottman, J.M., 33, 46
Fantuzzo, J.W., 39, 45 Graham, S., 64, 79
Fanzoi, S.L., 10,23,71,79 Grannis, J.C., 116, 120, 136, 139
Farnisch, A.M., 189, 199 Graves, A.W., 35,47
Farr, M.J., 115, 140 Gray, J., 144, 165
Feather, N.T., 180, 196 Green, J.L., 112, 139
Fehrenbach, P.A., 95, 110 Green, L., 27, 46, 49
Feldman, N.S., 100, 109 Gross, A.M., 39, 46
Ferrera, R.A., 184, 195 Grusec, J .E., 11, 22
Ferster, C.B., 28, 46
Festinger, L., 87, 100, 108
Figurski, T.J., 70, 79 Hagen, J.W., 184, 196
Fiske, E., 3, 23 Hall, R.V., 7, 23, 33,46,94, 107
Flavell, J.H., 5, 20, 23, 118, 139, 151, Hallahan, D.P., 31, 33, 35, 46-47, 102,
165 108
Fleming, J.S., 65-66, 79 Halperin, M., 154, 165
Flett, G.L., 100, 109 Hamilton, V.L., 175, 181, 195
204 Author Index
Hammen, C.L., 32, 48 Kane, P.T., 175,200

Hanson, A.R., 6, 13, 24, 95-96, 110 Kanfer, F.H., 37,47, 88, 92, 108
Harackiewicz, 1.M., 69, 78-80 Kapust, J.A., 33,48
Harari, 0., 91, 101, 108 Karabenick, S.A., 70, 80
Hannon, T.M., 33, 46 Karmiloff-Smith, A., 187, 197
Harre, R., 54, 79 Karoly, P., 40, 47,88,90, 108
Harris, K.R., 33, 46,101,108 Kaufman, A., 12,22-23
Harter, S., 11,20,23,55,61,65,69-70, Kaufman, K.F., 39-40, 47, 49
73, 79-80, 128, 139, 175, 196 Kazdin, A.E., 32-33,40,47
Hay, W.M., 32, 48 Keil, F.e., 170-171, 197
Hayes, S.C., 33-36, 39, 41, 46-48, 50 Kendler, H., 151, 165
Haynes, S.N., 32, 47 Kend1er, T., 151, 165
Heins, E.D., 33, 47 Kerwin, K., 123, 140
Helton, G.B., 32, 50 Kiewra, K.A., 119, 139
Hersen, M., 30, 49 Kirschenbaum, D.S., 40, 47
Hess, R., 2, 23 Kistner, J.A., 84, 108
Higgins, E.T., 56-57, 80, 100, 108 Kneedler, R.D., 31, 46, 102, 108
Higgins, S., 9, 23 Kopp, R.E., 12,23
Hill, K.T., 73, 79 Kom, Z., 47
Hill, M., 32,46 Kosevsky, B.P., 33, 46
Ho, V., 118, 139 Kosiewicz, M.M., 35, 47
Hoffman, 1., 176, 199 Kowalski, P., 73, 80
Holt, 1., 2, 23 Kozma, R.B., 83, 109
Holzman, T.G., 102, 107 Kraska, K., 116, 118-119, 132, 139
Homme, L.E., 7, 23 Kratochwill, T.R., 30-33, 41, 47-48
Howard, G.S., 54, 80 Kuhl, J., 14-16,23,113-114,116,
Hoyle, 65 118-120, 127, 132, 137-139
Hubner, 1.1.,64,82 Kuhn, D., 118, 139
Humphrey, L.L., 40, 47 Kupers, e.L, 11,22,94,107
Hundert, 1., 41, 47 Kurtz, B.E., 140
Hunt, J. MeV., 2, 23
Lamal, P.A., 39, 49

Inglehart, M.R., 66-67, 80 Latham, G.P., 91, 108
Laudan, L., 173, 197
Jacobs, I.E., 61, 81, 180, 184, 192, Lee, S., 3, 25
197-198 Leinhart, G., 122, 139
Jan Simons, P.R., 123, 139 Leontiev, A.N., 17,24, 146, 165
Jarrett, R.B., 39, 48 Lepper, M.R., 94, 109, 114, 139
lennings, J.L., 52-53, 80 Levin, LR., 5, 23, 153, 166, 183-184,
Johns, J., 180, 196 198
Johnson, M.R., 36, 46 Lewin, K., 14,24
Johnson, M.S., 182, 197 Licht, B.G., 84, 108
Johnston, M.B., 185, 195 Lin, Y., 119, 139
Johnston, P.H., 122, 139, 179, 196 Lindauer, B.K., 183-184, 197
Jones, I.e., 32, 39,41,47 Lindvall, M., 61, 70,82
Linn, M.e., 125, 139
Lipinski, D.P., 32-33, 47-48
Kabela, E., 27, 47 Lipson, M.Y., 86, 109, 185, 189-190,
Kaczala, e., 23, 196 197-198
Author Index 205
Litrownik, A.J., 33, 47 McNamara, J.R., 31,48

Lloyd, J.W., 31, 33, 35,46-47,102,108 McVey, K.A., 184, 198
Locke, E.A., 91, 96, 108 Meece, J.L., 23,123,136,138,175,181,
Lodico, M.G., 5, 23 195-196
Loebl, J.H., 100, 109 Meichenbaum, D.H., 17,24, 101, 108,
Logue, A.W., 27,47 118, 139, 152, 165-166
Low, R.M., 31, 45 Meloth, M.S., 196
Lozanoff, B., 32, 46 Menlove, F.L., 11, 22
Luria, A.R., 144-147, 165 Mergendollar, J., 156, 166
Lushene, R.E., 82 Meyer, B.J.F., 182, 197
Lutkenhaus, P., 136, 138 Michael, J., 34,48
Lyman, R.D., 33,47 Middlestat, S., 179, 199
Midgley, e., 23, 196
Miller, A.J., 31, 48
Mace, F.e., 4, 7-8, 30, 32-34, 39, 41, Miller, A.T., 11,24
45,47-48,54,90,94 Miller, N.E., 86, 108
MacIver, D., 176, 197 Mischel, W., 9, 24, 66, 81
Madden, N.A., 189, 199 Misiak, H. 14, 24, 52-53, 81
Maehr, M.L., 61, 80 Mitts, B., 7, 23, 33,46, 94, 107
Mahoney, M.J., 37, 45, 49 Moore, J., 70, 81
Maletzsky, B., 33, 48 Moore, W., 66-67,80
Malone, T.W., 114, 139 Morrow, L.W., 32, 48
Malott, R.W., 34, 39, 48 Mosatche, H.S., 100, 108
Manderlink, G., 69, 80 Munt, E.D., 47
Mandinach, E.B., 83, 102, 107, III, Murray, F.B., 21, 24
124-125, 138-139, 149, 165
Mandler, J.M., 182, 197
Manicas, P.T., 54, 80 Nagel, E., 173, 197
Markova, I., 64, 80 National Commission on Excellence in Ed-
Markus, H., 9, 24, 53, 57-59,64,66-67, ucation, 3, 24
7\,80,82, 177, 197 Nelson, R.E., 47
Markwiese, B., 10,23,71,79 Nelson, R.O., 30-34, 39,41,46-48,50
Marsh, H.W., 9, 20, 24, 64-65, 80-81, Nelson-LeGall, S., 179, 197
175, 179, 197 Nevin, J.A., 39, 48
Marshall, K.J., 32, 46 Newman, R.S., 61, 81, 184, 198
Martin, J., 39,48 Newman, S.E., 119, 126, 138
Marx, K., 144, 165 Nicholls, J.G., 11,20,24,53,68,73,81,
Marx, R.W., 126, 139 91, 101, 108, 158, 166, 174-175,
Masters, J.C., 90, 100, 108 178-179, 181, 186, 197
Mayer, R.E., 118, 141, 183-184, 199 Noddings, N., 132, 140
Mays, W., 52, 81 Nurius, P., 9, 24, 57, 64, 80, 177,
McCall, R.J., 53, 81 197
McCauley, K., 150, 154, 166 Nyquist, L. V., 66, 81
McCombs, B.L., 4,9-11,60-62,66,73,
77,81, 175
McCormick, C.B., 67, 81 Oka, E.R., 61, 81, 189, 192, 198
McFall, R.M., 6, 24, 32-33,46,48 O'Leary, K.D., 39-40,46-47,49
McGraw, K.O., 98, 108 O'Leary, S.G., 36-37, 46
McKeachie, W.J., 83,109,118-119,139 Ollendick, T.H., 30, 32, 41, 47-49
McKnight, D.L., 39,48 Omelich, e.L., 68, 73, 79, 83, 107
206 Author Index
O'Sullivan, J.T., 119, 140, 184-185, Richard, H.C., 33,47

197-198 Ringel, B.A., 103, 109
Owings, R.A., 181, 195 Ringle, J., 95, 110
Robinson, D.N., 53, 59, 81
Rodriguez, M.L., 27,47
Palincsar, A.S., 17,24, 101, 107, 126, Roehler, L.R., 196
140, 148, 166, 189, 191, 197 Rogers, C.R., 2, 10,24
Panagiotopolous, J., 127, 140 Rohrkemper, M.M., 18,24, 35, 64, 115,
Paris, S.G., 5,19-22,61-62,81,86,88, 122, 136, 140, 149-150, 153-155,
98, 102-103, 109, 1I9, 149, 151, 165-166, 171, 192-193, 198
166, 177, 180, 183-185, 188-190, Romanczyk, R.G., 39,49
192-194, 196-199 Rosenbaum, M.S., 30,49
Patterson, C.J., 94, 109 Rosenberg, J.F., 52, 55, 81
Pavlov, I.P., 145, 166 Rosenberg, M., 2, 24
Pena-Correal, T.E., 27, 47 Rosenfarb, I., 47
Peterson, P.L., 136, 138, 153, 166 Rosenholtz, S.R., 181, 189, 198
Peverly, S.T., 61, 82 Rosenthal, T.L., 86, 109
Piaget, J., 19-20,24, 146, 166, 171-172, Ross, K.A., 184, 198
198 Rotter, J.B., 83, 109
Piersel, W.e., 33, 49 Rowe, P., 32,49
Pintrich, P.R., 83, 102, 109, 1I8-1I9, Rozensky, R., 33, 45
139, 175, 179, 187, 195, 198 Ruble, D.N., 56, 81, 100, 109
Policastro, M., 182, 199 Ruvolo, A., 57, 82
Poling, A., 27, 45 Ryan, R.M., 61, 64, 70, 78
Pons, M.M., 61, 70, 82, 120, 123, 136,
141
Posner, M., 154, 166 Saari, L.M., 91, 108
Premack, D., 40, 49 Sagotsky, G., 94, 109
Pressley, M., 5, 23, 78, 1I9, 140, 153, Salend, S.J., 40, 49
166, 183-185, 189, 195, 197-198 Salovey, P., 67, 82
Putnam, J., 196 Sameroff, A.J., 54, 82
Putnam, R.T., 122, 139 Sanders, G.S., 100, 110
Santogrossi, D.A, 39, 49
Scardamalia, M., 125-126, 140, 180, 184,
Quevillon, R.P., 36,45 187, 198
Scarpati, S., 35-36, 49
Scheier, M.F., 4, 23
Rachlin, H., 27, 29, 34, 38, 49 Schloss, C.N., 32, 46
Rackliffe, G., 196 Schloss, D.J., 32, 46
Raddzikhovski, L.A., 149, 165 Schneider, W., 123, 140
Raven, J.e., 128, 140 Schoenfeld, A.H., 126, 140, 189, 198
Reeder, G.D., 67, 81 Schunk, D.H., 6, 11-13,24,31,37,61,
Reid, M.K., 185, 195 69-70,82-84,86-87,89-90,92-99,
Relich, J., 64, 80 102-103, 107, 109-110, 114, 153,
Rellinger, E., 78, 189, 195 166, 176, 188, 198
Resnick, L.B., 180, 182-183, 187, 198 Schwartz, J., 33,45
Rhodewalt, F., 71, 81 Secord, P.E., 54, 79-80
Rice, G.E., 182, 197 Seligman, M.E.P., 14, 25, 179, 195
Rice, J.M., 103, 1I0 Sentis, K., 57, 80
Author Index 207
Sexton, V.S., 14, 24, 52-53, 81 Strage, A., 118, 140

Shanker, A., 3, 25 Stuart, R.B., 6, 25
Shapiro, E.S., 7, 12, 25, 30, 32-33, Sugai, G., 32,49
48-49 Suls,J., 100, 110
Shapiro, L.J., 124, 140 Swanson, H.L., 35-36, 49
Shave1son, R., 9, 24, 64-65, 78, 81-82 Swing, S., 153, 166
Shaw, K.N., 91, 108
Shea, M.e., 4, 7, 54, 90, 94
Shelton, T.S., 181, 195 Tannatt, L., 20, 25, 175, 199
Shepard, R., 87, 110 Taylor, R.D., 67, 82
Showers, e., 61, 82 Teasdale, J.D., 179, 195
Siegler, R.S., 171, 188, 198-199 Tesser, A., 70, 81
Sigel, I.E., 20, 25 Tharp, R.G., 41, 49
Simmons, R.G., 20, 25, 175, 199 Thelen, M.H., 95, 110
Simon, H., 153, 166 Thomas,J.W., 118, 140
Simpson, C., 181, 189, 198 Thompson, e.K., 32, 46
Sivan, E., 196 Thompson, D.N., 102, 107
Skinner, B.F., 27-28, 35-36, 38-39,46, Thoresen, C.E., 37,49
49,85, 110 Thurstone, L.L., 2, 25
Skinner, E.A., 177, 199 Trap, J., 32, 47
Slavin, R., 127, 140, 150, 154, 166, 189, Turner, J., 188, 193, 198
199
Siobin, D., 144-145, 166
Smedslund, J., 21, 25 U.S. Office of Education, 2, 25
Smith, W.P., 95, 107
Snow, R.E., 83,107,113-115,140
Snyderman, M., 27, 46 Van Cleave, E.F., 20, 25, 175, 199
Sohn, P., 39,49 Vavrus, L.G., 196
Sorensen, D.A., 39,45 Veroff, J., 90,100,110
Speidel, G.E., 41, 49 Vygotsky, L.S., 8, 16, 18,25, 115, 140,
Spiegelberg, H., 53, 82 146-147,149-150,166, 171-172,
Spielberger, C.D., 66, 82 199
Spitalnik, R., 39, 46
Spong, R.T., 39, 48
Springer, e.J., 103, 109 Wageman, R., 69, 78
Srull, T.K., 67, 82 Wahler, R.G., 34, 49
Stanton, G.e., 64, 82 Wall, S.M., 40-41, 50
Stauber, K.A., 12,22 Walsh,J., 126, 139
Stein, B.S., 181, 195 Wang, M.e. 61, 70, 82, 121, 140
Stein, N.L., 182, 199 Wartofsky, M.W., 173, 199
Sternberg, R.J., 171, 199 Wasik, B., 188, 193, 198
Stevens, A.L., 189, 195 Wasik, B.H., 36-37,45
Stevens, R.J., 189, 199 Waters, H.S., 120, 140
Stevenson, H.W., 3, 25, 151, 166 Watson, J.B., 7, 25
Stigler, J.W., 3, 25 Watson, P.J., 32, 50
Stipek, D.J., 20, 25, 73, 80, 82, 158, 166, Watson, R.I., 14,25
174-176, 199 Webb, N.M., 132, 135, 141, 189, 199
Stokes, P.K., 69, 79 Weiner, B., 83, 91, 110, 114, 141, 153,
Stone, e., 147, 166 166, 178, 188, 199
208 Author Index
Weinstein, e.E., 118, 141, 183-184, 199 Wittrock, M.e., 60, 82

Weinstein, R., 179, 199 Wixson, K.K., 86, 109, 185, 190, 198
Weissberg, I.A., 184, 199 Wojnilower, D.A., 39, 46
Wellman, H., 151, 165, 173, 183, 188, Wolfert, E., 47
199-200 Workman, E.A., 32, 50
Werner, H., 22, 25, 186,200 Wurf, E., 53, 57-59, 66-67, 71, 80
Wertsch, 1., 115, 141, 147, 150, 163, 166 Wylie, R., 9, 25
Wesselman, R., 196
Wessels, K., 175, 181, 195
West, B.l., 33-34, 39, 48 Yussen, S.R., 175, 188,200
Westphal, M., 55, 82
White, R.T., 61, 78
Whitman, T.L., 36, 46 Zettle, R.D., 35-36,47, 50
Wigfield, A., 186, 196 Zimmerman, B.l., 1,4, 12-13,21-22,
Willis, S.E., 32, 50 25,28,61,70,82-83,86,88,95,
Wilson, C.C., 32, 47 109-110, 120, 123, 136, 141
Winne, P.H., 83, 110 Zinchenko, V.P., 150, 166
Winograd, P., 179, 188, 190-191, 196, Zivin, G., 146, 166
198, 200
Subject Index
Ability and self-regulation, 192-194

concepts of, 174-175 of strategies, 21, 183-185
vs. effort, 178 of tasks, 21,180-183
Action control Cognitive Behavior Modification, 37, 152
action-oriented cognitions, 15-16, 116 Cognitive conflict, 20-21
scale of (ACS), II7-II8 Competence-performance distinction, 21
state-oriented cognitions, 15-16, 116 Consciousness, 147-148; see also Self-
Adaptive learning, 143, 153-154 consciousness
Agency beliefs, see Volition; Self-efficacy Constructivism
authentic, 54, 59 historical roots of, II, 170
description of, 53-55, 58-60, 176-177 principles of, 171-172
and personal control, 68-70, 177-178 Cooperative learning, 129, l31, 189
and self-determination, 62, 68, 70, 78 Covert operants, 7
and self-development, 68-70, 78
and self-guides, 57
Aptitude treatment interaction (ATI), 2 Delayed consequences, 27,29,34,39,40,
Assimilation vs. accommodation, 19, 172 42
Attributions, 13,91-92,97-98, 105-106, Dialectical process, 144, 172
174-180 Discriminative stimuli, 29, 34, 35, 37, 42
Children's theories Educational reform movements

developmental changes in, 186 instructional standards view, 3
of effort, 21, 178-180 mental ability view, 2-3
efforts of instruction on, 190-192 social environmental view, 2-3
of self-competence, 21, 174 Egocentrism, 5, 20; see also Speech
210 Subject Index
Emergent interaction, 147, 153, 155-156, Learned helplessness, 179

163 Learning
Entity vs. incremental theories of intelli- adaptive, 192-194
gence, 178 enactive mastery, 13, 85
Equilibrium, 20; see also Assimilation strategies
faulty conceptions of, 184
"Good Strategy User" model, 185
Failure, response to, 193 training of, 104-106, 118
Free Will, 14 types of, 102-106
Functional language, 146 vicarious, 85; see also Modeling
processes
Logical positivism, 52, 54
Goal-directed action, 150, 163
Goals
ego-involved vs. task involved, 181 Marxism, 144
learning vs. performance, 181 Mediation vs. production deficiency,
in self-regulation, 13, 56 151-152
self-setting of, 91, 96-97, 100-10 1 Metacognition
and strategies, 5, 184
system of, 59, 61-63, 72, 185
Handicapped students, 32, 35, 37, 39 and theory change, 187-188
Help-seeking, 179 Modeling processes, 8, 13,86-88,94-96,
"Hidden curriculum," 2 99
Homework, 34
Humanistic psychologists, 2
Observational learning, 85; see also Mod-
eling processes
Ideational scaffolding, 17, 148 Operant psychology
Incentive escalation, 120 general theory of, 28
Informed Strategies for Learning and principles of behavior, 29
Reading and Thinking Strategies view of reactive self-monitoring, 33-34,
Programs, 21, 190-192 37
Instruction that promotes self-regulation view of self-instruction, 35, 37
constructivist, 190-192 view of self-regulation, 6-8, 27, 29
operant, 43-44 view of self-reinforcement, 37-38,
participant modeling, 126 42
phenomenological, 74-77 Orthogenic principle, 22, 186
social cognitive, 104-106 Outcome expectations, 11-12, 87
volitional, 127-134
Intentions, 15
Internal dialogue, 152 Phenomenology
Inter-response control, 7, 27-28 definition of, 51-52
perspective of, 9-11, 52, 59-62, 74
and psychology, 52-53
Knowledge Premack principle, 40
conditional, 21, 86, 184 Primary Mental Abilities Test, 2
declarative, 21, 86, 184 Proactive vs. reactive view of learning, I,
procedural, 21, 86, 184 3,4,22
Subject Index 211
Reciprocal interactions, 84-85 methods of, 30

Reciprocal teaching, 17, 189 narrations, 30
Reinforcement reactivity of, 31-32
negative, 28 recording device, 33
positive, 28 time-sampling, 31
response-independent, 39 variables affecting reactivity of, 32
spatial locus, 37 Self-observation, 12-13, 89-90, 94
Reward contingencies, 98-99; see also Re- Self-perceptions of academic competence,
inforcement; Self-reaction, tangible 20; see also Ability
motivators Self-reaction
Rule-governed behavior, 35, 36 evaluative motivators, 13, 92
tangible motivators, 13, 92-93
variables affecting, 32-33
Schema, 19; see also Children's theories Self-recording, 7, 11; see also Self-
Self-concept monitoring
defined, 9, 55-59, 64-66 Self-reference, 67
domain-specific, 61, 64-65 Self-regulated learning
global, 61, 64-65 as a capacity or stage, 5, 8,11,13,16,
possible selves, 57-59, 61, 66-67 18-19,22
role in self-regulation; see Self- common set of questions about, 6
regulation definition of, 4-5, 30, 111
Self-consciousness, 10, 52-55, 70-71 developmental changes in, 13, 145-146,
Self-consequences, 120; see also Self-reac- 174-188
tion, tangible and evaluative failure to, 5, 193
motivators key processes in, 7-8, 10, 12-13, 15,
Self-development, 54-56, 64, 69 18,20-21
Self-Discrepancy Theory, 56-57 motivation to, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9-10, 11-12,
Self-efficacy, 12-13, 84, 88, 93-99, 14-15, 17,20
103-104,176 role of self-awareness in, 7, 10, 12, 17,
Self-esteem; see Self-worth 20, 70-71
Self-evaluation role of self-oriented feedback loop in, 4
of competence, 55-56, 65, 68 social and physical environment effects
of control, 62-63, 65, 70 on, 8,10-11,11-12,14-15,17,
processes, 10, 55-56, 70 20
Self-instruction strategies, 5; see also Learning strategies
case illustration of, 43-44 triadic account of, 11
definition of, 7-8, 17, 35 Self-regulation
sequence of, 35-36, 152 and affect, 9-10, 58, 67-69, 120
statements, 35-36 capabilities for, 57, 58, 71
Self-judgment, 12-13,90-92,94-98 development of, 64, 71-74, 172
Self-monitoring and internalization, 18-19,49, 64, 70,
behavioral ratings, 31 147-148
behavioral traces and archival records, 31 interventions, 58-64
case illustration of, 43-44 key operant subprocesses in, 30
chained schedule, 34-35 and motivation, 61-62, 66
definition of, 7, 30 role of self-concepts in, 58, 67
duration measures, 31 role of self-goals in, 57, 68-72; see also
frequency counts, 31 Goals
212 Subject Index
Self-reinforcement, see Self-reaction, eval- Theories of self-regulated learning

uative and tangible motivators cognitive constructivist, 19-22,
case illustration of, 43-44 169-200
definition of, 7, 8, 37 operant, 6-8, 27-50
myth of, 38, 40-41 Phenomenological, 9-11, 51-82
operant view, 38-39 social cognitive, 11-13, 83-110
research on, 39-41 volitional, 14-16, 111-141
Self-serving effect, 179 Vygotskian, 16-19, 142-167
Self-system Think Aloud method, 160
hierarchical organization of, 55-56, 64- Tool-mediation, 150, 163
66 Transposition research, 151
self processes, 9-10, 66, 68-72
self structures, 9-10, 55-60, 62, 64-67
Self-worth
Unit
domain-specific, 55-56, 66
of activity, 163
global, 11, 55-56, 66
of analysis, 149-150
Signal system
first, 18-19, 145
second, 19, 145
Social cognition, 148 Volition
Social cognitive learning, 11-13, 84-86 and agency, 49, 54, 77-78
Social comparison processes, 87-88, 90, in the classroom, 127
97, 100, 175 and computing, 137
Social conflict, 21 conditions for, 114
SociaUinstructional environment, 143, 155 control strategies, 15-16, 118-120
Speech overt vs. covert, 119
communicative, 146 task setting and others, 121
egocentric or transitional, 18-19, definition of, Ill, 116, 188, 122
146-147 in education, 113
external, 18-19 history of, 113
inner, 17-19, 146, 154 individual differences in, 134-135
self-involved, 154-155 measurement issues in, 135-136
task-involved, 154-155 research
Student-centered instruction, 10-11, correlational, 123-124
74-77 descriptive, 121-122
experimental, 124-126
practical utility of, 115
Task theoretical utility of, 115
children's theories of, 180-183 vs. motivation, 113
difficulty, 150, 155, 163 and student achievement, 124-126
management activities, 128
master/instructor, 129
Teacher praise effects, 179 Willpower, 14, 113
Theories, see Children's theories Wurzburg School, 14
as characterizing children's knowledge,
186-188
and knowledge restructuring, 173-174 Zone of Proximal Development, 148, 152
(continued from page ii)
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Recent Advances in Cognitive-Developmental Theory: Progress in Cognitive Development

Learning in Children: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

Cognitive Strategy Research: Psychological Foundations

Cognitive Strategy Research: Educational Applications

Equilibrium in the Balance: A Study of Psychological Explanation

Crib Speech and Language Play

Discourse Development: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

Cognitive Development in Atypical Children: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

Basic Processes in Memory Development: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

Cognitive Learning and Memory in Children: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

The Development of Word Meaning: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

Formal Methods in Developmental Psychology: Progress in Cognitive Development Research

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

I. Motivation in education. 2. Academic achievement. 3. Self

Printed on acid-free paper

© 1989 by Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

Typeset by Publishers Service, Bozeman, Montana.

welcome. With books of the latter sort, heterogeneity of theoretical perspective

In addition to teaching himself to write, Franklin credited this procedure with

Series Preface ........................................ vii

Chapter 1 Models of Self-Regulated Learning and

Chapter 2 Operant Theory and Research on Self-Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Chapter 3 Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement:

Chapter 4 Social Cognitive Theory and Self-Regulated Learning . . . . . . . . 83

Chapter 5 Self-Regulated Learning: A Volitional Analysis 111

Chapter 6 Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement:

Chapter 7 The Constructivist Approach to Self-Regulation

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 201

Phillip J. Belfiore Department of Special Education, Mountaintop Campus,

James P. Byrnes College of Education, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

F. Charles Mace Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers

Barbara L. McCombs Mid-Continent Regional Educational Laboratory, 12500

Scott G. Paris Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

Mary Rohrkemper Department of Human Development, Bryn Mawr College,

Dale H. Schunk 037 A Peabody Hall, School of Education, University of North

Michael C. Shea Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers

Barry J. Zimmerman Box 445, Doctoral Program in Educational Psychology,

The Emergence of Theories of Self-Regulated Learning

Changing Views of the Causes of Student Learning

were not theorized to initiate or substantially supplement experiences designed to

Defining Self-Regulated Learning

Theories of Self-Regulated Learning

Operant Views of Self-Regulated Learning

Operant researchers emphasize the importance of self-monitoring or self-recording

KEY SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES

hypothesis that thought is actually covert speech. Although few contemporary

SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS

How DOES A LEARNER ACQUIRE A CAPACITY TO SELF-REGULATE?

Operant theorists have devoted relatively little attention to developmental issues

Phenomenological Views of Self-Regulative Learning

Phenomenologists assume that the ultimate source of motivation to self-regulate

Unlike operant theorists, phenomenologists assume that self-awareness is an

KEy SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES

Historically phenomenologists have stressed the importance of perceptions of self-

SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS

How DOES A LEARNER ACQUIRE A CAPACITY TO SELF-REGULATE?

McCombs (this volume) views self-regulated learning as determined by the develop-

Social Cognitive Views of Self-Regulated Learning

According to social cognitive theory, self-awareness involves one or more of a num-

KEY SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES

Bandura (1986) has identified three subprocesses in self-regulation: self-