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Roger Berkowitz
This essay is published in HA: The Journal of the Hannah Arendt Center at Bard College, vol. 6
https://medium.com/amor-mundi/the-four-prejudices-underlying-our-crises-of-democracy-
51833aeb6e82
In the United States, we have a President so boorish, nihilist, and impulsive that he is called a
moron by his own Secretary of State and likened to a mafia boss by the director of the FBI.
President Trump lies so obviously that his constant prevarications have torn asunder our common
reality. His tweets and insults assault the sanity of our daily lives. The President is unwilling to
unambiguously denounce fascists, anti-Semites, and racists. His abuse of women is notorious.
Although President Trump was democratically elected, his victory--alongside the democratic
success of illiberal democrats in Hungary, Turkey, and Russia--raise the specter of the return of
worries relics of a past age. We were, we now know, naîve to believe in the stability of modern
sprouted for cosmopolitan elites in Dubai. We turned a blind eye to resentment against illegal
immigration and applauded as the European Union created a new constitution without a vote. All
the while we ignored how the working classes around the world were hollowed out, squeezed,
disenfranchised, and abandoned; financial markets soared, CEOs paid themselves 370 times the
salary of their average employee, and global cities became our playgrounds. And while this was
happening, we elected Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, three of the least
politically experienced Presidents in our nation's history. Our confidence in the stability of
representative democracy now seems like a dangerous nostalgia for a "golden age of security"
that lasted from the 1950s through to the first decades of the 21st century. Our faith in
representative democracy during the last 50 years could go on only because nobody cared.
In retrospect, it may be possible to mark the beginning of our democratic crisis. In 1962,
President John F. Kennedy gave the commencement address at Yale University. The President
told the graduates they were entering a very different world. Past graduates had found themselves
in a world beset by great questions. When John C. Calhoun graduated in 1804, the nation was
divided over the questions of a national bank and slavery. When William Howard Taft graduated
Yale in 1878, the nation was grappling with questions of reconstruction, the "cross of gold," and
the progressive movement. In the 1930s, at the end of Taft's career, the United States was again
buffeted by forces of political and economic division surrounding economic liberalism and the
New Deal. For nearly 200 years, politics in the United States had been riven by dramatic
disagreements "on which the Nation was sharply and emotionally divided." Such ideological and
political divisions, Kennedy optimistically proclaimed in 1962, were specters of a distant past.
He announced:
"Today these old sweeping issues very largely have disappeared. The central domestic
issues of our time are more subtle and less simple. They relate not to basic clashes of
philosophy or ideology but to ways and means of reaching common goals—to research
for sophisticated solutions to complex and obstinate issues."1
This was one of the worst timed speeches in political history. Kennedy's confidence that major
political questions were behind us—that political problems had transformed into "administrative
or executive problem[s]"—quickly ran into the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the 60's
counterculture, and the Civil Rights revolution; the 1980s brought the Reagan Revolution; the
21st century saw the rise of the Tea Party and the outbreak of Occupy Wall Street. And then there
is Donald Trump.
In spite of being so completely wrong, Kennedy's technocratic faith—his belief that "the kinds of
problems" we face today are those "for which technical answers, not political answers, must be
provided"—sounds eerily familiar. The idea that expert analysis should and would replace
political contestation is bipartisan boilerplate. Tony Blair offered a new free-market Labor Party.
Immanuel Macron, a former investment banker and founder of the Centrist En Marche, and
Angela Merkel of the conservative Christian Democrats are beloved by educated elites because
they elevate competence over ideology. Bill and Hillary Clinton built the former's presidency and
the latter's campaigns on the promise of a third way that melded Blue Dog Democratic centrism
with technocratic competence. George W. Bush, in the midst of a war, depoliticized major
decisions in Iraq by saying that “our commanders on the ground will determine the size of the
troop levels.” And President Barack Obama was deeply deferential to the "expertise of
Rahm Emanuel, and, above all, mainstream economists and bankers such as Larry Summers and
Tim Geithner."2 Relying on administrators, Obama regularly bypassed Congress and governed to
an unprecedented extent through the administrative state. Jedediah Purdy writes that President
It is my thesis that our crisis of democracy is deeply entwined with the rise of the technocratic
and anti-political approach to politics. In a 2016 column, David Brooks sought to defend politics
against what he called the anti-politics of populism. Brooks argued that politics is about the
engagements among plural people who have different opinions in a common public sphere.
Brooks' defense of the messiness of a pluralist politics gets something right. Politics is based upon
what Arendt in The Human Condition calls the "fact of human plurality." Politics is that
centripetal force, a magnetic or charismatic center, around which a diverse and chaotic multitude
gathers and is held together. And the politician is that person who speaks or acts in such a way as
to enable the people to say what they share in common in spite of their differences.
But even as he praises the messiness of politics, Brooks recoils from the tumultuous nature of
populist politics. The problem with populists, he writes, is that they refuse to recognize expertise.
They don't like the social scientists and technocrats that Brooks believes are most qualified to
govern our democracy. He dislikes the Tea Party and also the Bernie Sanders contingent of the left
for the same reason: They want to elect people who are immature political actors, people who
“don’t recognize restraints." The populists Brooks demeans are political precisely in the way that
Kennedy thought was a thing of the past. They are pugilistic rather than bureaucratic. They have
ideologies and they want total victories for themselves. They are not inclined to listen to experts.
Brooks is right that populism can be crude, coarse, and dangerous. Right-and-also-left-wing
governance of stable, liberal representative democracies. With the rise of populist politics in the
United States, Russia, Turkey, and Hungary, traditional liberal democracies are experiencing a
crisis. The weakening of that democratic consensus is scary and dangerous. This is especially so
because it was the weakness of Western democracies in the 1930s that led to the rise of
Driven by real fears, it is only natural to seek to defend the institutions and norms of liberal
representative democracies that are currently under attack. We should and must do so. But so
much reflection on democratic crisis today assumes only the defensive posture of protecting our
crises riddled-democracies; It is my hope that we can take advantage of this crisis to make
democracy stronger.
* * *
A crisis, writes Hannah Arendt, "tears away façades and obliterates prejudices."
"The opportunity provided by the very fact of crisis—which tears away façades and
obliterates prejudices—[is] to explore and inquire into whatever has been laid bare of the
essence of the matter.... A crisis forces us back to the questions themselves and requires
from us either new or old answers, but in any case direct judgments. A crisis becomes a
disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments, that is, with prejudices."6
Populist and authoritarian movements have exposed the fantasy of peaceful, stable, and just
liberal representative democracies. The forgotten middle class has risen up and said enough;
black Americans subject to police violence are insisting that black lives matter. Around the
world, millions of citizens of these democratic regimes are rebelling; they are raising
inclusion and exclusion, ethnic and racial prejudice, and economic and social inequality.
If Arendt is right and a crisis only becomes a disaster when we respond to it with prejudices, we
* * *
In what follows, I suggest four prejudices that have been exposed by our democratic crises. Four
prejudices that we must obliterate; at the very least, we must open ourselves to revisiting these
questions.
First, populist movements have revealed the prejudice widely held by many in this room that
democracy by its very nature is liberal. By liberal, I don't mean left-wing or progressive. The
liberal tradition has its source in the freedom from oppression, whether it be the oppression of
tyrants, aristocrats, oligarchs, or the democratic majority. Liberalism speaks the language of civil
and human rights. The nobility of the liberal tradition is that it recognizes that human beings and
political citizens possess certain natural and political rights that are crucial to the thriving of
human dignity.
Against the liberal tradition of plurality and individual rights, the democratic tradition has its
foundation in the power and equality of the people. As Tocqueville understood, Democracy is
about the “equality of conditions.”7 No one has the traditional, political, or God-given right to
What is too often overlooked is that the liberal and democratic traditions are generally opposed
to each other. 8 Liberalism opposes and suppresses the coarser elements of democratic freedom.
As Tocqueville observed,
"A very civilized society tolerates only with difficulty the trials of freedom in a township.
The civilized community is disgusted at the township's numerous blunders, and is apt to
despair of success before the experiment is completed."9
Tocqueville saw the spirit of the United States in townships governed by farmers, teachers, and
shop owners. The township includes “coarser elements” who resist the educated opinion of the
experts and politicians. Which is why township freedom is usually sacrificed to enlightened
government. A government by elites and experts risks actively disempowering the people.
When liberalism triumphs over democracy, the people no longer feel they have a meaningful
opportunity for participation concerning important decisions. The very idea of democracy as
"government of the people, by the people, and for the people" is too often opposed by elites who
in the name of pluralism and civilization foreclose democratic possibilities and alternative ways
how the victory of a particularly liberal idea of democracy carries with it a democratic deficit
that can contribute to right-wing and also left-wing anti-establishment populist parties.10
* * *
A second prejudice exposed by our crises of democracy is that modern representative democracy
Arendt reminds us, is the gathering of a group of diverse persons around certain common
experiences and shared beliefs. Insofar as political elites—especially those political elites on the
social-democratic left—have defined politics as the pursuit of individual interests, they either
ignore or reject the political need to "mobilise passions and create collective forms of
identifications."11 Elite and technocratic democratic politicians recoil from arguments about
rootedness, belonging, and fundamental questions about how to organize our common world and
shared existence. Technocratic democracy forgets that politics must not only feed the people
bread but also must inspire and give them meaning. It is the rootlessness and homeless of
modern life, Arendt argues in The Origins of Totalitarianism, that leaves people susceptible to
totalitarian movements that satisfy their deep human need for belonging. Human beings need
stories they can tell about themselves that give purpose and significance to their individual
existences; only when our lives are understood to serve some higher purpose can we bear the
pain our insignificant human lives. Especially in the modern age when religious and traditional
explanations of collective purpose have lost their public impact, it is natural that large numbers
of people seek to justify the tribulations of their lives with artificial but coherent collective
narratives. It is because of their prejudice against collective religions, traditional, and national
identities, that liberal democrats cede the terrain of defining what it means to be an American, a
German, or a Turk to right-wing populists who are often the only ones eager to define a national
vision of a people.
* * *
A third prejudice made evident by our worldwide democratic crises is that we imagine our
different opinions and different interests, the moralists of the anti-political elite imagine the
populists as violent outsiders who threaten the post-political consensus. So confident in their
access to the truth, liberal, centrist, and even conservative elites refuse to engage in debate with
those populists who disagree; instead, elites present both right-and-left-wing populists present as
moral enemies to be destroyed and eradicated; they are deplorables and anarchists. The
moralization of the political opposition as evil is much easier than having to consider them as
political adversaries.12 What is more, the moralization of democratic politics makes democracy
impossible insofar as democracy requires that we agree to share a common world with those who
in their plurality are fundamentally different from ourselves. When our opponents are evil, no
common democratic world is possible. On all sides, we can retreat into our comfortable bubbles
of affirmation; we live content in the echo chambers of our superiority. But we recoil from the
hard work of democracy, of listening to and learning to find commonalities with those with
whom we disagree.
* * *
Taken together, these three prejudices—that democracy is liberal, that democracy is individualist,
and that democracy moralizes our opponents as evil and undeserving of sharing in a liberal
Democracy today is prejudiced against politics by its distinct preference for security over
freedom.
The prejudice against politics is governed by a profound fear: the fear that humanity could destroy
itself through politics and through the means of force now at its disposal. Having lived through
totalitarianism, and having witnessed the dropping of nuclear bombs, we today are deeply aware
that politics may well destroy the political and economic worlds we have built; it may also destroy
From out of the fear of politics comes, as Arendt writes, a horrible hope:
“Underlying our prejudices against politics today are hope and fear: the fear that humanity
could destroy itself through politics and through the means of force now at its disposal,
and linked with this fear, the hope that humanity will come to its senses and rid the world,
not of humankind, but of politics. It could do so through a world government that
transforms the state into an administrative machine, resolves political conflicts
bureaucratically, and replaces armies with police forces.”13
Terrified by the danger of politics in an age of horrifying technical power, it is all-too-likely that
democracies will seek to replace politics with technocratic and bureaucratic administration. But
such a hope, Arendt argues, will more likely lead to "a despotism of massive proportions in which
the abyss separating the rulers from the world would be so gigantic that any sort of rebellion
would no longer be possible, not to mention any form of control of the rulers by the ruled." We
will, in other words, trade our political and democratic freedom for the security of expert rule.
Hannah Arendt knew that democratic freedom is tenuous. She famously wrote in The Crises of
“Representative government is in crisis today, partly because it has lost, in the course of
time, all institutions that permitted the citizens’ actual participation, and partly because it
is now gravely affected by the disease from which the party system suffers:
bureaucratization and the two parties’ tendency to represent nobody except the party
machines.”14
Arendt saw the weakness of representative democracy to be its basic idea, that citizens should
Most liberal-minded people today are fearful of public power. We say power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely, but the insufficiency of this formula is lately all too apparent.
We are scared of the power that emerges when people act together. So we prefer a government of
experts, not least because it frees us to spend our time on private pursuits like consumption and
family. The disempowerment of the people in representative democracy embraces our bourgeois
preference to be freed to pursue our individual interests, to be relieved of the duty of politics and
For Arendt, the rise of massive technocratic bureaucracies leads to what she calls “the rule of
nobody.” The fact that politics is apolitical and governed by technocratic departments does not
mean that it is less tyrannical or less despotic. On the contrary, “the fact that no world government
— no despot, per se — could be identified within this world government would in no way change
its despotic character.” Such a bureaucratic government “is more fearsome still, because no one
can speak with or petition this ‘nobody.’”15 Bureaucracy is anti-political because “any sort of
2 Jedediah Purdy, "America's Rejection of the Politics of Barack Obama," The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/obamas-attempt-to-redeem-america/492710/
3 Id.
4 David Brooks, "The Governing Cancer of Our Time," The New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/opinion/the-governing-cancer-of-our-time.html
5 Id.
6 Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education"
7 Tocqueville, Democracy In America.
8 Chantal Mouffe, "The End of Politics and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism," in Populism and
the mirror of democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (2005), 53
9 Tocqueville, Democracy in America.
10 Id. 53.
11 Id. 55.
12 Id. 58.
13 Arendt, The Promise of Politics
14 Hannah Arendt, "Civil Disobedience," in The Crises of The Republic
15 Arendt, "Introduction to Politics," in The Promise of Politics, 97.