Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Engineering Geology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enggeo

Bow-tie risk assessment combining causes and effects applied to gas oil
storage in an abandoned salt cavern
Karin van Thienen-Visser a,⁎, Dimmie Hendriks b, Annemieke Marsman b, Manuel Nepveu a,
Remco Groenenberg c, Ton Wildenborg a, Hans van Duijne b, Marinus den Hartogh c, Tobias Pinkse c
a
TNO, Princetonlaan 6, P.O. 80015, 3508 TA Utrecht, The Netherlands
b
Deltares, Unit Subsurface and Groundwater Systems, Dept. Soil and Groundwater Systems, Princetonlaan 6, P.O. 85467, 3508 AL Utrecht, The Netherlands
c
Akzo Nobel Industrial Chemicals BV, PO Box 25, 7550 GC Hengelo, OV, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: A semi-quantitative risk assessment is presented for the storage of gas oil in depleted salt caverns in the Twente
Received 21 June 2012 region, the Netherlands. It is based on a bow-tie model, in which an incident, leakage of gas oil from the storage
Received in revised form 12 July 2013 system (cavern and wells), is evaluated by assessing its possible causes and effects. The causes are all the events
Accepted 10 November 2013
that may lead to leakage from the storage system. The effects are the consequences of the leakage. It is considered
Available online 18 November 2013
that the most serious of the subsurface risks is contamination of the groundwater due to upward migration of the
Keywords:
gas oil to the surface. A unique aspect of our risk assessment is the combination of causes and effects.
Risk analysis The effects of containment/failure are quantified at multiple time scales using a numerical flow model for multi-
Markov Chain phase flow through porous medium, based on the geohydrological properties of the subsurface of the Twente
Storage area. The probability of occurrence of loss of containment/failure (causes) is quantified semi-quantitatively,
Salt caverns using the causal relationships between the causes and effects.
Multiphase flow modelling Modelling of the leakage shows that, as expected, leakage from the well above the hydrogeological base in the
phreatic aquifer produces an immediate risk of contamination of the upper groundwater. However, leakage at
a deeper level does not pose a risk of contamination of groundwater, because the low porosity and permeability
of the geological layers prevent the upward migration of leaking gas oil. The semi-quantitative approach to the
probability of failure finds that for multiple scenarios (e.g. well failure, unstable cavern, high pressure) and in
the absence of human intervention, the probabilities of failure are medium to high. If human intervention is
assumed, these probabilities of failure diminish considerably, especially those associated with the well. These
findings are consistent with those from other hazard studies on storage in salt caverns.
The causes (probabilities of failure) and effects (modelling of leakage) together indicate that for most scenarios
the risk is low when human intervention (e.g. monitoring of the well) is assumed.
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the risk of leakage associated with gas oil injection and storage in salt
caverns is low, an extensive monitoring plan should be formulated to monitor the containment of the gas oil
in the storage system and its long-term stability, to ensure timely human intervention that reduces the risk
considerably.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Salt solution has been mined since 1919 in the Twente region of
eastern Netherlands from horizontal thinly bedded salt deposits at
relatively shallow depth (300–500 m). In salt solution mining, fresh or
undersaturated water is injected at the top of the cavern through the
annular space between the cemented casing and the brine production
string, while brine from the dissolution of the salt beds is produced
from the bottom of the cavern through the production string. The
Twente caverns have been produced from the bottom up. The salt
solution mining process creates caverns (voids) within the rock salt
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 88 86 64265; fax: +31 88 86 64475.
E-mail address: karin.vanthienen@tno.nl (K. van Thienen-Visser).
formation, which on abandonment are left filled with residual brine
and insoluble materials that together make up the cavern sump area.
For reasons of ground stability and to avoid subsidence and collapse,
caverns have a permitted spacing (Figure 3); in a large proportion of
the salt caverns in the Twente area, salt reserves have been depleted
and production has ceased. A new use for these depleted salt caverns
is the storage of hydrocarbons (crude oil, gas oil). Storage is achieved
by withdrawing some of the residual brine from the bottom of the
cavern while simultaneously injecting hydrocarbons at the top of the
cavern. During retrieval this process is reversed.
Storage of hydrocarbons in salt caverns is applied in many countries
around the world (Thoms and Gehle, 2000). The earliest cavern storage
in salt domes for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) started in 1951 (Avery
Island, USA); LPG storage in bedded salt deposits started earlier, in the

0013-7952/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enggeo.2013.11.002
150 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
early 1940s (USA, Querio, 1980). In Europe, hydrocarbon storage in
depleted salt caverns has been practised since the early 1950s (Thoms
and Gehle, 2000). Examples in Europe include the Manosque facility
in France and the Etzel salt dome near Wilhemshaven, Germany,
which has been used since 1971 for crude oil storage. Salt cavern storage
is one of the safest methods of storing large amounts of hydrocarbons
(Bérest et al., 2001; Bérest and Brouard, 2003), mainly due to the
impermeability of the salt. Nonetheless, incidents have occurred at 9%
of the salt cavern storage facilities worldwide (Evans, 2008; Evans and
Chadwick, 2009). Almost all incidents are due to human error and
poor safety controls and checks. The reported incidents can be divided
into design failure (34%), operational failure (30%), well failure (26%)
and failure of surface infrastructure (8%). In some incidents, failure
resulted from a combination of problems.
Prior to selecting caverns for the storage of gas oil (liquid fuel), it is
necessary to screen potential storage caverns for suitability. The most
important criterion is that gas oil cannot leak from the storage system
into groundwater and aquifers and thence to the surface, i.e., the risk
of groundwater contamination and human safety must be reduced to
near zero. Therefore we introduce the Containment Concept (Figure 1).
The Containment Concept for subsurface storage encompasses the entire
suite of barriers and facilities that ensure that the gas oil stored in a salt
cavern does not escape the storage caverns and disperse into the
surrounding storage environment/system. The boundary of the con-
tainment system for the gas oil is formed by the cavern walls, the gas
oil–brine interface at the base of the cavern, the cavern roof, and the
wells (packers, casing, and wellhead) and is represented by the green
line in Fig. 1. In the case of a working containment, it is unlikely that
the gas oil will penetrate the surrounding salt for more than several
millimetres in a thousand years, due to the very low permeability of
the salt (Bouw and Oude Essink, 2003; Doe and Osnes, 2006).
Considering a possible failure of containment, an assessment of the
risks associated with gas oil (liquid fuel) storage in depleted salt caverns
in Twente is required. In this paper, we present a risk assessment
methodology that takes into account the integrity of the containment
Fig. 1. Illustration of the Containment Concept applied in the risk assessment study for the storage of gas oil in abandoned salt caverns in the Twente area, the Netherlands.
of the cavern and wells (including over/underburden and faulting),
the long-term stability of the caverns, and possible effects on the envi-
ronment if leakage occurs. For this risk assessment we use the concept
of a bow-tie (Figure 2). Central in this bow-tie model is an incident
that has a certain probability of occurrence. Each incident has different
causes and effects, which are indicated to the left and right of the
bow-tie, respectively. The causes (left side of bow-tie, Figure 2) are
events that may lead to loss of containment and the effects (right side
of bow-tie, Figure 2) are the consequences of the loss of containment
for the contamination of groundwater (harmful effect). Causal relations
that exist between the causes and effects of each incident can be
translated into hazard scenarios. To prevent the incident central to the
bow-tie, measures can be taken on both sides of the bow-tie. Causes
can be prevented by dedicated monitoring and corrective measures,
and remaining effects can be mitigated.
The incident considered is leakage of gas oil from the storage system
(loss of containment). The storage system consists of abandoned salt
caverns in Twente (the eastern part of the Netherlands). Their (hydro)
geological setting is described in Section 2. In Section 3, the causes are
assessed in the light of the literature; the effects are modelled in
Section 4, using a multiphase flow model. Finally, in Section 5 we
consider the bow-tie as a whole and quantify the total underground
risk using expert elicitation (Wildenborg et al., 2005; Knol et al., 2010).
Mitigation of risk associated with the aboveground part of the oil storage
system (e.g. transport of gas oil) leading to risk to human safety is not
considered here but has been addressed in the Environmental Impact
Assessment (Tauw, 2013).
2. Natural containment: the hydrogeological setting
The hydrogeology of the Twente area consists of alternating aquifers
and aquitards and provides the natural containment of gas oil in the salt
caverns. Key parameters controlling the flow of liquids through the
subsurface are the permeability of the different stratigraphic units, the
presence of faults, and the density of the groundwater. Finally, the
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 151

Fig. 2. Bow-tie model used for the risk assessment.

position and dimensions of the caverns in the salt layers are important
for containment.
2.1. Stratigraphy of the Twente area
The stratigraphy in the Twente area from deep to shallow (old to
young) comprises the Solling Formation, the Röt Formation (containing
the salt caverns), the Muschelkalk Formation, the Altena Group, the
Niedersachsen Group and the North Sea Supergroup. As a result of
tectonic activity, there are several fault zones in the region (NITG-
TNO, 1998). The Röt Formation, where the salt caverns are located, is
subdivided into the Main Röt Evaporite Member, the Middle Röt
Claystone Member, the Upper Röt Evaporite Member and the Upper
Röt Claystone Member. The thickness of the Röt Formation in Twente
varies from 225 m in the north to 300 m in the centre of the area and
decreases to slightly less than 200 m in the south. The Main Röt
Evaporite Member, which is the oldest member of the formation,
contains the salt caverns (NITG-TNO, 1998; Geowulf, 2008; MWH,
2010). The member consists primarily of halite, but has a thick anhy-
drite layer at the base, as well as intercalated clay layers of 10 to 15 m
thickness at the top. It is subdivided into four units by the presence of
four claystone intervals (with variable dolomite and anhydrite) that
are well correlated over the general area. In the Twente area, the four
salt layers have been named, from top to bottom, A, B, C and D. Salt
layer A has a thickness that varies between 10 and 60 m, while layer C
has a more constant thickness of 15 to 20 m. Salt layers B and D are
generally in the order of only several metres thick. More information
about the lithology and thickness of all geological layers can be found
in Table 1 (NITG-TNO, 1998; Geowulf, 2008; MWH, 2010).
2.2. Hydrogeological properties of the subsurface
There are reported values for porosity and permeability or hydraulic
conductivity of the geological formations that occur in the subsurface of

Table 1
Hydrogeological and hydraulic properties of the geological units of the conceptual model of the Twente area. Source references of the hydraulic properties are: 1. Verweij and Simmelink
(2002), 2. Bouw and Oude Essink (2003), 3. Pöppelreiter et al. (2005), 4. Doe and Osnes (2006), 5. Bear (1972), 6. Domenico and Schwartz (1998), Dufour (1998), De Louw (2006).
Schematisation for STOMP modelling is also given: layering within the geological formations and the layer thickness.

Description host rock Properties host rock Properties permeable faults

Geological Formation Lithology STOMP STOMP layer Particle Total Geological Hydraulic Total Geological Hydraulic
formation thickness depth top thickness density porosity permeability conductivity porosity permeability conductivity
Source hydraulical (m) layer (m) (kg/m3) (fraction) (mD) (m/d) (fraction) (mD) (m/d)
properties (m)

North Sea 10–60 Sand (silt, clay) 0 28 2082 0.41 1.00E+05 1.00E + 00 – – –
Supergroup
above hydrogeol.
base 6,7,8
North Sea Clay −28 10 1746 0.1 1.00E−02 1.00E−08 – – –
Supergroup Consolidated −38 10 2200 0.3 5.00E+02 5.00E−04 – – –
below hydrogeol. sand
base 1,6,58 100–150 Claystone −48 10 1746 0.1 1.00E−02 1.00E−08 – – –
Consolidated −58 10 2200 0.29 5.00E+02 5.00E−04 – – –
sand
Claystone −68 10 1746 0.1 1.00E−02 1.00E−08 – – –
Altena group/ 0–100 Claystone −78 40 1746 0.07 1.00E−02 1.00E−08 0.17 1.00E−01 1.00E−07
Niedersachsen
group1,2,56
Muschelkalk3,5,6 Dolomitic marl −118 20 2243 0.27 1.00E+00 1.00E−06 0.37 1.00E+02 1.00E−04
Clayey marl −138 20 2243 0.29 1.00E−02 1.00E−08 0.39 5.00E−01 5.00E−07
0–200 Dolomitic marl −158 30 2243 0.27 1.00E+00 1.00E−06 0.37 1.00E+02 1.00E−04
Clayey limestone −188 20 2243 0.14 1.00E+01 1.00E−05 0.24 1.00E+03 1.00E−03
Marl, anhydrites −208 20 2610 0.24 1.00E−01 1.00E−07 0.34 1.00E+01 1.00E−05
Upper Röt 135–200 Claystone −228 170 1860 0.07 1.00E−02 1.00E−08 0.17 1.00E−01 1.00E−07
Claystone2,5,6
Upper Röt 15 Anhydrite −398 15 2320 0.01 1.00E−05 1.00E−10 0.11 1.00E−04 1.00E−09
Evaporite2,4
Main Röt 20–110 Rock salt, −413 60 2150 0.005 1.00E−05 1.00E−10 0.005 1.00E−05 1.00E−10
Evaporite2,4 claystone
152 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
the Twente area (see Bear, 1972; Domenico and Schwartz, 1998;
Dufour, 1998; Verweij and Simmelink, 2002; Bouw and Oude Essink,
2003; Pöppelreiter et al., 2005; De Louw, 2006; Doe and Osnes, 2006).
Although these values have been obtained partly from locations outside
the Twente area, they give a good indication of the porosity and perme-
ability of the subsurface of the Twente area.
Hydrogeologically, the subsurface of the Twente area can be
subdivided into two domains: the permeable aquifers in the sandy
deposits above the hydrogeological base and the generally less perme-
able or impermeable deposits below this hydrogeological base. The
first 10 to 60 m of the subsurface consist mainly of unconsolidated
sandy deposits with a high permeability (1.00 × 101–1.00 × 106 mD).
They constitute the phreatic aquifer that is important for abstraction
of drinking water, water for sprinkling and irrigation, aquatic and
terrestrial ecology and river and stream runoff (Hendriks et al.,
accepted). Depth to groundwater in the area ranges between 0 and
more than 12 m; and the groundwater flow in the area is from the topo-
graphically high areas (ice-pushed ridges) to the low areas (De Louw,
2006; Hendriks et al., accepted).
At the base of this shallow aquifer lie marine clays that have very low
permeability (1.00 × 10−5–1.00 × 101 mD). They form a significant
barrier (the hydrogeological base) and reduce connectivity with deeper
aquifers (De Louw, 2006). All the geological layers between the
hydrogeological base and the Main Röt Evaporite in which the salt
caverns are located have high resistances to flow (1.00 × 101–
1.00 × 106 mD). However, parts of the Muschelkalk Formation and
the North Sea Super Group consist of aquifers (NITG-TNO, 1998).
In our study, the values used for the porosity and permeability of the
salt layers of the Main Röt Evaporite, in which the salt caverns are
situated, were typical values for rock salt and anhydrite reported in the
literature. For rock salt and anhydrite, Doe and Osnes (2006) reported
a hydraulic conductivity of 7.0 × 10−8 to 1.6 × 10−5 m d−1, and
Bouw and Oude Essink (2003) assign a maximum hydraulic conductivity
of 1.00 × 10−13 m s−1 (1.00 × 10−8 m d−1) and a porosity of 2%. An
overview of the hydrogeological properties of all geological units in the
subsurface is given in Table 1.
2.3. Permeability of faults
In the subsurface of the Twente area, normal faults with a maximum
fault throw of 10 m have been detected both above and below the salt
(NITG-TNO, 1998; Geowulf, 2010). Some of the faults extend up to,
but never into, the deposits of the North Sea Group. If fault permeability
is strongly anisotropic, faults can form a preferential pathway between
aquifers at different depths over vertical distances of several hundreds
of metres that are otherwise separated by confining units. This has
important implications for the assessment of the risk of a spread of
contaminated groundwater or the reconstruction of hydrocarbon
migration within sedimentary basins (Bense and Person, 2006). How-
ever, despite various studies (e.g. Bense and Person, 2006; Anderson
and Bakker, 2008; Folch and Mas-Pla, 2008; Magri et al., 2010; Saar,
2010), no explicit assumptions can be made on the width and the
hydraulic properties of permeable faults. Generally, fault width increases
with increasing fault throw (fault width of approximately 2 m with fault
throw of 50 m; fault width of approximately 4 m with fault throw of
100 m). The permeability of such faults can be assumed to be several
orders of magnitude greater than that of the surrounding host rock,
depending on the clay content of the host rock (Bense and Person,
2006). Based on this knowledge, we made conservative estimates of
the fault properties in the Twente area: fault width of 0.2 to 5 m and
fault permeability of 1.00 × 10−1–1.00 × 102 mD depending on the
host rock lithology.
In salt layers the effect of slippage along normal faults is different.
Salt is viscoplastic, so it tends to heal fractures in fault zones prohibiting
an increase of permeability due to tectonic activity. The tectonic activity
in the area occurred when the salt was situated at a depth between 500
and 1500 m (Jurassic and Cretaceous). At such depths, the high pres-
sures and temperatures intensify the fault-healing process in the salt.
Additionally, fluid inclusions in the original salt stimulate pressure
solution and grain boundary migration recrystallization, with the result
that the offsets of the faults are accommodated by changes in crystal
structure instead of by brittle failure. Since the rock salt layer of the
Main Röt Evaporite which contains the salt caverns is at least 25 m
thick, the maximum fault throw of 10 m that has been reported for
the area is too small to achieve complete offset of the bed (Geowulf,
2010).
2.4. Groundwater density
The density of the groundwater greatly influences the behaviour of
gas oil in the shallow subsurface (see also Section 5). Groundwater
density mainly depends on how much dissolved salts the water con-
tains: chloride and sulphate concentrations are a proxy for this. Because
fresh water is less dense than salt and brackish water, it tends to float on
the saline groundwater in Twente. Only limited mixing of the fresh and
saline groundwater types occurs. In the Twente area, there is a transi-
tion from fresh to salt groundwater in the Tertiary deposits of the
Upper North Sea Group. The Peize Formation and younger, shallower
formations were deposited in a continental environment, whereas the
older formations were deposited in a marine environment. However,
as a result of the precipitation that has fallen on the Twente area since
the deposition of these formations, fresh water has infiltrated towards
deeper aquifers and the original freshwater boundary has shifted down-
ward. Consequently, the groundwater above the hydrogeological base
consists of fresh water, and below it the groundwater is brackish or
salt (chloride concentrations of 1500 to 15000 mg l−1 and sulphate
concentrations of 250 to 1400 mg l−1). In the younger Quaternary
deposits the groundwater quality varies little: chloride concentrations
range from 35 to 50 mg l−1 (Dufour, 1998).
2.5. Cavern position and dimensions
The salt caverns in Twente lie at depths between 300 and 500 m.
They are located in the Main Röt Evaporite Member (Table 1, Figures 1,
3 and 4), which forms part of the Triassic Röt Formation (NITG-TNO,
1998). Because the salt layers are horizontal and thinly bedded, the
caverns are relatively small compared to salt caverns in other regions
(Thoms and Gehle, 2000). They are up to 40 m high and have a long
axis of between 100 and 300 m and a short axis of 100 m (Figure 3).
The caverns considered in this study were those situated in the Röt
salt layer A for reasons of stability. Caverns extending in Röt layer
B and C are generally less stable and therefore not suited for gas oil
storage.
3. Causes of loss of containment
Possible causes of breach of containment in the Twente area and the
associated levels of risk and requirements to prevent them had been
identified earlier (van Duijne et al., 2011; Tauw, 2013). The present
study focused on the most likely scenarios (Figure 4) including salt
creep and temperature effects. Causes of breach of confinement were
defined as leakage fluxes from the storage system into the surrounding
rock and were separated into two categories: those requiring a detailed
approach because the risks involved were higher, and those requiring a
more global approach because the risks involved were lower. The
detailed approach entailed a semi-quantitative risk assessment based
on literature research, knowledge of the specific geology of the region
and expert assessment, the more global approach required only a gen-
eral literature research.
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 153

Fig. 3. Geometry of salt production caverns in Twente. The left side of the figure contains details of the two cross-sections shown on the map on the right. Section (A–A’) shows the minimal
permissible width for the salt pillar separating two adjacent caverns in a row that is required to prevent pressure communication. Section (B–B’) shows the minimal permissible width for
the salt pillar between adjacent rows of salt caverns that is necessary in order to maintain stability.

Fig. 4. Schematic overview of the possible leakage fluxes from the storage cavern: flux through the walls (1), flux through the floor (2), flux through the roof (3), flux through the casing
(4a), flux through the casing shoe (4b), and flux through faults or fissures (5).
154 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
3.1. Flux from the cavern
Flux of gas oil from the cavern (through the walls, roof or floor) may
occur through the surrounding rock (in this case, rock salt) or transpor-
tation through permeable layers or along faults intersecting the cavern
or immediate surroundings. If the Containment Concept is working,
the gas oil can infiltrate into the surrounding salt (Röt A: rock salt) for
only a small distance due to the salt's low permeability and hydraulic con-
ductivity (k = 1.16 × 10−2 mD; K = 7.0 × 10−8 to 1.6 × 10−5 m/d)
(Doe and Osnes, 2006). Since the caverns are completely enclosed by
rock salt (Figure 4) with a safety buffer of at least 25 m between adja-
cent caverns in a row, to prevent pressure communication (BGR,
2004a), a distance of 70 m between adjacent rows of salt caverns in
order to maintain stability and a 5 m thick rock salt roof in Röt salt A,
it is expected that the gas oil will not infiltrate into the surrounding
rock during the lifespan of the storage (30 years). Assuming conductiv-
ity is high, the maximum distance the gas oil will infiltrate the
surrounding salt is 0.18 m (1.6 × 10−5 m/d × 365 days × 30 years).
A special case is the cavern floor, as it does not come into contact with
the gas oil under normal operating conditions due to the residue of
brine and insoluble material that collects in the cavern sump area. A
variable volume of brine (occupying 5–20% of the cavern) will remain
in the cavern due to the height of the injection well inside the cavern;
floating on top of it will be a layer of gas oil, which at 850 kg/m3 is
less dense than the brine (density 1200 kg m−3). As the caverns were
solution mined from the base upwards, if the pressure inside the cavern
is much lower than the hydrostatic pressure, an influx of water could
occur from the Solling Formation below the cavern (Van Sambeek
et al., 2005). If there has been additional dissolution, the inner cavity
pressure will decrease with time before the injection of gas oil. This
scenario is, however, unlikely, since it would require pressures much
smaller than the planned operating pressure during storage, which is
32 bars.
Considering the extremely low permeability of the lithology in the
immediate vicinity of the caverns (rock salt, clays), leakage through
the cavern walls is considered unlikely under normal operating condi-
tions, in which pressure changes are planned to be minimal. The hydro-
static pressure due to the brine (density is 1200 kg/m3) in the cavern
varies, depending on the depth. It ranges between 35.3 and 58.9 bar
in the depth range from 300 to 500 m. As long as the hydrostatic column
in the well is determined by the brine, conditions in the gas oil storage
phase are the same as in the salt solution mining phase. In the special
case of salt caverns adjacent to each other, stress gradients due to
different pressures inside neighbouring caverns can be prevented
from building up in the salt pillars between the rows of caverns by
ensuring that there is a minimum thickness of 70 m rock salt between
adjacent rows of caverns (BGR, 2004b, Fig. 3). This safety buffer must
be maintained during the lifetime of the storage site until all facilities
have been properly abandoned. Ideally, caverns used for gas oil storage
should be surrounded by abandoned caverns to avoid problems arising
from adjacent operational brine caverns (for example, over-mining
which threatens the safety buffer).
Another possible pathway for fluxes is permeable faults. In Twente
area several faults have been identified, mostly in and around the
Boekelo fault zone which runs NNW–SSE along the southern edge of
the concession area (GeoWulf, 2008; MWH, 2010). As discussed earlier,
the increase in permeability resulting from the presence of the faults
will probably be small due to the small fault throws, the healing nature
of the salt and clay smear in the faults.
3.2. Flux through the cavern roof
A specific case in which the penetration of gas oil into the roof of the
cavern may occur is leakage via cracks formed in response to stress
changes. Cracks could form in the cavern roof in the case of tensile
(i.e. extensional) or shear (i.e. compressional) fracturing. Tensile
fracturing may occur if the pressure in the cavern exceeds the minimum
in situ stress, for instance through overfilling of the cavern. This would
be averted by keeping the maximum operational pressures below the
lithostatic pressure. The lithostatic pressure (pgz, where ρ is density, g
is the gravity constant 9.81 m/s2 and z is the depth) ranges from 54 to
90 bar (assuming an average overburden density of 1800 kg/m3 and a
depth ranging from 300 to 500 m). In the case of a cavern filled with
gas oil (the density of gas oil is 850 kg/m3), the pressure increase inside
the cavern is at most 1.4 bar (pgz = 1.4 bar, assuming the cavern is
40 m high and the difference in density between the gas oil and brine
is 350 kg/m3). This is too small to trigger tensile fracturing.
A cavern might be unstable because its salt roof is too thin to cope
with the pressure differences (stresses) acting on the cavern or
resulting from another cavern that is too close by. Using the thicknesses
and properties of the geological layering in Twente, BGR (1998) per-
formed a geomechanical modelling study and calculated that to ensure
stability, the minimum thickness of the salt roof in the Röt salt C must be
5 m. Also important for stability is the shape of the cavern roof. Prior to
gas oil storage, the roof will be hollowed out into a bell-shaped dome
around the well. This has an added advantage that gas oil will be easier
to retrieve at the end of storage. The thickness of the salt roof is per se
not vital to the stability of the cavern roof area. What determines the
stability of the cavern roof is the thickness of the salt roof combined
with the properties of the geological layers above the cavern and the
presence of intersecting faults or faults in the immediate surroundings,
as well as the internal hydrostatic pressure (brine static pressure).
3.3. Leakage of wellbore
Leakage through the wellbore has been indicated as a major risk in
the storage of gas oil in salt caverns (Evans, 2008; Evans and Chadwick,
2009). An area requiring particular attention is that of the placing of
the casing shoe and its cementation in the cavern roof area. Several
studies report leakage through this section of the well during hydrocar-
bon storage activities (e.g. Evans, 2008; Evans and Chadwick, 2009). In
the context of well integrity the interfaces between different materials
(cement/rock, cement/casing, casing/plug) have been identified as
potential preferential pathways for fluid flow (Gasda et al., 2004;
Miyazaki, 2009). In the cement annulus, migration of fluid or gas
under pressure may occur through pore bonding, fractures, channels,
or through the pore space. Fluid flow through the pore space in the ce-
ment will occur only if the cement is degraded or did not form properly
during the emplacement process (Zhang and Bachu, 2011). Fluid flow
and degradation rates in intact cement are too slow to compromise
well integrity at conceivable time scales (e.g. Kutchko et al., 2007).
The actual state of the cement and the casing are directly related to
the design of the well and its operational history. Casing displacement
and stress changes may cause the cement to fail under tension or
compression, or to de-bond from the casing or formation, creating
micro annuli and radial cracks (Boukhelifa et al., 2004). The packer
isolates reservoir fluids from the production casing, and “forces” the
fluids into the tubing. In addition, the packer may bear some of the
tubing loads (depending on how the completion is set). Like the pro-
duction tubing, evidence for failure of the packer is almost always
directly observed (failure of pressure test during initial installation,
loss of annulus fluid levels, presence of reservoir fluids inside produc-
tion casing during production life, pressure communication between
production tubing and production casing). Leakage through packers
has rarely led to accidents. Out of 36 recorded accidents (Bérest and
Brouard, 2003; Evans, 2008) in salt caverns, only one involved a packer.
The packer failed during repair of the casing and not due to corrosion or
mechanical strain. This indicates that packers usually perform well in
hydrocarbon storage operations. Nevertheless, packers are mechanical
and require special attention as they present the first and direct barrier
between the cavern and potential leakage pathways along or out of the
wellbore.
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
3.4. Effect of salt creep
A general equation for deformation by creep is
dε −Q
n due to the injection of undersaturated brine or the increase in solubility
¼ Ae RT σ ;
dt
where ε is the creep strain, A is the proportionality constant (MPa−n s−1),
Q is the activation energy (J/mol), R is the gas constant (J/mol/K), T is the
absolute temperature, σ is the in situ stress and n is the stress exponent
related to the micro-mechanism of deformation. Even from the general
salt creep equation, it is clear that creep is highly dependent on temper-
ature, stress and type of material. More stress/higher temperature will
accelerate creep.
Since the geothermal temperature increases with depth, creep also
depends on depth.
For a spherical cavern, the volumetric creep rate is defined as (Van
Sambeek et al., 2005)
. .
dV dR  n
1 3 −Q
dt
¼ dt
¼− ðP ∞ −P i Þ Ae ℜT :
3V R 2 2n
The cylindrical case can be deduced from the spherical case by
 pffiffiffinþ1
multiplying by 2= 3 . In a typical storage cavern in Twente, the
depth will be 300 m and temperature will be 20 °C, resulting in
sphere
volumetric creep rates of V̇ =V ¼ −0:0014%=year and V̇ =V ¼
−0:0026%=year when using Avery Island parameters (Van Sambeek
et al., 2005). These parameters are used because, like the Rőt salt A
layer considered here, Avery Island salt is almost pure halite (99.5%).
Assuming that internal pressure (Pi) in the cavern is 3 MPa lower than
the overburden pressure (P∞), the corresponding volume loss ranges
from 3.6 m3/year in the case of a spherical cavern, to 6.5 m3/year in
the case of a cylindrical cavern. In a 30-year period, the total volume
loss would be 195 m3, which is a small volume loss (0.078%) given the
cavern volume (250,000 m3).
The stress state in the salt around a cavern depends on (1) the
original in situ state of stress, (2) the pressure in the cavern relative
to the lithostatic pressure, (3) cavern geometry, (4) salt creep, and
(5) temperature changes in the salt (Nieland and Ratigan, 2006). There-
fore, salt creep can be induced by the creation of a void (cavern) in the
salt body, pressure changes in the cavern, stress concentrations around
the cavern, and stress gradients of the salt pillars separating caverns
with different pressures. In a typical salt cavern in Twente, given the
depth at which these caverns occur (300–500 m), the properties of
the Röt salt layers and assuming pressure changes are negligible, the
velocity of the salt creep is in the order of a few centimetres per year
(van Duijne et al, 2011; personal communication C. Spiers, Utrecht
University). This velocity is low, especially given that the long axis of
the cavern is from 100 to 300 m (Figure 3). In horizontal thinly bedded
salt deposits, caverns are wide but shallow, and their flattened cross-
section is therefore inherently associated with stress concentrations at
the sides of the cavern, and in the centre of the floor and roof. However,
as these stress concentrations were also present during brine produc-
tion, salt creep is not expected to be a high risk factor.
3.5. Temperature changes
Temperature changes in the cavern will induce pressure changes as
well as short term changes in creep velocity and thermal contraction or
expansion of the salt close to the well. Other effects are increased solu-
bility of the salt when temperature rises (Kunstman and Urbańczyk,
2008) and an increase in temperature of the gas oil due to the geother-
mal gradient (Eyermann, 1994; Giles, 1994) which may cause vapour to
be released. Since the caverns are at shallow depths (300–500 m) the
maximum fluctuation in temperature will range from 15 °C to 20 °C;
155
such fluctuations may occur if the gas oil or brine injected is cold
because the aboveground temperature is low (winter). Significant
changes in creep velocity are, therefore, not expected and will not be
an issue, providing that the pillars separating the caverns are not eroded
ð5Þ
as a result of rising temperature. Using the IUPAC-NIST Solubility
Database, a rise in temperature from 0 to 20 °C may cause an additional
2.4 g of salt to dissolve per litre of water. Assuming a cavern containing
80% gas oil and 20% brine, the volume of the gas oil, for a 250,000 m3 salt
cavern is 200,000 m3 or 2.0 · 108 l. In the case where the gas oil is
removed at the end of a storage cycle and relatively cold brine is injected
into the cavern, the 80% of gas oil is replaced by 80% relatively cold brine
which will gradually heat up to geothermal temperatures. For a temper-
ature increase of 20 °C, 2.4 g more salt may dissolve per litre, resulting
in 2.4 · 105 kg extra dissolved salt. For the 80% relatively cold brine
this translates to 111 m3 more salt that may dissolve (assuming a
density of salt of 2165 kg/m3), which corresponds to a cavern volume
increase of 0.05%. The results of this calculation may vary if a different
solubility is assumed: in this case, there may be less erosion of the
cavern walls. In addition, the figure of 80% gas oil being replaced by
ð6Þ
brine is high. More accurate results can be obtained by running simula-
tion models of the actual simulation. When the pressure on the gas oil is
reduced for transportation, the light components of the gas oil are
released until the vapour pressure of the warmed oil is atmospheric.
This could result in atmospheric discharges of volatile organic
compounds and methane that exceed permitted thresholds, or in safety
cylinder
concerns due to local concentrations of flammable gas. The temperature
rise in the Twente caverns is very small (b20 °C) because in this area the
salt is at shallow depths (300–500 m), which makes it unlikely that the
TVP (true vapour pressure: equilibrium partial pressure exerted by a
volatile organic liquid as a function of temperature) will exceed atmo-
spheric pressure (Giles, 1994). Furthermore, vapour release has not
been observed in similar storage caverns in Wilhelmshaven operated
by the Nord-West Kavernengesellschaft GmbH (NWKG), Germany.
4. Effects of loss of containment
Organic fluids such as gas oil pose a serious threat: to drinking
water and ecology, for example. Contamination consisting of 1 l of oil
can significantly affect the quality of 100,000 l of water, i.e. make it
non-potable for humans. For this reason, the risks of leakage to ground-
water resources are taken very seriously (Domenico and Schwartz,
1998; Marsman, 2002; Gerritse et al., 2009). Gas oil is an organic Non-
Aqueous Phase Liquid (NAPL) that is only slightly miscible with water
and has a lower specific density than water. Because its specific density
(820 to 860 kg/m3) is lower than that of fresh water (1000 kg m−3) and
saline water (1025 kg m−3), gas oil “floats” on groundwater. When gas
oil leaks from a cavern and no aquitards are present, it migrates upward
towards the water table (Marsman, 2002). To quantify the risk of this
happening, first the possible migration paths were identified and corre-
sponding flow scenarios were defined. Next, the spread of gas oil for
these scenarios was simulated using a numerical flow model suitable
for modelling multiphase flow through porous media (STOMP).
4.1. Migration paths and flow scenarios
The rate of upward migration of gas oil, the amount of lateral spread,
and the period after which pollution of the phreatic groundwater occurs
all depend on the characteristics of the geological layers in the subsur-
face around and above the point of leakage (porosity, permeability,
specific density), as well as on the properties of the gas oil and the
groundwater (density, viscosity, relative permeability). Additionally,
the depth of the leakage point is of importance (from the cavern or at
a certain depth along the wellbore in the case of failed packers and
faulty casing/cementation). As described above, the overburden of the
Twente area consists of alternating aquifers and aquitards, and contains
156 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
faults in which permeability is higher than in the host rock. The follow-
ing gas oil migration paths have been defined that might lead to gas oil
entering the upper groundwater bodies after loss of containment (5):
(1) Leakage occurs from the well above the hydrogeological base.
Leakage causes direct risk of contamination/pollution of the
shallow groundwater bodies.
(2) Leakage of gas oil occurs in the well below the hydrogeological
base. Two scenarios are possible:
(a) Breach of containment of the well is local, and the well casing and
well shoe are intact. The gas oil will leak into the surrounding
hard rock or sediment;
(b) Loss of containment of the well is not local and the cement of the
well is not intact, creating a short cut for the gas oil towards
layers above the hydrogeological base from where it will leak
directly into the upper groundwater.
(3) A permeable fault or another old well with degraded permeable
cementation is present at the location of the cavern and/or
the well, so leakage from the cavern or the well below the
hydrogeological base can lead to relatively fast upward move-
ment of gas oil towards the upper reach of the fault or old well.
(4) Gas oil leaking from the cavern or well moves upward towards
shallow groundwater bodies through a combination of permeable
faults and old wells near the cavern or the well and permeable
layers in the overburden.
Based on these migration paths, we defined seven flow scenarios, all
of which result from loss of containment or a deviation from the base
case (see Table 2). For each flow scenario, the depth of the point of
leakage was chosen to be within the limits of that flow scenario. Addi-
tionally a maximum period of leakage of 1 to 3 months was defined:
this is assumed to be the period after which mitigation measures start
and the leakage is stopped (see Table 3). The maximum period of leak-
age (before mitigation starts) strongly depends on how monitoring is
performed. We assumed that cavern pressure is continuously measured
and that within two weeks of observing any pressure irregularity, thor-
ough investigations are carried out. In the case of leakage from a well,
the problem can be solved within two weeks after the investigation. In
the case of leakage from a cavern, the problem is assumed to be solved
within approximately three months.
4.2. Multiphase modelling with STOMP
We used the numerical model STOMP (Subsurface Transport Over
Multiple Phases) developed by White et al. (1995), and Lenhard et al.
(1995) to simulate the spread of gas oil in the subsurface of Twente
when leakage occurs from a storage system with a salt cavern having
dimensions typical for the Twente area (see Section 2.5). STOMP is a
three-dimensional, three-phase, compositional engineering simulator
for modelling contaminant migration and remediation technologies
for the clean-up of subsurface sites contaminated with organic com-
pounds. The STOMP model code is based on the Richards equation for
Table 2
Scenarios of gas oil flow after leakage for the case-specific risk analyses.
Scenarios Depth of
leakage
source (m)
0 No loss of containment (base case) 435
1 Leakage from cavern in Röt Claystone 395
2 Scenario 1 with old permeable well in vicinity 395
3 Leakage from well below Hydrogeological base in 156
Muschelkalk Formation
4 Scenario 3 with old permeable well in vicinity 156
5 Leakage from well below hydrogeological base in 60
North Sea Supergroup
6 Scenario 5 with old permeable well in vicinity 60
7 Leakage from well above hydrogeological base 20
multiphase flow (Marsman, 2002) and on the constitutive relations
developed by Lenhard and Parker (1987) and Kaluarachchi and Parker
(1992). Flow and transport are solved numerically using an integrated
volume finite-difference scheme to discretise the governing equations.
For our analysis, the local subsurface of the Twente area was
schematised in a cross-sectional (2D) model domain based on the
hydrogeological information on the Twente area (see Section 3). In
the horizontal plane, the resolution of the model domain is 10 m. Verti-
cally, the resolution of the model domain varies depending on the level
of detail that is required in the result and how much is known about the
geological layers. The layers that represent the Upper Röt Claystone, the
Muschelkalk Formation, the Altena Group, the Niedersachsen Group,
and the North Sea Supergroup below the hydrogeological base have a
resolution of 10 m. The Main Röt Evaporite Member, the Middle Röt
Claystone Member and the Upper Röt Evaporite Member have a much
higher resolution (2 m), as does the layer above the hydrogeological
base (2 m). An overview of the subsurface schematisation of the Twente
area is given in Table 1.
For the analyses of the effects of gas oil leakage, a typical salt cavern
was schematised in the STOMP model. It had a total volume of
150,000 m3, a height of 35 m, a width of 110 m, and a length of
160 m. The cavern was assumed to be situated within the Main Röt
Evaporite, which was 60 m thick in our schematisation. The injection
well was positioned in the centre of the cavern. Due to the layer of
brine on the floor of the cavern to shield the gas oil from the permeable
sump material and formations below the cavern into which it may
potentially migrate, the maximum volume of gas oil that can be stored
was estimated to be 105,000 m3.
Additionally, the location and the properties of potentially perme-
able faults and “old” wells with reduced integrity in the vicinity of the
cavern were schematised. In the STOMP model schematisation two
normal faults at distances of 35 m and 40 m from the central well of
the salt cavern were schematised as well as an “old” well at a distance
of 40 m from the central well of the salt cavern. For permeable faults,
the permeability can generally be considered to be several orders of mag-
nitude higher than that of the surrounding host rock (see Section 3),
and depends primarily on the fault throw and the clay content of the
rocks flanking the fault zone (Bense and Person, 2006). Because the
subsurface in the Twente area consists of alternating clay-rich and
sandy formations, the permeability of faults varies strongly with
depth. Furthermore, “old” wells in the vicinity of the cavern that may
have a reduced casing integrity, were assumed to have a cement porosity
of 0.8 and a permeability of 1.00 × 106 mD. The zone of increased per-
meability ran from 30 m above the roof of the cavern to the surface
(worst-case scenario).
To simulate of multiphase flow behaviour with the STOMP model,
data must be input on the properties of the subsurface, the formation
water, the brine and the gas oil (Lenhard et al., 1995; White et al.,
1995; Marsman, 2002). Required subsurface data include:
• Hydraulic properties of the subsurface: porosity and intrinsic perme-
ability of each defined rock/soil type. Intrinsic permeability can be
based on measurements or calculations.
• Hydraulic conductivity at reference conditions (atmospheric pressure
Duration of
and 20 °C). The values for the porosity and permeability were obtained
leakage as described in Section 3.
(months) • Mechanical properties of the subsurface: particle density for each
3 defined rock/soil type. The values for particle density were obtained
3 from the website simetric.co.uk/si_materials.htm. Based on these
3 values and the values for porosity, the STOMP model calculated the
1
specific storativity, compressibility, and a tortuosity function for each
1 defined rock/soil type.
• Saturation properties of the saturation-capillary pressure function for
each defined rock/soil type. For this function, the Van Genuchten
water retention curve was used (van Genuchten, 1980). The Van
1
Genuchten function was chosen because it assumes that the wetting
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 157

Table 3
Results for scenarios 0, 6 and 7 of the STOMP modelling, depth to top and bottom of NAPL (m), lateral spread of NAPL (m), maximum gas oil saturation in NAPL outside cavern (%), and
maximum gas oil saturation in phreatic groundwater (%).

Characteristics of gas oil NAPL Time horizons

1 day 1 week 1 month 3 months 1 year 5 year 30 year 150 year

Scenario 0
Depth to top NAPL (m) 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436
Depth to bottom NAPL (m) 472 472 472 472 472 472 472 472
Spread NAPL (m) 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Max. gas oil saturation in NAPL (%) 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.989 0.990 0.991
Max. saturation phreactic gw (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Scenario 6
Depth to top NAPL (m) 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Depth to bottom NAPL (m) 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Spread NAPL (m) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 20
Max. gas oil saturation in NAPL (%) 0.002 0.015 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.038
Max. saturation phreactic gw (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Scenario 7
Depth to top NAPL (m) 20 18 14 8 0 0 0 0
Depth to bottom NAPL (m) 22 22 22 22 22 22 20 14
Spread NAPL (m) 10 10 30 30 30 50 70 90
Max. gas oil saturation in NAPL (%) 0.010 0.060 0.080 0.040 0.040 0.110 0.050 0.030
Max. saturation phreactic gw (%) 0.010 0.060 0.080 0.040 0.040 0.110 0.050 0.030

fluid drains from a porous medium whenever the capillary pressure
exceeds zero.
• The aqueous relative permeability for each defined rock/soil type. For
this purpose the Mualem function (Mualem, 1976) was chosen since
the aqueous relative permeability is dependent on the saturation
function (van Genuchten, 1980).
• The NAPL relative permeability for each defined rock/soil type. Here
too, the Mualem function was used because of its dependency on the
Van Genuchten function.
• The physical properties of the gas oil: the gas oil to be injected was
assumed to have a density ranging from 820 to 860 kg m−3 (average
of 840 kg m−3) and a viscosity ranging from 1.64 × 10−3 Pa·s to
3.87 × 10−3 Pa·s (average of 2.76 × 10−3 Pa·s). These values were
obtained from Appendix B of the gas oil 10 ppm product specifications
provided by the North Sea Group.
Table 1 shows all parameter values of the properties of each rock
type in the schematisation of the subsurface of the Twente area.
Boundary and initial conditions must also be stipulated before the
model can be run. They are obtained by appropriately conceptualising
the physical problem and translating that conceptualisation into bound-
ary and initial condition form. The initial conditions were defined for
time step T = 0 and consisted of a hydrostatic pressure at the lower
boundary of the model domain and a pressure gradient in the vertical
direction towards the upper boundary of the model domain. The pres-
sure in the lowermost layer was calculated from the depth and the
water density (5.2 × 106 Pa). At the upper boundary the pressure is
identical to atmospheric pressure (1.01325 × 106 Pa) and therefore an
unsaturated zone is created in the phreatic model layer. Another initial
condition is the NAPL pressure. In the lowest model layer, an NAPL pres-
sure was defined in order to obtain a layer completely saturated with
NAPL (5.2 × 106 Pa). In the rest of the model, the NAPL pressure was
defined as zero. The boundary conditions are constant for the whole
simulation period, and only at the upper boundary (the uppermost
layer) was the aqueous pressure defined to be equal to the atmospheric
pressure (this is the hydrostatic pressure) and the NAPL was assigned a
zero flux.
The seven flow scenarios were simulated with the STOMP model of
the Twente area. Additionally, the situation without loss of containment
was modelled (scenario 0). Model results were generated for 10 points
in time after gas oil leakage occurs: 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 months,
1 year, 5 years, 30 years, 60 years, 100 year and 150 years.
4.3. Results of multiphase modelling: effects of loss of containment
The results of the STOMP model consist of the top and the bottom of
the gas oil NAPL (metres below ground), the lateral spread of the NAPL
(m), the maximum gas oil saturation in the NAPL (%), and the maximum
saturation in the phreatic groundwater (%). From these values, which
were calculated for all 7 scenarios and the base case (no loss of contain-
ment), the effects of loss of containment could be determined. In the
base case (scenario 0), there is no loss of containment, the model
calculations show that during the 150-year modelling period the gas
oil saturation in the first metre of rock salt above the cavern is less
than 1% and no gas oil was detected further from the cavern (see
Table 3). In the case of gas oil leakage from any point below the
hydrogeological base, the model calculations show that during the
150-year modelling period the gas oil migrates only up to 25 m from
the point of leakage and does not contaminate the upper, phreatic
groundwater bodies in the Twente area. As an example, Fig. 5 and
Table 3 show the STOMP results for scenario 6 for the 150-year time
point. Due to the low porosity and permeability of the geological layers,
upward migration is largely precluded and the gas oil does not reach the
nearby structures that have greater porosity and permeability (fault or
“old” well). However, leakage from the well above the hydrogeological
base in the phreatic aquifer does cause an immediate risk of contamina-
tion of the upper groundwater bodies (scenario 7). After 1 year the gas
oil NAPL reaches the phreatic groundwater level and starts to spread out-
wards (reaching up to 90 m from the leakage point after 150 years).
After 5 years the maximum saturation of gas oil in the pores of the sed-
iments is reached (0.11%), but because the NAPL continues to spread
away from the point of leakage, the saturation within the NAPL reduces
as it becomes partially trapped in the pores (see Table 3 and Figure 6).
5. Semi-quantitative risk assessment
The first step in identifying and evaluating potential causes and
effects, and building scenarios is to elicit expert opinion (Wildenborg
et al., 2005; Knol et al., 2010). The team of experts must be carefully
composed, to minimise subjectivity and ensure confidence in their
judgement. The experts assign probabilities and impacts to potential
causes and effects, and resulting scenarios are semi-quantitatively.
Quantification of the impact of individual scenarios is possible during
subsequent quantitative modelling.
158 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
Fig. 5. Visualisation of the STOMP results of scenario 6, effects of leakage after 150 years: leakage from well below hydrogeological base in North Sea Supergroup with old permeable well in
vicinity.
In risk assessment, risk is defined as
Risk ¼ Probability of Failure  Impact:
In this study, the probability of failure was defined as the probability
of gas oil leakage (the incident) and the impact was defined as the
harmful effects on health, safety and environment resulting from the
contamination of groundwater.
The concept of “probability” we adhere to in this paper is the
Bayesian one. It is rooted in our knowledge position, as opposed to the
frequentist concept, which defines probability as an experimental
limit. The two interpretations are different, the mathematics are not.
The Bayesian concept has wider applicability. For instance, it allows
one to speak of probabilities of hypotheses, which frequentist probability
cannot handle. The probabilities we used in the Markov Chain approach
(see below) are mostly based on expert judgement. That too requires
the Bayesian stance on probability. For a thorough discussion on the
foregoing, see Jaynes (2003).
We limited ourselves to the underground risks involved (namely the
risk of contamination of groundwater). The surface risks such as leakage
of gas oil at the surface site, risk of explosion and risk to human health
were considered in the Environmental Impact Assessment (Tauw,
2013). The probability of gas oil leakage was calculated using two
approaches. First, we used a Markov Chain approach (see Appendix A)
to form comprehensive scenarios based on occurring events or states.
The resulting scenarios, in broad outline, were evaluated using input
from experts in the fields of geology, geohydrology, geomechanics and
well integrity. The impact was assessed by numerical modelling that
simulated the flow of leaked gas oil (horizontal and vertical pathways)
into the groundwater (harmful effect).
The starting point of Markov Chain analysis is a “base state” which
here is taken to be a properly functioning gas oil storage system in the
Twente region (i.e. a working Containment Concept). Any deviations
from the base state such as the presence of leaking faults, unexpected
presence of permeable layers or a too thin salt roof/pillar must be
defined as different base states. Events may occur that cause the base
state to evolve into other states as defined by Table 4. Examples are
failure of mechanical equipment such as packer or casing, mechanical
failure of the cavern (formation of cracks, instability) or operational
failure (high pressure).
The Markov Chain ends with so-called “absorbing states” which
are leakage states. We distinguished three different leakage states
based on the depth at which the leakage occurs; leakage above the
hydrogeological base, leakage from the hydrogeological base to just
above the cavern and leakage at cavern depth. These leakage states
were separated according to the different impacts in the risk analysis;
the impacts differ depending on the depth at which the leakage occurs.
Leakage above the hydrogeological boundary may lead directly to
groundwater contamination, while leakage at the well or at cavern
depth will not immediately lead to contamination.
5.1. Expert elicitation
As it is impossible to accurately know all circumstances in a well,
cavern and the subsurface and their development, we use probability
theory for our formalisation. As phrased above, each situation or combi-
nation of situations can be considered a “state”, and some states have a
certain degree of likelihood that they will progress to certain other
states. We defined the transition probabilities p(i,j) from state “i” to
state “j” for all states “i” and “j”. Having defined these transition proba-
bilities, we could then compute how likely a certain state is at any time
after the start date.
The transition probabilities were based on expert knowledge. The
experts were questioned about the likelihood of a transition from
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 159

Fig. 6. Visualisation of the STOMP results of scenario 7, effects of leakage after150 years: leakage from the well above the hydrogeological base. Lower figure is a close-up of the rectangle in
the upper figure, and shows the spread of the gas oil LNAPL on top of the phreatic groundwater level in more detail.

one state to another. They were asked to estimate this likelihood as the
probability of the transition occurring either in percentages or qualita-
tive statements as negligible, low, medium and high which were then
translated into percentages (Figure 8) within a certain timeframe,
expressed in years. These answers were converted to a likelihood
expressed as percentage per year. Both the expert knowledge and the
translation are qualitative. Hence, we had to investigate how the system
evolves under a range of acceptable values for these transition probabil-
ities. The results are general for the area considered and give insight into
what can be expected. All the transitions are expected to develop suffi-
ciently slowly, as we assume that the well is handled carefully and that
the materials and operational methods used are state-of-the-art. For
each specific storage case, we advise a case-specific quantitative risk
analysis. Fig. 7 shows the transition probabilities per year for the 27
different states (Table 4) for the base case (i.e. a working Containment
Concept). The probability of a state onto itself (i.e. nothing changes)
is largest. The leakage states (# 25–27) are also clearly visible: for
example, the transition from an unstable cavern (state 6) to leakage at
the well (state 26) and the cavern (state 27) is relatively high: 0.3 prob-
ability per year.
The results of the Markov Chain analysis can be presented as proba-
bilities of leakage for the three end absorbing states: leakage at the
hydrogeological base, leakage around the well and leakage at cavern
depth. For the base case, the probability of leakage is negligible at all
levels. The different malfunction states may occur at the cavern level
or at the well. Since the base state does not include permeable faults
160 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
Table 4
Description of the 27 states considered in the Markov Chain analysis.
# state State description
1 Base case
2 Failed cementation
3 Failed packer
4 Failed casing
5 High pressure
6 Unstable cavern
7 Formation of cracks
8 Failed casing & cementation
9 Failed casing & cementation & packer
10 High pressure & failed packer
11 High pressure & failed casing
12 Unstable cavern & failed packer
13 High pressure & failed cementation
14 High pressure & unstable cavern
15 High pressure& formation cracks
16 Unstable cavern & failed cementation
17 Unstable cavern & failed casing
18 Unstable cavern & formation of cracks
19 Unstable cavern & failed packer & failed casing
20 Unstable cavern & failed cementation & failed casing & failed packer
21 High pressure & failed packer & unstable cavern
22 High pressure & failed packer & formation of cracks
23 High pressure & failed casing & unstable cavern
24 High pressure & failed casing & formation of cracks
25 Leakage above hydrogeological boundary
26 Leakage around well
27 Leakage around cavern
or layers that could transport the gas oil above the hydrogeological
level, the only pathway of leakage to the hydrogeological level is
the well itself. According to the experts, the probability of this occurring
is low, hence we obtain a negligible probability of leakage at the
hydrogeological level. The existence of a permeable fault that intersects
the cavern increases the probabilities of leakage at cavern depth and
around the well to medium and high, respectively, over a period of
30 years. The existence of too thin a salt roof or too thin a salt pillar
will lead to instability of the cavern and increased probabilities of
leakage at cavern depth and around the well. This is mainly due to up-
ward migration of the unstable cavern. Based on several different inputs
for the transition probabilities we find that for a 30-year period the
probabilities for fluid release at shallow depths range from 0.04% to
0.3%, while for fluid release at cavern depth the probabilities range
from 0.07% to 2.5%. If we allow for worst-case estimates for the transi-
tion probabilities, we obtain 2.6% probability of fluid release at shallow
depths and 8.6% probability of fluid release at cavern depth. The proba-
bility of fluid release at shallow depths is similar to that calculated by
Veil et al. (1998) for the disposal of contaminated oilfield waste in salt
caverns (NORM study). The probability of fluid release at cavern depth
is 3–5 times lower than the probabilities calculated by Veil et al.
(1998). But given that the NORM study was based on a specific storage
site, whereas our study is general for the Twente area, the derived prob-
abilities of fluid release are not dissimilar. Since both studies are based
on expert knowledge, this provides a measure of confidence in our
translation of the expert knowledge into probabilities.
So far, transition probabilities without human intervention have
been considered. This is unrealistic, however. In reality, there are
monitoring or mitigation tools which can and will be used to prevent
leakage or act upon observed leakage. If the effects of human interven-
tion are taken into account, the probabilities of leakage are reduced
considerably. In other words, monitoring and mitigation are essential
in the prevention of leakage. This fits in with the historical cases of
incidents (Evans, 2008; Evans and Chadwick, 2009): human error
accounted for 94.4% of the problems which have been reported in Evan's
studies. In our risk assessment we see that human vigilance will, to a
large extent, be instrumental in preventing or lowering the risk of
leakage.
5.2. Scenario assessment
The Markov Chain analysis gives insight into the effects of different
states upon each other and the effects of human intervention and faulty
site characterisation (presence of unknown faults, permeable layers
etc.). From the result of the Markov Chain analysis eight scenarios
were constructed from the most likely paths to leakage (highest transi-
tion probabilities):
1. Base case, working Containment Concept
2. Well failure resulting in leakage below the hydrogeological base
3. Well failure resulting in leakage above the hydrogeological base
4. Unstable cavern resulting in cavern leakage
5. Unstable cavern resulting in well leakage
6. High pressure resulting in leakage at cavern level
7. High pressure resulting in well failure and leakage below the
hydrogeological base
8. High pressure resulting in well failure and leakage above the
hydrogeological base.
For each scenario control measures were defined, such as pressure
monitoring inside the cavern, monitoring of the annulus pressure,
monitoring gas oil and brine levels, sonar measurements (for observing
the shape of the cavern) and safeguards to avert high pressure.
These scenarios and their control measures were presented to eight
experts/expert groups in the fields of geology, geomechanics and well
integrity. They were asked to fill the risk matrix according to their
expertise or leave the matrix empty if their expertise was not sufficient.
Fig. 8 shows the results of the scenario assessment in the form of a risk
matrix. In this matrix the sub-classes for risk are defined as negligible,
low, medium and high with associated probabilities and consequences
of the leakage. The consequences of leakage (loss of containment) are
ranked according to the relative area (smaller or larger than 1 m3)
and timescale of the leakage (less than 1 month or 3 months) before
the leakage is repaired. Since risk is defined as probability of failure ×
impact, the higher risks are associated with higher probability and larger
areas and timescales of the leakage. Each coloured polygon indicates
one expert or exert group; the number in the polygon indicates the
scenario to which the risk refers. The arrow indicates the decrease in
risk if control measures are taken (human intervention). Considering
human intervention, scenarios 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 all show a negligible
to low risk of leakage. For scenarios 4, 5 and 6 the loss of containment
will be larger and hence also the risk. Without human intervention,
scenarios 4, 5 and 6 also yield the highest risk of leakage.
Overall, both the loss of containment and the probability of occur-
rence are assessed as higher if there is no human intervention, except
for the base case, where the risk is considered negligible in both cases,
assuming a working Containment Concept and monitoring system (no
human error). There appears to be little consensus on the risks in the
case of no human intervention, indicating that it is more difficult for
experts to assess the risks of no human intervention. One expert opined
that “no human intervention” was unrealistic and hence risk assess-
ment unnecessary. The risk assessment indicates that human interven-
tion is vital for minimising the risk. Therefore, in order to detect a loss of
containment in an early stage, there must be continuous comparison of
well head pressures when the brine–hydrocarbon interface is in the
cavern chimney, plus continuous monitoring of pressure at the bottom
of the well, pressure and flow in the well annulus, gas oil level, and brine
and gas oil inflow and outflow. Additionally, the shape and extent of the
cavern should be monitored using sonar at intervals of at least 5 years,
ideally before initial gas oil injection and after each gas oil extraction.
A change in the shape of the cavern will indicate a possibly instability
of the cavern as well as possible additional salt dissolution. Both are
indications of leakage and require human intervention. Also, industry
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 161

Fig. 7. Transition probabilities for the base case: from state i (x-axis) to state j (y-axis) (definition of states in Table 4) for the period of one year. A 0.3 probability means a 30% probability in
one year. The scale of the colour bars is not the same in all four figures. The largest transition probabilities are given for the probability of state i onto itself as clearly shown in the top left
figure. In the bottom left figure, the transition probabilities to the leakage states (25–27) are clearly shown. In this figure too, there is a relatively high probability of transition from an
unstable cavern (state 6) to leakage at the well (state 26) and from the cavern (state 27).

standard mechanical integrity tests (MIT) of the day should be
performed to monitor the integrity of the well during brine/gas oil
production and injection. In addition, we recommend establishing a
baseline measurement of gas oil saturation and concentration of
dissolved gas oil components in groundwater prior to injection and
the monitoring of groundwater quality when/if gas oil leakage occurs,
as well as designing a contingency soil and groundwater remediation
plan.
This generic semi-quantitative risk assessment resulted in a check-
list of requirements (van Duijne et al., 2011) for the feasibility of gas
oil storage in a specific salt cavern in the Twente area. This checklist
was used for the cavern-specific risk analysis.
6. Conclusions
with gas oil injection and storage in salt caverns is low, an extensive
monitoring plan should be formulated to ensure the long-term stability
of the storage cavern and wells and containment of the gas oil. It should
monitor the inflow and outflow at the wells, the pressures in the storage
system, the dimensions and shape of the caverns (regular sonar sur-
veys) and the integrity of the well to prevent leakage from the storage
system through the causes identified in this paper and those based
upon published incidents and accounts of release scenarios. Monitoring
should also be deployed to detect a loss of containment, especially
groundwater contamination. Also, we advise preparing a contingency
soil and groundwater remediation plan. Finally, since human error is
the primary cause of incidents at salt storage facilities, it is essential to
have a robust management plan that includes enough safeguards to
minimise the probability of human error.

A semi-quantitative assessment of the risks associated with storage Acknowledgements

of gas oil in an abandoned brine cavern in the eastern Netherlands
indicated that the risk of ground water contamination is low. This is
due mainly to the low permeability of rocks in the area (rock salt,
claystones). Consequently, there are a limited number of pathways for
the stored product to migrate upward towards the groundwater level.
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the risk of leakage associated
This work was funded by Akzo Nobel BV, Hengelo, The Netherlands
and carried out by Deltares and TNO. We thank Gerco Hoedeman, Laura
Wasch, Thijs Boxem and Wouter Meindertsma, TNO, who assisted in the
project (specifically Figure 8, the checklist and revision). We also thank
Joy Burrough who advised on the English.
162 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166

High

Breach of containment
5
6
>1m 2, 3 4
months

Medium
5 6 4
4
>1m 2, <1
4 6
month

Low
6 4 6 3
8
<1m 2, 3 2
5
7
months

Negligible
8 3 2 5
1
<1m 2, <1 7 2 3
1 1 5 7 8
month

Negligible Low Medium High

<0.001 0.001-0.01 0.01-0.1 >0.1

Probability

Fig. 8. Risk matrix for the eight scenarios. The background colours in the grid cells indicate risk: from negligible (blue) to low (green) to medium (orange) to high (red). The numbers in
polygons refer to the eight scenarios and the arrows show the change in risk from a situation in which there is no human intervention to one in which control measures are implemented.
The colours of the polygons indicate experts/expert groups: orange = experts who described the risk assuming there is always human intervention, claiming no human intervention is
unrealistic; blue and purple = two experts/expert groups assuming no human intervention and assuming human intervention as described by the arrows.

Appendix A. Markov Chains
Given that a storage system needs to always operate safely it is
necessary to ascertain what might cause the system to fail and what
are the risks. These risks have to be quantified. As the risk of an unwanted
effect is defined in terms of the probability of an event and of this event
having that effect, we should investigate both the probability of the event
and also the effect. This appendix deals with event probability.
We begin by noting that a system can be in various “states”. There is
a certain probability that these states will evolve into other states. As a
first step, we need to define the “base state” from which the other states
may ensue. The base state in this paper is a working containment situa-
tion as described in the main text.
Any deviations from the Containment Concept, such as the unfore-
seen presence of leaky faults, permeable layers, a too thin salt roof or a
too thin salt pillar will have to be defined as different possible states
for the analysis. But also any conceivable combination is a possible
state. So, if there are N “monolithic” states there are 2N-1 combinations
possible, as simple combinatorics shows. Not all of these might be
deemed relevant, and the investigator has the task to trim all possible
combinations to those that are potentially relevant. The investigator
does so taking account of a previous qualitative risk analysis performed
by a team of experts. It is obviously important that the relevant set
include “final” state(s) that describe the undesired situation(s). These
states are considered absorbing: once reached there is no way back
without drastic, wholesale mitigation.
Given that states can evolve into other states, we make the practical
and reasonable assumption that the likelihood of a transition per unit
time depends solely on the state the system occupies. In that case we
can apply the machinery of Absorbing Markov Chains to arrive at a quan-
titative statement for the occupation probabilities involved. To that end
the investigator has to define transition probabilities between the states
as he or she defined them. The unit of time is typically one year. Infor-
mation from the experts will enable the investigator to derive typical
values for these transition probabilities. How expert elicitation should
be done will not concern us in this appendix. Suffice it to say that it is
not necessarily a very straightforward process, as is known from the
psychological literature on the subject as quoted in Nepveu et al. (2009).
Ultimately, then, one obtains a transition matrix A(i, j) containing
the transition probabilities from the states i = Nj. A is a square matrix
of dimension S × S where S is the number of states deemed relevant.
The final states as mentioned above are absorbing; once they are
reached they are never left by the system. All the other states are called
transient states.
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 163

Especially interesting for elicitation purposes are diagonal elements; Table B.1 (continued)
they are related to the retention time (=uninterrupted occupation From # state To # state Base case Var1 Var2 Var3 Var4
time). The expert can certainly produce a rough number or a range for 1 7 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
this retention time. This can be used to compute the transition probabil- 2 8 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200
ity A(i,i) as 2 13 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010
2 16 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010
3 10 0.01000 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.01000
3 12 0.00300 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00300
−1
Aði; iÞ ¼ 1:−Tretention : 4 8 0.00500 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00500
4 11 0.00500 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00500
4 17 0.00050 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00050
5 10 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500
5 11 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300
So, if the diagonal element is zero it means that after one year the
5 13 0.00050 0.00050 0.00050 0.00050 0.00050
state i is definitely abandoned if initially occupied; If the diagonal 5 14 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
element equals unity the state is absorbing: it will never be left, when 5 15 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
occupied. This last condition will hold true for the “final” states. 6 12 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.02000
6 14 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200
Matrix A should have the formal properties of each transition matrix
6 16 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500
in that 6 17 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.02000
6 18 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.02000
6 19 0.00100 0.00100 0.00100 0.00100 0.00100
X 6 20 0.00050 0.00050 0.00050 0.00050 0.00050
A j ðiÞ≥ 0 for all i; j and j
A j ðiÞ ¼ 1 for all i: ðA:1Þ
6 26 0.35000 0.35000 0.35000 0.35000 0.10000
6 27 0.35000 0.35000 0.35000 0.35000 0.10000
7 15 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
7 18 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
The second property simply expresses the fact that the system must 7 25 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300
7 26 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
necessarily be in one of the states defined — there are no states other
7 27 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
than the ones we defined. When the initial state vector is v(0) = 8 20 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
(1, 0, 0, ….) – this probability vector represents the fact that the initial 8 25 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
state is the base case with probability one – then the state vector after 8 26 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
n time units is equal to 8 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
9 20 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
9 25 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
9 26 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
n
vðnÞ ¼ vð0ÞA ðA:2Þ 9 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
10 21 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
10 22 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
10 26 0.04000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.04000
and describes the occupation probability for the different states under
10 27 0.04000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.04000
scrutiny. Since the transition probabilities obtained from the experts 11 23 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
cannot be supposed to have “rock solid” status, some experimentation 11 24 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030
is needed, as a kind of sensitivity analysis. This was done in the work 11 26 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
this paper describes. 11 27 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
12 19 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000
Note that in an absorbing Markov Chain the final states are reached
12 21 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300
eventually. More precisely: lim An exists as n goes to infinity and in this 12 26 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
limit all transient states are evacuated and at least some if not all of the 12 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
final states are occupied with probabilities such that the total sum of 13 26 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
13 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
these equals unity. The probabilities of these states' occupation depend
14 21 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000
on the structure of A. The non-zero probabilities of reaching the final 14 23 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000
state(s) induce them to be occupied eventually. This makes perfect 14 26 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
sense mathematically. It does not prove that in practice all must go 14 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
wrong. It merely shows what the system has in store for us if we do 15 22 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
15 24 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000
not interfere at critical moments. Timescales on which that can be sen-
15 27 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000
sibly done follow from the analysis as well (Nepveu et al., 2009). 16 20 0.10139 0.00300 0.03000 0.10000 0.10000
17 19 0.25000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.25000
Appendix B. Input and output of absorbing Markov Chain analysis 17 20 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
17 23 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300
17 27 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
Table B.1 to Table B.4 show some values for the transition probabil- 18 27 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000
ities of different scenarios. 19 20 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000
19 26 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000
19 27 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000
20 26 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000
Table B.1 20 27 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000
Transition probabilities for the base case and four variants of the base case. 21 26 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000
21 27 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000
From # state To # state Base case Var1 Var2 Var3 Var4
22 26 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000
1 2 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 22 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
1 3 0.00400 0.00400 0.00400 0.00400 0.00400 23 26 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000 0.15000
1 4 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 23 27 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000 0.30000
1 5 0.00100 0.00100 0.00100 0.00100 0.00100 24 26 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000 0.05000
1 6 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 0.00030 24 27 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000 0.10000
164 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166

Table B.2 Table B.2 (continued)

Transition probabilities for 4 worst-case scenarios. From To Worst-case 1 Worst-case 2 Worst-case 3 Worst-case 4
# state # state
From To Worst-case 1 Worst-case 2 Worst-case 3 Worst-case 4
# state # state 21 27 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1 2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 22 26 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
1 3 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 22 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 4 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 23 26 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
1 5 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 23 27 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1 6 0.0003 0.003 0.00003 0.00003 24 26 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
24 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 7 0.003 0.0003 0.00003 0.00003
2 8 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.004
2 13 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
2 16 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
3 10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 12 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
4 8 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.005
4 11 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
4 17 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 Table B.3
5 10 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 Transition probabilities for 4 cases: permeable fault, permeable layer, thin salt pillar and
5 11 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 thin salt roof.
5 13 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
From # state To # state Permeable fault Permeable layer Thin pillar Thin roof
5 14 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
5 15 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
6 12 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 3 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
6 14 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 1 4 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
6 16 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 1 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
6 17 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 1 6 0.0003 0.0003 0.5 0.5
6 18 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 7 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
6 19 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 2 8 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
6 20 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 2 13 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
6 26 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 2 16 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
6 27 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 3 10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
7 15 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 3 12 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
7 18 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 4 8 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
7 25 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 4 11 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
7 26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 4 17 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
7 27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 5 10 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
8 20 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 5 11 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
8 25 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 5 13 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
8 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 5 14 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
8 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 5 15 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
9 20 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 6 12 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
9 25 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 6 14 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
9 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 6 16 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
9 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 6 17 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
10 21 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 6 18 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
10 22 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 6 19 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
10 26 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 6 20 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
10 27 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 6 26 0.1 0.2 0.35 0.35
11 23 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 6 27 0.1 0.4 0.35 0.35
11 24 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 7 15 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
11 26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 7 18 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
11 27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 7 25 0.03 0.003 0.003 0.003
12 19 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 7 26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
12 21 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 7 27 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.03
12 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 8 20 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
12 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 8 25 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
13 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 8 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
13 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 8 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 9 20 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
14 23 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 9 25 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 9 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 9 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
15 22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 10 21 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
15 24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 10 22 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
15 27 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 10 26 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
16 20 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 10 27 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
17 19 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 11 23 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
17 20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 11 24 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
17 23 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 11 26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
17 27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 11 27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
18 27 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 12 19 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
19 20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 12 21 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
19 26 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 12 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
19 27 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 12 27 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
20 26 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 13 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
20 27 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 13 27 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
21 26 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 14 21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166 165

Table B.3 (continued) Table B.4 (continued)

From # state To # state Permeable fault Permeable layer Thin pillar Thin roof From To Monitor Monitor Monitor well Safe Some human
# state # state pressure pressure scenario action
14 23 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
& well
14 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 27 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 4 17 0.0003 0.0003 0.002 0.002 0.002
15 22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 5 10 0.000001 0.000001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
15 24 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 5 11 0.000001 0.000001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
15 27 0.05 0.3 0.05 0.05 5 13 0.000001 0.000001 0.003 0.003 0.003
16 20 0.10139 0.10139 0.10139 0.10139 5 14 0.000001 0.000001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
17 19 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 5 15 0.000001 0.000001 0.003 0.003 0.003
17 20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 6 12 0.1 0.1 0.003 0.003 0.003
17 23 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 6 14 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
17 27 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.03 6 16 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
18 27 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 6 17 0.03 0.03 0.003 0.003 0.003
19 20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 6 18 0.1 0.1 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
19 26 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 6 19 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
19 27 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 6 20 0.0005 0.0005 0.1 0.1 0.1
20 26 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 6 26 0.35 0.35 0.1 0.1 0.1
20 27 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 6 27 0.35 0.35 0.002 0.002 0.002
21 26 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 7 15 0.0003 0.0003 0.005 0.005 0.005
21 27 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 7 18 0.0003 0.0003 0.03 0.03 0.03
22 26 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05 7 25 0.003 0.003 0.1 0.1 0.1
22 27 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 7 26 0.03 0.03 0.001 0.001 0.001
23 26 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 7 27 0.03 0.03 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
23 27 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 8 1 0.000001 0.2 0.35 0.35 0.35
24 26 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05 8 20 0.0003 0.0003 0.35 0.35 0.35
24 27 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 8 25 0.1 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
1 25 0.01 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 8 26 0.1 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
1 26 0.05 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 8 27 0.1 0.1 0.003 0.003 0.003
1 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.000001 9 1 0.000001 0.2 0.03 0.03 0.03
6 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 9 20 0.0003 0.0003 0.03 0.03 0.03
10 25 0.04 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 9 25 0.1 0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
11 25 0.03 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 9 26 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
12 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 9 27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
13 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 10 21 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 10 22 0.000001 0.000001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
15 25 0.05 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 10 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
15 26 0.05 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 10 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
17 25 0.03 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 11 23 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
17 26 0.03 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 11 24 0.000001 0.000001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
18 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 11 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
18 26 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 11 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.03 0.03 0.03
19 25 0.2 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 12 6 0.000001 0.2 0.03 0.03 0.03
20 25 0.2 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 12 19 0.05 0.05 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
21 25 0.2 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 12 21 0.003 0.003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
22 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 12 26 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.03
23 25 0.2 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 12 27 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.03
24 25 0.1 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 13 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.05 0.05 0.05
13 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.003 0.003 0.003
14 21 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 23 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
14 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
15 22 0.000001 0.000001 0.01 0.01 0.01
15 24 0.000001 0.000001 0.01 0.01 0.01
15 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
16 6 0.000001 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table B.4 16 20 0.003 0.003 0.03 0.03 0.03
Transition probabilities for the human intervention scenarios. 17 6 0.000001 0.2 0.01 0.01 0.01
17 19 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.05 0.05
From To Monitor Monitor Monitor well Safe Some human
17 20 0.03 0.03 0.003 0.003 0.003
# state # state pressure pressure scenario action
17 23 0.003 0.003 0.5 0.5 0.5
& well
17 27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
1 2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.003 18 27 0.5 0.5 0.003 0.003 0.003
1 3 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.0004 0.007 19 6 0.000001 0.2 0.03 0.03 0.03
1 4 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.003 19 20 0.03 0.03 0.5 0.5 0.5
1 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.002 19 26 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.03
1 6 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.00003 0.0003 19 27 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.15
1 7 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.00003 0.0003 20 6 0.000001 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
2 1 0.000001 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.05 20 26 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
2 8 0.002 0.002 0.2 0.2 0.05 20 27 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
2 13 0.0001 0.0001 0.2 0.2 0.05 21 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.15 0.15 0.15
2 16 0.0001 0.0001 0.2 0.2 0.000001 21 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.3 0.3 0.3
3 1 0.000001 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.000001 22 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.05 0.05 0.05
3 10 0.003 0.003 0.2 0.2 0.000001 22 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
3 12 0.0003 0.0003 0.2 0.2 0.000001 23 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.15 0.15 0.15
4 1 0.000001 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.000001 23 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.3 0.3 0.3
4 8 0.003 0.003 0.2 0.2 0.000001 24 26 0.000001 0.000001 0.05 0.05 0.05
4 11 0.003 0.003 0.2 0.2 0.000001 24 27 0.000001 0.000001 0.1 0.1 0.1
166 K. van Thienen-Visser et al. / Engineering Geology 168 (2014) 149–166
References
Anderson, E.I., Bakker, M., 2008. Groundwater flow through anisotropic fault zones in
multi-aquifer systems. Water Resour. Res. 44, W11433. http://dx.doi.org/10.1029/
2008WR006925.
Bear, J., 1972. Dynamics of Fluids in Porous Media. Dover0-486-65675-6.
Bense, V.F., Person, M.A., 2006. Faults as conduit–barrier systems to fluid flow in
siliciclastic sedimentary aquifers. Water Resour. Res. 42, W05421. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1029/ 2005WR004480.
Bérest, P., Brouard, B., 2003. Safety of salt caverns used for underground gas storage. Oil
Gas Sci. Technol. 58, 361–384.
Bérest, P., Brouard, B., Durup, J.G., 2001. Tightness tests in salt cavern wells. Oil Gas Sci.
Technol. 56, 451–469.
BGR, 1998. Rock-mechanical expertise concerning the stability of the existing caverns and
for dimensioning of new caverns in the Hengelo field. Report (English Translation)
prepared by Bundesanstalt Fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), Hanover,
Germany, for Akzo Nobel Salt, Hengelo, The Netherlands. 1998.
BGR, 2004a. Rock-mechanical calculations for the stability and integrity of inline pillars
within parallel cavern rows. Report prepared by Bundesanstalt Fur Geowissenschaften
und Rohstoffe (BGR), Hannover, Duitsland for Akzo Nobel Salt B.V., Hengelo, The
Netherlands, November 2004.
BGR, 2004b. Investigation in the bearing load of pillars in the Hengelo terrain of Akzo
Nobel. Report prepared by Bundesanstalt Fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe
(BGR), Hannover, Duitsland for Akzo Nobel Salt B.V., Hengelo, The Netherlands,
March 2004.
Boukhelifa, L., Moroni, N., James, S.G., Le Roy-Delage, S., Thiercelin, M.J., Lemaire, G., 2004.
Evaluation of cement systems for oil and gas well zonal isolation in a full-scale
annular geometry. SPE Paper 87195, IADC/SPE Drilling Conference Dallas, TX, U.S.A.,
March 2–4.
Bouw, L., Oude Essink, G.H.P., 2003. Fluid flow in the northern Broad Fourteens Basin
during Late Cretaceous inversion. Neth. J. Geosci.Geol. Mijnb. 82 (1), 55–69.
De Louw, 2006. Wateratlas Twente, De grond en oppervlaktewatersystemen van Regge
en Dinkel. Waterschap Regge en Dinkel/TNO Bouw en Ondergrond.
Doe, T.W., Osnes, J.D., 2006. In situ stress and permeability tests in the Hutchinson salt
and the overlying shale, Kansas. Technical Conference paper, Fall 2006 Conference,
Rapid City, South Dakota, USA.
Domenico, A.D., Schwartz, F.W., 1998. Physical and Chemical Hydrology. John Wiley and
Sons, Inc.0-471-59762-7.
Dufour, F.C., 1998. Grondwater in Nederland, Onzichtbaar water waarop wij lopen. NITG-
TNO90-6743-536-8.
Evans, D.J., 2008. Accidents at UFS sites and risk relative to other areas of the energy
supply chain, with particular reference to salt cavern storage. SMRI Fall 2008 Technical
Conference, 13–14 October Galveston, Texas, USA.
Evans, D.J., Chadwick, R.A., 2009. Underground gas storage : worldwide experiences and
future development in the UK and Europe. Geological Society Special, Publication,
313. Geological Society of London, London, UK (283 pp.).
Eyermann, T.J., 1994. Status of the strategic petroleum reserves. SMRI 1994 Spring
meeting, Technical conference, 25–26 April, Houston, Texas.
Folch, A., Mas-pla, J., 2008. Hydrogeological interactions between fault zones and alluvial
aquifers in regional flow systems. Hydrogeol. Process. 22, 3476–3487. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1002/hyp.6956.
Gasda, S.E., Bachu, S., Celia, M.A., 2004. The potential for CO2 leakage from storage sites in
geological media: analysis of well distribution in mature sedimentary basins. Environ.
Geol. 46 (6–7), 707–720.
Geowulf, 2008. Geological framework TWR area compliation report. Prepared for Akzo
Nobel Industrial Chemicals B.V., 2008, vol 1 (report no: GL08.502).
GeoWulf, 2010. Geological analysis of the Marssteden area. Twente Region for AkzoNobel
Industrial Chemicals (GL10.121).
Gerritse, J., Van der Grift, B., Langenhoff, A., 2009. Contaminant behaviour of micro-
organisms in groundwater. In: Quevauviller, P., Fouillac, A.M., Grath, J., Ward, R.
(Eds.), Groundwater Monitoring. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ISBN: 978-0470-77809-8.
Giles, H.N., 1994. The impacts of gas intrusion and geothermal heating on crude oil
stockpiled in de U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Presented at the SMRI-Fall meeting
1994, Hannover, Germany.
Hendriks, D.M.D., Kuijper, M.J.M., Van Ek, R., 2013. Groundwater impact on environmental
flow needs of streams in sandy catchments in The Netherlands. J. Hydrol. Sci.
(accepted).
Jaynes, E.T., 2003. The Theory of Probability, the Logic of Science. Chapter 2 Cambridge
University Press.
Kaluarachchi, J.J., Parker, J.C., 1992. Multiphase flow with a simplified model for oil
entrapment. Transp. Porous Media 7, 1–14.
Knol, A.B., Slottje, P., Van der Sluijs, J.P., Lebret, E., 2010. The use of expert elicitation in
environmental health impact assessment: a seven step procedure. Environ. Heal. 9, 19.
Kunstman, A., Urbańczyk, K., 2008. Designing of the storage caverns for liquid products,
anticipating its size and shape changes during withdrawal operations with use of
unsaturated brine. SMRI 2008 Spring meeting, Technical Conference, 28–29 April,
Porto, Portugal.
Kutchko, B.G., Strazisar, B.R., Dzombak, D.A., Lowry, G.V., Thaulow, N., 2007. Degradation
of well cement by CO2 under geological sequestration conditions. Environ. Sci.
Technol. 2007 (41), 4787–4792.
Lenhard, R.J., Parker, J.C., 1987. Measurement and prediction of saturation–pressure
relationships in three-phase porous media. J. Contam. Hydrol. 1, 407–424.
Lenhard, R.J., Oostrom, M., White, M.D., 1995. Modeling fluid flow and transport in
variably saturated porous media with the STOMP simulator. 2. Verification and
validation exercises. Adv. Water Resour. 18 (6), 365–373.
Magri, F., Akar, T., Gemici, U., Pekdeger, A., 2010. Deep geothermal groundwater flow in
the Seferihisar–Balc¸ova area, Turkey: results from transient numerical simulations
of coupled fluid flow and heat transport processes. Geofluids 10, 388–405. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-8123.2009.00267.x.
Marsman, A., 2002. The Influence of Water Pollution on the Flow of Light Non Aqueous
Phase Liquids in Soil. (Phd Thesis) Wageningen University90-5808-734-4.
Miyazaki, B., 2009. Well integrity: an overlooked source of risk and liability for under-
ground natural gas storage. Lessons learned from incidents in the USA. Geol. Soc.
Lond. Spec. Publ. 313, 163–172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1144/SP313.11.
Mualem, Y., 1976. A new model for predicting the hydraulic conductivity of unsaturated
porous media. Water Resour. Res. 12, 513–522. http://dx.doi.org/10.1029/
WR012i003p00513.
MWH, B.V., 2010. Salt mining possibilities in areas adjacent to the Hengelo brine field.
Prepared for Akzo Nobel Industrial Chemicals B.V., Feb 2010.
Nepveu, M., Yavuz, F., David, P., 2009. FEP analysis and Markov chains. Energy Procedia I
2009, 2519–2523.
Nieland, J.D., Ratigan, J.L., 2006. Geomechanical evaluation of two gulf coast natural as
storage caverns. SMRI 2006 Spring meeting, 30 April–3 May, 2006, Brussels, Begium.
NITG-TNO, 1998. Geologische atlas van de diepe ondergrond van Nederland, kaartblad X:
Almelo – Winterswijk.
Pöppelreiter, M., Borkhataria, R., Aigner, T., Pipping, K., 2005. Production from
Muschelkalk carbonates (Triassic, NE Netherlands): unique play or overlooked
opportunity? Geological Society, London, Petroleum Geology Conference series, 6,
pp. 299–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1144/0060299.
Querio, C.W., 1980. Design and construction of solution-mined caverns for LPG storage.
Presented at the Fall Meeting of the Solution Mining Research Institute, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, October.
Saar, M.O., 2010. Review: geothermal heat as a tracer of large-scale groundwater flow and
as a means to determine permeability fields. Hydrogeol. J. 19, 31–52. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s10040-010-0657-2.
Tauw, 2013. Environmental Impact Assessment for the Storage of Gasoil in Existing Salt
Caverns, by Tauw B.V. Under Contract of AkzoNobel Industrial Chemicals B.V.
Thoms, R.L., Gehle, R.M., 2000. A brief history of salt cavern use (keynote paper). In:
Geertman, R.M. (Ed.), Proceedings of 8th World Salt Symposium, part 1. Elsevier
B.V., pp. 207–214.
Van Duijne, H., Hendriks, D., van Thienen-Visser, K., Wildenborg, T., 2011. Report of
Interviews and Workshop 2U-CC Project (Confidential) (Deltares Memo 1203390-
000-BGS-0016).
Van Genuchten, M.T., 1980. A closed form equation for predicting the hydraulic conduc-
tivity of unsaturated soils. Soil Sci. Soc. Am. J. 44, 892–898.
Van Sambeek, L.L., Bérest, P., Brouard, B., 2005. Improvements in mechanical integrity
tests for solution-mined caverns used for mineral production or liquid-product
storage. Prepared for SMRI in Cooperation with MIT, May.
Veil, J., Smith, K., Tomasko, D. Elcock, Williams, G., Blunt, D., 1998. Disposal of NORM-
contaminated oil field wastes in salt caverns — legal, economic and risk issues.
SMRI 1998 Spring meeting, Technical Conference, 19–22 April 1998, New Orleans,
Louisiana, USA.
Verweij, J.M., Simmelink, H.J., 2002. Geodynamic and hydrodynamic evolution of the
Broad Fourteens Basin (The Netherlands) in relation to its petroleum systems. Mar.
Pet. Geol. 19, 339–359.
White, M.D., Oostrom, M., Lenhard, R.J., 1995. Modeling fluid flow and transport in
variably saturated porous media with the STOMP simulator. 1. Non-volatile three-
phase model description. Adv. Water Resour. 18, 53–77.
Wildenborg, A.F.B., Leijnse, A.L., Kreft, E., Nepveu, M.N., Obdam, A.N.M., Orlic, B., Wipfler,
E.L., van der Grift, B., van Kesteren, W., Gaus, I., Czernichowski-Lauriol, I., Torfs, P.,
Wójcik, R., 2005. Risk assessment methodology for CO2 storage — the scenario
approach. In: Benson, S.M. (Ed.), The CO2 Capture and Storage Project for Carbon
Dioxide Storage in Deep Geological Formations for Climate Change Mitigation.
Elsevier (Ch. 30).
Zhang, M., Bachu, S., 2011. Review of integrity of existing wells in relation to CO2
geological storage: what do we know? Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control 5, 826–840.