David Dunn

Maksim Litvinov: Commissar of Contradiction

When the Sudetenland was absorbed into nazi Germany in September

1938, the German Counsellor in Moscow assessed the implications
and thought it likely that Stalin would soon ’draw conclusions about
personalities from the failure of Soviet foreign policy’. He (von
Tippelskirch) had in mind primarily Maksim Litvinov, who had
’made fruitless efforts in Geneva throughout the crisis ...’.’ Indeed,
as Litvinov’s staff began to be purged during the next few months,
several commentators thought that Litvinov’s own head would soon
ro11.2Such predictions came to nothing; but then they had been based
on the all-too-ready assumptions about the Soviet political system,
not on any real insight into the relationship between Soviet domestic
and foreign policy. Regrettably, however, almost fifty years on, we
have still not isolated -

certainly not in a form that allows us to

predict with any certainty -
what it is that allows a Kollontai, a
Litvinov or a Gromyko to survive, even to flourish. One may well
argue that Gromyko’s ability, for instance, to steer clear of intra-
Party bureaucratic feuds and rivalries, keeping out of behind-the-
scenes conflicts, ensured his survival.3 But that hardly explains his
success within the system.

Gromyko and Litvinov clearly had much in common, but it would

not be a realistic exercise in political science to match them point for
point, experience for experience, if only because of the qualitative
difference in the nature of their counterparts. In any case, an
overriding consideration is surely the more basic difference between
their foreign policies: Gromyko’s seemed to work by Soviet standards
at least; Litvinov’s was seen to fail. Gromyko’s roots, it is true, lay in
the Litvinov renaissance, at a time of USSR-US anti-fascist co-
operation ; yet such co-operation materialized quite accidentally.
Gromyko’s mastery of English, his regular perusal of the major
English-language newspapers and journals, even his lack of contact
with the sidewalks and streets of his own capital city might almost be

Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London, Newbury Park, Beverly Hills and
221-243.
New Delhi), Vol. 23 (1988),221
222

taken as Litvinov’s own trademarks.4But surely, such is the common

ground of any Soviet Narkomindel official, as Teddy Uldricks might
have noted.5 This essay attempts only to examine the Litvinov
phenomenon, to show how he withstood the challenges
of his time, in particular during the period September 1934-
September 1938 when Soviet membership of the League of Nations
created for Litvinov, as both Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs
and his country’s representative in the League, a unique set of
contradictions.
First there is, of course, the irony that, although Litvinov disliked
his predecessor, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy
Chicherin, the one issue over which there was no disagreement
between them was the League of Nations.6 Both men violently
disliked it. Indeed, from the time of its creation it would be difficult to
find any Bolshevik who did not look cynically at the League as an
instrument of bourgeois imperialism. It was only after Stalin had
initiated a new approach to the League that the decade-old Soviet
values were brought into question.’ Litvinov had already accepted
the notion of ’socialism in one country’ (perhaps, according to Louis
Fischer, even before Stalin had done,and certainly before it became
known by that name), and he appeared ideologically at ease
promoting any resulting Stalinist reinterpretation of foreign policy. If
there is a contradiction inherent in this position, it is a contradiction
common to all those Bolsheviks who survived the purges, and many
who did not. Furthermore, there is the fact that the League of Nations
itself daily exposed its own major contradiction. The organization
could only function effectively if sovereign states were willing to
sacrifice part of their sovereignty to the common good. It was only to
be expected that the speeches made by the representatives of
individual states would reflect their country’s foreign policy, but
when these states let those policies influence the way they voted and
interpreted every League decision in the light of its effect upon them,
it was this nationalistic-
almost parochial - approach that was one
of the chief causes of the League’s downfall. The USSR’s advocacy of
collective security with no loss of sovereignty helped sustain this
paradox, but the contradictions in the role of the USSR as exemplified
by Litvinov at Geneva went far beyond this conflict of national and
international interests. This essay discusses the five main contra-
dictions in Litvinov’s role as Foreign Minister and the USSR’s
League representative.
 223

First, therewas the League’s attitude to Soviet membership. In the

summer of 1934, France, Italy and Britain had begun to put out
feelers among their fellow members about Soviet admission to the
League. By September, when the Assembly met, it was known that a
large proportion of League membership would be prepared to vote
for Soviet admission, although a small group intended actively to
oppose it.9
In the past, the most common method of giving consideration to
new members had been to await their application. Issuing invitations
to Mexico in 1931 and Turkey in 1932 had set a precedent. It would
have been degrading for the USSR to have to ask for admission. The
first problem with an invitation was that the Assembly had to act in
unanimity. The knowledge that several states were antagonistic
towards the idea of Soviet admission and would definitely cast their
vote against it created an impasse. The solution worked out by the
British and French was to draw up an invitation, not from the
Assembly, but from as many individual states as could be encouraged
to sign, asking the USSR to apply for admission. The USSR agreed to
go along with this formula provided that there were sufficient
signatures to convince it of an overwhelming majority in favour of its
admission. The list of signatures was presented to Maksim Litvinov
at Geneva on 12 September 1934.
The second major problem was of ensuring a permanent seat on the
Council for the USSR. In a private session of the Council on 10
September, Portugal and Argentina opposed the move but agreed to
abstain during the actual vote. On 15 September, when the Council
met officially to consider the question of a permanent seat for the
USSR, Panama joined Portugal and Argentina in abstaining. 10 Thus
-

nem. con. -

the Soviet Union would have its permanent seat on

the Council.
South American countries were not keen on the prospect of Soviet
entry into the League. As a whole, the Latin American bloc had
refused to recognize the USSR, although there were a few notable
exceptions, for reasons primarily of trade. When the question of
League reform cropped up, as it did frequently during the next few
years, Litvinov invariably found himself at odds with his South
American counterparts. When Uruguay severed relations with the
USSR in December 1935 and the case was brought before the League,
it became apparent that there were considerable sources of tension
between the Soviet Union and the countries of South America.
224

Poland had also opposed a permanent seat on the Council for the
USSR; it feared that the USSR might raise the question of the Polish
treatment of minorities. Before the voting took place, however, an
agreement was reached whereby, in exchange for Poland’s agreement
to a permanent seat on the Council for the USSR, Poland could opt
Minority Treaty. This, of course, did not erase all Polish
out of the
antagonism to the USSR: there was ill-feeling because Poland itself
had earlier been denied a permanent seat on the Council. In addition,
there were the objections of the exiled Ukrainian government, now
located in Lvov, which strongly opposed Soviet admission to the
League.
As a rule, the Assembly did not consider serious issues until they
had been discussed in committee. The question of Soviet entry was a
serious issue. The structure of the committee gave states that were
antagonistic towards the USSR a chance to air their grievances.
Supporters of Soviet entry were none too keen on this idea,
particularly the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou. However,
nothing he could do could prevent the Sixth Committee from
discussing the Soviet case.
The USSR accepted the invitation. It had the necessary thirty
signatures to support its application for membership, and it replied in
a manner indicating adherence to the Articles and spirit of the
Charter. Its one reservation, however, was that:

Since Articles 12 and 13 of the Covenant leave it open to states to submit disputes to
arbitration or judicial settlement, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to
make it clear that, in its opinion, such methods should not be applicable to conflicts
I
regarding questions arising before its entry into the League.&dquo;

The President of the Assembly received the exchange of communiques

between the USSR and the other League members and referred the
matter to the Sixth Committee the same day.
On 17 September, in the late afternoon, in front of a large crowd,
the debate in the Sixth Committee began. 12On the one side were the
opponents of Soviet admission, principally the Portuguese, Swiss and
Belgian delegates. In defence of the Soviet Union stood Louis
Barthou. He had worked closely with Litvinov over the past few
months in the negotiations concerning the ’Eastern Locarno’ and
also a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance. A major factor
contributing to better Soviet relations with the League had been the
personal assurances given by Barthou that the USSR would be
welcomed into the League. Barthou’s efforts to attain a closer
 225

relationship with the USSR stemmed from France’s growing fear of

German aggression. The French persisted in their interpretation of
the League as a machine which ought to hold Germany in check, and
any contribution to that particular end was welcomed by them.
Barthou prepared to defend the USSR in front of the Committee. He
had the backing of Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia and
numerous other smaller powers including Scandinavia. But the

opponents of Soviet admission had the first say.

The Belgian Foreign Minister, M.H. Jaspar, argued that the USSR
was untrustworthy since it had never compensated those from whom
it had expropriated investments, land and other assets upon coming
to power. Guiseppa Motta, the Swiss delegate, condemned the Soviet
regime for its communism and atheism, for its treatment of religious
groups and of minorities, for its love of the Comintern and world
revolution, and for its contempt of the ordinary values of democratic
states. His conclusion, in short, was that the Soviet Union acted as an
outlaw in international society.
In reply to these criticisms, Barthou argued that the USSR could be
encouraged to reform more easily through close contact with the
League than by being kept outside it. In any case, he maintained, in
agreeing to the Rules of the Charter the USSR was making a
commitment to the norms of international society. The real question,
reasoned Barthou, was that if the League of Nations had been
founded as an instrument for the organization and preservation of
peace, how could that peace be achieved by keeping the USSR at
arm’s length? At the end of the debate, thirty-eight states voted in
favour of Soviet admission, three opposed it and seven abstained.
On the morning of 18 September, the General Committee met to
hear the report of the Sixth Committee. It decided to put the motion
before the Assembly as quickly as possible. 13The Assembly convened
at 6.00 p.m. that evening, but before a vote could be taken, Eamonn
de Valera, the delegate from Eire, launched a renewed attack upon
the USSR. He urged it to give the whole world the same assurances
about religious freedom that it had given the USA almost a year
before. 14 In the subsequent vote, thirty-nine states were in favour of
Soviet admission, three against and seven abstained. 15Next a vote
was taken on whether the USSR should be given a permanent seat on
the Council: ten countries abstained; forty supported the motion. 16
With such majorities in favour of Soviet admittance and a permanent
Soviet seat on the Council, it was left to the President of the Assembly
to invite the Soviet delegation to take its place.
226

The Soviet delegation had arrived at the League building in good

time, and had already gone through the process of being cleared by
the Credentials Committee. Earlier in the day, Maksim Litvinov had
been understandably tense but, after a visit to the cinema earlier in the
afternoon, he seemed to have regained his composure.&dquo; It may be
conjectured that his feelings again ran high when he was asked to wait
in an antechamber from which the lectern on which he would have
expected to arrange his notes had ’disappeared’. Then he and his
party were led by the Master of Ceremonies into the round hall and
brought to the door of the assembly hall. According to Boris Shtein,
another member of the Soviet delegation, the Master of Ceremonies,
Marcel Houden, appeared agitated and kept opening and closing the
door. He finally seemed to give them their cue, whereupon Litvinov,
followed by Shtein and M. Potemkin, walked the length of the hall
and took their places.
The chairman had already announced the results of the voting. He
had not, however, completed his speech. To Shtein, now seated in the
hall, it appeared superfluous for the Assembly President, R.J.
Sandler of Sweden, to conclude by inviting the Soviet delegates to
take their places. 18Several delegates had already crossed the floor to
congratulate the by now seated Soviet delegation. 19But what neither
Shtein nor the other Soviet delegates realized was that they had been
’set up’ by the Master of Ceremonies. His nervous encouragement of
the Soviet delegates to enter the hall before the correct cue was
possibly a cheap trick to give journalists something to exploit. A man
so experienced in the workings of the League, who had officiated at
other states’ initiations, knew very well when the USSR should have
entered the hall. His ploy had the desired effect. The Telegraph, for
example, headlined its account of the proceedings the next day:
’Russia Joins the League. Litvinov Arrives too Soon.’ Moreover,
when the Assembly President made the announcement for the Soviet
delegation to take its place, all eyes focused on the centre aisle. Thus
Litvinov, who stood to take his bow, was greeted by the sight of their
turned heads and backs. Seemingly undaunted by their dorsalateral
reception, he moved across to the rostrum to give his inaugural
speech.
In his opening address, Litvinov inadvertently pinpointed the
inherent contradiction of his position in the League. He suggested
that those states which had encouraged Soviet membership believed
that the presence of the USSR would strengthen the European
security system. Some states may indeed have held this belief; but it
 227

was not the opinion of the British, for example. For them, it was not
because it was thought to be a worthwhile addition to the forces
countering aggression that the USSR had been asked to join the
League. The entry of the USSR was rather seen as an assurance to the
rest of Europe that the USSR itself was less inclined towards
aggression and subversive activities than it had been. It was a mark of
respectability that the west was conferring on the Soviet Union,
similar to that conferred by individual states through recognition.
Litvinov, however, (but almost certainly not Stalin) interpreted
Soviet admission to the League as an indication that Europe, like
himself, was concerned with the disorder being caused by Japan and
threatened by Germany. His opening speech focused on the idea of a
unified war against aggression; and although not specifically stated
on this occasion, he laid the foundations for his soon-to-be-famous

phrase: ’Peace is Indivisible’. 20

This simple catchphrase came to symbolize the Soviet stance at
Geneva. It meant that no localization of war could ever be permitted
because it would deny the whole meaning of the League Charter.
(There was also the better reason that war has a habit of not
remaining localized and of spreading across national boundaries; but
the USSR never argued this point of view.) Time after time,
throughout the major crises of the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Spanish
Civil War, the Sino-Japanese conflict, and during the less dramatic
issues brought before the League, Litvinov argued against allowing
any kind of acceptance of aggression -
he once went to the extent of
inviting diplomats to his house and engraving ’Peace is Indivisible’ on
their individual butter-pats. The League, owing to the dominating
self-interest of its more powerful member states, was in no condition
to respond to Litvinov’s rallying-cry. The one single point of
common interest that he had gone to Geneva to establish had no
chance of being accepted. The League offered one of its normal
responses to Litvinov’s speech on collective security, a monologue
which some may have taken with a pinch of salt anyway. The Soviet
representative was put in charge of a League Commission to examine
seaweeds. The first contradiction in Litvinov’s position was thus
firmly established.&dquo;

The second contradiction lay in the changing domestic face of Soviet

socialization. By December 1933, the Soviet leadership was set on a
course which would inevitably lead it towards a closer relationship
228

with the League. It did not, however, attempt to hurry the formal
proceedings of League membership. One possible reason is that time
was needed to accustom its citizens to the idea of a positive Soviet-

League relationship. State indoctrination and political socialization

play an important role in Soviet government. Such a drastic shift in
foreign policy could benefit from a very thorough socialization
campaign.
Nikolai Bukharin and Karl Radek were among the principal
counsellors for the ’ideological’ form of address. Articles for
widespread domestic consumption appeared in Pravda. Litvinov
headed the ’suppositional’ campaign, delivering a number of
speeches, espousing the thesis that the League of Nations was not as
antithetical to Soviet interests as might first be assumed (after years of
reports to the contrary). He, and others in his Commissariat, drew
upon the history of the League to illustrate its inefficiency, but argued
that, if correctly applied, League principles in themselves were far
from unappealing. Their argument ’supposed’ that, with the entry of
the USSR, the League would be modified and improved. Occasional
articles of this nature by Litvinov also appeared in Pravda. Litvinov’s
stance was totally in line with the role he was to play in the League
itself.
Another aspect of the socialization campaign stressed the
pragmatic response. Reports of imminent war and impending doom
appeared. With ominous destruction hanging over the USSR, its only
recourse was to seek safety wherever possible. There was little need to

argue the merits of the League, which appeared a haven. Since the
USSR was deliberately pursuing a go-slow policy over League
membership, many reports might be termed ’sensationalist’. In all
fairness, however, they may have reflected the very real fear of some
people in the Soviet Union at the time about their country’s lack of a
genuine defensive foreign policy.
The socialization programme never painted a rosy picture of the
League. At best, there was an acceptance that any League beauty
spots just about outnumbered the warts. However, there was little
doubt that there was positive Soviet propaganda about the League.
Then, with Soviet admission ensured, the promotional campaign was
checked. The number of positive Soviet mimeographs on the League
during 1934 and 1935 fell drastically. There was only one forty-eight-
page book on how the League worked, and a seventeen-page
pamphlet explaining why the USSR had joined it.22 These, together
with several articles, might be considered a still favourable press. On
 229

the other hand, criticisms of various aspects of the League’s work

began to re-emerge. B.A. Aleksandrov’s research (Kolo~tialnie
mandaty [Moscow 1934]) disparagingly unravelled the intricacies of
the League’s mandate system; Lev Ivanov produced a book on the
collapse of the Disarmament Conference. In 1935 there was once
more a lull in critical Soviet works, but 1936 saw the publication of D.
Borisov’s work on League sanctions, touching up the already black
picture of League mismanagement. Favourable editorials and articles
also disappeared from the press. More and more attention was
devoted to the warlike, rather than the peaceful side of capitalism.
Although still arguing that the USSR had joined the League for the
protection of the proletariat, no advantages were claimed for the
toiling masses as a result of Soviet membership. Throughout the
years 1935 to 1938, the USSR did publish Litvinov’s major Geneva
speeches, but only the most selective Soviet readers could have
become lightheaded with joy at the thought that their government
had joined the League of Nations.
Western commentators were critical of every anti-League Soviet
declaration. These they interpreted as Soviet hypocrisy, although
perhaps the greater hypocrisy was in their not recognizing a
comparable dichotomy in the attitudes of their own governments. Be
that as it may, Litvinov’s position at Geneva was genuinely under-
mined, and paradoxically so, as the USSR began to use him to
promulgate to its public its reservations about the League. Litvinov
himself would appear before Soviet audiences and describe the
actions of the League in the same disparaging manner as any other
Soviet official. He would comment on the inefficiency of its
membership - much as he did at Geneva - but without the
optimism to follow the realism and with no subsequent exhortation
to the effect that simply by applying League principles peace would
result. The strict responsibilities of Commissar denied him this
opportunity, and presented another contradiction in his position at
Geneva.

The third contradiction concerned propaganda. Many western

commentators tend to argue that the USSR joined the League in
order to use Geneva as a platform for its propaganda. This argument
is partially sustained by the fact that the USSR was never tested in its
Geneva commitment to peace, and meanwhile received a largely
favourable press among the more idealistic public in the west. The
230

first contradiction outlined in this article does indeed lead one to

search for an alternative explanation as to why the USSR joined the
League, and the third contradiction is based on the premise that
Stalin wished to use the League, at least in part, for propaganda. The
irony was, however, that the USSR’s most successful propaganda had
nothing whatsoever to do with Litvinov’s proposals for collective
security, but was a by-product of all things of its trade dispute
- -

with Uruguay.
In the mid-1920s, the USSR had been willing to enter into
diplomatic and trade relations with a number of Latin American
countries. Only Uruguay had responded favourably and it was trade
that prompted the establishment of diplomatic relations between
the two countries in 1926.23 In December 1927, the Argentinian
government authorized the setting-up of a Soviet trading agency,
Yuzhamtorg, in order to develop trade with South America. 21 In July
1931, the Argentinian police raided the agency’s premises and closed
it down. The reasons they gave were that Yuzhamtorg was acting as a
vehicle for the transmission of funds and assistance to the communists
of Latin America. 25
Yuzhamtorg was relocated in Uruguay, where it seemed to function
to the satisfaction of both the Soviet and Uruguayan governments. In
the summer of 1933, following the US lead, Uruguay initiated
negotiations for the exchange of diplomatic missions with the USSR.
In March 1934, a Uruguayan mission was sent to Moscow; the USSR
installed a mission in Montevideo two months later.26 The economic
depression was forcing Uruguay to expand its trade and develop such
links, and the continued pressure it exerted on Uruguay proved to be
the crux of the dispute that followed.
In January 1936, a case was brought before the League. The
Uruguayan government had severed diplomatic links with the USSR.
The Soviet government acknowledged the right of Uruguay to
recognize (or not) the Soviet government, but claimed that under
Article 12, Uruguay had violated its obligations to the Charter of the
League of Nations. 27 Article 12 stated that members of the League
must submit any serious disputes to the Council. Uruguay had not
submitted the dispute to arbitration or enquiry prior to severing
relations. The USSR, therefore, brought the case before the League
Council.
Litvinov argued that the missions between the two countries had
not been a bone of contention. The discussion between the Uruguayan
Foreign Office and the Soviet Minister in Uruguay had been limited
 231

points. The first concerned an individual, Simon Radovitsky.

to three
Radovitsky was an anarchist whom the Uruguayan government was
holding on a charge of terrorism. The Uruguayan government did not
accuse the USSR of inciting Radovitsky in his terrorist activities but,
because he had been born in Russia, they demanded that he be
deported to the USSR. The Soviet government replied that
Radovitsky was not a Soviet citizen and therefore it saw no reason
why he should be accommodated in the USSR. The Soviet response
seemed reasonable enough, despite the fact that many people in the
west still believed the USSR to be an open-plan prison for terrorists
and murderers. The Uruguayan government reacted strongly, with its
President treating the Soviet refusal as a personal affront.
Secondly, in late October 1935, an article against local communists
had appeared in a Uruguayan newspaper. Firing somewhat wide of
its original mark, it attacked the Soviet regime. The Soviet Foreign
Minister, M. Minkin, made a verbal complaint to the Uruguayan
Foreign Minister, who replied that his government could not
influence the press since it did not necessarily share the views
expressed. The Foreign Minister added, however, that the question of
Radovitsky was still on the President’s mind; it was becoming hard
not to think of it as a political issue.
Thirdly, on 10 December 1935, Litvinov had received a telegram
from Minkin. It explained that the President of Uruguay was now
more favourably disposed towards the Soviet government, and
would consider himself satisfied with the refusal to take Radovitsky if
the USSR would purchase two hundred tons of Uruguayan cheese.
Minkin recommended to Litvinov that, in order to appease President
Terra, a ’small consignment of cheese should be bought’. Litvinov
refused; and when the Uruguayan government learned that the USSR
would not be placing any orders for cheese, it became even more
upset than it had been when the USSR had refused to take
Radovitsky. This was perhaps understandable since the existence of
the state of Uruguay depended more heavily on the exchange of
goods than it did on the export of terrorists. Uruguay ’retaliated’ by
severing diplomatic relations with the USSR on 27 December. The
reasons it gave were that the Soviet government had contributed large
sums of money to finance revolts in Brazil. The USSR brought the
matter before the League.
In front of the League Council, Alberto Guani, the representative
from Uruguay, put forward a case that hung upon two perilously
weak premises. (There was no mention of Radovitsky and the
232

cheese.) In the first place, he reiterated the standard criticisms of the

Soviet Union: through the Comintern and other such organizations,
the USSR fostered, supported and fomented revolutions abroad. In
the case of the revolt in Brazil, the particular Soviet incitement was
supposed to have come from a speech made in Moscow by the
Chinese communist, Van Min. Van had expressed sympathy for the
liberation movements in Brazil and neighbouring countries; more-
over, he had supposedly mentioned the Soviet assistance being given
in these areas through its mission in Montevideo. Litvinov claimed
that the report of the speech which appeared in the Latin American
press was a fabrication. Whether it was or not hardly affected the
merits of the case. It was still up to the Uruguayan representative to
demonstrate to the Council precisely how Soviet assistance to Latin
American revolutionaries had been given. This provided the second
premise of Guani’s argument. He intimated that the police had
uncovered, with the help of the Montevideo banks, a series of cheques
and correspondence between Minkin and Latin American agents.
Such information, however, he continued, was confidential and
could not be presented openly before the Council.
Litvinov stated that he had no objection to writing to the banks
through Minkin, asking them to disclose details of all the transactions
that Minkin had undertaken since his arrival. How, asked Litvinov,
could the Council decide the merits of a case against the USSR
without concrete evidence in the form of account numbers and drawn
cheques? None was produced.
Guani had the last word. He insisted that the position of his
government was necessary for the defence and security of Uruguay.
The decision to sever relations with the USSR was, he claimed, a
matter for the Uruguayan government alone and therefore could not
be submitted to an international court, not even the Council.
Uruguay, he concluded, had acted within its rights -
a valid

argument had Uruguay not been party to the Covenant of the League
of Nations.
On 24 January 1936, the Council delivered its verdict. It expressed
’the hope that the interruption of diplomatic relations between
Uruguay and the USSR will be temporary, and that the two countries
will take a favourable opportunity of resuming those relations. 121
Pravda was quick to point out the next day that the Council’s
resolution, hoping for relations to be restored, was a clear condemna-
tion of the Uruguayan government and its actions. The USSR, after
all, had not severed relations. Pravda also noted that the League
 233

resolution recognized, albeit indirectly, no grounds for Uruguay to

break off diplomatic relations with the USSR.29
Arbitration between states was the stock-in-trade of the League of
Nations. In the peaceful settlement of disputes its record was
tarnished, but there had been notable successes, especially in the early
days. The Aaland Islands and Vilna (now Vilnius) were two
examples; and it was not until the later case of Manchuria that
’peaceful’ settlement finally proved to be beyond the ability of the
League. Disputes similar to the one between Uruguay and the USSR
were therefore commonplace in the League. Yet what was extra-

ordinary was to find the USSR active inside the League on an issue so
completely unconnected with the preservation of world peace. After
Litvinov’s initial appointment as head of the Commission on
seaweeds, it was as if the USSR had made careful plans to avoid
entanglements in any League activities that did not relate to collective
security and the fight against military aggression. There were some
exceptions to this generalization, notably finance, less so health and
sanitation, and briefly the ILO. But the only real interest it seemed to
have was in presenting its solution to the breakdown of international
security. Yet the merits of the Soviet case in its dispute with Uruguay
seemed too tempting to let slip. The proceedings illustrated the fact
that the USSR would be prepared to submit to arbitration, revealed
the comparatively generous nature of Soviet attitudes to trade with
poorer countries, and brought forth and dismissed rumours of
Comintern activities in Brazil. On the one hand, the USSR achieved
little. Hardly anyone could have relished the prospect of having the
activities of the Comintern dragged into the Geneva arena yet again,
or of hearing about the actions of the Uruguayan government, trying
to nudge the USSR into importing a little more. On the other hand, if
propaganda was its reason for coming to Geneva, how could the
USSR ignore this minor episode? It may not have concerned
collective security, but it did provide the USSR with its first (and
only!) opportunity to stand directly under the Geneva spotlight
without creating a shadow of a doubt in anyone’s mind.

The fourth contradiction resulted from Italian aggression in Ethiopia.

The war in Ethiopia was the first real chance for the League to put its
house in order after the fiasco of its ’peace-keeping’ in Manchuria.
Unfortunately, the individual interests of certain states within the
League turned the war in Ethiopia into a question of the price to be
paid for Italian co-operation.
234

The British and French had called a tripartite conference at Stresa

to discuss the prevention of the Ethiopian episode from appearing
before the League. Yet, at that conference, the question of Italy’s war
with Ethiopia was immediately shelved in order to effect a recon-
ciliation with the Italians, and to move to a general censure of Hitler
and the German nazi government. The French especially feared that
Italian and German fascism might identify mutual areas of interest,
areas inimical to France and Britain. To both Britain and France,

Ethiopia seemed a useful bargaining tool. Even to the USSR, which

had been excluded from the conference, the idea of a collective
anti-German front seemed far more relevant to the preservation of
world peace than was a criticism of Italy for its aggression against
Ethiopia. Thus, even after a great many Ethiopian appeals and an
equal number of deferments and unkept Italian promises, when the
question of Ethiopia eventually came before the League Council in its
May 1935 session, Litvinov deliberately chose to act as President,
thereby seeming to distance the USSR from the affair.3° The
conciliatory Soviet attitude towards the Italians was probably
adopted in the hope that an Anglo-French agreement with Italy was
imminent, and would therefore save everyone the dangerous task of
censuring Italy inside the League. In effect, the USSR was playing for
time; and its lack of initiative in leaping to the defence of the Charter
was a mark against it. Its inaction also had the effect of restraining
some smaller states which might otherwise have spoken out openly

against Italian aggression but, without the Soviet lead, did not dare.
It also made the Italian Foreign Minister, Baron Aloisi, realize the
uniqueness of Italy’s position in the balance between European
states, and encouraged him to exploit his newly found strength by
declaring that ’the steps taken by Italy to ensure the defence of her
territory could not be subject to comment by anyone whomsoever’.3’I
President Litvinov tried to hurry the session along; and the only
verdict that the Council produced was that a further three-month
period of private settlement between the Italians and Ethiopians
should be tried.32 It was only several months later, at the point when
Italy proposed the expulsion of Ethiopia from the League on account
of its barbarism, that the USSR countered with a strong defence of
the League Covenant and, therefore, of Ethiopia. The nine months
delay marred an otherwise exemplary Geneva copybook for Litvinov,
the one occasion on which he did not immediately reply to aggression
with the words ’Peace is Indivisible’. The wait had produced no
positive results. Moreover, apart from the possible adverse effect on
 235

Ethiopia, it had not helped the image that the USSR was hoping to
project at Geneva.
On a number of occasions in September and October, the Italo-
Ethiopian issue was debated. On 11October, the Co-ordination
Committee adopted the proposal for an embargo on arms for both
belligerents.33 By 19 October, it had adopted another five proposals
on sanctions against Italy. The Soviet Union promptly agreed and

adopted the first two of these proposals on 17 September: prohibition

on loans and credits to Italy and on Italian imports. On 28 October, it

agreed to apply the other three proposals from whenever the

Committee fixed a date.34 The Soviet response to sanctions was one of
complete support and immediate application. Yet within the League
itself, the USSR continued to criticize the scope of the sanctions,
which it did not think went far enough; Litvinov claimed that they
were not ‘exhaustive’.35 The USSR was equally critical of the League

process that allowed individual members to determine what should,

or should not, be classified under the heading of sanctions. Smaller

states whose trade would have been hardest hit by the application of
sanctions had been encouraged to replace trade with Italy by trade
among themselves. However, in the Committee debates, their
arguments for not imposing all possible economic sanctions had had
an effect: they had been able to block the extension of sanctions after
the first few had been applied. Of equally serious concern to the
USSR was the fact that even when sanctions had been approved by
the Committee, it was then up to individual states to decide whether
they would apply them. The USSR was extremely critical of the
democratic structure of League operations which, it believed,
weakened the power of the Covenant. The League could never be
other than the sum of its co-operating members, and the USSR
resented this inherent weakness. It criticized those states which chose
to put individual sovereignty before international obligation. But,
unfortunately for its credibility, the USSR would argue this point
only when international obligation did not conflict with its own
sovereignty. At Geneva, however, such a stance was possible; the
USSR was consistent, backing the application of Covenant principles
to the task of peace-keeping, maintaining that individual preferences
had to be sacrificed for the common goal. Even outside Geneva, the
USSR gave genuine indications that it was sincere in believing that
aggression could be stopped by strengthening sanctions, extending
them and ensuring that they were universally adopted (although quite
how this was to be achieved was never satisfactorily explained). The
236

Soviet press, still critical of the League, which it had earlier suggested
would impose one of its ’infamous’ mandates on Ethiopia, was for a
brief while discernibly less hostile. As League sanctions collapsed in
disarray within the next year, it reverted to its former stance. An
indication had been given, however, that there was a real glimmer of
Soviet hope in the League becoming a force for the preservation of
peace. The second contradiction in Litvinov’s position briefly seemed
to have disappeared. It soon reappeared, however, bringing with it a
further contradiction.
Some fifty members agreed to the imposition of sanctions upon
Italy, but the sanctions were far from comprehensive. Specific
omissions included oil, coal, phosphates, wood and pig iron. Twelve
countries, in fact, supplying almost 75 per cent of Italian oil, had
agreed to a sanction on oil, but both the USSR and Romania had
attached the provision that all producers, League or not, would have
to do likewise.36 Romania and the Soviet Union reasoned that unless
a full embargo were imposed they would simply be hurting them-

selves, with the USA or some other oil-producing country capturing

their share of the market. With no oil sanctions imposed and
therefore not acting in contravention of any League decision, the
USSR did increase its oil exports to Italy, but by less than one-third of
the average amount exported in the identical month of the previous
year.3’ These figures compared favourably with Romania’s and, in
particular, with those of the USA (a non-League member), which
increased its oil shipments by nearly three hundred per cent in one
year.38 The USSR paid meticulous attention to sanctioned items as
classified by the League and, in the words of Lowell R. Tillett, ’had a
perfect record in exports, and a near-perfect record in imports’.19
However, Tillett went on to show that the USSR’s percentage of total
exports to Italy during the period increased faster than Britain’s,
France’s and Romania’s, i.e. that the USSR conducted a vigorous
export drive in goods not specifically embargoed.
There is some justification for criticizing the USSR’s attitude.
Would it not have been consistent with its Geneva policy for the
USSR first to have applied an oil sanction regardless of universality&dquo;
and second to have held other Soviet exports to Italy at a reasonable
level? There was no legal obligation on the USSR, merely a moral
one: was the USSR’s duty to Ethiopia cancelled by the League’s
disabilities? As a state, the USSR had no commitment of its own to
Ethiopia; neither was it prone to considerations of conscience. When
the USSR found that the League was only requesting, rather than
 237

legally informing, its members to carry out a particular policy, its

primary consideration became the needs of the industrial sector back
home. Without question, other countries would have picked up any
markets abandoned or neglected by the USSR. Not only, therefore,
would any private Soviet sanctions not have had an effect upon the
Italian economy, but they would have had an adverse effect upon the
Soviet one, no matter how small. And yet, Litvinov’s position was
complicated and undermined by this Soviet economic realism, since it
was he who had pressed most consistently for the strongest and

tightest measures in drawing up League sanctions.

The fifth contradiction was in the sphere of Soviet-German relations.

The pattern of Soviet relations with Germany after 1919 was
indirectly shaped by the League of Nations. Soviet attitudes were
pragmatically determined by the League’s policy towards itself and
Germany. Soviet-German relations were a by-product of, sometimes
even a response to, League decisions, the result of the League playing

its role of both an antidote to ’communist poison 14and, through

the Treaty of Versailles, making Germany the milch cow of the
victorious imperialist powers. Thus, in the early days, with both
countries earmarked for economic isolation, the Soviet Union and
Germany began to trade with each other.
One of the USSR’s principal reasons for joining the League was
German and Japanese aggression. By 1934, both Japan and Germany
had resigned their League membership. Although the USSR did not
wish to jeopardize its relations with Germany, it felt that it could not
afford to sit back and wait for Hitler to enact chapters from Mein
Kampf, notably a push eastwards into the Ukraine. At Geneva, the
USSR periodically reiterated its opposition to the Peace Treaties,
thereby continuing to extend its good offices to Germany. But,
since its Geneva policy consisted of a denunciation of all acts of
aggression, it was inevitable that Germany would come in for some
criticism.
In the early hours of 7 March 1936, German troops marched into
the Rhineland. The League Council was unable to meet until after 13
March owing to Litvinov’s commitments in Moscow and those of
Rustti Aras in Ankara.42 The French and British had conferred about
the matter, but the French had refrained from taking any action -
as

they would have been entitled to do under the terms of the Locarno
Treaty. Germany claimed that the Locarno Treaty had already been
238

broken by France signing the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact,

now in the process of ratification by the French Senate.
The Council convened on 14 March in London. The Locarno
powers were already there in conference. They had been divided on
the Rhineland issue. The French wanted the strongest reprimand for
Germany; the Italians claimed that if that meant sanctions against
Germany, they could not and would not comply. They argued that
the ’over-reaction’ of the League of Nations to their own incursion
into Ethiopia had resulted in their present economic links with
Germany. In fact, they would not take any action which Germany
might describe as ’hostile’. The British seemed uninterested in the
whole proceedings. Not surprisingly, when the League came to apply
itself to the issue, it was unable to achieve what the Locarno powers
had themselves refused to do, namely to take any action. The
representatives of the smaller powers, anxious not to jeopardize their
own country’s position with Germany, remained silent. Litvinov,

rather surprisingly, broke into a denunciation of all types of

aggression.
In League debates called to discuss particular cases of aggression,
Soviet representatives had invariably generalized, refusing to mention
aggressors by name. This was and would continue to be the Soviet
response to Ethiopia, Manchuria and Spain. On this day, however,
Litvinov singled out German aggression. He pointed out that no one
threatened Germany. He dismissed claims that Hitler was prepared
to enter responsibly into new international and legal obligations. By
citing Mein Kampf, he attempted to dispel any illusions that Hitler
might have a genuine love of peace. He stressed that the occupation of
the Rhineland was undertaken for the purposes of setting up German
hegemony over the whole continent of Europe. Litvinov also made it
clear that the USSR would oppose German readmission into the
League.43
It would be reasonable to assume that Litvinov delivered his
violently anti-German tirade on his own initiative, since it was not
representative of any change in his government’s policy towards
Germany. On 6 March, the USSR had been negotiating a new
commercial agreement in Berlin. Negotiations were suspended when
the USSR learnt of the German move, but after it became apparent
that neither the League nor the Locarno powers would take any real
action, the talks were resumed. An agreement was reached on 29
April.°4 While it is true, for example, that two days after the
occupation both Ivan Maisky and Viacheslav Molotov publicly
 239

echoed fears of Germany’s bellicose activities and international

attitude,45 it was normal for the USSR to condemn German actions
and activities to the Soviet people. At Geneva, however, the practice
was normally the opposite.
The USSR’s League presence was ostensibly based on the premise
that joint action against Germany was vital to world security. (This
was also the rationale behind its foreign policy in Spain, where it

unsuccessfully schemed to attract Britain and France into an anti-

fascist alliance.) League membership, whether or not advantageous
as a propaganda platform, was one means by which it hoped to alert

other states to its willingness to ally itself. The USSR, however, was
unprepared to alienate the fascist forces any further than was
absolutely necessary, and here it may be argued that a disagreement
arose between Stalin and Litvinov about how far was actually

necessary. League speeches were consistently worded to promote

’indivisible peace’ against all forms of aggression, with the USSR
pursuing both inside and outside the League a policy of remaining on
good terms with Germany. For example, when the Saar plebiscite
took place in 1935, Litvinov not only joined in the general compli-
menting of the League on its handling of the affair, but laid particular
stress upon the results, which he viewed with favour.46 By such
comments, the USSR hoped to court Germany, whose refusal to have
anything to do with a pact securing the USSR’s western borders (the
so-called Eastern Pact) was a source of considerable anxiety.
Admittedly, there was a line to be drawn in complimenting
Germany on its annexations, however legally they were contrived,
and the USSR at Geneva could be heard on occasion condemning
German aggression, by implication at least. (There was similar
caution in dealings with Japanese aggression: for example, it was only
in March-April 1933 that the USSR agreed for the first time to testify
before the League’s Lytton Committee on Manchuria.) As German
aggression grew, so the correct Soviet tone became more difficult to
determine. Outside Geneva, Soviet opposition to fascist aggression
found physical expression in Spain, yet even despite the anti-
Comintern pact, Soviet-German relations were far from frigid.
One indication of the USSR’s intention to remain on reasonable
terms with Hitler may be seen in the replacement of the Jewish Soviet
ambassador in Berlin, Jacob Suritz, in the summer of 1937. The
watershed of the Litvinov brand of foreign policy came in 1936-37 -
not 1938 and Czechoslovakia, as a number of commentators have
maintained. Litvinov’s raison d’etre, to attract either League or
240

simply Franco-British support, had by then already suffered its great

set-backs: the British and French had not reacted to Hitler scrapping
Locarno, and had forsaken both Ethiopia and Spain. Of the two
options now open to Stalin -
to befriend or to alienate Hitler
completely -
he still seemed to choose neither, while continuing to
ride with Litvinov’s phantom charges against fascism, via the almost
defunct possibilities of collective security through the League and a
triple alliance with Britain and France. It was an odd state of
indecision for Stalin. Litvinov himself could not alter his Jewish,
anti-German, pro-British and French orientation, but the USSR
could. Why was Litvinov not dismissed? Why did Molotov not
appear at this moment?
The answer might be that in a subtle way this is what did happen.
Litvinov continued to spend a great amount of time at Geneva,
whereas if his role in the Commissariat had been paramount, he
would have delegated the League speeches to an assistant and busied
himself with various other diplomatic activities. It is clear that
Litvinov himself still worked to achieve an Anglo-French alliance
(Nyon proves that), less certain that he still hoped for the League to
make a stand against aggression. For Stalin, however, the Geneva
commitment was retained simply as a public relations exercise; it
ceased to be a credible arm of Soviet foreign policy. Litvinov’s
continued presence at Geneva lent credibility to Soviet declarations
of united opposition to aggression and its own peaceable intentions.
For a further year, therefore, Litvinov could be seen trying to cajole
the League into collective action. At the end of this period, after the
surrender of Czechoslovakia on 21 September 1938, Litvinov made
his last League appearance. There was a brief period of stability as the
Jewish, anti-German Suritz filled in, and then Soviet withdrawal
from League activities gathered speed.
On the assumption that a change in personnel in the Soviet Union
invariably symbolizes a change in policy, Molotov’s appointment as
Commissar heralded a new approach to Soviet foreign policy. Surely,
however, by the late 1930s only the fact that Soviet policy had already
shifted could account for Litvinov not being purged. By 1938, Stalin
must have considered Commissar Litvinov simply as his League
representative, who for the past year or more had no longer
represented a viable aspect of his country’s foreign policy. In the
absence of a better explanation, it is not unreasonable to suggest that
Litvinov’s own life could have been saved by this fifth and final
contradiction. He had simply become too unimportant to be a threat.
 241

Are there parallels with today? It is tempting to try to draw lessons

from history to see whether the story of Litvinov at the League of
Nations can help us in any way to understand Gromyko’s role
vis-A-vis the USA and the United Nations in the larger context of
Soviet policy. Even though the international situation is entirely
different from those distant days when Soviet power was an unknown
quantity, we should surely not neglect the thought that there is some
rough-and-ready form of continuity in the contradictions that have
plagued Soviet foreign policy through the years.

Notes

1. Quoted, Henry Roberts, ’Maxim Litvinov’ in G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds), The
Diplomats: 1919-1939 (Princeton 1953), 362-63.
2. See, for example, Victor Serge, ’Litvinov’, Esprit, 7 (1939), 419-27.
3. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York and London 1985).
, 11February 1985,25; also in The Observer, 26 May 1985,18.
Extract reprinted in Time
4. For Gromyko see loc. cit. For Litvinov see Z.S. Sheinis, ’Srazheniia u golubogo
’, 8 (1967), 174. Sheinis’ biography of
ozera’ (The Battle on the Sky-blue Lake), Oktiabr
Litvinov is due to be published shortly. Although material from this work has, since
the 1960s, appeared in Soviet journals and is, therefore, unlikely to effect a radical
perestroika of either Stalin or Soviet foreign policy, the publication of the complete
biography at this time provides yet another example of the effect of Gorbachev’s
administration’s glasnost policy upon historical literature.
When Bernard Shaw visited Russia in 1931, it gradually dawned on him that both
Anatoly Lunacharsky and Maksim Litvinov, who insisted on accompanying him
everywhere, did so not in accordance with official Soviet policy but in order that they
themselves might see more of their own country (’Correspondence with Mrs Charlotte
Shaw’, British Library Additional Manuscripts 50550, f.233). On one occasion,
Litvinov interpreted a conversation between Shaw, Lady Astor and some female
railway navvies in the frontier town of Negoreloe. The women claimed never to have
heard of Litvinov and thought at first that he was ’another Englishman’ (Bernard
Shaw, ’Touring in Russia’, Parts I and II, Nash’s Magazine (January and February
1932), 193-94).
5. Teddy Uldricks, ’The Soviet Diplomatic Corps in the Cicerin Era’, Jahrbücher für
Geschichte Osteuropas, XXIII, (1975), part II, 213-24.
As a Soviet Narkomindel official, Litvinov conveniently fits into the Uldricks
model. By the standards of his times his origins made him eminently suitable for
diplomatic work. He had lived abroad and was knowledgeable and fluent in a number
of languages. In common with three out of four of his 1927 staff, he was a Communist
Party member. He was Jewish (Jews were the second largest national group) and
bourgeois. The one factor which placed him outside the norm was that he had no
post-high school education.
6. For an explanation of Chicherin’s attitude, see Richard K. Debo, ’Georgy
Chicherin: Soviet Russia’s Second Foreign Commissar’ (PhD dissertation, University
242

of Nebraska 1964), 147-49. See also Georgy Chicherin, Stati i Rechi (Moscow 1961),
especially 67-86.
7. In December 1933, Stalin hinted at a new Soviet attitude towards the League, a
decidedly more moderate stance, expressive of a hope that the League of Nations might
become a ’small obstacle against aggression’. New York Times, 23 December 1933.
8. Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: Europe between the Two World Wars (New York
1966), 127.
9. F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London 1952), 634.
10. League of Nations Official Journal (hereafter LNOJ) (1934), 1395.
11. LNOJ, Special Supplement (hereafter SS) 125, 59.
12. For the full text of the debate see LNOJ, SS 130, 17-27.
13. LNOJ, SS 125, 62.
14. Ibid., 63-64.
15. Ibid., 64.
16. Ibid., 65. It is interesting to note that, apart from Belgium, Portugal and
Switzerland which had already been quite vociferous in their opposition to the USSR,
nearly all the other abstentions came from Latin American countries: Argentina,
Cuba, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Luxembourg abstained from voting every time.
17. Sheinis, ’Srazheniia u golubogo ozera’, 172.
18. Loc. cit.
19. The Times, 19 September 1934, 10:c.
20. For the full text of Litvinov’s speech see LNOJ, SS 125, 68-69.
21. Frederich L. Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad (New York 1946),
255. Also, Arthur Upham Pope, Maxim Litvinov (New York 1943), 349.
22. Lowell R. Tillett, ’The Soviet Union and the Policy of Collective Security in the
League of Nations, 1934-1938’ (PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina 1955),
77.
23. Stephen Clissold (ed.), Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968: A
Documentary Survey (London 1970), 8.
24. Loc. cit.
25. Ibid., 8-9.
26. Maxim M. Litvinov, Relations between the USSR and Uruguay (London 1936), 8.
27. Pravda (30 December 1935).
28. LNOJ (1936), 138.
29. Pravda, 25 January 1936.
30. Sterling H. Fuller, ’The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the League and
United Nations’ (PhD dissertation, University of Texas 1952), 109-10.
31. Quoted in Walters, op. cit., 634.
32. LNOJ (1935), 639-43.
33. LNOJ, SS 145, 34.
34. Tillett, ’The Soviet Union’, 137.
35. LNOJ, SS 145, 27-28.
36. LNOJ, SS 150 , 246 and 297. Cited in Lowell R. Tillett, ’The Soviet Role in
League Sanctions against Italy, 1935-36’, American Slavic and East European Review,
vol. 1, XV (1956), 13.
37. Ibid., 12.
38. Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 1935. Cited in ibid., 13.
39. Tillett, ’The Soviet Role’, 15.
40. The USSR continually attacked the ’universality’ theory put forward by some
 243

League members. Certain states argued that lacking universality, i.e. without 100 per
cent agreement by League members on what action to take, the Articles of the League
of Nations could not have any real force in world politics. Litvinov believed that
political action spread from the lowest common denominator up: alliances looked
good between two, better between three, better still between four... Universality may
have been his ideal but it was never a prerequisite for action.
41. Woodrow Wilson’s own expression according to Charles Prince, ’The USSR and
International Organizations’, American Journal of International Law, XXXVI (1942),
427.
42. Walters, op. cit., 694.
43. For the full text see LNOJ (1936), 319-23.
44. James E. McSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe: The Origins of World War II,
1933-1939 (Cleveland 1968), 50-51.
45. For extracts of both texts see Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign
Policy, 1933-1941, III (London 1953), 178-85.
(1935), 135-36.
46. LNOJ

David Dunn
is a Lecturer in Contemporary History at
Lancashire Polytechnic. He is the author of
articles on various aspects of Anglo-Soviet
and Anglo-US relations, and is currently
researching cultural stereotyping in post-war
US films, songs and comics.