16.) PEOPLE vs ROMEO CASTRO. G.R. No.

L-38989 October 29, 1982

FACTS:

 Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, convicting
Romeo Castro of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, and sentencing him "to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Ferdinand Recoco
 Appellant does not dispute his guilt for the death of 9-year old Ferdinand Recoco.
 But he assigns as error the failure of the trial court to appreciate the extenuating
circumstances of defense of his son and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
 The facts established by the prosecution: 4:30 in the afternoon of November 17,
1971, Leonor Gata, aunt of the deceased: when asked why he (Castro) boxed
Recoco replied that he was angered when he saw Ferdinand box his 4-year old son,
Ely. The deceased forthwith admitted having boxed Ely because the latter took a
potshot at him with a water pistol.
 That evening, Ferdinand developed a fever - December 5, 1971, i.e., 13 days after
the incident, he died.
 The appellant's version of the incident: As Ely was walking home, Ferdinand
Recoco approached Ely and boxed him. The appellant immediately ran toward the
place where the boys were and, upon seeing that Ely was being boxed by Ferdinand
for the second time, he hit Ferdinand on the face and pushed him aside. Thereafter
Ferdinand ran away

ISSUE: (I’m not sure. Rather than risk dragging you into my ignorance, I’ll let you discover


HELD: The appeal is impressed with merit.

 For treachery to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be

established that the means, method or manner of execution of the offense was
deliberately and consciously adopted in order to make it impossible or difficult for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
 In the case at bar, appellant had neither the opportunity nor the reason to plan or
deliberate on the mode of execution of the crime because he undoubtedly acted at
the impulse of the moment. Treachery must therefore be ruled out.
 Moreover, the lower court's conclusion that appellant dealt successive blows on the
deceased finds no basis in the physical evidence adduced at the trial. The
testimonies of these doctors strongly corroborate the defense version that appellant
merely gave one fist blow on the deceased.
 Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the appellant's act was
executed, as well as the marked disproportion between the means employed and the
ultimate consequence thereof, the appellant's claim that he merely intended to
chastise Ferdinand, and not to do away with him, deserves the fullest credence. On
this premise, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
should be appreciated in his favor.
 As heretofore stated, appellant does not seek acquittal, for he does not justify his act.
But in passing judgment upon his criminal liability, it behooves the Court to consider
the cause or motive that impelled him to act as did. This is not to justify the offense
he committed, but only to demonstrate the lesser degree of depravity in his act.
  The trial court, in brushing aside appellant's claim of passion and obfuscation, opined
that the act of Ferdinand in boxing appellant's 4-year old son was too trivial and
insignificant to have produced the passion or obfuscation contemplated by law. But
while the cause would indeed seem trivial and slight, it is nevertheless to be noted
that the appellant's actuation arose from a natural instinct that impels a father to rush
to the rescue of a beleaguered son
 Under the circumstances aforementioned, We hold that appellant is guilty only of the
crime of homicide, mitigated by two mitigating circumstances, to wit: (1) lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong; and (2) passion and obfuscation.

17.) JOB QUIAL VS CA and the PEOPLE. G.R. No. L-63564 November 28, 1983

The Court has resolved to grant partial due course to this petition as regards petitioner's
claim to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Job Quial, while intoxicated, hit a certain Edmundo Sebido with a single fist blow on the face,
causing the latter to fall with his head hitting the asphalted road, resulting in head injuries
which eventually cause his death. Indicted, Quial was Convicted of homicide by the Court of
First Instance of Palawan, from which an appeal was taken to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. The latter court affirmed the appealed decision with modifications, prompting the
appellant to file the instant petition for review praying for a reduced penalty in view of the
alleged presence of two additional mitigating circumstances: lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong and voluntary surrender.

Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
Barring exceptional circumstances indicating otherwise, such as clear physical capability to
inflict a fatal blow, an intention to kill cannot be deduced from a single fist blow, especially
when the assailant, as in the case at bar, was intoxicated when the attack took place.

On the other hand, the petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. While he did not hide from the authorities after the boxing incident, he did not
voluntarily surrender either. It was only when he was served the warrant for his arrest on
July 17, 1975 that he gave himself up to the police.

Voluntary surrender does not simply mean non-flight. As a matter of law, it does not matter if
the accused never avoided arrest and never hid or fled. What the law considers as mitigating
is the voluntary surrender of an accused before his arrest, showing either acknowledgment
of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities from the trouble and expense that his
search and capture would require.

There being two mitigating circumstances in favor of the petitioner, intoxication as found by
the Intermediate Appellate Court and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, and no
aggravating circumstance, he is entitled to the penalty one degree lower than that provided
by law for homicide.

WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is hereby reduced to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories provided for by law. The
appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects. No costs.
18.) PEOPLE VS CAYETANO RODRIGUEZ. G.R. No. L-41263 December 15, 1982

FACTS:

 Between eight and nine o'clock in the evening of February 1, 1972, a shot from
Rodriguez's rifle wounded his neighbor and alleged friend, Domingo Balisi, 31.
Although seriously wounded, he managed to enter his father's house, followed by
Quirino, Cammayo and Rodriguez himself. The gunwielder was silent when
Cammayo asked him why he shot Domingo.
 When asked by his wife, the barrio capt., and a Constabulary investigator at the
hospital, same reply from Balisi: identified Rodriguez as his assailant. As testified by
Domingo's widow, Olimpia, the motive for the cold-blooded assassination was
Rodriguez's infatuation for her.
 Domingo died on that same night while he was being transferred to the provincial
hospital. The chief of police confiscated from the wife of Rodriguez the rifle used in
the shooting. Rodriguez was not in his house. He went into hiding.
 The version of Rodriguez was that while he was pursuing a dog that was running with
his kettle of cooked fish, he allegedly fired at the dog when it was about to enter
Quirino Balisi's yard - that the wounding was accidental and unintentional. Rodriguez
said that he was the one who procured the jeep that brought Domingo t/ the
emergency hospital but he did not go with the jeep because he was afraid that he
might be harmed. He testified that when he was informed that there was a warrant for
his arrest, he surrendered to the chief of police.
 However, the record shows that the warrant dated February 12, 1972 was served
upon him in March, 1972 and he posted his bail bond on the 15th of that month. He
appeared before the Constabulary detachment at San Jose only after a release order
was issued by the municipal court.

ISSUE:

Whether Cayetano Rodriguez, 37 a former policeman, accidentally shot Domingo Balisi, as

claimed by the said accused, or maliciously shot the victim, as claimed by the prosecution

HELD:

 The trial court correctly found that Rodriguez liquidated Domingo in order to eliminate
any legal and moral impediment to his winning the love of Domingo's wife.
 It did not err in holding that Rodriguez's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
because his testimony that the shooting was accidental appears to be a palpable
fabrication.
 appellant's alternative contention that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance is untenable. Rodriguez intended
to kill Domingo. He used a deadly weapon in consummating the killing.
 Nor can voluntary surrender to the authorities be appreciated in appellant's favor, as
argued by his counsel and as recommended by the Solicitor General. Appellant
 surrendered only after a warrant for his arrest was issued and he had found it futile to
continue being a fugitive from justice.
 The trial court did not err in holding that the crime committed was murder qualified by
treachery. Rodriguez made a sudden, deliberate and surprise attack on the unwary
and unarmed victim.
 the trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED

19.) ROBERTO LICYAYO VS PEOPLE. G.R. No. 169425

FACTS:

 16 February 1992, victim Rufino Guay (Rufino), along with his friends, Jeffrey and a
certain Joel Dumangeng (Joel) attended a wedding at Mabbalat, Kiangan,
Ifugao. Petitioner, together with his friends, Paul and Oliver, were also present at the
same wedding.
 While both groups were at a local store drinking / buying gin, a brawl occurred
between Rufino and Aron. Rufino fell to the ground. Aron thereafter placed himself on
top of Rufino and punched the latter several times. Jeffrey approached the two and
tried to pacify them. Paul entered the scene and punched Jeffrey on the
head. Thereupon, a scuffle followed.
 Officers Danglay, Buyayo and Baguilat heard some individuals calling for police
assistance. Officer Buyayo approached petitioner and held the latters back collar to
prevent him from joining the fray. Petitioner turned around, faced Officer Buyayo, and
tried to stab the latter but he missed. Officer Buyayo retreated. The officers
introduced themselves to petitioner as policemen and pleaded with him to put down
the knife. Petitioner ignored the officers pleas.
 1 February 1993, an Information[6] in Criminal Case No. 819 (Homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code) was filed before the RTC. On 11 May 1993, an
Amended Information[7] in Criminal Case No. 820 was filed before the RTC accusing
petitioner of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial.
 the RTC rendered a Decision dated 20 February 2003, finding petitioner guilty of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 819. It acquitted Aron and Paul because the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. It did not rule on the liability
of Oliver because he was not arraigned in the said case. Further, it dismissed
Criminal Case No. 820 for direct assault because petitioner was not arraigned
therein. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court
denied.

ISSUE:

WON: the information filed is not sufficient as it did not specifically charged petitioner for the
crime of homicide defined and penalized under article 249 of the revised penal code; hence,
petitioner could not be validly convicted for said crime.
WON: granting that the information is sufficient, petitioner is entitled to the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation and intoxication

HELD:

 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The information in the
instant case contains the foregoing required statements. The information mentions
the name of petitioner as the accused, the name of Rufino as the offended party, the
date and place of the commission of the crime, and designates the crime committed
by petitioner as homicide. It also alleges the act of petitioner constituting homicide
which is the unlawful stabbing of Rufino with the use of a bladed weapon. The fact
that the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, does not make it
defective. There is nothing in the afore-quoted Rules which specifically requires that
the information must state the particular law under which the accused is charged in
order for it to be considered sufficient and valid. What the Rules merely require,
among other things, is that the information must designate the offense charged and
aver the acts constituting it
 Under paragraph 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a criminal liability may be
mitigated if there was sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party which
immediately preceded the act complained of. To avail oneself of this mitigating
circumstance, it must be duly proven that the alleged provocation originated from the
offended party. The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and
Aron started the brawl which resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. What is
evident is that Rufino and Aron suddenly and unexpectedly grappled during the
incident. Since it was not convincingly shown that the alleged provocation originated
from Rufino, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation should not be
appreciated in favor of petitioner. For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating
circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the willpower of the
accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the
wrongfulness of his acts.
 the petition is hereby DENIED

20.) FELIPE NAVARRO VS CA AND PEOPLE. G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999

FACTS:

 certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals inding petitioner Felipe Navarro
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
 Evidence show that Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers. Scuffle
 with Management ensued due to them taking pictures. Jalbuena and his
companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on
duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station.
 Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?". At this
point, Lingan intervened. After some heated exchange, Lingan said: "Masyado kang
abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro
replied: "Ah, ganoon?" As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him
with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood
flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow
on the forehead which floored him.
 Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
between petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE:

WON: the honorable court of appeals has decided the case not in accord with law and with
the applicable decisions of the supreme court. its conclusion is a finding based on
speculation, surmise or conjecture; the inference it made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; it committed grave abuse of discretion; its judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; its finding is contradicted by evidence on record; and its finding is
devoid of support in the record.

RULING: The appeal is without merit.

 Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the

ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of
a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason
alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial
expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent
to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence. In the instant
case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight
to the testimony of Jalbuena.
 It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording
is not prohibited.
 The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter
of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred
involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
 Medical testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit
Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the
forehead with his fist.
 It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party immediately preceding the act should have been
appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or
 improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating
anyone. The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.
To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which
must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. And it must immediately precede the
act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended
party and the commission of the crime by the accused. In the present case, the
remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted
sufficient provocation. Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had
no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be
appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after
the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the
latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining
the penalty.
 However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where
the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be
appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right
in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions.
 The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was
homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum
period.44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification