Pagarigan vs Yague

GR 195203 April 20, 2015

Facts:
Anastacio Yague (Anastacio), the previous owner of a parcel of rice land located at Brgy. San Carlos,
Paniqui, Tarlac, had initially instituted his stepfather Macario Pagarigan (Macario) as tenant of the
land.Macario, with the help of his son Alfonso Pagarigan (Alfonso), cultivated the land and, as agreed upon,
shared equally the land's yearly harvest with Anastacio.

Allegedly with Anastacio's consent, Alfonso became tenant of the land in place of his ailing father sometime
in 1957. Subsequently, Anastacio transferred the title of the subject rice land to his daughters, Angelita
Yague and Shirley Asuncion (respondents).

The respondents were prompted to conduct an investigation when they did not receive any share in the
land's harvest in 1999 where they found out that the petitoner, Antonio Pagarigan, is the one cultivating
their land without their consent.

The respondents demanded that the petitioner vacate the property. They also argued that the petitioner's
house and the two fishponds on the property were constructed without their knowledge and consent,and
that the petitioner even allowed his son to build a house on the property without first seeking their
permission.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that his father Anastacio consented to his institution as tenant of
the land and to the construction of his house on the property. He also argues that an implied tenancy was
already created between him and the respondents because of the latter's acceptance of his deliveries
of palay.

Failure of the parties to reach a settlement before the barangay and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
resulted in the ejectment complaint the respondents filed against the petitioner before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, DARAB, Region III, which ruled in favor of the respondents. The
said decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Is there an implied tenancy between the respondents and the petitioner?

RUling:

None. The SC enumerated the essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship which are the
following: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of
the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee. The SC ruled that in the present case, the element of consent from the landowner to
the petitioner's tenancy is absent.

The SC also held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter hew long, will not ipso
facto make one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal
cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner. It emphasized that the presence of a tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed since the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done
away with by mere conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of
facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.

G.R. No. 155580

ROMEO T. CALUZOR vs DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
LORENZO LLANILLO, and MOLD EX REALTY CORPORTATION, Respondent.
Facts:
Lorenzo Llanillo owned the parcel of land (land) situated in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan. The
petitioner averred that Lorenzo took him into the land as a tenant in 1970, giving to him a sketch that
indicated the boundaries of the portion he would be cultivating.
 To effectively till the land, the petitioner and his family were allowed to build a makeshift shanty
thereon. Even after the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of his produce to the family
of Lorenzo through Ricardo Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzo’s overseer.
Respondent Deogracias Lanillo (Deogracias), the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner
P17,000.00/hectare of the cultivated land in exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias. In the end,
Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead, Deogracias and persons acting under his orders forcibly
ejected the petitioner and his family by levelling their shanty and plantation with the use of a bulldozer.
The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council to conciliate failed; hence, the authority to file a case
was issued to the petitioner.
The petitioner instituted this case against Deogracias in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in Malolos, Bulacan, demanding the payment of disturbance compensation.
He impleaded Moldex Realty Corporation (Moldex) as an additional defendant upon discovering that the
latter had entered the land to develop it into a residential subdivision. He prayed for the restoration of his
possession of the tilled land, and the payment of disturbance compensation.
Deogracias denied that any tenancy relationship between him and the petitioner existed; and that
the land in controversy had not been tenanted.

Issue:
1. WON tenancy relationship exists between the petitioner and the respondent Deogracias.
2. WON the petitioner is entitled to the payment of disturbance compensation.
Ruling:
1. According to the SC, For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following elements must
be shown to concur, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the
purpose is of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved
by substantial evidence; this means that the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a
de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure or to be covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not shown to be presented in this
case. To prove the element of consent between the parties, the petitioner testified that Lorenzo
had allowed him to cultivate the land by giving to him the sketch of the lot in order to delineate
the portion for his tillage.
Yet, the sketch did not establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the petitioner in as
his agricultural tenant. This element demanded that the landowner and the tenant should have
agreed to the relationship freely and voluntarily, with neither of them unduly imposing his will
on the other. The petitioner did not make such a showing of consent.
The sixth element was not also established. Even assuming that Lorenzo had verbally
permitted the petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy relationship between them thereby set
in because they had not admittedly discussed any fruit sharing scheme, with Lorenzo simply
telling him simply that he would just ask his share from him.32 The petitioner disclosed that
he did not see Lorenzo again from the time he had received the sketch until Lorenzo’s death.33
Although the petitioner asserted that he had continued sharing the fruits of his cultivation
through Ricardo, Lorenzo’s caretaker, even after Lorenzo’s death, producing the list of produce
to support his claim,34 the list did not indicate Ricardo’s receiving the fruits listed therein. The
petitioner did not also contain Ricardo’s authority to receive Leonardo’s share.
Harvest sharing is a vital element of every tenancy. Common sense dictated, indeed, that
the petitioner, if he were the de jure tenant that he represented himself to be, should fully know
his arrangement with the landowner. But he did not sufficiently and persuasively show such
arrangement. His inability to specify the sharing arrangement was inconceivable inasmuch as
he had depended on the arrangement for his own sustenance and that of his own family. The
absence of the clear-cut sharing agreement between him and Lorenzo could only signify that
the latter had merely tolerated his having tilled the land sans tenancy.
 It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land will not
ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove
personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner. Substantial evidence
necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence;
there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because
selfserving statements are inadequate. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements
for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by conjectures. Leasehold
relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship,
the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial. For implied tenancy to
arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.
2. The petitioner was not entitled to disturbance compensation because he was not the de jure
tenant of the landowner.
It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance compensation to be validly made by a
de jure tenant must meet the procedural and substantive conditions listed in Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 3844, to wit:
Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The agricultural lessee shall have the right
to be indemnified for the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting
and other expenses incidental to the improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or abandons
his landholding for just cause or is eje ition, he has the right to be indemnified for one-half of
the necessary and useful improvements made by him on the landholding: Provided, That these
improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time of surrender and/or
abandonment of the landholding, at which time their value shall be determined for the purpose
of the indemnity for improvements.

Caballes vs DAR
GR No. 78214 December 5, 1988

Facts: The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters was
acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes (petitioner) executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes
(Andrea) in 1978. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square
meters, situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu, which was also sold to the petioner spouses.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed
his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of ₱2.00 to the owner, Andrea
Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the
produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis.

As new owners, the spouses asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they needed the property, but
Abajon refused. On 1982, Yolanda Caballes filed a criminal case for malicious mischief against Abajon
after the latter cut down the banana plants on the property worth about ₱50.00.

The Regional Director of DAR held that there is the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.
On appeal by the petitioner, the Secretary of DAR, reversed the decision of the Regional Director. Upon
motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the New DAR Secretary sets aside the previous
decision and finds the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties (because of the 50-50 sharing
of the crops ebtween Abajon and Andrea. Invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, the MAR ruled that
'the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy.

Issue:
WoN the respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter portion
of a commercial lot of the petitioner

Ruling:

No. The SC ruled that RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm
land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter,
and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income."
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot.
Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the said law.
THe SC also ruled that the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who
plants certain crops thereon. All therequisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties.
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary
purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the
premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private
respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes.

G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
The plaintiff seeks to eject the defendant from the fishpond which is under lease to the defendant
in this case, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of the trial court of
Pampanga contending that the action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which
has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.
It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who originally leased it
from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff.
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the said
fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified
that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers.
Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. who is residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all
professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been
seen working on the fishpond.
The trial court took cognizance of the case which ruled that The lease contract is manifestly a civil
lease governed by the New Civil Code considering the fact that neither the defendant, who is physically
incapacitated, or his daughter is Personally cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of
mechanical farm implements, and the further fact that the persons named above are not members of the
immediate farm household of the defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between
the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199 (par. Sec 4 and 9), as amended.
Issue:
WON the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is that of a leasehold tenancy and not
civil law lease.
Ruling:
No. There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject
matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law
lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the
use of sugar lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed
by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled that "land in which fish is produced is
classified as agricultural land."5 The mere fact, however, that a person works an agricultural land does
not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199.
He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
 Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of leasehold tenancy
with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to
work the fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of
appellant's immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the members of the family of the
tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support
and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm
household.”
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land
cannot be considered tenants;8 and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the
land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of
sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
______________________________

Qua vs CA,CARMEN CARILLO, EDUARDO CARILLO, JOSEPHINE CARILLO, REBECCA

CARILLO, MARIA CEPRES, CECILIO CEPRES and SALVADOR CARILLO, JR.
GR No. 95318 June 11, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of the
346 square meter residential land in Malinao, Albay, wherein the private respondents constructed an auto
repair shop and 3 houses. She further claims that the respondents' stay in the land was by mere tolerance
and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the land without any agreement between her (sic),
paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to the government.

The private respondent Carmen Carillo, on the other hand, alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot
[home lot] because she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots adjoining
the lot in question, Lots No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner; that as tenants, they could not
just be ejected without cause; that it was not petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in question
but the former owner, Leovigildo Peña who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the house of
Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.

The Municipal Court found private respondents to be mere squatters and rendered judgment ordering them
to vacate and remove their houses and the auto repair shop. On appeal to respondent RTC, the judgment
was modified by ordering the case dismissed insofar as Carmen Carillo was concerned being qualified as
an agricultural tenant and declaring that the home lot and her house standing thereon should be respected.

Issue:
WoN private respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants entitled to, among others, the use and
possession of a home lot.

Ruling:

No. The SC ruled that It is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood of private respondents is
not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is further supported by private
respondent Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was constructed with the consent of
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served as a driver-mechanic.
From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, it is also apparent that making the same
agriculturally viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or else they should have immediately
replanted coconut trees in place of those that did not survive. Indeed, the location of their auto repair shop
being near the poblacion and along the highway, private respondents chose to neglect the cultivation and
propagation of coconuts, having earned, through the automobile repair shop, more than enough not only for
their livelihood but also for the construction of two other dwelling houses thereon.
The SC reiterated that the essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is
agricultural production; and (4) there is consideration. It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the
tenant to work on the land, that (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists
of sharing the harvest. The situation obtaining in this case still lacks, as discussed earlier, three of the afore-
enumerated requisites, namely: agricultural production, personal cultivation and sharing of harvests.
 Bejasa vs CA
G.R. No. 108941. July 6, 2000
Facts:
The parcels of land in question are indisputably owned by Isabel Candelaria. Candelaria entered
into a three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio. In the contract, Malabanan agreed "to clear, clean
and cultivate the land, to purchase various seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants are thereon
existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits, etc."
Subsequently, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim
that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land and shouldered all expenses of
production.
Later, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first
agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria.
When Malabanan died, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan,.
The contract had a term of one year. Thereafter the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in
consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of one year.
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victorias demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued
to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.
Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land. Later,
Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas.
The Bejasas filed with the RTC of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of
leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan
contending that a leasehold tenancy was established.
Issue:
WON there is tenancy relationship in favor of Bejasas.
Ruling:
None. True, Malabanan (as Candelarias usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate
the land.
However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy
relation, still, no such relation existed. There was no proof that they shared the harvests. Reynaldo Bejasa
testified that as consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to deliver the landowners share (1/5
of the harvest) to Malabanan. Only Reynaldo Bejasas word was presented to prove this. Even this is cast
into suspicion. At one time Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that 25%
was for Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria. Later on he stated that the landowners
share was merely one fifth.
"Self serving statements ... are inadequate; proof must be adduced."
Between Candelaria and the Bejasas, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave
her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that
Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanans arrangement with them. True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanans lease possessed the land.
However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the
Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement,
consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out
to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil
law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the
land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan",
which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract.

Saul vs Suarez
GR No. 166664 October 20, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Suarez owns a 23-hectare agricultural land in Poblacion Tboli, South Cotabato. a complaint for
reinstatement with preliminary mandatory injunction, recovery of possession and damages was filed against
him and Tboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), by respondents Leo B. Saul et. al.
Respondents alleged that they were agricultural tenants in petitioners land on a 25-75 sharing agreement;
that after two croppings, petitioner voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government under a Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) and that they signed the documents for the transfer of the land under the CARP as
farmer-beneficiaries, and petitioner, as landowner; and that the sale was approved by the local Land
Valuation Office of the LBP

Respondents claimed that while the VOS was being processed, they were summarily ejected from the
property by TADI after the latter entered into a Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy with petitioner
thereby depriving them of their landholdings.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that respondents were installed as tenants, not by him, but by
Wennie Gonzaga of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). He denied the existence of a growers
contract between him and TADI over the subject land.

For its part, TADI claimed that its growers contract with petitioner covered parcels of land different from
those being claimed by respondents.

Subsequently, The Regional adjudicator found that respondents failed to prove their alleged tenancy over
petitioners land and that they only have an inchoate right to the land since its coverage under the CARP has
yet to be completed.

On Appeal, the DARAB Central Office reversed the said decision and ruled that petitioner admitted
that respondents were his tenants. the DARAB and the appellate court relied solely on the alleged admission
in petitioners answer to the complaint
4. That plaintiffs were instituted sometime in 1993 and were given three (3) hectares each
respectively, while for plaintiff Roger Brillo was given 2 hectares; the sharing of the parties involved was
25-75 in favor of the tenants; after for two croppings defendant D. Suarez approached and offered the land
by Voluntary Offer to Sale (VOS) last November 1993 in our favor (plaintiffs-tenants) and the papers for
VOS was processed in the office of Department [of] Agrarian Reform (DAR) Koronadal, South Cotabato;

Issue: WoN respondents are bona fide agricultural tenants

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that the said admission was taken out of context. While petitioner admitted that
respondents were tenants in the land, he qualified in paragraph 2 of his answer that it was Wennie Gonzaga
of the DAR who installed them as such. Clearly, it was the DAR who placed respondents in actual
possession of the land upon petitioners offer to transfer the same to the government. Other than this
supposed admission, there is no evidence on record to prove the tenancy relations. Respondents did not
substantiate their claim with evidence to show that they were agricultural tenants in petitioners land. They
did not allege actual cultivation or specify the crop produced thereby. Neither did they mention how much
of the produce was delivered to petitioner or submit receipts to prove the purported 25-75 sharing of
harvests. They did not state, much less prove, the circumstances of their agreement with petitioner as to the
alleged tenancy relationship. Thus, there is no basis to the claim that they are agricultural tenants on the
property.

The SC held that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the
tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests.
All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites
will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.

The DARABs reliance on the ruling in Tizon v. Cabagon, et al. that the landowners admission of
the fact of tenancy relationship is conclusive is misplaced. In Tizon, there was actual proof of tenancy
relationship as the landowner therein categorically admitted in the petition that respondents were her
tenants. She also testified in open court that respondents were managing or in charge of the lands.
Respondents therein proved actual cultivation and there was sharing of harvests.

Soliman vs PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PASUDECO), INC.

G.R. NO. 169589 : June 16, 2009
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
 Automat Realty vs Spouses Dela Cruz
GR No. 192026 Octoober 1, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Automat is the registered owner of the 2 subject parcel of lands located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

Since the land was not occupied, respondent Ofelia Dela Cruz volunteered her services to petitioner Lim
(broker) as caretaker to prevent informal settlers from entering the property. Automat agreed on the
condition that Dela Cruz would voluntarily vacate the premises upon Automat's demand.

Respondent spouses' family stayed in the property as rent-paying tenants. They cultivated and improved
the land and even shared the produced palay with Automat through petitioner Lito Cecilia.

Subsequently, Automat asked respondents to vacate the premises for them to start developing the property
but the respondents refused to do so claiming that they were agricultural tenants who enjoyed security of
tenure under the law. They argue that an implied contract of tenancy was created when they were allowed
to till the land for 10 years. Consequently, they are entitled to security of tenure as tenants. They add that
the subsequent reclassification of agricultural lands into non-agricultural [land] after the effectivity of the
CARL does not automatically remove the land from the coverage of the CARP [as a] valid certificate of
exemption o[r] exclusion, or a duly approved conversion order, must first be secured.

Respondent spouses filed a petition for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order against Automat before the PARAD for Laguna,
which was dismissed. The DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD's decision. It declared respondent
spouses as de jure tenants of the landholding. The same was affirmed by the CA.

Petitioners now argue that (a) the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the property is not agricultural land,
(b) the board's finding that respondent spouses are de jure tenants was not supported by evidence, and (c)
the essential requisites for a valid agricultural tenancy relationship are not present.

Issue:

WoN an agricultural tenancy exists between Automat and respondent spouses

Ruling:

No. The SC ruled that not all the elements to establish tenancy are present in the case.
The SC held that the land in the case is not an agricultural land. It is undisputed that the DAR Region IV-
A CALABARZON had already issued two orders exempting the property from CARP coverage. The
exemption orders clearly provide that the lands were reclassified to non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988,
or prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARL). Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural
land as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
"Agricultural land refers to those...not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to
15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."

Note: Relationship between Automat and respondents is not agricultural tenancy but that of a Civil Lease.
Article 1643 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give
to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or
indefinite. . . .