Cuizon vs.

Ramolete
Francisco Cuizon et al. vs. Hon. Jose R. Ramolete
May 29, 1984 | Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City
docketed as L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters, Rufina
and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of
Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al.

Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration
and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same
year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978.

During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to
herself all the property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and renounced and
waived whatever rights and interests and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of
the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was
issued in favor of the petitioners.

In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as administrator, was
appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s
estate and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The Cebu CFI granted the
same.

Issue: Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a TCT issued in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said
parcels of have been?

Held: No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven
years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to
the proceedings.

In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.”

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name
of third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate.

Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate
and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
SAN DIEGO v NOMBRE (Yap)

11 SCRA 165, May 29, 1964

Petitioner/s: MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR.

Respondent/s: ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR

Doctrine: The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is
appointed by the court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of
the estate. Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not
required in agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which law gives the
principal in limiting the powers and rights of an agent stems from the fact that control by the principal can
only be through agreements. Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific
provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.

Facts:

(1) Respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator. As such, he leased
one of the properties of the estate—a fishpond—to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The
terms of the lease was for 3 years, with a yearly rental of P3,000. The transaction was done
without previous authority or approval of the Court.

(2) A year after, Nombre was removed as administrator, and was replaced by one Sofronio
Campillanos. Escalanlar was cited for contempt for allegedly refusing to surrender the fishpond to
the newly appointed administrator.

(3) Subsequently, Campillanos filed a motion for authority to execute a lease contract over the
fishpond, in favor of petitioner Moises San Diego, for 5 years with yearly rental of P5,000.
Escalanlar was not notified of the said motion. Nombre, on the other hand, opposed to the
motion, pointing out that the fishpond was leased by him to Escalandar for 3 years. He alleged
that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator must be recognized
unless declared void in a separate action.

(4) The lower court declared the contract in favor of Escanlar null and void for want of judicial
authority and that San Diego offered better lease conditions than Escanlar. In light of this,
Escanlar agreed to increase the rental to P5,000 after the termination of his original contract.
However, the trial judge stated that such contract was fraudulent and executed in bad faith
because Nombre was removed as administrator and the rentals of the property was inadequate.

(5) However, on appeal, the CA ruled:

No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant lease of property placed under
his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Art. 1647, it is only when the lease is to be
recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus,
regardless of the period of lease, there is no need for special authority unless the contract is to be
recorded in the Registry.
 Rule 85, Sec. 3 of the ROC authorizes a judicial administrator to administer the estate of the
deceased not disposed by will, for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore,
exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court; such as the leasing the
property. And where the lease has been formally entered into, the court cannot, in the same
proceeding, annul the same. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator
or the heirs to annul the lease.

(6) On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that Art. 1878(8) limits the right of a judicial
administrator to lease the real property without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds 1
year. The lease in favor of Escalanlar, being 3 years and without court approval, is therefore void.

Issue: W/N the provisions on Agency should apply in this case. (NO)

Held:

The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed
by the court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate.
Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not required in
agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which law gives the principal in
limiting the powers and rights of an agent stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be
through agreements. Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law
and orders of the appointing court.

Fallo: The decision of the CA was affirmed.

Rule 84: General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators

G.R. No. L-28214 — Jaroda v. Cusi

Reyes, J.

The special administrator of the decedent’s estate filed two petitions in the special proceeding, which the lower court
duly granted. One petition asked for permission to withdraw cash from the decedent’s bank account, while the other
prayed for the granting of a power of attorney to allow the special administrator to act as an agent in selling the
decedent’s property. The petitioner moved to nullify such orders.

DOCTRINE
It is highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A
judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

FACTS

1. The decedent Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate, leaving:

a. An estate consisting of real and personal property, including:
i. A share in the co-ownership of Juna Subdivision
ii. Cash deposited in several bank accounts
b. Forced heirs such as:
i. His surviving spouse
ii. Nine children (including the petitioner Natividad Jaroda)
iii. Four grandchildren (including the respondent Antonio Tan)
2. The respondent Tan commenced the intestate special proceedings by filing a petition for administration in
CFI Davao. He was first appointed as special administrator and subsequently as the regular administrator.
3. Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of cash from PNB, which sums were actually not listed in his
petition.
a. He alleged that these sums were held in trust for the decedent’s co-owners in the subdivision.
b. This was granted by the lower court.
4. Tan also filed a petition with lower the court, praying for the approval of the court of a power of attorney
which appointed Tan as an attorney-in-fact to sell the decedent’s share in the subdivision.
a. This was also granted by the lower court.
5. The petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders. However, this was denied by the CFI for lack of merit.
6. Jaroda appealed from this, but the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from
was interlocutory. Jaroda then filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus but
the SC dismissed the petition, adding in its resolution that appeal in due time is the remedy.
7. Hence this petition for certiorari, alleging that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as the respondent
Tan continued to sell lots of lands from the subdivision, to the detriment of Jaroda and the other heirs.

ISSUE with HOLDING

WoN the lower court acted in GAOD in granting both orders? Yes. The Court found that the lower court
committed GAOD in granting both orders.

1. Re: power to withdraw bank deposits for the co-owners.

a. The Court found that the lower court committed GAOD in granting the order allowing the
respondent to withdraw the bank deposits standing the name of the decedent.
b. Such withdrawal, according to the Court, is foreign to the duties and powers of a special
administrator. This was provided in Section 2, Rule 80, which states that a special administrator
can:
i. “take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
decease and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall
not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.”
c. Also, the order was issued without notice to and hearing of the heirs of the deceased.
i. The Court specifically mentioned here that while the withdrawal of the bank deposits may
be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the estate (which is
 within the powers of a special administrator), such withdrawal is a waiver by the special
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the estate to the bank deposits in favor of
the co-owners. Such an action required notice to the heirs.

2. Re: power to act as attorney-in-fact.

a. The Court also found that the lower court committed GAOD in granting the order allowing the
respondent to act as attorney-in-fact in selling the decedent’s share in the subdivision.
b. The order approving the power of attorney is void for want of notice and for approving an improper
contract.
c. More importantly, the Court noted that an administrator is not permitted to deal with himself
as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property.
i. The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule, auto-contracts are permissible
if not expressly prohibited, and that there is no express provision of law prohibiting an
administrator from appointing himself as his own agent, even if correct, cannot and
should not apply to administrator of decedent's estates, in view of the fiduciary
relationship that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
responsibilities toward the probate court.
ii. The court below also failed to notice that after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille, the
administrator Tan had replaced said deceased as manager of the Juna Subdivision
by authority of the other co-owners.
iii. By the court's questioned order of 3 September 1965 empowering him to represent the
interest of the deceased in the management of the subdivision, the administrator Tan
came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals: the court and the
heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on
the other, in managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision.
iv. This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense
of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable, if
not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the
court that appointed him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the
orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of 5 May 1965 and 3 September 1965 of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. 1391, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. The
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. Costs against the respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan,
in his personal capacity.

DIGESTER: Jose Ranulfo R. Mendoza

MAURO P. MANANQUIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, respondent.

A.M. No. 2430; August 30, 1990
CORTES
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession
and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the
estate even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1
(1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].
FACTS:
1. This is a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.
 2. It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina
Zerna.

3. In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over
several lots included in Zerna’s estate.

4. The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.

5. It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE
VILLEGAS.

6. When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL
alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS
should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were renewed,
VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator.

ISSUE: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease.
RULING:
NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the
estate even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1
(1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].
Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the
probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to
notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.
Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent subject to disciplinary
sanction for having, as counsel of record for the administrator in Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978
of renewals of the lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which
respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing partner.
By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through
the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned in that article.
The disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is grounded on public policy considerations which disallow the
transactions entered into by them, whether directly or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised
by these individuals over the properties or rights covered [See Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973, 51 SCRA 120; Maharlika
Publishing Corporation v. Tagle, G.R. No. 65594, July 9, 1986, 142 SCRA 553; Fornilda v. The Branch 164, RTC Fourth Judicial Region,
Pasig, G.R. No. 72306, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 281 and January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 351].
Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE
JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the
prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to
lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through
the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose
Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his
client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution, with a
warning that future misconduct on respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of
the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Villegas.
SO ORDERED.
Tumang vs. Laguio (G.R. No. L-50277 February 14, 1980)

Facts: The widow of the deceased Dominador Tumang, Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix
and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely terminated
and closed with respect to herself and two of her children. The petition was premised on the fact
that the aforesaid heirs had already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to them,
and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names, there was need for an order of
the court declaring the proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was
opposed by appellee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that appellee,
as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them and that
there could be no partial termination of the proceedings.

Tumang, as required by the court, filed a "Compliance", alleging that the estate and
inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that as certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court, no claim
has been presented that has not already delivered all the properties and dividends of the shares
of stock adjudicated to her and her minor children since the approval of the original and
amendatory projects of partition; and that with such admission, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to entertain the motion under consideration.

In view thereof, the opposition and the motion for reconsideration was denied, the court
ratiocinating that counter-petitioner's receipt of the cash dividends in question without first
requiring the administratrix the accounting being sought to be rendered for purposes of
determining the correctness of the cash dividends, constituted a waiver to question its
correctness.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have waived the right to demand accounting.

Ruling:

No, the right to demand accounting have not been waived.

The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of

an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be
performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed
and terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact
that the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require
supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall
render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled.

[G.R. No. L-4090. January 31, 1952.]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED HONOFRE LEYSON, deceased. VICTORIO L. RODRIGUEZ,
administrator-appellant, and MARGARITA LEYSON LAURENTE, heiress-appellant, v. PABLO M. SILVA,
 movant-appellee.
Eliseo Caunca, for Appellants.
Fidel J. Silva, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR; ADMINISTRATOR’S FEE. — The court may fix an administrator’s or
executor’s fee in excess of the fees prescribed by sec. 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court where the estate is large, and
the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator.

2. ID.; DISCRETION OF COURT IN FIXING AMOUNT OF ADMINISTRATOR’S FEE. — The amount of an executor’s
fee allowed by the Court of First Instance in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal, except for
an abuse of discretion (Rosenstock v. Elser, 48 Phil. 709).

3. ID.; ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; ADMINISTRATOR’S FEE. — Although being a lawyer is by itself not a factor in the
assessment of an adminstrator’s fee, it should be otherwise when the administrator was able to stop what appeared
to be an improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at an
additional expense to the estate.

4. APPEAL; ESTOPPEL; QUESTION OF LAW; ALLEGATION IN APPELLEE’S BRIEF. — Where the appeal was
elevated to the Supreme Court on the appellant’s manifestation that they would raise only questions of law and that
no question of fact would be discussed, the appellants are estopped from contesting the facts alleged in the
appellee’s brief regarding the work the latter performed, if the order of which the appellants complain does not state
such work.

5. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATION; BOND; LIABILITY OF SURETIES ON THE BOND. — Where the land did
not come into the administrator’s hands in pursuance or in the course of his administration and that it was not
included in the inventory prepared by or in conjunction with the administrator, the cancellation of the bond should not
be withheld. Even if the administrator has no valid title to the lot, the sureties are not chargeable for it on the bond.
The administrator’s liability is personal and exclusive of the sureties.

FACTS:

This appeal is from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Honorable Rafael Amparo, Judge, authorizing
the cancellation of the bond of Pablo M. Silva who had resigned as joint administrator of the intestate estate of
Honofre Leyson, deceased, and allowing Silva P600 as compensation for his services. The appellants are the
remaining administrator and an heir of the deceased.

ISSUE:

1. May the court fix an administrator’s or executor’s fee in excess of the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule
85, which follows?
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in cancelling Mr. Pablo M. Silva’s administrator bond, inasmuch as few
months before the issuance of said order dated August 19, 1950, granting his resignation, he secured the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13 (6947) Quezon City, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
11778-Manila, issued in the name of Honofre Leyson, and in their stead another titles were issued in the
name of Pablo M. Silva, the herein appellee, in a doubtful manner.

HELD:

1. Yes. It will be seen from this provision that a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case, where the
estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or administrator." And so it has been held that "the amount of an
 executor’s fee allowed by the Court of First Instance in any special case under the provisions of Section 680
of the Code of Civil Procedure is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be
disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of discretion." (Rosenstock, v. Elser, 48 Phil. 709.)

The fact that the appellee is an attorney-at-law has served the estate in good stead, and this ought not to be
lost sight of. Although being a lawyer is by itself not a factor in the assessment of an administrator’s fee, it
should be otherwise when as in this case the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an
improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at an
additional expense to the estate.

Section 7, Rule 85

Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services
as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. — An executor or
administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses the care, management, and settlement of
the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed,
or a commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and is
finally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by
delivery to heirs or devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value,
one per centum of so much of such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed
thirty thousand pesos, one-half per centum of so much of such value as exceed one hundred
thousand pesos. But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been
attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor
or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the
allowance may be re-examined on appeal.

If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be

apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by them
respectively.

When the executors or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.

When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his
executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written
instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the
will.

2. There is no showing that De Silva was guilty of misappropriation or of any of the acts of commission or
omission for which his bond could be held liable under Rule 85. The sole ground for the insistence that this
cancellation should have been withheld is that the appellee is in possession of a residential lot in Cubao,
Quezon City, which belonged to the deceased Honofre Leyson. But the appellee claims that this lot was sold
to him by Leyson on March 2, 1945. Certainly it was already in his possession when he and appellant
Rodriguez took over the administration from the special administratrix. This land therefore did not come into
De Silva’s hands in pursuance or in the course of his administration, and neither was it included in the
inventory prepared by or in conjunction with one of the appellants. Even granting then, for the sake of
argument, that De Silva has no valid title to this lot, the sureties are not chargeable for it on the bond. De
Silva’s liability is personal and exclusive of the sureties who are the parties mostly affected by the third
assignment of error.

Moreover, there is a pending suit over this property and that suit affords the estate ample protection against
the said property being alienated pending final disposition of the litigation.

Upon the foregoing consideration, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Where the land did not come into the administrator’s hands in pursuance or in the course of his administration and
that it was not included in the inventory prepared by or in conjunction with the administrator, the cancellation of the
bond should not be withheld. Even if the administrator has no valid title to the lot, the sureties are not chargeable for it
on the bond. The administrator’s liability is personal and exclusive of the sureties.

Notes: what happens to cases pending the death of the defendant?

Philippine Trust Co. v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (2008)

Petitioner: Philippine Trust Co. , Intestate Estate of James Burt

Respondent: Luzon Surety Co. Inc. (1961)

Ponente: Dizon ,J.

Doctrine: Actions against administrator who disbursed funds of the estate without authority will result in the
forfeiture of the administrator’s bond, aside from criminal liability of estafa.

FACTS:

1. CFI Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt
upon a bond of P1K, with Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety.
2. For reasons that do not fully appear of record, the Court dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed the
Phil. Trust in his place.
3. Phil Trust submitted an inventory-report showing the sum of P57.75 as the only asset left of the Intestate
Estate of Burt.
a. The Court, upon review of the record of the case, found that Picard’s previous inventory of the estate of
the deceased had around P7k balance (after deducting expenses).
4. Court ordered Picard to deliver within 48 hours from the receipt of a copy of the Order the P7K (balance less
the P57.75) to Phil. Trust Company. Otherwise, he will be imprisoned for contempt until he complies with the
order.
5. In compliance with the Order, Picard submitted an itemized statement of disbursements made by him as
administrator of the estate, showing additional expenses such as burial expenses, sums of money given to
deceased adoptive son, leaving a balance of around P900.
6. Court issued an Order finding Picard guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amounting to about P8K
without authority.
7. For this reason, the Court referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation. – Picard prosecuted
for estafa.
a. Picard pleaded guilty estafa. Civil liability -P8K.
8. Thereafter, Court issued an order requiring Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond
filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated.
9. Luzon filed a motion to set aside said order upon the following grounds: firstly, that the Court cannot order
the confiscation of the administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate
of James R. Burt having been shown, and secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute
the probate bond."
10. Court denied the motion as well as the MR.

ISSUES: WON probate court, ex proprio motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's
bond.

RULING + RATIO: Yes. Probate Court can order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator’s bond.

1. In the Philippine jurisdiction, probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but
also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond.
a. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the
administration proceedings as much as it’s filing and the fixing of its amount.
b. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond executed in the same probate
proceeding.
2. Also, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Picard shall faithfully execute the orders and
decrees of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force
and effect.
3. Luzon’s contention that it was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of its bond because no
prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or other interested person has been proved is also without merit
a. According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the
sum of P200 and P3K, respectively, were approved by the probate court but the same have remained
unpaid because of lack of funds.
4. Luzon also claims that it had been released from liability as surety because it received no notice of the
proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the administrator. This contention we also find to
be untenable.
a. From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's bond — which makes
him privy to the proceedings against his principal — he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud
and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party to the
proceeding.
b. De Mendoza vs. Pacheco: the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable thereon although they
were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator, nor were they notified in connection
therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the bond.
5. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of an
executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting."—
meaning, sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts
of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.