1.

Bonifacio

RTC of Makati, Br. 149

Facts:

Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent
Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint
before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code .

The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public hatred and
contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory article
persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the said company. This is
after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies they
obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to indict the
petitioners, filed separate information against them .

Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it
failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not
punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners
maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties
resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published,
and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended
party accessed the internet-published article.

Issue:

Whether petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.

Held:

Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to
only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.

The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the offending article
was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
This is wrong. For the court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction
in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open
the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is
likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. This goes against the purpose as to why
Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal
action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the
accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
motion to quash the Amended Information.

2. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO

SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968

FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and
86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of
Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc.
vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation
et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not
only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the
surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

3. Antiporda vs Garchitorena (1999) G.R. 133289

Facts:

Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping, the case
was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the
prosecution to submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the new
information contained the place where the victim was brought.

The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be conducted and
the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman. The
accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance
and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused
filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after their
voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their persons, their
motion for reconsideration was again denied.

Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense
committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the
said crime is work connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.

We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel
and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be impaired.
In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended
Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the
Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated
where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not
place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent
nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.
4. Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006

Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:

On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later
identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal
in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC
convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC
acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the
petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal
complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a
warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the
urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons,
the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the
Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.

5. ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS II G.R. No. 125066

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before the Fiscal’s office on
October 20, 1987.

On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the
victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:

We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases
covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in
the instant case, “the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly
with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation;
provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only
by information.” However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant
to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised
Penal Code, the latter prevails.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this
case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of the offenses charged
in the information in this case.

6. Francisco v. CA, 122 SCRA 538 [1983]

Crim Pro -Rule 110

Facts:

On February 6, 1966, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong
Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December
26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry Bernardino. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information against Francisco and Bernardino with the CFI of Rizal of the crime of grave oral
defamation. Later, upon order of the court, the information was amended by adding statements
allegedly uttered by the two accused constituting the crime of slander.

On Feb. 1, 1973, the trial court convicted Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave
oral defamation and sentenced each of them the penalty of arresto mayor and was made to pay
the complainant P10,000. Upon appeal in the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision was
modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. Bernardino passed away while this
petition was instituted in the Supreme Court. Francisco, then argues that since the CA had
found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which under Art. 90
of the RPC, prescribes in two months, the CA should have dismissed the case.

Further, Francisco claims that the CA should have acquitted him on the ground that the
said crime had already prescribed as per evidence presented, the alleged defamatory remarks
were committed on December 26, 1965, while the information charged against him was filed
more than four months later.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that "for the purpose of determining the proper
prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in the
information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as said
crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander". Since the prescription for grave
oral defamation is six months, the crime has not yet prescribed when it the information was filed.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office
interrupts the period of prescription. Only 39 days had passed from the time the offense was
allegedly committed to the day of the filing of the complaint.

Issues: Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the CA to be the offense
committed by the petitioners has prescribed.

Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the prescription of an
offense.

Held.

1. Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in the crime
charged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has already prescribed.
To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on
prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

2. Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without
jurisdiction, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. Thus,
the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription.

7. DOMINGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

8. Domondon vs. Sandiganbayan

Crime:

Violation of the Anti-Graft Law under Sec 3 of RA 3019

Facts:

On February and May 1994, four (4) separate informations were filed at the
Sandiganbayanagainst certain officials of the Philippine National Police due to the discovery of
a chain of irregularitieswithin the PNP Commands. The petitioner was included as an accused
on account of his approval of the Advice Allotment in the amount of P5M and P15M respectively
which amounts to a violation of the Anti-Graft Law under Sec 3 of RA 3019.On May 17, 1994,
the Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders, the first was ordering the prosecution todemonstrate
probable complicity in the transaction described in the information and the second order
wasdeffering action on the motion for consolidation considering the uncertainty of the Court in
proceeding thecase at this time and considering that only one of the 15 accused filed a motion
for consolidation. A Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on
August 26, 1997and included petitioner as they were recommended for further prosecution by
the Ombudsman.Petitioner alleges that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the
pertinent cases have beenremanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the

Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has revested" in the latter and "…it is grave abuse
of

discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating these cases.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from proceeding with the hearing and
other incidents of Criminal Case No. 20574 against the petitioner during the pendency of
the petition.

Ruling:

No.The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner are untenable. The Court
explained

:“

Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a
preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances:(1) To
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;(2) When necessary for the
orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;(3) When there is
a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority;(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

9. ONG v. PP of the Philippines

10. SAMSON v. GUINGONA

The facts are as follows:

On July 13, 1995, at about 8:05 p.m., at Scout Reyes Street, Barangay Paligsahan, Quezon
City, patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the intersection of Scout
Reyes Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with Datu Gemie Sinsuat as
passenger. Instantly, the patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in different parts of the body, inflicting
upon him multiple gunshot wounds, causing his death.[4]

In August 1995, PNP-Criminal Investigation Service and Central Police District Command
district director and the heirs of Gemie Sinsuat filed with the Department of Justice a
complaint[5]for murder against Rodolfo Samson, James Bustinera, Pablo Totanes, Adriano Cruz,
and police officers Ernesto Diaz, Fernando Nituan, Jaime de la Cueva, Nestor Tiotioen and
Edwin Villanueva, for the killing of Datu Gemie Sinsuat, a son of a politician from Cotabato, on
July 13, 1995, at Scout Reyes, Barangay Pinagkaisahan, Quezon City.

The case was assigned to Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Velasco.

Accused Diaz, Nituan and dela Cueva admitted killing Datu Sinsuat but claimed self-defense
since according to them, they killed Sinsuat during a shootout. On the other hand, accused
Samson and Totanes denied any participation in the killing and alleged that they arrived at the
scene of the crime after the shooting in response to a radio message requesting for
assistance.[6]

Accused Bustinera and Cruz submitted a separate joint counter-affidavit claiming that they
arrived at the scene of the crime after the shootout. They brought the body of Datu Sinsuat to
the Capitol Medical Center upon instructions of Captain Samson.[7]

After investigation, on October 3, 1995, Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Y. Velasco filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, an information[8] for murder against petitioners and other
police officers, except Nestor Tiotioen and Edwin Villanueva, who turned state witnesses.

On October 3, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Very Urgent Motion for Judicial
Determination of Existence of Probable Cause (with Prayer to Hold the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest)[9] praying:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to personally determine the

existence of probable cause before issuing the warrants for the arrest of the accused, and to
dismiss these cases if it shall determine that no probable cause exists against the accused.

Movants also pray that a warrant of arrest be held in abeyance until after the resolution of this
case or in case a warrant has already been issued to recall the same with respect to the
movants.

On October 9, 1995, the trial court ruled that there was probable cause for the arrest, with no
bail, of accused Ernesto Diaz, Fernando Nituan and Jaime de la Cueva.[10]

On October 18, 1995, the trial court ruled that it was premature to discuss the merits of Exhibits
A to F (for the prosecution) for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering
that these exhibits were not presented during the preliminary investigation of the case and
accused were not furnished copies of the same.[11] The trial court ordered the reinvestigation of
the case with respect to petitioners. Thus-

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds that at the time of the filing of the information for
murder against accused Samson, Totanes, Bustinera and Cruz based on the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation and Resolution dated September 29, 1995 issued
by Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against accused P/Sr. Insp. Rodolfo Samson, PO3 Pablo Totanes, PO3
James Bustinera and PO1 Adriano Cruz.

The Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice or his Assistant Prosecutors is ordered to
reinvestigate this case giving accused Samson, Totanes, Bustinera and Cruz opportunity to
controvert Exhibits A to F with sub-markings.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order. However, before the
Department of Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, on February 6, 1996, petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court the instant petition to enjoin respondents from further proceeding with
the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same.[13]

The issue is whether or not the Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a
reinvestigation of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for determination
of probable cause.

We dismiss the petition.

Petitioners plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the criminal case against them is
not legally permissible.

As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final, to
enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution.[14] With more reason will injunction not lie when the case
is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.[15] However, in extreme cases,
we have laid the following exceptions:

(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is
under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7)
where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.[16]

Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any of the recognized exceptions
above set forth. Petitioners only rely on the probability that a reinvestigation may result in the
remand of the case to the court and the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

We find petitioners plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly without
merit. As a rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.