BELGICA V.

OCHOA

Section 25: (4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

Section 29: (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Section 27: (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

DEFINITION OF TERMS:
a. Pork Barrel System – collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and
Executive branches of government, including its members.
b. Congressional Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or
collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices.
c. Presidential Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner
of its utilization. (Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund)

FACTS:
 It has been a common practice for legislators to acquire lump sum discretionary funds, more commonly known as pork
barrel, for their respective districts.
 The pork barrel system dates back to the presidency of Corazon Aquino, in the form of the Country Wide Development
Fund
 NBI began investigation on allegations that the gov’t has been defrauded of some 10B pesos over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various gov’t agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 Commission on Audit released the results of the 3 year audit investigation covering the use of the legislators’ PDAF
from 2007-2009 (last 3 yrs of Arroyo admin). Purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of the PDAF and
VILP releases
 Belgica et. al are assailing the constitutionality of 2013 GAA for PDAF, PD 910, and PD 1869

ISSUES:
W/N the 2013 PDAF Article and all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws are unconstitutional for:
1. violating the separation of powers principle
2. violating the non-delegability of legislative power principle
3. impairing the President’s power to veto line-items in the GAA

HELD:
1. Yes, the pork barrel system violated the separation of powers principle and is therefore unconstitutional.
2. Yes, the 2013 PDAF Article violated the non-delegability of legislative power principle, and is therefore,
unconstitutional.
3. Yes, the PDAF Article impairs the President’s veto powers

RULING:

1. The pork barrel system, as well as other provisions of law which similarly allows legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation of the budget, are violative of the separation of powers principle, and are
thus unconstitutional.
 Separation of Powers – when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another
a. 2 ways principle of separation of power may be violated:
i. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance, of its constitutionally
assigned function (interference)
ii. One branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another (assumption)

 The enforcement and implementation of the national budget is constitutionally assigned to the executive.
  Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role comes to an end and from there the Executive’s
role of implementing the national budget begins.
 Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited only to scrutiny and investigation (oversight function).
 Legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify projects to be funded, through project
lists, prior consultations, and program menu.
 Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in fund release and realignment., through endorsement by
congressional committees
 These post enactment measures are not related to the functions of congressional oversight and are thus, a violation of
the separation of powers principle.
 Legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or
informal practices institutionalized in government agencies.

2. The 2013 PDAF Article violated the non-delegability of legislative power principle, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress (through legislation).
 The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation (Art. VI, Sec. 29 – No money shall be paid out of
the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.)
 Power of appropriation involves: (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine.

3. President’s item veto power

 For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper “ite” which may be
the object of the veto
 The item of appropriation must be characterized by a singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, known as a “line-item”.
 The legislator’s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that
item later on.
 The item veto power of the President mandates that appropriation bills adopt line-item budgeting
 Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of 24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations.
After the GAA is passed, they could effectively appropriate the PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
 The actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and this
effectuated without veto consideration -> “budget within a budget”
 The system forces the President to decide between accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, or reject the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
 Even without the post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would still remain
unconstitutional since it would still deny the President his veto powers.
 The PDAF system leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination.

OTHER ISSUES:

Local Autonomy
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
 District representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district-representative of
a far-flung rural province
 Even senators and the Vice President who do not represent a locality receive funding from the pork barrel as well.

Presidential Social Fund/ Malampaya Fund

 Constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power because of the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President”.
 It does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presiden’t authority with respect to
the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used
 The said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and
in effect, allows him to appropriate public funds beyond the purview of law.
 Sec. 8 of PD 910 (Malampaya Fund) unconstitutional
 Sec. 12 of PD 1869 (Social Fund) unconstitutional