Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
LANGUAGE :;~:
[ 'def
theo1
the t AND THE ORIGINS OF order
~~~~
aga1r
PSYCHOANALYSIS ~p:~
nitial
lette1 JOHN FORRESTER s and
had' )duce
the \\"Ord itself, for reasons which will become apparent
immediatel)'.1 For, when he told it me, I could not help
noticing that the word was in fact an anagram of the name
of his lady. H er name contained an 's', and this he had put
last, that is, immediately before the 'amen' at the end. 1Ne
m ay say, therefore, that by this process he had brought his
'Samen· ['semeri'J into contact with the woman he loved ; in
imagination, that is to say, he had masturbated with h er. H e
himself, ho\.vever, had never noticed this very obvious con-
nection; his defensive forces had allowed themselves to be
fooled by the repressed ones. This is also a good example of
the rule that in time the thing which is meant to be warded
off invariably finds its way into the very means which is being
used for \Varding it off.
I ha\'e already asserted that obsessional thoughts have
undergone a distortion similar to that undergone by dream-
thoughts before they become the manifest content of a dream.
T he technique of this distortion may therefore be of interest
1 (The actual word will be found below, p. 280.)
Lan gua ge and the Origin s of Psychoanalysis
Language and the
Origins of
Psychoanalysis
John Forrester
Forrester, J ohn.
Language and the origins of psychoanalysis.
Bibliography: p.
I. Psychoanalysis. 2. Psycholinguistics.
3. Symboijsm (Psychology) 4. Philology. I. T itle.
BFl75.F65 1980 150.19' 5 80- 13755
ISBN 0- 231 - 05136-0
Whal I wanl back is whal I was
Before the bed. before the knife,
Before 1he brooch-pin and the salve.
Fixed me in this parenthesis;
Horses ftueni in the wind,
A place, a 1ime gone o ut of mind.
wholly to be a fool
while Spring is in the world
my blood appro,es,
and kisses arc a better fate
1han wisdom
lady i swear by all Dowers. Don"1 cry
- the bcsl gesture of my brain is less 1han
your eyelids" ftuuer which says
e. e. cummings
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgrments xii
Notes 0 1J Tex1s and TrQJ1slatio11s xiv
List of Abbreviations xvi
Aphasia, Hysteria and the Talking Cure I
Hysteria 8
Aphasia 14
The Theory of the Talking-Cure 1.9
2 The Metapsychology of Spcccll 40
Constructing the Machine 40
The Machine Speaks 49
3~boli~ E
Symbolism in Hysteria 66
Symbolism in The /nterpre1ati0t1 of Dreams ( 1900) 70
Universal Symbolism: Approaches to the Problem
( 1905-10) 76
The History of the Oedipus Complex. 1897- 1910 84
Myth and Dream, 1910- 1I 96
Jung's Approach to the Symbol 102
Freud's Theory of Symbolism I 11
The Debate Closes: Jones' Theory of Symbolism 122
4 Grammar 131
Symptom as Talk: Talk as Symptom::Symp1om as
Symptom: Talk as Talk 131
The Propositional Structure of eurosis 141
S Philology 166
Philology in the Nineteenth Century 168
A Question of Nerve: Leonardo, Moses and the Problem
of Tradition 180
The Specimen Theme of Psychoanalysis 188
Who were the Philologists? 193
Conclusion 211
viii Contents
Notts 213
Bib/iogrophy 256
lnd~x 282
Preface
There is no doubl thal this work rerers i1selr10. and rcr•rs 10, a number
or "'Orks ID a number or genres or ps)'ChOanalytic Jilcralure. Three
works, each or which has proved or invaluable assistanCC, represent
1brcc or 1bcsc genres: Jones dcfini1ivc biography or Freud,
Ellcnbergcr"s monumcn1al compila1ion Tht Discm..,,ry o/ tht Uncon-
scious. and the exact. me1hodical and cons1an1ly in1eltigcn1 Tht
language of Ps)'ch()Ql1al)'sis or Laplanche and Pon ta Iis. I have rollowed
1hc biographical me1hod only in so far as it seemed 10 me to throw ligb1
on the na1ure or dcvclopmeni or the psychoanalytical work 1ha1 Freud"s
life represen1s. The chronological marking and assiduous amassing or
historical rac1s to be found in Ellcnbcrger"s work has been or enormous
help whenever dctrulcd qucs1ions or historical context have seemed to
make a significant contribulion 10 1hc undcrs1anding of 1he concep1ua l
fo undations or psychoanalysis: this aspecl will be found mosl promi-
ncnlly displayed in Chapter I. T he working manual lha1 The Language
of Psychoanalysis embodies has been a con1inual source or s1imula1ion,
as well as pulling u brake upon overly specula1ive in1erpre1a1ions. In so
far as 1he aim of my work is a concep1ual reading, rather than a
hisloricul uccounl . many or hs 11rgumcn1s should be read in parallel wilh
lbose lo be round in Laplanche and Ponialis' book. I
There also cxis1s a genre of psychoa nalytic wri1ings 1ha1 is unique in
charnctcr: analyses ei1hcr or Freud"s own dreams, slips e1c., o r of those
casc·historics he wrote, undertaken to vindicate. deepe n or criticize the
exemplification of psychoanalysis that F reud's work represents. While
such 'grea1-man' hislory is not an isolated phenomenon, in psychoana-
lytic 1erms many of 1hcse hagiographical works contain arguments or
great theoretical inlcrest and impor1ance. The question of the special
relationship that every analys1 has wi1h Freud, and that every psych<>-
analytic texl bear5 10 those of Freud's, is beyond the scope of ibis
introduction to this thesis. Suffice it to cite the most illuminating
discussion or this topic that I know or. tha1 or Wladimir Granoff in
Fi/ia11ons, pp. 7- 2.S4. who raises the question whc1hcr 1hc relation to
Freud is no1 consti1u1ive or psychoanalysis itsclr.
"'
x Preface
There arc •cry few accounts of psychoanalysis which take as their
starting-point the fact that it is a talking<ur<, and that one might expect
its theory to deal directly with the importance of language in the course
of the cure. The central problem is, as it was for Freud in 1890, to
explain "the power of words". IL will bet beset of answers to this question
that will interest u,.; as we shall see. they have implications that
permeate all of psychoanalytic theory. But this thesis cannot claim to be
without forerunners. There are a number of works thHt have included a
discussion of the exegetical and linguistic character of the science that
Freud developed. For example, SU7;mne Langer wrote:
But this is one of the rew works in the English language that lakes as
its central concern the relations of speech and lan11uage with both
psychoanalytic theory and therapy, from the metapsychology to the
1rnnsferencc. 2 Indeed, I have sometimes made the decision to expose
these linguistic elements in Freud's theory at the expense of other
themes that. on the surface, would seem to be of greater importance. Al
1imes. then, this book will appear obsessively single-minded in the
pursuit of its theme. The extent of this obsession, and the concomitant
omission of other clements of psychoanalytic theory. should not lead
my reader to the mistaken conclusion that I believe or would have
others believe that other themes are of minor imponancc. that they can
always be reinterpreted in the light of a 'linguistic' framework, or that
any mention of concepts derived from realms other than the 'linguistic'
is of necessity subject to some new linguistic ver.ion of a transcendental
critique. Bul I cannot renounce the conviction, many times tested in the
course of my auempts 10 find an ·objective' reading of the texts, that
language is the central concern of psychoanalysis.'
Acknowltdgtmtnts xiii
Publishing Corporation, for the extracts from Fi~ ltcturts on Psycho-
Analysis, and Group Psychology; The Hoganh Press Ltd and
W. W. Norton &Company Inc, for lheextrac1S from Out/into/ Psycho-
Analysis, Tht Ego and the Id, and Tht Qutstian of l.Ay Analysis; The
Hogarth PrC5S Ltd and Routledge & Kegan Paul, in conjunction with
Princeton University Press, for the excerpts from Tht Frtud/ J1111g
utters: Th" Correspondence berwten Sigmund Frtud and C. G. Jung,
edited by William McGuire, translated by Ralph Manheim and
R. F. C. Hull (American Bollingen Series XCIV), copyright © 1974 by
Sigmund Freud Copyrights Ltd and Erbengemcinschaft Professor Dr
C. O. Jung; Routledge& Kegan Paul and W. W. Norton & Company
Inc, for the extracts from uonardo do Vinci; the British Psychological
Society, for the extracts from the article ' The Theory of Symbolism' by
Ernest Jones published in British J<Jurnalof Ps)'Chology(l916); Granada
Publishing Lid and Liverigbt Publishing Corporation. for the poem
'since feeling is first' bye. e. cummings; The Hogiirth Press Ltd, on
behalf of Katherine Jones, for the extrac1S from Frtt Associations by
Ernest Jones; Olwyn Hughes on behalf of Ted Hughes. and Alfred A.
Knopf Inc, fo r the extract from 'The Eye-mote' in ~ Colossus and
Otlwr P~ms by Sylvia Plath; lottmational Universities P~ Inc, for
the quotations from the Minutes of Vienna Psycho-analytic Society,
vol• I- JV, translated byN. Nunbcrgandcdited by Herman N. Nunberg
and Ernst Fcdcm; and Warner Bros Music Ltd, fo r the extract from the
song 'Gates of Eden' by Bob Dylan.
Notes on Texts and
Translations
I. The English text of Freud 1ha1 I have cited is, of course, the
exemplary and extraordinary Standard Edition of the Complete
Psydwlogleal fVorks of Sigmw1d Frew/, edited by James Strachey in
collaboration with An na Freud. assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan
T yson (1953- 74). My debt lo the erudition, exactitude and unifonncare
displayed on every page or its twenty four volumes is as incalculable as
every other reader of Freud's now is, whether he is read in English,
French or Gcnnan. In a work of the sort I have wnuen. I can safely say
that any fidelity lo Freud's thought owes as much 10 the Editors of the
Standard Ediuon as 10 my own allempts to ma1n1a1n standards of rigour
and scholarship.
2. Where translations of works cited in this book exist and 1 am
aware of their existence - I have given references to the translated
works, rather than 10 the original, except where the reference in
question explicitly cites the original text. If no translation exists. the
translation that I give is my own. I have checked the transla tions or all
passages cited from the Stmul11rcl Edition, using both the Gesommelte
Werk<' und the S111die1u111sgabeedition, which benefits from the accurate
readings of F reud's text established by the Standard Etlitio11. Where 1
have modified the translation, a corresponding note will be found.
Perhaps I s hould mal:.eclearthat. wnere 1 have modified the translation,
1 do 001 necessarily believe that my modified text is a more accurate or
belier 1rnnsla1ion than that to be found in the Standard Editi0t1.
although there arc instances where 1 believe this to be so. In many
pa&\.agcs my modifica1ions are allemativc translations. which are hoped
to give at least as faithful or as treacherous a reading in SE. but which
attcmp1 10 bring out a certain nuance that was no1 quite captured by the
editors. In modifications such as these. 1 have almost certrunly lost
another nuance, this latter often being the reason why the SE
translation was chosen. My modified translations are thus in the service
of n particular reading of Freud to be found in this work . 1 hope that my
,;iv
List of Abbreviations
SE The Standard Edition oftlte Com11lete l'syc:hofogicaf Work s
of Sigmund Freud
Origins F reud. The Origins of l'sychoa1wly.1is. lettn.1 to IVi/ltelm
F//ess. Drafts and Notes: 1887- 1902 (The reference is
given to SE only. when the passage in question is
reproduced there.)
Minutes Minutes ofthe Vienna l'syc/10011alytic Society. vols I- IV. M .
Nunberg (trans.), Herman Nunberg and Ernst Fedcrn
(eds) (Nev.· York: International Universities Press. 1962-
76).
Jonts Ernest Jones. Sigm1U1d Freud lift and IVIN'k. 3 vols
( London: The Hogarth Press. I 9S3- 7). (I have employed
the second edition or vol. 1, published in 1954; references
10 the second and third volumes arc to the first editions).
SP Abraham. Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis.
CP Abraham, Clinical Papers and EssO)'S on Ps)•rhoanalysis.
c. Ferenc2i, First Conrributions to Psychoanalysis.
F.C. rerenczi. Fur1her Contributions to Psych0<m"lysis.
Fin. Fcrenczi, Final Contributlo11.r l<J Psyc:hot111t1l1sis.
C IV Jung. The Colle<·ted Works of C. G. J1mg.
E Lucan, Ecrits (The lirsl number following E gives page
numbers in t he French edition. the second in the English
translation, Etrits: A Selection.)
xvi
1 Aphasia, Hysteria
and the Talking Cure
Al dawn my lover
Comes to me
And tells me of her dreams
With no attempts
To shovel the glimpse
Into the ditch of what each one means
At times I think
There arc no words
But these to tell what's true
And there arc
No truths outside
The gates of Eden
Bob Dylan
Thus the lhcrapeulic means are verbal. In addition. the theory oft he
neurotic symptom includes language as an essential component. Each
symptom is constructed on the basis of certain ideas. as Freud's first
paper on the neuroses demonstrated (Freud. 1893c). The dilference
between a neurological and a neuro1ic symptom is 1hat the latter's
location in lhe body is determined by the specific structure ofa system of
thoughts, whose expression in the body is often bound up with a verbal
tum of phrase. The peculiarity of the neurotic symptom is twofold:
firstly, the locus of the symptom betrays a false corporeal11y, 10 so far a.s
it is not that organ in its bodily solidit)' tllnt is 'diseased', but the 'idea' of
that organ that is the line of crystallization of the neurosis. Secondly, the
expression of words in the body amounts to a displacement of the
4 language and the Origins of P•>'<'hoanalysis
proper locus of words. We will retum 10 the 1heore1ical oonscquence of
this double peculiarity. For oow, we should note that the tailing-cure
has a symmetry':
a. Worm replace symptoms in the prOC<SS of the cure;
b. ft 1s words that give a specific form 10 the symptoms. We might
wish to subsume this under the more general principle that, in
order to explain the specific character of each symptom. it is
necessary 10 assume that the symptom is equivalent to a verbal
message. (Cf. Szasz, 1962)
Throughout this work I will sometimes be employing the term 'word'
where another might think that 'idea' or ' thought' was more ap-
propriate, and sometimes I will appear 10 make li11lc or no distinction
between 'words' and 'ideas'. Qb,iously, one can distinguish between the
concept of a 'word' and the ooncept of a ·1hough1'. Bui, having made
this distinction, one might be well justified in treating them as
analogous, relying upon cenain crucial similarities. Some justification
of this practice would seem to be in order. lbisjus1ification leans mainly
upon the usage that Freud made of the terms 'idea', ·presentation·.
'word·presentatioo·. 'object-presentatioo' and their fundamental re-
lation 10 the key distinction drawn in psychoanalysis between the
·conscious' and the·uoconscious'. (I rekr the reader to the enlnC$ under
th= headings in Laplanche and Pon1alis (1973). ) Lei us start with the
term 'idea'.
Freud fell free to speak of·unconscious ideas' and, from this, we may
conclude that one aspect of the classical conception or the idea was of
secondary importance in his usage of the word, namely, ' the conno-
tation of the act of subjective presentation of an object 10 consciousness.
For Freud, an idea or presentation is 10 be understood rat her as what
comes from the object and is registered in the "mnemic systems'"
(Laplanchc and Pontalis, 1973, p. 200). Thus, in the Project, the idea,
and the act of thought that denotes the movement of ideas, are
essentially a cuthcxis of mcmory·tracC$, which are. as we shall sec in
Chapter 2. thcmsclvC$ coded into a system akin 10 that provided by a
language. Thus ~ithcr ideas nor memory-tract$ can be thought of as
weak ·copies' of the objects they represent; they have their place in
·1hought·reahty' aoeording to the place that they take up lD a system.
But this system is distinct from that which makes up the system of
word-presentations: in the Project and in later works, Freud spoke of
the processes of thought as distinct from the consciousness that
a11achmcnt 10 word-presentations lends 10 them. Indeed, one could say
Aphasia, Hysteria and the Talking Cur~ 5
1hat the aim of psychoanalysis is 10 go beyond 1he ideas presented 10
consciousness in verbal form, in an a11cmp1 10 reconstruct these
unconscious. pre-verbal thought processes. We 1hus have a model in
which 1hcrc arc two separate systems of prcscn1a1ions. which can be
used in a 1opographical fashion. bu1 whose essential propcnics reside in
the dis1inc1ion between the two sys1cms and in their possible mutual
ar1icufa1ion. We 1hen find that another slrand in Freud's 1hough1 lends
10 subvcrl 1hc systemic model. We mighl call lhis new strand 1he
ins1rumcntalis1 or opera1ionalis1 conccp1ion of the unconscious, which
Freud expressed succinc1ly in a le1tcr 10 G roddeck ( Briefe ilber das Es, p.
38): 'Thus the unconscious is only somc1hing miraculous. a sign for the
lack of bellcr acquaintanceship (knowledge) .. : Or. more clearly, in
A11 0111/ilw of P.<ycl1oa11alysis:
H YST ERI A
Via the family doctor, Cbarcot learned that the girl had been placed in
a Parisian establishment, as he had recommended. but the parents were
resolved not to be parted from her. In consequence. they were afraid to
inform Ch:ucot. even though the girl did not have long to live. Cbarcot
became angry: the sine qua non of his advice had been ignored. •Jc
dechna1s toutc rcsponsibilitc dans cctte malheureusc a/Taire:
Nevertheless. be allowed himself to be ~rsuaded by the family doelor
to visit the estabhshment where the girl was wasting away. saw the poor
girl, 1ook the parents aside and informed them how angry he was. The
only chance of success lay in lheir departure back to Angouleme
immediately, •aying to the girl that Dr Charcot was forcing them to
leave. But it was difficult to obtain the parents' consent to 1his plan;
Aphasia, Hysteria and 1he Talking Cure 11
ondced. 11 needed all ofCharcoi's anima1edconvic11on and eloquence 10
persuade first the mother and then the fathtr to leave.
Thal anemoon. after they bad depaned, the girl cried for an hour.
Then she slaned 10 caL Within finccn days she was sitting up. and by the
end of two months she was almost comple1ely cured. Then Cbarcot
in1erroga1ed the girl. who entrusted to him the followin,g confidence:
As long as papa and mama didn't leave me, in other terms, as long as
you hadn't triumphed - because I knew that you wanted to confine
me - I believed !hat my illness wasn·1serious, and, as I had a horror of
eating, I didn't cat. When I saK11ha1you )\1ere tl1e 111t1J'ter, J '"·as aj'raid,
and, despite my loathing, I tried 10 eat, and. linlc by little, ii became
possible.' I thanked the child for her confession, which, as you see,
contains a complete education. ( Ibid., p. 163)
Finally. to put to tbe test the equilibrium that was being increasingly
rees1ablished. the patient bad sexual intercourse wi1b a woman of his
own choosing and in 1hc presence of his [male]seduccr, with whom he
then broke immediately. (Schrenck-Notzing (1889) p. 321)
Aphasia, Hysteria ond the Talking Cure 13
Afltr strengthening his normal heterosexuality with more hypnosis,
the doctor r«iei"ed a card from the young man, announcing his
betrothal to a 'childhood sweethean' (un• ami• de1eunesse). Obviously,
the treatment was completely succcssfol, but Schrenck Notzing noted
that runher relapses were always possible, in which case hypnosis
should be used again.
This case appears to be typical or a genre or hypnotic practices of the
period. What is striking is the dramatic quality or the measures that are
necessary for the cure: the production of guilt and horror, the
installation of aversion to his inversion and its final testing in what can
only be described as a melodramatic fashion. The test. the proof,
sunctioned and almost certainly prescribed by the doctor. amounts to
the realization of a fantasy, without the recognition tha t the fantasy
runctions in any significant way, either in the aetiology or the sexual
condition or in the efficacy oft he cure. The relation between doctor and
patient remains a theoretical simple, subsumed within the on~
dimensional concept or suggestion. What functions as cure. is. again, as
with Charcot. a ·psycho-drama' in which the doctor's presence is totally
obscured. More to the point. this is not a 111Jking-curc. even though its
medium appears to be words. The symptom is not approached to
invesugate its discursive rune1ion: nor is the talk or the patient seen as
anything beyond an in<lex of his condition.
But we should not obscure the issue by arguing that no relation is
formed between doctor and patient. Quite the opposite: it is the ' human
interest' that the doctor displays in his patient that gives the case the
impression of being psychological in character. But what is present in
Freud's early cases, and absent in these others, is a sense that the
neurosis and its cure is determined by the patient's system of ideas, as
expressed in words, in which the doctor becomes unavoidably en-
meshed. The early e-0ncept of transference as being Rrst and foremost a
resistance marked Freud's recognition of the importance of the doctor
ronhe patient, but it also points up that it is the patient's responsibility,
his activity and mastery, that is the focus or the cure. And this is not a
moral responsibility - though the moral dimension or neurosis and its
relation to social norms is present very early in Freud's theory, and
onen found adjacent to the concept of rC$ponsibility; rather, it is the
patient's responsibility as speaker, as producer or signs, that is in
question. The eurcdcpcnds on his getting his words in the ' right place:
into sound, rather than allowing them to become caught up in his body.
It is with the metaphor of the ' right place' that Freud began to depart
from Chan:ot's neurology. As long as the causes of hysteria were
14 language and the Origins of Ps>"Choanalysis
thought or in terms of shoe!<., atTcet or suggestion, a correlation with the
ncr. ous system was cooceptually feasible, ifnot exactly rigorous. But as
soon as the words of the patient were caught up in his disease, the
nervous system became insufficient as a locus for these 1<ords. h was at
this poin1. with the question of the rela1ion bc1wecn 1he locus of words
and 1he siructure of the nervous system. lhal Freud's work on aphasia
assumed its importance. My argument is the following: Freud's work on
aphasia - his fl rs1 book. apart from translations - is the .1i11e qua non of
lhc birth of psychoanalytical theory as we can now distinguish it from
01 her con1cmporary theories of neurosis: a 1hcory of the power of wo rds
in 1hc formation of symptoms. To appreciate Freud's work o n aphasia,
we must turn to the history of tha1 subject in lhc nineteenth cen·
tury.
APHASIA
Clinical en1hv
<;=> Ant1tomicll IQQ1ion
llHionl
I
l110l.ltJon of fur'IC'llon•
in ptoduc1li0n of tll)t«h
unused 10 !he slric\Ul"C$ sci forth in. say. Ryle's Th~ Con~pt of 1\find.
Now we can revise the judgement 1ha1 aphasia theory was founded
upon 1hc separation of physiology from chmcal pathology. Rather.
physiology functioned covenly as the foundation of the method that
created idenutics between anatomical location andclinkal entity. From
the 1870s on, there was only one way to think the function of the
nervous system: lhe reflex arc. Argument ceased about !he mode of
function oflhe ner\'OUS system. With a reflex physiology as !he implicit
foundation of the discipline. !he very terms ·sensory' and ·motor'
sanctioned a sliding between two distinct areas: from the physiology of
the reflex arc to the clinical entities observed in practice. The Joss of
ability 10 ' hear' words corresponded to the 'lesion of a sensory centre in
the brain. Similarly. motor centres of the brain could be identified with
·motor functions· employed in speech. The clenr simples of universally
accepted physiology thus became the characterizing descriptions of the
clinic: inubility to speuk, corrcl:ned with ability to understand. as
detected by tests of un informal kind. lr•nsformed simply into the
notion of a di•ordcr of the motor centre of language. When this simple
·sensory·molor' dualistic accot1nt of the speech process proved in·
suilicicnt. Lichthcim ( 1885) in1roduc1.'<l the notion of a centre for'idcas'.
All aphasias were due to the interruption by a lesion of the linear
progression from scn~ory to motor nerves. via the t'A'o centres, the
conduction pathways. and the ideas centre.
Other clinicians developed these ideas. Centres proliferated. The
clinical signs of speech defects became more finely differentiated:
writing defects were either compared or contrasted with speech defects.
Pltilosophical battles came to be fought over the interpretation or
clinical descriptions. In France. where the Cnnesian tradition, as
exhibited early in the century by Flourens. had emphasised the unity of
perception, the unity of the m oi in the perception or matter, these
themes of unity and synthesis were resurrected in !he debate over
aphasia:
18 language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
In 1hesc facts . as in idiocy •... 1he cerebral lesions isola1e. as ii were.
the different conical region: and instead of all being in harmony and
forming a solidari1y, we see the strange spectre of individuals. wi1h
special aptiludes perfectly developed but isolated, and conlrasting
\ividly with their sterility as regards other intellectual powers.
appropria1ely deserving the name of wise idiots. (Magnan, 1878- 9,
p. 119)
The notion of unity and synthesis" bound the s1udy of aphasia to the
ruling doc1rioe of the degeneracy of the nervous system. which formed
the basis of neurology in France. Wi1h the psychological venion of this
docirinc, developed by Janel in the 1890s and aner. the synthetic unity
of the /lff>OIW/ity guaranteed 1hc normal functioning of the individual.
But in certuin psychological versions of aphasia theory developed in 1be
1890s and 1900s, including Freud's, a crucial rupture occurred: a unity
was established. but at the level of language, no1 of personality. No hin1
of the uni1y of 1he subject was impressed upon 1he conceptual structure
of aphasia theory. Unity was in1roduced in the associative field of
language: the unity of the word. not the /ch. 11
One of the firs1 attacks on the diagram-makers. as Head christened
1hem. came from a union of philosophical and psychological argumen1s
in the work of the English neurologist, John Hugblings Jackson.,.
Jackson was concerned to stop the sliding between psychological and
physiological terms that be perceived dogging aphasia theory in
particular and neurology in general. His doctrine of concomitances - a
hard nosed argument for lhe strict parallelism and separation of psychic
and physic11 l processes - both secured neurology ugainst a creeping
psychologism and opened the door to a fully fledged psychology of
aphasia. The issue of centres of funclion seemed 10 lapse silcnl ly wi1hin
Jackson's overly complicated syntax; but the psychology of aphasia
came inlo its own in the detailed attention he paid to the individual
u11cranccs of aphasics. He asked a ques1ion whkh be1raycd the grea1
gulf 1ha1 separated him from bis contemporaries; why this utterance
rather than any other? His answer recombined 1he psychology of tbe
indhi dual and the physiology of the organism. He posited that aphasics
suffer a lesion at a particular moment in time: they suffer an auack
analogous to epilepsy. The 'nervous arrangemen1s' 1ha1 had been about
10 discharge. innervating the series of motor nerves. arc caught in the
act, as it were, and retain their high level of undisc.barged energy in a
now pcrmanen1ly closed and permanently ac1ivatcd circuit. separated
off from the olher nervous elemenls, which, under the impact of the
Aphasia, Hysteria mid tire Talking Cure 19
lesion. reven to a lower order of function; the ·arrangements" arc fixated
upon the moment of the attack. The recurrent utterances of the aphasic
thus com:spond to what he was about to say at the moment of the
attack: 'utteran= not .. now making... but nearly, if indeed not quite,
"'ready made up"'.' ( Jackson, 1878- 80, p. 169.)
For the aphasic, his recurrent utterance bas three characteristics: he
has /1, he has no other, and 'he cannot gel rid of it.' (Ibid., p. 191.) The
lesion led to a dissolution of the nervous system to a lower level of
function. that is, lo a more highly organized state. For Jackson, higher
levels of the nervous system, corresponding 10 'propositional conscious-
ness', were characterized by the voluntary, non-automatic nature of
their processes. Jackson's theory assumed two axes, one running from
org!lnized to unorganized, the other running from conscious to
au1oma1ic. Whal is iotriguing in this theory is 1ha1 the dissolution oft be
nervous system consequent upon a lesion or a functional disturbance
entails a regression to a more highly organaed state: a high level of
organiz,a1ion is the mark of a lower level of sophistication of nervous
functioning. In this sense, consciousness corresponds to a less struc.
turtd "freedom· of the relations be1"·ccn nervous arrangements,
whereas automatic functioning involves highly StnJClured and therefore
inOexible activity of the nervous system. Hence. when the about-to-be-
uuered utterance was caught in the catastrophe consequent upon the
disrup1h·e lesion, it remained as a highly organized unit "trapped'
within the now automatic functioning of the system. The notion of
organization meshed with the concept of levels or the nervous system:
dissolution led the nervous system back 10 older and more primilive
levels or organization, possibly back 10 the original levels of speech,
where language was 'ready made up·.
We can see the shape the psychological critique of the diagram
makers was lo take: 1he anatomical identity dropped out, 10 be replaced
by a putative general functional identity of 1.he "state of lhe nervous
system• and the 'clinical description• of the uncranccs(or lack of them).
Aside from the replacement ofana1omy by functional concepts (which
would appear to be physiological in a general sense). the levels of
awareness of the linguistic problems of anal)-sing aphasics began 10
surface v.i1h Jack.son. He distinguished 1he live unerances of the
normal. which were voluntary and had meaning. were true pro-
positions., were living structures, from the dead recurrent unerance, tbe
vestigial trace of the higher levels of organization that had been
destroyed. In contrast with the diagram makers. who retained a strictly
ntomistic and nominalistic conception of longuuge, Jackson's notion
20 langllO(Je and rhe Origins of Psyt:hoonalysls
was far more sophisticated. He argued that the basic units oflanguag<
wtrc propositions, not words. That is, a strUClurc, a syntax. is necessary
to language.
The proposition llad meaning insofar as clements in it were subject to
substitution. i.e. words only had meaning insofar as they were
dispensable. and a structure was only linguistic insofar as it was placed
in opposition to the elements that constituted it. This 'structuralist'
clement in Jackson's thought bore fruit in the work of Pick (1913) on
aphasiu and the writings of Jakobson in the 1940s and 19SOs. What the
theory of the proposition entailed was a structural distinction between
'meaningful' and ' meaningless' utterances: aphasic ullerunces might
appear to have meaning, but this meaning had o nly been inherent in
them at Che origin, at one particular moment when dynamic proposition
formation had suffered its demise in consequence of the lesion. Insofar
as the phrase was ' ready made up' it was meaningless, precisely because,
being 'ready made up', it was not suited to the other ocx:asions on which
it came to be uttered. ln other v.·ords, failure of the phrase to obey the
condition that its clements be subject to substitution entailed that it
would be meaningless when it came to be repeated.
It is exactly this distinction that Freud carried over from aphasia
theory to hysteria. in the form of the opposition between symptom and
speech . The chronic hysterical symptom bore remarkable similarities to
the aphnsic's recurrent utterance: it was a piece of language that had
once hod meaning but which, by becoming cut off from the dynamic
structure of contingent elements - for different reasons in the two
conditions - had lost its meaning, and, for reasons to do with the
systemic relations of the nervous system ('conversion' and 'somatic
compliance'), was doomed to repetition. Of course, there was a tension
between this conception of the symptom as meaningless in contrast to
speech, and the conception that 1hese same symptoms have a meaning,
insofar as they are equivalent to a verbal phrase or thought. We will
consider this at greater length in Chapter 4 ·Grammar'. What Freud
took from aphasia theory was the notion that a symptom's apparent
meaninglessness could be illuminated-by placing it in a very specific,
'traumatic' past context, when it did have meaning. The h}sterical
symptom. in contrast to 1he aphasic recuncnt utlcrancc. needed an
additional operation to restore its meaning - namely translation into
the verbal phrase of which it was the recurrent e•prcssion - before one
could place it in its proper past context. ' 0 In Freud's psychoanalytic
practice. the 1wo procedures - finding the verbal translation and finding
the point in time to which this translation belonged - were never
Aphasia, Hysteria and tire Talking Cure 21
scpara1cd. being in1cgral parts of one method of in"csligation. Bui, in
psychoanalysis. as in aphasia studies, pa1ienu came to be known by
their 'recurrent uuerances", for examp~. Broca"s Tan, Trousseau's
Sapon" and Freud's Wolfman.
Jac.kson concluded that words only have a meaning when 1hcy form
part of a symbolic syslem which represenu an ordered and inlemally
dynamic series of inner slates. But there were 01hcr elements of
'language' thal were put into question by lhc phenomena of aphasia.
Was the language los1 by the aphasic the memory of lhe language signs
or 1hc capacily 10 produce signs? Bas1ian (1887) surmounted 1his
problem on 1he psychological level: he dis1inguished bel ween recollec-
1ion and memory. Again, as so oflen in the discussion of aphasia, an
exact mirroring of brain ana1omy and philosophy of language was
preserved. The distinction between memory and recollection cor-
responded to that between neurones and the associa1ion fibres connect-
ing them. Losing the power of recollec1ion mean1 losing the power 10
connecL Bui Bastian no longer required 1ha1 lhe units - whether they be
neurones or words - be localiied: they were like Jackson's 'nervous
arrangements' in that they existed in an undefined phys1ological space,
independent of the brain. The change in the character of the space in
which such units were located was expressed by Freud in 1893 as
follows:
I, on the contrary, assert that the lesion in hysterical paralyses must
be completely independent of 1he anatomy of the nervous
system ... (Freud (1893c) SE I 169)
And he took the argument 10 i1s conclusi,on by usserting that, in
hys1eria, ii is an idea that suffers from a lesion ('/l!sio11', 'Verletzu11g').
The construction of such a 'physiological' space in which the structures
of language were located was to be one of the cornerstones of Freud's
1heory of1be mind. The extent 10 which that space was physiological can
be gauged from the basic categories of 1he Pro}~cl for a Scien1ific
Psychology he wrote in 1895. There, 1he unit of the ' mind' is the
neurone. The extent to which the ana1omy of1his space had recap1ured
its essential metaphorical topography. can be gauged by the virtual
idcntily of neurone and idea in the theoretical structure. And in Tlw
ln1trprc101io11 of Dreams. we find 1ha1 the space of psychic action has
become assimilated 10 the purely ideal geometric space of op1ics, in
which the material support is strictly incidenlal to considerations of
spatial order and function (Freud (1900a) SE V 536-7; see Lacan,
1975a, pp. 891T and Lacan, 1978, p. 146).
22 Languag• and the Origins af Ps~haa11alysu
Freud's own inCt'Cased auentivencss 10 the conlenu of lhe articulaled
language !hat formed lhe objec1 of the Sludy - both in aphasia and
hys1cria - was parl of a growing 'psycbologiz.aiion' of ihe problems of
aphasia in the last decade of the nine1een1h century. The newer
generation ofalienisu, psychologisu. neurologisu, etc.. entered 1he lists
in lhe Sludy of aphasia; their names are familiar from other contCJ<ts:
•
Bleuler, Bergson, Liepmann, Goldstein, Abraham, Jones. Wilh the new
psychological awareness came a critique of 1hc diagrams of the earlier
gcncraiion. They did not criticize the nolion of the localization of
unerances in space: rather, they criticized the iden1ificntion of centres of
verbal activity with locations in 1he brain. Beyond 1his, a further critique
of psychological and linguistic atomism was mooted. Goldstein,
Bergson aod.Cassirer broughl their weigh! 10 bear against atomistic
associaiionism, while it was from such an associniionism that many
imporlant critiques of the brain centre/linguis1ic unil identity thesis
were to emerge. We find an ambiguity between a1omis1ic associationism
and fonnalism in Freud's aphasia theory.
Freud's monograph on aphasia was firs1 and forcmos1 a critique of
1he diagram·makers. In it be crossed swords wilh Wemicke's no1ions of
sensory and motor aphasia n, took much time and trouble demolishing
Lich1hcim's diagram. and ·even scratched the high and migh1y idol
Meynen."' Later writers acknowledged their indebtedness 10 his
mas1erly critique. In Goldstein's eyes, be had opened up the study of
aphasia for a psycho-philosophical approach (Golds1cin, 19 10). Bui, as
Goldslein no1cd wilh disapproval, Freud wamed 10 place a lheory of the
association of ideas al the centre of aphasia theory, in order to replace
1he identity of pathological with anaiomical uni1s. It was 1hrough a
subtle confusion of levels that Freud used a.~sociutionism lo demolish
1he concept of a centre. Jn laying emphasis on association rnther than
func1ion, Freud did not al firsl shifl 1he argument 10 a purely
psychological level. The ana1omical (or physiological) correlate of
'associaiion' was 'connection fibre'. Freud used an array of anatomical
facu 10 show 1ha1 it was such connection fibres 1ha1 were of primary
importance in cerebral functioning. Such an argumenl also impijed the
functional 'anonymi1y' of these fib..,.. The model 1hus invoked was a
homogeneous field of connection fibres. an abst111Cted physiology that
could now be converted into a purely psychological SPllCc. Any allempt
to segment the field of language was vigorously rcsis1ed: al the level of
1he brain, what one found were connective fibres: a1 the level of
psychological space. one found a hierarchy ofinierdependent functions
of associa1ion.
Aphasia. Hysteria and the Talking Cure 23
A ssociationism dominated this schema in a way that dismayed
Goldstein. II was true that Freud had demolished the putative spatial
unity pro,,jded by the brain of the diagram·makcl'$." But be im-
mediately replaced it with an homogeneous associative field of language,
which could not aid Goldstein in his broader psychological aims, which
were more directed towards the use of categories analogous to the
K antian categories of experience. Goldstein's categories were intended
to embody the necessary preconditions for the possibility of ordered
perception. To this end he used the perception of space as his model for
the construction o f meaning in aphasia. T his Kantian trend. paralleling
the 'synthetic unity' of the French school, received its fullest account in
Cussircr's The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In philosophical terms, it
allcmpled lo insert the subject of aphasic discourse at u level above, but
necessary 10 , the Jaws of th e association of ideas. A transcendental
unitary subject thus played the same role as the ' brain' of the brain
mythologists. the individual categories corresponding 10 the individual
centres. inferred from the location of lesions.
N ow ii is >ignifican1 that Mcyncrt had propounded a well known
theory 1ha1 had guaranteed a unitary subject of perception .;a the
notion o f the ego being a projection of 1he body onto the brain. By
tracing the anatomical connections between the periphery and the
conex. be demonstrated that a ·reality ego' provided a faithful
reproduction of the body, which could be immediately appcrceivcd by
C·Onsciousness ( Meynert. 1871. 1885). Freud was most severe on this
model in On Aphasia for reasons that now appear clear. H e was firmly
opposed lo any hint ofa transcendental subject, whether it be 1he q uasi-
anatomical lesion/centre of the d iagram-makers, or the physio logical
subject of Meynerfs fi bre-1rac1 and reflex model. T he overrid ing
consideration for Freud was to establish a s•IJ-sujjic'ie111 unity al the level
of the ·speech apparatus', since any other principle of unity would
reopen the possibility of a reduction of the problem of aphasia away
from its proper linguistic/psychological level. Language had its own
principles of organization and combination which reductionism alwa}'S
obscured. Hence, even the notion of·cortical synthesis', to be found in
twenllelh century work on tho body·schoma (Corrue, 1973; Schilder,
1935), might be misleading, since it might elide the ontological
distinction bttwcen thing and roprcscn1a1ion. Freud thus replaced
Mcynert"s I: I ·projection' of peripheral sense-data onto the cortex with
a series of levels of ·representations' ( Vorottllungrn).
Freud's argument against Meynert's projection theory had 1wo
functions:
24 Language omJ the Origins of Psychoanalysis
a. By showing tba1 1he distinction be1ween a perttplion and ils
associalion was bolh less marked and more complex 1han Meynert
had 1hough1. he dismissed 1be ·mirroring' model of represen-
tation.
b. If even 1he 'body-schema' is a combina1ory represen1a1ion. ralher
than an imagic presentation (a mirroring, a rcRcction, a veridical
projcc1ion), 1bcn, once we lum 10 lhe specific phenomena of
aphasia, we must acccpl 1ha1!he order of language mus ! have an
even grcalcr order of combination and organii.ation.
Freud argued !his Jailer point in a mos! in1eres1ing manner:
We can only presume 1ba1 1he fibre 1rac1s. which reach 1hc cerebral
cor1ex af1er their passage lhrough 01her grey masses. have main-
1aincd some relationship to 1he periphery of1hc body. but no longer
rcnec1 a lopographically exact image of ii. They conLain the body
periphery m the same wayas - 1oborrowan example from 1be subject
wi1h which we are concerned here - a poem con1ains 1he alphabet. i.e.
1n a complelely different arrangemenl serving 01her purposes. in
manifold associalioos of 1he individual elements, whereby some may
be represen1ed several limes. others no1 a1 all. (Freud. 1891b, p. 19)
When one of the functions that was learned later fails, an earlier,
more intrencbcd function comes into play:
Aphruia, Hysteria OJ1d the Talking Cure 27
It can be assumed that the various speech activities continue to be
performed by way of the same associations by which we learned them.
Abbreviations and substitutions may be employed, but their nature is
not always easy to recognize. Their significance is still further reduced
by the consideration that in cases of org;inic lesion the speech
apparatus as a whole probably sulTers some damage and is forced into
a return towards tbc primary and secure, though more cumbersome
modes of association. ( Ibid .• pp. 76- 7)
ln1ellectua!
Svstem of word1)fesenr.atlons
I I I I
(Level 2)
/ cent<e \
System of objec-1·bs:sociallons ILM!f I) Sensory Motor
~nllt lor centre for
words words
~ t
Baaic 'Dlegram'
... if he sees things before him with all their original actuality. we
shall observe that he is completely dominated by some affect. And if
we then compel him 10 put this affect into words, we shall find that, at
the same time as he is producing this violent affect. the phenomenon
of his pains emerges very markedly once again and that thencefor-
ward the symptom. in its chronic character. dtsappcars.... It could
only be supposed that the psycb.ic trauma docs in fact continue to
operate in the subject and maintains the hysterical phenomenon. and
that it comes to an end as soon as the patient bas spoken about it.
(Freud ( 1893h) SE Ill 35)"
Aphasia, Hysteria and 1he Talking Cure 31
Sometimes Freud wrote as if the visual memory itself was being
dissolved when it was put into words:
Once a picture has emerged from the patient's memory, we may hear
him say 1hat i1 becomes fragmentary and obscure as he proceeds with
his description of it. 111e patient ls, as it ~·ere, getting rid oj'it by tur11ing
it into words. ( Breuer and Freud (1895d) SE II 280)
What is being turned imo words is an affect and a memory that had
become converted into a symptom. The symptom itself was the
expression of these ' Jost' words. 29 On 1he model of the word/object
systems, what has happened is that a relation between thespetijic word
presentation and the specific object association has been refused - a
similar mechanism to that which Freud called asymbolic aphasia. As a
consequence of this refusaJ, lov.•er, earlier-learnt functions arc brought
into play: the words find their material locus in the body, rather than in
sound: they become gestures.'" Jackson had argued that something
similar takes place in aphasia: the recurrent utterances of the aphasic are
thoughts that are frozen, repeated, ready made up, and hence not true
speech . They are insistent and outside of the subject's control, in the
same way as hysterical symptoms are. To find out why these u11erances
and no others are found, one must look to the history of the course of
the aphasic syndrome, often finding a specific event or affec.t as the
explanation. Similarly, the talking cure had as its means an historical
enquiry, in search of a point in time when the relationship between the
two systems had suffered some 'perturbation'. But, with the dimension
of time, the theory became more complex.
Jn studying hysterics, Freud was not led back to any memory in the
unconscious.~ these memories themselves possessed an added dimen·
sion: their position in time. Symptoms Y.'Cre formed wht-n a prcc-ipitating
cause - usually a strong afTect - resonated with a repressed memory 1
Only one idea of general value has occurred to me. I have found love
of the mother and jealousy of the father in my own case. and now
believe it to be a general phenomenon of early childhood , even if it
docs not always occur so early as in children who have been
made hysterics. (Freud (1950a) SE I 265)
Behind this formulation of the notion of Oedipal desires lay the need
to lint. the development of the instinctual life with the intellectual
development of tbc speccb function. Freud was searching for a
chronological determinant for the causation of neurosis. And it still
lay in a temporally determined lack of synchronization of desire and its
integration into 'experience'. Throughout Freud's writings there will
remain a conception that there is something about the sexual that is
beyond the capacity of the mind to assign. Again. we can refer to the
resistance to signification that the loss of the penis awakens in both
sexes. a resistance that forms the rock bottom of all neuroses (cf. Freud
(1937c) SE XXIll 250- 3; also Freud (1909b) SE X 142 and (1905d) SE
VII 240 I). Arter the first entbusiastic hypotheses of the 1890s Freud
began to be more circumspect, while still finding the sume problematic
at the heart of neurosis. Of Little Hans Freud wrote:
It is hard to say what the inftuen"" was which ... led to the sudden
change in Hans... . Wheth<r the scales were tumed by the child's
lnrtlltttual inability to solve the difficult problem of the b<:getliog of
children and to cope with tbe aggressive impulses that were lib<:rated
by his approaching the solution. or whether the effect was produced
by a somatic incapacity ... (F reud (1909b) SEX 136)
Any verbal approach 10 the object that has become ' lost' to 1hesystem
of word presen1111ions is likely to be efficacioU$. Indeed, Freud's
remarks on the general functions of speech bear out the impression that
any uilking. even if it is language a1 i1s most unspecitic - oaths - will
e1Tec1 the stale of psychical heahh thal the hysteric has given up by
rcrusmg 10 speak:
What makes the patient ill is silence. But this long passage indicates a
subtle fusion of the two elements we have carefully separated so far.
'Talk' is conceived both as lying in the dimension of meaning, of truth,
of spcci6ci1y; and it is also conceived of as a mechanism for the
discharge of a tension. an excess of excita1ion that, al 1his date ( 1893). is
still conceived of as analogous to the excitation of the nervous system
(cf. Andersson. ( 1962)). We might well call this lancr element the
ca1hani<: dimension and the former the semantic dimension.'' What is
most interdting is that the aphasia monograph was almO>t exclusively
concerned with the conditions necessary for the understanding of the
semantic dimension. even though the dis1inc1i•e characteristic of the
semantic, specificity, was lacking in aphasia . It elaborated a syntax of
systems into which the distinctively Freudian concept of hysteria as a
38 Language and tk Origins of Ps)'choonal)'S~
·semantic" disorder could be placed. With the demise of the cathanic
method and cure,JI all the therapeutic weight came to rest on the
semantic clement.
This is not to deny that the quantitative clement was not still bound
up in the terminology that Freud developed. But it is important to
recognize that these terms- for example, resistance and transference-
camc to refer primarily to clements ofsignification: resistance is first and
foremost resistance 10 signification; transference refers primarily 10 the
signification of the analyst in the psychic economy, rather than the
displacement of quantity onto this new object.
As a consequence, it is at the level of theory, rather than of therapy,
that we find the q uanlitative mode put most in evidence. It was in the
Project that Freud a11emp1ed to combine 1he idea of psychic systems
developed in On Aphasia with a derivation from firsl principles of the
quantitative functioning of these systems. We will not be able 10 analyse
this a11cmp1 in detail. What must concern us is the exact position given
to the ·speech apparatus' in that abortive work. We will find the
clements we have already encountered emerge more clearly, namely, the
fundamental importance of the relations betwccn the object assoc;.
a1ions (traces) and word prcscn1a1ions (verbal residues). and the
civilizing function oflanguage, which underpins the therapy ofhyslcria.
But. before we tum to the Project and then 10 1hc ,later theory of
language in Freud"s work, we should finally try and measure the
originality oft he talking cure, when con1ras1ed wi1h Charcot"s theories
ofhyslcria, hypnosis and aphasia. h has been argued mosl in1crcstingly
by Major( l974, 1977) that the !urning poin1 in Freud's 1herapy was the
momenl when he allached grcalcr impor1ancc to 1he hyslcrics' words
1han 10 her drama1ic gcs1ures. The talking cure 1urns away from the
dn1ma1ic rela1ion between doctor and pa1ien1 10 lhe words of 1he
hys1eric, the doctor's gaze is shined away from the body of 1he patient,
thus crca1ing the presence of a master. filling the field of consciousness
oft he hysteric and allowing her to become the plaything of1 he masters
desire. i.e. to 'satisfy' her desire. Major links Ibis with a shift of the
doc1or-pa1icnt relationship that Freud brought about by assigning such
dominance to the acoustic element of language:
A further qucs1ion might now be asked: how docs the ego dislinguish
between indications of quali1y from wand indica1ions of qualily from
speech?
Freud gave no direc1answer10 this qucs1ion , bu1 we may be able to
piece one together from the elements of his 1hcory. To do so. we muse
rc1urn 101wo passages: the firsi in On Aphasia. where hese1sout the 1wo
srs1cms of word-presentations and objcct-assocoa11ons (Chapter I. p.
28). and lhc second when be in1roduccd 1he sys1em of speecb-
associat1ons ro Pan Ill of the Projecr. In both passages he s1a1ed tbatthe
sys1em of word-prcsenlations is 'closed' (geseh/ossen). In On Aphasia,
he explicitly contrasted it wi1h the ·open' sys1em of objec1-associa1ions.
In addi1ion, in the Projeer, he stated tha1:
46 language (llld the Origins of Psychoanalysis
Speech associations consists in the linking of I/I neurones with
neurones which serve sound-presentations and themselves have the
closest association with motor speech-images. These associations
have an advantage of two characteristics over the others: they are
limited (ge.schlasstn) (few in number) and exclusive. ( Ibid. SE I 36.S)
T HE MACHINE SPEAKS
But. somehow, 1his machine refused 10 run. Wedo nol knowexac1 ly why
Freud discarded 1he Project: in the lcllcrs lo Flicss he simply exclaimed:
' I no longer understand 1hc s1a1c of mind in which I concocted the
psychology ... ii seems to me to have been a le.ind of abcrra1ion.' (Freud
(19500) Origins (29 Nov. 1895) p. 134). Five weeks arier wriling 1his he
was bock 1inkering wi1h the model, schema1ically indica1ing ·a comple1e
revision of all my <Po/Jw 1heories'. (Ibid. (l Jan. 1896), p. 141 ). The most
subs1an1ial change was a more clearcul dcmarca1ion betwec.n o/J, on the
o ne hand, aod <P and won the other. No Q actually flowed from <P and l/f;
rather. a record of ,P's reception of stimuli w.is achieved as a sidc-dTect,
1hrough a son of induction or excitalion of !/I by w. Thus w b«:amc bo1h
more cen1ral to 1he recording of exicrnal e"entS in !/I. while tfl b«:ame
more 1ndepcndcn1 of bolh <P and w. I/I was now 1hc scat of unconscious
processes which could, as before, only 'subsequcnlly acquire a secondary,
anifidal consciousness by being linked wilh processes of discharge and
pcrcx:plion (wilh speech-associations)'. (Ibid.) Percepiual processes, on
1hc o ther hand, automalically involved consciousness.
The Metapsycholog}' of SJNech 51
and the revisions of the following months did not impro,·e it. We might
well ask: whydoesn't theprocessofcognitive thought. made possible by
spccch. in which auention can be directed to any ;--pathway, anticipate
the change in condition of the memory of the pre-sexual experience
consequent upon puberty, and thus anticipate the release of unplcasure
from a related post-pubertal experience? Is it that there is something
inherently recalcitrant in sexual experience which makes it difficult to
think about or to put into words? Such a solution to the problem of
repression was to be entertained by Freud in later years, but it obviously
lcn more questions unanswered than it solved . In fact. Freud always
found this problem recalcitrant, returning to it frequently. One answe.r
he gave, in the paper on 'Repression', postulated a primary repression
which fixed a certain relationship between an idea (memory) and a
(sexua l) instinct: such an answer still did not approach the question
'why?'. Bui , from the Project on, ii would seem that Freud became
sensitive to the sort ofconsiderations we ha ve raised concerning the use
of speech associations to work over a memory whose condition bas
changed since its original registration.
In essence Freud's idea was this: repression was due to a lack of
synchronization between the inhibitory activity of the ego, further
regulated by the speech associations, and the internal excitations due to
the sexual processes. The argument in the Project had relied solely upon
a tempo ral discontinuity in the level of sexual excitations introduced by
the threshold of puberty. Since, as we noted, this explanation seemed to
be open to objections arising from the properties of the •q,ijlru', why
not look to the other side of the process, the mechanisms of inhibition,
for the foctor predisposing to repression? In other words, why not look
to the stages of the development of thought, o r, following Ferenczi , the
stages in the development of a sense of reality. for the discontinuities
that give occasion for the specific vulnerability of the mental apparatus
to which repression wiU1esses? 10 It was true that rttis angle of approach
would not explain why it seemed to be s~xua/ experiences and only
sexual experiences which were the initial occasion fo r repression. But
Freud recognized that bis attempt to find the sufficient condition for
repression in the amplifying factor of puberty had not supplied a very
satisfactory explanation; and in the years 1895- 98 be bad little clear
idea or additional factors specific to the develo pment or sexual
excitations that would provide a sufficient condition for repression. So it
was probable that factors on both sides of the equation would prove
necessary: one factor, on the side of sexuality, in order to explain why
the traumatic experience was always sexual ; and another factor, on the
The Metapsycholog}' of SJNech 51
and the revisions of the following months did not impro,·e it. We might
well ask: whydoesn't theprocessofcognitive thought. made possible by
spccch. in which auention can be directed to any ;--pathway, anticipate
the change in condition of the memory of the pre-sexual experience
consequent upon puberty, and thus anticipate the release of unplcasure
from a related post-pubertal experience? Is it that there is something
inherently recalcitrant in sexual experience which makes it difficult to
think about or to put into words? Such a solution to the problem of
repression was to be entertained by Freud in later years, but it obviously
lcn more questions unanswered than it solved . In fact. Freud always
found this problem recalcitrant, returning to it frequently. One answe.r
he gave, in the paper on 'Repression', postulated a primary repression
which fixed a certain relationship between an idea (memory) and a
(sexua l) instinct: such an answer still did not approach the question
'why?'. Bui , from the Project on, ii would seem that Freud became
sensitive to the sort ofconsiderations we ha ve raised concerning the use
of speech associations to work over a memory whose condition bas
changed since its original registration.
In essence Freud's idea was this: repression was due to a lack of
synchronization between the inhibitory activity of the ego, further
regulated by the speech associations, and the internal excitations due to
the sexual processes. The argument in the Project had relied solely upon
a tempo ral discontinuity in the level of sexual excitations introduced by
the threshold of puberty. Since, as we noted, this explanation seemed to
be open to objections arising from the properties of the •q,ijlru', why
not look to the other side of the process, the mechanisms of inhibition,
for the foctor predisposing to repression? In other words, why not look
to the stages of the development of thought, o r, following Ferenczi , the
stages in the development of a sense of reality. for the discontinuities
that give occasion for the specific vulnerability of the mental apparatus
to which repression wiU1esses? 10 It was true that rttis angle of approach
would not explain why it seemed to be s~xua/ experiences and only
sexual experiences which were the initial occasion fo r repression. But
Freud recognized that bis attempt to find the sufficient condition for
repression in the amplifying factor of puberty had not supplied a very
satisfactory explanation; and in the years 1895- 98 be bad little clear
idea or additional factors specific to the develo pment or sexual
excitations that would provide a sufficient condition for repression. So it
was probable that factors on both sides of the equation would prove
necessary: one factor, on the side of sexuality, in order to explain why
the traumatic experience was always sexual ; and another factor, on the
52 l.Anguag• and the Origins of Psyc:hoanalysls
side of the development of thought, in order to explain why such a
sexual experience could be a trauma.
But, for a time after be bad scribbled o ut the Project, and probably as
a result of us persistent interest for him, Freud continued to tinker with
the ' thought' side of the equation. And, since sp«ch was such an
important part of the apparatus for inhibiting unplcasure and produc-
ing conscious (as opposed to repr=edl ideas, the chronology of the
development of language seemed a likely place to look fo r the con-
ditions under which repression might occur. Thus it was not o nly the
clinicnl data - the traumas that kept being pushed back earlier and
e:arlier, rhat were buried deeper and deeper - thar led Freud into the
prehistoric past; ii was also !he search for conditions indicating a certain
vulnembility of the psychic apparatus thar led him to the early years of
experience - led him, that is, to a period that wo uld always be as much
pro-verbal as it was to be pre-Ocdipal. 1 1
At the end or 1896, Freud tried out a new schema.
a m
Pcp1, Uc.
x""·x
Pc:p1,1 Con te,
)( x-x )( x x- x )(
x x x x x x
x
... the real dilfercnce between a Ucs. and a Pcs. idea (thought)
consists in this: that the former is carried out on some material wruch
remains unknown, whereas the laner (the Pcs.) is in addition brought
into connection with word-pr=cacions. This is the 6nt a11emp1 co
indicate distinguishing marks for the cwo syscems. che Pcs. and the
Ucs.. other than their relacion to conscic>U$Dcss. (Freud (1923b) SE
XIX 20)
But none of this implies 1ha1 the quality of being conscious has lost its
importance for us. h remains the one lighl which illuminates our palh
and leads us through the darkness of mental life.... our scientific
work in psychology will oonsis1in translating unconscious processes
into conscious ones, and thus filling in the gaps io conscious
perception. (Freud (1940b) SE XXlll 286)
... the question bow we make something that i.s repressed (pre)
consc.ious would be answered as follows. It is done by supplying Pcs.
intermediate links lhrough the work or analysis. Consciousness
remains where it is, therefore, but, on the other hand. the Ucs. does
not rise into the Cs. (Freud (1923b) SE XIX 21)
62 language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
How can we interpret these ' intenncdiatc links' as being anything
other than speech residues? An affirmative answer seems over-
determined on both tbeoretical and therapeutic grounds: psycho-
analysis. as the talking-cure, requires first and last that the patient should
say whatever comes into his head, and it is this surraoo or words that the
analyst must study.
A problem like: Where shall I probe now? should not exist. The
patient shows the way, in that by following the basic rule (saying
everything that comes into his head) he displays bis mental surface
from moment to moment. (Freud ( 1965a), 9 Jan 1908, p. 20)
SYMBOLISM IN HYSTERIA
When I began to call up the traumatic scene, the patient saw herself
back in o period of great mental irritability towards her husband. She
described a conversation which she had hod with him and o remark of
his which she had felt as a bitter insult. Suddenly she put her hand to
her check, gave a loud cry of pain and said: 'It was like a slap in the
face'. With trus her pain and her attack were both ot an end.
There is no doubt that what bad happened had been a symboliz-
ation. She bad felt as though she bad actually been given a slap in the
face. Everybody will immediately ask how it was that the sensation of
a 'slap in the face' came to take on the outward forms of a trigeminal
neuralgia. why it was restricted to the second and third branches, and
why it was made worse by opening the mouth and chewing - though,
iocidcntally, not by talking. (Ibid.)
accepted as complete.•
When we speak of the equation 'literal =genital' as the end-point of
interpretation, it should be made clear that interpretation was necessary
on both sides of the equation before it could be established. The concept
of the genital was expanded, so that any bodily sensation could be
viewed as a displacen1ent from the genital or - most prominent1y i11
Ferencz.i's work - as a regression of a genital sensation back onto those
parts of the body from which genital sensations had originally been
synthesized. 7 On the other side of the equation, the notion of a figure of
speech becomes literal - and hence corporeal - interlocked with the
newly expanded c-0ncept of the genital. As a consequence, a certain
typicality of interpretation, based up-0n the reference to sexuality,
entered into the analysis of symptoms. Freud paved the way for these
typical interpretations by finding in the acme of sexual satisfaction a loss
of consciousness, the absence, through which a crossing of the gap
between the literal and the figurative became possible (Freud ( 1909a)
SE IX 233- 4). This new hypnoid state. firmly attached to the normal
processes of sexual satisfaction. thus ensured that the content of the
hysterical symptom would be borrowed from the b-0dily sensations of a
polymorphous sexuality. We still retain the verbal intricacies of the
earlier conception of the hysterical symptom as abuse oflanguage; but it
is now firmly linked to a condition that the end-point of interpretation
of these word-plays should refer directly to an inflated genital. When the
word bec-Omes flesh it has a singularly simple morphology.
We have established that the theory of symbolization in neurotic
symptoms establishes the relation between a bodily state and a figure of
,,....o~ n;....t.. c. - -..u. ~..............1vo.... r. .... t.._i,;,,. ......,..,.._:,.,: ...., ,...,,..,.,;"'""~~-----
70 Languag• and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
a basic language, whose structure is possibly decipherable through the
in1crpre1a1ion ofsymptoms, 1he~lves interpreted through a reduction
of the speech of the patient. This theory of symbolism will reappear in
the next department of psychoanalysis in which a theory of symbolism
was found to ~doubly necessary: dream theory.
Herc was one more explicil target against which Freud was arguing: a
peculiar symbolizing activity of the mind. In the late nineu:cn1h century
context, this activi1y could be concaved of as a form of degeneracy or a
loss or appcrceptive ability (a concept which Silbcrer was later to revive
in just this context and with which we shall deal later). Freud wished to
assert positively that the keys and solutions to the dream are laid down
prior to 1he peculiar state of mind io10 which the dream thrusls us-
Although the interpreter may take the lead in using them as 1hc clue to
the meaning of the dream, it is not an arbitrary_ individualistic ac1. but
Symbolism 73
one sanctioned by the history of culture:
Wherever neuroses (or dreams) makc use of such disguises they are
following paths along which all humanity passed in the earliest
periods of civilization - paths or wh<>5e continued existence today,
under the thinnest of veils, e"idencc is 10 be found in linguistic usages,
supcrs1nions and customs. (Ibid .. SE V 347)
We have here 1wo oppositions that arc closely linked, but which it is
important to separate: the opposition between 'arbitrary' and 'already
laid down' (or 'determined'); and the oppo~ition between 'individual'
and 'collective'. One of the tensions in Freud's thought was that, on the
one hand. he wished that any 'arbitrariness' that entered into analysis
should enter from the patient's side, not from the analyst's. Bui if both
pa11en1 and analyst can call upon linguistic usage and historically
necessary determinations of specific forms of meaning, lhcn lhc
arbitrariness bas been foreclosed. Ricocur confuses these 1wo levels
when hecb.araclcrizes the shift from the Studi,.10 the Traunukurung as
one tn which the mechanisms of displacemcn1 and condensation have
absolute priority in the Studies. 10 lhe SCI or 'cultural s1ereo1ypes' or
Tlw ln1erpre1a1ion of Dreams (Ricoeur, 1970. p. 97, n. 1). The cultural
s1erco1ypc 1ba1 we find in the later Freudian symbolism is not individual
in any important sense. But 1becultural refcrencesoflinguislic usage are
individual a11dcollcctive al the same time. When 1he patienl ar1icula1es a
figure of speech in 1he dream or in 1he neurotic symptom. we perceive a
common basis upon which the elemenl draws, but we also nole 1ha1 the
figure of speech forms parl of a verbal d.iscoursc that is completely
individual 10 the paticn1. In the tension between the clichc and the
inappropriate analogy we see the fusion ofindividual and collcc1ive that
both allows the analyst 10 vouchsafe bis interpretations and to
safeguard against the stereotypical symbolical or decoding methods of
interpretation.
Thus I wish 10 contrast 1be symbolical method of in1erpre1a1ion with
the lingui>1ic melh~ in the laner the dream-element in question
reveals its meaning by the son of figure of speech 1ha1 we have already
considered in hysterical symbolization. How do such analyses function
in practioc? The following example illu<1ra1<d the remarks 1ba1 I have
already quoted:
In finding such symbolisms, the dream is. again. not employing some
special powtr of symbolization. but is rathtr "follo,.ing the pa1hs which
11 finds already laid down in the unconscious' (tlit sit mr unbr.<UJSten
De11kt11 fH,,;,. g'bahnt rorfo1de1), (Ibid. SE V 346). For such limi1ed
topics. such as the symbolism of the body discovered by Schemer. or the
symbolism of seed and plough_ "the way ha> been well prepared by
linguistic usage. itself 1he precipitate of imaginttthc similes reaching
back 10 remote antiquity .. :. (Ibid.)
The final sanction for Freud's method of interpretation was the
76 language a11d the Origins of Psy<'hoonolysis
atN'JJib1/t1y to the drcameT of the fonns of signiflClltion that were
presented to him. But this was not the only argument against the
m<thod of symbolic decoding. His antagon1Sm to the laner no doub1
stemmed in part from his conviction of the individuality of structure of
each dream. of each neurosis. Such structures were built up out of the
same methwtisms. but one did not exp«t these mechanisms to produce
the same manifest content or symptom corresponding to a given
concealed thought. since the individual's unique experiences were the
raw material o ut of which the structures were built. In his papers on the
neuroses in the 1890s, Freud made much of the revo lution he was
effecting in the nosology of the neuroses: his new classification was
bused 011 mechanism, not on symptomatology (e.g. Freud (1895b) SE
Ill 90 I). Similarly, his theory of dreams rested on the delineation of
the metltanisms or the dream-work, not the superficial themes or
common features shared by various dreams. 10 To retre:u back to
classification by symptom and sign would in effect amount to losing
everything that psychology bad gained for pathology.
We have seen that the individuality of reference of the content of the
dream or the neurosis is guarantttd by the method of free association.
Where this source fails. the shared meanings 'stored up' in linguistic
usage arc a•ailablc to the interpreter. The articulation of the archi-
tectonic within which explanations in terms of linguistic usage are
founded still remains undefined, and will remain so until Chapter 5.
Now, we should turn lo the changes in the editions of Tltt l111erpretation
of Dream.< and the impact of the growing psychoanalytical movement
upon the method of dream-interpretation for a clarification both of this
architectonic support and the concept of the symbol. Dul, a lready, in
connecting the problem of symbolism and the explanation through
linguistic usage we have presaged the form that Freud's later theory of
symbolism took .
Pnticnts arc silent in two situations: when they do 11ot accept sexual
symbolism, or when the transference situation pr<-scnts an obstacle.
(Afinutes I, p. 180; cf. Freud (1916- 17) SE XV 149- SI)
Joachim replied:
... the analysis of dreams has shown us that the unconscious makes
use of a panicular symbolism. especially for rtprescnting sexual
complexes. This symbolism varies panly from individual to in-
dividual: but panly it is laid down in a typical form and seems to
coincide with the symbolism which. as we suspect. underlies our
myths and fairy tales. (Freud (19 10a) SE Xl 36)
Freud now sanctioned the first two of the following three possible
conceptions of symbolic expression:
By October. Jung was well entrenched in the vast new area of study.
and found difficulty in finding a description for it: ·Archaeology or
rather mythology bas got me in its grip, it's a mine of marvellous
material.' (Ibid. IS7J. pp. 251- 2.) Freud replied:
I am delighted to learn that you arc going into mythology. A little less
loneliness.... I hope you will soon come to agree with me that in all
likelihood mythology centres on the same nuclcur complex as the
neuroses. {Ibid., 16-0F. p. 260)
·Her own love for her father bad therefore been recently revived; and.
if so. the question arises to what end this had happened. Clearly as a
reactive symptom, so as to suppress something else - something, that
is, that still exercised power in the unconscious . .. she had suc-
ceeded in persuading herself that she had done with Herr K. - that
was the advantage she derived from this typical process of repression;
and yet she was obliged to summon up her infa ntile alTcction for her
rather and to exaggerate it, in order 10 protect herself against the
feelings or love which were constantly pressing forward into con-
sciousness.' (Freud (1905e) SE VII 58)
In May 1909 Freud used this important distinction (upon which the
concept of narcissism was eventually built) to elucidate the aetiology of
the psycho-neuroses:
Personally, Freud is more and more inclined toward the view that ii is
not masturbation that - as the patient asserts - is the source of all
these neurotic sufferings; the essential faclor is what lies bcbind
masturbation - namely, the primitive mas1urba1ion-fantasics ...
Neurolics arc persons who in fantasy have not arrived at a
detachment from their first objects; and it is from this content of the
primilit:• fantasies that all these feelings of repression follow. For
persons who can detach these fantasies from father, mother, etc.,
masturbation has no psychological consequences. (Minu1ts II, p.
229)
88 language a"d the Origins of Psrrhoanal,.sls
This position contra.sted strongly with the spirit of Freud's pro-
nounccmtnts upon the aetiology of the neuroses in his paper of June
190S (Freud. 1906a). The emphasis !Mrc had ~non the disiurbances in
the organic sexual processes. By 1909 Freud was emphasizing the means
by which such organic disturbances came about. i.e. the defences
against various objects or aims that lead to a fixation. or lack of
detachment of libido, fro m various sexual component-instincts. With
the work• of 1907 and 1908, the new element came to the fore: the
consequences of the thought-activity of children for the construction of
neurotic symptoms in later life. Two papers were the consequences of
this investigation of the ' normal' thought-world of children and young
people: 'The Sexual Theories of Children' and 'Family Romances'.
Both these papers. wriucn in late 1908.,, eonccntrated on the relations
between the child and its parents, but in a completely different manner
from either the seduction theory or the Three E:ssars on Sexuality. The
theme of parent and child was located on the level of thought and
fantasy: the intellectual anempt to resolve the 'twin' problems of the
origin of babies. and the origin of the self (including there. the question
as to the origin of the self qua sexed being).
With the introduction of the term 'complex' by Jung (derived from
the methodology of the association experiment). the issue becomes
more complic.atcd. Now 'complexes' referred to circles of ideas
possessing a permanent and hidden affe<.1ive charge. In 1908 we find
Freud following J ung, perhaps reluctantly. in using the term complex
for a vitriety of psychical contents: the 'personal' complex, the
'professional' complex - and the 'family complex' (Freud ( 19() 1b) SE VJ
4-0; added 1907). We can now see the components that. on top of the
conccpl of infan tile sexuality and object choice. went into the construc-
tion of the Oedipus complex: the study ofl hechildhood sexua l theories,
the family romunces of adolescence. and 1he family complex. But as yet
we ha\•e not unravelled all the threads.
For a small child his parents are at first the only authonty and the
source of all belief. The child's most intense and most momentous
1N1sh dunng these early )'ears is to be like his parents (lhat ii. the
parent of his own sex) and to be big tikc his father and mother. (Freud
( 1909c) SE VII 237)
This statcmcnt, taken from ' Family Romances'. d= not sound at all
like a component part of the Oedipus complex. It lacks that essential
diffcrcntiution between father and mother that characterizes the triadic
Symbolism 89
structure of the Oedipus complex. Indeed, it hinges around a psychologi-
cal mechanism that comes closer to the non-psychoanalytic concept of
'imitation'. True, it was not until B•yond th• Pltasuu Principk (Freud
(l920g) SE XVIII 17) that Freud was to establish an explicit critique of
the concept of imitation. But Adler was to make explicit the direction of
thought indicated here. when he asserted that the child's wish to be ·on
top', to be in a position of power with respect to those toward whom he
felt inadequate. was the dominant concem of the neuro tic(Adler, 1912-
17). So. at this time, Freud and his co-workers were not particularly
concerned with the triadic relation of father, mother and child. When
Jung wrote a paper on 'the fathe r complex' (as Freud called it io a
letter). a paper roughly contemporaneous with Freud's ' Family
Romance and ' Sexual Theories' papers. he was able to assert:
Freud replied:
The old "family romance", which is the core of all neuroses. expresses
itself also in this case.... (/.Iinures I, p. 295)
The family romance and the sexual theories of children went hand in
hand in forming the basis of lhe neurosis. Staning wi1h the gap lhat
exisis between the impulses oflhechild and its k.nowledge of1hc means
of procreation and S<Jlual activity, the sexual inves1igalion of the child
comprises an attemp1 at sexual knowledge of the parents. The mystery
surrounding his own genital sensations bears an unknown relation to
the mystery of the parents' sexual relation (Freud (1909b) SEX 134-6).
The investigation of this relation is closely connected with the mastur-
batory gratiRcation of 1he infantile period: the sexual theories are the
first fantasy-structures of the Bilderonanist . The fomily romances of a
slightly later agc(though we should note that Freud at this stage did not
auach much importance to cardinal chronological considerations) arc
1hc sexual theories transj>os<d under the pressure of the allcmpt to
liberate the self from the parental authority.
Having arrived 'back' at thecentrali1y of1hc parents in the life of the
child, Freud wrote to Jung in December 1908:
Over 1he next few momhs the concept was to take the shape that we
more immediately recognize as the Oedipus complex, 1ha1 is. solu1ions
to the problems of the aetiology of the neuroses ceased to have either the
Symbolism 91
5truccure or'tirher(the mother) or (the rather)' or 'the>mothcr-and·thC>
father', and began to take up a form in which opposition and
idcntificat.ion were both necessarily involved. Firstly. Freud brought the
sexual curiosity and intellectual activity or the child into close connec-
tion with both his tender and hostile impulses:
We anticipate that it may tum out by chance that adult neurOSC$ have
their prototype in cbikl life. ... Then we would have a clear
undcl'$tanding of the origin of the neuroses and. between the nuclear
complex and the later adult neurosis, we would have to insert the
elementary neurosis as an intcrmedia1c stage. The pediatrician is in a
position to make the distinction definite between the psychologically
Symbolism 93
conditioned strata of neurosis and a core that falls into the earliest
years of life; he can further determine, with regard to this core, what
should be shifted over to development and what should be ascribed 10
heredity. Perhaps it will appear that behind all psychologically
conditioned phenomena there lies something else. (!of i11u1es II, pp.
322- 3)
With the introduction of the Oedipus complex and its integration into
a new schema of the aetiology of the neurOSC$ - a process that one
cannot separate from the genesis of the concept and which acts as the
gauge of the existence of that concept - Freud gave a new dimension of
'typicality'. of 'universality', to psychoanalyt ic theory. Al the base of all
neurosis. at the deepest level - and o nly, to be sure, al the deepest
level - was to be found one single structure, transforms of which gave
rise 10 different neuroses. The dcrnil with which u psychoanalytic
explanation only makes sense was by implication downgrodcd: another
criterion, conformity to the unitary Oedipal strucLure, seemed to pull in
the opposite explanatory direction. Instead of a finer and finer
appreciation of the intimate details of the individual neurosis, an
approximation that might have as its ideal conformity with an
·understanding' of that person's life, it becomes more and more
tempting to urge analysis towards a single and final end of all
interpretation, an apocalyptic twilight of the dialectic of destiny. And
what end was this? - The panem, the image, that bad. so surprisingly,
appeared to F reud in The ln1erpu1a1ion of Dr~ams, and for which be
had virtually created a special category: dreams of the death of relatives
and or incest. The discooo:rting explicitness of a class of dreams, which,
by definition. were at their most implicit when to be explicit would be to
disconcert, now. came to be the aim and measure of psychoanalysis,
whereas then, in 1900. it bad been something to be explained away,
Symbolism 95
some1hing 10 be patched over, the bole in the psychoanalytical kenle.
Symbolism, as the apparatus of explanation that took over the niche
created by the makeshift category of typical dreams, functioned in
parallel 10 the Oedipus complex, now grown, as we have seen, out of all
proportions toils humble beginnings as a typical dream. Both bypassed
de1ail; both bypassed interpretation; both bypassed the spinning out of
words that coagulated meaning through the plurivocality of their
reference. The Oedipus complex introduced a transparency between
symptom and cause, symptoms now being viewed as one modality
umong others of a cause already known. One might argue that this
transparency occurred only at the level of theory, the level that, as we
emphusizcd above, was strongly emphasized in the new three-tier
structure that the Oedipus complex inaugurated; one might argue that,
in the realm of practice, just as much detail of the ' inner world', just as
many subtle innuendos of symptom and image were examined. But this
is precisely what the theory of symbols shows us was no11hecase. h was
a prartica/ exigency- the /ailur• of detail, the lat•k or a connection,
silence - to which the theory of symbols was meant to answer. Its uni-
dimensional and irreversible mo,·cmcnt along a univocal reference be-
came a formidable pan of practice, founding a supporting theory that
we are still in the process of examining. matching the movement of
simplification - even duplicating and supporting it - that the concept of
the Oedipus complex brought 10 1he aetiology of the neuroses. J usl as all
roads lead (back) 10 the Oedipus complex, so that the questions of
heredity versus accidental, of constitution versus experience, of male
and female, have 10 be asked in terms of 'mummy' and 'daddy', so do
the clements of a dream increasingly have to find their final reference in
a very limited set of referents: 'the body in all its aspects, the parents,
children. brothers, sisters, birth. death, nakedness - and something else
besides'. (Freud ( 191 6- 17) SE XV 153: translation modified)"
We have established that the period 1907- 10 saw the formulation of
the Oedipus complex.•• The component parts of the concept were
brought together via the concepts of the nuclear complex, the family
romance and the sexual theories of childhood. The Oedipus complex
acted as a simplifying concept, in the accumulating welter of infantile
fantasy and sexual theory. Its first simplifying function was to reduce
the number of o bjects of aetiological moment. ll was only later that it
acquired the function of synthesizing the component instincts, or of
mediating between the ego and the social world (as in the genesis of the
super-ego).
The simplification worked in two ways: firstly, by exclusion and
96 Language and the Origins of PSJ'Choanalysis
secondly by subsumption. Cenain ·complexes· would necessarily prove
or secondary derivation and therefore would function as intermediate
steps in the solution of a neurosis. Such would be Jung·s •profcssionar
and ·personar neuroses. Such, also, might be the religious complex: the
reduction of God to the father is bound up with the Oedipus complex. 10
Secondly. ccnain themes, seemingly of equivalent primordiality to
Oedipus, could be subsumed within the Oedipus complex: the themes of
birth and rebirth. of the rescue, of the cloaca! theory of birth. and so
fort h. The latent content oftbe neurosis was afllrmed as stable.just at
the point where the detailed manifestations of it were proliferating.
Just as symbolism gives direct access to meanings derived from the
unconscious. so the Oedipus complex gives direct nccess to the primary
desires. More than that, it gives a justification for a certain irrevcrsi·
bility of interpretation: from the god to the fa ther, and not vice versa.
Once one k.nows what the core of a neurosis is going to be. the process of
interpretation becomes more straightforward, less dependent upon the
twists and turns of the ·detail' that had been so 1mpor1ant. The typicality
of Oedipal desires is mirrored in the typicality of their representation.
h is in the domain of myibology and its symbolism that we find the
movements towards simplicity of aetiology and towards interpretative
verisimilitude most at odds. And it was mythology that came to
preoccupy Freud and his co-workers most in the period we a re studying.
From this time on, the genetic approach outlined here was to be
Freud's argument against the universal symbolizing tendency of Stckel
Symbolism 97
and later of Jung. Through the genetic approach. he could retain his
previous theory of symbolism intact. 'The meaning of symbols is to be
found in linguistic usage and the historical understanding of language' -
this would always be Freud's fundamental atti1ude to symbolization.
In 1895 he had loca1cd this usage in 1hc prcscn1 and the past. In the
19 IOs he was forced to give up the double determination of the linguistic
usage of the present - that is, free associa1ion and resorted to
dc1ermination of symbolism through the pre-historic origins of lan-
guage. With Stekel's dream-symbols. language was no longer a direct
guide to meaning. leaving the explanatory afTec1ion that Freud had for
language with 1he secondary task of explaining why thesymbols had the
meaning 1hey in fact did have. As he phrased his new posi1ion in 191 4,
symbols were ·a relic and a mark of former idcn1i1y'. (Freud (1900a) SE
v 352.}
In his letter to Jung of January 1910, from which I have just quoted,
Freud had stated the programme for the investigation of symbolism
that he was to follow lhroughou1 the rcs1 of his"""'"~· First fruit of his
investigation of the dtvclopmcnt of languag< and archaic regression
was a paper written in February 1910: 'The Antithetical Meaning of
Primal Words'. Freud mad< u~ of a pamphkt. written by a philologist,
Karl Abel. on the prot<>-Egyp1ian language. showing that in that
language there arc a number of words with two meanings. one of which
is the exact opposite of the other. Freud and Abel constructed an
explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the development of
language. Freud postulated a stageoflanguage. exactly parnllel with the
system al work in the dream, in which a word represented a conceptual
'dimension'. e.g. 'weak-strong'. A later s1agc of lunguagc differcntia1cd
'weak' from 'strong' by adding to the one word 'wcak-s1rong' two
different ges1ures. Eventually via a 'phonelic reduclion (modification}
of the original root' (Freud (1910e) SEX! IS8).1wo words separated out
on the basis of a coupling of the original conceptual dimension with a
ge>tural sign that fixes the meaning in that dimension. In other words,
when the drcam--..ork converts two seemingly separate words first into
a relation of antithesis. and then. following funher regression. into a
relation of identity. the dream is simply reviving the ancient usages or
language.
On the scientific side just an oddity. I have two patienu with nuclear
complexes involving their witnessing acu or infidelity on the part or
their mothers (the one historical. the other perhaps a mere phantasy).
They both tell me about it in the same day and preface their story with
dreams about ..-ood.. .. Now I am aware that boards mean a
woman, also cupboards, [both these words have sexual connotations
in Germani but I have never heard of any close connection between
wood and the mother complex. It occurs to me though that wood in
Spanish is madera- matter (hence the Portuguese name of the island
or Madeira) and undoubtedly mater lies at the root of mater/a
(matter). Force and matter would then be father ond mother. One
more of our dear parents' disguises. (The Freud/Jung u11ers 190F,
pp. 314- 5)
Herc Freud had found what he was looking for: symbolism sanc-
tioned by contemporary or ancient linguistic usage and origins. With
such an V<planation he could dismiss the category 'symbolical thought'
as being of secondary importance when compared with either word
representations or object presentations, which formed the two basic
systems of mental functioning. In other words. symbol1Sm did not form
the exemplar or non-verbal representation for Freud: symbolism was
always secondary, derived from the system of word-presentations,
rather than giving direct access to the system or object presentations.
Jung, on the other hand, began to ascribe more and more importance
I00 Language and the Origins a/ Psyehoanal)'sis
10 symbolic though! in opposition 10 vtrbal 1hought. For a period of
1imc, ii seemed 10 bolh men lha1 Ibey were working along parallel lines
'"i1h respect 10 symbolism: I.My wrolc two 1mponont theoretical works
a11he same time, Freud assuring Jung tho1 he was not plagiarizing, bu1
1hinking independcrnly. 21 These 1wo works were 1he ·Formulations on
1he Two Principles of Mental Functioning' of Freud. written in
November 1910. and Jung's 'Concerning Two Kinds of Thinking'.
wrinen from January 19.IO to December 1910, even1ually becoming the
major 1heore1ical section of Wand/1111gen und Symbol~ tier Libiclo. n
In his paper, Freud introduced lhe pleasure principle and the reali1y
principle as lhe 1wo principles of menial functioning. They were
charac1crized more by aim than by mechanism: 1he pleasure principle's
aim was simply the avoidance of unplcasure, and the release of1ension;
1hc realily principle aimed a1 1ruth, here in1crpre1cd as the besl
guarJnlce of fu1ure pleasure. Involved in the distinc1ion was the
opposi1ion of fantasy and reali1y. and again, Freud made much of the
cssen1ial contribution speech and verbal residues made 10 the function-
ing of the reality principle. through the conscious perception of inner
s1a1cs thal they made possible. He made no menlion of symbolism or
symbolic thought; indeed. one might ask. why should be. since
elsewhere he had reduced the status of symbols to linle other than a
derivo1ive of language?
Jung started his description of the two kinds of thinking with a
characterization of the dream as symbolic. He thus started by shifling
1hc term 'symbolic' to the centre of the problem of interpre1ation. There
was no hint in this work as ye1 of his con1en1ion that this symbolic
meaning lrunscends a verbal hermeneu1ic, but his focus on 1he symbolic
gave the first hint of how be was 10 develop the symbolic mode. He
continued in the paper with a discussion of our normal mode of
thinking, finding. with a whole array of suppor1ing au1boritics. that it
consisis in thinking in word forms, which enable though! to lake a
specific direction. The second mode of thinking is non·vert>al. un-
directed. subjective 'dream or phantasy thinking' (Jung, 1911 /12/15. p.
22). This is the form of thinking that Freud disco•ercd, he maintained,
and it is identical '"lb the thought that the ancients expressed in their
myths and that ,.-e express in our dreams and our psychopatbological
structures: i1 is symbolic thought.
These 1wo conceplions of 1he two forms of thinking did not seem to
their proponents to differ very much. As Jung wrote to Freud in March
1910:
Symbolism I01
The lirsl lhiog abou1 your conccp1ioo of1hc unconscious is lha1 i1 is in
sinking agreemen1 with wba1 I said in January on symbolism. I
c~plained there that 'logical' thinking is 1hinking in • ·ords, "'hicb like
discourse is directed outwards. ' Analogical' o r fantasy thinking i5
emo1ionally loned, piclorial and wordless. not discourse bu1 an inner-
dircctcd rumination on ma1erials belonging 10 lhe pas t. Logical
1hinking is 'verbal thinking'. Analogical 1hinking is archaic, uncon-
scious, nol pul into words and hardly formulablc in words. (The
Freud/Jtmg urters 181J, pp. 298- 9)
Only Oleuler has taken il inio his head 10 carp a1 the notion of verbal
and non-verbal thinking. withoul advancing anything positive. (Ibid.
193J, p. 319)
He then look the not slep and equa1ed visual 'symbols' with the firs1.
non-\crbal thinking. It was here thal he began 10 diverge from Freud's
view. As Freud commented upon a draft of Jung's chapter:
The opposi1cs arc actually fan1as1ic-rcal, no1 symbolic-real. ( Ibid.
199aF. p. 333.)
Freud even thought 1hat the 'whole thing should not be titled
"Symbolism", but "Symbolism and My1hologf', since more light is
thrown upon the lauer 1han the fonner.' (Ibid. p. 335.)
Before we turn 10 a closer look al the development of Jung's work. let
usjus1 no1e some of lhe issues raised by bringing logelher symbolism and
my1h. Freud conceived of myths as being like dreams. H is pupils drew
upon 1hc same analogy bu1 with very different methods.» For Freud,
mylhs were 1he dreams of a people and 1hey needed the same detailed
analysis as he had outlined in 111e lnterprt1a1io11 of Dreams. Necessarily
included in this analysis was a sharp dis1inction bc1wecn 1he la1en1 and
lhe manifcsl con1ent. Just as symbols had been unwillingly admined,
under firm consirainl, into lhe interpretation of dreams. so lhcy could
be allo"'ed to fonn a minor pan of the analysis of myths. The diffcrrncc
bet" ccn myth analysis and dream analysis consisted on the absence of
'1nd1vidual associalions'. Since this was the methodological point of
en1ry of symbolic decoding of dreams. myth analysis had this in
common with inierpretation using symbols. Jung certainly equa1ed
myths and symbols precisely because of 1his characteris1ic: he never
paid a,s much attention to individual associations as Freud did.
102 language and tlw Origins of Psychoanalysis
But Freud oonccived of the myth as a paranoid prodU<:l of the same
order as the secondary revision of the dream. Much of the work of
myth-analysis revolved around extricating the ·originar myth from the
revisions and distortions that had aocumulatcd in it over long periods of
time.•• This difficulty of ascertaining the original 1ex1 of a myth bad as
its consequence that analysis of mythic products would always remain
secondary. for Freud, 10 the analysis of neurotics, with whom a
discursive enquiry.such as 1ha1 conducted with the Ratmun in search of
the original wording of his obsessional formula, could result in a clear
decision as to the Urtext.
Another way of pulling this point is lo assen lhal Freud was very
loathe to give up the contcxtualist methodology of interpretation. The
advantage oft he individual dreamer's associations did not derive from
their unified source, from their belonging 10 an individual, although this
unity functioned as a precondition for the elimination of certain
distortions that were unavoidable in myth analysis. Rather. the
individual could supply the detailed con1ex1 1ha1 was necessary for
interpretation. For this reason, Freud regarded as doubtful any symbols
that did nol have support from a number of he1erogenous sources:
myths, fairy Illies. and, of course. linguistic usage. And if dream·
symbols needed support from myth before they could be acttpted. how
could Jung hope 10 justify the use of dream-symbols in the analysis of
myth?
... ii fits in very well with certain other observations which have
forced me 10 conclude that the so-called 'early memories or child·
hood' :ore no1 individual memories at all but phylogenetic ones. (Ibid.
27SJ . p. 450)
... this primal identity [oft he instincts] may well have as linle to do
with our analytic interests as the primal kinship of all the races of
mankind has Lo do with the proof of kinship in order Lo establish a
legal right to inheritance. (Freud (1914c) SE X IV 79)
The stream is libido; what ii bears are the images and figures that
recur in dreams, myth and psychosis, each image remaining equally
unimportant or important until it seizes upon a piece of neurotic
preoocupalion and finds expression. The chief mark of the neurotic is
his indo lence in turning 10 outmoded symbolic expressions for comfort
when he should be confronting the present-day problems that confront
him. To Jung. the n eurotic was questionable from a moral point of view.
while his symbol w.is efficacious from a spiritual point of view. Its
spiritual efficacy, its prospective function, marked another clear
difference between Jung and Freud. Insofar as the mother-symbols
were not the mother. the neurotic suce«ded in finding an alternative 10
the incest complex. The symbol had a positive function in that it pointed
'beyond' the mother, beyond the symptom lo a spiritual resolution.
Where Freud emphasized the derivative nature of the symbol, Jung
emphasized its creative and forward-looking function. For Freud
Symbolism 111
symbols were repressed or regressed ooncep1s; for Jung they were
1ranscendcn1 ooncepls.
Wha1 1be conflic1 amoumed 10 was a fundameo1al difference of
a1ti1ude 1owards the ineffable. Freud, in absorbing the ineffable into the
inexpressible, and in his verbal ralionalism, dis1rus1ed the symbol
insofar as ii became pure Image, and wasdt1ached from the Word. Jung
wished to 6nd in 1be symbol a transcendence of verbal rationality: the
opposi1es for him really were 'Symbolic. Real'. Symbolism opened up
onto the secrels of myth as an allegorical ques1. 1'he myths and
1rodi1ions of other societ.ies could no1 only be undcrs1ood, but they
could be recuperated, be brougb1 back 10 life, through the in1crprc1-
a1ion of symbols. Nol only did Jung and Silbercr embark upon a
psychological inlerpretation of alchemy - perhaps lhe only way in
which 1wen1ieth century thinkers could oome 10 lerms with that episode
in the history or thought - but they hoped 10 show that such an
allegorical search could be useful in the parallel adventures of a modem
Robert Fludd. The silence of the symbol was to be welcomed as an
opcni11g onto the ineffable. Freud iook the silence of 1he symbol.just as
he look the silence of 1he transference. as crea1ing a praC'lical exigency:
1he necessity of connection. Bui the symbol and the transference
phenomenon - the 1wo oocasions for silence - lay at the opposile ends
of a Spectrum: to find the symbolic connection a dclour via the mosl
alien - alien to the patient - assoeia1ions, and vcryofien, as weshaU see,
via the most obscure linguistic forms, was found to be necessary.
Whereas. wi1h the transference. what was required loyclose at hand. too
close 11t hand, o silence signifying the danger of proximity, of 'over-
conncc1ion'. Al the 01her end of the spectrum, cloaked by the silence of
a long dead language, a putative ignorance made it imperative to try and
catch the echo of a reader whispering to himself in the Library of
Alexandria.
Permanent marks have been left by this oral phase of sexuality upon
1hc usages of language. People commonly speak, for instance, of an
'appe1izing· love-object. and describe persons they arc fond of as
'swcc1'. It will be remembered. too, tha1 our linlc paticnl would only
cal sweel lhings. In dreams sweet 1hings and sweetmeats siand
regularly for caresses or sexual gratifications. (Freud ( 1918b) SE
XVII 107)
The elements ·auf geseres~ and ·auf ungescrcs· received two separate
determinations;
i. Freud made inquiries of the philologists (Schr!ftgefehrten) who told
him that:
We must finally make up our minds to adopt the hypothesis that the
psychical precipitates of the primac\'111 period became inherited
propcny which. in each fresh generation. called not for acquisition
but only for awakening. In this we have in mind the example of what
is ccnainly the 'innate' symbolism which derives from the period of
the development of speech, which is familiar to all children without
their being instructed, and which is the same among all peoples
despite their different languages. (lbid.)' 4
Such a passage, which bad capitulated to all 1hc pressures of Jung and
Sickel - us well as perhaps even of the facts - still leaves us wondering
about the different languages and the period of the development of
speech. ls its implication that there was one primaeval speech that gave
rise to a universal symbolism, and then was dissolved, by unimaginable
calastrophcs, into the diversity of tongues that exisl today or of which
we have record'? Yet again, the relation of plurality/diversity to
individuality and generality is evoked. The uni1ary past has a certain
indeterminate but necessary relation to the plural present. Yct, now. the
plural present does not express its diversity in the way it did in The
lnttrpretation of Dreams: the stock of symbols, the relic of a spark of
linguistic creativi1y that lies outsidc of history, now provides an
ahemative to the diversi1y of association, the bricola!Jt of the dreamer,
and the explanation that roots both 1hesc modes or dream·
interpretation in one primal root. the explanation 1hrough the deve.lop-
mcni of language, is now a pale shadow of a justification. It seems to do
linle work in the practice of analysis.
120 Language ond 1he Origins of Psychoonalysis
What Freud had feared in 1900 came true: S)'ltlbolic methods of
interpretation came to dominate analysis. During the period of debate
(1907- 16). one can still catch F reud castigating his followers for their
wayward S)'ltlbolic intc:rpr<tations. For instance. in October 1912,
Freud presented a case to the Vienna Society cn1i1lcd: 'Communication
about a Case. combined with some Polemical Observations. One part
of the polemic consisted in the following detail:
After four months of treatment, she brought a dream 1ha1 explained
the essentials of her childhood history and of her neurosis - provid<"<l
one did no1iry10 interpret ii merely symbolically, bu! drew upon the
patient's associations. (Minures IV, p. 108)
When we cum lo the case· his1ory of the Wolf-man. wriuen for 1he
most part in 1914 bul not published until tho end of 1he First World
War. we find a si milarly polemical remark, set in a work that is first and
foremost a polemic against Jung. Freud discussed the Wolf-man's
screen memory of a ·~utiful big buuerlly with yellow stripes and large
wings which ended in pointed projection.s '. The elucidation of this
memory gave Freud occasion to indicate two of1hc possible •pitfalls in
analysis. both stemming from the analyst anemp11ng to impose upon
the patient's material. without talcing due account of1he complex and
highly individual structure of associations at issue.
One day he told me 1ha1 in his language a bunerfly was called
'babushka·, 'granny'. He added that in general buuerllics had seemed
lo him like women and girls. ... I will not hide the fact tha1 at1haL
time I put forward the possibility that the yellow stripes on the
buuerfly had reminded him of similar stripes on a piece of clothing
worn by some woman. I only mention this as an illus1ra1ion to show
how inadequate the physician's constructive efforts usually are for
clearing up questions !hat arise.... Afler this 1he little problem was
once more left untouched for a long time; but I may mention the facile
suspicion that the points or Slick-tike projections of the bunerfty's
wingsmighl have had the meaning of genital symbols. ( Freud (1 918b)
SE XVII 89 92)"
The facile suspicion turned out lo be wrong. One feels how pleased
Freud was 1ha1 the second anonymous and dreary suggestion proved so
inadequate lo the 'reality' of the ·memory'. Rather. the Wolf.man's
infantile thought processes revelled in the sort of word· play that Freud
always found lhe more convincing manner of explanation.
Symbolism 121
One day there emerged. timidly and indistinctly. a kind of recollec-
tion that at a very early age. even before the time of the nurse. be must
have had a nursery-maid who was very fond of him. Her name bad
been the same as bis mother"s. ... Then on anothtr occasion be
emended this recollection. She could not have had the same name as
his mother .. . . Her real name, he went on. had occurred to him in a
roundabout way. He bad suddenly thought of a store-room. on the
first estate. in which fruit was kept after it had been picked, and of a
particular sort of pear with a most delicious tustc - a big pear with
yellow stripes on its skin. The word for 'pear' in his lunguage was
'grusha', and that had also been the name of the nursery-maid.
ll thus became clear that behind t.he screen-memory of the hunted
bulterOy the memory of the nursery-ma id lay concealed. But the
yellow stripes were not on her dress, but on the pear whose name was
1he same as hers. (I bid. SE XVII 90-1)
Yet. even now. with the elucidation of the magical significance of the
bunrrOy-pcar. the playing with words was not finished.
I ! ..,,_ ..
1ns1inc1Anfantile
Ycl again. we encounter the cruciaJ diO'crencc between Freud and his
colleagues that we have met so many times in this chapter: the symbol
was never at the heart of the method of dream-interpretation he
advocated, so thal he was delermincd to demons1ra1e that, when
symbols arc encountered, they arc derivatives ofthougbl which have to
be constructed before the 'real' business of in1erpretation can start.
Even 1hcn. the end result of in1erpre1a1ion will concern thoughts that
occurred (or should have occurred) in infancy: 1hc Freudian account
Symboli.rm 125
always remained within that band orthough1 bounded by impulse and
transcendental images. Whereas Jung and Silbcrcr located symbols at
the cross-roads or two different movements or interpretalion - the
regressive (the Freudian) and the prospective (the palh orindividuation
and transcendent knowledge)- Freud saw symbols as only part or the
more general problem of the means or representation or thoughts in lhe
essentially alien form or visual images, forced upon the dream by the in-
dependently delermined mode or regression or lhe mental apparatus.
In his paper. 'The Theory of Symbolism', Ernest Jones felt his first
iask wus to distinguish symbolism from linguistic metaphor: the easiest
way 10 find the true meaning of symbolism was by clarifying the
linguistic representations of metaphor. J ones defined the metaphor by
reference to the figurative/literal opposition with which we arc familiar
(Jones, 1916, p. 133). He then proceeded. almost without rcforence to
the discussion of metaphor, to give the primary characteristics of the
symbol, as outlined by Rank and Sachs (1913): representation of
unconscious material, constancy of meaning, independence of in-
dividual conditioning factors. its evolutional)' basis. its linguistic
eonnccuons and its phylogenetic parallels. But it is the very monotony
of the ideas represented by symbols that is so striking a characteristic,
and Jones explained this feature as follows;
All symbols represent ideas of the self and the immediate blood
relatives. or of the phenomena of birth, love and death. In other
words they represent the most primitive ideas and interests im-
tiginablc. The actual number of ideas is rather gr~ttcr, ho wever, than
might be supposed from the ):niefncss ol' this summary - they
amount. perhaps, 10 about a hundred .. .. (Jones, 1916, p. 145)
But the exact relation of the symbol to its "determining word' is not
always the same. "It may appear in an older and now obsolete use of the
same word, in the root from which the word was derived. or from other
words cognate with it."(Ibid.) Even then we may not have found the
association that brings the symbol into connection with language, and
thus fixes its rcfcrcntt. The sphere oflinguistic usage in which one might
have to cast one's net in search of the word grows wider and wider:
jokes, folklore, etc. Or, sometimes, the relations between phrases in
Symbolism 127
roreign languages and the word that stands ror the symbol must be
pursued, a path mapped out most bizarrely by Freud's use of Abel's
work on the antithetical meaning of primal words. Jones docs not look
quite as far as ancient Egyptian:
Jones rebutted:
Herein lay Jones' primary allaclc upon the J ung- Silbcrcr in1erpret-
a1ions: 1hey look metaphor to be the primary form of symbolism,
whereas Jones saw metaphor as 001 symbolical at all. since i1 docs nol
involve unconscious affective forces. Around this thesis were arraigned
1hrcc arguments tha1 J ones shared, however uncomfortably, with his
Symbolism 129
opponents. Firstly, symbols arc concrete since that mode of reprcscn·
tation is both easier and more primitive. But whereas Silbcrer in
panicular saw their concreteness as a primary characteristic ofsymbols,
Jones saw it as as a by-product ofthestrengthorthc unconsciousaffeets,
which firmly attach symbols to the primary processes of thought.
through which identify is asserted, in contrast to the ·similarity and
difference· of metaphor.
Secondly, we !ind that Jones granted to symbolism the privilege that
Freud wished to refuse it: direct access to the unconscious. Thus Jones
come very close to Jung's position at this point: what distinguished his
line of argument was the assertion that the primary affects are sexual in
character. Thirdly, how does this mesh with his argument about the
linguistic determination of symbolism? Strangely enough, the metho·
dology of symbol interpretation through etymology and semantics was
common to all the psychoanalyS!s and the post-ps)<choanalytical school
(as Jones called Jung, Maeder and Silbcrer): the study of the Aryan
languages, the rummaging around in the cultural baggage of the Aryan
peoples in search of meanings. and the ~coccupation with cross-
cultural and universal connections was common to all. But it was only
Freud and Jones who endeavoured to use this material as the evidence
for a primal language which coincided with the primordial and
biologically determined complexes of mankind. An empirical demon·
stration of the convergence of all th~ facts upon such primary
meanings, a conceptual dissection of the inadequacy of a conception
that tried to orient symbols towards a less sordid and less bodily future
was not enough: the psychoanalysts seemed to need a fo undation of
symbolism both in language and in biology. The oddest part of that
fo undation was that it detoured via the whole system of meanings found
in the Aryan languages.
Symbols arc privileged since they refer us back to a time when the
name and the thing matched each other perfectly. Strange spectre! The
unconscious. the source of all ambiguity and incomprehensibility in its
recurrent surfacings. is the locus of a language that is unambiguously
unh-ocal in its reference. In order to giiin a foothold on tbc universal, a
nominalism has been sneaked in round the back door, into the language
of the unconscious, from which all other languages derive. This
nominalism opposes the Platonic idealism that Jung cultivated in the
concept of the archetype:
The alchemist saw the union of opposites under the symbol of the
tree. and it is therefore not surprising that the unconscious or present-
day man. who no longer feels at home in his " orld and can base his
experience neither on the past that is no more nor on the future that is
yet 10 be. should hark back 10 the symbol of the cosmi<: tree rooted in
this world and growing up to heaven - the tree that is also man. In the
history of symbols this tree is described as the way of life itself,
a growing into that which eternally is and docs not change: which
springs from the union of opposites and, by its eternal presence, also
makes that union possible. (Jung (1938/54) CW IX Part I 109- 110)
4 Grammar
I fear that we do not get rid of God because we still believe in
grammar.
Friedrich Nietzsche'
Old rule ofgrammar: what does not lend itself10 declension, a11ribu1c
10- transference.
Sigmund Freud'
The idea or passive includes in ii the case. in which 1be action tba1 I
suffer is performed by myself.
A Grt~k Grammar, 1824'
... the impressions whicb have had the greatest elTect on us - those
of our earliest youth - are precisely the ones which scarcely ever
become conscious. But if memories become conscious once more,
they exhibit no sensory quality or a very slight one in comparison with
perceptions. A most promising light would be thrown on the
conditions governing the excitation of the neurones if it could be
confirmed that in the Y,-systcms memory and the quality that
characterizes consciousness are mutually exclusive. (Freud (1900a)
SE V 540)
Freud moved easily from this observation to the idea that these gaps
and incoherences in the patients' self-descriptions were the counterpart
of the memories that bad been lost to consciousness through being used
to construct neurotic symptoms. From whence the idea of a double
c-riterion for their cure: either the removal of the symptoms or the
restoration of these memories to the consciousness of the patient (and
we can here note the tension between this criterion and the psycho-
analytic conception of memory, as discussed above).
In my first hour with the patient I got her 10 tell me her history herself.
When the story came out perfectly clearly. in spite of the remarkable
events it dealt with. I told myself that the case could not be one or
hysteria. and immediately 1nsu1uted a careful physical examination.
This led to the diagnosis of a not very advanced stage of
tabes ... ( Ibid. SE VII 16 n2)
You have seen correctly that the association technique [of Jung] is
suitable for a first orientation but not for carrying out the treatment.
for with each new stimulus word you put to the patient you interrupt
him and cut off the ftow. The spontaneous production of word series
you use in analysis is certainly incomparably belier. but it does not
give a good picture or clear insights, and it seems 10 me to save no
time. Where the patient is able to produce such a series, he would
certainly have been capable or producing whole speeches. This would
have been slower only in appearance, and would have produced a
clear picture of the resistances into the bargain. The production or
word series is only n wny or circumventing the resistance. and for that
I have no use whatever: I neglect the complexes for the resistances
and try to approach the latter direct. (Freud (1963a), 5 May 1910, p.
39) 1 "
The resistances are thus made manifest through the structure of the
patient's talk. and it i> this stru<:ture that becomes the object of the
analyst's attention. Of course. it is only ·when the patient descends to
140 l.Anguage and the Origiru of Ps}"<hoanalysls
minute details from the abstractions which are their surrogate' (Ibid.
p. 38). that the analysis really gets going; but it is his auention to the
Structure or lalk that allows the anal)'Sl tO aid this pr~.
Such minute observation of the patient's 1alk goes back to the first
psychoanalyiic works. In Studies on Hysteria, Freud gave the foUowing
account of his first interview with Frau Emmy von N. in 1889:
Wl>at will now concern us is a certain mode of analysis, which ! wiU call
propositional or grammatical analysis. that Froud and other early
psychoanalysts 20 found useful in the explication of the permanence that
characterizes neurosis. That this mode of analysis was never rigorously
defined will be apparent from our discussion; that it owed its attraction
to a 'primith·c' concept of grammar may also be apparent. But that it
offered a means of linking the concept of instinct, lying as it seemed to
142 longuogt am! tht Origins of Ps)'rhoanal)'sis
on the borderline of biology. with the prcoocupations with language
that had marked psychoanalysis at a theoretical and practical level from
the beginning, will also perhaps explain its perennial allure. That it
could be abandoned as circumstances warranted might also sanction a
low estimation of its importance; but that ii served as the mainstay for
some fundamental hypotheses of psychoanalysis also witnesses to its
fertility.
II will come as no surprise to find that the terms 'subject' and 'object'
were a fundamental part of the conceptual armoury which Freud
supplied 10 psychoanalysis. But it may be more surprising to sketch out
10 what extent lhcsc terms had a grammatical, rather than a logical or
epistemological, reference. Obviously, as concepts, these terms had a
relative independence of any given proposition. But. as working
concepts. they more of\en than not found their most satisfactory
reference in the parts of given sentences 10 which they, qua grammatical
terms, could apply. More intriguingly, we find that the ·verb' that links
the subject and the object was treated as being equivalent to what in
ps)choanalylic theory is called ·an instinct'. Having said this. we find
that a neurosis will be the ·psychic structure' equivalent to a proposition
or a SCI Of proposiliOllS and their transformed dorivativcs.
Now this is an altogether more ambitious daim than that put forward
in Studies ,,,, H)•steria, where specific symptoms were taken to be the
equivalents of certain phrases, or figures of speech. We find ourselves at
an altogether more sophisticated theoretical level : instead of the
symptom, the visible and surface manifestation of a hidden 'disease' or
;cause'; and instead of a peculiar ph rase or figure, n simple proposition.
The movement of theory is parallel to that mapped out in Chapter 3: an
increasing complexity of interpretation coupled with an increasing
simplification at the level of 'first causes'. We move from n haphazard
and heterogcnous collection of phrases, in which the more complex the
neurosis the greater number of such phrases will have to be uncoverod,
to one or a few propositions, which we might call 'primal sentences'.
The thesis in question, then, is that a neurosis is formod around a
·core proposition·. whose structure is grammatically simple. consisting
in a subject. a verb and an object. The relation between subject and
object is defined by the verb. The verb itself corresponds to the instiOCl,
or, more strictly, each component-instinct corresponds to a dass of
verbs. For example. the 'oral instinct' corresponds to a class of verbs
including 'suck', 'bite' and, at a more sophisticatod level of analysis,
'whistle', 'froth'. The class to which a given verb belongs characterizes
the sexual uim of the component instinct (or, as Freud defined it in 1905,
Grammar 143
'lhe act towards whic,h the instinct tends' (Freud ( 190Sd) SE VII 135- 6).
Lei us look al one example of how modifications or 'vicissitudes' of the
subject ""rb- object sysiem gi- rise 10 importanl 'psychicar con·
sequences.
The relation between subject and object revolves around the active
charac:1er of 1.he verb. The 'instinct' behaves here as all verbs do in
language: a verb is &Clive unless qualified in mood by modal auxiliary
verbs. The subject takes on a qualiiy when the verb takes on a mood or a
lime. Defensi"" transformation such as ·1uming round upon the
subject's self' are effected by specific transfonnations of 1be indicative
fonn of the verb. The above schema receives its instantiation in
the following set of transformations pcrfonned upon a simple sen-
tence:
I. I am beating him Active voice
2. I am bea1ing myself Middle voice"
3. He is beating me Passive vojcc
Each of the sentences I. 2 and 3 iscorrelolcd wi1h a certain instinctual
position. upon which a neurosis or a perversion could be buih. But
furihcr lransforms can be derived from these senlenccs. Obviously, the
following sentence is derived in some way from the primitive sado-
masochistic positions of I, 2 and 3:
4. My father is beating (the child). (whom I hale).
II was around this latter proposition that Freud centred bis analysis
of a pbantasy expressed by a number of pa1ients as: ·a child is being
bca1en •. That paper was an important s1ep in 1he formula1ioo of a new
1heory of masochism which could supplement, or perhaps supplanl, the
accoun1 derived from the passage from' Instincts and their Vicissitudes'
quoted above. (Sec Freud ( I924c)). Since bo1h papcl'll made use of the
144 liJJrguogt and tht Origins of Ps)'rhoonolysls
me1hod of propositions, ii will be of in1<rcs1 lo sec how - or wbether -
one c;in link up lhc sci of propositions elaborated in ' Instincts with the
more clinical material discussed in· " A child is being bea1en"'.
Lei us first set out what Freud called the three 'phases· of the beating
phantaJy that he believed lo have uncov<rcd:
4. My father is beating {the child), (whom I hate)
S. My father is beating me
6. A child is being beaten
How could we envisage proceeding from the propositions I, 2 and 3
to No. 4. or. going further, to the proposition, actually spoken in
analysis, ·a child is being beaten'? Obviously, 1here ore o number of
differenl transformations. each of them grammatically simple and
perhaps analytically plausible, which could serve as means by which to
genera1e these propositions. For instance, a replaocment of the subject
of I. - an 'identification' - by " my father" would result in the Following:
4a. My father is beating (him)
or. alternatively. the extraneous person (/rtmd P~rson) could be
identified as ·my father (in 3.), giving:
Sa. My father is beating me.
Following upon such an identification, a displacement of the object
from the self to a similar gives:
6a. My father is beating the child
Such might have been the procedure to be followed if tho method of
' lnstincls and lheir Vicissitudes' were being followed. But F reud wrote
"'A Child Is Being Beaten" ' partially in order to demonstrate that the
derivation of beating phantasics was more complicated than the
discussion ofsado-rnasocbism of' lnstincts .. : might have led one to
believe. The propositions 4a and 6a lack an essential element of the
healing phantasy; they lack the element ·1ovcfha1e'. Freud made the
following comment as to the revelation of this clement:
/!'
My lath• lova me
Guilt
Mv f1th• dottn't love '"4
The fact that we arc not in the habit of saying of a single sexual
instinct that ii loves its object, but regard the relation of the ego to its
sexual object as the most appropriate case in which to employ the
Grammar 147
word ' love' - this fact teaches us that the word can only begin to be
applied in this rcl:ltion after there has been a synthesis of all the
component instinclS of sexuality under the primacy of the genitals
and in the service of the reproductive function. (Freud ( 1915c) SE
XJV 137- 8)
With love restricted to the arena of the genital and that of the 'wbole-
cgo'. the dominance of the Oedipus complex. as an extension of the
'int.rests' of the ego. entails a lesser emphasis on the vicissitudes of the
component instincts. Hence the shift of emphasis we have found, from
' lnstinclS . . .'to '"A child is being beaten"'. In the former, a simple
proposition, representing a component-instinct, sadism, suffers a series
of grammatical lnl.nsformations ( 1- 3). thus giving rise to masochism. In
the paper on beating phantasics, all such component-instincts must be
subordinated 10 the Oedipus complex, with its dominant 'instinct', love.
Let us now layout, in a schema, thewholcofthesct of propositions that
arc necessary in order to gi"e rise to ·a child is being beaten'.
Trrnd A Trtnd 8
/
A31. My ltthet h b111lno jI "
A3t>.Mv lither
'"' chiJd• ...mom t h•tt f do"n'1
I tovt me
~
A4. My '""" It b<.~nt-•,,_,.,., 8 4 / " " ' I• buli"l me
In the light of our equation between the simple proposition's verb and
an iDStinct, to which wiU CO<TeSpond a phase of libidinal devclopmmt,
we sec the 'closeness of fit' between the necessity for postulating a
certain phase in ·"A child is being beaten" · and the n=ity for
postulating tbesc stages of the development or the libido.
But what sort of ncc..Sity is thls? Let us bricfly cxaminc the different
modes of explanatory necessity that Freud employed. In his papers of
the 1890s. he invoked a fonn of necessity pertaining to an economy of
explanation of the manifest signs or symptoms of a neurosis, particu-
Grammar 151
larly when be spoke of !be facl lha1 sympioms have a meaning. He
Sl8led in 1896:
... 1be aetiological preiensioos of the infan1ilc scenes rest not only
on lhe regularity of !heir appearance in the anamncscs of hyslerics,
bul. above all, on the evidence of there being associative and logical
tics belwecn those scenes and the hyslcrical symploms. (Freud
(1896c) SE Ill 210)
Jn order to explain why lhe symptoms toke 1he form !hey do, ii is
necessary to embark upon a prolonged inquiry into the mea11i11g of the
symptom. From ibis. arises whal we might call 'hcrmeneulic necessily':
the long and arduous search for the meaning of a symp1om will ensue in
a necessity being altributed to the clements 1ha11oge1her go 10 make up
lhc s1ory or incidents that the symptom recounts. ' Hermeneutic
neccssi1y' bears much upon the details of a case.
The second type of neccssiiy also appears to arise out of close work
with detail, wi1b the products of inlerpretatioo. This second form arose
naturally out of !be first, although they arc logically quite dislioct. This
second form pertains to a 1emporal order: certain prehistoric events not
only appear to be inextricably bound up with the character of
symptoms, but also appear to function as 'necessary conditions' for
their coming into being. These events appear not only to be hermeneutic
factors, but also aeliological factors. But lhe relationship between these
events and the symptoms is not a simple causal one, as the concept of
Nac/11r/Jgllchkei1 indicates. But this form of neccssi1y docs seem to be of
a 1cmporal order, even if we would not wish 10 speak of it as causal
necessity. An example. of lhis form of necessity would be lhe manner in
which Freud suggested to the Ratman that he had indulged in
masturbation in his infancy, a suggestion that was meant to explain a
peculiar midnighl ritual and which then eliciled a memory of his infancy
in which he had ftown into a rage with bis fa1her.1hc putative prohibitor
oftbe masturbation and thus a suitable object for rage. (Freud (1909d)
SEX 204- 5.)
Such necessity belongs to the order ofconstruction. Construction and
interpretation both share those forms of necessity pertaining to the
manner in which an array of evidence is meshed wilh certain ex-
plana1ory entities - whether the latter be 'meanings' in general {Dora's
jewel-case and re1iculc arc cx:plaioed in a loose manner by being referred
to thought-activity concerning her genitals) or pas1 incidents (the Wolf
Man's dreams refer to a set of events, none of which can be brought
152 la11guage and the Origins of Ps)>ehoanalysis
(back) to consciousness, these dreams acting as the witnesses for
positing that these events 'took place', even to the point where the
conviction of the patient will be the phenomenological correlate of this
explanatory necessity).
But we are concerned more with yet another form of necessity, for
which 'empirical considerations· arc of secondary importance. This
necessity arises from the need to find a simple sequence of the basic
propositions of the neurosis. Ao incomplete S<quence of propositions
would be of little value. Hence it becomes nec<.~ry to postulate the
existence of intermediary and. perhaps more importantly, 'junction'
propositions. Freud's problem in the paper on beat ing phnntasics was
simple: how can one demonstrate the sequence by which beating. at first
only egotist ical in character. could become an erotic event. His answer
was to postulate the existence of an intermediary proposition that could
also function as thejunction between two different instinctual trends. In
this way. ' M y father is beating me' came lo function as a 'switch·
proposition': but not in the patient's associations this time, rather in the
analyst's theoretical schema. Without the constructed proposition, one
cannot inject the necessary erotic component into the idea of beating;
without the constructed propositions one cannot pass in an unbroken
sequence from one proposition to another. We might call this type of
necessity. 'architectonic' or 'structural' necessity.
It is clear that ' architectonic necessity' can be of importance when an
analyst olTcrs his patient a construction. Freud intimated as much when
he spoke of the 'false combinations (irrige Kombina1iont11)' that the
analyst is q uitc likely lo offer. When an analyst conjectures that the birth
of a sibling occasioned the transfer of alTections from the mother to the
father, he is obviously postulating an event in accordance with certain
constraints arising from the propositions or early instinctual positions
that have already been established. together with constraints stemming
from a theory concerning what sort of early events might conceivably be
an intermediary stage between those phases already known to be of
importance in any given case. With propositional analysis. the influence
of theoretical constraints is that much more marked. 11 is the proximity
of the basic propositions to the level of instincts that both acts as an
incentive to the development of propositional analysis. and acts as a
constraint upon the sort of propositions and sort of transformations
that might be acoeptablc in its employment. We will return to this topic
at the end of the chapter. in ordertoclarifywhat might be the criteria for
acccpling a proposition as 'primal '.
Let us here return to the manner in which these three varieties of
Grammar 153
ncccssily bear upon lheconcretee.i<ample oflhc beating·phanlasies. ll is
clear thal Freud took very liule account of lhe manifesl symptoma·
tology of the cases be used to construct the prOJ>O$itional sequence
engendering the 'neutral' phantasy acrually found in analysis. He gives
linle or no empirical justification in and of itself for pos1ulating phase 2
(proposition 5). ln other words. neither 'temporal' nor ' hermeneutic'
necessity plays a significant role in lhe analysis of the phantasy
structure. As Freud observed,
The nnalytic physician is obliged to admit to himself that to a great
extent these phanlasies subsist apart from the rest of the content of
the neurosis, and find no proper place in its structure. (Freud (19 I 9e)
SE XV!I 183)
We can conclude that the form of nccessily pertaining to the mode of
explanation found in S1udies on Hys1eria and the earlier works on lhe
neuroses. namely the postulation of certain uncon!iCious elemen1s in
order to unify diverse manifest signs of a neurosis, plays liulc part in the
analysis of the beating-phantasies. What is of importance is the
ncccssity imposed. on the one hand. by the theory of the instincts and
lheir different developmental phases, and. on the other hand, by a
principle of architeclonic simplici1y, whose concomi1an1 is a concern
wilh the order of grammatical transforma1ions performed upon lhe
'primal' instinctual representatives.
These different forms of'nccessi1y' correspond to dilTerenl forms of
explanalion found in psychoanaly1ic work. Thus. when we lalk of
dilTercnl forms of'neccssi1y' being used, we are referring to lhe mixlure
of modes of explanation thal migh1 make up any given piece of
psychonnalytic work. That dilTerent types of explanalion may be
combined when at work on a specific piece of ma1erial should come as
no surprise. Whal our inves1iga1ion here shows is lhot one type of
·nccessily', pertaining lo an inlcmal logic of an explanation which is
concerned with the relations bclween construc1cd propositions, was the
dominanl mode in ·"A child is being bca1cn" · and perhaps in other
papers where the propositional logic of lhc neurosis was al the
forefront. The internal logic refers to lhe sequence of lransfortnations
pcrfonned upon a given instinctual position.
Such lransformalions correspond lo the mechanisms of defence. One
otlcn infers their existence upon most indirect C\'idcncc, in accordance
wi1h criteria of simplici1y and uniformi1y. The procedure is parallel to
lhal adopled in explaining lhe genesis or certain manifest forms of
spoken language: a grammar is posiled lhOl governs the possible
I S4 Language and the Origins of PJ~hoana/yJis
transfonnations of a given sentence. More pointedly. givc:o the concept
of 'corutruction' in psychoanalysis. the grammarian infers an inter-
mediate fonn, or set ofsuch forms, between a 'primitive' sentence and a
manifest one. And such intermediate forms would never be attributed to
the con!ciou•ncss of native speakers. Note that any subsequent
temporal articulation of these distinct forms upon a chronological
dimension is predicated upon their first having been ordered according
to the admi5'ible laws of transformation.
The parallelism of method between the grammarian and the psycho-
analyst is not the most interesting feature of our discussion. Rather,
the fact thlll the analyst's objects are sentences - either ones that have
been spoken in analysis, or ones that represent the ideal types of
numerous similar sentences-justifies our treating the activity of
construction and interpretation as - 10 coin a term - a 'metagram-
matical' one.
But metagrammatical analysis is not primarily focused on the
patient's uneraoces - indeed, one hardly needs 10 refer to the patient's
utterances. The examples we have analysed arc schemata correspond-
ing. perhaps, to 'inSlinC1ual representatives', rather than being pivotal
moments in the discourse of analysis. Cenainly the analyst would like
the patient 10 be able to incorporate the propositions into his own
speech, to recognize them as the clearest po5'ible statement of what he
had repressed, and 10 be able to accept them as such, in order to judge
them and hence forget them, instead of repressing them anew and thus
'remembering' them. Such a passage from saying to judging would then
mark a psychic full-stop 10 that episode of rhetorical persuasion on
behalf of the analysand. A further example of the method of pro-
positional analysis, or mctagrammatical con5truc1ion, will indicate both
the fertility of the method and its distance from any analysis of the
speech of the patient.
The startiiig-point of the analysis of bcating-phantasics was a
scn1cnoc spoken in analysis: ' a child is being beaten', From there, the
analytic argument leaves all reference to the speech of the patient to one
side, following out the implications of a propositional analysis. lo the
case-history of President Schreber, there is not even this spoken (or
written) starting-point. Propositional analysis acts strictly at the level of
a dedue1ive stn1C1ure of the paranoia, with only the most general
reference to the clinical detail. Freud's proposiuonal model was
intended 10 contribute to a general theory of the paranoiac psychoses.
All of these, he thought, arise from the repression of a primary ' idea', a
'primal sentence', expressive of homosexual love. The idea that suffers
Grammar 155
repression and subsequent transformation can best be expressed in the
form of a simple sentence: ·1 love him". The return or the repressed
ncccssanl)' takes the form of a compromise between the force attached
to this idea and the force of the censoring ego: the means by which this
compromise is effected arc the grammatical transformation or the
primal sentence. Each of the three elements of the sentence might be the
point or application of this grammatical operation . But each of these
three operations must give rise to a proposition that is in conformity
with a principle peculiar to paranoia, namely, that the repressed should
return rrom ' without'.
One way lo formulate this principle is lo say that the mechanism of
'projection' is the defence mechanism proper to paranoia. But, as we
shall sec. the mechanism of projection is not a necessary condition for
this group of transformations. Rather, one might wish to couch the
principle as follows: admissible transformations of the primal s.ntence
must not include the ruhjttt as first fNrson of tht statt mem." The most
common means by which this principle asserts itself in ·practice' is
through the replacement of the fiBt pcBOn pronominal subject ('I') by
the third person pronominal subject ('he', 'she or "1t'). ll is this
procedure that Freud followed in his discussion of the Schreber case.
(a) Firstly. the verb can be transformed, and, as is so onen the case wit I\
Freud's more formal considerations of defence mechanisms. the
fundamental transformation is "turning into its opposote'. Thus the verb
'love· becomes 'h.ate':
I. I love him I 2 • Defence: Turning
2. I hnte him 24
} into its opposite
2- 3 • 'Projection'. or Principle
3. He hates me ...
therefore I bate him 25
} of the exclusion of the
fiBl person subject
The =or of picking up the tuning fork instead of the hammer could
thus be translated into words as follows: "You idiot ! You ass! PuU
yourself together this time. and see that )'Ou don ·1 diagnose hysteria
again where thcrc·s an incurable illness, as you did, years ago with the
poor man from the same placer . . .. II will be observed that this
time it was the voice of self-criticism which was making itself heard in
the bungled action. (Freud (1901b) SE VI 166)
Every time we make a slip in talking or writing we may infer that there
hns been a disturbance due to mental processes lying outside our
intention. but it must be admitted that slips of the tongue and of the
pen often obey the laws of resemblances, of indolence or of the
tendency to haste, without the disturbing element succeeding in
imposing any part of its own character on the resulting mistake in
speech or writing. It is the compliance of the linguistic material which
alone makes the determining of the mistakes possible and at the same
time sets the limits up to which the determining can go. (Ibid .. pp.
221 - 2.)H
Herc Freud indicates that the limits of the field of anal)'>is are set by
the field oflanguagc: what is not within that field docs not admit of a
signifirant connection between cause and effect, only its 'necessary
conditions' being spcci6cable. Ae'ting out must be brought within the
field of language; as much as possible of the transference must be said,
not acted. In other words, emphasis upon the transference corresponds
ton fi•ing of the limits of the field of analysis as those oflanguage. What
was previously the sile~t object of analysis - the symptom, putatively
structured by transformations of primal sentences - is replaced by the
transference neurosis (Freud (1914g) SEXll 154). But this new neurosis
must be made to 'talk' if its creation is to be marked as a gain. The
advantage of the transference neurosis is that the phantasy·slructure
generated by the deformations of the primal sentences coalesces around
the object that is present, 10 which the seducing words are impotently
offered. A dialogue can ensure that these words do not once again
become frozen into symptoms. so that the ephemeral character ofwords
is restored to them. so that they will no longer be emblcmatically fixed -
no matter with \\•hat serious loving int~nt - to imaginary objects. J•
Perhaps we can now reformulate the dl\ergencc wnb which "'e
opened this chapter by drawing upon the grammatical mode of analysis
we have discussed. The language of the symptom could be conceived of
as a set of marks that arc structured b)' derivative) of pr; mu I sentences -
the core of the neurosis. T he la nguage that is spoken. when it is not itself
Gramnwr 165
symptomatic - when it is 001 the ctiche. 1he repe1i1ion of words heard
and 1endentiously forgonen. when ii is 001 complacen1ly and fearfully
rigid. in other words, when it does not retain the structure of 1he primal
scnlence - rejoices in its epbemerality, which it is hoped will allow it
some =ape from the blind insistence that characterizes the trans-
formed derivatives of the unconscious primal scnlenccs. Whal is said in
and by this spirit. this spirit embodied in Gtistlgk t/t». always bas 1he
charnc1er of a movement, impelled by powerful and invisible forces:
the change that 'saying it aloud"' engenders bears witness to the
ine~plicablc efficacy of speech in subverting a permanence that, before it
is dissolved, appears to be constitutive of the subject. Or, to return to the
simple beginnings, to the Studies°'' Hysteria, 'it is only with the last
words of the analysis that the whole clinica l picture vanishes'. ( Breuer
and Freud (I 895d) SE II 299.)
5 Philology
I am not yet so lost in lexicography, as to forget that words are the
daughters of earth and things are the sons of heaven.
Dr Johnson'
How can man be the subject of a language 1ha1 fori ho usands of years
has been formed without him, a language whose o rganiu11ion escapes
him, whose meaning sleeps an almosl invincible sleep in the words be
momenlarily activates by means of disco urse, and within which be is
obliged. from the very outset, to lodge bis speech and though1. as
1hough Ibey were doing oo more than anima1c, for a brief period, one
ses-ni of lha1 web of innumerable possibili1ics?
Michel Foucaull (1966/70) p. 323
The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth
century =rkcd a revolutionary phase in thought about language and in
the study of languages. At the empirical level. o ne trend was of
fundamental importance: an enormously increased concern with non·
Classical languages. This trend gained force from an intellectual
movement very directly associated with that mt langc of romanticism
and historicism centred in Germany; its dirCC1 antecedent and con-
seq uence was the concern of scholari with the relations between
languages. The delicate balance that was to be found in historicism.
P/Jilo/ogy 169
between the uniqueness that is characteristic or a specific historical
fonnation, and the set or laws that, once discovered. characterizes that
formation through the series or temporal transformations that they
describe, is found most clearly represented in lhc study or language.
With Humboldt '. Herder ( 1772) and Hegel (1910) we find an emphasis
on the inner crcati\'c force that is peculiar to language and peculiar to
each language: with Bopp, Rask and Grimm (and, earlier, the work of Sir
William Jones), we find an attempt to demonstrate 1bc laws by which
one language becomes another, in 1hc course of a time now undefined by
an ex1crnal chronology, a time in accord wi1h the sequences laid down
by 1he inner logic of language's developmen1, ra1her lhan as marked by
those 'external' events whose veryexternali1y was brought in1oques1ion
by 1he new science or language. • II was Grimm's Law. regulating the
transformations of consonants from Sanskri1, through Greek and
Latin, to German, English and French, 1ha1 was 10 capture the
imperialistic imaginings or the sciences of man, just as Cuvier's law of
the correlation or parts and the law of supply and demand could sustain
01hcr and parallel hopes as to the rule of law over man.
The ideal orlaws that act forever below the surface or what is spoken,
determining what can be spoken without recourse to what can be
represented, was the goal of the new philologists. When language's
relation to the world became something that could be investigated as
problematic, rather than assumed. language itselr 1ook on a new weight,
a new densily and opacity, a certain strangeness. Comparative linguists
turned 10 a formalistic account or language that sheered the system of
sounds off from any system of the world. In this sense, the Saussurian
accounl or the arbitrariness and selr-sufficiency or the signifier with
respect LO the signified was lhe achievemenl or a century of striving to
map OUI lhe independenl Jaws or sound-lransfornialion. 1 The overall
effcc1 or lhc preoccupation or philologists wilh 1hc in1ernal laws or
language was to detach language off from 01her histories, lo turn it in
upon itselr, 10 make it the object or a science 1hat no longer conrused
itsclr with a science of thought, or the science of representation.
In consequence, language found its own history. Each language, the
product of a unique and specific creative force, possessed ao individual
chronology. its own cycle ofbinh and death, of youth and old age, or,
later in the century. was subject to an efflorescence and a demise
according to its success in the struggle for linguistic survival.' And each
family of languages, and thus, conceivably, all languages, received its
own in1crnal chronology, as defined by 1he sequences or transform-
n1ions that bound them together as a family. but which seemed to define
170 language and the Origins of Ps>oehoa11alysis
1hem as a family first and foremos1 through their common historical
derivation. fl was at this point thal the Humbold1ian >train could fuse
wi1h the more formal studies. giving rise to the no1ion of a unified field
of e•prcss1on. uniquely determined by the morphological la"s that
de1ermincd the structure of a language, that was specific 10 a race, a
culture. a people indeed. that was. in the last anal)'1is. the distinctive
defining feature of that culture. With the Grimms, with the Schlegels,
with Herder, the study of linguistic transformations was continuous
wi1h the collation and organization of a cultur-JI ' heritage••: the fairy
tales, the mythologies. the 'folklore' of a ·nation' that was defined by a
limited nnd homogeneous field of expression made distinguishable by
lhc laws of phone1ic transformation.
T he study of lllnguages in the 19th century demonstrated the same
fusion of the unique and the compara1ivc that students of historicism ••
have made familiar: each language revealed a uniqueness and specificity
I hat guaranteed its separateness, while the comparative method acted as
the means by which the complete field oflanguagcscould be covered. ''
This common double characteristic may explain the adjacency oficn
credi1cd in this period to history and philology. Adding a third clement.
rehgion. a conceptual grouping charactenstic of 1he great 'humanistic'
projects of the century emerged:
The thin red line that distinguished thought from its products could
be reduced to a minimum by studying the product that lay closest 10
thought. that always seemed to lie closor to thought than any metaphors
of mirroring or moulding could capture. All the metaphors that are
normally employed 10 characterize the rehuion of language to thought
Philology 171
railed to capture the inexorable necessity reh by many linguists in the
ninetccoth century for assuming that thought could be adequately
seized by language.
We thus find in historical lingutttics a curious mixture of a cultural
relativism and a rigorous idealism. First, one detached a language from
the category, common to all languages, of 'represeotation-of-thc-
world", in order to demonstrate its peculiar uniqueness. Then one could
demonstrate bow this language expressed a thought that, through its
strangeness, might reveal the strangeness or thought itself.•• But the laws
or comparative linguistics indicated how these unique systems of
thought could be bound together into one or a few systems of
transformation of form, so that thought itself would find its own unity in
what gave languages their own unity. One detached language from the
history of man, only to return it, once bound by its own laws. to found a
new history, in which not only its age, but also its adjacency to the
cognitive categories, guaranteed it pride or place.
Two categories of experience served as the principal objects of
philological analysis: myth and religion. The school of Higher Criticism.
represented by Strauss and Renan, undenook the examination of the
various texts of the Judaic and Christian religions. Their aim was
twofold: to employ philological methods to establish what w-as ·mythi-
cal" in the histories there set out; and then. having eliminated what
was mythical. to establish a 'historical' life of Jesus. One secs here the
double movement of philology: establish the separate history ap-
propriate to words. through whose aid, both positive and negative, a
history of one man or of men in general cou ld be rewritten. The
chronology accorded to words precedes and determines the chronology
of life.
Such a method was applicable to ·myth' as well; indeed, myth and
religion dissolved into one another insofar as philological analysis
undermined the sacred innocence oft he word. lfchc final arbitration of
language by 'history' was continually postponed, as it tended to be in
the analyses of those texts talccn to be purely mythical, a natural 'first
cause· or an event that formed thc roc.k-bottom of the analysis of the
mythic d1stonion of reality failed to emerae as the new repository of
religion; u1,all)'. philology could always postpone the excavation of the
historical exemplars that might serve again as tbc foundation of
religion. When analysing a Babylonian creation myth it might not be of
value to attempt to disco\'rr the event or person represented in a
distorted fashion by the myth, although nearly every philologist might
have recourse to such an explanation if need be. h was quite good
172 language and the Origi1is of Psyrhoanal)'Sl•
practice 10 remain con1en1 wi1h lhe linguislic reduc1ion of miracle 10
illusion. of m)'lh 10 melaphor.
Bui Ibis original even1 was oflen lo relUm, as if lhc compara1ive
philologis1s could never be coo1en110 leave !he synonyms and reduc1ive
chains ofsignificalion hanging in lhin air. We do no1 have far 10 go. from
lhe recons1ruction of the life of lhe his1orical Jesus. 10 lhe recons1ruc-
1ion of lhe dealh of lhe primal fa1her. And. if such o cominuum seems
ques1ionnble, we may possibly give ii more body by looking al lhc
intermediate terms, s uch as Prometheus, or Moses.
ll was nol only from lhe side ofChris1iani1y lhal lhe coupling of mylh
and religion was encouraged. Humbold1ian e1hnology und work such as
Rask's on the Old Norse languages highligh1ed holh lhe importance of
the non-European languages and 1he necessi1y lo s1udy previously
ignored lan,guages. oolb living and dead, in order lo establish lhe full
field of wh.ich compara1ive linguis1ics was lhe science, even if lhe final
inleresl of the researcher would still remain lhe Germanic longues. Nol
only were Greek and Lalin demo1ed in favour of Sanskrit, bul also
Old Irish, Norse, Old Danish, Cle., look up a place equal in scientific
value lo 1hc languages of Cicero and Homer. And, if Cicero and Homer
mighl s1ill supply lhe texts for lhe s1udy of 1he morphology and
phonology oflhcir respective languages, where "ere 1he lexls for Old
Irish ond Danish 10 come from, if no1 from 1he sagas and m)'lhs. 1he
' his1ories" of those languages? The mc1hodologicnl necessilies pre-
scribed lha1 1he linguisls exleod lheir in1ercs1s far beyond lhosc of 1he
form of words. How does one eslablisha homology be1wecn lhe form of
1wo words unless one has a parameler lhal ac1s as a media1ing lhird
term? The achievemen1 of Champollion is lhe paradigm of lhis process
of decoding: in order lo begin work on lhe syntux. morphology and
phonology of a language, one must have a base line, and this base line is
suppl ied by an idenlily or meaning. The inquiry into meaning cannot be
separalcd from lhc inquiry inlo form. Hence, in order lo establish lhe
unily of law-like transformations between a set of languages, lhc
linguislS were required 10 undertake an ever more detailed inquiry in10
lhe nuances of meaning of lhc basic texts. In other words. Ibey
undertook 10 es1ablish !he web of iden1it1es and differences thal made
up lhe my1bological sys1ems lha1 lhesc lex1s reprcsen1cd. ll became as
impera1ive lo eslablish the exact significa1ion of lhe heroic exploits
recoun1cd in Sanskril as il was lo trace the possible fa1c of1hc lishermcn
from Galilee.
Even if lht philologi.s1s finally came lo the end of lhcir analyses and
established an end lha1 was also lhedcfinitive beginning. lhis mighl no1
Philology 173
be a historically pro,•cn event. It might have an altogether different
character. while still being the end and achievement or the analysis.
Thus the chain of transformations by which the Assyrian· Yonf became
the E11glisb · l>fDTy·, when retraced by Thomas Inman " . indicated the
primal feminine significance of the number 'one'. And this number,
when coupled " ith the number 'thrtt', representing the masculine. could
be shown to underly all mythology and religion, Christianity included.
Both Bopp and Schleicher were concerned to demonstrate that the
reconstructed language proto-lndo-Europcan resided upon a pure
triadic base-structure of vowels: ' a', ·r. ' u'. 1• Obviously this end-point
was not one of pure signification; rather, it was the opposite: an end-
point that could be guaranteed by reference to the physiology of the
organs by which sounds were produced." Or, again, we may take
another example from the work of Franz Bopp, who could demonstrate
that the primitive verb-form of the Inda-European languages was a
suffix, '-•', signifying the primal verb ' to be'. !Bopp (1816); Pedersen,
1931. p. 257).
Now these arc extreme examples, in which a universal origin or a
point or absolute linguistic plenitude (cf Lovejoy. 1936) was the
immanent principle by which a unification or the manifold forms or a
'word' could be attained. On a smaller scale, a reference to a stable point
or reference. the signification of a word-form, was always necessary. if
the changes from one language-system to another wcr< to be shown to
be lawlikc. An identity of sound (or or ccnsonantal form in more
obscure areas, particularly with Hebrew) might serve as evidence for the
development of neighbouring forms from one another. But the
coincidence of forms was not usually enough - and could never be
enough if it were a question of series of such identities - to guarantee the
law. A semantic element was necessary to cstoblish that this identity was
more than a 'coincidence'. So the more obscure and fragmented the
evidence with which linguists had to work, the further into the semantic
complexities of myth and custom were they led. Thus Max Miillcr's
translation of the Rig-Vedas, his exposition of the Hindu cosmology
and mythology, and bis research into the structure of Sanskrit were all
part or one esseotially linguistic project (Chaudhuri. 1974: Muller. 1864.
1875. 1902).
Hence we can sec clearly the manner in which the two main
characteristics of nineteenth century linguistics were interdependent.
The first characteristic was the sc3rch for the laws which governed the
transformation of phonetic, morphological and syntactical forms from
one language to another. The second characteristic was the search for
174 language and the Origin.1 of Psychoanalysis
e1ymological trees. for the genealogy of significa1ion, a genealogy tha1
found iis evidenlial specification in lhe 'irraiional' dimension of myth,
religion and folklore, and which could be generalized. under lhe pen of
the renegade philologist Nie1ZSCbe, into a ·genealogy or morals".
Etymoloay employed differences of form only 10 subsume 1hcse under
an identity ofsignification. Or, to put it another way, differences of form
enabled one 10 recognize difference of significa1ion. As 1he dis1ine1ion
between semantics and synmx became firmer, their mutual in1erdepen·
dcncc became more prono unced. If a continuous series or transform·
ations of a phonetic or mo rphological character could be demonstrated,
the resulting chain of terms promised to bear a rich frui t when an inquiry
into the meanings thus interlinked was undertaken. The larger the
system of words brought into the system oflawlikc transformations, the
more it was likely to be able to find a ·significant' set of displacements of
meaning thus sanctioned. A new ambitious project became feasible: the
mapping out or tbe key significations for a given group or languages,
corresponding to the primary forms of thought expressed in that
language. And, as oflc.n as not, 1hcse original forms of1hought were 1he
expression of a fundamenml intuition of God's existence, so that the
regressive analysis conducted via phonology and e1ymology led to tbc
foundations or religion.
The power of the mind which enables us to sec lhe genus in lhe
individual. lhe whole in the many and to form a word by connecting a
subject and a predicate, is essentially the same which leadsmen to find
God in the Universe and the Universe in God. Language and religion
arc 1hc 1wo poles of our consciousness mutiu1l1y presupposing each
ot her. 11
Language is formed from the Geist, not the Geist from language. We
must crystallize the Geist out from language, but also fro m many
other sources. (Stcinthal, 1868, p. 103)
There is, then, some rcal ('l)conna:tion between vulture and mother -
but what help is that to us? For have we any right to expect Leonardo
to know or it. seeing that the first man who succeeded in reading
hieroglyphics was Fran~ois Champollion? (Ibid.)
Till "'-1111
---
--
·-· .. ·--
I~.,.,
/
"Viti of
ol-..1ni,.
°'"""'°",..Sil
Philology 183
If we consider the more complicated equation 111 first, we note that
Freud conceived of four indcptndent argumtnts to support it. But,
having set them out, be recognized that the sources of infonnation
which Leonardo bad at bis disposal might have been limited. Having
investigated the Renaissance availability of sources cooocrning the
Egyptians. he concluded that Leonardo was almost certainly aware
through his reading of Horapollo that the vulture was an Egyptian
symbol." But Horapollo's text only yields sufficient information to
warrant two of the four arguments that Freud presents: b., that the
hieroglyphic image for mother is a vulture, and d., that the Egyptians
believed that there are only female vultures, procrea tion taki ng place
through fertillzation by the wind. The arguments a 1 and c receive no
further discussion as to their availability to Leonardo. Indeed. Freud's
final conjectural historical sequence was as follows: Leonardo read of
the virgin vulture's procreative capacity in one of the Church Fathers.
and, solely from tllis piece of evidence (roughly equivalent to d. in the
diagram), equated the vulture and the mother.
It would seem that, judged simply from a historical point of view, the
arguments about bierog)ypbics, the sound of the Egyptian goddess'
name. and the representations of the androgynous goddess" arc strictly
irrelevant to the point at issue: Leonardo's conception of the vulture.>•
Of course, as we have Sttn, Freud introduced a further. seemingly
non-philological clement, derived from his paper on the sexual theories
of children, the theory that the nipple and the penis arc equated in
phantasy, and that the endowment of the mother with a penis is a
common infantile theory. The former throws light upon equation I,
'tail • penis', and the latterthrows light on borh the peculiar androgyny
of the Egyptian goddess and upon the c.ombination of the two
equations, 'tail =penis', 'mother =vulture', into the final equation,
·mother's penis = vulture's tail' (Freud ( 191 Oc) SE X 197). But, since the
phallic appurtenances of the Egyptian vulture goddess were ' unknown·
to Leonardo. this argument only has force for the step in the argument
from 'tail - penis' to 'tail c morher's penis'. Indeed, we can now
recognize that the whole argumtnt concerning the Egyptian vulture-
hcaded goddess is irrelevant - a fact arrived at by an alternative route
by Maelagcn (1923), Schapiro (1956), Strachcy (SE XI 60-2) and
Spector (1972).
As the Editors of the Standard Edition note, once one recognizes that
the bird named in Leonardo's recollection is a kite and not a vulture,
one has to recognize the consequent irrelevance of the Egyptian
material - 'though this nevertheless retains much of itS independent
184 Language and 1/re Origins of Ps,.choanolysls
value· (SE XI 62). Bui. through our claritica1ion of the form of Freud's
argument. we ha•ecome to see 1ha1 nearly all of1he Egyptian material is
irrelevant. •·ha1er:er the correct 1raosla1ion of'nlbio'. Only the step from
the virgin vulture to the mother was recognized by Freud as 'known· by
L<onardo: th< resl of the Egyptian mat<rial only serves to assert a
gentral connection between the vulture. I.fut. hieroglyphics. and
androgynous mother-goddesses. As wediscninngle thcst arguments, we
find that the brunt now falls upon the infantile sex ual theory of the
phallic mother.-" The admiuedly fascinating Egyptian material seems
to have no purl 10 play - a1 least in Leonardo's case!•
So whal purpose does the Egyptian material serve. given that even
Freud recognized, admittedly in passing, and wi1hou1 undue emphasis,
1hn1 it docs not contribute significantly 10 the argument concerning
Leonardo's pbantasy-recollection? With Spector. we could argue that it
served a selr·analytic function for Freud, expressive. in some manner, of
his personal complexes; we might even say that, having pared away
what is superfluous to lhe solution or Leonardo ·s personal equation. the
residue represents what belongs to Freud"s personal equation. Bui I
prefer to sec it5 function as that of a significant survival. a pointer,
towards an argument that Freud •ishedto make. We could hypothesize
further that Freud believed that be should substantiate his conclusion as
10 the phallic significance of the tail and the maternal significance of the
vulture voa a plulological inquiry that he recapitulated in the lecture,
and, with slightly more rigour. in the published paper. Thal his
ques1 ioning us lo the existence of the links between 1hc Egyptian and the
RenaisSllnce texts was subsequent 10 his certainty or the correctness of
his philological conclusions would also seem likely. Bui. as a result of his
self-questioning. apres coup. he found himself forced 10 rely upon
another argument, less philological, referring only 10 the thought·
connections of infancy, rather than to the 1hough1-conncc1ions laid
down by 'folk experience'. Instead of the continuum of symbolic forms
extending from the Egyptians to Leonardo's phan1asy - vulture hiero-
glyphic. /o.fu1-,\1u11tr. phallic goddess reprcsenlalions. vullurc·s tail -
Freud "as forced. by the uncomfortable gaps in lhe lustoncal record. to
explain both the Egyptian and ·11alian' symbolic forms by reference to a
·common source - the sexual theories of childhood. From the manner
in which Freud prcsemcd his argument. one can •urmisc 1ha1 he would
have preferred to have established a s1raigh1forwardly philologically·
grounded reconstruction of Leonardo's ·Egyptian· phaniasy, so 1ha1 the
argument would nol have to depend upon the prior validity of the
infantile theory of the maternal phallus. (Perhaps even ii was myiholo-
Philology 185
gical evidence, such as that offered by the Egyptian symbols, that
formed the evidence for that the,o ry.) Freud would have preferred to
argue from the sustained vitality of ·folk experience·. rather than
having to invoke theories about childhood. As it is, the evidence drawn
from •folk experience' was pure.ly circumstantial and evocative-
though one has to read very carefully to realize that such is the case -
rathcr than furnishing the essential links (associations) in a train starting
with the vulture and ending with the phallic mother. Certainly the
purely circumstantial character of this evidence is masked by the form
of argument Freud employed.
But why have we invoked this particular episode in our discussion of
philology? Freud's first argument, derived from the Eg)'J)tian material -
an argument that I wish to call the philological one - broke down in the
face or a confused but honest anention to the problem of tradition.
Freud recognized that there was a break in the continuity of the tra-
dition from the Egyptians to the Renaissance - a break in the se-
quence of markus of meaning. If be had been able to establish the
continuity of the tradition. he would not have had to rely upon the in-
fantile theories of sexuality. It would appear plausible that Freud
assumed that such a continuity existed: exactly the assumption that the
concept of the Volksgeisr embodied. His critical anention to the actual
evidence for this continuity arrived too late to save his account from the
inconsistencies that we have been able to point up. It is as if the breaks in
the continuity of tradition. having been papered over. reappeared as
breaks in the continuity of Freud's argument. To save his argument, he
introduced an ahistorical cause that produced, independently. and at
different points in history, the repetition of 1he markers of signification
that could retrospectively j ustify his discussion of Egyptian hiero-
glyphics and symbolism.
With the concept of infantile sexuality a.nd the related concept of
phantasy. Freud was supplying what the philologists had themselves
always been searching for: a means for tying the dispersed elements or
myth. art and religion together. He was supplying the psychological
theory that Stcinthal and Lazarus had aimed for. and which. as we can
sec from the paper on Leonardo, filled in the evidential gaps when
etymological chains or 'external" evidences of the transfer of signifi-
cations were lacking. In this way, the theory of infantile sexuality
supplied a 'primitive language' that corresponded to other languages
proposed by philologists in order to codify and comprehend mythical
discourse: Muller's 200 roots. or the basic clements of the celestial
universe that astral mythologists appealed 10. And this primitive
186 Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
language, by definition, d.id not have to take acoount or1he gaps in the
historical record. The fact that, even though supplied with such a trans-
historical explanatory recourse, Freud wished to draw so much from the
or
dispersed signi6cations Egyptian, German and Italian only proves to
us how much more be would have prererred to give a complete
philological proor as well as those derived from the theory or inrantile
sexuality, rather than being forced to rely almost completely upon the
phantasies or children.
But there was something unsatisfactory to Freud about this solution
to the pro blem of tradition. This unease was one or the reasons why he
becume more and more interested in a ' Lamarckian' solution to the
problem. That it was indeed a problem, and recognized as such in terms
familiar first and fo remost to philologists, can be gauged from the long
discussions upon the subject, 10 be found in Moses and /lfon orheism
(1934- 8). In his preliminary discussion in that work, Freud argued for
the parallel emcacy and occasional primacy or oral as compared with
written tradition. The analogy or the efficacy or the 'memories' or
Minoan civilization amongst the Hellenic peoples, where very Jillie
written record or the former civilization was to be round, was brought
forward to suppon this argument (Freud (1939a) SE XXlll 70-1). But
the problem ran deeper than the power and perma~ncc or oral
tradition.
Oral tradition did not seem to be able to account for the enormous
·arter-elfect' or events that had taken place long berore, and which bad
almost cenainly passed out of 'folk-memory'. 1.n casting about for
solutions to this problem or the preservation or traces, Freud first
considered the universal symbolism be had uncovered in language
(Ibid., SE XXlll 98). He then turned to the 'archaic heritage' of
neuro tics and children, uncovered in cases such as that of the Wolrman
( Ibid., SE XXlll 99; Freud (1918b) SE XVll 11 9- 21). Freud then
addressed the problem in its most general form, rather than considering
the question with respect to this or that inherited contents.
On fun her reftection I must admit that I have behaved for a long time
as though the inheritance of memory-traces of the expe.riencc or our
ances1ors. independently or direct communication and or the in-
ftuence of education by the setting or an example, were established
beyond question. When I spoke or the survival ora tradition among a
people or or the fo rmation or a people's character, I had mostly in
mind an inherited tradition of this kind and not o ne transmitted by
communication. Or at least I made no distinction between the two
Philology 187
and was not clearly aware of my audacity in ncglcc:ting to do so.
(Freud (1939a) SE XXlll 99-100)
One feels that the surpri.se at his own audacity concealed the fact that
the q uestion had been al issue for a long time. Aner all, it was precisely
lack of audacity that made Freud step back from asserting the
continuity or signili<:ation between the Egyptian godd='s phallus and
Leonardo's vulture's tail. Now, late in his life, he took the step of
guaranteeing the continuity of symbolic forms, witho ut relying either
upon the evidence of written traditions or upon the imputations of
' invisible' o ra.1 tradition, and could immediately assert that, in con-
sequence, 'we have bridged the gulf between individual and group
psychology'. ( Ibid:, SE XX 111 I 00.) And, as if to underline the
importance of bridging this gap, he then argued that, since group
psychology must be amenable to some sort of analysis, ' the audacity
cannot be avoided' (Ibid.).
The curious feature about Lhis argument concerning the inheritance
of mental characteristics. which bas come to be associated. in the
twentieth century, with the biological debate between ' Lamarckian ·and
·oa,,.,inian· theories, is that it was mobilized in order to solve a
historical or psychological problem: tradition and the continuity oftbe
contents or the mental register. Freud never associated the argument
with the name of Lamarck. whose theories were put to another, though
related, use for a brief period in the F irst Wo rld War. Freud, in fact,
knew his Lamarck better than those who described the theory of the
inheritance of acq uired characteristics as ·Lamarckian ' - when such a
theory was held equally by Darwin and most other biologists in the
period 1865- 1930. Remembering this, we will not be led astray into
thinking that the 'inheritance' of acquired characteristics pertains to the
biological founda tions of psychoanalysis.n Rather. it arose out of
Freud·s relation to the accepted conceptual armoury of philological
research in the nineteenth century, which would often pay scant
anention to the vicissitudes of time and space in the link:ing of word-
forms. In the essay on Leonardo, Freud backed away from such
audacity, only to find out later that be had 10 restore at least one form of
such an argument, since psychoanalysis. as much as philology, had need
of the temporal and spatial continuity that the concept of tradition
secured. Just as the Volksgei.st, relying on its primary manifestation.
language, tr.lllscended the individual (whether it be individual society or
indi vidual speaker), liccocing the linking of diverse word·forms from
one epoch to another, so did Freud feel o bliged to introduce a parallel
188 language and t!N. Origins of Psychoonalysis
conecpt of the continuity of tradition, the continuity of ·folk-memory',
at exactly those points where philological and linguutic research
focused mosl sharply: the continuity and singulari1y of reference of
nant~s.
A sexual relation with three women. Indeed, the number ·3· figures
largely in the dream. both in the manifest con1<:n1 and in the associations
Freud gave to the latter, but nowhere more ·symbolically' than in the
chemical formula which Freud saw'printcd in heavy lypc' - the formula
for trimcthylamin":
/cE~
/ .........-"
N~ C'~
~c_......-~
-...._H
T he dream-analysis that we find in The lnttrprttation ofDrtams (Freud
(1900a) SE IV 106-20) centred around a wish for self-vindication. a
wish that entailed the vilification of others. We have already en-
countered chis theme and one version ofi1selabon11ion in the · Non Vixit'
dream (Chapter 4. p. IS8fT above). All the dreams of self-justification
rC<lcived unconscious suppon from the infantile memory that we
discussed there: Sigismund's anempt at self-justification in the face of
parental justice, following the banle of wills with his playmate, John,
over an unspecified object that, we surmise. in some way represented
190 Language and 1/re Origins of Psychoonalysis
Pauline, the third member of the playgroup. The recurrent 'symbolic
slructurc tha1 rcprcscn1cd this insistent pattern of wish-fullilling
1hougb1s consisted in four terms: Freud (self). a rival or fellow-
conspirator, a j udicial representative of the older. parental order, and
the object, a woman or her representative.
According 10 the account Freud gave in his lcncr. 1hen. we find this
"object', explicitly sexual now. replicated three times in the dream. lo
fact, i1 is not only the object that is 'triplicated'; we find 1ha1 each of the
01her1crms of the 'self-justificatory' infan1ile scene figures in the dream-
analysis under 1hrec different guises:
(i) as au1hori1ies, Dr M. (Breuer), whose judgemcnl is shown to be
absurd and shortsighted, as well as being in confticl wilh the
dreamer's; FleischJ, 1be friend who had poisoned himself with
cocaine (sich mit Kokain Vt!rgifte1 hot), and concerning whose death
Freud was oflen to foci a need fo r self-jus1ification, as if he bad been
responsible for this dca1b of an ideal; and Freud's 'cider bro1her'
(mein im Auslundt lebendtr iilterer Bruder), who, for the purposc:s of
the dream·s aim. had been assimilalcd 10 Dr M. as being 100
·s1upid' to accept Freud's suggestions or 1hcorics.
(ii) filling the posts of conspirator and compc1itor, we find 0110 (Oskar
Ric). who was compared unfavourably 10 Leopold (Ludwig
Roscnslein). another medical colleague; and, finally, we find Flicss,
who had supplied Freud with the fo rmula 1hat we can now use to re-
rcprescnl. in a cu..,.ory form. as did F reud in his dream•'. the
' meaning' of the dream:"
Philology 191
We thus find the theme of the relation 10 the three women embedded
in the symbolic structure of the dream, modelled upon an infantile
scene, and represented in a 'pure' symbolic form: a chemical formula.
One could even. as did Lacan and Anzicu. discover the sexual theme of
the three women without knowing of Freud's letter to Abraham. since ii
is the underlying triadic structure which organizes all of Freud's
associations. But, we will now leave aside the themes of the rival and tbe
authority in order 10 follow Freud as he pursued the theme of the tbrcc
women-daugh1ers-w1dows-pa1ien1s in 'The Motives for the Choice of a
Casket' (1913)."
In this second version. Freud staned by examining the choice to
wbicb Bassanio must submit in order 10 gain Ponia 's band in The
Merchant of IImice. a cboioe b<twccn three caskets. Freud argued that
this choice is homologous to Lear's ·choice' b<twecn his three daugh-
ters. lo this wdl known paper''. Fr<ud argued, via a range of
mythological soun:es.., that Lear's refusal 10 choose his third and
youngest daughter, the daughter who r<presents death, is equivalent 10
an intellectual triumph over death, a triumph that ends in tragedy, since
it is in vain that an old man yearns for the love of woman as he had it
first from his mother: the third of the Fates alone, the silent Goddess
of Death. will take him into her arms. (Freud (1913f) SE XII 301)
We may surmise tha11hc 1heme oflhc threc women found in both the
dream of Irma's injection and in the theme of the choice of a casket was
central 10 Freud's self-analysis. Bui one of the versions employs
material derived from free association as its evidential base, while the
other employs an ahogether different sort of material, but one entirely
familiar lo philologists: the close-reading of two Renaissance plays,
East European and Grncco-Roman myths, and Germanic folklore.
Insofar as they referred 10 the same theme, these two modes of
argument seemed 10 be intcrchaneeable. Indeed. in the text of 'The
Motive for the Choice of a Casket'. there were only three points al
which Freud called upon specifically psychoanalytic areumcnts: to take
the step from the theme of the choice b<twecn caskets 10 that of a choice
between women, via the symbolic equation, well known 10 b< a
significant feature of Freud's own symbolic map, ·casket= woman'.,;
secondly. to demonstrate the equation 'dumbness= death', for which
demonstration dream-interpretation proved in fact to be insufficient.
necessitating recourse 10 1he category of linguistic usage. mythology
and folklore (in this case. 1wo of the Grimms' /.fiirch~n): thirdly. to
192 language and tk Origins of Psychoanalysis
r<solvc 1wo contradictions. the first of which arises when one notes that
!he woman who represents death bas all the characteristics ofa beautiful
and lo••ed one". the second of which arises from 1he facl that both the
plays and the myths replace the inerirabiliry of dea1h by the choice of a
woman.
T he public can forgive Freud least of all for his sexual symbolism. In
my view he is really easiest to follow here, because this is just where
mythology, expressing the fantasy-thinking of all races. bas p.reparcd
the ground in the most instructive way. I would only mention the
writings of Stcinthal in the 1860s. which prove the existence of a
widespread sexual symbolism in the mythological records and the
history of language.... The Freudian symbol and its interpret-
ation is therefore nothing unheard of. it is merely unusual for us psy-
chiatrists. (Jung ( 1908) CW IV 23-4)
•
194 Language and the Origins of P•J'<hoanolysls
Wha l wc can sunnisc is the following; the psychoanalytic lhcory of lhe
symbol was created as much by Freud's followel'$ as by Freud, and for a
'cry good reason: it was one departmenl of the inner life of mankind's
history that bad already recei\'ed much exposure from lhc researches of
philologists and mythologisls. For any "psychia1rist" convcn<anl with the
philological sciences, sexual symbolism was a source of respectable
support fo r Freud's interpretative me1hods. which. much to Jung's
indigna1ion. had come in for many "cheap philological criticisms· (Ibid.
CW IV 17). •0 Thescxual symbolism that was one of the major findings of
philology and mythology became grafted 0010 Freud's method. And the
appurcm all1nity of Freud's method with those employed by philologists
perhaps accounls for lhe fact that those philologically-minded
psychoanalysts - Rank. Jung, Abraham, Ferenczi, Stekel. Jones, to
mention only the besl-known,a list to which wc will retum in a moment -
could confuse findi ngs whioh were almost exclusively philological in
character with those thal were more properly psychoanalytical.
But who were these philologically minded psychoanalysts? Al lhe bead
of the list, we must place Freud. We ba'·e already seen, in Chapter 3.
'Symbolism'. the uses to ,..hicb Freud could put philology and some oflhe
modes of philological reasoning he employed. Here ,.e will simply note a
few more aspects of his philological bent. He drew a large number of
comparisons between the dream-work and linguistic mechanisms. lhus,
by implication, pointing lowards linguistic mechanisms as the
appropriate a rea in which to find the spccificcharac1cristic:s of the action
or the unconscious, though the linguistic mechanisms in question might
either be present-day ones. or ones appropriate 10 the development of
language o r those belonging to a hypothesized primitive language."
For example. he called upon philological evidence to suppon his
account of lhe transformation of the first giji, a child's faeces, into lhose
highly valued faecal substitutes. gold and m oney. o n the one hand, and
baby and penis on thcother(Freud (l933a) SE XXll 100). When Freud
wished to indicate profitable areas of application for psychoanalysis, he
turned firs1 to philology (Freud (1913j) SE XIII 165- 90; (1924f) SE
XIX 20SIT). But the rela1ion was more one of disciplinary contiguity
than of a possible assimilation of philology to psychoanalysis: as we
no1ed above (p. 98). Freud went out of his way to indicate to the other
analysts that they had much to learn from a study of philology. And it
was lo lhc philological sciences that he looked lo provide a more
adequate lraining fo r the psychoanalyst than could medicine when he
wro1e. on 71re Q11esrio11 of Loy Analysis:
Philology 195
... analytic inslrUClion [in a college of psychoanalysis] would include
branches of knowledge which are remote from medicine and which
the doe1or does not come across in his praC1ice: the history of
civilization, mythology. the psychology of rcligJon and the science of
literature. Unless he is well at home in these subjects. an analyst can
make nothing or a large amount of his material. By way of
compensation, the great mass or what is taught io medical schools is
of no use lo him fo r his purposes. ( Freud (1926e) SE XX 246)
Can you imagine what "cndopsyd1ic myths" arc? They are the latest
product of my mental Jabour. The dim inner perception of ones own
psychical apparatus stimulates illusions, which arc naturally pro-
jected outwards, and characteristically into the future and a world
beyond. Immortality. retribution, the world after death. are all
reflections of our inner psyche . .. psychomythology. (Freud ( 1950a)
Origins, 12 Dec 1897, p. 237)
196 Language and 11!. Origins of PsJv:hoanalysis
Was ii again only a coincidence 1ha1 1he nexl leuer 10 Flicss. written
1en days later. venlured into the area that supplied 1he s1ock-io-Lrade of
Kleinpaul and the 01her philologists: 1he double meaning of words?
... in 1he case of obsessional ideas the mos1 dispara1e things tend
to be broughl together under a word wilh more than o ne
meaning.... A girl au ending a sewing class which was soon coming
to an end was troubled by the obsession: .. No, you mustn't go yet, you
haven 't finished, you must do [mache11) some more, you must learn all
that it is possible to learn.·· Behind this was the memory of childhood
scenes; when she was put on the pol, she did not want to stay o n it and
was subjected to the same compulsion: .. You mustn't go yet, you
haven't finished. you must do some more." The word "do" permi1s
identification of the later with the infantile situa1ion. (Ibid .• (22 D«.
1897) SE I 272- 3)
All tho.\ is not entirely arbitrary. The word machen has itself
undersonc a similar transformation of meaning. An old phantasy of
mine, which I should like to recommend to your linguistic pe.rception,
deals with the derivation of our verbs from such orig1nally copro-
erolic 1erms. (Freud (1950a) SE I 273)
Philology 197
Certainly a philological project on the grand scale. and one which
never came close to fruition. Tbedcfercncc to Fliess' linguistic talents"
strikes one as out of place. perhaps a pan of those other deferences.
numerological. nasal and otherwise, that comprised what has come to
be known as F reud's transference to Fliess. It occurs to us that these
references to grandiose philological schemes are of the same ilk as all the
other gr.1ndiosc schemes Freud proposed to Fliess: the Project for a
Scltntifo' Psychology. the projected book entitled Bis•.<uality in
Mon'°, 10 mention only 1he most slriking. These grandiose schemes
might have been the necessary correlale bo1h of Freud's self-analysis
and of the slow crystallization of psychoanalysis out from the slurry
formed by all those other sciences in epistemological adjacency to it; in
other words, they may have been necessary to the construction of the
epistemological space of psychoanalysis. If the detaching of psycho·
analysis from neurology hap~ed silently, its witness, af\er the event.
being Chapter VII of The lnrerprerarion of Drranu, the hopeful
fascination evoked by the prospect of support from philology waxed as
well as waned: a cycle one can observe in those eminently philological
works of the rum of the cenrury. Tht PsychoparholO(ly of£<.,yday Life
and Jokts and rheir Relation to rhe Unconscious, as well as in the sporadic
but regular references to philology across the entire corpus of F reud's
ps)'ehoanalytical work until his death.
Wladimir Gr.1noff has captured well the tone of Freud's hopeful
relation to philology:
What \\e can add to this remark of Granoff's is the diffcrcnl tense of
Freud's fontasy of scientifte support to be derived from these other
disciplines: chemistry was always invoked in the future tense. whereas
Freud believed. without really knowing the exact details. the exact
sources. that linguistics - philology - had already laid doM•n the scien-
tific base, the manifestations of which Freud was (re)discovering in
198 l.m1g11age and the Origins of Psy<:hoanalysis
another form; that all these audacious. ·arbitrary', 'crazy' confusions of
words were already there. Qn the unconscious? In a dusty and already
old volume of the Zeitsdirift flir Vofkerpsyd1ologie und Sprodn..is-
smschaft? In the 'history of the devclopmmt oflanguage'? In 'linguistic
usage'? Or. even, in the domain of k.nowledge possessed by those
transferential objects that Freud was more and more successfully
teaching himself to do without. even if such a withdrawal did involve the
rctrospcctivc phantasy of a splendid isolation?)
We can read the following passage from a lecture that Ferenczi gave
10 the Free School of the Social Sciences in Budapest in 1911:
l wus in the bath, and then the plumber came and unscrewed it Then
he took a big borer and stuck it into my stomach. (Freud ( 1909b) SEX
65)
The plumber came; and firs1 he took away my behind wi1h a pair of
pinoers, and then gave me another, and 1hen the same with my
widdler. ( Ibid., SE X 98}
Yes. the Doctor (the plumber) did come, he did take away his penis -
but only lo give a bigger one in exchange for it. (Ibid .. SE X 100}
How not to obey the pressure to push b;ick, to the beginnings, when
sexuality was represented directly and without ambiguity, when
language was as yet undistorted and not yet mythical. when one could
find 11 pre-mythical and pre-metaphorical state of language, when lhc
'original predicates·. the 'kinship relations' (K lcinpuul, 1916. p. 8) of the
206 Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
first speech, were not yet coveted over, when one could find a state of
language that included as part of its raison d'itrt the incomprehensible
identities that analysis and philology relied upon for their continual
progress? And with this drive back into the history of language, t.he
problem of the prcKrvation of linguistic traces could not be avoided.
We have already hinted that there could be two solutions to this
problem. Let us now address them.
When we studied Freud's paper on Leonardo, we found that the
problem of the permanent prcKrvation of signification - i.e. the
problem of tradition - lay behind the contorted form of his argument.
The point of attack in Leonardo was the problem of the prCKrvation of
a word from one epoch to the next. Similarly, when he came to write his
essay on Moses. a similar opening Kerned possible: why not solve the
K<mingly intractable problem of the relation between the Egyptians
and the Jews by reference to one word that can cross the barrier? But
perhaps his not altogether happy experience with Leonardo had
forewarned him against such a simple solution.
I was then [c. 1900] under the illusion 1ha1 [man's biological nature]
could best be studied in neurology, where ii would seem lha1 human
impulses and the control of them could well be examined . . .. No1
that I was in any way unaware of the philosophical problems
involved. On the contrary, I even conceived the idea that a profound
study of speech and language - the only mental function where some
coun1erpan can be localized in the conex of the brain - with their
disorders would be the most promising path 10 investigating the
relationship between mind and brain; with this end in view I did an
immense amount of work in that field, which remained for some years
one of my side inl<rests. Incidentally, it has a ccnain irony that lhe
only position I have ever held in the University of London is that of
membership of the Board of Studies for Comparative Philology.
(Jones. 1959. pp. 18- 19. er. Jones, 1907. 1908. 1909)
It will not have passed unnoticed that it will not be easy 10 find this work
a disciplinary niche. ls it a historical work, auempting 10 gel straight the
historical record, attempting to find a cenain 'reading' that could be
reiterated endlessly, and su11 remain a dclinitivc reading, as if, once
read, Freud would not have to be reread? Or is this work an aucmpt to
reformulate. via a his1orie<rconcep1ual argument, the foundations of
psychoanalysis, so that, where we oocc saw biology we now sec
philology. where we once saw symbolic decoding. we now sec phonetic
switching, where we once saw the discharge orfixated energy we now see
the rule-like transformations or a personal script?
I can deny neither or these ways or reading this work. But there is no
doubt that a third way of reading it is possible. We might call this
its Lacanian dimension. What may strike many readers is the
absence or the name ' Lacan' in a work that is devoted to the topic of
language and psychoanalysis. Such an absence could not but be a
deliberate act. an omission that owes its raison d'i1re to a series of
decisions. What results from these decisions can now be seen in one of
two ways: firstly, it is possible 10 demonstrate the fundamental nature of
the theory and practice of language and speech in psychoanalysis
without panaking of the beady prose, or the inc!Tablc ambiguities, of
Lacanian analysis. Secondly, we can read this work as the prolegomena
to a more direct approach 10 the Lacanian school or analysis, which, in
the 1950s, explicitly referred itself 10 a reading of Freud that runs
parallel to this thesis in its emphasis on the function of language in
analysis, in the talking-<:ure. To put it another way, if we read Freud this
211
212 Language and the Origins of Ps)'Choanal)'sis
,.,ay, i1 may help us 10 undentaod how i1 is possible for Lacan to
construct his theory under the banner of a return to Freud.
To conclude on such a nole may appear strange. Afier all, this work
makes historical claims. Bui it is as well to record the fact that these
historical claims were fir.It and foremos1 hypotheses arising out of a
close reading of Freud 's texts, rather than being 1he slowly accumula1ed
suspicions arising out of a general survey of late nineteenth century
eul1ure. If one can try to demons1ra1e a uni1y that encompasses
neurology and philology, it would cenainly be a difficult task if
psychoanalysis had never existed. 1 may have had to become acquainted
with that background, that context. that culture, in order to carry out
this study. But such an acquaintanceship was in the service of a desire to
throw light upon cenain obscurities in the psychoanalytic texts: jumps
in the argument, assumptions that seemed to be less demonstrable than
demonstrative. the specific form or a debate.' The issues that such
topics raised for me required the long detours tha1, when reorganized,
made linear. make up this work. Put simply, a 'slip' of Freud's pen was
the occasion for an inquiry into the constitution or the sciences or
language and mind in the nineteenth century. And "'e should not be
surprised that such strange detour.1 were necessary in order to 1ry and
discover what Freud could possibly have meant when he talked in 1890
of the 'magical power of words'.
So this work as history revolves around a corpus of writings 1hat -
need it be said? - remain the primary focus of psychoanalysis. And the
fact that our history looks 'forward' to Lucan, just as it looks
'back words" to Jackson and Kleinpaul, does not, I trust. make it a
historical monster, out of step eitber witb the past or witb the pr=nt. I
make no pretensions to writing the history of the past as if it were a self·
sufficient system of permanent traces that could be closed off by a
remark such as that of Ernest Jones', when he was assessing the
significance of Freud's self-analysis: ·once done. it is done for evcr." 3 In
this work I have tried to do nothing other than write the history of the
present. In history, as in psychoanalysis. one understands what comes
before through what came aftet.
Notes
I. One of the nama that Anna O ... Brcuer's first paltmt. ga\C to tht method
she had treated (Breuer and Freud (189$d) SE II 30). She emplo~cd the
English words. since. at that point in the course or her ncur0$.ls. she could
not speak German.
2. From the bcg:innin.g of his psychoanaJy1ic work, f'reud detached h1mself
from two doctrines. obviously related to cac:h other. th"-t we c.an call
Nores 215
It iscleurly impos~iblt to say anything about this that is. about the state
which the pathogenic material wus in before the a_nalysis - until we have
arrived at o thoroua.h cluriAcmtion of our basic psychological viev.·s.
especially on 1he nnture or consc-iousness. It re1nains, I think, a fact
deserving serious considcratioo that in our analyses we can follo"' a train
or1hought from 1hc con,scious in10 the unconscious (i.e. into something
that is nbso1u1cly not tccogniicd os 11 111cn1ory), that we can trace it from
there fo r some dls1oncc 1hroushconsciousncss once more and that we can
sec it terminate in the unconscious again, without this nl1ernn1ion of
' psychial ill umina11ion' male ing 1tnychangc in the I rain of thought itself, in
its logical consistency and 1n the interconnectio n bet"'·cen its various
parts. Once 1his 1roin of thought was before me as a whole I shouJd no1 be
able to gucs..' which pan or it wa,s recogni:zed by the patient as a memory
and which \l.'8S not. I o nly, as it were, sec the peaks of the 1rain ofthoug.hl
dipping down in the unconscious - the reverse of ~'hat has been asserted
of our normal psychical processes.
(i) II was oficn when Freud came to a problem belonging t o the theory of
C'Onsciousness tb11 he broke off bis discussion. The most notable
example of 1his was the m1ss1ng chap1cr(_s) or 1hc proposed book on
metapsychology (see Editor's Introduction to the Paper> on
Mctapsycholog)'. SE XIV 105-7)
(u) The idea tha1 an unconscious train of thought cannot be distinguished
Notts 221
from a consaow train of thought by 11.J IOIJ(1I consistency' or by the
0
J3. The discussion of the ·rcaJicy' of the primal scene in the Wolfman's c.ase·
history is obviously or relevance here. See Freud ( 1918b) SE XVII 49- 60,
S7- 9. 9S-7. As is clear from th'c discussion 1here. the txistencr of the
'primal' event is intimate!)' bound up with the question of its efficacy as
'caUK'. And, to clarify this lattc-r quntion. Freud had another stt of
conecpu already elaborated,. the- most interesting of wh.ch is. perhaps.. lhc-
conorpt of dcfc-rre<I action: What only bad a poMibl1ity of c~is1in1 "at the
ttme' IS eJftetivc-1y brought into extstm« at a later date. and the c-tTect of its
existence is 5uch that it is as if it had ex1.sted at the earlier time: ·-.hat
cmcrgc."S from the unconscious is to be uodcntood tn the light not of what
gon before bul of what comes after.' (Freud (1909b) SE X 66.)
34. Cf. Frcud(l9633),January 10, 1910, p. 31: 'All repren1onsareofmmwri< 1.
nol of capc-riences; at most the latter arc rq>tci~ in retrospect.'
35. Freud (1919e) SE XVll 188: • ... und solrlt" lnhalt ther in
Wortoorsttllungtn er}Dsst •·ertfen kann ol$dos Du11klc. das mit d"m Genito/en
:w·an1n1enhiingt.'
36. Note 1he relation between the concept of haJlucination and that or the
seduction scene tha1 Ricoeur (1970), pp. 95- 6, points ouo:
Rank's formula - that those people become ocuro1tein v.hom the trauma
of binh was so strong that they ba-.'c nc-.·cr bttn able completely to
abrcact it - is highly disputable from a thtoretal poin1 of view. We do
not nghtly know _.hat is meant by abreacttng the 1rauma. Talct:n l1terally,
it implies that the more frequenlly and lhe more intensely a neurotic
person reproduces the affect of aruticty 1he more closely will he approach
10 menial health - an untenable conclusion. It was bccau.u it did not tally
or
with the facts thal I gave up the theory abreaction which had played
such a large par1 in 1he cathartic method.
Notes 223
39. Of course, this is entirely separate from the question whether o r not Freud
had a distinctively aural bias: aJJ the evidence would seem to indicate that he
did. (Although GranolT ( 1975) and Leclaire ( 1967), in their discussions of
the notion ·uberdeutlich'. try to show how this aural bias overlaid a strong
visuality that left traces in the form of Freud's ' key·signifiers".) But to try
and explain the specific character of a scientific theory from the personal
idiosyncrasy of one man would seem both to be a methodologically
implausible hypothesis and to weigh down the already straining 'body' of
historical causes with yet another organ that bas changed the 'face' of
history: alongside Cleopatra's nose we would have to place Freud's ear.
40. No1 only did the theory of the 'spc«.h residues· found in the Prqj111.·1 remain
essentially unchanged throughout the period rrom 1895 to the last works of
1938, as we shall see in the rouowing chapter, b u1 the 'project for a scientific
psychology' that was Freud's life work retained a consistent structure of
argument from 1895 on. T he clearest and most remarkable dcmonstratjon
of this fac-1, which wiU often licence us drawing up<>n a variety of 1exts
written a1 different times. as if they were the y,•ork. of one writing subject. is
the identity of structure of the Project and Freud's last and finest expository
work. An 011t/i11e of Ps}·t·hoanalysis. Let us compare these:
Project Outlint
I General Scheme I The Mind and its Working
II Psychopathology (Hyst<ria, Affect) II The P ractical Task
Ill Normal Processes Ill The Theoretical Yield
The parallel is even more slfiking if we compare the contents of Section I in
the lY.'O works:
Projtct Out/int
1.- 3. General theorems concerning I. The psychical apparatus
the activity of neurones
4.- 5. The biological standpoint and 2. The theory of the- instincts
the problem of quantity
6. Pain 3. The de\'elopment of the
sexual function
7.- 18. Quality, consciousness, ego, 4. Psychical qualities
1hought.
19- 21. D«•m analysis and dream 5. Dream-interpn:tation as
consciousness an illustration
The one major dilTerenoe bet.,..,·een these two accounts is the complete absence
of the topic of sexuaLity from Section I of the Project (although the
importance of sexuality for the aetiology of the neuroses was discussed in
Se<:lion II Psychopathology). What we find instead of sexuali1y is 'pain·. We
are entitled to make the following two comments. Firstly, we have found yet
another suppon for Freud's conviction that it was the introduction ofa theor)r
of sexuality into the model of the psyche elaborated in the period 1895- 1900
that gave pS)'Cboanalysis its distinctive casL Secondly. this homologous
relation of sexuality and pain might gj•oe U$ pau$e for thought as to the general
psychoanalyticaJ conception or the crottc, despite the c\fer increasing
insistence with which Freud, as he grew older. pleaded the cause of Eros.
224 Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
('HAPT1ll 2
I. In the acx:oun1 of the Projtt1 I " ill not gi,·e dcra1lcd rcfercnca to the tcx.1.,
cxccpc where my reading depends upon specific pas.saacs. or where I quote
direclly. On the PrOJ«t, the following works arc of value: Amacher ( 196S.
19n). Andorsson (1962). Hetllcrnt0 (1974). Prib<am (1962). Pnbram
(1969). Pribram and Gill (1976). Safouan ( 1968). Solomon (1974).
Wollhcim (197 1).
2. The term 'cathcxis', coined by Strachcy, vexed Freud au much as it has
vexed some of his commentators and later psychoanalytic theoreticians.
The German words. 'besttzt', 'btsetzung', do no t have the technical ftavour
1hat the Greek-based 'cathexis' has, and do not unduly encourage the
overly mcchanistit readings that cathcxis has seemed to. It is 1nuch too late
co su.ggcst an altcrnati\te t ranslation, even if one were to find one that was
satisfactory. The naturaJ translation, 'occupied', 'occupalio n', although
having some interesting connotations a nd potential alluJive qualities, such
as in •pre-occupation'. is perhaps less flexible than 'cathcxis·.
As 10 the much debated question or 1he o ntological status of ·Q·. a
rc1dina of Stracbey's no<c following tbe Proj"'· SE I 392- 7, establl.tlts its
claim as the main precursor of the ·economic mode' or psychoanalytic
met1psychology. As to its rcfereooc. as to it.s relation 10 the ~arious realities
depicted by anatomy. physiology. neurology, etc.• there is a vut litcratur-c
on tha topic. much of it marked by fundam<ntal confuSlon. H erc. I • •ash
only lo note that r sec no difficulty in dissociating Q cntirc:ly from any
an11om1cal references., no r any diffic;ulty in ufu11n1 to cqu.a1c it with a
ncurophysiological c;ooccpt whose empirical correlate must be a certain
quan111at1vc characteristic or DCr'\'C-C.Clls. I ~hC\iC that Solomon is qWtc
riabt when he distinguishes bet"'eco neuroanatomy and neuro physiology,
wrong when he claims that •1hc essence or Freud'• theory ... is not
dualistic' (Solomon. 197 4, p. 26) and o n extremely weak around when be
wrilcs that ··•Q" is essen1iaJly a borrowed no1io n. a nd to divorce the
Freudian notion or"Q", and. la1er. " psychic energy", fro m ils physicnlisli<",
o rigins is to rob the concept of its substantial n1caning.•. . if t he ntodel or
the"p•ychicapporatus" is divorced from the neurophy1iolog1cal model. the
central no tion of "encrgy" becomes Little more thon a metaphor.' (Ibid. p.
32). Apan from the curious fetish.ism of ·subs1anee' seen in this pass.age.
round in many of the discussions of the material base of theories of the
psyche. and brilliantly analysed by Bachelard in The Philosophy of No. we
have only 10 re.mind ourSCl\'C$ 1hat Freud's lasl 'appendix' 10 1hc Proj~ct
concxmcd a dc\•ice th.al had as much mattri1li1y as a brain. provided as
naorous a model as could be ~ished for. and yt1 could under no conceivable
arcum.stancts provide oocasion for identifying Q v..ith any o tht.r sort of
tnCfSY than the ··ps)'Chie:'. I am thinking of the M)stte Wnt1n& Pad This is
also obviously not the occasion on which 10 prcocc-upy ourselves ~;th the
v111ctyof phil0$0phica.I rca50n1ng 1hat uses the word ·metaphor' as a means
for 1bc. as.s1gnatioo of conceptual vac.u ity.
J. We arc tempted to equate this mechanism of muscular innervation 14•ith t hat
or hysterical COn\•ersion, as Freud WU 10 do in discusSJons With Ferencti
durins W orld War I, when he equated this puthwo.yofintcmalchang c with
225
Lamarck's notion of ·Neccssi1y·. Freud wishtd ·10 s:how 1h11 the ''nflCCSSo
11y'' that a«"ordiog 10 Lamarc,lc creates and transforms organs is nothing
but the po\ttc:r of unconscious ideas ovrr one's o,..,, body. of which ~c see
remnants in b)'$lcria, in short the ··omnipotcocc of 1houabts''. This would
aaually aupply a psycboanal)1ic- aplana1ion of adapcauoo (or fitness
(Z~·ttkn14Jsigkt'i1) ): it .,;:ould put the copnc s1one on psyc-boa.naJysis.
There would be tv.:o linked principles or progrcui\'Cc-han1ct adaptation of
one's own bod)' and subsequent 1ransrormat1on or the c,xtcrnal world
(au1oplu$licity and hctcroplMtici1y), etc.' (F reud (196Sa). pp. 26 1- 2. Sc:<:
also Jones. vol. 111. pp. 334-S.) Cf. FcrcnC7j (1913). pp. 223- 226. for the
relation between hysterical conversion and the omnipotence of thoughts.
Cf. Freud (1916-17), SE X VI 366; (1910c), SE X11 2S; ( 19 12- 13). SE XIII
93: ( 1924c). SE XIX 168 and n. 4,
4. ll is worth noting that the German term ·Z1i1·hen' is trnnslatod uniformly
throughout the Projrc1 as •indicalions', hence concealing to a small extent
1hc gcncrtal 'scmiologtca1' cont.ext of Freud's discussion or quality.
S. Freud himself recognized the paradoxical nature of his argument later in
the Projrct. without provtding a satisractory solution of the problem (SE I
378- 9).
6. In this sense. to call the speecb·associalioris ·exclusave·. as Freud did. is not
quite COITecl. They can be cxc:ludtd from the rest or one's pcroeptuaJ input
ov.1n1 to thttr lirtUtcd and closed cb.ara~cr. But, oncn as not. Freud
appeared to a.ssumc that the spco;:t..a.ssociations were cAclusive in a more
primary sms.e. thus allowing him tO actt'DI lhe pnvile&ed Cha1acter or awal
perception. Such a privileged position of the speech residues is displa)ed in
m1nyofhisworks,amongs11h<m a pamge from Frcud(l923b) SEXIX 21.
7. We could profitably relate this idea of the impan1ali1y or iptteb to its
funet1on in analysis. where it is placed in opposition to ac1ion. Sec Chapter
4.
8. The a 1nbiguou."1 charac.ter or Freud's position wi1h rc!Jpt..'Ct to wordless
thought is clea r in the follo\lo'i.ng passage. in which he discu»cd .,,productitte
1houghl' (ibid .. SE I 379- 80):
All these traumas occur in early childhood up 10 about 1hc fifth year.
Jmprcuions from the 1ime at "'hk:h a child is beainning to talk stand out
as bdna of particular interest; lhc periods between lhc ages or two and
four seem to be the mos·1 imponan1; it canno1 be dc1ermincd \\'ith
ceriainly how long alter birth this period or r<eeplivily begin..
15. Thia stattmcnt is not slrictly w::urate,. since- the patient also ha.s fttlings in
his or her cooJCiousnes.s. But. by a stnnge conccpc.ual tn~nion, psycho·
analysis. which S«med to be so much about 1he lire or the rccliop, =d
out of its therapeutic work the importance or feelings. The pttiod of
theoretical speculation that resulted in the mctapsycbologlcal works
written in the Ore.at War and in the culminating paper, "The Unconscious·,
v.·hkh cxprc5$ed more clearly than anywhere else the dominance of verbaJ
conaciousncss from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, hod been instigated
wilh •paper 111J11 Freud started in Oelobcr 1910, en Ii tied ' In whJlt scnse may
onc•pcak or unconscious rcclings?' (sec The Freud/Jung l•llers2 18F, p. 368
and nil). This paper eventually became section Ill of 'The Unconscious'
(( I91Sc) SE XIV 177- 9). There, Freud madcit cleanhat it was noutrictly
admiuible to speak of unconscious feelings: 'lhc pos1.ibili1y or the attribute
of uncon1Ciousocss would ht' complc1cly excluded as far as emotions.
fcc1inas and affects arc coocc:rncd." On the 1idc of consciousnCA. also. the
or
psychoanalyst always deals in verbal repons s1atcs of con,tdou.sness.. or,
co remain truer to the Freudian diaJea. the patJCftl reads orftbe surface or
his con.1Ctoumess.. Thus. as far as the a.n.al)5t u conumed. be JS c:oocemed
wi1h the words spokm and the words that have come to consciousness..
16. When Freud did intimate that linkage with verbal residues was not a
sufficient. or a necessary. condition for becomin& conscious. be could not
brin1him.self10 reveal an altemauve path towards a deeper understanding
or the process. For example, in "The Unconscious' (191Se) SE XIV 203:
As we can see. being linked with word·prcscntarions is not yet the same
thing u becoming conscious. but only makes it possible to bcQomc so; it is
therefore characteristic of the S)'Slem Pcs. and or that system alone. With
these discussions, however, we have evidently dcprarted from our subject
proper and find ourselves plunged into problems concerning the precon-
scious and the conscious. which for good reasons "'·c arc reserving for
separate treatment.
Among the precepu oftbc Most:S religion tMre 1s one that is of greater
importanu than appean to begin v;ith. Tbb is the prohibition against
making an image ofGod - tMoompuhion to • onhip a Ood whom one
canaot sec••.. - an expression of the pride or mankiod io chc dc\'elo~
mml of speech. • ·hicb resulted in such an extraordinary advaoccmcot of
1ntellmual activities.. The new realm of intellectuahty was opened up. in
which ideas. memories and inferences became decisi\'C ln contrast to the
lower ps,ychical acti\ity which had direct percepcions by the sense-organs
as its oon1en1. This was unquestionably one of the most important stages
on the pa1h of hominiza1ion.
228 language and t/71! Origins of Psychoonalysls
Again, in another passage. this time from (1909d) SE X 233 al : ' As
Uchlcnbergsays.. ''An astronomer knO\\'S whetl\crtht moon is inhabited or
not Wllh aboul a.s much certainly as he knov.'S who was his father. bu1 not
~.-ilh so much certainty as be' kno-."S "'ho ..,..as his mother". A great advaooe
wat made in ci\iliution when mien decided to put their inferences upon a
level with the tcst.imooy of their senses and to make the Step (rom
matriarchy to patriarchy.·
18. And even lhe acquisition of, or perhaps acquiescence under, belief is bound
up with the speech function, sin«-. as outlined in the Projrc.·1. judgcmeot is
dependent upon the unity conferred upon an object and its variable
a11ributn by the verbal imagr:s. such an object - an alien, incomprehensible
' thina\ ;u Freud described it - being fi rst characterized by the scream. In
( 1930a) SE XXI 67, Freud argued 1ha1 the scream characterizes the first
objccl in its absence, thus marking off what is phcnomcnologicall)'
discontinuous, temporary and unpredictable - and therefore ·outside' - as
COntlnuOUS llOd permanent OD the )cvcl O( lhought·rcaJity.
19. A phraso 1hat occurred often in Schr10ber's M t molrs, which both Freud and
JW1g used in their correspondence to remind each oLhcr that chinking. even
1hinking pg:ychoanaJyticall)', is never eno ugh.
20. The allusion is 10 a notcwonhy accoun.t of the inalienable character of the
fundamcolal ruk, found in Freud (1909d) SEX 166:
H<re 1hc pa1icn1 brot c olT, gOI up from 1he sofa, and b<ggc:d me 10 span:
him 1be rcci1al of the details. I usurc:d him 1h11 I m)'klf had no tasle
wbatc\'e r for cruelty. a.ad certainly had no des.ire 10 tormtnt bim. but that
naturally I could not grant him somtthing which was beyond my pov.-cr.
He mi&ht just as wdl as.k me to give him the moon. (EbmJog ut kiJnn" u
m(clt bitlC'.n, llun twei Kom~t~n zu schrtnlctn.)
The passaae is noteworthy not only for the clarity with which Freud
revealed to his patient that the rundamcntal rule is not a iubjcc1 for
legislation, but also as an indication of how the analyst, as the rcprcscntat·
ive or thi11 law, can very easily encourage the forma1ion or an identification
or the analyst with the tormentors, 1he 1ort urers. so commonly found, in
obscssjonal neurosis, as delegates or 1he father. When the analyit assured
the patient that he had no 1aste for cruelty. that he had no desire to
1ormcnt b.im, he encouraged both the conversion o( this disclaimer into a
phantasy of its opposite. and 1be identification of all torture or cruelty with
the inftex.ibility of the fundamcotal rule. th•t i1. in the final 1.nalysis.. with the
inftexib1li1y of symbolic reality, or, broadly spcak1na. wnb lan1uage. We
might •-.:nturc the hypothesis that lhosc anal)'>IS who idcniiry the 'law' with
1hc laws of language have managed 10 purify 1he 1ransl'er10nce 10 a poin1
where the M aster is identified with the legislator of lanauagc; the question
o( the dwolution of such a transference remains an abeyance.
C:lli\fTEa J
I. A number of author5 b.avc noted this feature of the additions to the dream-
Nolfs 229
book, of whom Wdd<n ( 1968. 1973) has d.-wn m0>t lllcotion to the
fundamcntaJ change in the eoncep1ion or $ymbolism lb.at this in,·ol\'ed.
2. On the shor1 SIOJ)' style or ' Katherin•' - Schonau (1968) and Ro hner
(1966).
J 1.<Claire ( 1966) also emphasized the insttmtan""'3 appcarantt of the fechng
of ccna1n1y. and the accompanying fethna of hbera11on that Freud (and
James, 1890, vol. I. pp. 679ff; Roscnzw<ig (1968)) d<>Crihcd when analysis
restores to consciousness a name that has been forgotten. Sec Frtud ( l901 b)
C haplet l.
4, For •n account of the concept of symbolism as it h3s been understood in
variou1 schools of analysis) see the articlt on S1n1bo/;sn1 in Laplanche a nd
Po ntalis ( 1973). It is wonhwbile noting that cc:r1ain ~·orks o n the
psychoanalyticconcept of the symbol do n o1 bear on ~·hat either L11planchc
und Pontalis or I rncan by ·symbol', but cover tt much broa.dcr field, which
would more profitabl y be called tha1 of1he sign. See. for instance, A.xeltod
( 1977) and Mitchell ( 197J). Such uses of the term symbol have affinities with
the di1<ussion in Rioocur (1970). But the psyrhoonalyl/c concept or the
lymbol v.·ould seem to correspond more nearly w·ilh Pie:rcc'1 cooccpl of the
'icon'. Sec Pier« ( 1897, 1932) and Dewey (1946).
S. Laplancbe and Pootalis(l973, p. 44J) .-·ish to draw out a furtberdlstioctioo:
moral hteral. in addition 10 figurative li1eral.
We should al~ note 1h:a1 Brcucr's emphasis on souttdassoci.atioo was not
taken up by Freud in the Stud~$lO the extent chat he ¥ri'l.S 10 emphasize it in.
for example. 71t~ ln1trpr~1a1ion of Drn:ms.
6. Ferenc:zi summed up the theory or h~teria H follows ((1919) pp. 102- 3):
•.. . e"·ery b)·,terical symptom. considered from whatever asp«t. is alwa)"S
to be recognized as a beterotypc genital (unction. The ancients '1!'Crc.
therefore. right "''hen the)' said of hysteria: UteruJ loquitur?'
7. The most dc1.ailed account or this theory is to be fo und in Ferenczi ( 1924),
but a lw spcculati\o'C ,·crsion was expressed in Ferenczj (19 19). Cf. also
Fcrcnczi. 1926. p. 48:
Another argument of not~ thi$ time from Fercnczi (1924), p. 22, cxcurS
during f"erenc7J's discussion of tM hypothesis th11 the canoibal15lic
phanta.Sld of babies are deri'ed from at1empU lo return to the v.·omb:
Obviously this notion of the Urpmi.s loucbcs. u • 'C hl\'C been keen to point
ou1. on the theory of symbolism. Fcronai conunucd:
11 11 nol 1h11 1hc 1001h is 1hcreforc 1be symbol of 1hc penis bu1 r2tbcr. to
speak paradoxically. that the IJ11cr ma1uring ptnis is the symbol of the
more primitive boring implement, the tooth. Tbc p.1radoxical character
orthi.s supposition is perhaps modcnalcd, however. by lhc coruiidcratioo
chat every symbolic association is preceded by a stage in which two things
arc treated as one and so can represent each 01her.
Clearly this latter consideration does not r~soltv the 'paradox'i bul we may
well ask: what is the paradox?
8. Cf. Freud ( 19<lla) SE V 659:
The dream-thoughts which we first come across as v.·c proceed with our
analysis oficn strike us by the unusual fonn in which they arc expressed;
1hey are not clothed in the prosaic language wually employed by our
thought, bu1 arc on th< con1rary represented •ymbolicaUy by means of
~m.llcs and metaphors.. in images resembling thOSt of poclicspocda. There
is oo difficvtty in accounting for lht constraint imposed upon the form in
-.·hich the drcam·thougbts are expressed.... If "'C tmagine ourK.lves
faced by the ptoblcrn of roprescn1ing 1hc arguments in 1 political leading
article or the spccc.bcs of couo5C'I before 1 <'Ourt of law in a series of
pictures, we shall easily understand 1he modifica11ons which must
ncc:asarily be carried out by the dream-work owing to rons;mrations oj
reprt1#ntabili1y fn rite ctJntent of tlr.e dream.
The reference to the three traditional forms or discourse upon Yio•hich the art
of rhetoric i.s founded - poetry, demagogy and the law indicates clearly
whRt sort of language Yii'C must expect to hear on 1hc: royal road 10 the
uncon..:ious. er. Mahony (1974) who would relate Freud's 1hcrapy of
rhc1oric with a pre·Aristotelian conception of the cural ivc word. a mixture
of tp6d~ and thtlkttrion; alternativt-ly, one could view Freud's conception as
gr11ning 1hc Rhetoric on to the P«tics.
9. Fcrcntti. the fir11 pqrchoanaly:st co 'test' chc more iencral validity for
another language of interpretations originally derived from German
hnguisttc usage. " 'as extremely wary in his earl)' wn1ings or giV'lng symboltc
interprctauons not based upon '-erbal plays. For e.xamp~. in Fert:nczi
(1908). p 19 o7, be wrole:
But now that analysts at lea.st have become r«e>ncilcd to replacing the
manifest dream by the meaning rn·caJcd by its interpretation. many of
them ha••c become guilty of falling into a nother confusion which they
cling to with equal obstinacy. They S«k to find the e»<oa: of dreams in
their latent content and in so doing they overlook the distinction between
the latent drcam·thoug.bts and the dream-work. At bottom, dreams are
nothing other than a particular form of thinking, n1ude possible by the
conditions of t he state of sleep. It is the drl•a1tt·"'"rk which creates that
fonn, and it alone is the essence of dreaming - the explanation of its
peculiar nature.
proh1b1t1on. ont \\'hicb would inscri~ the desire ror 1hc mother in a schema
'alrcudy laid down·. \\1hettby such a dC'J.irc already C\rokcs 1ts O\\'D
repudiation by a 'third term' (•he fathe r). On this par11cular theory of de.sire,
,.... Uicun (19S6- S7): Dolcuzc and Guauari (1975) esp. pp. 601T; Foucaul1
( 1976) pp. 50- 6 7: a nd Forr<Sler ( 1980). Oeleuze and Guau an make certain
clainls about 1hc hibtory of the Oedipus con1pl..:x thot huve a close affinity
whh those I an1 making here.
18. Follo"•ing Freud, i,o.·e will leave enig1na1ic the ·something else be.sides".
19. My argumcnl in this section pu1s into question the 35-Jertion or Laplanchc
and Pon1alis ( 1973) p. 283. 1ha1 ·1hc history of 1hesc researches rinto the
Oedipus com~ex] is in reality coextensive with that of psychoanatysis
itttlf'. their implication being that the Oedipus complex was. in a se:ns.c,
' there". •from the beginning'. I ha,·e tried to show that Freud did not
discover the Oedipus complex as such durins his self-analysis. as is
main1a1ncd by Stracbey. Jones. Laplanchc and Pontalis and many othcn.
Raibtr. he doSCO\'ttcd Oedipal impui..s. If "'' mtan by 1be OcdipUJ
compfc>. thc nucleus or core of a neurosis., then it sccmsc.tcar that Freud did
no1 cs1abl11b tlus until 1be period 1908-10. lkleuze and Gua11ari (1975. pp.
60-6) ha,·c some illuminating comments to ma.kc on the development and
the function of the Oedipus complex in the early yean or psychoanalysis.
20. The first f ull-scalc argument concerning the OedipuscomplcA i:s to be found
on TottmandTaboo(l912-1 3). Volume XII of 1he Standard &lotion (19 11-
JJ) is completely lacking in any referc11ce to the Oedipus complex or the
nuclear ncuroS1$, and it includes t he paper on 'The Oi.sposi1ion 10
Obsessional Neurosis' ( 1913i). where one might have expected some
discu55ion of the topic.
21. E.a. Ibid .• 199F, p. 332. II is subtle indicalions or 1hi1 sori that warranl the
conclusion already stated in C.hapter It: Jung was acting as the stimulus for
revivina chemcs and copies t hat Freud had dealt with in detail long before.
in the Projttt and Thi' fnterprl'lation of Dr-tams, bul which had been
'forgotten'. Freud was right when he claimed tha1 he was not plagiarizing;
bul he ccn.ainly owed J ung $0mcthing. For an 1llcmati\'c rc:aiding of
pass.ages such as this., e.mphasizing the sense in which their •ntclleaual
collaboration wa.s an attempt to co-opt the other lnto cach's own brand of
ps)'chO<is. ..., Roustang (1976) Chapter 111 "A ehacun sa fohe· pp. nlT.
22. Wond/1111gtn wrd S>mbok du Ubido was 1raosla1cd in10 E.o&Jisb in 1915.
under lhc title Tlw Ps)Y-hology of tlw Uncon.s<'iou.s. The \\Ork in Jung's
Collttt~d Works that corresponds 1oi1 i.s vol. V. SJ·mbols o/T,.ansj0tmo1ion,
wh~h is a hcavdy revised and de-Frcudianaed vcnion of the original.
23. Even before Freud had turned hisaltc::olion losymboUsm and i1s rcla1ioa to
myth, his pupils bad published on tbc subject: Abraham's Traum und
Myth...,: •in• Studi• : ur Voiktrpsychologi• ( 1909) and Rank'• Dtr Mythus
vo11 der G~burt dt's Ht'lckn (1908). Both these works drew heavily upon an
Notes 233
assumption thnt the drc:nm 'lyml:>ols provided 1hc- key to mythological
symbolism, deriving their dream symbols from the section on typical
dreams in Tht Jn1trprt1a1lon of Drtczrns. and from the symbols that.
although 001 pubbshcd as yt1 in psychoanolytic:IJ works. wer< gradually
being accepted in psychoanalytical circles in 1hi.s period. We approach here
a rather peculiar parado.1t: Abraham in particular emphasized 1hc shocking
charac1c:r or the Frcudi1n drc1m·symbols (' .•• none of Freud's teachings.
bowc,·cr much 1hcy di,:crac rrom currenc schools o( thought, has been so
violently attacked u th11 on 1he 1n1crprcta1ion of symbols.' - Abraham
(1909) p. 162). Y<I none or1hese symbols had as )<I bttn published under
Freud's signature. and, u Abraham's "ork amply dc-moruuated and
recognized - dc:spctc 1tKlf - . most o( these symbols " 'ere 001 derived from
psycboanaJysis. but rather rrom the -.:Ork or comparati\'C mytbologis~
who had been happily makin& known the scandak>\15 meaning or ancimt
myths for decades. wi1hou1 the wrath or shocked public opinion disturbing
the pcaoc of the Wl1\·crsuics. As Fttud wr0tc lO Stanley HalJ on November
23, 1913 (Freud. 1960a. p. 310):
It would be easy enough to sho"" that the concept of )tructurc and the
'4'0rd ··structure·· itself are as old a.s the epistcme chat is to s.t)'. as old as
,.,..,..... SC!eno< and -...m philosophy.• , . Ncv<nh<l<ss. up until the
"'.--co1·· "hich I wish to dcfio< (thll is. the chanae 111 th< US< orlhc: conccp<
of 1tructurc). the structure -or rather the structurality of the structure-
•.. has alwa)'s btt.o ncutraltttd or ttdoced. and this b)· a process of
giving it a centre or tt(erring it t0 a point of presence. a fixed origin. The
function o( this cent~ was not only 10 orien1, balance, and organiu the
structure - but above all 10 make sure that the oraanizing priOOplc of the
struc1urc: would limit what we might call 1hc: frr~play of I.he struc-
lure... . The centre also closes on· tht rreeplay it opens up itnd
236 language and the Origins of Ps)'choanalysis
makes possible. Qua ~.ntrc, ic is Lht poinl at v.hich the substitution of
con1cn1s. clements. or tcTID5 is no longer possibk.
111' d1fficull to give a detailed account of these !trend$) because they arc
oncn obscure instinctual impulses w·hic-h it was impossible for the child to
&r35p psychically at t he time of their O«:urrencc, which ~"ere therefore
only interpreted by her later (fr.rt 1tlne nach1riigllrht> lnterprttto11on /olrr~n
Notes 239
20. Amonpt whom one can indud• St<kol and Tausk (1914). who gavt papers
omplo}ina the mo1hod 10 the Vi<nna Psychoanal~tical Socie1y, and
Abraham (1911. pp. 144-S)., (1920. pp 3SO. 3$8). who employed ii in bis
series or
papers on cyclolhymia (manic-depressive psychosis).
21 . The middle voice is introd·uced to take account or this stage betv.·een active
und pahi\'C, corresponding to· Wendung gtgen die tfgtllf' Person·. 'That it is
not superfluous to a.ssume the exisltnce of stage (2) is to be 5CCn from the
behaviour or the sadistic instinct in obsessional neurosis. T11erc is a turning
round upon the subject's self M'i1J1ou1 an attiludc or passivi1y towards
Qnothcr person. ... The active voice is changed . not in10 the passive. but
in10 the rencxive. middle voice." (Ibid. SE XIV 128).
22. The \'Ctbs that might characterize the sadistic tiidc ortbc anal-sadisttc phase
include: ·master·. 'destroy·. "dismember'. One of 1hc thcmc:s that Lacan
v.cavcs into his theory of the mirl"Or-stage is 1h111 of the dismcntbe:rment of
the body. in dreams or in phantasy. a.s a derivati,·c of lhe fundamental
d"un11y oflhc body as experienced. ils unily only bt111a sccu~ through an
1dcnl•fica11on '4ilh the other seen in the mirror. Now this dyadic relation
1ha1 llJ\'cS rist 10 111< uni1y of tbt tgo abo 1hrn1<11s 10 destroy it. so that
·au.rc»i,ity' arises on the foundation of this rcla11on of un16cat100 and
othemtSS, 11S<lf founded upon IM "body in pi<C<S". When "" put Ibis
alongside of Lacan's use of the Hegelian dialectic or master and slave with
which he characterizes a certain relation of c10 and other found in
obsc~ional neurosis, 'ft•htch involves the ·wa1ting·for·· dcath' of chat
ncurM1s, the Fttudian no1ion of 'mastery·. gaining 11s staius as a
componcnt-ios1inc1 rrom its sourct in the musculature. and often equated
with the active mode of a verb, setms to disappear. being replaced b)' a n
11uressivity that arises out of the nece$sary structure of the relation bctv.·cen
the ego and its object, retroactively bringing into bcina a phcnomenolog)' of
the •body in pic:ocs' and tending towards the d ialcc1ic between thoughl as
inner ocgotion and dtalh :u ouitr nega1ion. (Cf. Taylor (197SJ°pp. 148ff.)
Such a reading v.•ill aJso dispJace the symbol fron1 il.s function in 'mastering·
unplcasurt. in favou r of the dialectic of pre"Stnce and a.bscnoc. or Eros and
Tbtna1os. as in Lacan·s many and \'aried di5.quisitions upon the 'fortida·
p_mc of lhJ'ond 1N Pleasur~ Princ1plr. But such a read1na will also be in
concc11 with a pr1marJ' aggrcssivily. found in the .,.,Ork of Kkin. and
pl1us1bly founded upon 1hc later Freudian no1ion of the death lDStinct.
Us.nasucb a later "crsioo oflht 1htoryofsado-ma.sochum.1.aplan cht buill
a rcadins of the ·grammar or f1n1osy• ((1970). p 166) upon a non·scxual
'helero-agg_ttss.i,ity'. prior to the sp1i11ing off o(the S1d1.stic and ma.sochistic
components of a se~"'11 componeot·instinct. Insofar as I •m rollowing the
basic outline: of ·instincts and their Vicissiludts·. 1n which Freud had ool
recognizrd as primal}' the profound problems or n1asochism. such issues
will not be discussed in detail. Sufftec ii to be said 1ha1 I sec no difficulty in
•1dapting the no1ioo of a propositional structure to the later theoretical
position. if .,.,c can find a means 10 make ncccptnblc the notion of a
conditional primal sentence.
240 language and the Origins of Ps)'t:hoanalysis
23. We can only no1c in foo1.no1e 1hc important consequences of this
rcJormu1a1ioo of the mechanism of projection. It puts in a secondary
po$i1jon a cooccption of projection as markinJ an ·capulsion· from an
·inside' to an ·out.side". thus bringing intoconft.ct tht ·arammatteal' mode of
psychoanalysis with what \\C might call the 'topological" mode. cm ployed in
an infonnal manner by K lcin and 'Ailh an attempt at mathematical
fonnaJa.atioo m the more reomt work of Lac.an. The simple cqua1ion of
'projcctjon' with ·expulsion· 'o\'Ould amount 10 an eli.sion of the distinction
between the subj«t of an enuncialion and 1he subject or a statement; it thus
corraponds to a b3$iC feature of Kleinian theory whereby the infant
'makes' the ~·orl d 1hrougb his own fan tasmatk: activity of projection and
introjcctjon. The subjectivism of the epistemologk:aJ foundatjon of this
theory leads to great difficulties in introducing 'others· into the world. The
advantage of the gTammatical mode is that 'othcn· arc there rrom the start.
inio(ar a11 one will allow that all propositions are 11ubjcct l() a more general
vtrsion of the ' paranoid principle' "A'e have outlined above. The general
version will read as folloV1•s: lhe subject of an enunciation never coincides
with the: subject of a statement. This DOW general principle:. w·bjch we might
call lhc principle of the duplicily of 1he subjcc:1, higbligblS the similarity
bc1wcco the mcc:baoism of projection (first pcnon is ..eluded from being
subjcc:t of the sta1emen1) and the necessary condition for a language (as
oppoKd to a code) - hence the rather strange: characterization by Laca.n
(1948, El 11/ 17) of all knowledge as paranoid in charac1cr.
24. Freud laler formulated more clearly his conviction that bask tn.nsform-
atiom of '\etbs' or 'instincts' do not involve a trianJformatton of content
(This might not apply to the transformation known as ·aublimatioD' -
perhaps a method of defining sublimation). See (191 x) SE XIV 127 and
(1918b) SE XV!I 26.
2S. Freud (191 lc) SE Xll 63. One notes thac this proposi1ion, ' I hate him',
sce1n1 to disobey the principle of the exclusion or the first person subject.
Bui, as Laplanchc and Pontalis ( 1973, p. 3SJ) poin1 out, the proposition,
' lie hates me', is treated as the txcuse for the cause of the hatred felt for the
Olhc:r. which is the primary symptom or paranoia. One might ha ..·e 10 add a
su.,.:.clausc to the principle. permitting fl return or the subject to the first
person in cases where there is a 'good enough reason'.
26. Anzieu (19S9, p. 33) notes that the 1hree women in the dream of lnllJl'S
injection correspond 10 three wldo\\'S or men who Freud bad regarded as
rival&. so that 'ca veuves sont pour Frtud des avcrtisse-mcnls du destin'.
27, Safouan (1974, p. 34) notes th< repetition of Sln>eturc found in Freud's
a nalfiiJ of this dream., and gives it as a tea.SOD for thccorrec:tnc:SS of his own
techn1quc, o( asking lhe anal)'Aod to gi\•e associations Sl&ning from a
recurrent phra.sc:: in the case Safouan discuJSCS. 1hc recurrent phrase used
for the purpost of·free associatjon· was ' You bcbl\'C •• .'
28. Cf. Freud (1899a) SE 111 311, which describes a ac:c:nc in which Sipund
and J ohn, 'as 1ho ugb by mutual agrttmenl', 'fall on the linlc girl' and
deprive: her or her no~·ers.
29. The pass.age is placed i.n brackets in SE, bu1 no1in the original German te.xt.
30. In the ca..se-·hlstory of the Ratman, Freud implied lhat reported speech can
find no place in the unconscious - a notion that is clos.cly related to the
241
reasons wbjcb bad earlier led him 10 sq>ara1e spetehes in dreams otr as a
special categ ory or 1he manifes1 content. derived entirely from sptte:hes
actuaUyhurd m ..W life. Freud compared the Ratman'sa11i1udeto his own
ideas to the WM ntajtstitha.1is invol\'ed both in insulting the Emperor and in
r<portina s uch in•ulu. See (1909d) SE X 178- 9.
31. Whether the unconscious has a means or rcprc:senuna 'if' and 'but' is a
debatable point. In Tltr l.ntt rprrtation ofDrt'amJ, tbc 1ngcnuityofthc means
or rcprneotalioo adopted by the dream~ wor k iJ quite clear. e.g. the
representation or dependent clauses by means or ' prolosues' etc. But
certainly the ' pttssure' of the unconscious often forcc!l thc pro11.si.s into the
indicative, in order to rcpreknl it as a fulfilled wish, us in (l 899a) SE 111
) 16- 17.
)2, Cr. the incident recouolc<I by Freud in the third person in ( 190 1b) SE VI
2 1S- 6:
CHAPTEI\)
But I think you ought to tackle 1he astral significunce of myths, which
now. since the discoveries or Winckler (Jeremias, Stuck.en) about the
ancient oriental ...,·orld system can no longer be ignored . .. I beUcvc
there is also room for a psyc:holoaiclll explanation, because in the- last
resort the ancients only projected their phantasics on to the s ky. (Freud,
196Sa. p. 29)
2S. It was such a conceplion of the passivity of the language·speakcr in the face
of a system or
signs already laid down that informed StcintbaJ's v.·ork. and
elicited W. O. Whitney"scritical <!say(Wh11ney, 1873). Whitney could not
undcntand bow any one could dtny that mankind in the past, and childttn
lo the pracnt, learnt language by a proccu of trial and error dirc:c:tcd
or
towards the practical purpose communication. Stcinthal. in a m.iJ:turc of
Hcrbartian and Hqclian lan,guaga., emphasized the stnse in which no
Notes 247
human being could e"er be said to be outside the unity conrerrcd by
language. Cf. the comment or Foucault ( 1966/70) p. J23:
26. Wr: may thus contrast the Humboldtian emphasis on 'force' and 'energy·
with the Saussurian emphasis on 'sys1cm· and ' la~·'. Freudts conception
fulls between these two, since he obviously conceived of a system of
signification proper to the determination of 1hc iubjcct, while conceiving of
the dynamics of meaning as a force, or, perhaps~ a 'charge', that
accompanies the >.A'Ord. Vle might even conceive of the Qor the Projt*t:t as an
attempt to give more prc:cisioo to the Humboldtia.n notion ofcreative force.
so 1hat v.·c can finally read Q as sjgnifying ·quantity of meaning'.
27. S.. on particular, Jones I 40S-12; Dortr (1932). The discussions by
Amacher, Ellenberger, Macintyre., ...,ho mention lhc Hc.rban cooncction,
add tittle to Jones' aocount. Andersson (1961), pp. 10- 14, includes a good
disawion or the affinities or Freudian and Herbartian ps)cbology.
28. We should note in passing thar Joneii a1trmp1ed 10 d1Jtance Freud·s theory
or unconscious conftia and repression rrom Hcrbart"s by rc:mar-king that
Herbart's theory accorded a primacy to 1hc conflict or tdtas. whereas
Freud's turned around a conflict of afjttu. By now. it should be clear that
or
thiJ opposition~ one that has bedtv'illcd much or the discussion the exact
nature of Freudian theory, is misleading, if not completely wrong. More
important, I believe, i.s the statement we have quoted a number of times,.
where Freud emphasized that repression acts on/)' on memories. so that the
contra$t with Herbart should be in terms of idea/memory, not idea/a1Tcc-t.
And it is precisely this dimension of the pa.st, lacking to Herbart's
psychology, that the Vo/k,.psfchologlr<htn introduced, when lhey fe lt
themselves sent lo the hittory of language jn their search for lhc
foundations or pSychology.
29. Such a use of a notion oflhe 'battle o( ideas', themselves in an unconscious
condition. can be round in Steinthal (1862b), pp. 168- 171.
30. (19 10c) SE XI 82 g;,·cs the passage as follows: 'whde I was 10 my cradle a
vull ure came down to me. and open~ my mou1b "''ilh its tail. and struck me
many times with it.s tail agains:1 my )ips.•
)I . Wbm we compare the argument conccm1ng the 'vulture' with that
coocernins the 'tail~. it is lt:ss clear- that Freud ignored the seemingly
obvious equation of the bird with the mother, 'deducible', one would have
thouaht. from the fact that it is doing something which ts very similar lO
what a mother does to a child. In fact this is one of the points where the two
accounu which Freud gave differ markedly. in the paper read to the
Society, he noted the equation "tail = penis' ind thu.s concluded that
Leonardo's 'phantasy' (assuming that it wa1 such. bccauk be gave no
248 Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis
credcocc whauoe,·cr to the hypothesis lha1 this memory of Leona.rd o's was
an actual memory. even one that was pani.tllydinoned) was bomOK.XuaJ in
cbaractu: 'to take 1.he penis ('tail'; in Italian. it mcan.s precisely thal) into
1he mouth and 1uck oo it.' ( Mintua II p. 340). In the published paper,
Freud apanded on this homosexual phantasy, indtc:11ina its orig.in in tJx
'organic impression ... indclibly prinled on us' (SE XI 87) ofsuckioga1 the
mother's breast. Freud fell secure in gi,ing ibis mcan1n1 to the phanlas)~.
since Leonardo bad attributed the event to a period ·while I was in my
cradle' (quo1ed by Frcud in halian: "emndo io i• cul/a' - Ibid.) Oc:spile the
fact that Freud assigned a dccJ>'lying mcanin& or
the phantaJy to the
experience or suckling at the breast - v.·hich he had done by close textual
reading rather than hy mythological rercrencc - it is clear from the rest of
the pnper, 0$ .,.,,.,u as from the fact that thjs item is lackina from the earlier
version or I.he paper, that the actual weight of explanation falls on the
Egyptian elucidation of the 'vuJture' elcmcn1. What was also or greater
importance for F reud than the simple 'vulture • mother' is the homosexual
aspect of the phantasy: the tail is first and foremost a ptni1. not a nipple. and
we arc dealing here with the 'mother-with·a-~i1'. The clement "penis', as
we have seen, finds 'linguistic' rather than 'natural analogic" evidential
suppon.
32. Freud's account is slightly ambiguous on this point. But Horapollo's text is
quite clear:..., Horapollo (1840) pp. 230:
)). Indeed. Freud recognized this at one point in his account: 'it •ppcus that
the sou.rttS to whkb (Leonardo ) had acicess contained no information
about this remarkable feature (i.e. ~fut's combination of maternal and
muculine cbaracteristiar (1910c) SE XI 94.
l4. Jones· account of the argument that Freud u~ is strictly misleading in this
rcspccl:
In 1he book Freud had made a good deal of 1hc my1hological associalion•
of 1hi1 bird, which in Egypt was regarded•• a Mother-Goddess (Mut)
though equipped with a male organ. and since ii wns onen cited in
Ca1holic theology he thought it likely lhal Leonardo w"* aware or the
maternal symbolism. (Jones, vol. IL, 390)
Quand nous analysons cc te:xte, ii fau t 1enlr compte du texte tout ent.ier,
y compris des notes. A cette occasion, Freud Cvoquc cc point des
a.ssociations oU le rCvc.prcnd son insertion dans l'inconnu, cequ'il appellc
son ombilic.
Nous arrivons i cc qu'il y a derriCrc le trio mysLiquc. Je dis mystique
pa~e que nous en eonna.issons main1enan1 le sens. Les trois femmes, lcs
1rot1 ~un, Jes trois colTrcts. Freud nous en a dcpuis d~mon1ri le sens. Le
dcmicr tcrmc es-t la mon. tout simplemrtlt.
4S. Jones (vol. II. p. 404) ealled it ·one of the 11>0 m0<1 cbarmi. . lhings be ever
wrote' and coafessed that be had ·a penonal fondness' for tlus paper. such
th.al it was h.is (avourite. He continued~
A scene then occ:u.r red to me which, for the last 29 years, has occasionally
emerged in my conscious memory without my understanding it. My
mother was nowhere to be found: I was screaming my head off. My
brother Philipp .. . was holding o pen a cupboard [Kosten) for me. and,
when I found that my mother was not inside ii either, I began crying still
more. till~ looking slim and beautiful, she came in by the door . ..
48. This point is. in fact.. the crux of tbe paper; it also marks the point of
transition in Freud's ov.·n self·ana1ysis: from the ·sexual megalomania 1 of
the dream of Irma's injection - 'I have them a ll'. that is, he did not choose -
to the rec-0g:nition of the ineluctable necessity ( Verhii.ngnis) of death, "'hich
must be chosen, under pain of Che tragic outcome to which a refusal to
choose would lead. It is also tbc point a t which Freud shifts from an
identification with his father - ·1 have them all',- that is, all of his falher's
three wives - to a refusal of such an identification, perhaps. as Granoff has
argued. vitl a pardoning of the father's sexual profligacy, such a pardon
opening up the possibility of a choice. On the question of the three ~· ives of
Frcud"s father. see Granoff (1975), pp. 318ff. Schur (1972. pp. 201T).
49. Ibid .. SE Xll 3-01: · ,,, ein.• jfiiche1ll1of1e, a/legorische Deu11111g' •..
SO. The whole passage runs:
I have not been able to establlsh the identity of 1hc:sc many philological
critics, and it would be of great interest to be able to do so.
51. E.g. Freud ( 1900a) SE V 407:
.• . the course of li.o,guistic evolution bas made things very easy for
dreams. For language bas a v..·hole number of words at its command
which originally had a pictorial and concrete significance. but are used
252 language and the Origins of Psyrhoanalfsls
1oday tn a colourless and abstract sense. Alf 1tiat the dream nttd do is to
a:i\t tbc:sc words their former. full mnning or to go back a li1tlc way to an
earlter pba.sc: in their de\-etopmen1 (in dtm B.-tkutvng.J'4 ·an~I dies IYortu
"" Stii<k ••II llf'rab:usteigm). (add<d 1909)
S2. Sa:. for iru1ance. f<renczi (1909a) pp. 4Yff, F<r<nai (1909b), p. 176:
F•renczi ( 19 11) p. ISi: Fereoczi (1913) PIJSSIM .; Abraham (1909) pp.
16l 9: Stekel, who rcrerred off the cuff to Kleinpaul ror s upport for o ne of
his 1ymbolk equations in the M inut~s Ill, p. 61; Reik similarly drc~· on
K lcinpaul to prO\'C that belief in "'ampircs owes its o rigin to wet dreams.
ti-fln"trs Ill . p. 312. Klcinpaul was one of the philoloaists whose recurrent
and in1i111c111 rerercnce to 1hcccntrality or scii;ut1.lhy in primitive 1hough1 and
foraotten lnnguagcs was a source of continua l comfo rt and suppor1 fo r che
'cmbonlcd. psychoanalysts.
SJ. T hi1 \\'Ork1ook as its themes ghosts. souls and immortality, 'the fauna of
hell', 'angels of deach'. "the cull of the soul. ils sut and its fetishes',
mostly drawn rrom Classical and Old Gcrman1e sourc:es.
S4. A fear th1111 was realized in 1901 , when Fliess told Freud that 'the thought-
ruder reads in others only his O'o\'n thoug.h1.s(Dt'r'G,dankmkst!r t;tn bd tkn
AnMr~n nwr s~ure tf{Jmen Gtdanlcen). • (Note that the translation gi,·en in
Frtud (19SO.) OrigiJtS. 7 Aug. 19Cll. p. 334 - ·111t 1hougb1-readcr m<rely
rc:a.ds his own thoughts into Othe:r people' - inVOl\CS I subtle sh.an
that
chanJ<S th• ••Urt oolance of this r<mark of Fb<SS .. ) Th< rela uon of this
theme w11b Freud's later rapproachtment to ttltpathy is clear. and we may
find OCCHaon to specify the philological contc.11 of Freud's stubborn
openmindC'dnC$$ to tcle:pathic phenomena..
SS. Cf. hcud (19S0a) SE I 24S: ·All wns of things lie be: hind the wording of t he
tcle-gram in the dream: the memory of the ctymologiaal delicacies that you
lay out before me .. . (D;t Erinntrun.g an dit t tymologl,s(•hm GtnUJ.st, Jit
Du mfr vor:w·e1:e11 pjfegs1 .•.)' ( translatio n mod1fied).
56, It is certainly significant that the book on Bls1x1ralit)! in ~Ion ~· as Freud's
attenlpt to restore a.n intjmacy with Flies.s chat had a lreody suffered
irrep11r•blc damage: he mentioned 1he projec1 directly uftcr he bad cited
F licsf ac<u$alioo$ of 'thought-reading'. (Freud ( 19S0a) Origins. 7 Aug
19Cll. p. 334) The idea itself secm<d to impose UJ>On him• collaboration
wi1h the t rue author or the idea, the author who could no t but feel insulted
by 1hc prospect of the 1houg.h1-reader also passin.g olT as his own tboug.hts
those that had been fr~t/y ·read" to him, as the acrimonious dispute over
priority of 1904 witnessed. See Freud (1960a). pp. 2S9 60; Jones. »ol. I.
l4S 7: Abrahamsen ( 1946) pp. 1-44.
S7. Abraham had originally wan1<d 10 follow ph1loloay u a carttr, but round
that the nted for a rcmuocrati\e profession prttmpted tum. His tcquaint·
an~ with English, Spanish. Italian. Rhaeto-Romanic. Danish~ Dutch.
French. Greek and Laun. tbe result of his early IO\t, prtpartd him ¥.ell for
his essays into comparative mythology. In his correspondence "'1th Freud.
he onen remarked on the pleasure lh&t the prospect or d0tng philological
work afforded him.
S8. We s hould no te the primacy or the-philolo1tcal method, whatever the final
·causes' o.ssig.ncd to the myth. s.ince lhe n1e1hoc:b by "'' hich primitive man
Notes 253
made fire and k>vc were tbcmscl ...es deduced rrom the meanina of word.s in
1hc primiti-c languages. a philological uiumph 1ha1 had very IJ1tlc recourse
to the alternati'-e mode of prchis1onc detect1Ye·,.ork supplitd by
1rchacol013'.
59. MU(b orlinlc Hans"analysis revolved around rhc qunuoo ofll>c origin o(
babies. But it is clear that. despite lhe emphasis that Freud and Hans· rather
ploccd on ll>c fac11hot lhe baby was a "lumpr" 1ho1 came oul or Mummy. 1hc
q uestion of the role of the father was just as important u that of the mother.
especially insorar as an answer to that question mi.1 ht throw light on the
'premonitory sensations• he e~ptricnccd in hit! widdler 'whenever he
though• of 1hcsc rhiogs" (SE X 134). On the one hand. rhis problem bad
originally proved too much for little. Hans: 'his a.t1empt at discovering what
it was that had to be done with his mo1her in order that she might have
children sank down into his unconscious." (SEX 135). 1hc rcsulr being his
phobia. On the other hand. Hans· parents n e~r cornmunicated to him the
e:cact nature of the father's role in procrea1ion; Freud. ha lr\\•ay through lhe
1n1lys-iR. h.ad noted 1heir 'hcsi1.a1ion to give him inronn11ion whi<.h wa.s
already Jona overdue·. But Hans groped his way tO\\'&rds some resolution or
rhe problem. so that his final phanrasy included • rcprc:Kntalioo or lhe
process bywb.tch a ~n.i:stumed into a baby: some son of d1sappt.arance and
replacement that involved Hans becoming •tike: Daddy". 11 is e:kar lb.at it is
no1 only the pa55i"c homosexual trend 1ha1 i.s at issue here. bu1 also those
ISSUC$ COQlloctcd with lhe de»elopmenr of I~ OOOCCpl or tbe Oedipus
compltx 1ha1 v.c discussed in Chapter 3. pp. 841T
60. Abraham (1909. p. 200) oorcd thal rhc Promcrheus myth assert> the
primacy of the malCUlioc function in procrcatton. a parallel achjc\·cmcnt to
little Han1· disappearing. and rc.appearin& pe-nis-chikl,,
61 . On the fi rst page of the same \\'Ork. Freud wrote: "rhc first thing that
attracts our at1cntion about 1he figure or Mosts is his n11n1c, whk:h is
" M oshch" in folcbrcw. "What is it.s originr· \\'C mo.y ask. "and what docs it
mean?"' (SE XXIll 7). Havin11hen nrgucd 1hnt the na1nc is Egyptian in
origin, l~rcud asked: irhis name was Egyptian, then surely 1hc bearer or1bjs
nan1e was Egyp1ia.n'? •Jn relaLion to ancienl and priinitivc times, one would
have thought that a conclusion such as chi11 111 10 1 person's nationality
baJcd on h.is name woukl ba"c seemed far more rcliabJc and in fact
unimpeachable." (SE XXlll 9). Behind this argument. we cannot help but
see an allusion to that primaeval s1a1e of language in which there is an
unambisuow relation bclweco 14·ord and thing dciignatcd. a Jlalc akin to
1hat magical power or words ascribed by Freud 10 the ta.lking"urc in 1890
ond an&l}scd in parallel wilh animism in Torem and Taboo ( 1912- 13): lherc
is somC11\Jng abou1 a name tha1 'sticks' to a 1hing.
62. And what oould be more arbiuary lhan "kinship"? - To be bom. without
any say 1n the matter. as the child of a mo1her, to find that motht-r is tint ed
in s.ome obscure and ineluctable fashion 10 a ·ratbt'r· and )'t't 1hc force or
psycho1nalys1s is to indicate the unav°'dablc and unresolvable character of
this pooition. Cf. Granoll' ( 1975). p. 534:
Is it t hen possible to not become tht: father of one's falhcr'! Isn't 11 Lhen
to escape rrom the iatolcrablc si1ua1ion of being born. v.·ithout havin,g a
254 Language and tk Origins of Psychoanalysis
'lll' Ord lO say about it. (rom the desire that gave I woman tO thi$ (at.her?
The intolerable character of destiny. it is all to be found rooted therein.
Jfl am such a one. throw my Every-day Life unread into the wa.ste·papt.r
basket. 11 is full of n:fcrmc;cs to you: obviou.s ones. where you supplied
t he m11crial. and concealed one:s. where the mot1\"atioa denves from
you•... Ha,ingsaid lb.is~ I can Stttd ii to you ..i1hout a v.Ofd usooo asir
comes in ..• (Freud. 1950a). Origills, 7 AuJ. 1901. p. 334: (traos-
laloon modified.)
67. As Granoff points out. the ·occult' dimmsion of Freud 1 thought runs from
0
COl"CLUllOf"I
I. Freud·s report of pan of what the IUtmu said dunna tbt 6nt hour of
bis 1rca1mcot. 1n Freud (1909cl) SEX 162.
2. F or cJ1.amplc. the special place thal Freud accorded to ipttehCJ heard in
dreams was a problem that perplexed me (or a long lime. The: frujt or I.hat
pcrpltJl.Jty i.s Luge parts oftbec;haptcr OD grammar and orthechaptcron the
mtt1psy<:holog)' of speech. Very little refercttce to the initia1 problem will be
found in those chapters.
3. Jones I 351. See the discussion in GranotT (1975), pp. 2641T.
Bibliography
Instead of puns. give us proofs!
Kurt Mcodcl (1910)
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I have not given 1be paginalioos of1he 1w0German 1exts employed (the
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( 19 IOc) uonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood SE XI 63-
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258 language and tk Origins of Psyd1oanalysis
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(191 lb) ·Formulalions on lhe two principles of menial functioning" SE
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(191 lc) "1'$ycboanalytic notes on an au1obiographical accounl of a case
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(1912b) "The dynamics oftransfen:ncc· SE Xll 99-108.
(1912- 13) Totem and Taboo SE Xlll 1-161.
(I 9 t 3r) "The motive for 1hc choice of a ca•kcl (The theme of 1hc tnrcc
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(I 9 I 3i) 'The disposition 10 obsessional neurosis' SE XII 317- 26.
(19 13j) 'The claims of psychoanalysis 10 scien1iRc iniercs1' SE XIII 165-
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(1914d) ·on 1he hisiory of the psychoanalytic movement' SE XIV 7--06.
(1915c) 'lnslincts and their vicissitudes' SE XIV 117 40.
(191.5e) "The unconscious· SE XIV 166-204.
(1916- 17) Introductory Lectures on PsychoanalJ~is SE XV- XVI.
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(1925d) A11 Autobiographical Study SE XX 7- 74.
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1
A History of Psychoanalysis
Reuben Fine
From the meeting in 1902 of four people in Sigmund Freud's office to
the present 4000-member international society, psychoanalysis has been
shrouded in mythology and misleading publicity. Rivalries Within the
movement and numerous charismatic but peripheral figures have received
as much attention as the dramatic evolution of psychoanalytic Lheory from
Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams onward. Reuben Fine's definitive
account of th~ history of psychoanalysis dispels the myths and provides us
with the facts behind on of the most significant intellectual developments of
'
the 20th century.
A History of Psychoanalysis portrays the splits and schisms within the
field, such as that between Freud and Jung, as personal rather than ideological
differences. Fine lucidly traces the mainstream of psychoanalysis which, in
spite of internal dissension, has become the most advanced system developed
in psychology and psychiatry.
Ego Psychology II
Psychoanalytic Developmental Psychology
Gertrude and Rubin Blanck
In Ego Psychology II, Gertrude and Rubin Blanck elaborate upon ego
psychological theory, extending it and broadening it into a psychoanalytic
developmental psychology. They present the unifying proposal, derived from
Freud 's concept of an overall ego (the Gesa1nr !ch} that the ego is the organiz-
ing process itself. A holistic theory of psychological development evolves from
this basic proposition.
Ego Psychology II has special value for psychotherapists, psychologists,
psychoanalysts, and social workers: the authors' extensive case-study material
illustrates the theory and technique of developniental psychology in vivid
form. The authors show how psychoanalytic developmental psychology
updates drive theory, sheds new light on transference, redefines resistance
and defense in the poorly structured personalities, clarifies the pathology of
the borderline conditions and of narcissism, and suggests reconsideration of
the manner in which many neurotic fonnations a.re attained .