VICENTE S. ALMARIO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

532 SCRA 614 (2007)

Courts will not allow one party to enrich himself at the expense of another.
Unjust enrichment: Article 22, CC recognizes the principle that one may not enrich
himself at the expense of another.
Form of "enrichment:" Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial,
physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money

FACTS:

On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 (B-737) First
Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 (A-300) First Officer.
Since said higher position required additional training, he underwent, at PAL‘s expense,
more than five months of training consisting of ground schooling in Manila and flight
simulation in Melbourne, Australia. After completing the training course, Almario served
as A-300 First Officer of PAL, but after eight months of service as such, he tendered his
resignation, for ―personal reasons.‖ Despite a letter coming from PAL to reconsider his
resignation otherwise he will bear the cost of training, Mr. Almario still proceeded with
his resignation.

Later on, PAL filed a Complaint against Almario before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
for reimbursement of P851,107 worth of training costs, attorney‘s fees equivalent to 20%
of the said amount, and costs of litigation. PAL invoked the existence of an innominate
contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his
training, he would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at
least three (3) years. Almario having resigned before the 3-year period, PAL prayed that
he should be ordered to reimburse the costs for his training. In his Answer, Almario
denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would have to render service
to it for three years after his training failing which he would reimburse the training costs.
He pointed out that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the
Airline Pilot‘s Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), of which he was a member, carried
no such agreement.

Mr. Almario‘s contention was confirmed by the RTC but was reversed by the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA found Almario liable under the CBA between PAL and ALPAP
and, in any event, under Article 22 of the Civil Code. Thus, this action for review on
Certiorari by Mr. Almario.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the act of Mr. Almario is in violation of the CBA (YES)

2. Whether or not Almario is obliged to reimburse the costs incurred by PAL for his
training (YES)

HELD:
Article XXIII, Section 1 of the CBA provides that pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall
be frozen in their position and shall not be permitted to occupy any position in the
company‘s turbo-jet fleet. The reason why pilots who are 57 years of age are no longer
qualified to bid for a higher position is because they have only three (3) years left
before the mandatory retirement age of 60 and to send them to training at that age,
PAL would no longer be able to recover whatever training expenses it will have to incur.

Simply put, the foregoing provision clearly and unequivocally recognizes the prohibitive
training cost principle such that it will take a period of at least three (3) years before PAL
could recover from the training expenses it incurred.

The rationale of the three-year period is the prohibitive training costs. At an earlier time,
when the CBA between PAL and its employees were still negotiated, the Secretary of
Labor basically ruled that PAL should be allowed a return on investment for their pilots’
training expenses. Thus, the provisions that pilots 57 years of age shall be frozen and
pilots less than 57, provided they have previously qualified in any company’s turbo-jet
aircraft, shall be permitted to occupy any position in the company’s turbo-jet fleet,
were incorporated in later incarnations of the CBA.

When Almario took the training course, he was about 39 yrs old, 21 yrs away from the
retirement age of 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise and experience he gained
from the training course, he was expected to serve PAL for at least three years to offset
“the prohibitive costs” thereof.

Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher
level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiently
discharge the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover the
training costs by availing of Almario‘s services for at least three years. The expectation
of PAL was not fully realized, however, due to Almario‘s resignation after only eight
months of service following the completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore,
refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust
enrichment1.

1
Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is
appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the
defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered
by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of
property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of
preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the
conditions of life of the defendant.

The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. This
prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-
payment of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the
part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the
plaintiff, however, need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some
relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for
the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived.