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Putin's Gamble
Oksana Antonenko
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Putin’s Gamble 49
Putin’s Gamble
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Oksana Antonenko
reasons, Russia is important not only for the war in Afghanistan, but also for
longer-term goals such as targeting terrorist money flows, identifying and
eliminating al-Qaeda cells throughout the world, addressing proliferation of
weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) materials and technologies and finding
effective responses to bio-terrorist threats.
But to translate current cooperation into a long-term strategic relationship, a
number of outstanding divisive issues will require creative solutions. Russia and
the US continue to disagree on missile-defence issues and US plans to scrap the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia and NATO are still divided
over the prospects of further alliance enlargement, particularly the prospective
membership for the Baltic States. The US and its European allies are still
concerned about Russia’s military and civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran
and Russia’s opposition to the continuation of the UN sanction on Iraq. And
finally, Russia continues to experience economic difficulties and to hope for the
improvement of its prospects for integration into the new global economy
through World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership, elimination of trade
barriers with the US and the EU and removal of the debt burden that it inherited
from the Soviet Union.
Russian President Vladimir Putin took a major gamble after 11 September,
setting aside all outstanding strategic disagreements and offering full
Russian support to the US-led coalition against terror. This gamble entails
significant risks to his political future, since large sections of Russia’s public
and political élites do not share his apparent confidence in the American and
European commitment to reward Moscow for its support. Moreover, Putin
risks undermining other important relationships which he and his
predecessor Boris Yeltsin have established in other parts of the world:
strategic partnerships with China and India; military cooperation with Iran;
and renewed ambitions to bolster Russian influence in Central Asia.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
should become a serious partner of the US and the Europeans in shaping the new
global strategic environment.
extraditing Chechen warlords and Arab mercenaries who have found refuge
abroad. In statements following the 11 September attacks, Bush explicitly
mentioned Chechnya as an area where terrorists operate.7 However, in his
address to Congress, the president did not name Chechen groups among the
terrorist organisations that the US intends to target. 8 Nor did these groups
appear on the US State Department’s list of ‘foreign terrorist organisations’. This
indicates the dilemma faced by the US and the Europeans in adjusting their
position towards the war in Chechnya. They have to provide, or at least pledge,
assistance to Russia in dealing with the legitimate targets of its anti-terrorist
campaign – namely foreign mercenaries and the Chechens who are responsible for
terrorist acts in Russia itself and against civilians in Chechnya. But at the same
time, they are determined to continue pressuring Russia to minimise attacks
against civilians, to investigate human-rights violations committed by its forces
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during the military campaign and to promote a political solution to the ongoing
conflict. (There are signs that the last of these three aims is now being met by
negotiations between Moscow and Chechen leaders.)
Similarly, the Americans and Europeans need to strike a reasonable policy
balance regarding Russian worries about terrorist groups operating from the
territory of other CIS states. For example, Moscow wants the US to apply
pressure on Georgia to expel Chechen fighters from its Pankisi Gorge area. This
region, bordering Chechnya, is home to a large ethnic Chechen-Kist population
which has lived on Georgian territory for centuries, as well as many refugees
from the Chechnya conflict. The situation is also largely outside Georgian
government control, a fact that Chechen fighters have taken advantage of.
Georgia, however, has denied the presence of armed groups in the area and
refused Moscow’s requests for joint military operations in the area. Before 11
September Russia had also appealed to the US, UN and OSCE to apply pressure,
but with little effect. This changed somewhat after 11 September. During an
October 2001 visit to the US, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze
admitted that Chechen fighters could be hiding in Pankisi. He authorised the
extradition of 13 armed Chechens who had been arrested after crossing into
Georgia from Russia; Russian sources allege that he also authorised his security
services to seek a deal with other Chechen fighters to move back into Russia. The
result was more trouble: a group under the notorious commander Ruslan Gelaev
left Pankisi and moved into an area of conflict between Georgia and the break-
away ‘republic’ of Abkhazia: there was fighting between the Chechens and
Abkhaz forces which drew in Georgian guerrilla forces on the side of the
Chechens. Georgian authorities accused Russia of military involvement in the
fighting, launching a military campaign under the pretext of the post-11
September war on terrorism. Russia accused Georgia of openly supporting
Chechen guerillas.
The conflict has yet to be resolved; fighting continues with Georgian–Russia
relations in crisis and the international players distracted by other priorities
(despite the fact that international military observers were killed when a UN
helicopter was shot down). This example demonstrates how the US anti-terrorist
campaign in Afghanistan can have direct implications for regions where old
Putin’s Gamble 53
inter-state tensions can escalate into fresh crises, based on new expectations
about the US response.
Similar developments, on a much greater scale, may occur in Central Asia,
where relations between states remain tense and many issues – border
delimitation, the sharing of water resources and energy supply routes – have
been left unresolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia fears that
the US campaign in Afghanistan and the renewed civil war that might follow it
could produce long-term instability in Central Asia, which would directly affect
Russia’s own security. The Central Asian states Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Kazakstan are part of the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty, which so far has
relied primarily on the Russian military for security guarantees (whether
bilateral or through CIS mechanisms such as the CIS Rapid Deployment Force
for Central Asia set up in August 2001). Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty
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in August 1999 but maintains some military ties with Russia, which supplies it
with most of its weapons and military equipment. All of these states are prone
to instability. The most vulnerable is probably Tajikistan: which is still
recovering from its own civil war and fears that the peace process started in
1997 can be undermined by fleeing Taliban and al-Qaeda joining their
supporters among the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Uzbekistan, the
strongest regional power, faces similar security threats from the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). With strong links to both al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, the IMU has staged a number of incursions from Afghanistan since
1998. It is likely to attempt more terrorist attacks, which could include assaults
on US forces at the Kanabad air base.
If the US campaign in Afghanistan were to lead to a wave of Central Asian
instability, Russia might have to commit its military forces – which are in short
supply, following a decade of failed military reforms – to fight another local war
in Central Asia. Giventhe continuing large military presence and financial
commitment required by the fighting in Chechnya, many Russian politicians
have raised concerns over Putin’s unconditional support for the US campaign.
Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Head of the Defence Committee of the Russian State
Duma, appealed for guarantees from the US that it would provide financial and
possibly military support to Russia, should the Central Asian states be
destabilised. On the other hand, some in the Russian military believe that Putin
has gone too far already in allowing US troops to operate from CIS territory.
without treaties, but Moscow hoped that this was an initial bargaining
position. The hope was to be disappointed during Putin’s November trip to
the US. Although Bush made the concession of not announcing a formal
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it was clearly only a temporary delay. And
while Russia welcomed the US intention to remove two-thirds of its strategic
nuclear warheads from operational deployment over the next decade
(bringing its arsenal down to 1,700–2,200 warheads) Putin clearly remains
unhappy about the lack of a treaty. He did pledge to respond with a similar
scale of reductions (which are inevitable anyway due to the aging Russian
nuclear arsenal and financial burden of maintaining it), but he continues to
insist on legally binding and verifiable mechanisms. Similarly, the Russian
president expressed his commitment to preserving the ABM Treaty and
hinted at Russia’s willingness to modify the treaty to allow the US to
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eventually replace the Russia–NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The hope
in Moscow is that the new body might give Russia real decision-making power
within the alliance. The council could address cooperation on intelligence
exchange, monitoring non-state terrorist groups, developing measures against
WMD terrorism and even joint exercises against potential terrorist targets. This
may also encourage Russia to take more decisive action in supporting Western
non-proliferation policies and cutting its military cooperation with states
suspected of proliferation and supporting terrorism, while encouraging more
transparent and effective military reform in Russia.
Conclusion
For the first time since the end of the Cold war, Russia and the NATO allies
share vital security interests. The West also recognises that Russia can make
a real practical contribution to combating global terrorism. The foundation for a
long-term strategic coalition stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok – as
envisioned by the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev – looks plausible again.
The history of the past decade shows, however, that failure to find acceptable
compromises on difficult issues can lead to a serious Russian backlash. After
the Soviet Union cooperated with the West on German reunification and the
Gulf War, the resulting positive momentum dissipated because of NATO
enlargement and the West’s failure to provide meaningful economic
assistance. The rift was deepened by NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo and
Russia’s bloody war in Chechnya.
President Putin has taken a leading role – as well as considerable risks – in
pushing for a qualitative shift in Russia’s strategic relationship with the US and
Europe. It is now up to the NATO allies to respond with similar good will and
imagination to accommodate Moscow’s legitimate strategic concerns and bring
Russia closer to global economic integration. If this chance is missed, the next
ten years are likely to resemble the 1990s: a decade of lost opportunities in
Russian–Western relations. But there would be one ominous difference: the West
no longer enjoys anything like the peaceful invulnerability that it imagined it
had after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
58 Oksana Antonenko
printer/weekly5167.html. 1001596063.html.
8
Ivanov also gave the order to cancel ‘President Bush’s Address on
planned flights and missile launches Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of
in the Pacific Ocean region where the Congress’, New York Times,
37th Long-Range Aviation Group was 21 September 2001, p. A4.
9
holding training exercises. The United Opinion polls taken on 26 September
States thanked Ivanov for taking this indicate that 48% of Russians oppose
step. The air force press service said US strikes against Afghanistan and
that manoeuvres would continue as 34% support them (immediately after
planned until 14 Sepember, but that the September attacks, 61% of
flights and missile launches would Russians supported the US military
take place only within Russian response and 26% opposed it). A 12
territory. October poll taken in Moscow shows
2
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that 57% of Russians do not support
(2001), adopted by the Security the US military operation in
Council at its meeting on Afghanistan, while 41% approve. The
28 September 2001. same poll shows that 72% of Russians
3
Joint statement on counter-terrorism would oppose military action against
issued by Presidents George Bush and other countries identified by
Vladimir Putin, 21 October 2001, Washington as harbouring terrorists,
following bilateral meetings at the such as Iraq, Iran and Libya, while
APEC forum, Shanghai. 25% would support them. Only 14%
4
According to the Russian Defence believe that the US action will destroy
Ministry, by the end of the year terrorist networks, while 64% believe
Russia will have provided the that it will provoke new terrorist
Northern Alliance with $45m. attacks. As a result, 47% of Russians
Defense Ministry spokesman, quoted believe that Russia should maintain
in Igor Korotchenko, ‘Lend-Lease neutrality in its response to the US
from Russian Defense Minister’, military action, 30% believe that
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 October 2001, Russia should provide limited
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2001-10- support, 13% favour strong support
04/1_ivanov.html. and 9% believe that Russia should
5
VTSYOM poll at http:// oppose US military action. In
www.polit.ru/documents/448442. assessing potential Russian support
6
Following the 11 September attacks for the international anti-terrorist
on the US, Russian support for the coalition, 40% of Russians are in
Putin’s Gamble 59
favour of using Russia’s political the supporters of Unity, the most pro-
leverage in the Middle East and 42% presidential political party. VTSYOM
support intelligence sharing. Only 8% polls available at
support offering the US forces http://www.polit.ru/documents/
Russian military bases for conducting 444250.html and http://www/
operations in Afghanistan and a mere polit.ru/documents448442.html.
10
4% support direct Russian ‘Russian defence minister rules out
participation in the military operation. NATO use of Central Asian bases’,
Support for Russia’s strict neutrality Interfax news agency, reported by
in the current anti-terrorist campaign BBC Monitoring, Former Soviet
is particularly strong (63%) among Union, 14 September 2001.
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60 Oksana Antonenko