C.

Interference with Relations husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
1. Family Relations

See Art. 26 NCC

ISSUE:
a. Alienation of affection 1. Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
Alienation of affection lawsuits (also known as “homewrecker” or “heartbalm” courts of the Philippines.
lawsuits), are civil tort claims. As its monikers suggest, an alienation of affection 2. WON defendants are liable for damages
case is brought by a spouse who’s been deserted as a result of a third party’s
actions. The deserted spouse files the lawsuit against the third party for the loss HELD:
of affection that was provided through the marriage. 1. No. Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
Alienation of affection lawsuits are usually filed against third-party lovers, but cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino
anyone that interfered with a marriage can be named as a defendant, such as citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would
parents, in laws, clergy members, and even therapists who recommended
arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
divorce to a deserting spouse.
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of
b. Loss of Consortium
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce
Loss of consortium is a term used in the law of torts that refers to the
between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
deprivation of the benefits of a family relationship due to injuries caused by a
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.
tortfeasor.
2. Vicenta is liable. Her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
Tenchavez vs Escano
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
FACTS:
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises
adequate excuse. However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's
Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and
parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño,
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be
alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are
testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration. In fact, Plaintiff
church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said
Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of
for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
Tenchavez thereafter initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint against
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a
damages and attorneys' fees.
valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present

Silva vs Peralta
FACTS:
At the outbreak of the war in 1941, the defendant Esther Peralta resided with
her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia. Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen and an
officer of the United States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of
Australia, had been ordered sent to the Philippines during the enemy
occupation to help unite the guerillas in their fight for freedom.
Sometime during the year 1944, Florence, a younger sister of the defendant,
was accused of having collaborated with the enemy, and for this she was
arrested, and accompanied by Esther for investigation that Silva first met
Esther. Florence was exonorated of the charges made against her and was
ordered released, but with the advice that she should not return to Maco for the
time being. Heeding such advice, Florence and her sister,appellee herein, went
to live with the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Camilo Doctolero. Silva started to frequent
the house of the Doctoleros, and soon professed love for Esther. Having been
made to believe that he was single, she accepted his marriage proposal; and the
two were married by one Father Cote on the occasion of a house blessing. No
documents of marriage were prepared nor executed ,allegedly because there
were no available printed forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived
together as husband and wife. From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino
Silva, Jr., was born. Subsequently, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle
of Ising, for which reason,he was transferred to Leyte, and later to the United
States, he divorced Precilla Isabel and later, contracted marriage with plaintiff
Elenita Ledesma Silva.Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther
Peralta demanded support for their child, and upon his refusal, instituted a suit
for support in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the present
action was filed against Esther, and another suit against her was instituted in
Cotabato. The Trial Court awarded damages in favor of the defendant thus the
plaintiffs-appellant appeal on both questions of fact and law from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Davao to the Supreme Court, the amount
involved being more than P200,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct
consequence of Silva's deceitful maneuvers in making love to appellee, and
inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his wife.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES.
It is to be noted that while the latter's liability was extra-contractual in origin,
still, under the Civil Code in 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are
measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual debtor in bad
faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he had forseen them or
not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also for
lacrum cessans, as required by Article 1106. Article 1002 of the 1889 Civil Code
of Spain formulated no standard for measuring quasi-delictual damages, the
article merely prescribing that the guilty party "shall be liable for the damages
so done". This indefiniteness led modern civil law writers to hold that the
standards set is articles 1106 and 1107, placed in the general rules on
obligations, "rigen por igual para las contractuales y las extrascontractuales, las
pre establecidas y las que borten ex-lege de actos ilicitos". (Roces,Notes to
Fisher)" Los Daños Civiles y su Reparacion,"(1927).
It is well to note in this connection, that Silva's act in hiding from appellee that
he could not legally marry her, because, he allegedly have an Australian wife,
was not mere negligence, but actual fraud (dolo) practiced upon the appellee.
Consequently, he should stand liable for any and all damages arising therefrom,
which include the expense of maintaining the offspring and the expenses of
litigation to protect the child's right's and the loss of the mother's own
earnings. This is a liability that flows even from Articles 1902 and 1107 (par. 2)
of 1889 (Arts. 2176 and 2202 of the New Code).Art. 1902. Any person who by
an act or omission causes damage to another by his faultor negligence shall be
liable for the damage as done. Art. 1107. In case of fraud (dolo) the debtor shall
be liable for all losses and damages which clearly arise from the failure to fulfill
the obligation.
Geluz vs CA
FACTS
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy from her parent,
she had herself aborted by defendant. After the marriage with the plaintiff, she
again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by
defendant in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic. Nita was again
aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50. It is the
third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff’s basis in filing this action and
award of damages. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages
upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be recovery for damages resulting to the death or
abortion of an unborn child.
SC RULING:
This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the
death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed w/ personality.
Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband
of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.(1)
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke
the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pronato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born
later with the condition specified in the following article." In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all.
But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished
from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and
physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or
services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis
that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss,
and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well
as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230,
CC).
But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates
that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affection.
Hernandez vs Dolor
Facts:
Boyet Dolor and Oscar Valmocina died as a result of a collision between an
owner type jeep driven by Dolor and a passenger type jeep driven by herein
petitioner Juan Gonzales. Other passengers also suffered physical injuries.
Consequently, respondents (parents of the deceased Boyet and Oscar, and the
other injured passengers) commenced an action for damages against
petitioners, driver(Gonzales) and the owner of the vehicle (spouses
Hernandez).During the trial, the following were established:
1.The owner type jeep was travelling at a moderate speed
2.The passenger jeepney was travelling fast when it bumped into the owner
3.Petitioner Juan Gonzales obtained his professional driver’s license only
3monthes before the accident occurred.
4.Hernandez spouses leases the jeep to the driver on a daily basis. Hernandez
spouses are contending that they should not be impleaded in the case since
they were not in the jeep during the accident. They also claimed that there is no
employer-employee relationship that exists between them and the driver since
they only lease the jeep to the latter. Trial Court held rendered the decision in
favor of the victims and held Hernandez spouses solidarily liable. CA affirmed
the decision but with a few modifications on the amount of the damages (in
relation to the topic in the which is Loss of Consortium in Family
Relations: the awards for moral damages given to the parents of deceased
were increased by the CA from 20k to 100k for both sps Dolor and
Valmocina).
Issue:
WON Hernandez spouses are solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales;
WON the increased amt of moral damages by the CA is justified
Held:
Hernandez spouses are solidarily liable.Even though they were not in the jeep
during the accident, they are still answerable under several provisions of the
Civil Code namely:
Article 2180… employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even thought eh former are not engaged in any business or activity
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict.
While the above provisions do not expressly provide for the solidary liability,
they should be read in consonance with Article 2180 – one can be liable for the
acts or omission of another whom he is responsible for, meaning that an
employer is accountable for the actions of his employees. Article 2194
categorically states that responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for quasi-delict is solidary.The Hernandez spouses maintained that Julian
Gonzales is not their employee because the latter pays them daily for the use of
the jeepney. They argued that they are practicing a lease agreement using the
“boundary system”. SC held that there exists an employer-employee
relationship because by agreeing to the Hernandez, there would be a villation of
the Public Service Law and we are going to place the riding public at the mercy
of reckless and irresponsible drivers because most drivers are in no position to
pay for damages when accidents occur.
As to the increase in the award for moral damages, the SC held “Truly, the
pain of the sudden loss of one's offspring, especially of a son who was in
the prime of his youth, and who holds so much promise waiting to be
fulfilled is indeed a wellspring of intense pain which no parent should be
made to suffer. While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule
for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages
cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, we hold that
the Court of Appeals' award of moral damages of P100,000.00 each to the
Spouses Dolor and Spouses Valmocina for the death of their respective
sons, Boyet Dolor and Oscar Valmocina, is in full accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.”
Castro vs People
Facts
This case is a petition on certiorari emanated from the complaint for grave oral
defamation filed by Atty. Albert P. Tan against the petitioner Jerome Castro. The
petitioner is the assistant of headmaster in the Reedly International School,
while the private respondent Atty. Albert Tan is a parent of Justin Albert, who is
studying in the said School. The RIS issued a letter to the parents of Justine
Albert that their son accumulated 34 code violation including public display of
affection and conduct unbecoming of a gentleman. As a sanction, RIS exclude
their son from participating in the graduation ceremony. But Atty. Tan filed a
complaint in the Department of Education alleging that the dismissal of his son
was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. Dep-Ed
rendered its decision in favor of Tan, ordering the RIS to readmit Justin Albert
without any condition. Thus he was able to participate in the graduation
ceremony On the day of the graduation ceremony, Atty. Tan met Bernice C.
Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. During their conversation, Tan intimated that he
was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities,
including the petitioner who was the assistant headmaster. Then Chin made a
call to the petitioner and told him the plan of Tan to sue the officers of RIS in
their personal capacity, at the end of their conversation the petitioner told
ching “okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to tan, that’s dangerous”.
Ching then made another phone call to atty. Tan and informed him that the
petitioner said “talking to him is dangerous”.
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the office of the City
prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the petitioner on August 21, 2003. On
Nov. 3, 2003, petitioner was charge with oral defamation in the Metropolitan
trial court (MeTC)
The prosecution essentially tried to establish that the petitioner depicted Tan
as a dangerous man through the testimony given by Ching. Then Atty. Tan
added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he filed
against RIS in the Dep-Ed.
The petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latter’s
complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing with
Ching on the telephone. The MeTC rendered its decision in favored of Atty. Tan
finding the petitioner guilty beyond doubt of the crime of grave oral
defamation. On appeal, the RTC affirmed and modified the decision of MeTC
declaring that the petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation. But because Tan
 filed his complaint in the office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City on Tayag vs Lacson
August 21, 2003, the RTC ruled that prescription already set in, therefore
acquitted petitioner on that ground The office of the Solicitor General filed a Facts:
petition for certiorari in the court of appeals assailing the decision of the RTC.
In March 1996 a group of farmer-tenants on three parcels of land owned by the
The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, therefore CA
Lacsons assigned to petitioner Tayag their rights as tenants/tillers for p50/sqm.
reinstated the MeTC decision. Petitioner appealed in the Supreme Court in the
The said amount would be payable “when the legal impediments to the sale of the
contention that CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari
property to the petitioner no longer existed.” Tayag would have exclusive rights to
inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment but failed to prove that the RTC
purchase the property if and when the Lacsons agreed to sell the property. Tayag
committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when RTC
gave varied sums of money to the farmers as partial payments, and the farmers
acquitted him.
issued receipts. Sometime later Tayag discovered that the farmers changed their
ISSUE:
minds and would be selling their rights to the Lacsons instead, prompting Tayag to
Whether or not the petitioner violated article 26 when he announced that the
pray for Injunction against the farmers and Lacson. In their defense, the Lacsons
Private respondent is a dangerous man
claimed that they did not induce the farmers to violate their contracts with Tayag,
Ruled:The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could have been guilty of
and that since the farmers were merely tenants, they had no right to enter into any
violation of article 26 of thecivil code if it was raised in the case. Since the
transactions involving Lacson properties without the owners’ consent.
petitioner is an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As
such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. The action of the petitioner could cause damage to the
private respondent. Damage are provided for violations of tan's personal Issue: WON injunction should be granted; WON respondents violated 1314 of NCC
dignity, personality and privacy that may result for alienation of tan from his
Ruling: NO. Farmers had no right to grant Tayag the option/right to buy the
friends Article 26 every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
property as they were merely tenants
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a In this case, the defendants-tenants-subtenants, under the deeds of assignment,
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: 1)xxxxxx granted to the petitioner not only an option but the exclusive right to buy the
2)xxxxxx 3) intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; landholding. But the grantors were merely the defendants-tenants, and not the
respondents, the registered owners of the property. Not being the registered
c. Criminal Conversion (Adultery) owners of the property, the defendants-tenants could not legally grant to the
It is similar to breach of promise, a tort involving a broken engagement against petitioner the option, much less the "exclusive right" to buy the property. Nemo dat
the betrothed, and alienation of affection, a tort action brought by a deserted quod non habet, literally meaning "no one gives what he doesn't have" applies in
spouse against a third party. this case.

2. Family Relations Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and
interests.In the absence of a clear legal right, there can be no writ of preliminary
a. Meddling with or disturbing family relations (See Art 26(2) NCC) injunction.
b. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends (See Art 26(3)
NCC) In the case at bar, petitioners have no clear legal right:

3. Economic Relations The respondents are the owners of the land. Thus, they cannot be enjoined from
encumbering/alienating their own property. As registered owners of the lands,
a. NCC Art 1314 (Law) they can do whatever they want with it except in cases stated in the law. The deed
of assignment will not bind the respondents because:

The farmers are not the owners;

The respondents were not privy to the deed of assignment;

Petitioner testified, that he did not meet/know any of the respondents prior to the
filing of the complaint.
The respondents did not consent to the deed of assignment and The DAR have not
approved the sale.
Lastly, the respondents were only impleaded because it was alleged that they induced
the farmers to violate the contract. In violation of Art. 1314 of the NCC. The elements of
tortious interference are as follows:
1. There is a valid contract
2. A 3rd party knows the existence of such a contract
3. The 3rd party interfered with such contract w/o any legal justification.
Lagon vs CA & Lapuz
Petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate
court, two parcels of land. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro
Lapuz filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. Respondent claimed that he
entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over
three parcels of land. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to
put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals
to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated
to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-
appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop
collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that
petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting
rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin
Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract between private
respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the lease
contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo showed him four
copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned.
ISSUE: W/N THE PURCHASE BY PETITIONER OF THE PROPERTY DURINGTHE
EXISTENCE OF RESPONDENT’S LEASE CONTRACT CONSTITUTED TORTUOUS
INTERFERENCE?
Held:
NOT ALL THREE ELEMENTS TO HOLD PETITIONER LIABLEFOR TORTUOUS
INTERFERENCE ARE PRESENT
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort
recognized in that provision is known as interference with contractual relations. The
interference is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to
reap the benefits that should result therefrom.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals , down the elements of tortuous
interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract;(b) knowledge
on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the
third person without legal justification or excuse. The second and third elements are not
present. Petitioner conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed
no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and
watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire
property’s title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even
the registry of property had no record of the same.The records do not support the
allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to
sell the property to him. Records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner
did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not
proffer any evidence to support his claim.
In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his
lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or
bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of
tortuous interference was never established.
Petitioner’s purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial
or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In
the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a
malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other
words,
a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer
liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved. This case is one of
damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. “Injury” is the legal invasion of a legal
right while “damage” is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.

b. Business Interruption Damages
(65 ALR4th 1128)
A.S. Watson, and Co., limited, a corporation duly organized under the laws of Great
Britain and registered in the Mercantile Register of the Philippine Islands, was
extensively engaged in the city of Manila and the Philippine Islands in the business
of manufacturing and selling soda water, lemonade, ginger ale, and other aerated
waters.

The soda water, lemonade, and other aerated waters manufactured by A. S. Watson
and Co., Limited were sold in bottles, specially made for the purpose, with their
trade mark blown on the side in large raised letters and figures, these letters and
figures being so strikingly and prominently displayed that they forcibly attract the
attention of the eye and arouse the sense of touch on the most superficial
examination. On these bottles labels were pasted also bearing the said trade mark,
and in addition the name of the particular variety of aerated water contained
therein.

It was the custom of the said A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, to give the purchaser of
its aerated waters what was called a deposit slip with each case of such goods sold,
obligating themselves to refund a stipulated amount on the return of the empty
bottles together with this deposit slip.

The defendant, Vicente Manuel, manufactured and sold a number of bottles of

aerated waters in bottles identical in form and appearance with those used by A. S.
Watson and Co., Limited, with the trade mark of that firm blown on the side in the
same manner in which it is blown on their bottles, there being no reasonable doubt
that the bottles used by the defendant were bottles which had been formerly used
by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited in their business as manufacturers and vendors of
aerated waters.

The evidence tended to prove that the aerated waters sold by S. Watson and Co.,
Limited, have a wide reputation for excellence of the Philippine Islands, and that
great care and attention to detail are exercised in their manufacture, with a view to
the production of a wholesome and pleasant beverage, and that to this end distilled
water is used exclusively in their preparation; and there is evidence in the record
which tends to prove that the aerated waters sold by the defendant were
unwholesome and of inferior quality, and that distilled water had been used in
their manufacture.

On this evidence the trial court convicted the accused of "unfair competition," and
sentenced him to pay a fine of $50, gold, and the costs of the trial, and to subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and non-payment of the fine.

c. Unfair Competition
Test of Unfair Competition
Issue:Whether or not Manuel is guilty of unfair competition.
US vs Manuel
Held:
Facts:
Yes. "Any person who in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages in
which they are contained or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature
 of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that
the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual
manufacturer or dealer, and who clothes the goods with such appearance for the
purpose of deceiving the public and defrauding another of his legitimate trade, or
any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling
such goods with a like purpose, shall be guilty of unfair competition and in order Elements of Unfair Competition
that the action shall lie under this section, actual intent to deceive the public and
defraud a competitor shall affirmatively appear on the part of the person sought to NBI-Microsoft Corp. vs Hwang
be made liable, but such intent may be inferred from similarity in the appearance
FACTS:
of the goods as packed or offered for sale to those of complaining party."\
Microsoft is a foreign corporation that owns copyright and trademark to several
The true test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been clothed
computer software. Respondents are officers of Beltron, a domestic corporation.
with an appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser
The companies entered into a Licensing Agreement which authorized Beltron, to
exercising ordinary care, and not whether a certain limited class of
reproduce and install no more than one (1) copy of microsoft software on each
purchasers with special knowledge not possess by the ordinary purchaser
computer system hard disk and the distribution and licensing of copies of the
could avoid mistake by the exercise of this special knowledge.
Microsoft Product as reproduced and/or acquired from Authorized Replicator or
The evidence or record sustains the findings of the trial court and we find no error Authorized Distributor in object code form to end users. The Agreement also
in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused, except that the sentence authorized the companies to terminate the contract if the other fails to comply
includes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and non-payment of with any of the Agreements provisions. Microsoft terminated the Agreement
the fine imposed, for which there is no authority in the act of the Commission effective for Beltron’s non-payment of royalties.
defining and penalizing "unfair competition." The sentence imposed by the trial
Microsoft learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft
court is therefore subsidiary imprisonment, and thus modified and sentenced is
software. Microsoft applied for search warrants against respondents in the
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. After expiration of
Regional Trial Court which granted the said warrants. NBI searched the premises
ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter
of Beltron and confiscated the subject articles. Basing it from the articles seized,
the record be remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.
Microsoft filed a complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) with copyright
infringement under Section 5(A) in relation to Section 29 of Presidential Decree
No. 49, as amended, (PD 49) and with unfair competition under Article 189(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.

The city prosecutor dismissed the complaint, prompting the petitioner to appeal to
the resolution to the Secretary of Justice. Petitioner alleged that from the time the
license agreement was terminated, respondent/s is/are no longer authorized to
copy/distribute/sell Microsoft products. However, respondent/s averred that the
case is civil in nature, not criminal, considering that the case stemmed only out of
the desire of complainant to collect from them the unpaid royalties and that the
contract entered into by the parties cannot be unilaterally terminated.
Furthermore, Beltron contends that respondents the articles seized from them
were either owned by others, purchased from legitimate sources, or not produced
by Microsoft. Ultimately, the SOJ affirmed the resolution of the city prosecutor. The
ruling was that the obligations between the parties is civil and not criminal
considering that Microsoft merely sought the issuance of Search Warrants to
pressure Beltron to pay its obligation under the Agreement, and the validity of
Microsofts termination of the Agreement must first be resolved by the proper
court. On the other hand, the DOJ ruled that Microsoft failed to present evidence
proving that what were obtained from respondents were counterfeit Microsoft
products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents there is probable cause to charge the respondents for
copyright infringement and unfair competition
RULING:
Yes. The term probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
The gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized
manufacturing of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of
any of the acts covered by Section 51. Hence, any person who performs any of the
acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders
himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement. We held in
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied
by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement
of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in
the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of
anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the
copyright. (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, under Section 5(A), a copyright owner is vested with the exclusive
right to copy, distribute, multiply, andsell his intellectual works.
On the other hand, the elements of unfair competition under Article
189(1)[43] of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of
another manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in
the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or
in (4) any other feature of their appearance[;]
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a
chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose[; and]
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.
The element of intent to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods or
their appearance.
Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted
well within its rights in filing the complaint before DOJ on the incriminating
evidence obtained from Beltron. Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold
that Microsoft sought the issuance of the search warrants and the filing of the
complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft.
There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior “resolution
from the proper court of whether or not the Agreement is still binding between the
parties.” Beltron has not filed any suit to question Microsoft’s termination of the
Agreement. Microsoft can neither be expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron
decides to sue before Microsoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual
property rights.
Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because
Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to produce such CD
installers The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CDs
and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a Microsoft
licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the Agreement and the
alleged question on the validity of its termination is immaterial to the
determination of Beltron’s liability for copyright infringement and unfair
competition. Beltron’s defense that the box of CD installers found in their
possession was only left to them for safekeeping is not tenable.
Distinction bet. Unfair Competition and Trademark Infringement
Del Monte Universal vs CA
Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the
United States and not engaged in business in the Philippines. The Philippines and
the United States are signatories to the Convention of Paris which grants to the
nationals of the parties rights and advantages which their own nationals enjoy for
the repression of acts of infringement and unfair competition. (Philpack) is a
domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. Del Monte
granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines
various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark
and logo. Del Monte authorized Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent
Office the Del Monte catsup bottle configuration.
Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of Registration
by the Bureau of Domestic Trade to engage in the manufacture, packing,
distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit
Catsup. The product itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the
Del Monte bottle, which respondent bought from the junk shops for recycling.
Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively
designed bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack warned it
to desist from doing so on pain of legal action. Philpack and Del Monte filed a
complaint against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition, with a prayer for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Sunshine is guilty of infringement or unfair competition for
having similar label in the catsup bottles.
(2) Whether or not Sunshine is guilty of infringement for having used Del Monte
bottles.
(1) Sunshine is guilty of infringement.
To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is important to bear in mind the
following distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition.
Although Del Monte has actual use of the bottle's configuration, the petitioners
cannot claim exclusive use thereof because it has not been registered in the
Principal Register. However, we find that Sunshine, despite the many choices
available to it and notwithstanding that the caution "Del Monte Corporation, Not to
be Refilled" was embossed on the bottle, still opted to use the petitioners' bottle to
market a product which Philpack also produces. This clearly shows the private
respondent's bad faith.
--------------------

(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark,

whereas unfair competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of
another.

(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary whereas

in unfair competition fraudulent intent is essential.

(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a

prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not
necessary.

The question is not whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label
when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article upon
the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to
likely result in his confounding it with the original.
At that, even if the labels were analyzed together it is not difficult to see that the
Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del Monte trademark. The
predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are green and red-orange, the
same with Sunshine. The word "catsup" in both bottles is printed in white and the
style of the print/letter is the same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato,
the figure nevertheless approximates that of a tomato.
(2) No, Sunshine is not guilty of infringement. (as regards the use of the bottle)
Configuration of the said bottle was merely registered in the Supplemental
Register. In the case of Lorenzana v. Macagba, the Court declared that:
(1) Registration in the Principal Register gives rise to a presumption of the validity
of the registration, the registrant's ownership of the mark and his right to the
exclusive use thereof. There is no such presumption in the registration in the
Supplemental Register. XXX
Geographically Descriptive Term
Shang Properties vs St. Francis
FACTS: St. Francis Development Corporation (SFDC), a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business and the developer of St. Francis Square
Commercial Center in Ortigas Center, filed complaint for unfair competition against
Shang Properties Realty Corporation (Shang) before the IPO - Bureau of Legal
Affairs due to Shang’s use and filing of applications for the registration of the marks
“THE ST. FRANCIS TOWER” and “THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRILA PLACE” for use
relative to Shang’s business, particularly the construction of permanent buildings
or structures for residential and office purposes.
SFDC alleged that (1) it used “ST. FRANCIS: to identify numerous property
development projects in Ortigas Center and (2) as a use of its continuous projects
in Ortigas Center and real estate business, it has gained substantial goodwill with
the public that consumers and traders closely identify the mark with its property
development projects.

Registration in the Principal Register is constructive notice of the registrant's claim
of ownership, while registration in the Supplemental Register is merely proof of
actual use of the trademark and notice that the registrant has used or appropriated
it.
On the other hand, Shang contended that the mark with its property cannot be
exclusively owned by SFDC since the marks is geographically descriptive of the
goods or services for which it is intended to be used.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Shang Properties is guilty of unfair competition. -------------

(2) Whether the mark “ST. FRANCIS” acquires a secondary meaning warranting
SFDC’s right to its exclusive use.

HELD: (1) NO. Shang is not guilty of unfair competition. Unfair competition is the
passing off (of palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods
or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and
probable effect of deceiving the public.

In other words, it is when he gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of
his competitors with the intention of deceiving the public, that the goods are those
of his competitor.

In this case, the elements of fraud is wanting, hence, there can be no unfair
competition.

There is no evidence that (1) Shang gave their goods/services the general
appearance that it was SFDC which offering the same to the public (2) Shang
employed any means to induce SFDC’s goods/services; and (3) Shang made any
false statement or commit acts tending to discredit the goods/services offered by
SFDC.

The mark “ST. FRANCIS” is geographically descriptive in nature, thus, it cannot be

exclusively appropriated unless a secondary meaning is acquired. Therefore, Shang
is not guilty of unfair competition.

(2) NO. The mark ‘ST. FRANCIS” did not acquire secondary meaning. Descriptive
geographical terms are in the public domain in the sense that every seller should
have the right to inform customers of the geographical origin of his goods.

A geographical descriptive term is any noun or adjective that designates

geographical location and would tend to be regarded by buyers as
descriptive of geographic location of origin of the goods or services. A
geographically descriptive term can indicate any geographic location on
earth, such as continents, nations, regions, states, cities, streets and
addresses.

Under Section 123.2 of the IP Code, specific requirements have to be met in order
to conclude that geographically descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning,
to wit: (a) the secondary meaning must have arisen as a result of substantial
commercial use of a mark in the Philippines; (b) such use must result in the
distinctiveness of the mark insofar as the goods or the products are concerned; and
(c) proof of substantially exclusive and continuous commercial use in the
Philippines for five (5) years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness Remedies; what to prove
is made. Unless secondary meaning has been established, a geographically
descriptive mark, due to its general public domain classification, is perceptibly La Cosiedad Germinal vs Nubla (refer to class digest)
disqualified from trademark registration.
Del Rosario vs Quiogue
In this case, SFDC was not able to prove its compliance with the above-mentioned
requirements. While it is true that SFDC had been using the mark since 1992, its Facts:
use thereof has been merely confined to its realty projects within the Ortigas
Center. As its use thereof has been merely confined to a certain locality.
Petronilo del Rosario (del Rosario) owns an undertaker's establishment known as
"La Funeraria Paz," on the Calzada de Bilibid (originally at Nos. 533 and 535), in
the district of Santa Cruz, for nine years previous to the entry or registration of said
name in the registry on the 14th of January, 1909. His branch establishments at No.
100 Calle Alix, in the district of Sampaloc, and Nos. 148 and 150 of Calle Ilaya, in
the district of Tondo also bear the same name.
The main establishment which used to be on Calzada de Bilibid (now named ‘Paz’)
was already transferred to Nos. 513 and 515 on the same street. The old premises
(Nos. 533, 535 and 537) were now occupied by Vicente Quiogue (Quiogue),
operating a similar undertaker's establishment, under the same "La Nueva
Funeraria Paz," with a sign bearing the said name placed in a most conspicuous
spot, which name he also used in his advertisements in the local papers.
The name being almost the same, and the establishment being situated in the same
place where "La Funeraria Paz" had been located and known for nine years, these
facts have actually deceived those who, intending to send their orders to "La
Funeraria Paz" of Petronilo del Rosario, inadvertently employed "La Nueva
Funeraria Paz" of Vicente Quiogue, and the said establishment thus succeeded in
obtaining benefits which should have gone to the real establishment whose
services were sought. In view of the foregoing, del Rosario prayed that the Court of
First Instance of Manila issue a preliminary injunction and another final one,
prohibiting Quiogue from using the name "Funeraria Paz" in his establishment, and
that the latter be adjudged to pay P500 as losses and damages, and the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff had acquired the exclusive right to use the word “Paz”
in his trade name against any other person in the same street by reason of the long
time he had used the said word, and by virtue of the recording of the same in the
registry of trade-marks and trade-names.
4.
Ruling:
YES.
The defendant-appellant heavily relied on section 2 of Act No. 666 of the Philippine
Commission, which states that:
“Provided, That a designation or part of a designation which relates only to the
name, quality, description of the merchandise or geographical place of its
production or origin cannot be the subject of a trade-mark.
In accordance with the foregoing, the defendant contends that he cannot be
prevented from using the word "Funeraria," a generic name of the trade, and it was
so admitted at the trial; but as the name "Paz," does not appear that it is a
"geographical name of the place of production or origin of an article," as in the
examples of names rejected in the decisions.
The court is not persuaded. "Paz" is a name which has been used by the plaintiff to
designate his establishment, not necessarily taken from the name of the street on
which it is situated at the present time; the word "Paz" is also applied to his
establishments situated on Calle Ilaya in Tondo, and on Calle Alix in Sampaloc, and
is still so used.
The trial court concluded that the use of the words "Funeraria Paz" answered no
other purpose than that of making it easy to mistake the defendant's establishment
for that of the plaintiff formerly located in the same place, or so that it might be
considered as its successor; that the addition of "La Nueva" was nothing more than
a tick employed by the defendant in order to covertly appropriate the trade name
of the plaintiff; that the very fact of adding "La Nueva" to the prominent words
"Funeraria Paz" on the sign shows how fully convinced he was that, without such
an addition, he could not use the said sign which he now considers as a "generic
name of the place of production or origin" referred to in said Act No. 666; that the
lowering of rates, together with all the circumstances set forth, tended to establish
a competition in bad faith; and that the results are as shown by the defendant in his
claim for damages by reason of the preliminary injunction, which prevented him
for obtaining such beneficial results.
--------------------------
Other related Laws
(See NCC Art 28; RPC Art 189; Intellectual Property Code Sec 217)
Political Relations
a. Violation of rught to suffrage
See NCC Art 32
US Vs Valero
Facts:
On July 1907, the accused, who was then municipal president of Jamindan,
made an inspection of the barrio of San Juan, situated in said municipality,
accompanied by two policemen armed with rifles. When he entered the
house of Gregorio Maximo he requested the latter to vote for Jose Altavas
for member of the Assembly. Upon refusal of Maximo, as he already
promised to vote for another, the accused became furious and sought to
intimidate him, threatening that if he voted for anybody but Altavas, he
would find himself at the point of a gun, that he would learn that the
accused was the one who governed in Jamindan.
After the election, Maximo was taken from his house by a couple of
Constabulary at the instigation of the accused. The accused ordered the
Constabulary to punish Maximo, and, after they had bound him to a tree,
they proceeded to maltreat and beat him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the threats proved were sufficient under the law to justify
a conviction.

HELD:
YES. We do not deem an argument necessary to demonstrate that the court
below was right in its conclusions of law. We simply call attention to the
language Section 30 of Act No. 1582, the terms of which are too clear to
require comment:

"Any person who, by any wrongful means, shall prevent or attempt to

prevent any voter from freely and fully exercising his right to vote, . . . shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than
one year, or by a fine of not less that two hundred pesos nor more than five
hundred pesos or both, in the discretion of the court."

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs against the
Appellant. So ordered.

----------
See Ulep EPA book pg 409
b. Violation of other Political Rights, eg. Freedom of
speech,press,assembly, and religion
Art 32 NCC; ART 132 &133 RPC
Alberca vs Ver
FACTS:
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then
Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In
compliance thereof, the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids,
certain members of the raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were arrested
without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period
after their arrest, they were arrested without denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel,
through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver.
Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of
habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners’
detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state
a cause of action against respondents.
On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the
case. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On
May 11, 1984, the trial court, without acting on the motion to set aside the
Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against
petitioners. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC,
petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985,
seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court’s resolutions and
order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution;
(2) Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit
for acts done in the performance of official duties and functions;
(3) Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat
superior, be answerable for damages jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have
been violated.
HELD:
(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
(PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended
Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when
the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises
from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving
the exercise of powers or authority arising from martial law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought
within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends
petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it
does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their private belongings,
the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of
the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino
of Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were
merely responding to their duties, as they claim, “to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance
with Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial
Law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch
pre-emptive strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But this
cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission
untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress
upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and
protected by the Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or
employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the
constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to
protect the Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right,
or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic
institutions and imperil their very existence. What is meant is that in
carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
must be observed; otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to
unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle of mind is just
as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle
is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned.
(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this
case. It has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent
or to master and servant relationships. No such relationship exists
superiors of the military and their subordinates. However, the decisive
factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an
officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not
the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well
as indirectly responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
---------------------------
MHP Garments vs CA
FACTS:
MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms,
supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP
was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies." MHP received information that Agnes Villa Cruz,
Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de Guzman, an employee
of MHP, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a
report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). De Guzman, Captain Renato M.
Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men then went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they
seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed
private respondents. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel
to MHP for safekeeping. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair
competition was filed against private respondents. The Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. He also
ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go
personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even
then, not all the seized items were returned. The other items returned
were of inferior quality. Private respondents then filed a case against MHP
and de Guzman for sums of money and damages. The trial court ruled for
the private respondents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision with modification.
ISSUE:
1. Is there a valid search and seizure?
2. Is MHP Garments Inc. liable for the search and seizure conducted by
the Philippine Constabulary?
RULING:
1. NO. In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any warrant.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrantless search can only be undertaken
under the following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and
seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received
information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts
items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are
not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de
Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents.
They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the
raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed
illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of
the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows
there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply
for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for
a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they
took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to
violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal.
There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search
has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched." These facts and circumstances were
not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search
and seizure.
2. YES.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages.
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they
instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scouting supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:
…it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC
soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These
circumstances should answer the trial court's query — posed in its
decision now under consideration — as to why the PC soldiers
immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner)
corporation.
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee.
Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl
scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was
liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner
corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably
seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9,
1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting
items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID
PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to
apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of
Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest
and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be
used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. Orders
the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions.
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably
failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts
of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private
respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient
needs. Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure
of respondents' goods without any warrant.
Lui vs Matillano(full text)
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44768 which reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21.2
The Antecedents
Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa
visited his aunt, his father’s older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily
Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur. On May 2, 1988, Lariosawas
employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with
a monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and
King Kiao and was located at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw
Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime
and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the
mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store
owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Ben’s nephew. Aside
from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.
Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his
employer every morning before going to work and in the afternoon, in
exchange for free meals and lodging. There were occasions when Lariosa
stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with
them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao Savings Bank in
Bansalan.
On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the
day off. He went to the house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her
husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested until the next
day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on
October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated.
Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned
Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor. Lariosa
decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiao’s
house.
On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to
collect his backwages from Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa
withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan City
and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousin’s place, at Quimpo
Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair
of Rayban sunglasses for P900.00.
On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at
New Matina, Davao City, but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On
November 4, 1988, he returned to Nancy’s house and stayed there until the
next day, November 5, 1988.
That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in
cash at the store. Ben reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto
Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after
Lariosa’s employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered
that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the
culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the
side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of
Pagsa and Malang to retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with
them to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed, they borrowed Lui’s Ford
Fierra for their transportation. The vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall
where Pagsa alighted on the pretext that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa,
Rene, and his wife remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and
informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.
After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa
and two others, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he
wanted to talk, and asked the latter to go with him. Pagsa urged Lariosa to
go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Lui’s vehicle. The car
stopped in front of Lui’s house, where the latter alighted and went inside,
while his companions and Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui returned,
he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with the
weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The
group went to Ben’s house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as
they drove towards the store.
Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen
Ben’s money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the
comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an
attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to
admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom
(PNP) based in Davao City.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No.
MRF-A-004-88 dated November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow
up a theft case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m."
Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters
and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He
then left the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the
corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.
In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on
board. One of them handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to
open the store with the use of the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as
ordered, one of Lui’s companions took his picture. Another picture was
taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door. Lariosa was then
boarded in the police car and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and
Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to the police car driven by
Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Lui once more
mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he stole
P45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal what he did with the money.
When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before, Lariosa
replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriend’s parents at
New Matina, Davao City. The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they
asked Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept thereat. Nancy
replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The
policemen took these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom
headquarters where Lui and his two companions were waiting.
Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa
replied that he used to stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses
Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then brought
Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Lui’s companions, Alan
Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the
Matillano residence.
Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in
civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses
Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow. With
handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into
the house. They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosa’s
aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosa’s sister,
Paulina’s daughter-in-law, Virginia, the latter’s sister, Erlinda, and a seven-
month-old baby. Paulina was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, "Mrs., we are
authorities. We are here to get something." Paulina remonstrated, "Why
are you meddling (manghilabot)?"
Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because
something might happen. He then said, "All right, where is your aparador
because we are getting something." Paulina told Lui to wait for her
husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a
hurry. Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions,
Mendoza and Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located.
Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two
companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies’ shoes belonging to
Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two
polo shirts which belonged to the latter’s children. They also ordered
Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his companions took her
old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lui and his two
companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of
the room, one of Lui’s companions recognized her as Lariosa’s sister. Lui
and his companions brought her along with them as they left the house.
Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach
ached and she was on the verge of losing consciousness. Concerned,
Erlinda massaged Paulina’s stomach. However, Erlinda had to leave
because she was worried about her mother. Paulina then went to the
kitchen, prepared hot water and put a soothing ointment on her stomach
to relieve the pain.
In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police
Station and caused an entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had
recovered the following items from the Matillano residence -- one pair of
colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one floor mat costing P290.00; a pair
of black ladies’ shoes worth P126.00; and another pair of ladies’ shoes
worth P69.00.
At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons
identifying themselves as policemen had gained entry into their house and
took the following: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; two pairs of pants; two
floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace;
one ring; and old coins.3
At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police
blotter that earlier that day, at 4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his
house: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two floor mats; two
pairs of ladies’ shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and, old
coins, without his and his wife’s consent and without a search warrant.4 In
the meantime, Doroteo Barawan, officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Barangay Captain, filed a complaint against Kim Kiao, et al., based on the
complaint of Paulina, docketed as Barangay Case No. 168.5
On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where
he stated that he stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao
United Products, and that he used part of the money to buy appliances, a
Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies’ shoes, a Seiko wristwatch,
two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.6
On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.7 The trial court
rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime
charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured
Lariosa’s confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with
police authorities.8 The trial court, likewise, found that Lui had an ulterior
motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:
What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the
burden of this charged against the accused despite want of any appreciable
evidence, can be gathered in the record, as indicating the fear of
complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against him in the
Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment,
without any sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint
was intended to support complainant’s ground against any possible
complaint, the accused might file against him with the Department of
Labor by way of anticipation.9
On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following
exhibits:
Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June
14, 1989, one Eulogio Matillano, accused’s uncle, is hereby allowed to get
or to retrieve exhibits "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," and "M," consisting of Sony
Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban sunglasses; two (2) bundles of
floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies’ shoes; and Seiko
Actus wristwatch.10
Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery
against Lui, Peter Doe, John Doe and Alan Mendoza. An Information was,
thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
880-B. On December 13, 1988, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of
the accused therein. Upon reinvestigation, however, the Provincial
Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989, recommending that
the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but that the charges be
forwarded to the Judge Advocate General’s Office for possible
administrative sanctions against Rojas.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
the complaint against the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is a member of
the Integrated National Police, this office is without jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint against him pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1850. Therefore, let the complaint against Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its
annexes, including a copy of the resolution of the undersigned, be
forwarded to the Judge Advocate General’s Office at Camp Catitipan, Davao
City, for whatever action it may take.11
The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The
National Police Commission, thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating
Rojas of administrative liability for the complainant’s failure to
substantiate the charges.12 The Commission held that Rojas was merely
complying with the mission order issued to him when he accompanied Lui
and the latter’s two companions to the Matillano residence.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre
H. Bello III dismissed the petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutor’s
resolution filed by Paulina Matillano. The Secretary of Justice, likewise,
denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.
In a parallel development, Lariosa’s parents, as well as Paulina Matillano,
filed a complaint for robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or
arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al., with the Commission of
Human Rights docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS. In a
Resolution dated December 4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission
recommended, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is
sufficient prima facie evidence:
1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; and
2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile,
as defined under Art. 128 of the same code.13

The Proceedings in the Trial Court
On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil
complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against
Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged the following:
3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, for several years now. They are law-abiding and
peaceful citizens in the community;
4. That at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while
plaintiff husband was away from his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife was there tending the house, defendants,
without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru intimidation
succeeded in searching the house owned by the plaintiff after which they
brought with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of
pants, two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova wrist watch, one necklace
(sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and several old coins, without the consent
of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items taken;
5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one
Elinito Lariosa but defendants thru the use of naked power and brute
force, illegally searched the house of the herein plaintiffs in gross violation
of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;
6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally
search the house of plaintiffs and then taking with them the items
mentioned above without even the benefit of any receipt is not only
violative of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also of
Article 32 of the Civil Code;
7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental
anguishes, wounded feelings, deprivation of the properties taken,
besmirched reputation, and fright for which reason defendants should be
made to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00;
8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of
example or correction for the public good, defendants should be made to
pay jointly and severally exemplary damages in the amount of
P300,000.00;
9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of
counsel for an agreed attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award
plus per diem of P1,000.00 per court appearance;
10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not
less than P10,000.00;14
They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their
favor, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment
issue ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:
1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Litigation expenses of P10,000.00;
4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;
5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity.15
In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia,
that they did not conduct a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that
plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter the house and even
brought out pairs of pants. They added that the other items were brought
out by Lariosa’s sister and that they took only one (1) floor mat, two (2)
pairs of ladies’ shoes, and one (1) pair of blue pants.16
The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed
them to enter their house, and with Lariosa’s sister, voluntarily turned
over the items declared in the complaint. They testified that no violence,
threats or intimidation were even committed by them against Paulina
Matillano. Defendant Rojas further testified that he was merely complying
with the Mission Order issued to him when he entered the house of the
plaintiffs in the company of the other defendants, and that he remained in
the ground floor while the other defendants retrieved the goods from
plaintiff Matillano in the second floor of the house.
On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of
the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their claims. The trial court
also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court gave
credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff
Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that
the latter voluntarily turned over the subject items to them. The trial court
took into account the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Secretary of
Justice, the National Police Commission, as well as the order of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No.
880-B.
The Case on Appeal
The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where
the appellants contended, thus:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA
MATILLANO VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE
HOUSE BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF HER NEPHEW ELINITO LARIOSA
WHO WAS HANDCUFFED;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA
MATILLANO WAS THE ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE
BANSALAN POLICE STATION.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE
CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS –
APPELLEES.17
On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the
decision of the RTC. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants-
appellees jointly and severally:
1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
as exemplary damages; and
2. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), as attorney’s fees; and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The appellate court denied the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the
said decision. The appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the
decision.
Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals contending that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-
HONORED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT
FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE AND
DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
THAT TRIED THE CASE;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANO’S
RESIDENCE, IN DISREGARD OF THE EXCULPATORY FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT MRS. MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED
PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE.19
The Issues
The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not
respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her
house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry
owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable
for damages to the respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the petitioners’
liability to the respondents.
Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court
shall delve into and resolve them simultaneously.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of some
exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts of the trial court are
substantially different from those of the appellate court, and the resolution
of such issues are determinative of the outcome of the petition.20
The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in discarding the factual findings of the trial court. Contrary to the
disquisitions of the appellate court, the petitioners assert that the
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui are peripheral.
Lui did not conduct any search in the second floor of the respondent’s
house and even if he did so, respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right
against unreasonable search when she allowed the petitioners to enter.
According to the petitioners, the respondents failed to prove that they
forced their way into the house of the respondents, and that the facts and
circumstances which the appellate court found the trial court to have
overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the
factual findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the
appellate court failed to discern that the action filed by the respondents
with the trial court was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery against
Lariosa, the respondents’ nephew.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative
weight to the evidence of the respondents. It stated in its decision that the
trial court erred in giving credence and probative weight to the
testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the
appellate court found that the trial court had overlooked facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, would have altered the
court’s decision. The appellate court gave weight to the findings of the trial
court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.21
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and
Mendoza, guns drawn and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the
kitchen door and barged into the house of the respondents. They
proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her
vehement protests, and because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she might
be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the
petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their house. The foregoing
was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, thus:
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?
A I know him.
Q Why do you know Eli Lui?
A Because he is from Bansalan.
Q On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?
A I was in our house.
Q At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you
notice any unusual incident that took place in your house?
A There was.
Q What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?
A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.
Q Where did they enter?
A They entered through the kitchen.
Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?
A I was in our sala.
Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic)
your house?
A I was afraid.
Q Aside from fear, what did you do?
A One of them suddenly said, "Mrs., we are authorities."
ATTY. TAN:
Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.
ATTY. SUARIO:
She is responding the question because my question is, "Aside from fear,
what did you do?" and according to this witness, she was not able to do
anything because one of those who entered…(not continued)
COURT:
I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q What did these persons do when they entered your house?
A One of them said, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something
from your house."
Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they
were persons in authority?
A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I
know (sic) him later to be Leo Rojas.
Q Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas?
A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo
Rojas.
Q What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?
A He was in civilian clothes.
Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your
house?
A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was
also with them in the name of Elinito Lariosa.
Q Who else, Mrs. Matillano?
A Eli Lui.
…
ATTY. SUARIO:
At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word "manghilabot" be
incorporated.
COURT:
So, the word is "interfering" or "meddling." You record the word
"manghilabot." Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?

ATTY. SUARIO: A They did not.

Q When you said "manghilabot," what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano? Q Who first entered the house among the five (5)?

A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and
why are they doing that (manghilabot)? whom I recognized was Eli Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.

Q When you said those remarks, what else happened? Q Was your door opened at that time?

A It was Eli Lui who answered, "Mrs., do not answer anymore because A It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.
something might happen." (Basig madisgrasya).
Q But you can open it without kicking the door?
ATTY. SUARIO:
A Yes, sir.
"Madisgrasya," Your Honor, is more than something.
Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
ATTY. SUARIO:
A Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?
Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?
Q Who were armed among the five (5)?
A He said, "All right, where is your aparador because we are getting
something." And I even told him that we should wait for my husband but A All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.
they did not agree because they said they are in a hurry.
Q You are very sure of that?
Q And after that, what else happened?
A I am very sure.23
A I accompanied him upstairs.
Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his
Q You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you cohorts took her personal things, and those of her family’s, from the
accompanied upstairs. second floor of the house:

A Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions. Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were
upstairs, what happened upstairs?
Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their
names? A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats,
the pair of leather shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let
A Yes, sir.22 me open the chest and when it was already open they rummaged through
it and they got my old Bulova watch, my necklace, my ring and a coinsita,
… old gold coins.

ATTY. TAN: Q When you said "coinsita," what is "coinsita"?

Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your A Old coins.
house. When you said suddenly, will you please describe how did they
enter the house? Q After taking all of these things, what else happened?

A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the A They went downstairs.24
house.
…
Q 1988?
Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken
from your house, do you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that A 1988.
were taken?
Q And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?
A Yes.
A My children.
Q And there were also two (2) floor mats?
Q What are the names of your children?
A Yes, that is true.
A Allan and Danilo.
Q One (1) Bulova wristwatch?
Q Where is Allan residing?
A Yes.
A During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.
Q One (1) necklace?
Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in
A Yes. Bansalan?

Q Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes? A No more.

A Yes. Q How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?

Q Two (2) pairs of pants? A He was living in Sta. Cruz.

A Yes. Q He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?

Q One (1) ring? A He was still single then.

A Yes. Q But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?

Q Who owns these two (2) pairs of lady’s (sic) shoes? A Yes.

A That was mine. Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?

Q What were the color of the shoes? A My children also.

A Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum). Q You are referring to Allan and Danilo?

Q Where did you buy that shoes? A No, because I still have so many children.

A In Davao City. Q So, who owns these two (2) pants?

Q What store in Davao City? A Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.

A NCCC. Q Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?

Q What particular date when you bought that shoes? A In our house.

A I think it was in the month of November. Q How about these two (2) t-shirts?
A Also owned by my children. A More.

Q Are you referring to Allan and Danilo? Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and
pants?
A They used to wear that.
A Yes.
Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he
was then residing in Tacloban? Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of
clothes, pants, polo shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2)
ATTY. SUARIO: polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere taken?

May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban. A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still
usable the good ones.
COURT:
Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched
All right. your trunk?

A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually A I was ordered to open the trunk.
they left some of their clothes inside our aparador.
Q Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?
Q These polo shirts were still new?
A Eli Lui.25
A Already used.
The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the
Q How about the pants? Barangay Captain26 and filed a complaint against petitioner Lui and his
cohorts.27
A The other one is already used and the other one is new.
The petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and
Q How about the floor mats? their cohorts inside the house and voluntarily gave their personal
belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of respondent Paulina
A That is mine. Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.

Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or The petitioners’ attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility
aparador, is that correct? and courtesy to respondent Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into
account petitioner Lui’s state of mind before he and petitioner Rojas and
A Yes, that is true. their cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao City, and
proceeded to the house of the respondents in Bansalan. Before they left
Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein? Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled Lariosa with the acquiescence of the
police authorities, and forced him to give an uncounselled extrajudicial
A Many. confession. This was the finding of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88:

Q Could you say one (1) dozen? Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused
denied having anything to do with the lost money of the complainant.
A It cannot be counted. Later, he was turned over to the police for investigation and there without
affording accused with his right to counsel, he was interrogated orally and
Q Could you say three (3) dozens? was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought items which
the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to
A It is really full of dress. the complainant’s establishment and forced to do re-enactment of the act
of robbery, without accused again afforded the right to counsel. Pictures
Q Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?
were taken during the re-enactment while accused was handcuffed, as
shown in the pictures taken by the police.
Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial
statement (Exhibit A), no longer able to bear the pain of the mauling to him
by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of maltreating the accused even in the
presence of the guards in the jail and seriously threatening accused to
admit ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New Matina,
SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious
threatening words of accused’s companion in the jail, that if he will refuse
to sign his alleged confession, he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui
with the police.
Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui
seems to have an open hand in the prosecution of accused. He was the one
who called the police to arrest him, even without a warrant of arrest.
Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied on him in the
investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode in
a car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the
establishment of complainant during the re-enactment in going to
Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by accused out of the
money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows (sic) [that] the police
despite justification, that they do not have enough facilities (sic), [had]
gone astray in conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any
possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of making the scale of justice bend in his
favor, by manifesting control over the police power of investigation highly
and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and interests of the accused.28
If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence
of police authorities, he would not have cared a whit in barging into the
respondents’ house with petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, and
his cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners and their cohorts wanted to insure that their caper would
succeed. Hence, they did not coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station
when they went to the respondents’ house with their intention to divest
them of their belongings.
Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to
him by Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the
petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to "follow up a theft case
within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City." The
petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to commit or tolerate
the commission of a crime, such as violation of domicile as defined in
Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
ART. 128. Violation of domicile— The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling
against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found
therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the
premises, shall refuse to do so.
If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not
constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the
search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to
the second floor of the respondents’ house and himself conduct a search
therein, he allowed them to search the premises without a warrant. The
petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in
the house of the respondents, much less divest the latter of their personal
belongings. As a police officer, it was petitioner Rojas’ duty to prevent the
commission of crimes in his presence, and to arrest the persons
committing such crimes.
The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on
the following grounds: (a) she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a
businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b) the occupants of the
respondents’ house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were
all women; (c) the respondents failed to report the incident to the
Bansalan police authorities; and, (d) the provincial prosecutor’s resolution
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880-B for robbery
against the petitioners, which was sustained by the Secretary of Justice,
and the ruling of the National Police Commission exonerating petitioner
Rojas from any liability.
We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court.
First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not
stay permanently in Bansalan. He went there only to collect money from a
certain Matura and other businessmen.29 She also testified that there
were many cases against the petitioner, one of which was for arson. The
case was dismissed, but one of her neighbors was rendered missing.30 If
the petitioner, a businessman for ten years or so, had no qualms in
torturing Lariosa under the very noses of police officers, he would,
likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent Paulina Matillano
and divesting her of her personal belongings. It must be stressed that
petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a police officer from
Davao City.
Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the
occupants of the respondents’ house were all women. They must have
believed that there were male occupants; hence, barged into the house
with drawn guns.
Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillano’s sworn
statement before the Bansalan Police Station, she declared that the
petitioners were armed with guns. They threatened her life and, without
any search warrant therefor, divested her and her family of their personal
belongings against their will.31
Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain,
respondent Paulina Matillano declared that the petitioners entered their
house, that petitioner Lui pointed a gun at her, and that the petitioners and
their cohorts searched the house and carted away their personal
belongings.32 That the report made before the Barangay Captain and
petitioner Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement are not as complete as her
testimony before the trial court is understandable. Affidavits are usually
taken ex parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate, but they
do not detract from the credibility of the witness.33 An entry in the police
blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want of suggestions or
inquiries, without the aid of which the victim may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that
pertain to the subject.34 The same principle applies to entries in the
barangay blotter.
Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and
quasi-administrative agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present
case, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Justice,35 found no probable cause for robbery against the petitioners
because they had no intent to rob, but merely to recover the properties
from the house of the respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have
been acquired by Lariosa with money stolen from his uncle, Ben.36 The
decision of the National Police Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of
grave misconduct was anchored on its finding that the petitioner was
merely performing his duty as ordered by his superior officer.37 It was
inevitable for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint for violation of
domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91-1488 because the
crime of violation of domicile was committed in Bansalan and not in Davao
City.38 In contrast, the Commission on Human Rights recommended the
indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner Rojas for
violation of domicile.39
Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil
Code, the dismissal of the complaint against the petitioners by the
Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial Court and the National
Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages
filed by the respondents against the petitioners. The action of the
respondents against the petitioners may still proceed despite the dismissal
of the criminal and administrative actions against them.
The petitioners’ contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her
right against unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant
consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable." This provision protects not only those who
appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty, who must
nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.40 The
general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with
judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes
unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional provision41
because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right.
Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in
the performance of official functions.42
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication
cannot be presumed.43 There must be clear and convincing evidence of an
actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a
constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right
exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.44 The waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every
reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights.45 The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into
her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein.46 A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law.47
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or
impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the
opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties.
However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied
waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The
petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and
intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of
the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and
seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.
Furthermore, the petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano
voluntarily handed over the articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is
no evidence that there was foreknowledge on the part of the petitioners of
the articles they wanted to retrieve from the respondents’ house. Even if
respondent Paulina Matillano did hand over the articles to the petitioner, it
was only because the petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and
intimidated her into doing so.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are
liable to the respondents for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts
respectively awarded by it. Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City,
conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns, gained entry into the
respondents’ house, and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina
Matillano. Although petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he
assented thereto by allowing petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the
second floor and divest the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners even left together after the incident.
In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,48 we had the occasion to state:
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages
for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or
private individual, thus:
"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages.
"x x x
"(9) the rights to be secure in one’s persons, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
"x x x
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudged."
"ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
"x x x
"(6) Illegal search;
"(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.
"Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional
rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral
damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In
addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded."
xxx
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It
is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To
make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is
the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have
abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in
the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put
an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort." (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the
liability of persons indirectly responsible, viz:
"[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32.
The law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly or indirectly’
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
xxx
"While it would certainly be too naïve to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated
‘directly’ should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violations." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court
correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were
indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid
pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. As
correctly observed by respondent court:
"Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing
appellees’ (respondents’) merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint
for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the
protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being
the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon
appellant (petitioner) corporation’s instance that the PC soldiers
conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances
should answer the trial court’s query— posed in its decision now under
consideration – as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the
seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation."
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee.
Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl
scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable
to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner
corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonable
seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender
 them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.49
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Aparicio vs Andal
Facts:
In five criminal cases and two civil cases pending before the respondent Judge’s court,
petitioner filed a motion for Inhibition to enjoin the respondent judge. This the latter
denied, bringing the petitioner to the SC on a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus. He avers that although the Motion for Inhibition did not
explicitly state on its face the valid grounds relied upon to support his motion, such
grounds were known to Judge Andal. He theorizes that the Judge in refusing to inhibit
himself from the cases subject of the Motion for Inhibition and in all the other cases
pending before him in which the petitioner is acting either as counsel or a party litigant,
Judge Andal violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of the law,
access to the court and speedy disposition of cases, making Judge Andal civilly liable
under Art. 32 of the new Civil Code. He asserts that because of Judge Andal’s refusal to
inhibit himself, he (petitioner) and his family suffered mental anguish and incurred
expenses for which they must be compensated.
On the other hand, Judge Andal maintains that the motion for inhibition did not cite any
valid grounds to justify his inhibition. He submits that when he denied the motion for
inhibition, he was not aware that A.M. No. RTJ-88-245 was filed against him as it was
only on November 4, 1988 when he received a resolution of this Court directing him to
comment thereon, that he first came to know about it. He describes as a mere gratuitous
assumption the petitioner’s assertion that in denying the Motion for Inhibition he was
motivated by rancor and resentment because of the certiorari and administrative cases
earlier filed against him. On this score, he asseverates that he does not normally resent
the filing of certiorari cases against him as he has neither the reason nor the luxury of
time to entertain such a feeling. Moreover, he is so preoccupied with his case load to
even think of it. He further stresses that he has nothing personal against petitioner, as he
does not know the latter personally. On the claim for damages, he submits that the same
is without basis and is purely imaginary and speculative.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when he denied the petitioner’s Motion for Inhibition in the several
criminal and civil cases subject thereof and in thereafter continuing to take cognizance of
said cases and all the other cases pending before him.
2. Whether or not Judge Andal can be held civilly liable for damages under Art. 32 of
the Civil Code in relation to the constitutional provision that all public officers must at all
times be accountable to the people.
Ruling:
(1) No.
1. Rule 137, Section 1 of the new Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Disqualification of Judges — No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.
It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated
by Judge Andal in his orders denying the same, cited no valid ground,
which fact was confirmed by the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for
the accused in the criminal cases and the defendants in the civil cases.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said motion was
not whimsical or capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite
the petitioner, as the petitioner would want this Court to believe, but
was done in the valid and judicious exercise of his function and duty
as judge.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the state of hostility being
pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary. Indeed the petitioner
had not presented any evidence to support his conclusion that the
filing of the petition for certiorari docketed as UDK 8748 and UDK
8822 and the administrative cases adverted to, caused the displeasure
of Judge Andal as to affect his impartiality in trying petitioner’s cases.
Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a
judge’s legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without
respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich."
(2) No. On his claim for damages against Judge Andal in these same
proceedings, the petitioner-lawyer invokes Art. 32 of the Civil Code
which provides in part:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
 16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature end cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his
behalf:
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from the judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.
In Aberca v. Ver, we postulated thus: "The purpose of the above codal
provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedom enshrined in the constitution. Its message is clear; no man
may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity." Under said
article judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other
penal statute. As we have earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in
denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with
the trial of the different criminal and civil cases pending before his
court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his
official acts, thus, he is not answerable for damages.
5. 9 Major Defenses to Intentional Torts (refer to syllabus)
Laws and Illustrative cases
See Art 429, NCC
US vs Anaban (Full Text)
The facts in this case, according to the information and the testimony of all the
witnesses, are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on the night of Thursday October 4, 1906, the six defendants,
accompanied by other persons, invaded the dwelling house of one Guiled,
located in the sitio of Selpang, Baguio, said Guiled being a councilor for the
barrio of Taloy of the municipality of Baguio; that the defendants demanded
from Guiled the payment of a fine of P20 because they found a horse in the
vicinity of his house, and the payment of said fine being refused, Maniguay and
Bombon, two of the defendants, bound him, while the other defendants, who
had remained on the ground floor of the house, in obedience to the orders give
by the former, seized and carried away three pigs. Cimbay, the wife of Guiled,
on seeing her husband bound and fearing that they would all be killed, jumped
out of the window and proceeded to the house of Lateng, ex-councilor of the
same barrio. Ogues, who lived nearest to the house of Guiled, having heard the
squealing of the pigs, had left his own house, and had seen the events as they
occurred at Guiled’s house, also went to the house of ex-councilor Lateng and
confirmed the statement of Cimbay. These three, Lateng, Cimbay and Ogues, the
same night or at daybreak of the following morning, proceeded to the house of
Guiled. On arrival Lateng again learned of what had passed, and then, that same
morning Friday, returned to his house.
While on the one hand the prosecution has stated the facts in the terms set
forth above, the defendants, on the other, have, with more or less uniformity,
related the affair in the terms used in his testimony by Estanislao Anaban. This
defendant says that, from the month of January of that year, he was the
president of the settlement (rancheria) of Pugo.
"We went there in search of a horse that was lost. On Thursday morning we
commenced our search and followed the trail of the animal which lead to that
place. At noon we arrived at the house of Guiled and thought it better that we
first see the councilor of the barrio. This we did; we went to see Guiled and I
asked him to help us in the search. He detailed Palos, a friend of mine, to help
us, and continued to follow the tracks of the horse. In the company of Palos, we
endeavored to find the horse and followed its tracks, and, after a while, we
found the animal tied near the house of Guiled; we then untied it, this being
done by Palos, who also took the horse away; from there we led the horse to the
house of Guiled and requested him to furnish us with a certificate showing that
the animal was found at his place. He replied: ’How can I furnish you with the
certificate? No one here knows how to write.’ As it was growing late, I begged
Guiled to allow us to remain in his house, to which he assented, whereupon
some of us started to prepare our meal, while one of our companions repaired
to the east side of Guiled’s house to obtain some bark which they needed; after
a while our said companion returned and told us that there were three pigs in a
pen. We went to the place where the pigs were and I recognized one of them as
being my own and the other two as the property of Capitan Bayasang and
Sabong, respectively. Having made this discovery I went to Guiled and asked
him from whom he obtained the animals and he replied that he had acquired
them from one Martin. After hearing his reply, I notified him that one of the pigs
belonged to me and that the others were the property of Capitan Bayasang and
Sabong, respectively, and asked him to allow me to take the animals to my
house. To this he assented, and said, moreover, that he would come along with
us to the town in order to see Martin and recover from him the money he had
paid for the pigs, and besides that he had also to collect P9 that Martin owed
him. After this conversation, it being almost dark, we prepared our supper
there, ate, and spent the night in the house of Guiled. The following day, Friday,
we took breakfast there and also our noon meal in said house, and then started
for Pugo shortly after midday, and in the company of Osteng and Guiled we
went to the office of the President."cralaw virtua1aw library
The witness further testified: That the twelve individuals who came from Pugo,
besides Osteng, Palos, and Guiled, with their respective wives, one Capitan
Saliuag whom they found already in the house and the children thereof, slept in
the house of Guiled; that they arrived at Pugo on Friday afternoon; that they
met Martin in the office of the president, where he had gone; that he (the
witness) overheard the witness saying to Martin: "Inasmuch as you are not the
owner of the pigs you sold me, you must return the money to me," and Martin
who replied: "All right, but I have no money now, I will pay you as soon as I get
it;" that Guiled had told them that he had paid 6 pesos for the three hogs and
that Guiled had passed the night of Friday at Pugo, in the house of Capitan
Guideng, taking his supper at the house of Capitan Licao and his breakfast on
Saturday morning at the house of the witness, after which he (Guiled) returned
to his house.

The judgment reads, and it is true, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is no dispute or controversy as regards the fact that the defendants had
been in the house of Guiled, nor as to the taking of the three pigs by them; and,
if these animals were taken away under the circumstances alleged by the
defendants, they have committed no crime. The testimony of the principal
witnesses is absolutely contradictory and can not be reconciled; either the
witnesses for the prosecution or those for the defense have testified
falsely."cralaw virtua1aw library
Guiled and Cimbay, his wife, Palos, and Osteng are the witnesses for the
prosecution, as to the affair which, they say, took place in the house of Guiled.
Anaban, the president of the settlement or pueblo of Pugo, and the other eleven
persons who composed the party which went out in search of two horses they
had lost, have consistently given a long detailed account of their two days’ trip,
of their stay in the house of Guiled as guests of the latter, and to whom
belonged the rice they cooked on that night, and who even gave them the meal
on Friday which was brought by four members of his settlement who returned
to Pugo with the other twelve on Friday afternoon. Guiled accompanied them
and remained at Pugo during that night until Saturday morning, when he left.
This was testified to with rare unanimity by sixteen witnesses, with the
exception of slight discrepancies as regards the stay of Guiled at Pugo from
Friday afternoon to Saturday morning.
There is one very important point in the case. Lateng sent Licao, an Igorot, to
Baguio to give information as to what had happened in the house of Guiled.
Licao testified that he was sent by Lateng, Cimbay, and Ogues. Licao left Taloy
on Friday morning and reached Baguio in the afternoon. The Attorney-General
says in his brief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On arriving at Baguio in the afternoon, Licao proceeded at once to the tribunal
to give the above said information. Naturally, Licao knew nothing more of what
had occurred in the house of Guiled than what he had been told by Cimbay and
Ogues, each one of whom ran out for help as soon as they saw Guiled tied up, so
that, when Lical arrived at Baguio, he could do nothing but notify, as he did, the
municipal secretary, Santiago Sales, that something unusual was taking place in
the house of Guiled, whereupon Sales wrote and handed to Licao the following
letter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘Baguio, October 6, 1906. — Dear Belet, councilor of Taloy, Benguet, — With
reference to the information given me by the person you have sent over here,
regarding the presence of certain strangers in that locality, you may forward
them to this office, whatever purpose they have or things they are looking for,
especially if they come from other provinces and are unknown to you — (Sgd.)
Santiago Sales, municipal secretary.’ (Exhibit A.)
"Although this letter — the Attorney-General continues — is dated October 6, it
must have been written on Friday the 5th of October, on which date Licao says
he arrived at Baguio, received the letter and went back to Taloy, though he only
got as far as Atab. Santiago Sales himself is very certain that he sent the letter
on the day previous to the arrival of Guiled at Baguio, and we find no
inconsistency in the testimony as regards the fact that Guiled reached Baguio
on the afternoon of Saturday the 6th of October." (Brief, p. 8.)
This letter written by Sales, which must have been in the possession of Guiled
or someone of the barrio of Taloy, was found at Pugo and produced by the
defense during the trial. How this happened has not been explained at the trial.
Licao testified that he left Baguio on Friday night, spent the night at Atab, and
then proceeded to Pugo, in compliance with the instructions he received from
Sales. To judge by the inconsistencies found in his answers, while testifying
during the taking of the evidence in rebuttal, this witness must have been
greatly harassed. It appears that his testimony was controlled by the dominant
idea that he did not go farther than Atab, in which place, it first appears he slept
twice, but later he says he remained there only once, on Friday night; it must
have been another controlling idea in his testimony that he did not reach Pugo
until Sunday, and that he slept in his house on Saturday night, not taking into
account the serious happening at the house of his councilor and not taking any
pains in delivering at once the letter to Guiled. The following questions were
propounded by the court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Did you meet any of your acquaintances while traveling from Atab to your
home?
A. Yes, I met Guiled.
"Q. Was there anybody with him?
A. He was alone, I wanted to give him the letter, but he told me to take it to
Pugo."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defense put the following questions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. What orders did you receive from the secretary when he gave you the
letter?
A. He said nothing.
"Q. Did the municipal secretary tell you to hand the letter to Guiled?
A. Yes.
"Q. Did you give the letter to Guiled?
A. No, because he told me that he could not read.
"Q. You delivered the letter to Guiled, did you not?
A. Yes, I did, but on seeing it, he told me to take it to Pugo because he could not
read.

"Q. Where did you meet Guiled?
A. Between Baguio and Taloy.
"Q. When you went to Pugo, did you see Guiled there?
A. No.
"Q. Where was he when you were at Pugo?
A. He must have been here (in Baguio) on Saturday the 6th because I met him
on the road, on his way to this place.
"Q. Is it not true that you went to Pugo because they told you in Taloy that
Guiled was there?
A. No; I went there on account of the letter.
"Q. When you met Guiled, did you tell him that the letter was for him?
A. No.
"Q. Did not the municipal secretary of Baguio tell you to deliver the letter to
Guiled?
A. Yes, he told me to hand it to Guiled, and for this reason I handed it to him
when I met him, but he told me to take it to Pugo because he could not read.
"Q. Did you tell Guiled that the municipal secretary had instructed you to
deliver the letter to him?
A. Yes, I told him, but he could not read and I took the letter to Pugo." (Pp. 466
to 468.)
The letter and the testimony of the witness throw much light on the two
versions which appear from the records in regard to the facts which really
happened in Selpang and Pugo, on Thursday and Friday, the 4th and the 5th of
October, 1906.
If the defendants are really guilty, if they have committed the crime of robbery
en cuadrilla, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity being present,
they should be sentenced to the penalty of presidio mayor in its maximum
degree, and the chief of the band, Anaban, to the penalty next higher. Anaban,
however, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, and the others to six
months and one day.
The letter shows that the defendants went to Selpang for the purpose of looking
for something, not to steal, and this is what was communicated to the secretary.
It is unnatural and improbable that Guiled, after having been abused by the
people from Pugo, should have sent to them the very letter which is the reply to
the complaint he made against them. Guiled must have been really present at
Pugo on Saturday; he must have received Sales’ letter there, and from thence he
must have left for Baguio, perhaps for fear of being complained of. On arrival at
Baguio, and if he had made any complaint of that abuse and robbery en
cuadrilla with arms, the municipal would have necessarily referred him to the
court of the justice of the peace for the preliminary investigation. Said
proceeding could not have lasted until 18th day of October.
The justice of the peace stated that he remembered that the defendants
testified that they had gone to Selpang to look for some horses, and the
testimony of Anaban during the preliminary investigation having been
produced by the defense, it appears in every way consistent with the testimony
which, in regard to their trip to Selpang, he and his companions have so
uniformly given. The innocence of the defendants is evident.
We, therefore, reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts and acquit
the defendants with the costs of both instances de oficio.
US vs Brobst (Full text)
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work
on a mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number
of native laborers. Mann discharged one of these number of native laborers. Mann discharged
one of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the premises,
and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he was a thief and a disturbing
element with the other laborers. A few days afterwards, some time after 6 o'clock on the
morning of the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three of four others, went to the
mine to look for work. The defendant, who at that time was dressing himself inside his tent,
which was erected on the mining property, when he caught sight of Saldivar, ordered him off
the place, exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move to
leave, and although the order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the defendant,
whereupon the latter became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a
powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where
the handle of Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being
struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered. ( dio vueltas - spun around helplessly) and
without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's house, which stood about
200 yards (100 brazas) away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached
the door of the house, and was buried some two or three days
later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide ( homicidio), marked with
extenuating circumstances, defined in subsections 3 and 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, in
that the defendant "had no intention of committing so grave an injury as that which he
inflicted," and that he struck the blow "under such powerful excitement as would naturally
produce entire loss of reason and self-control." Sentence of six years and one day of prision
mayor was imposed, and from this sentence defendant appealed to this
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for the appellant, relying mainly on appellant's claim that he did not strike Saldivar,
and that he merely pushed him lightly with the black of his open hand, and relying also on the
lack of satisfactory proof of the existence of lesions or external marks of violence on the body
of the deceased, contend: first, that the evidence fails to sustain a finding that the deceased
came to his death as a result of injuries inflicted by the defendant; and, second, that even if it
be a fact that the defendant, in lying his hand upon the deceased, contributed to his death,
nevertheless, since the defendant had a perfect right to eject the deceased from the mining
property, he can not be held criminally liable for unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful
exercise of this right.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Two witnesses, Dagapdap and Yotiga, who were standing close by the time, swore positively
that the blow was delivered with the closed fist, from the shoulder ( de dentro para fuera),
and that it was a hard blow; Dagapdap testifying that, "Al pegar el puñetazo, Simeon dio
vuelta, y despues se marcho (when the blow was struck, Simeon staggered and afterwards
went away); and Yotiga that "despues de dar el golpe se retrocedio y levanto los brazos"
(after the blow was struck, he backed away and threw up his arms). The testimony of these
witnesses is clear, positive, and definite and is wholly uncontradicted, excepted for the
improbable story told by the accused in his own behalf, when he testified that seeing Saldivar
standing outside his tent, he told him twice to go away and then stepped up to him and
pushed him lightly with the back of his hand, which came in contact with the handle of
Saldivar's bolo, but not with sufficient force to push him back or do him any injury. If it had
been necessary to use force to compel Saldivar to leave the place, it is at least highly
improbable that the accused approaching him from the front would have lightly placed the
back of his open right hand on Saldivar's left side, without attempting to seize him, or to
compel him to give around.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Pedro Leocampo, the only other witness called at the trial who appears to have been present
when the incident occurred corroborated the testimony of the witness Dagapdap and Yotiga
as to all that occurred prior to the actual infliction of the blow, which he did not see. He
testified that at the time when the accused, standing in his tent, ordered the deceased to
leave, he, the witness, was eating his breakfast, with his back to the accused and the deceased;
that hearing the order, he turned his head and saw the accused start toward the deceased
with his arm outstretched, but that at that moment he turned away and did not see the
accused actually come up to, strike or touch the deceased; that when he saw the accused
approaching the deceased, the accused did not have his fist clenched, but that he could not
say whether the blow was struck with the open hand or the closed fist, because at the
moment when it is said the accused came up to and touched or struck the deceased, the
witness's head was so turned that he could not and did not see what took
place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
No evidence was introduced at the trial which in any wise tends to put in doubt the truth of
the testimony of these witnesses as to the fact that they were present at the time when the
place where the incident occurred; and of this fact we are satisfied that there can be no
reasonable doubt, although, as frequently happens when ignorant witnesses are testifying in
the courts in these Islands, their evidence is conflicting as to the precise hour by the clock
when it took place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Some attempt is made to discredit the testimony of Yotiga, because it appears from the record
that in answer to certain questions on his examination-in-chief, he stated that when the blow
was struck he was some hundred brazas (200 yards) away. It developed, however, on
examination by the trial judge, that this answer was given under the impression that the
question asked was the distance from the mine to the house of the sister of the deceased, as to
which considerable testimony was taken; and it is very clear from all the testimony that both
these witnesses were standing within a few yards of the defendant when he struck the
blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The testimony of Dagapdap is also criticized because, in answer to the opening questions on
the examination-in-chief, he spoke of the blow inflicted as a bofetada (a slap with the open
hand on the cheek), which, later on in his testimony, he changed to the word puñetazo (a
blow with the fist), as a result, it is intimated, of suggestive questions by counsel for the
prosecution. We do not think this criticism well founded, or that the language of the witness
on which it rests sustains the inference sought to be drawn therefrom. In the first place, it
must be forgotten that the witness was manifestly an ignorant man, unskilled in the use of
words, and testifying in a remote province in a native dialect; and that his testimony was
interpreted into the Spanish of the record by an interpreter who might well have been
mistaken in selecting the precise Spanish equivalent of the word or words actually used by
the witness, and whose use of Spanish throughout the record does not demonstrate such
precision and nicety in the use of words as to justify the laying of too much stress on the
phrasing adopted by him in the haste of interpretation in the course of a trial: so that, in our
opinion, the detailed description of the manner in which the blow was inflicted, as given by
the witness without suggestion or assistance of any kind, is much more decisive as to its
nature than the word by which reference to it was made. And in the second place, as appears
from the Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua Castellana and the Diccionario de la Lengua
por la Academia Española, the word " bofetada," when used strictly, connotes not merely a
blow with the open hand, but such a blow struck on the cheek or side of the face, a meaning
which the whole testimony of the witness clearly discloses it was not his intention to give to
whatever word he did actually make use of in referring to the act. The definition of the word "
bofetada," as given in the former dictionary, is "a blow which is given on the cheek ( mejilla)
with the open hand," and in the latter is "a blow given with the open hand, on the side of the
face ( carillo) or cheek ( mejilla) of another." chanrobles virtual law library
It has also been suggested that the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is
inherently improbable, because, as it is said, if the blow had been struck as described by
them, the injured person would necessarily have "doubled up or over," and not, as appears
from their testimony, thrown up his hands and staggered away. No expert testimony was
introduced at the trial upon this point, and while it may, perhaps, be admitted that if the blow
took effect in the abdominal region, common experience would justify us in expecting as a
result of the blow, that the injured person would "double up or over," it must not be forgotten
that the blow having been delivered over the ribs on the left side, it may as well have taken
effect in the region of the heart; in the absence of expert testimony we do not think that in the
event, evidence that the injured person threw up his hands and staggered away is necessarily
in conflict with the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution as to the weight of the blow
and the place where it was inflicted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the
defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that whatever
authority the defendant may have had to eject the deceased from the mining property and to
use physical force to that end in case of need, the blow thus struck was far in excess of such
authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and can not be excused or justified as an exercise of
necessary force in the exercise of a right. The defendant's own testimony does not indicate
that there was any danger to be apprehended from Saldivar, and there is nothing in the
record which would indicate that the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that he
would offer a violent or even a substantial resistance to an attempt to expel him from the
mining property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his death as a result of the blow inflicted by
the defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a laborer in
defendant's mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he left her house
in apparent good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short time afterwards he
received a violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the body where many of the vital
organs are located; and immediately thereafter, he stared up the short trail leading to his
sister's house, and died as he reached the door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening
cause, we think there can be no reasonable doubt that his death resulted from the
blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for appellant suggest that death may have been the result of some cause unknown,
such as a fall, an assault by robbers, or perchance a suicidal frenzy, intervening between the
time when the accused was last seen starting up 200-yard trail to his sister's house, and the
time when, as she testified, he died just as he reached her door on his way back from the
mine; and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But the doubt which must be
decided in favor of an accused person in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, and not a mere
whimsical and fanciful doubt, based upon imagined but wholly improbable possibilities,
unsupported by evidence; and while we do not hold that it is absolutely and morally
impossible that some other cause could have intervened to bring about the death of Saldivar,
we do hold that there can be no reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable man that death
was in fact brought about by the blow inflicted by the accused, and was not the result of some
independent cause intervening during the very short period of time prior to his death, during
which he was not under observation by witnesses called at the
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for the appellant enlarge on the fact that accepting defendant's statement that he
sent the deceased away from the mines about a quarter past six, it would appear from the
testimony of the sister of the deceased that about two hours may have elapsed between that
time and the time when he arrived at her house. The sister fixed the time of the arrival of her
brother at from 7 to 8 o'clock or possibly a little later; but she appears to have been an
ignorant woman who did not know how to read the face of a clock, and it is quite clear that
hers was no more than a rough estimate, based on the height of the sun, and the most that can
fairly be inferred from the testimony is that the deceased was struck early on the morning in
question, and that not long afterwards on the same morning, he died at the door of his sister's
house 200 yards away. But even if it be granted that two hours actually did elapsed from the
time the deceased left the mines, until he reached his sister's house, this interval is not long
enough to materially weaken the inference that the death resulted from the
blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that no autopsy was had on the body of the deceased, and that a medical officer
called in by the accused who saw the body, but who does not appear to have examined it very
closely, certified that he found no outward lesions or marks of violence; but this evidence is
not sufficient to negative the existence of internal lesions, for the medical authorities inform
us that death may and often does result from a blow over or near the heart or in the
abdominal region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence;
and there is evidence in the record of the discovery on the cadaver of two suspicious black
spots, one about the place where the blow was struck, and another at or near the umbilicus,
though the evidence fails to disclose the precise nature of these discolorations. (Medical
Jurisprudence, Taylor, 12th Am. Ed., pp. 310 and 388; Moulin's Treatise on Surgery, Hamilton,
part 2, chap. 1, p. 151; Tratado de Medicina Legal por Legran de Sulle, Vol. II, pp. 206, 207.)
chanrobles virtual law library
It has been suggested that the deceased may have had a weak heart or some other diseased
organ, and that but for such physical defect death might not have ensued from the mere force
of the blow inflicted by the defendant. There is no evidence to this effect, and on the contrary
there is testimony in the record that on the morning before he died he was in apparent good
health; and the fact that a few days before, he was able to work in the mines, and that he came
to the mines that day in search of work, renders it highly improbable that he was suffering at
the time from any grave organic weakness. But however this may have been, it has been
frequently and justly decided that where death results as a direct consequence of the use of
illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. (U. S.
vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. Rep., 96; U. S. vs. Montes, 6 Phil. Rep., 443; see also decisions of supreme
court of Spain, March 10, 1871, and June 26, 1980.) chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for appellant also contend that even if it be granted that in unlawfully exercising
force upon the person of the deceased, the appellant caused for contributed to his death,
nevertheless he should at most be convicted of homicidio por imprudencia temeraria
(homicide as a result of reckless negligence), because, manifestly, the unlawful act was not
committed with the intent to kill, and as counsel contend, the striking of the blow by the
appellant was not an act adapted, or likely ( idóneo) to inflict a death wound under ordinary
circumstances, or reasonably calculated so to do. In support of this contention counsel cite
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of November 9, 1885, February 10, 1876, July 5, 1888,
and July 12, 1890, and appears to rely especially on the former decision wherein sentence of
homicidio por imprudencia temeria was imposed, the court holding "que es condición
esencial del delito de homicidio, que el hecho material de que resulte sea impulsado por
voluntad libre encaminada por acto idóneo a causar la muerte ó algun mal fisico que por
consecuencia natural la produzca." chanrobles virtual law library
In the case, however, it was proven, and the court found that not only did the defendant not
intend to kill the deceased but also that he did not intend to do him any physical injury
whatever; but in the case at bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary,
intentional, and unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe blow on the person of the
deceased; and while it is true that the accused does not appear to have intended to take the
life of his victim, there can no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him
some injury, at least to the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him, and he
is therefore, criminally responsible for the natural, even if unexpected results of his act, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, which prescribes that -
Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural
consequences of hi illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such
consequences, but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as
did the trial judge in this case.
What has been said sufficiently disposes of all errors assigned by counsel for appellant, except
certain alleged errors of procedure in the court below which we do not think it necessary to
discuss, because even if it be admitted that such errors were committed, they do not appear
to have in any way wise prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court be and are hereby
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC. and NELIA SANTOS FANDINO, petitioners, vs.
JOSE J. ESPINO JR., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents (1979)
Facts: Plaintiff Espino and his wife went shopping in South Supermarket. He found a
cylindrical rat tail file which he held in his hand thinking it might get lost because of its
tiny size. Eventually, he placed the said item into the front breast pocket of his shirt, with
a good part of the merchandise exposed, because he conversed with the maid of his aunt.
At the check out counter, plaintiff paid for the purchases of his wife but he forgot to pay
for the rat tail file. As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by the security
guard of the petitioner regarding the file in his pocket. He quickly apologized saying "I'm
Sorry" and he turned towards the cashier to pay. But, he was stopped and instead was
brought to the rear of the supermarket when he was asked to fill out an Incident Report
labeling him as "Shoplifter".
His wife joined him since he was taking so long and they were brought to the first
checkout counter where Ms. Nelia Santos-Fandino's desk was. She made a remark:"Ano,
nakaw na naman ito". Jose told Ms. Fandino that he was going to pay for the file because
he needed it but she replied "That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying
for the goods say... They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them."
Jose objected stating he is a regular customer of the supermarket
He gave P5 to pay for the P3.85 cost of the file but Ms. Fandino said the P5 was his fine
which will be rewarded to the guard. People were staring at them. He took the file and
paid the file at the nearest checkout counter with P50 and got out as fast as they could.
His first impulse was to go back to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass
windows. But reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should take its
due course.
He filed against Grand Union Supermarket et al. founded on Article 21 in relation to
Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5 fine
CFI: dismissed
CA: reversed and granted damages of P75,000 by way of moral damages, P25,000 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney's fee
Issue: Whether Espino had intention to steal the rat tail file.
Held: NO. Jose did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from the
open shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary,
he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it.
Considering further the personal circumstances of the private respondent. his education,
position and character showing that he is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class
1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager
incharge of motoring and warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the
Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for
six months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of articles published in the
Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus,
Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of
Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington, We are fully convinced, as the
trial and appellate courts were, that private respondent did not intend to steal the article
costing P3.85. Nothing in the records intimates or hints whatsoever that private
respondent has had any police record of any sort much less suspicion of stealing or
shoplifting.
Cause of action for damages based on Articles 19 and 21
in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code
We likewise concur with the Court of Appeals that "(u)pon the facts and under the law,
plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for damages against the defendants.
Defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under Articles
19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code."
That private respondent was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident. The Incident
Report (Exhibit A) with the entries thereon under Exhibit A-1 which says opposite the
stenciled word SUBJECT: "Shoplifting," Exhibit A-3 which says opposite the stenciled
words Action Taken: Relesed by Mrs. Fandino after paying the item," Exhibit A-4 which
says opposite the stenciled words Remarks Noted: Grd. Ebreo requested Grd. Paunil to
apprehend subject shoplifter," established the opinion, judgment or thinking of the
management of petitioner's supermarket upon private respondent's act of picking up the
file. ln plain words, private respondent was regarded and pronounced a shoplifter and
had committed "shoplifting."
We also affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioner Nelia Santos Fandino, after
reading the incident report, remarked the following: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito". Such a
remark made in the presence of private respondent and with reference to the incident
report with its entries, was offensive to private respondent's dignity and defamatory to
his character and honesty. When Espino explained that he was going to pay the file but
simply forgot to do so, Fandino doubted the explanation. saying: "That is all what they
say, the people whom we caught not paying for the goods say... they all intended to pay
for the things that are found to them." Private respondent objected and said that he was
a regular customer of the Supermarket. The act of Fandino in branding the private
respondent as a thief which was not right nor justified.
The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and
interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he
was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the
police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which
brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered
the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article
2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners
wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and
public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person.
Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
Contributory negligence
In the case at bar, there is no question that the whole incident that befell respondent had
arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay
for the file. It was his forgetfullness in checking out the item and paying for it that started
the chain of events which led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing him
mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of
omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory
negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may
recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they
saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of
coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers
or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private
respondent's predicament. We do not believe that private respondent was intentionally
paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended
for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be
preserved and promoted by good public relations.
Grant of exemplary damages is unjustified/ Defense of property
The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is
unjustified. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they could be
adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil Code). Considering that exemplary damages are
awarded for wanton acts, that they are penal in character granted not by way of
compensation but as a punishment to the offender and as a warning to others as a sort of
deterrent, We hold that the facts and circumstances of the case at bar do not warrant the
grant of exemplary damages.
Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right
which the law accords to them. Under Article 429, New Civil Code, the owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. And since a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office exempts him from civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not be
punished by imposing exemplary damages against him. We agree that petitioners acted
upon probable cause in stopping and investigating private respondent for taking the file
without paying for it, hence, the imposition of exemplary damages as a warning to others
by way of a deterrent is without legal basis. We, therefore, eliminate the grant of
exemplary damages to the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
hereby modified. Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to private
respondent moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and further, to
return the P5.00 fine to private respondent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CHAPTER III – NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept
New Civil Code – Art. 2176
1. Definition and Test of Negligence
PICART VS SMITH
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. The plaintiff
was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive
blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the
rule of the road. Picart and his horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart did not move his
horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued
driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse
he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the
bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which
required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.

Issue: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
Held: Yes and so was Picart for being on the wrong side of the road.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Smith’s negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his
horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered
his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore
had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has
approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and
vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from
Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.
In the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., this Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to
recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise
have been assessed wholly against the other party.
People v. Delos Santos
FACTS:
On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan de Oro City,
a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course were performing an
Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of the lane. A speeding Isuzu Elf ran
into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The accused surrendered to the Governor,
and was eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and
Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence, this
automatic review.
ISSUE:
Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a mere reckless
imprudence
HELD:
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event
was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on Glenn’s part.
First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the
incident was "very dark," as there was no moon. And according to PAGASA’s observed
weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50
kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was
absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there
was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that
illuminated the highway. Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all
wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which
made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither
reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals. Third, GLENN was
driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging
trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as Glenn’s vehicle was traversing.
Worse, they were facing the same direction as Glenn’s truck such that their backs were
turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no convincing evidence was
presented to rebut Glenn’s testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by the very
bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck
rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights
coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees. Indeed,
as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one “to stop or swerve to a safe place the
moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the
same"; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be
inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three
very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the
group with his truck.
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons
killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is
significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind
against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with
intent to kill. Glenn’s offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to
the left or to a safe place the movement he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he
done so, many trainees would have been spared.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before its milling factory. The TRB furnished the Philippine National Construction Corporation
negligence can be held to exist. (PNCC) (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Toll Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to comment
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code thereon.
states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking (MOA), where the latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX on the
into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) following terms and conditions:
his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have
known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first 2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;
bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy with a
established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the
sign which should read as follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!;
place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in
accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his 4. Tollway safety measures should be properly observed;
speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the
opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite 5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to
direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO;
he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care
6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their stalled trucks immediately to avoid any
under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.
inconvenience to the other motorists;
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the
7. This request will be in force only while the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and
result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex
Sapang Maragul via Magalang remain impassable.
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries.

At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and
his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going
I.SHORT TITLE: PNCC vs CA
north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and
II. FULL TITLE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, southbound lanes of the road. They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and
Petitioners, southbound lanes, including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists
vs. of the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling company
GENERALAO and PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., in the area. They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. However,
CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 159270. August 22, 2005. CALLEJO, SR., J. Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECO’s equipment supervisor and transportation
superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still very
III. TOPIC: Test to determine the existence of Negligence early. Nonetheless, Mallari told them that he would send someone to clear the affected
area. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At
around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the highway of
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS: the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area
at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought
sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin
of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to his office in Sta.
via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the necessary report.
for its trucks to enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via Dau-Sta.
Ines from Mabalacat, and via Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San Fernando going to
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of
JETTY Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla along the NLEX at about
65 kilometers per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo
Generalao; they were on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother’s first death
anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and
turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the
scattered sugarcane.
Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white
sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes, which appeared to be flattened.
On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages
against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 93-64803. They alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence, PNCC failed
to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO
trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that
PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up
emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of
such spillage; and that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was
the direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Latagan and the
damage to Arnaiz’s car. They prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered for
the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants jointly and severally:
(a) To pay unto plaintiff Rodrigo Arnaiz the sum of P100,000.00 representing the value
of his car which was totally wrecked;
(b) to pay unto plaintiff Regina Latagan the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
reimbursement for medical expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages,
and the sum of P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
(c) To pay unto plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao the sum of P5,000.00 by
way of reimbursement for medical expenses; and
(d) To pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; plus the
costs of suit.
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which the Honorable Court may find due them in the
premises.16
In its Answer, PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the North Luzon
Expressway, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the mishap was due to the
"unreasonable speed" at which Arnaiz’s car was running, causing it to turn turtle
when it passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the
proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECO’s gross negligence in spilling the
sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged
that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.
The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiffs and cross-claim
against its co-defendant PASUDECO.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Latagan,
dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence. The case as
against the PNCC was, likewise, dismissed. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. ORDERING defendant PASUDECO:
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorney’s fees
P50,000
2. To pay costs of suit.
II. The case is DISMISSED as to defendant PNCC. No pronouncement as to costs. Its
counterclaim is, likewise, DISMISSED.
III. The claims for damages of plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and defendant PASUDECO appealed the
decision to the CA. Since the plaintiffs failed to file their brief, the CA dismissed their
appeal.
Resolving PASUDECO’s appeal, the CA rendered judgment on April 29, 2003,
affirming the RTC decision with modification. The appellate court ruled that
Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely
contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e., PASUDECO’s failure to properly
supervise its men in clearing the affected area. Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted
that he was at his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the appellate
court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed DECISION is hereby MODIFIED and
judgment is hereby rendered declaring PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and solidarily,
liable:
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorney’s fees
2. To pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The PNCC, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The petitioner asserts that the trial court was correct when it held that PASUDECO
should be held liable for the mishap, since it had assumed such responsibility
based on the MOA between it and the TRB. The petitioner relies on the trial court’s
finding that only PASUDECO was given a permit to pass through the route.
The petitioner insists that the respondents failed to prove that it was negligent in
the operation and maintenance of the NLEX. It maintains that it had done its part in
clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles of
sugarcane along the road when its men left Km. 72; only a few scattered sugarcanes
flattened by the passing motorists were left. Any liability arising from any mishap related
to the spilled sugarcanes should be borne by PASUDECO, in accordance with the MOA
which provides that "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity
related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."
The petitioner also argues that the respondents should bear the consequences of their
own fault or negligence, and that the proximate and immediate cause of the mishap in
question was respondent Arnaiz’s reckless imprudence or gross negligence.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding PNCC and PASUDECO jointly and solidarily liable
for damages
VII. RULING:
The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right, privilege and authority to
construct, operate and maintain toll facilities covering the expressways, collectively
known as the NLEX. Concomitant thereto is its right to collect toll fees for the use of the
said expressways and its obligation to keep it safe for motorists.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
do. It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly
demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. The Court declared the test by which
to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith, viz:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course
or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist.35
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane
dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the
ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The
petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger
motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in
charge of the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of
its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private
agreement, to other parties.
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of
sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left
flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been
sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks
still left along the tollway.
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz’s car ran over scattered
sugarcanes spilled from a hauler truck.
Anent respondent Arnaiz’s negligence in driving his car, both the trial court and
the CA agreed that it was only contributory, and considered the same in mitigating
the award of damages in his favor as provided under Article 2179 of the New Civil
Code. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Even the
petitioner itself described Arnaiz’s negligence as contributory.

Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the
MOA. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699, dated April
PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and 29, 2003, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent
acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO
and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the Court held in the vintage case of Sabido
AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO), represented by its
v. Custodio:39
Manager ROMEO O. DAGANI, Petitioner,
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent
VS
acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other,
are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person ANGELITA BALEN AND SPS. HERCULES AND RHEA LARIOSA, Respondents
and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have G.R. 173146 [November 25, 2009]
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
Facts of the Case:
other tort-feasor. ...
ANECO installed an electric post in Ata-atahon, Nasipit, agusan del Norte, with its
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable
main distribution line of 13, 000 kilovolts traversing Angelita Balen’s residence. Balen’s
need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
father even protested the installation with the District Engineer’s Office and with ANECO,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the
but his protest was not heeded. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
and Celestino Exclamado were electrocuted while removing the TV antenna from Balen’s
injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of
residence. The antenna pole touched ANECO’s main distribution line which resulted in
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an
their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered
efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent,
extensive third degree burns. Balen and Lariosan then lodged a complaint for damages
and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of
against ANECO. The RTC decided in favorof respondents and against ANECO. On appeal,
the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is Issue:
an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any Whether or not ANECO was negligent, and thus, must be held liable for damages
or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it for injuries suffered by the respondents.
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them
to the injured person was not the same. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. Ruling of the Court:
Thus, with PASUDECO’s and the petitioner’s successive negligent acts, they are joint The Supreme Court ruled that ANECO’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the injuries sustained by respondent.ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it
New Civil Code.
complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in
installing the subject high tension wires above MIGUEL BALEN’s house, still a potential
risk existed that people would get electrocuted, considering that the wires were
not insulated. Moreover, it was found that ANECO failed to heed the complaint of Balen’s
father about the installation of the line. The proximate cause of the electrocution of
respondents was ANECO’s installation of its main distribution line of high voltage over
the house of Balen, without which the accident would not have occurred.
The petition was denied.
Ruks Konsult vs. Adworld Sign
Facts: Adworld filed for damages against Transworld when Transworld’s billboard
structure collapsed and crashed against Adworld’s billboard structure, which was
misaligned and its foundation impaired.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its billboard
structure was due to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred instantly and
unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage caused to Adworld’s billboard structure
was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks,
the company which built the collapsed billboard structure in the former’s favor. It was
alleged therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and poor foundation
not suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks should ultimately be
held liable for the damages caused to Adworld’s billboard structure.
Issue:
Whether Ruks was solidarily liable with Transworld for the damages in Adworld’s
billboard
Held:Yes.
Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. It is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s initial
construction of its billboard’s lower structure without the proper foundation, and that of
Ruks’s finishing its upper structure and just merely assuming that Transworld would
reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2) successive acts which were the direct and
proximate cause of the damages sustained by Adworld. Worse, both Transworld and
Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard was weak; yet,
neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on each
other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at all.
Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of
negligence in the construction of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held
liable for its collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure.
As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint
tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together in committing
wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent
and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves." The
Court’s pronouncement in People v. Velasco is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is solidary since both
of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury.
2. Four elements of a Cause of Action for Negligence (Including Medical
Negligence)
The elements are:
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Cause
4. Damage or Harm
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFREDO L. PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU,
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA JR., Honorable CONDRADO M. VASQUEZ, all of the
Office of the Ombudsman; JESUS F. GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and
GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, all of the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.
[G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997]
Topic: Elements of Medical Malpractice
Facts: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent
surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He
was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda
Balatbat Reyes was the anesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, Florencio died of
complications of “unknown cause,” according to officials of the UST Hospital. Leonila
requested that the NBI perform an autopsy on her husband’s body. The NBI found that
he had died because of “lack of care by the attending physician in administering
anesthesia” and recommended that Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes be charged for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
A series of nine prosecutors tossed the responsibility of conducting a preliminary
investigation to each other with contradictory recommendations (investigative
pingpong). Prosecutor Eudoxia T. Gualberto recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in
the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the
recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to
Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from
any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G.
Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. Frustrated, Leonila filed graft charges
specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against Prosecutors
Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the
Office of the Ombudsman. On July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. In fine, petitioner assails the
exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations
of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to file
an information for graft against the respondent City Prosecutors.
Ruling:
The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint for lack of evidence.
The powers and functions of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the
following: investigatory powers, prosecutory power, public assistance function,
authority to inquire and obtain information, and function to adopt, institute and
implement preventive measures.
The Ombudsman then may dismiss the complaint if he finds it to be insufficient in form
and substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may
proceed with the investigation of the complaint if, in his view, it is in due and proper
form.
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action
when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may
exceptionally be invoked.
From a procedural standpoint, it is certainly odd why the successive transfers from one
prosecutor to another were not sufficiently explained in the Resolution of the
Ombudsman. Being the proper investigating authority with respect to misfeasance, non-
feasance and malfeasance of public officials, the Ombudsman should have been more
vigilant and assiduous in determining the reasons behind the buckpassing to ensure that
no irregularity took place.
The NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence on
the part of the attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia. The fact of want of
competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, which can be best determined on a full-
blown trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence
case without extensive investigation, research, evaluation and consultations with
medical experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass
judgment on such a technical matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and
findings.
As to Medical Malpractice
Medical malpractice or medical negligence is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which
has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care
provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury
and proximate causation.
When the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient
relationship was created. In accepting the case, said doctors in effect represented that
they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients. They
have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these
professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician
surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable
malpractice. Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want
of due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in
damages for negligence.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of
anaesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res
ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to
hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper
anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized
standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that
the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment.
Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two
inquiries: whether the doctors’ actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and
whether these were the proximate cause of the patient’s injury. Indeed here, a causal
connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim’s death after the negligent act
of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed,
should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the allegation of
negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending
surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It
appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted had the proper
drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia.
Dela Torre vs Imbuido
Facts:
At around 3:00pm of February 3, 1992, Carmen (sps of petitioner Pedrito Dela Torre)
was brought to Divine Spirit General Hospital’s operating room for her caesarian section
operation, which was to be performed by Dr. Nestor Imbuido. By 5:30pm, of the same
day, Pedrito was informed by his wife’s delivery of a baby boy. In the early morning of
February 4, 1992, Carmen experienced abdominal pains and difficulty in urinating. She
was diagnosed to be suffering from urinary tract infection (UTI), and was prescribed
medication by Dr. Norma. On February 10, 1992, Pedrito noticed that Carmen’s stomach
was getting bigger, but Dr. Norma dismissed the patient’s condition as mere fratulence.
When Carmen’s stomach still grow bigger despite medications, Dr. Norma advised
Pedrito of the possibility of a second operation on Carmen. Dr. Norma, however,
provided no details on its purpose and the doctor who would perform it. At around
3:00pm on February 12, 1992 Carmen had her second operation. Later in the evening,
Dr. Norma informed Pedrito that “everything was going on fine with his wife.” The
condition of Carmen, however, did not improve. It instead worsened that on February 13,
1992, she vomited dark red blood. At 9:30pm of the same day, Carmen died. Per her
death certificate upon information provided by the hospital, the immediate cause of
Carmen’s death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebro vascular accident,
hypertension and chronic nephritis induced by pregnancy. An autopsy report prepared
by Dr. Partilano, medico-legal officer designate of Olongapo City, however, provided that
the cause of Carmen’s death was shock due to peritonitis severe with multiple intestinal
adhesions; status post caesarian section and exploratory laparotomy. Pedrito claimed in
his complaint that the respondents failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of
them as members of the medical profession, and were negligent for practicing surgery on
Carmen in the most unskilled, ignorant, and cruel manner. Dr Partilano testified during
the trial.
Issue: Whether or not respondents were liable for medical malpractice that resulted to
Carmen’s death.
Held:
No. Medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim
which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim,
a patient, or his or her family as in this case, must prove that healthcare provider, in most
cases, a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Four essential elements must be established namely: 1.) duty; 2.) breach; 3.) injury
and 4.) proximate causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the
physician negligent and thus, liable for damages.
For the trial court to give weight to Dr. Partilano’s report, it was necessary to show first
Dr. Partilano’s specialization and competence to testify on the degree of care, skill and
diligence needed for the treatment of Carmen’s case. Considering that it was not duly
established that Dr. Partilano practiced and was an expert on the fields that involved
Carmen’s condition, he could not have accurately identified the said degree of care, skill
and diligence and the medical procedure, that should have been applied. Similarly, such
duty, degree of care, skill and diligence were not sufficiently established in this case
because the testimony of Dr. Patilano was based solely on the results of his autopsy on
the cadaver of Carmen. His study and assessment were restricted by limitations that
denied his full evaluation of Carmen’s case. He could have only deduced from the injuries
apparent in Carmen’s body, and in the condition when the body was examined. Judging
from his testimony, Dr. Patilano did not even take full consideration of the medical
history of Carmen, her actual health condition at the time of hospital admission, and her
condition as it progressed while she was being monitored and treated by the
respondents.
CASUMPANG v. CORTEJO
Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the
Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in
breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever. Dr. Livelo initially attended to and
examined Edmer. He took his vital signs, body temperature, and blood pressure. Based
on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed
Edmer with "bronchopneumonia." Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing, and
for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an
antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune Care card and was
referred to an accredited Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town. She was
thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also
accredited with Fortune Care. Dr. Casumpang confirmed the initial diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia. Mrs. Cortejo had doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She immediately
advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough, but Dr.
Casumpang merely told her that her son's "bloodpressure is just being active”, and
remarked that "that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm”.
The following day, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood streak" prompting the
respondent (Edmer's father) to request for a doctor at the nurses' station. Forty-five
minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one of the resident physicians of
SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with
blood streak," she failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed
it away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for examination.
Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer's head, eyes,
nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-
continuing fever, and rashes that were not typical of dengue fever. Her medical findings
state: “the patient's rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the patient's
nose is flaring which is a sign that the patient is in respiratory distress; the abdomen has
negative finding; the patient has low grade fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the
patient's skin were not "Herman's Rash" and not typical of dengue fever”.
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr. Miranda, the
respondent showed her Edmer's blood specimen, and reported that Edmer had
complained of severe stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg. Dr. Miranda
then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted that he was bleeding. Suspecting
that he could be afflicted with dengue, she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the
liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not
to pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral medication.
Dr. Miranda thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative. She
likewise ordered the monitoring of the patient's blood pressure and some blood tests.
Edmer's blood pressure was later found to be normal. At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr.
Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer's condition.
Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures done including:
hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests.
The blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening. Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's
parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he
recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent
consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that
they hire a private nurse. The respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to
Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked
Edmer's condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was
"comfortable." The respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the
driver was nowhere to be found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that
cost him P600.00.23
At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was
transferred to Makati Medical Center. Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending
physician the patient's clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination,
the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in its
irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. His Death Certificate indicated the
cause of death as "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever
Stage IV." Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and erroneous
diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH,
and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda (collectively referred to as
the "petitioners") before the RTC.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and awarded actual and moral damages. The
CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. The rulings of both courts gave credence to the expert
testimony of Dr. Jaudian.
VI. ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a physician-patient relationship between the petitioning
doctors and Edmer.
2. Whether or not the petitioning doctors are guilty of negligence.
3. Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo Tabangcora Jaudian
as an expert witness.
4. Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners' negligent
act/omission and the patient's resulting death.
5. Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors.
VII. RULING:
1. Yes. In the discussion below, the elements of medical malpractice should first be
discussed before the determination of the physician-patient relationship.
The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors' negligence in diagnosing and
treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit,
an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by medical professionals
who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. As the term is used, the suit is
brought whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet the
standards demanded by his profession, or deviates from this standard, and causes injury
to the patient. To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this
case, the deceased patient's heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a
reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor
would not have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient. The
patient's heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation. Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on
one's conduct. It requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and
the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty to the
patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability. A physician-patient relationship is
created when a patient engages the services of a physician, and the latter accepts or
agrees to provide care to the patient. The establishment of this relationship is
consensual, and the acceptance by the physician essential. The mere fact that an
individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment does not
create the duty of care unless the physician agrees. The consent needed to create the
relationship does not always need to be express. In the absence of an express agreement,
a physician-patient relationship may be implied from the physician's affirmative action
to diagnose and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in such diagnosis and/or
treatment. The usual illustration would be the case of a patient who goes to a hospital or
a clinic, and is examined and treated by the doctor. In this case, we can infer, based on
the established and customary practice in the medical community that a patient-
physician relationship exists. Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the
legal duty of care follows. The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the
same standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a medical
condition under similar circumstances.
Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his
duties under professional standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is
specific to each individual case. If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured
in body or in health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to
damages.
To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between
the negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be
unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. The injury or damage is proximately caused by the
physician's negligence when it appears, based on the evidence and the expert testimony,
that the negligence played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the
physician's negligence.
In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Casumpang and
Edmer was created when the latter's parents sought the medical services of Dr.
Casumpang, and the latter knowingly accepted Edmer as a patient. Dr. Casumpang's
acceptance is implied from his affirmative examination, diagnosis and treatment of
Edmer. On the other hand, Edmer's parents, on their son's behalf, manifested their
consent by availing of the benefits of their health care plan, and by accepting the
hospital's assigned doctor without objections.
With respect to Dr. Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer arose when she
assumed the obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter. As second year
resident doctor tasked to do rounds and assist other physicians, Dr. Miranda is deemed
to have agreed to the creation of physician-patient relationship with the hospital's
patients when she participated in the diagnosis and prescribed a course of treatment for
Edmer. The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Miranda examined Edmer twice (at
around 12:00 and 3:30 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988), and in both instances, she
prescribed treatment and participated in the diagnosis of Edmer's medical condition. Her
affirmative acts amounted to her acceptance of the physician-patient relationship, and
incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with it.
2. Only Dr. Casumpang is guilty of negligence.
Whether or not Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda committed a breach of duty is to be
measured by the yardstick of professional standards observed by the other members of
the medical profession in good standing under similar circumstances. It is in this aspect
of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the
professional standards observed in the medical community, but also that the physician's
conduct in the treatment of care falls below such standard. In the present case, expert
testimony is crucial in determining first, the standard medical examinations, tests, and
procedures that the attending physicians should have undertaken in the diagnosis and
treatment of dengue fever; and second, the dengue fever signs and symptoms that the
attending physicians should have noticed and considered.
Dr. Jaudian testified that Edmer's rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, fever, and the
presence of blood in his saliva are classic symptoms of dengue fever. According to him, if
the patient was admitted for chest pain, abdominal pain, and difficulty in breathing
coupled with fever, dengue fever should definitely be considered; if the patient spits
coffee ground with the presence of blood, and the patient's platelet count drops to
47,000, it becomes a clear case of dengue fever, and bronchopneumonia can be
reasonably ruled out. Furthermore, the standard of care according to Dr. Jaudian is to
administer oxygen inhalation, analgesic, and fluid infusion or dextrose. If the patient had
twice vomited fresh blood and thrombocytopenia has already occurred, the doctor
should order blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes, hemostatic
to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing.
Dr. Casumpang failed to promptly detect dengue fever
It will be recalled that during Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits to Edmer, he
already had knowledge of Edmer's laboratory test result, medical history, and symptoms
(i.e., fever, rashes, rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in
breathing, and traces of blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead
Dr. Casumpang to the possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either dengue fever,
or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of broncho pneumonia. This
means that given the symptoms exhibited, Dr. Casumpang already ruled out the
possibility of other diseases like dengue.
In other words, it was lost on Dr. Casumpang that the characteristic symptoms of dengue
(as Dr. Jaudian testified) are: patient's rapid breathing; chest and stomach pain; fever;
and the presence of blood in his saliva. All these manifestations were present and known
to Dr. Casumpang at the time of his first and second visits to Edmer. While he noted some
of these symptoms in confirming bronchopneumonia, he did not seem to have
considered the patient's other manifestations in ruling out dengue fever or dengue
hemorrhagic fever.
The Court also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to check Edmer's
throat despite knowing that as early as 9:00 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer had
blood streaks in his sputum. Neither did Dr. Casumpang order confirmatory tests to
confirm the source of bleeding. The Physician's Progress Notes stated: "Blood streaks on
phlegm can be due to bronchial irritation or congestion" which clearly showed that Dr.
Casumpang merely assumed, without confirmatory physical examination, that
bronchopneumonia caused the bleeding. Dr. Jaudian likewise opined that Dr.
Casumpang's medical examination was not comprehensive enough to reasonably lead to
a correct diagnosis.60 Dr. Casumpang only used a stethoscope in coming up with the
diagnosis that Edmer was suffering from bronchopneumonia; he never confirmed this
finding with the use of a bronchoscope. Furthermore, Dr. Casumpang based his diagnosis
largely on the chest x-ray result that is generally inconclusive.
Significantly, it was only at around 5:00 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988 (after Edmer's
third episode of bleeding) that Dr. Casumpang ordered the conduct of hematocrit,
hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests. These tests came too
late, as proven by: (1) the blood test results that came at about 6:00 in the evening,
confirming that Edmer's illness had developed to "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever" and (2)
Dr. Jaudian's testimony that "dengue fever could have been detected earlier than 7:30 in
the evening of April 23, 1988 because the symptoms were already evident.
Dr. Casumpang’s negligence in the Treatment and Management of Dengue
As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure once the patient had exhibited
the classic symptoms of dengue fever should have been: oxygen inhalation, use of
analgesic, and infusion of fluids or dextrose; and once the patient had twice vomited
fresh blood, the doctor should have ordered: blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient
every 30 minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in
breathing.
Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to these standards. The evidence strongly suggests
that he ordered a transfusion of platelet concentrate instead of blood transfusion. The
tourniquet test was only conducted after Edmer's second episode of bleeding, and the
medical management (as reflected in the records) did not include antibiotic therapy and
complete physical examination.
Dr. Miranda is Not Liable for Negligence
In considering the case of Dr. Miranda, the junior resident physician who was on-duty at
the time of Edmer's confinement, we see the need to draw distinctions between the
responsibilities and corresponding liability of Dr. Casumpang, as the attending physician,
and that of Dr. Miranda.
The resident applicants are generally doctors of medicine licensed to practice in the
Philippines and who would like to pursue a particular specialty. They are usually the
front line doctors responsible for the first contact with the patient. During the scope of
the residency program, resident physicians (or "residents") function under the
supervision of attending physicians or of the hospital's teaching staff. Under this
arrangement, residents operate merely as subordinates who usually defer to the
attending physician on the decision to be made and on the action to be taken.
The attending physician, on the other hand, is primarily responsible for managing the
resident's exercise of duties. While attending and resident physicians share the collective
responsibility to deliver safe and appropriate care to the patients, it is the attending
physician who assumes the principal responsibility of patient care. Because he/she
exercises a supervisory role over the resident, and is ultimately responsible for the
diagnosis and treatment of the patient, the standards applicable to and the liability of the
resident for medical malpractice is theoretically less than that of the attending physician.
These relative burdens and distinctions, however, do not translate to immunity from the
legal duty of care for residents, or from the responsibility arising from their own
negligent act.
In the US Case of Centman v. Cobb, it was held that interns and first-year residents are
"practitioners of medicine required to exercise the same standard of care applicable to
physicians with unlimited licenses to practice." The Indiana Court held that although a
first-year resident practices under a temporary medical permit, he/she impliedly
contracts that he/she has the reasonable and ordinary qualifications of her profession
and that he/she will exercise reasonable skill, diligence, and care in treating the patient.
We find that Dr. Miranda was not independently negligent. Although she had greater
patient exposure, and was' subject to the same standard of care applicable to attending
physicians, we believe that a finding of negligence should also depend on several
competing factors, among them, her authority to make her own diagnosis, the degree of
supervision of the attending physician over her, and the shared responsibility between
her and the attending physicians.
In this case, before Dr. Miranda attended to Edmer, both Dr. Livelo and Dr. Casumpang
had diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia. In her testimony, Dr. Miranda admitted
that she had been briefed about Edmer's condition, his medical history, and initial
diagnosis; and based on these pieces of information, she confirmed the, finding of
bronchopneumonia. Dr. Miranda likewise duly reported to Dr. Casumpang, who admitted
receiving updates regarding Edmer's condition. There is also evidence supporting Dr.
Miranda's claim that she extended diligent care to Edmer. In fact, when she suspected -
during Edmer's second episode of bleeding - that Edmer could be suffering from dengue
fever, she wasted no time in conducting the necessary tests, and promptly notified Dr.
Casumpang about the incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance led to the finding of
dengue fever.
We note however, that during Edmer's second episode of bleeding, Dr. Miranda failed to
immediately examine and note the cause of the blood specimen. Like Dr. Casumpang, she
merely assumed that the blood in Edmer's phlegm was caused by bronchopneumonia.
Based on her statements we find that Dr. Miranda was not entirely faultless.
Nevertheless, her failure to discern the import of Edmer's second bleeding does not
necessarily amount to negligence as the respondent himself admitted that Dr. Miranda
failed to examine the blood specimen because he washed it away. In addition,
considering the diagnosis previously made by two doctors, and the uncontroverted fact
that the burden of final diagnosis pertains to the attending physician (in this case, Dr.
Casumpang), we believe that Dr. Miranda's error was merely an honest mistake of
judgment influenced in no small measure by her status in the hospital hierarchy; hence,
she should not be held liable for medical negligence.
3. No. The RTC and CA correctly ruled for the competency of Dr. Jaudian as an
expert witness in the case.
The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to decide upon in the
exercise of its discretion. The test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending
upon the subject matter of the investigation, and the fitness of the expert witness. In our
jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness' special knowledge
experience and practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical
medical matters to the Court.
In this case, the court find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on the standard of care
in dengue fever cases. Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during
trial that he had attended not less than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had
exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not
less than 50 dengue related cases.
As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and
relevant exposure in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced that Dr.
Jaudian demonstrated sufficient familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in
dengue fever cases. Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge and experience
sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the subject.
4. Yes. The causation between the negligence and the injury was proven.
Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue fever despite the presence
of its characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also
failed to promptly manage Edmer's illness. Had he immediately conducted confirmatory
tests, (i.e., tourniquet tests and series of blood tests) and promptly administered the
proper care and management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even
death, could have been substantially reduced.
Furthermore, medical literature on dengue shows that early diagnosis and management
of dengue is critical in reducing the risk of complications and avoiding further spread of
the virus. That Edmer later died of "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock," "Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV," a severe and fatal form of dengue fever, established the
causal link between Dr. Casumpang's negligence and the injury.
5. Yes. SJDH is solidarily liable with Dr. Casumpang. The Court affirms the hospital's
liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the basis of the doctrine
of apparent authority or agency by estoppel.
There is No Employer-Employee Relationship Between SJDH and the Petitioning
Doctors
In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties,
the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2)
payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only
the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end.
Control, which is the most crucial among the elements, is not present in this case.
Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised any degree of
control over the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the petitioning
doctors conducted and performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their
diagnosis and treatment. Likewise, no evidence was presented to show that SJDH
monitored, supervised, or directed the petitioning doctors in the treatment and
management of Edmer's case. In these lights, the petitioning doctors were not employees
of SJDH, but were mere independent contractors.
SJDH is Solidarity Liable Based on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine of Apparent
Authority
Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the
petitioning doctors, SJDH is not free from liability. As a rule, hospitals are not liable for
the negligence of its independent contractors. However, it may be found liable if the
physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This
exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority." In sum, a hospital can be
held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an independent
contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors:
first, the hospital's manifestations; and second, the patient's reliance.
Hospital’s Manifestations
It involves an inquiry on whether the hospital acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital. As pointed out in the Nogales Case, the hospital need
not make express representations to the patient that the physician or independent
contractor is an employee of the hospital; representation may be general and implied.
In Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital, questions were raised on "what acts by the
hospital or its agent are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual was an agent of the hospital." In this case, the court considered the act of the
hospital of holding itself out as provider of complete medical care, and considered the
hospital to have impliedly created the appearance of authority.
Patient’s Reliance
It involves an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance on the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In Pamperin, the court
held that the important consideration in determining the patient's reliance is: whether
the plaintiff is seeking care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff is looking to
the hospital merely as a place for his/her personal physician to provide medical care.
Thus, this requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he/she relied
upon the hospital to provide care and treatment, rather than upon a specific physician. In
this case, we shall limit the determination of the hospital's apparent authority to Dr.
Casumpang, in view of our finding that Dr. Miranda is not liable for negligence.
SJDH Clothed Dr. Casumpang With Apparent Authority
SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent authority leading the
respondent to believe that he is an employee or agent of the hospital.
Based on the records, the respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to
care and treat his son Edmer. His testimony during trial showed that he and his wife did
not know any doctors at SJDH; they also did not know that Dr. Casumpang was an
independent contractor. They brought their son to SJDH for diagnosis because of their
family doctor's referral. The referral did not specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or even
to Dr. Miranda, but to SJDH.
Significantly, the respondent had relied on SJDH's representation of Dr. Casumpang's
authority. To recall, when Mrs. Cortejo presented her Fortune Care card, she was initially
referred to the Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town. She was thereafter
referred to Dr. Casumpang, who is also accredited with Fortune Care. In both instances,
SJDH through its agent failed to advise Mrs. Cortejo that Dr. Casumpang is an
independent contractor.
Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang's services on the reasonable belief that such were
being provided by SJDH or its employees, agents, or servants. By referring Dr.
Casumpang to care and treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr. Casumpang, not only
as an accredited member of Fortune Care, but also as a member of its medical staff. SJDH
cannot now disclaim liability since there is no showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the
respondent knew, or should have known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent
contractor of the hospital. In this case, estoppel has already set in.
We also stress that Mrs. Cortejo's use of health care plan (Fortune Care) did not affect
SJDH's liability. The only effect of the availment of her Fortune Care card benefits is that
her choice of physician is limited only to physicians who are accredited with Fortune
Care. Thus, her use of health care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or
coverage of services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTLY GRANTS the consolidated
petitions. The Court finds Dr. Noel Casumpang and San Juan de Dios Hospital solidarity
liable for negligent medical practice. We SET ASIDE the finding of liability as to Dr. Ruby
Sanga-Miranda. The amounts of P45,000.00 as actual damages and P500,000.00 as moral
damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Court AFFIRMS the rest of
the Decision dated October 29, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 12, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 56400.
3. Particular Acts of Negligence
a. Provinces, Cities and Muncipalities
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
CITY OF MANILA vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
FACTS:
Genaro N. Teotico managed to hail a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board
the jeepney, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. His
head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
thereof to pierce his left eyelid and also suffered contusions on different parts of his
body. Teotico then filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police.
The defense presented evidence to prove that the Office of the City Engineer of Manila,
received a report of the uncovered condition of a catch basin but the same was covered
on the same day; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with
the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that
whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the
matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or
covering the catchbasin and in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under
the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter.
The City of Manila invoked Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) reading:
“The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions”
as against:
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
“Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.”
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because
Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the
Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The CFI of Manila rendered sustained the position of the defendants. On appeal taken by
plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but applied Article 2189,
which was sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila which raised that the City of Manila
cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took
place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in
connection therewith.
ISSUE:
Whether the present case is governed by the City charter or by Article 2189 of the Civil
Code.
RULING:
Article 2189 should apply. Section 4 of the charter refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first
time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such
assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial
court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of
the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province,
city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road. In which case, has been exercised by the City of Manila and is proved by
its regular inspection of such manholes.
G.R. No. 71049, May 29, 1987
BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF MANILA AND INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy “bagoong”
when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After his purchase, he
stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening,
to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-peti-tioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half
inches. He felt ill and developed fever thus he was rushed to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital where he had to be confined for (20) days due to high fever and severe pain.
His injury pre-vented him from attending to the school buses he is operating. As a result,
he had to engage the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his business for an
aggregate compensation of P900.00.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
(Asiatic) under whose administra-tion the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed.
The lower court rendered decision in favor of respondents. The appellate court absolved
the City of Manila. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not ruling that
respondent City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated
Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
HELD:
Yes, the appellate court erred. The City of Manila is negligent thus a joint tortfeasor for
quasi-delict with Asiatic which are both jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioner.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that:
"Provinces, cities and munici-palities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suf-fered by any person by reason of de-fective conditions of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision.
Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between
respondent City and Asiatic remained under the control of the former. This is evidenced
by employment by the City of a market master to take direct supervision and control and
to check safety of the place for the public.
Moreover, a customer in a store has the right to assume that the owner will comply with
his duty to keep the premises safe for customers.
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one must have exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family. The City of Manila failed in this regard. Ordinary
precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize the dangers to life
and limb under those difficult circumstances.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED,
making the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation solidarily liable to pay
the plaintiffs P221.90 actual medical expenses, P900.00 for the amount paid for the
operation and management of the school bus, P20,000.00 as moral damages due to pain,
sufferings and sleepless nights and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Municipality of San Juan vs CA
Facts: KC (K.C. Waterworks System Construction), the contractor, was instructed by
MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, a
national road, in San Juan City. KC is working under a Contract for Water Service
Connection between it and the MWSS. The workers installed four (4) barricades made
up of two-inch thick GI pipes welded together, 1.3 meters wide and 1.2 meters high, at
the area where the digging is to take place. The digging operations started at 9 o’clock in
the morning and ended at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon. The workers dug a hole one
(1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the excavated portion of
the road with the same gravel and stone excavated from the area. At that time, only ¾ of
the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-
excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the
concessionaires.
On May 31, 1988, Priscilla and a passenger, Ms. Biglang-Awa, a prosecutor, passed thru
the right side of Santolan Rd going to Pinaglabanan St., at a speed of 30 kilometres per
hour. The streets were flooded owing to the heavy rains. Suddenly, the left front wheel
of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a
result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.
Thereupon, Priscilla Chan contacted Biglang-awa’s husband who immediately arrived at
the scene and brought his wife to the Cardinal Santos Hospital.
According to the police officer who investigated the accident, he did not see any
barricades placed on the road when he arrived less than an hour after the accident.
Because of this, Ms. Biglang-awa filed an action for damages against the MWSS, the
municipality (now a city), some municipal officials, and KC.
After trial, the lower court found the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages
in favour of Ms. Biglang-awa.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with a slight modification on the amount of
damages.
The municipality of San Juan appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that
since Santolan Road is a national road, it is not liable for accidents thereon, since as a
municipality, it is only responsible for the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and
other public places, under the provisions of the then existing Local Government Code. It
also argued that the under the terms of Metropolitan Manila Commission circular, the
permitted excavator is liable for damages, not the municipality.
Issue: WON the Municipality of San Juan is liable.
Held: In denying the appeal filed by the municipality of San Juan, the Supreme Court
ruled:
“Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a
controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or
supervision thereof. This, we made clear in City of Manila vs. Teotico, et al:
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province,
city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either “control or supervision” over said
street or road.
“Doubtless, the term “regulate” found in the aforequoted provision of Section
149 can only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the power of control or, at the
very least, supervision over all excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other
pipes within its territory.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, supra, of the Local
Government Code, the phrases “regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes”, and “adopt measures to ensure public
safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and
property”, are not modified by the term “municipal road”. And neither can it be fairly
inferred from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioner’s power of regulation vis-
à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are to be
performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the municipality’s liability for injuries
caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of
gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or
excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its
territorial jurisdiction.”
b. Owner of Motor Vehicle
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if
he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable. (n)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. (n)
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO,
EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T.
CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.
De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members
of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February
26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to
pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages;
P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants
against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of
P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of
the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the
accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael
Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54
(now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving
his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs.
Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu
Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling
at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic
— the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to
35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a
distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a
certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope
coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's
son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him,
only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given
him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice
the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been
visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his
headlights for a considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that
lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's
right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and
carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened
his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat the
Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in
between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have
been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25
miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to
the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as
already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo,
confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment
by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene
show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the
moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's
negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The
next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable
with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as
law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood
(1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the
driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who
sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes
himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur
to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to
stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself
responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the
chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such
a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant,
if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe
Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware
Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation
of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the
immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but
also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was
wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car
owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience
of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only
twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence,
for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left
side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction.
The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to
assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his
mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man
nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no
absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own
cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not
trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to
appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on
the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor
vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not
similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or
proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before
he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should
do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the
law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers
by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would
be effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is A. Abrasions, multiple:
an error. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. (1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital
The award of P48,000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows:
EILEEN CAEDO:
1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00 A. Lacerated wound
(V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00 (1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3) shin,
lower 1/3.
3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00 ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasolabial region;
4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00
(4) leg, lower third, anterior.

5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00 MARILYN CAEDO:

6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them
also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they
sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral
damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side.
The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their
injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence.
Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable
of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual,
damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third
C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D, D-1,
D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries,
the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring
defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following: BIENVENIDO GELISAN VS. BENITO ALDAY

MARCIAL T. CAEDO: FACTS:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior; On January 31, 1962, Gelisan and Espiritu entered into a contract under which the latter
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture; hired Gelisan’s freight truck for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer. It
Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary; was agreed that:
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull. the rate would be P18.00 per trip within Manila, the loads shall not exceed 200 sacks,
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO: and that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the
goods to be hauled by him.
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees. Espiritu’s driver then took the truck on February 1, 1962. Plaintiff Alday, a trucking
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal; operator, owns about 15 freight trucks, and had known the Espiritu since 1948 as a truck
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement. operator. Alday had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe. (Atlas) from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right. at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper
F. Concussion, cerebral. at 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer. Alday accepted the offer and instructed his checker to
let Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip.
EPHRAIM CAEDO: The fertilizer was delivered to his driver and helper with the necessary way bill receipts.
However, he did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas bodega at Mandaluyong and he
could not be found.
Alday reported the loss to the Manila Police Department. Espiritu was later arrested and
booked for theft while the truck was found by Alday on Sto. Cristo St., and was later
impounded by the police. Gelisan claimed the truck but as he could not produce at the
time the registration papers, the police would not release the same to him. He paid the
premium of P300 to a surety company for the release of the truck.
Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of fertilizer, in the amount of
P5,397.33, to Atlas so that, he filed a complaint against Espiritu and Gelisan with the CFI
of Manila, for the recovery of damages suffered by him thru the criminal acts committed
by the defendants. The defendant, Roberto Espiritu failed to file an answer and was,
accordingly, declared in default.
On the other hand, Gelisan, disowned responsibility. He claimed that he had no
contractual relations with the plaintiff Alday as regards the hauling and/or delivery of
the 400 bags of fertilizer; that the alleged misappropriation or nondelivery by Espiritu,
was entirely beyond his (Gelisan's) control and knowledge, and which only became
known to him when his freight truck was impounded by the police; and that in his
written contract of hire with Espiritu, it was expressly provided that the latter will bear
and pay all loss and damages attending the carriage of goods to be hauled by him.
CFI ruled that only Espiritu was liable since Gelisan was not privy to the contract
between Espiritu and Alday. CA ruled that Gelisan is also liable for being the registered
owner of the truck; and that the lease contract between Gelisan and Espiritu, with the
stipulation that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses attending the carriage of goods, is
not binding upon Alday for not having been previously approved by the Public Service
Commission. Gelisan appealed to SC.
ISSUE: WON Gelisan is liable for damages to Alday for the nondelivery of the bags of
fertilizer
HELD: Yes. The registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages
that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any
of the passengers therein. Montoya vs. Ignacio: Since a franchise is personal in nature
any transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service Commission so that
the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the public. xxx It follows
that if the property covered by the franchise is transferred, or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against the Public Service
Commission and in contemplation of law the grantee continues to be responsible under
the franchise in relation to the Commission and to the Public. Nevertheles, Gelisan has a
right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount that he may be required to pay as
damages to Alday. The lease contract in question, although not effective against the
public for not having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid and
binding between the contracting parties
SC also find no merit in the petitioner's contention that his liability is only subsidiary.
The Court has consistently considered the registered owner/operator of a public service
vehicle to be jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of
said vehicles.
e. Proprietor/ Owner of Building or Structure or Thing.
NCC – Arts. 2180 (4), 2190-2193,1163, 1170
US v. Zabala – diko Makita sa net
YHT Realty Corp, Erlinda Lainez and Anicia Payam vs. CA and Maurice McLoughlin
[G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005]
Facts:
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay
at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines when he met Tan. Tan befriended
McLoughlin and convinced him to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where
Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel
while Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes of
Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin’s booking at the Tropicana where he started
staying during his trips to the Philippines.
He rented a safety deposit box and is aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana
relative to its safety deposit boxes; that it could only be opened through the use of two
keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the
possession of the management of the hotel. When a registered guest wished to open his
safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then would
assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety
deposit box with the two keys.
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box:
- US$15,000.00 which he placed in two envelopes
- envelope containing US$10,000.00, and
- the other envelope US$5,000.00;
- AUS$10,000.00 Australian dollars which he also placed in another envelope;
- 2 other envelopes containing letters and credit cards;
 - 2 bankbooks; and
- a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box.
Before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box
and took the envelope containing US$5,000, the envelope containing AUS$10,000, his
passports and his credit cards. McLoughlin left the other items in the box as he did not
check out of his room at the Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. He discovered
that there was only $3,000 in the envelope which ought to have $5,000, but thought that
it was just a result of bad accounting of his money.
After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana and left for Australia. He then
discovered that:
- the envelope with US$10,000.00 was short of US$5,000
- the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box
upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond
bracelet.
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines, he asked Lainez if some money and/or
jewelry which he had lost were found and returned to her or to the management.
However, Lainez told him that no one in the hotel found such things and none were
turned over to the management.
He again registered at Tropicana and rented a safety deposit box. He placed
- envelope containing US$15,000.00
- envelope containing AUS$10,000.00 and
- other envelopes containing his traveling papers/documents.
McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his safety deposit box. He noticed that:
- in the envelope containing US$15,000, US$2,000 were missing and
- in the envelope previously containing AUS$10,000, AUS$4,500.00 were
missing.
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and Payam
who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. Tan
admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key while he was asleep and was able to open
the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez.
McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident, and Lopez
wrote a promissory note.
Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan, McLoughlin insisted that it must be the
hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However, Lopez refused to
accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box
entitled Undertaking For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box, specifically paragraphs (2) and
(4) thereof, to wit:
2. To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any
liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any
cause whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use thereof by any
other person should the key be lost;
4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of TROPICANA APARTMENT
HOTEL upon giving up the use of the box.
McLoughlin went back to Australia and he consulted his lawyers, and they opined that
the stipulations are void for being violative of universal hotel practices and customs. His
lawyers prepared a letter which was sent to the Office of the President, Corazon Aquino.
The Office referred the letter to the DOJ which forwarded the same to the Western Police
District (WPD).
After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia, McLoughlin came to the
Philippines and went to Malacaňang to follow up on his letter but he was instructed to go
to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him to proceed to the WPD for documentation, but
McLoughlin went back to Australia as he had an urgent business matter to attend to.
Upon his return to the Philippines, the WPD conducted an investigation which resulted
in the preparation of an affidavit forwarded to the Manila City Fiscals Office. Said
affidavit became the basis of preliminary investigation but McLoughlin left again for
Australia without receiving the notice of the hearing. Thus, the case at the Fiscals Office
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mcloughlin requested the reinstatement of the
criminal charge for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his lawyers wrote letters of
demand to those having responsibility to pay the damage.
Meetings were held between McLoughlin and his lawyer which resulted to the filing of a
complaint for damages against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan
(defendants) for the loss of McLoughlin’s money.
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in and out of the country to attend to
urgent business in Australia, and while staying in the Philippines to attend the hearing,
he incurred expenses for hotel bills, airfare and other transportation expenses, long
distance calls to Australia, Meralco power expenses, and expenses for food and
maintenance, among others.
RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin.
It was established that McLoughlins money, kept in Tropicana’s safety deposit box, was
taken by Tan without McLoughlins consent, through the use of the master key which was
in the possession of the management. Payam and Lainez allowed Tan to use the master
key without authority from McLoughlin. The trial court added that if McLoughlin had not
lost his dollars, he would not have gone through the trouble and personal inconvenience
of seeking aid and assistance from the Office of the President, DOJ, police authorities and
the City Fiscals Office in his desire to recover his losses from the hotel management and
Tan.
As regards the loss of US$7,000.00 and jewelry worth approximately US$1,200.00, no
claim was made by McLoughlin for such losses because he was not sure how they were
lost and who the responsible persons were. But considering the admission of the
defendants that they allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court opined that it was
logical and reasonable to presume that his personal assets jewelry were taken by Tan
from the safety deposit box without McLoughlins consent through the cooperation of
Payam and Lainez.
The trial court also found that defendants acted with gross negligence in the
performance and exercise of their duties and obligations as innkeepers and were
therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred by McLoughlin.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of the Undertaking For The
Use Of Safety Deposit Box are void for being contrary to the express mandate of Article
2003 of the New Civil Code and against public policy. Thus, there being fraud or wanton
conduct on the part of defendants, they should be responsible for all damages which may
be attributed to the non-performance of their contractual obligations.
CA: Affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court except as to the amount of
damages awarded.
Issues:
1. Whether the finding of gross negligence on the part of petitioners in the
performance of their duties as innkeepers is supported by the evidence on
record;
2. whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box admittedly
executed by private respondent is null and void; and
3. whether the damages awarded to private respondent, as well as the amounts
thereof, are proper under the circumstances.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The evidence reveals that two keys are required to open the safety deposit
boxes of Tropicana.
One key is assigned to the guest while the other remains in the possession of the
management. If the guest desires to open his safety deposit box, he must request the
management for the other key to open the same. In other words, the guest alone cannot
open the safety deposit box without the assistance of the management or its employees.
With more reason that access to the safety deposit box should be denied if the one
requesting for the opening of the safety deposit box is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of
any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the
management had at least a hand in the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for
the loss is force majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had
custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. In fact, they even
admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlins
safety deposit box. This only proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person
aside from the registered guest had access to the safety deposit box. Yet the management
failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to discover the taking
before it disclosed the matter to him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible
for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of the negligence of its employees.
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this incident
considering that Payam admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three times in
opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the
latter was still asleep. In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable
that without the acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety
deposit box, the loss of McLoughlins money could and should have been avoided.
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees
believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The
evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan
to the management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not
exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence of any showing that he made the
management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the
safety deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant
such conclusion considering that what is involved in the instant case is the very safety of
McLoughlins deposit. If only petitioners exercised due diligence in taking care of
McLoughlins safety deposit box, they should have confronted him as to his relationship
with Tan considering that the latter had been observed opening McLoughlins safety
deposit box a number of times at the early hours of the morning. Tans acts should have
prompted the management to investigate her relationship with McLoughlin. Then,
petitioners would have exercised due diligence required of them. Failure to do so
warrants the conclusion that the management had been remiss in complying with the
obligations imposed upon hotel-keepers under the law.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their
obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the
burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that
the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also, this
Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer
was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove
the negligence of such employer. Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlins money
was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees in allowing Tan to not have occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent negligence in allowing Tan,
open the safety deposit box without the guests consent, both the assisting employees and who was not the registered guest, to open the safety deposit box of McLoughlin, even
YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held assuming that the latter was also guilty of negligence in allowing another person to use
solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193. his key. To rule otherwise would result in undermining the safety of the safety deposit
boxes in hotels for the management will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under
2. Yes. Article 2003 is controlling, thus: the pretense of being a family member or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the
safety deposit box without fear of any liability that will attach thereafter in case such
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to
person turns out to be a complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade
the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation
responsibility for any liability incurred by its employees in conspiracy with the guests
between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set
relatives and visitors.
forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
Petitioners contend that McLoughlins case was mounted on the theory of contract, but
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy
the trial court and the appellate court upheld the grant of the claims of the latter on the
precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business
basis of tort.[45] There is nothing anomalous in how the lower courts decided the
like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
controversy for this Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort liability can
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their
exist even if there are already contractual relations. The act that breaks the contract may
persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law
also be tort.[46]
in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed 3. Yes. It is within the province of lower courts to settle factual issues such as the
by hotel keepers on guests for their signature. proper amount of damages awarded and such finding is binding upon this
Court especially if sufficiently proven by evidence and not unconscionable or
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New
excessive.
Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in
the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever. Evidently,
the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the
contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper 19 October 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners are directed, jointly and severally, to
shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by pay private respondent the following amounts:
servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as
it may proceed from any force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that may
spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of
1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment;
the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to
qualify the same as force majeure. 2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to
Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips;
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002 which exempts the hotel-
keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or visitors. Even 3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana
a cursory reading of the provision would lead us to reject petitioners contention. The Copacabana Apartment Hotel;
justification they raise would render nugatory the public interest sought to be protected
by the provision. What if the negligence of the employer or its employees facilitated the 4) One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon
consummation of a crime committed by the registered guests relatives or visitor? Should Tower;
the law exculpate the hotel from liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of
5) One-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expense
the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this provision presupposes that the hotel-
from McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here
keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the
in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips;
occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not responsible for the loss of goods by theft,
unless his actionable negligence contributes to the loss. 6) One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses;
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared not 7) One-half of P356,400.00 or P178,200.00 representing expenses for food and
only by the guest himself but also by the management since two keys are necessary to maintenance;
open the safety deposit box. Without the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would
 8) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
9) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
10) P200,000 representing attorneys fees.
d. Head of Family
ART. 2193 NCC
e. Attorneys
90 ALR Rth 1033
ISAAC v. MENDOZA
In February 1944, Isaac (Plaintiff) sold to Mendoza (Defendant) a parcel of land in Pili,
Camarines Sur, for the amount of Php 450.00, Japanese currency, reserving the right to
repurchase within four years.
After liberation, the seller offered to redeem, but defendant objected, saying the
redemption was premature.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
In Feburary 1946, litigation was instituted in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Camarines Sur, to compel re-transfer.
After having been duly summoned, the defendant failed to answer. Consequently, upon
plaintiff's motion, he was defaulted by order of May 10, 1947.
On September 23, 1947, considering the plaintiff's evidence the court rendered judgment
requiring the defendant to execute a deed of re-sale of the land, to receive the amount of
P90 Philippine currency, which Isaac had consigned in court, to pay damages in the sum
of P95.
On December 9, 1947 Mendoza submitted a petition to set aside the judgment invoking
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Basis of defendant's petition was the
allegation that as his attorney Jorge C. Briones had not received notice of the court's
denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint, he had reason to believe the time to
answer had not expired. Opposed by plaintiff, the petition was denied.
Wherefore defendant appealed directly to this court.
VI. ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court below erred in declaring defendant-appellant in default.
2. Whether or not defendant-appellant should not suffer from his lawyer’s shortcoming.
3. Whether or not defendant-appellant has standing in court.
VII. RULING:
1. No. It appears from the record that, duly summoned, defendant through Attorney
Briones filed a motion to dismiss, which was overruled by order of April 8, 1946. At the
bottom of that order there is notation that had been furnished Attorney Briones by
ordinary mail. On February 8, 1947, the plaintiff filed his motion for default, asserting
that, defendant's motion to dismiss had been denied and that so far, defendant had
interposed no answer. On February 15, 1947 the court issued an auto suspending
consideration of plaintiff's motion and giving the defendant a period of ten days within
which to reply thereto, if so desired. Copy of this directive was sent by registered mail to
Attorney Briones, but the latter "refused to claim the registered letter despite the notices
given him by the postmaster". And according to an affidavit submitted to the court,
Attorney Peñas for the plaintiff, had again and gain reminded Briones that the time was
come for the answer.
Apprised of the foregoing circumstances, the court of first instance denied the petition to
set aside.
We think such denial was entirely proper. According to the rules, Attorney Briones is
deemed to have received the copy of the auto of February 15, 1947 which he declined to
accept from the mails (Rule 27 section 8). That order was sufficient to advise him of the
rejection of his previous motion of dismissal, supposing he had not actually received the
copy of the order of April 8, 1946, which had been forwarded to him by ordinary mail.
2. No. The appellant insist here that "the record fails to show a conclusive evidence that
Atty. Jorge C. Briones . . . was notified". This is refuted by the above account of the facts
and of the governing principles. It is remarkable that, to meet the conclusions therein set
forth, defendant has not introduced any sworn statement of Attorney Briones.
In connection with the argument that defendant should not suffer for his lawyer's
shortcoming, it should be explained that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of
his counsel in realm of procedural technique; but if the client is prejudiced by the
attorney's negligence or misconduct he may recover damages.
3. No. Another point, which is equally decisive. Unless the appellant has filed a motion to
set aside the order of default, on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 38, he has no
standing in court nor the right to appeal.3 Examining appellant's motion of December 9,
1947 we observe that he merely requested for the annulment of the decision rendered
after his default (September 23, 1947) without praying for the revocation of the order of
May 10, 1947 declaring him to be default. But granting, for the sake of argument that the
aforesaid pleading impliedly included the second prayer, we are met by the insuperable
objection that the petition was too late. Because filed beyond the six-month period
within which applications for relief under Rule 38 may be entertained. From May 10 to
December 9 seven months had elapsed.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, this appeal being without merit, we affirm the order of the trial judge
denying the petition to set aside. With costs.
f. Employees student’s permit. Cang prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit, for lack
of cause of action and for lack of legal capacity.
STEPHEN CANG and GEORGE NARDO y JOSOL, Petitioners, vs. HERMINIA CULLEN,
Respondent. RTC ruled in favor of Cang and Nardo.

G.R. No. 163078; November 25, 2009; J. Nachura CA reversed the RTC Decision.

FACTS: ISSUE: WHETHER Cullen, as Saycon's employer, is lisble for damages caused by her
employee.
Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle, along P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City,
occupying the middle portion of the outer lane. The taxi, on the other hand, was traveling HELD: YES.
on the inner lane and slightly behind, but to the left of, the motorcycle.
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the accident. Corollarily,
Cullen alleged that between Sikatuna and D. Jakosalem Streets, the taxi veered to the Article 2185 of the Civil Code states:
right and sideswiped the motorcycle, then attempted to speed away. Peace officers near
the scene flagged down the taxi. As a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously injured. Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
Cang and Nardo, claimed that it was the motorcycle that bumped into the taxi. Nardo vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
narrated that he was driving the taxi on the inner lane (near the center island) along P. regulation.
del Rosario St., moving towards the intersection of D. Jakosalem St. When the "caution"
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid down this
signal of the traffic light flashed, he immediately slowed down. It was at that point that
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
the motorcycle bumped into the taxi’s rear.
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
Cullen, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycon’s hospital and medical not, the person is guilty of negligence.
expenses amounting to P185,091.00. She also alleged that due to the injuries Saycon
Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was negligent. In the first place,
sustained, he was unable to work. For humanitarian reasons, Cullen had given Saycon an
he should not have been driving alone. The law clearly requires that the holder of a
amount equivalent to his wages and P2,000.00 per month from June 1997 until he was
student-driver’s permit should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating
able to return to work.
a motor vehicle. Further, there is the matter of not wearing a helmet and the fact that he
Cullen filed a Complaint for damages against Cang and Nardo praying that judgment be was speeding. All these prove that he was negligent.
rendered ordering the Cang and Nardo, jointly and severally, P205,091.00 in actual
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, [w]hen the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
damages; P2,000.00 per month from June 1997 up to the time Saycon would be able to
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
return to work, with 6% per annum interest from the date of extrajudicial demand;
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 20% of the total amount by way of attorney’s fees;
the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
P10,000.00 as acceptance fee; P500.00 per court appearance, as appearance fee;
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the cost of the suit.
The trial court gave more credence to Nardo’s version of the accident that he was on his
Cang filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the complaint violated the Katarungang
proper lane, that he was not speeding, and that it was the motorcycle that bumped into
Pambarangay Law but the motion was dismissed.
his taxi. The trial court established that the accident was caused wholly by Saycon’s
Cang averred that Nardo was not driving the taxi as the his employee, but that Nardo was negligence. It held that "the injuries and damages suffered by Cullen and Saycon were not
leasing the taxi from him. Also, Nardo did not sideswipe the motorcycle driven by due to the acts of Cang and Nardo but due to their own negligence and recklessness."
Saycon, nor did the latter speed away after the incident. They maintained that, at the
Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he would not have been entitled to
time of the impact, Nardo’s taxi was on its proper lane and that it was the motorcycle
recover damages from Cang and Nardo had he instituted his own action. Consequently,
that veered into Nardo’s lane and bumped the taxi. After the impact, Nardo drove the taxi
Cullen, as his employer, would likewise not be entitled to claim for damages.
backward to where Saycon and the motorcycle were slumped on the road. He then
alighted from the taxi. Meanwhile, two traffic enforcers had crossed the street. After Further militating against respondent’s claim is the fact that she herself was negligent in
examining Saycon’s injuries, one of the enforcers ordered Nardo to bring the former to a the selection and supervision of her employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
hospital. In addition, Saycon was driving the motorcycle without any protective headgear
and that the latter was not authorized to drive the motorcycle since he only had a Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own
duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Thus,
in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts
must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a student’s permit is, to our minds,
proof enough that Cullen was negligent – either she did not know that he only had a
student’s permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this deficiency. Whichever
way we look at it, we arrive at the same conclusion: that she failed to exercise the due
diligence required of her as an employer in supervising her employee. Thus, the trial
court properly denied her claim for damages. One who seeks equity and justice must
come to this Court with clean hands.
In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who caused the
accident and, as such, he cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the other hand,
Cullen, as Saycon’s employer, was also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of
diligence required in supervising her employee. Consequently, she cannot recover from
petitioners what she had paid for the treatment of her employee’s injuries.
g. Doctors
DR. IDOL L. BONDOC, Petitioner, v. MARILOU R. MANTALA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203080, November 12, 2014
FACTS: Marilou Mantala (Mantala) was admitted at the Oriental Mindoro Provincial
Hospital (OMPH) on April 3, 2009, at 11am, with referral from the Bansud Municipal
Health Office (BMHO). She was due to deliver her fifth child and was advised by the
BMHO for a cesarean section because her baby was big and there was excessive amniotic
fluid in her womb. She started to labor at 7:00 in the morning and was initially brought
to the Bongabon Health Center. However, said health center also told her to proceed
directly to the hospital.
Mantaala alleged that inside the delivery room of OMPH, she was attended to by
petitioner who instructed the midwife and two younger assistants to press down on
respondent's abdomen and even demonstrated to them how to insert their fingers into
her vagina. Thereafter, petitioner went out of the delivery room and later, his assistants
also left. As she labored in pain, she felt the movement of her baby inside her womb and
the intermittent stiffening of her abdomen.
At about 4pm, Mantala still has yet to give birth. The midwife and the younger assistants
again pressed down on her abdomen causing excruciating pain on her ribs and made her
very weak. They repeatedly did this pressing until the baby and placenta came out. When
she regained consciousness, she was already at the recovery room. She learned that an
operation was performed on her by petitioner to remove her ruptured uterus but what
depressed her most was her stillborn baby and the loss of her reproductive capacity.
Mantala noticed that her vulvawas swollen and that there was an open wound which
widened later on and was re-stitched by Dr. Bondoc. Dr. Bondoc was heard uttering
words unbecoming of his profession pertaining to the respondent’s state while in labor.
Respondent filed then a complaint for grave misconduct against the petitioner before the
ombudsman. The petitioner resigned as medical officer of OMPH, alleging that the
complaint against him is now moot and academic.
On August 12, 2010, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon rendered a Decision
finding the petitioner administratively liable (penalty of DISMISSAL). It held that by fully
entrusting to his subordinates the task of handling respondent's complicated delivery,
petitioner exhibited an improper or wrongful conduct and dereliction of duty as medical
practitioner.
The foregoing ruling was affirmed by the CA and petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bondoc’s conduct during the delivery of respondent’s baby
constitute grave misconduct.
HELD:
YES. Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer,13 a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment.14 It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term,
however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. On the other hand,
when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct. 15
In deliberately leaving the respondent to a midwife and two inexperienced assistants
despite knowing that she was under prolonged painful labor and about to give birth to a
macrosomic baby by vaginal delivery, petitioner clearly committed a dereliction of duty
and a breach of his professional obligations. The gravity of respondent's condition is
highlighted by the expected complications she suffered - her stillborn baby, a ruptured
uterus that necessitated immediate surgery and blood transfusion, and vulvar
hematomas.
Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of the Medical Profession in the
Philippines states:
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously. He should secure
for them all possible benefits that may depend upon his professional skill and care. As
the sole tribunal to adjudge the physician's failure to fulfill his obligation to his patients
is, in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is discreditable and
inexcusable.
A doctor's duty to his patient is not required to be extraordinary. The standard
contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good
physicians, i.e. reasonable skill and competence. Even by this standard, petitioner fell
short when he routinely delegated an important task that requires his professional skill
and competence to his subordinates who have no requisite training and capability to
make crucial decisions in difficult childbirths.
Not only did petitioner routinely delegate his responsibility to his subordinates, he
casually instructed them to press down repeatedly on respondent's abdomen, unmindful
of her critical condition as borne out by his very own findings. Worse, petitioner
haughtily and callously spoke of respondent's case to the other doctors and medical staff
while performing a CS after he had briefly attended to her at the delivery room
"...paanakin na long 'yon, abnormal din naman ang bata kahit mabuhay, kawawa lang
siya." Such insensitive and derisive language was again heard from the petitioner when
he referred for the second time to respondent's traumatic delivery, saying that: "Pinilit
no 'ng tatlong ungas, ayon lumusot pero patay ang bata, tapos ito, mukhang pumutok" As a
government physician, petitioner's demeanor is unbecoming and bespeaks of his
indifference to the well-being of his patients.
Petitioner thus not only committed a dereliction of duty, but also transgressed the ethical
norms of his profession when he failed to render competent medical care with
compassion and respect for his patient's dignity.
A physician should be dedicated to provide competent medical care with full
professional skill in accordance with the current standards of care, compassion,
independence and respect for human dignity.
A grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that the accused is a first time offender or
by the length of service of the accused. The Court stressed that dishonesty and grave
misconduct have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service. They
inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When an officer or
employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public's
faith and confidence in the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
B. GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY OR REASONABLY PRUDENT MAN
C. GENERAL STANDARD OF CARE (MEANING)
1. Art. 1173 of the NCC
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914
FACTS: The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in
the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's
residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to
enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the
night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his
premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle with the rails,
resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries
complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in
question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails
rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus making
the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but
it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an
extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and
that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence
was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P.
Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a judgment of
P1,000.
Both parties appealed from the decision, the defendant on the ground that it was not
liable and the plaintiff on the ground that the damages were insufficient according to the
evidence, and while the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial upon the statutory
grounds and took proper exception to the denial thereof
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent, and, if so, to what extent.
HELD: NO.
In support of the defendant's contention counsel says: "Defendant's negligence was its
failure properly to maintain the track; plaintiff's negligence was his intoxication; the
'principal occurrence' was plaintiff's fall from his calesa. It seems clear that plaintiff's
intoxication contributed to the fall; if he had been sober, it can hardly be doubted that he
would have crossed the track safely, as he had done a hundred times before."
There seems to have been two hearings, one on the 31st of August and the other on the
28th of September. Not all the evidence taken on the hearings being before the court so
the SC refused, under the rules, to consider even that evidence which is in the Court; and,
in the decision of this case, the Court is, therefore, relegated to the facts stated in the
opinion of the court and the pleadings filed.
In the trial court’s decision, there is nothing in the opinion which sustains the conclusion
of the court that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the accident which is the
basis of this action. Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is
the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of
ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is
required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree
of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
After showing clearly and forcibly the negligence of the defendant in leaving its tracks in
the condition in which they were on the night of the injury, the court has the following to
say, and it is all that can be found in its opinion, with reference to the negligence of the
plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which Mr. Wright was on returning to his
house on the night in question, the testimony of Doctor Kneedler, who was the physician
who attended him an hour after the accident, demonstrates that he was intoxicated. . . . .
If the defendant or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the
rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large amount
of travel, the plaintiff was no less negligent, he not having abstained from his
custom of taking more wine than he could carry without disturbing his
judgment and his self-control, he knowing that he had to drive a horse and
wagon and to cross railroad tracks which were to a certain extent dangerous by
reason of the rails being elevated above the level of the street.
If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted
to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have
avoided the damages which he received, although the company, on its part, was
negligent in maintaining its tracks in a bad condition for travel.
Both parties, therefore, were negligent and both contributed to the damages
resulting to the plaintiff, although the plaintiff, in the judgment of the court,
contributed in greater proportion to the damages that did the defendant.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the
conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he
would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to
say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the
ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be
sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to
conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a
drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and
guesswork.
It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the
question presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of the
case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co., above; and the Court do not find facts in the opinion of the
court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.
ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL. v. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-39587, 24 March 1934, EN BANC, (VILLA-REAL, J.)
FACTS:
Aleko E. Lilius, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne
Lilius, left Manila in their Studebaker car — driven by Aleko E. Lilius — for the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on a sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he
made said trip although he had already been to many places, driving his own car, in and
outside the Philippines. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road at
said points and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before
reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and
inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road, it was impossible
to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing, coming
from Calauan, the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several
people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite
side. He slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people to
get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself
upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's train
coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's car
right in the center. After dragging the said car a distance of about ten meters, the
locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great that the plaintiff's
wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground
unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer Andres Basilio, he was
unable to stop the locomotive until after it had gone about seventy meters from the
crossing. Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the
crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. The flagman
or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the station with a red flag in one
hand and a green one in the other, both of which were wound on their respective sticks.
The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his post at the
crossing upon the arrival of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore
traveled at great speed.
ISSUE: Is Manila Railroad Company negligent?
RULING:
YES. This court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of
the defendant-appellant company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at
the crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that
they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part
of its employees — the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at
the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train; the stationmaster,
for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to his post on time; and the engineer,
for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the
absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and continuously
ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing. Although it is
probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and the discharge of their duties because, otherwise, it would
have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous occasions as well as on
the night in question, the flagman and switchman would have always been at his post at
the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a good father of a family, which
the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent
selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from
the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence,
but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own negligence,
contributed to the accident, inasmuch as nobody is a guarantor of his neighbor's
personal safety and property, but everybody should look after them, employing the care
and diligence that a good father of a family should apply to his own person, to the
members of his family and to his property, in order to avoid any damage. It appears that
the herein plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the
presence of his wife and child suggested to him in order that his pleasure trip might be
enjoyable and have a happy ending, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded
according to the circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the
face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road, in order to
warn them of his approach and request them to get out of the way, as he did when he
came upon the truck parked on the left hand side of the road seven or eight meters from
the place where the accident occurred, and upon the persons who appeared to have
alighted from the said truck. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the
crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been
free from obstacles, it was because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to
go ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating
its existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which
he received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the
locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already
become inevitable.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion that the defendant the
Manila Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own negligence
and that of its employees, for not having employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of the said employees in the discharge of their duties.
G.R. No. 98243 July 1, 1992
ALEJANDRO ARADA, doing business under the name and style "SOUTH NEGROS
ENTERPRISES", petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the
decision * of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 20597
entitled "San Miguel Corporation v. Alejandro Arada, doing business under the name and
style "South Negros Enterprises", reversing the decision of the RTC, Seventh Judicial
Region, Branch XII, Cebu City, ordering petitioner to pay the private respondent tho
amount of P172,284.80 representing the value of the cargo lost on board the ill-fated,
M/L Maya with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
complaint on March 25, 1983 until fully paid, and the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: Alejandro Arada, herein petitioner, is the
proprietor and operator of the firm South Negros Enterprises which has been organized
and established for more than ten (10) years. It is engaged in the business of small scale
shipping as a common carrier, servicing the hauling of cargoes of different corporations
and companies with the five (5) vessels it was operating (Rollo, p. 121).
On March 24, 1982. petitioner entered into a contract with private respondent to safely
transport as a common carrier, cargoes of the latter from San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental to Mandaue City using one of petitioner's vessels, M/L Maya. The cargoes of The Board's report containing its findings and recommendation was then forwarded to
private respondent consisted of 9,824 cases of beer empties valued at P176,824.80, were the headquarters of the Philippine Coast Guard for appropriate action. On the basis of
itemized as follows: such report, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard rendered a decision dated
December 21, 1984 in SBMI Adm. Case No. 88-82 exonerating the owner/operator
NO. OF CASES CARGO VALUE officers and crew of the ill-fated M/L Maya from any administrative liability on account
of said incident (Exh. 2).
7,515 CS PPW STENIE MTS P136.773.00 On March 25, 1983, Private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court its
first cause of action being for the recovery of the value of the cargoes anchored on breach
1,542 CS PLW GRANDE MTS 23,438.40 of contract of carriage. After due hearing, said court rendered a decision dated July 18,
1988, the dispositive portion of which reads

58 CS G.E. PLASTIC MTS 1,276.00 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) With respect to the first cause of action, claim of plaintiff is hereby dismissed;
24 CS PLP MTS 456.00
(2) Under the second cause of action, defendant must pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00;
37 CS CS WOODEN MTS 673.40 (3) In the third cause of action, the defendant must pay plaintiff the sum of P2,849.20;

8 CS LAGERLITE PLASTIC MTS 128.00
640 CS STENEI PLASTIC MTS 14,080.00
9,824 CS P176,824.80
On March 24, 1982, petitioner thru its crew master, Mr. Vivencio Babao, applied for a
clearance with the Philippine Coast Guard for M/L Maya to leave the port of San Carlos
City, but due to a typhoon, it was denied clearance by SNI Antonio Prestado PN who was
then assigned at San Carlos City Coast Guard Detachment (Rollo, p. 122).
On March 25, 1982 M/L Maya was given clearance as there was no storm and the sea
was calm. Hence, said vessel left for Mandaue City. While it was navigating towards Cebu,
a typhoon developed and said vessel was buffeted on all its sides by big waves. Its rudder
was destroyed and it drifted for sixteen (16) hours although its engine was running.
(4) Since the plaintiff has withheld the payment of P12,997.47 due the defendynt, the
plaintiff should deduct the amount of P4,849.20 from the P12,997.47 and the balance of
P8,148.27 must be paid to the defendant; and
(5) Defendant's counterclaim not having been substantiated by evidence is likewise
dismissed. NO COSTS. (Orig. Record, pp. 193-195).
Thereafter, private respondent appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals claiming
that the trial court erred in —
(1) holding that nothing was shown that the defendant, or any of his employees who
manned the M/L Maya was negligent in any way nor did they fail to observe
extraordinary diligence over the cargoes of the plaintiff; and
(2) holding that the sinking of said vessel was caused by the storm, consequently,
dismissing the claim of plaintiff in its first cause of action for breach of contract of
carriage of goods (Rollo, pp. 33-34; Decision, pp. 3-4).

On March 27, 1982 at about 4:00 a.m., the vessel sank with whatever was left of its
cargoes. The crew was rescued by a passing pump boat and was brought to Calanggaman
Island. Later in the afternoon, they were brought to Palompon, Leyte, where Vivencio
Babao filed a marine protest (Rollo, p. 10).
On the basis of such marine protest, the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted a hearing of
the sinking of M/L Maya wherein private respondent was duly represented. Said Board
made its findings and recommendation dated November 7, 1983, the dispositive portion
of which reads as:
In its decision Promulgated on April 8, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the court a quo, the dispositive portion and the dispositive part of its decision reads as:
WHEREFORE, that part of the Judgment appeal6d from is REVERSED and the appellee
Aleiandro Arada, doing business by the name and style, "South Negros Enterprises",
ordered (sic) to pay unto the appellant San Miguel Corporation the amount of
P176,824.80 representing the value of the cargo lost on board the ill-fated vessel, M/L
Maya, with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of the filing of the complaint on
March 25, 1983, until fully paid, and the costs. (Rollo, p. 37)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board recommends as it is hereby The Court of Appeals ruled that "in view of his failure to observe extraordinary diligence
recommended that the owner/operator, officers and crew of M/L Maya be exonerated or over the cargo in question and his negligence previous to the sinking of the carrying
absolved from any administrative liability on account of this incident (Exh. 1).
vessel, as above shown, the appellee is liable to the appellant for the value of the lost
cargo.
Hence the present recourse.
On November 20, 1991, this Court gave due course to the petition. The pivotal issue to be
resolved is whether or not petitioner is liable for the value of the lost cargoes.
Petitioner contends that it was not in the exercise of its function as a common carrier
when it entered into a contract with private respondent,but was then acting as a private
carrier not bound by the requirement of extraordinary diligence (Rollo, p. 15) and that
the factual findings of the Board of Marine Inquiry and the Special Board of Marine
Inquiry are binding and conclusive on the Court (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
Private respondent counters that M/L Maya was in the exercise of its function as a
common carrier and its failure to observe the extraordinary diligence required of it in
the vigilance over their cargoes makes Petitioner liable for the value of said cargoes.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation offering their services to the public (Art. 1732 of the New Civil Code).
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that petitioner was exercising its function as a
common carrier when it entered into a contract with private respondent to carry and
transport the latter's cargoes. This fact is best supported by the admission of petitioner's
son, Mr. Eric Arada, who testified as the officer-in-charge for operations of South Negros
Enterprises in Cebu City. In substance his testimony on January 14, 1985 is as follows:
Q. How many vessels are you operating?
A. There were all in all around five (5).
Q. And you were entering to service hauling of cargoes to different companies, is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In one word, the South Negros Enterprises is engaged in the business of common
carriers, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir,
Q. And in fact, at the time of the hauling of the San Miguel Beer, it was also in the same
category as a common carrier?
A. Yes, sir,
(TSN. pp. 3-4, Jan. 29, 1985)
A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for insistent reasons of
public policy is burdened by law with the duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not
only in ensuring the safety of passengers, but in caring for the goods transported by it.
The loss or destruction or deterioration of goods turned over to the common carrier for
the conveyance to a designated destination raises instantly a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier, save only where such loss, destruction or damage
arises from extreme circumstances such as a natural disaster or calamity ... (Benedicto v.
IAC, G.R. No. 70876, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA 547) (Emphasis supplied).
In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural
disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common
carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and
after the occurrence of flood, storm or other natural disaster in order that the common
carrier may be exempted from liability for the destruction or deterioration of the goods
(Article 1739, New Civil Code).
In the instant case, the appellate court was correct in finding that petitioner failed to
observe the extraordinary diligence over the cargo in question and he or the master in
his employ was negligent previous to the sinking of the carrying vessel. In substance, the
decision reads:
... VIVENCIO BABAO, the master of the carrying vessel, knew that there was a typboon
coming before his departure but did not check where it was.
xxx xxx xxx
If only for the fact that he was first denied clearance to depart on March 24, 1982,
obviously because of a typhoon coming, Babao, as master of the vessel, should have
verified first where the typhoon was before departing on March 25, 1982. True, the sea
was calm at departure time. But that might be the calm before the storm. Prudence
dictates that he should have ascertained first where the storm was before departing as it
might be on his path. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
Respondent court's conclusion as to the negligence of petitioner is supported by
evidence. It will be noted that Vivencio Babao knew of the impending typhoon on March
24, 1982 when the Philippine Coast Guard denied M/L Maya the issuance of a clearance
to sail. Less than 24 hours elapsed since the time of the denial of said clearance and the
time a clearance to sail was finally issued on March 25, 1982. Records will show that
Babao did not ascertain where the typhoon was headed by the use of his vessel's
barometer and radio (Rorlo, p. 142). Neither did the captain of the vessel monitor and
record the weather conditions everyday as required by Art, 612 of the Code of Commerce
(Rollo, pp. 142-143). Had he done so while navigating for 31 hours, he could have
anticipated the strong winds and big waves and taken shelter (Rollo, pp- 36; 145). His
testimony on May 4, 1982 is as follows:
Q. Did you not check on your own where the typhoon was?
A. No. sir. (TSN, May 4, 1982, pp. 58-59)
 Noteworthy is the fact that as Per official records of the Climatological Division of the white foam from
Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAG-
ASA for brevity) issued by its Chief of Climatological Division, Primitivo G. Ballan, Jr. as to
the weather and sea conditions that prevailed in the vicinity of Catmon, Cebu during the breaking waves
period March 25-27, 1982, the sea conditions on March 25, 1982 were slight to rough
and the weather conditions then prevailing during those times were cloudy skies with begin to be blown
rainshowers and the small waves grew larger and larger, to wit:

SPEED WAVE HT. SEA WEATHER in streaks along

KNOTS (METERS) CONDITIONS the direction of the wind;

March 25 Spindrift begins

(Exh. 3)
8 AM 15 1-2 slight cloudy skies
A common carrier is obliged to observe extraordinary diligence and the failure of Babao
to ascertain the direction of the storm and the weather condition of the path they would
w/ rainshowers
be traversing, constitute lack of foresight and minimum vigilance over its cargoes taking
into account the surrounding circumstances of the case.
2 PM 20-25 2.0-3.0 moderate overcast skies
While the goods are in the possession of the carrier, it is but fair that it exercises
extraordinary diligence in protecting them from loss or damage, and if loss occurs, the
to rough w/ some rains law presumes that it was due to the carrier's fault or negligence; that is necessary to
protect the interest of the shipper which is at the mercy of the carrier (Art. 1756, Civil
8 PM 30 3.7 rough sea heaps up Code, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89757, Aug. 6, 1990, 188
SCRA 387).
white foam from Furthermore, the records show that the crew of M/L Maya did not have the required
qualifications provided for in P.D. No. 97 or the Philippine Merchant Marine Officers Law,
breaking waves all of whom were unlicensed. While it is true that they were given special permit to man
the vessel, such permit was issued at the risk and responsibility of the owner (Rollo, p.
36).
begin to be blown
Finally, petitioner claims that the factual findings of the Special Board of Marine Inquiry
exonerating the owner/operator, crew officers of the ill-fated vessel M/L Maya from any
in streaks along
administrative liability is binding on the court.

the direction of In rejecting petitioner's claim, respondent court was correct in ruling that "such
exoneration was but with respect to the administrative liability of the owner/operator,
officers and crew of the ill-fated" vessel. It could not have meant exoneration of appellee
the wind; from liability as a common carrier for his failure to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods it was transporting and for the negligent acts or omissions
Spindrift begins of his employees. Such is the function of the Court, not the Special Board of Marine
Inquiry." (Rollo, P. 37, Annex A, p. 7)
2 AM 30 3.7 rough sea heaps up The Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations particularly Chapter XVI thereof
entitled "Marine Investigation and Suspension and Revocation Proceedings" prescribes
the Rules governing maritime casualties or accidents, the rules and Procedures in
administrative investigation of all maritime cases within the jurisdiction or cognizance of
the Philippine Coast Guard and the grounds for suspension and revocation of
licenses/certificates of marine officers and seamen (1601 — SCOPE); clearly, limiting the
jurisdiction of the Board of Marine Inquiry and Special Board of Marine Inquiry to the
administrative aspect of marine casualties in so far as it involves the shipowners and
officers.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz vs CA
The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist
during the operation of the deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and
negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in an information which reads:
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused abovenamed, being then
the attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did then and there, in a
negligence (sic), careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner, and failing to supply or
store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all exigencies apt to
arise before, during and/or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence,
carelessness, imprudence, and incompetence, and causing by such failure, including the
lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert a tragedy, the untimely death of said
Lydia Umali on the day following said surgical operation."
On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo,
accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in
Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30
in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening
of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window
and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the
window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to
persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before her
mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the
operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had
a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be
operated on as scheduled.
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited
outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting,
Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules
which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo
came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood
from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the
operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the
operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take
their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a
stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional
blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as
there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen
supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to
go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of
oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and
her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her
transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and
further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the
prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the
intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District
Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the
ambulance.
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the
operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was
blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr.
Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo
District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and
possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient.
While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus, on March 24,
1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death
certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense
charged for insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby
held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty
under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs."
The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed
in toto the decision of the MTCC prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 1995
affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that she is further directed to pay the
heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances as
sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed negligent in the performance of the
operation:
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare
for any contingency that might happen during the operation. The manner and the fact
that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates
that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the
operation. There was no showing that before the operation, accused Dr. Cruz had
conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was
(sic) said in medical parlance that the "abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises"
because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open (sic) and surgeon
must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a public
document was not presented because it is only there that we could determine the
condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1" that the
sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed
upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died
because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because
of loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for
lack of skill, the reason why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City
District Hospital. As such, the surgeon should answer for such negligence. With respect
to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that she should
be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the operation."
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's
declaration of "incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and skill of appellant
(herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and after the operation." And
likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals echoed similar
observations, thus:
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself
indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows the absence of due care and supervision over
her subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating room?
Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have
contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the petitioner could answer these, but
she opted not to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing
good to testify on her defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the
prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and unrebutted.
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that the
accused asked the patient's relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was
already in progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for the
patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type "A" blood, but
such was not anymore available from the source; that the oxygen given to the patient
was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the
petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-needed
oxygen. All these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for any
unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery, which was not emergency
in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared
blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any
cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by an internist, which are standard
requirements before a patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as
part of the pre-operative evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as
bleeding time and clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The
petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the
family wanted the postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously, she did not prepare the
patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she did not
prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these, proof
thereof should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are overwhelming
evidence of recklessness and imprudence."
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the
evidence on record.
VII. RULING: This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing
circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L.
Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
 Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased summarized his
findings as follows:
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any
expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell
good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the court the cause of death?
the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic
illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have shock.
exercised.
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its
A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.
untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain medicines; the
failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?
omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent
transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir. (Underscoring supplied.)
petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts
below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon,
this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:
of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses.
For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in "Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination
the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. of the specimen submitted by Dr. Arizala?
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the
courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to
other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be determine the cause of death, sir.
remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?
case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology
unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert report.
opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?

A. This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic;
the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?
subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on
A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-
her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was
replacement of blood and so the victim before she died there was shock of diminish of
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists
blood of the circulation. She died most probably before the actual complete blood loss,
that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth
sir.
element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a
consequence of the reckless imprudence. Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof
of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?
and the resulting death of his patient.
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood
vessel may be cut while on operation and this cause (sic) bleeding, or may be set in the
course of the operation, or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are
other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero: A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature
in the suture was (sic) become (sic) loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if proven.
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir." (Underscoring supplied.)
Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot
(sic) blood vessel or any suture that become (sic) loose the cause of the bleeding could
not be attributed to the fault of the subject?
The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause
of death. However, as likewise testified to by the expert witnesses in open court, A. Definitely, sir." (Underscoring supplied.)
hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during surgery may be caused by several different
factors. Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration on the matter:

"Atty. Pascual: According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are:
(1) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it vessel to get out of control; (3) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a
could be at the moment of operation when one losses (sic) control of the presence, is that cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at
correct? During the operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel? this juncture that the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not
reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie
A. Yes, sir.
or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. Hence
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size? the following pertinent portion of Dr. Arizala's testimony:

A. Yes, sir. "Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were
sutured ligature or plain ligature
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?
A: Ligature, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is first suturing it and then tying a knot or the tie was merely placed around the cut
that correct? structure and tied?
A. May be (sic)." (Underscoring supplied). A: I cannot recall, sir.
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion: Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to
examine, is that correct?
"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what
would be the possible causes of such hemorrage (sic)? A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.
A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures
reason for the bleeding, sir, which cannot be prevented by anyone, it will happen to were not sutured or tied neither were you able to determine whether any loose suture
anyone, anytime and to any persons (sic), sir. was found in the peritoneal cavity?
COURT: A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in the On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that
body? DIC caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting
defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or
complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs. [42] And as
operation that I (sic) have done.
testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for prevented, it will happen to anyone, anytime." He testified further:
the hemorrhage or bleeding in a patient by an operations (sic)?
"Q. Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic)
DIC?
This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by
A. Yes, sir. both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict
petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an
Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be prevented? expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The
probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has
A. Yes, sir.
engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus,
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)? her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

A. Possible, sir.

Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia
suffered among such things as DIC? Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.

Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia
Umali looking for the chart, the operated (sic) records, the post mortem findings on the
histophanic (sic) examination based on your examination of record, doctor, can you
more or less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could have been the caused (sic) of
death of this Lydia Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is
dessimulated (sic) Intra Vascular Coagulation or the DIC which resulted to hemorrhage
or bleedings, sir.
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say
whether the doctor her (sic) has been (sic) fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as
well as the other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For
insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it
is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her
duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated
the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their
mother up to the present time [46] and this Court is aware that no amount of
compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the
sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary
damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral
damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Precisely based on this examination. Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) for appropriate action.
ATTY. MALVEDA:
SO ORDERED.
Not finding, there was no finding made.

COURT:

He is only reading the record.

ATTY. PASCUAL:

Yes, sir.

A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir."

CANLAS v. CA
FACTS:
 August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Vicente Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land situated in BF
Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas.
 Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the lands to Mañosca for P850K,
P500K payable within 1 week, and the balance serves as his investment in the
business. Mañosca issued 2 checks P40K and P460K. The P460K lacked
sufficient funds.
 September 3, 1982: Mañosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of
lands for P100K with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as
the Spouses Canlas.
 September 29, 1982: Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian
Savings Bank (ASB) for P500K with the parcels of land as security and with the
help of the same impostors. The loan was left unpaid resulting in
a extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.
 January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the mortgage was
without their authority. He also requested the sheriff Contreras to hold or
cancel the auction. Both parties refused.
 The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
 RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing a Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale and
annulled the mortgage
 CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for coming to the bank with Mañosca and
letting himself be introduced as Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear chance
HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED
 Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply
 The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a
family
 not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said
impostors to show their true identity
 acted simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing
signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous
deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno
 previous deed of mortgage did not bear the tax account
number of the spouses as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas
 doctrine of last clear chance
 where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom
 the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence
 Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente
Mañosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting him the
owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land
 Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the simple expedient of faithfully
complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the
persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss
 Canlas went to ASB with Mañosca and he was introduced as Leonardo Rey. He
didn't correct Mañosca. However, he did not know that the lots were being
used as a security for he was there to make sure that Mañosca pays his debt so
he cannot be estopped from assailing the validity of the mortgage
 But being negligent in believing the misrepresentation by Mañosca that he had
other lots and that the lot were not to be used as a security, Canlas was
negligent and undeserving of Attorney's fees.
 the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors
who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina
Canlas = complete nullity
G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004
JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement to the rider. It
derives a certain charm from being unencumbered by any enclosure, affording the cyclist
the perception of relative liberty. It also carries some obvious risks on the part of the
user and has become the subject of regulation, if not by the government, then by parental
proscription.
The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the
driver of the car which had struck him. The argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to
install safety devices on his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist
himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are deceptively simple,
but the resolution entails thorough consideration of fundamental precepts on negligence.
The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 160, of Pasig City, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both courts
adjudged petitioner, Jonas Añonuevo ( Añonuevo ), liable for the damages for the injuries
sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia). Instead, the petition hinges on a
sole legal question, characterized as "novel" by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of
the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was
violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-
motorized vehicles.1
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accident in question
occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni
Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along
Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his
Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc.,
the employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a
left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained
serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989,
and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and
Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC.2 He had also filed a criminal complaint
against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was
subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.3 Trial on the civil action ensued, and in
a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble
and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorney’s fees, as well
as legal costs.4 Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision5 dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the
RTC Decision in toto6. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in
a Resolution7 dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo filed their
respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and Gamble’s petition was denied
by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997. Añonuevo’s petition,8 on the
other hand, was given due course,9 and is the subject of this Decision.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of
the RTC. Among them: that it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had struck Villagracia;10 that
Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a
comminuted fracture;11 that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for
Villagracia, Añonuevo was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left turn into
Libertad;12 that considering Añonuevo’s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing
his path as he made the turn. Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed; 13 and
that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of
him in order that the accident could have been avoided.14 Notably, Añonuevo, in his
current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by
the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia.
Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the
conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is
not a trier of facts,15 is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower courts,
which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are in fact generally
binding.16
Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions for resolution.
Añonuevo’s arguments are especially fixated on a particular question of law: whether
Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized
vehicles.17 In the same vein, Añonuevo insists that Villagracia’s own fault and negligence
serves to absolve the former of any liability for damages.
Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument. Añonuevo
points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or
headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.18Nor was it duly registered with
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. Finally, as
admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.19 Before this Court,
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but
directs our attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo’s own negligence. 20 Villagracia
also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would
not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals likewise
acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but characterized the
contention as "off-tangent" and insufficient to obviate the fact that it was Añonuevo’s
own negligence that caused the accident.21
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register
his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil
Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in
1950 of the New Civil Code.22Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles
only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage.
Still, Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of
vehicles23. He points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the
Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than
as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators
"must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be
specifically mentioned," yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
"inescapably become matter of public concern" so as to expand the application of the law
to be more responsive to the times.24
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature,
as embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court
interprets, and not creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to consider
the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185 could be interpreted to include
non-motorized vehicles.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized
vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters,
and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were
even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the
framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the
scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term "motorized vehicles." If Añonuevo
seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater
interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical
experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in
1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by
statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over
sixty. Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized
and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He
premises that the need for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized
vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent
basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A
motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle,
which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical
force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable
of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time,
motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of
an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor
vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater
combustability due to the fuels that they use.
There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor
vehicle. As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v. Juanillo25, the Court has recognized that an
automobile is capable of great speed, greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by
animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads, putting
to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such
roads."26 In the same case, the Court emphasized:
A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree
of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater
destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver;
whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident.
It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons
riding, driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and
let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to
understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver
will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile driver must at all times use all
the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the
circumstances.27
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between
the motorist and the cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable
care to avoid collision with bicyclists.28 While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike
on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out
of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to
fully discharge the duty than from the latter.29
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached
responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated
to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed
the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would
have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter,
pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities
attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there
has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles,
arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard.
Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other
types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the
distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this
distinction.
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia, this
should not preclude any possible finding of negligence on his part. While the legal
argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that Villagracia
was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious
consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia
himself.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place.30 However, the existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but
rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.31
Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed a
municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety
devices thereon. This view finds some support if anchored on the long standing principle
of negligence per se.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.32 In Teague vs.
Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval American authorities elucidating on the rule:
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury
has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury." (65 C.J.S.
1156)
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence,
negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the question,
negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has
prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily
prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to
injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach
of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise
expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard
is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal
excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated,
whether the act or omission constituting such violation would have been regarded as
negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter
of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation. x x x." (65
C.J.S. pp.623-628)
"But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by
exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct
was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an
ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the
ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was
intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such
circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists
in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the
makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied these principles to speed
limits and other regulations of the manner of driving." (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14
at 15).
"x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury
intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not
necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be
found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character and in the
natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious
consequence. The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which
the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." (38 Am Jur 841)34
In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire resulting in fatalities was
found negligent, base on her failure to provide adequate fire exits in contravention of a
Manila city ordinance.35 In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals36, the failure of the
petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances sufficed to support a
finding of negligence.37 In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, 38the Court found that the failure
of the petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with the
statute constituted negligence per se, thus holding him liable for the damages for the
destruction by fire of a customer’s vehicle garaged therein.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation
of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to
be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the
occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracia’s mishap was
precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated.
Añonuevo argues that Villagracia’s violation should bar the latter’s recovery of damages,
and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we consider as proven, that
Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the
proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone
unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection,
whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude
that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety
regulations, especially considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the
turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see
Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the
cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he
proceeded to make the left turn.
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages.
In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a collision between a truck and a
privately-owned Cimarron van caused the death of three of the van’s passengers. The
petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was
committing multiple violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code 40 at the time
of the accident. Among these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the
accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults, including the driver; and
the van had only one functioning headlight. Similar as in this case, petitioner therein
invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be presumed
negligent. The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, dismissed these arguments:
[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to
the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal
cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in
whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving
an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly
increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there
was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front
seat overcrowded "decreased its maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as
these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged
negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.41
Sanitary Steam42 is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a
municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some
degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless
it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is but
indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government,
which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such
failure alone is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident.
Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and
the degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances reasonably
require.43 To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on
the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracia’s
behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that
matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to
impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard
established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to
deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and
the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to
forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to
provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded
owing to the conduct of others.44
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous enough so
as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of statutory requirement, one is not
negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto
a bicycle.45 In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute
negligence as a matter of law46 but is a question for the jury whether the absence of
proper lights played a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist.47 The absence
of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, may constitute
negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long
as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision; 48 however, the
absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident
was well illuminated by street lights,49 if substitute lights were present which clearly
rendered the bicyclist visible,50 if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of
lights thereon,51 or if the motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it
had been equipped with lights.52 A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes
may support a finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured
bicyclist where such condition was a contributing cause of the accident.53
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply
with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not
sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established
between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in
Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown
as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed
thereto.54 Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of
Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.
On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth citing:
[As] admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a distance of
about ten (10) meters before the accident. Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided
the accident had he [stopped] alongside with an earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a
full stop giving way to appellee. But according to [eyewitness] Sorsano, he saw appellant
Añonuevo "umaarangkada" and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30).
This earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Añonuevo at an
unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia (TSN March 9, 1990 p.
49). Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he did not blow his horn when he crossed Boni
Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p. 47).55
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10)
meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Añonuevo would
have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that
Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility that
the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident.56 A motorist
has been held liable for injury to or death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned
suddenly into the bicyclist so as to cause a collision.57
Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection
between the safety violations imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he
relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently
established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as
having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracia’s own liability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence.1âwphi1 The
leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf58 clarifies that damages
may be mitigated if the claimant "in conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only
to his injury."59 To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs
of an impending danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of
the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only
when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.61
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely
responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should
be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if
Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment. Añonuevo himself
admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer
claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact
that Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe
that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist
would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it
was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s failure to have
installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that Añonuevo failed
to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as not proven.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
What are the attributes of a “reasonable person”
The Captain of the Ship Doctrine
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON
RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents (2002)
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall
bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at
the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a
good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3
hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain
damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda
and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist
for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition
was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating”
Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist failed to exercise due care in intubating the
patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and
for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for
not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD: Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the
damages.
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of
an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical
malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the
attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos
already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and
exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically
sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa
loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!
Liability of the Anesthesiologist
The anesthesiologist was not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part in the care of Erlinda and her negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.
One need not be an anesthesiologist to tell whether the intubation was a success. [res
ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only
saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity
with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility. The
anesthesiologist omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any
negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. As
was noted in our Decision, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia,
including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.
Captain of Ship Doctrine – Liability of the Surgeon
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the
proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain
degree of, at the very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on
Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In
effect, he represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary
competence and skills. Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977.
Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would always engage the services of Dr.
Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient.
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda.
Thus, when Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to
call for another anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.
Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka
and Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight
compartments because their duties intersect with each other.
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured primarily
for their performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the treatment
of petitioner Erlinda, and that one does not exercise control over the other, they were
certainly not completely independent of each other to absolve one from the negligent
acts of the other physician.
It is quite apparent that they have a common responsibility to treat the patient, which
responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the condition of the
patient while the other physician is performing the necessary medical procedures.
It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to
petitioner Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours late for the
scheduled operation. In reckless disregard for his patients well being, Dr. Hosaka
scheduled two procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at
different hospitals. Thus, when the first procedure (protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita
Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda was kept in a state of uncertainty at the
DLSMC. The unreasonable delay in petitioner Erlinda’s scheduled operation subjected
her to continued starvation and consequently, to the risk of acidosis, or the condition of
decreased alkalinity of the blood and tissues, marked by sickly sweet breath, headache,
nausea and vomiting, and visual disturbances. The long period that Dr. Hosaka made
Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the anxiety that she must have been feeling at
the time. It could be safely said that her anxiety adversely affected the administration of
anesthesia on her. As explained by Dr. Camagay, the patients anxiety usually causes the
outpouring of adrenaline which in turn results in high blood pressure or disturbances in
the heart rhythm.
Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of
petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician to serve the interest of
his patients with the greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill, but
also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person, in the performance of his
duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.
Liability of the Hospital
No ER-EE relationship between the respondent doctors and the hospital. As such, the
Hospital is not liable.
2. Emergency Rule or Sudden Peril Doctrine
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]
FACTS: Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at
No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation
(MALTC) isthe owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto,
its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned
passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of
the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon
demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The
bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.
Valdellon filed a criminal lcomplaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property against Suelto.
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for
damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.
HELD:
No.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he
actedon an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding
with apassenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and
intruded into
the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan
v.Court of Appeals, thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
timeto consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles
on the right side of the road or highway.
Moreover Section 35 of the law provides for the restriction as to speed.
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation."
By his own admission,petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the
property of privaterespondent.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have
resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was
not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve
to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make
a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street. Petitioner Suelto’s
reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and
his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
3. Factors affecting its application
57A Am Jur 2d, Sec. 900
D. The theory of Presumed Negligence
LEOPOLDO POBLETE vs. DONATO FABROS and GODOFREDO DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-29803 September 14, 1979
FACTS:
Plaintiff Godofredo Poblete is owner of the damaged taxicab and the defendants are the
driver and owner of the allegedly offending vehicle, Donato Fabros and Godofredo de la
Cruz.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that from the allegation of the complaint, the
action is one to hold Donato Fabros, as the employer of the allegedly negligent driver,
Godofredo de la Cruz, subsidiarily liable for the damage caused the plaintiff, and is,
therefore, premature, there having been no criminal action filed against the driver who
had died during the pendency of the case at bar, and, in effect, states no cause of action. A
motion for reconsideration was filed to the order of dismissal, but to no avail. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal was proper?
HELD:
NO. It is crystal clear that the court itself has found that the employer-employee relation
of the two defendants has been sufficiently alleged; otherwise, it would have no basis for
saying that the complaint is "against Donato Fabros in his capacity as employer of
Godofredo de la Cruz." The defendant Donato Fabros has himself correctly perceived the
basis of the complaint against him, as one based on quasi-delict, for instead of filing a
motion for a bill of particulars if he deemed the allegations vague or ambiguous, he
interposed in his answer the defense of a "due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection, employment and supervision of his driver." (Page 8, Record on Appeal; Page
26, Rollo).
In the second place, in alluding to the subsidiary liability of the employer, Donato Fabros,
the court a quo has, likewise, found sufficiently alleged negligence as the basis for the
action. The complaint expressly and clearly alleges that the accident was "due solely to
the gross negligence, carelessness and unskillful driving of defendant Godofredo de la
Cruz" (Page 3, Record on Appeal, Page 20, Rollo).
With the allegation of negligence against the driver, Godofredo de la Cruz, and that of an
employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant, Donato Fabros, the
complaint clearly and unmistakably makes out a case based on quasi-delict, as explicitly
provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which, inter alia, provides:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision is that the employee
(driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to make the employer,
likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier
observed, primary and solidary. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Gamboa, L-10296, May 21,
1957; Malipol vs. Tan, 55 SCRA 202: Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607;
Vinluan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 742; Anuran, et al. vs. Buno et al. 17 SCRA
224).
It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the 'law itself,
that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast with
the American doctrine of respondent superior, where the negligence of the
employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly
deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides
that the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12
Manresa, 657; Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co., 38 Phil. 768), as observed in the same cases just cited.
From what has been said, the error of the court a quo in dismissing the case on his
mistaken notion that the action is based on crime, not quasi-delict, becomes very patent.
How the court concluded that the action is to enforce the subsidiary liability of Donato
Fabros as the employer of the negligent driver Godofredo de la Cruz is inconceivable,
with the plain and explicit prayer of the complaint to declare the defendants "jointly and
severally" liable for damages, a concept antagonistic to that of subsidiary liability. The
death of defendant, Godofredo de la Cruz, the driver, is therefore, no hindrance to the
present action, at least as against the employer, Donato Fabros, taking its course to final
judgment, which the court a quo should have rendered, the trial of the case having been
terminated, instead of dismissing the case, without even a motion to dismiss, with the
evidence, in an probability, supportive of an action on quasi-delict, which the pleadings,
both the complaint and the answer, raised as the specific issue involved and as joined by
said pleadings.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal dated April 17, 1968 is hereby set aside, and let this
case be remanded to the court of origin for the rendition of the judgment on the merits
based on the evidence adduced during the trial. This judgment shall be immediately
executory upon its promulgation.
D.1) When may negligence be presumed
NCC Arts. 1733, 1735, 1756, 2180 (last par.), 2184, 2185, 2188
PILAPIL VS CA AND ALATCO TRANSPORATION
Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-
defendant's bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about
6:00 P.M. While said bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the distance between
Iriga City and Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along
said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner
above his left eye. Private respondent's personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner
to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and treated.
Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr.
Malabanan of Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no
improvement in his left eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City
where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr.
Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar
above the left eye.
Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Branch I an action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing
incident. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment with the following dispositive
part:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered:
1. Ordering defendant transportation company to pay plaintiff Jose Pilapil the sum of P
10,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing actual and material damages for causing a
permanent scar on the face and injuring the eye-sight of the plaintiff;
2. Ordering further defendant transportation company to pay the sum of P 5,000.00,
Philippine Currency, to the plaintiff as moral and exemplary damages;
3. Ordering furthermore, defendant transportation company to reimburse plaintiff the
sum of P 300.00 for his medical expenses and attorney's fees in the sum of P 1,000.00,
Philippine Currency; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED
From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals where the
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354R. On 19 October 1979, the Court of Appeals,
in a Special Division of Five, rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment
of the court a quo.
Hence the present petition.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
In seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that said
court has decided the issue not in accord with law. Specifically, petitioner argues that the
nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of certain
risks, and the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger
is one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
VI. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in revoking the award of
Moral Damages and Attorney’s Fees to petitioner.
VII. RULING: In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the
business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its
consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely
undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself
liable for any breach thereof.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case. The requirement of extraordinary diligence imposed
upon common carriers is restated in Article 1755: "A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Further, in
case of death of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be
at fault or to have acted negligently.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care
and foresight can provide. what constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with
due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part
of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the
time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because
the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however,
the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary
diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the
injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and
Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the
conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires.
Petitioner contends that respondent common carrier failed to rebut the presumption of
negligence against it by proof on its part that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the
safety of its passengers. We do not agree.
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either
that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury
suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the
injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private
respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is
not and ought not to be held liable.
Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the safe transport of their passengers, it would seem that this is not the
standard by which its liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers is
to be determined directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage Article 1763
governs:
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to
a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The
negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by
the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could
have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be
noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in
the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for
the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the ground that the injury
complained of could have been prevented by the common carrier if something like mesh-
work grills had covered the windows of its bus. We do not agree. Although the suggested
precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and
prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful
or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is
not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent
any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type,
in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of
care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with
negligence in this respect.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
E. The 3 means of proving a negligence claim
1. Direct Evidence
2. Circumstantial Evidence
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur
3.1 Definition and Requisites
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON
RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents (2002)
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late
for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the
anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College
of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist
for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition
was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating”
Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist failed to exercise due care in intubating the
patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and
for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for
not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of
an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical
malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the
attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos
already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and
exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically
sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa
loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!
Liability of the Anesthesiologist
The anesthesiologist was not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part in the care of Erlinda and her negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.
One need not be an anesthesiologist to tell whether the intubation was a success. [res
ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only
saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity
with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility. The
anesthesiologist omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any
negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. As
was noted in our Decision, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia,
including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.
Captain of Ship Doctrine – Liability of the Surgeon
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the
proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain
degree of, at the very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on
Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In
effect, he represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary
competence and skills. Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977.
Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would always engage the services of Dr.
Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient.
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda.
Thus, when Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to
call for another anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.
Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka
and Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight
compartments because their duties intersect with each other.
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured primarily
for their performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the treatment
of petitioner Erlinda, and that one does not exercise control over the other, they were
certainly not completely independent of each other to absolve one from the negligent
acts of the other physician.
It is quite apparent that they have a common responsibility to treat the patient, which
responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the condition of the
patient while the other physician is performing the necessary medical procedures.
It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to
petitioner Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours late for the
scheduled operation. In reckless disregard for his patients well being, Dr. Hosaka
scheduled two procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at
different hospitals. Thus, when the first procedure (protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita
Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda was kept in a state of uncertainty at the
DLSMC. The unreasonable delay in petitioner Erlinda’s scheduled operation subjected
her to continued starvation and consequently, to the risk of acidosis, or the condition of
decreased alkalinity of the blood and tissues, marked by sickly sweet breath, headache,
nausea and vomiting, and visual disturbances. The long period that Dr. Hosaka made
Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the anxiety that she must have been feeling at
the time. It could be safely said that her anxiety adversely affected the administration of
anesthesia on her. As explained by Dr. Camagay, the patients anxiety usually causes the
outpouring of adrenaline which in turn results in high blood pressure or disturbances in
the heart rhythm.
Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of
petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician to serve the interest of
his patients with the greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill, but
also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person, in the performance of his
duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.
Liability of the Hospital
No ER-EE relationship between the respondent doctors and the hospital. As such, the
Hospital is not liable.
Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes
Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decisions
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and
bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the
sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that
the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband,
Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy,
Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he
allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the
procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation:
“sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue
for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing). A “diligent search” was conducted but
they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors
told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended
that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed
during the operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was
told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of
gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring
Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought
treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She
underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr.
Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2
pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence
and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr.
Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the
cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the two
doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr.
Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO;
DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones
who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the
operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr.
Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that
a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen because of the
dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a
reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief
from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit.
What’s worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary
consequence of her operation.
Medical negligence; standard of diligence
To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a
health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldn’t have done], and that the
failure or action caused injury to the patient.
 Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the
incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it
 Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
 Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery
 Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of
closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2
pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces
later extracted from patient’s vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’ does not convince
the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence.
Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the
defendant [DR. FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR.
AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr.
Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision
HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND
DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that
modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care
to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason
to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Court’s
bases for sustaining PSI’s liability:
 Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON:
power to hire, fire, power of control]
 Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or
the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and
specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from
passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly
paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it
vouched for their skill and competence.
o
 If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when
negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital
should not be allowed to escape liability for its agents’ acts.
 Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s
liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to
support the application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI
failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect
from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical
 treatment. PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter
reported in the note of the count nurse, and this established PSI’s
part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the
gauzes.
o what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
 PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter,
through the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the
operation was carried on with the assistance of various
hospital staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the
negligence committed
 PSI also liable under NCC 2180
 profession; b.) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with
o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr.
Ampil
Solidum vs People of the Philippines GR No. 192123 March 10, 2014
Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the
large intestine out through the abdominal walls, enabling him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald was admitted at
the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed
the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Lucerio, Dr.Donatella Valeria and Dr.
Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologist included Drs. Abella, Razon and Solidum. During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia and went into a coma. His coma lasted for
two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see,
hear, or move. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
was filed by Gerald’s parents against the team of doctors alleging that there was failure
in monitoring the anesthesia administered to Gerald.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical negligence.
2. Whether or not res ipsa liquitor can be resorted to in medical negligence cases.
Held:
1. No. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the
other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person to perform or failing to perform such act.
The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence no matter in
injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for
the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements namely:
a.) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient
relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his
the applicable standard of care; c.) the causation, is, there must be a reasonably close and
casual connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and d.)
the damages suffered by the patient.
In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to protect the patient
against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the
physician in respect of the patient. The standard of care is an objective standard which
conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does
not depend therefore, on any individual’s physician’s own knowledge either. In
attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician has
properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony
from both plaintiff and defense experts is required.
2. The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor means that where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by defendant that
the accident arose from want of care.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of
the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances
of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is
able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or
treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular
practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application
in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did
not produce the desired results. Thus, res ipsa liquitor is not available in a malpractice
suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the
operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside the routine performance
occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man
as the negligent case or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor may be utilized and the
dependent is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
G.R. No. 183198 November 25, 2009
LUZ PALANCA TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JAM TRANSIT, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of the Decision2dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89046 and the reinstatement of the Decision3dated December 20, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838.
The antecedents are as follows—
In her Complaint, petitioner Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a
passenger-type jitney with plate number DKF-168. On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00
a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway,
Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit passenger bus
bound for Manila, bearing plate number DVG-557 and body number 8030. The bus was
driven by Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).
At the time of the collision, Tan’s jitney was loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs (balot
and salted eggs). It was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez (Ramirez). Tan alleged that
Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not observing traffic rules and
regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then, with care and
proper light direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or
barangay road of Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the Poblacion. The jitney
turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed.
Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for medical
treatment at the Pagamutang Pangmasa in Bay, Laguna. Tan prayed for damages in the
amount of P400,000.00 for the damaged jitney, P142,210.00 for the destroyed
shipment, P20,000.00 for moral damages, attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00
per court appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under the premises.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted ownership
of the subject passenger bus and that Dimayuga was under its employ. However, it
denied the allegations in the Complaint, and claimed that the accident occurred due to
the gross negligence of
Ramirez. As counterclaim, JAM sought payment of P100,000.00 for the damages
sustained by the bus, P100,000.00 for loss of income, and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees
plus P3,000.00 per court appearance of counsel.
After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
Tan proffered testimonial evidence, summarized by the RTC, and quoted by the CA, as
follows:
LUZ PALANCA TAN, 47 years old, married, a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and a
businesswoman, testified to the facts stated in the complaint that: She is engaged in the
business of nets and ropes, and egg dealership based [in] Santa Cruz, Laguna. She
supplies her products to her customers [in] San Pablo and Lucena. On March 14, 1997,
while at home, she was informed by her husband that one of their jeepneys, which was
loaded with eggs, was bumped by a JAM Transit bus when the latter overtook the
jeepney. The vehicle was driven by one Alexander Ramirez, who has one "Monching" as a
companion. As a result of the accident, she incurred damages in the amount
of P650,000.00 based on the following computation: P400,000.00 as actual damage
sustained by the jeepney, from an estimate (Exhibit "D") furnished by Plantilla
Motors; P142,000.00 for the lost value of the egg shipment, based on a certification
issued by the Calauan Police Station; and P15,000.00, for the hospitalization and
treatment of the driver and his companion. The jeepney is duly registered as evidenced
by its registration receipt (Exhibit "G"). On cross examination, she testified that Ramirez,
the jeepney driver when the accident occurred, was under her employ since 1993 and is
still working for her.
On redirect, the plaintiff testified that prior to March 13, 1997, the day the accident
happened, Ramirez has not met any vehicular accident and that it was only in the
aforestated date when he figured in one. On re-cross, she testified that she has no
knowledge of Ramirez’ prior experience as a driver. She did not ask Ramirez for his NBI
or police clearance prior to her hiring the said driver. On additional redirect, the plaintiff
testified that she is satisfied with the performance of Ramirez as a driver as he is kind.
ALEXANDER RAMIREZ, 35 years old, married, resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and a driver
testified that: He knows the plaintiff Luz Palanca Tan because she is his manager. He
worked for her as a driver sometime in 1993. He sometimes drove a jeepney or a truck.
On March 13, 1997, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, he reported for work at his
employer’s warehouse located [in] Pagsawitan, Sta. Cruz. He got the passenger jeep
loaded with salted eggs, "balot" and quail eggs for delivery to Lucena City upon
instruction of Tan. In going to Lucena City, he chose to drive on the Maharlika Road at
San Isidro, Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna because it is better than the road along Brgy.
Dayap of the same municipality. However, while at the Maharlika Road, he met an
accident at around 5:00 a.m. The jitney turned turtle.
PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, 37 years old, married, resident of Calauan, Laguna, and a
member of PNP-Calauan, Laguna, testified that: He was on police duty as of March 14,
1997. On that day, he issued a certification (Exhibit "B") pertaining to a vehicular
accident which occurred earlier. He came to know of the accident as relayed to their
office by a concerned citizen. He proceeded to the place of the accident, which was at
Maharlika Highway, in an intersection at Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna for an
investigation. Upon reaching the place, as a rule followed by police officers, he inquired
from some of the residents about the incident. As relayed to him, the jeepney with Plate
No. 168 was going towards the direction of San Isidro, followed by another jeepney, a
truck and then by a JAM Transit bus. The bus overtook the jeepney it was following then
side swept the jeepney (which figured in the accident) dragging it along ("nakaladkad")
towards the sampaguita gardens. [NOTE: The testimony of the witness regarding the
information gathered was ordered by the Court to be deleted.] Then, he went personally
to the place where the incident happened.
He stated it was cloudy that day. He described the highway where the incident happened
as having a double straight yellow line which prohibits overtaking on both sides of the
road. The said place is near the intersection of Maharlika Highway and the barangay road
leading to Brgy. San Isidro.
On cross examination, he stated he cannot remember if he was with other police officers
during the investigation of the incident but he can recall having interviewed a certain
Mercy Ponteiros and one Rodel, who are both residents of the place.
On redirect, he stated that the witness Mercy Ponteiros is still residing at Brgy.
Bangyas[.]
On additional direct examination, he stated that the accident site is still fresh in his mind
and he drew a sketch (Exhibit "F" to "F-7") of the said place. He identified in the sketch
the direction of the highway which leads to Manila and to Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The road,
per his approximation, was about 10 meters wide, with the shoulder about 5 meters
except that it was diminished to about 2 meters on account of some encroachment. The
highway has a painted crosswalk. It also has a yellow line without any cut which means
no vehicle could overtake from both sides of the road. He showed in the sketch the spot
where the jitney and the bus were at the time of the incident. Shown the photographs
(Exhibits "E" to "E-6"), he stated that they are truly reflective of the scene of the incident,
the damages in both the jeepney and the bus, as of March 13, 1997.
On cross, he stated that what he saw was the situation after the incident. He came to
learn of the accident at around 5:10 in the morning from a report received by their office,
as relayed by a concerned citizen. He remembers that SPO4 Rogelio Medina, now retired,
as one of his companions at the accident site. The site is about a kilometer away from
their police station. He can recall the scene of the incident because of the photographs.
The persons he investigated were the jitney driver, his "pahinante" (helper) and some
people in the vicinity. He could not remember the names of those persons but they were
listed in the police blotter.
RODRIGO CONDINO, 38 years old, married, resident of Victoria, Laguna and a mechanic,
testified that: He is a mechanic of Plantilla Motors at Bubucal, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He
knows the plaintiff Luz Tan as he and his chief (mechanic) repaired the jeepney owned
by the latter after it figured in an accident on March 13, 1997. He came to know of the
accident when the said vehicle was brought to their motor shop. They made an estimate
(Exhibit "D") of the damage sustained by the said vehicle, which amounted
to P450,000.00.4
Tan also formally offered as exhibits the following documents:
Exhibit "A" - Articles of Incorporation of JAM Transit, Inc.;
Exhibit "B" - Certification issued by the Calauan Municipal Police Station regarding the
vehicular accident;
Exhibit "C" - PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the jitney shipment;
Exhibit "D" - Estimate of damages sustained by the jitney, from A. Plantilla Motors Repair
Shop;
Exhibit "E" - Six (6) photographs depicting the site of the vehicular accident;
Exhibit "F" - Four (4) pages of receipts representing hospital and medical expenses paid
by the plaintiff for injuries sustained by her driver and helper in the accident;
Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Registration of plaintiff’s jitney;
Exhibit "H" - Driver’s license of Eddie Dimayuga, defendant’s bus driver;
Exhibit "I" - Sketch of the site where the vehicular accident occurred.5
On the other hand, JAM offered the following testimonial evidence –
EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, 49 years old, married, resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and bus
driver of JAM Transit Inc., testified that: He has been a passenger bus driver since 1983.
He was previously employed with the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB).
He was employed with JAM Transit since 1992. He has a professional driver’s license, D-
12-78-008462562.
On March 14, 1997, he reported for work. He met an accident while driving a bus. The
other vehicle involved, a jitney, belongs to Luz Palanca Tan and driven by Alexander
Ramirez. The accident happened along the intersection of Maharlika Highway, Brgy.
Bangyas at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning. He was driving the bus with a speed of 40
km/h when suddenly, a vehicle overtook the bus from the right side going to Calauan. He
was not able to evade the vehicle as there was no way for him to do so. The front portion
of the bus and the mirror were destroyed.
On cross examination, he stated that his route as of March 14, 1997 was Sta. Cruz-
Lawton. He cannot recall the bus conductor who was on Bangyas, Calauan. He stated he
was not able to evade the jitney as there was no way for him to avoid the situation,
causing the jitney to be dragged to the side. Nothing else happened after the bus hit the
jeepney. He and other persons took the driver from the jeepney and brought him to a
hospital.
On redirect, he stated that bus conductors change duties every two or three days. 6
JAM did not offer any documentary counter-evidence.
Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found the JAM passenger bus driver at
fault as he was then violating a traffic regulation when the collision took place. Thus, the
RTC ruled in favor of Tan and disposed as follows—
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants who are hereby
adjudged to pay the plaintiff jointly and solidarily, the following:
1. actual damages of P142,210.00 for the lost and damaged cargoes; P400,000.00 for the
destroyed jitney; P1,327.00 medical expenses of the jitney driver and his companion, for
a total amount of [P543,537.00];
2. P10,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
4. Costs of suit[.]
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal and dismissed the
complaint on the ground that there was nothing on record that supported the RTC’s
finding that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking Tan’s jitney. The CA noted that
Ramirez only testified that, on March 14, 1997, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m.,
while transporting eggs along Maharlika Road in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan,
Laguna, causing the jitney he was driving to turn turtle. The CA also observed that the
Certification (Exhibit "B") made no mention that the JAM passenger bus was
overspeeding or that it was overtaking the jitney; and, thus, there was no evidence as to
who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in connection with the vehicular
accident. The CA held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when
direct evidence is nonexistent or not accessible. It further said that Tan had access to
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the mishap, such that the circumstances of the
vehicular accident or the specific act constituting the supposed negligence of Dimayuga
could have been testified to by Ramirez or by the latter’s companion. The CA concluded
that res ipsa loquitur could not apply in this case because the doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement of establishing proof of negligence.
Hence, this petition, with petitioner positing that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable given the circumstances of the case.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those
who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence -- in
the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant -- that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. This rule is grounded
on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere
occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.8
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an
independent or separate ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine do not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of
such proof, permitting plaintiff to present, along with the proof of the accident, enough of
the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
presumption of negligence, and thereby placing on defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof.9 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following
requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.10
Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? We answer in the affirmative. We
do not subscribe to the finding of the CA that petitioner had direct access to the evidence
surrounding the accident, but since she failed to present it, the doctrine would not
operate to apply. While Ramirez took the witness stand, he was only able to testify that
he drove along Maharlika Highway in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna,
Tan’s passenger jitney loaded with salted eggs, balot and quail eggs for delivery at
around 5:00 a.m. when he met an accident, causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Obviously,
Ramirez had no vivid recollection of how the passenger jitney was actually hit by the JAM
passenger bus. Further, for some unknown reasons, the other possible eyewitnesses to
the mishap were not available to testify. With the dearth of testimonial or direct
evidence, should petitioner now be left without remedy? The answer is NO.
We cannot agree with the CA when it said that how the incident happened could not be
established, neither from the photographs offered in evidence in favor of petitioner, nor
from the Certification11 that quoted an excerpt from the records on the Police Blotter of
the Calauan Municipal Police Station. The CA, likewise, discounted the probative value of
the Police Blotter because, although prepared in the regular performance of official duty,
it was not conclusive proof of the truth of its entries, since police blotters are usually
incomplete and inaccurate; and sometimes based on partial suggestion, inaccurate
reporting and hearsay.12
It is worth noting, however, that photographs are in the nature of physical evidence13 -- a
mute but eloquent manifestation of truth ranking high in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.14 When duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
representations of the subject as of the time in question, they are, in the discretion of the
trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the evidence,
the situation or condition of objects or premises, or the circumstances of an accident.15
The photographs16 proffered by petitioner indeed depicted the relative positions of her
jitney and of the JAM passenger bus immediately after the accident took place. An
examination of the photographs would readily show that the highway where the
accident occurred was marked by two yellow continuous parallel lines at the center,
separating the right lane from the left. Based on evidence, the JAM passenger bus was
moving along the highway towards Manila, and the jitney was going along the same
route, until it was about to turn left to the barangay road towards the Poblacion. After
the incident, the photographs would show that both vehicles were found on the opposite
lane of the highway. The front right portion of the bus was shown to have collided with
or hit the left portion of the jitney with such an impact, causing the latter to turn turtle
with extensive damage, injuring its driver and his companion, and completely destroying
its cargo.17
Although the person who took the pictures was not able to testify because he
predeceased the trial, Senior Police Officer II Daniel Escares (Escares) was recalled to the
witness stand to authenticate the said pictures. He testified that the pictures were
faithful representations of the circumstances immediately after the accident.18 Escares
also made an appropriately labeled sketch19 of the situation after the collision, and
testified as to the physical circumstances thereof, including the width of the road and the
road shoulder, especially the double yellow lines at the center of the highway. 20
As regards police blotters, it should be remembered that although they are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Entries in police records made by a
police officer in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.21 In this case, the
Certification,22 whose entries were adopted from the police blotter of the Calauan
Municipal Police Station, the sketch23 prepared by Escares, and the photographs, taken
together would prove that the jitney and the bus were going along the same way; that the
jitney was about to negotiate the intersection going to the left towards the feeder road in
the direction of the Poblacion; and that the bus hit the left-turning jitney causing the
smaller vehicle to turn turtle.
Indeed, no two motor vehicles traversing the same lane of a highway with double yellow
center lines will collide as a matter of course, both ending up on the opposite lane, unless
someone is negligent. Dimayuga was driving the JAM passenger bus which, from the
evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with petitioner’s jitney.
Driving the bus gave Dimayuga exclusive management and control over it. Despite the
claim of JAM to the contrary, no contributory negligence could be attributed to Ramirez
relative to the incident on the basis of the available evidence. Inevitably, the requisites
being present, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
We, thus, quote with concurrence the findings of the RTC—
As both parties are asserting claim for the damages each has respectively sustained from
the subject collision, the negligence of either driver of the bus or of the jitney must be
shown, and the burden to prove the negligence, by preponderance of evidence, lies upon
both who are alleging the other’s negligence. Preponderance of evidence is "evidence as
a whole which is superior to that of the defendant {or the other}" [Pacific Banking
Employees Organization vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495].
To prove negligence of the bus driver, plaintiff relies heavily upon the testimony of PO3
DANIEL C. ESCARES, who identified the police report of the incident [Exhibit "B"] as well
as the sketch of the site [Exhibit "I"] and the pictures taken as reflective of the scene of
the incident [Exhibits "E" with sub-markings], invoking [in plaintiff’s memorandum] the
application of the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitor."
From the said exhibits, the plaintiff postulates that her jitney then being driven by
Alexander Ramirez, as well as the bus driven by defendant Dimayuga were heading the
same direction towards Manila, but when the jitney was about to negotiate the left side
road intersection towards the feeder/Barangay road of Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna,
it was bumped by the oncoming/overtaking bus driven by Dimayuga, that caused the
jitney to turn turtle at the road shoulder causing damages on the jitney, the cargoes and
injuries to the jitney driver and his companion. It was allegedly improper for the bus to
overtake as the road bears a double yellow line at the middle which prohibits overtaking.
On the other hand, the bus driver who is the lone witness/evidence for the defendant
testified he was driving at the Maharlika Highway at 40 km/hr when the jitney
"overtook" from the right and that there was no way for him to evade the latter so it was
dragged to the side [TSN, May 18, 2006, p. 13]. In its memorandum, defendants postulate
that it was the jitney driver who was negligent as it overtook the bus from the right
which is not proper. Plaintiff allegedly could not claim damages for its failure to prove
the bus driver’s negligence, and it was the jitney’s own negligence that is the proximate
cause of his injury.
No direct evidence was presented with respect to the exact road position of the bus and
the jitney at the time of the collision such that the same can only be inferred from the
pictures of the colliding vehicles taken immediately after the incident [Exhibits "E"].
At this juncture, it was established from exhibits "E-5" and "E-6" that the jitney’s left side
portion was directly hit by the front-right portion of the bus. This is consistent with the
plaintiff’s theory that the jitney was then negotiating the left portion of the road when it
was hit by the oncoming bus causing the jitney to have a 90-degree turn around. The bus
and the jitney were almost perpendicular to each other when the collision took place,
with the bus directly hitting the jitney head on.
The statement of the bus driver that the jitney "overtook" from the right only presumes
that at the point of collision, the bus was at the left lane of the road overtaking the
vehicle/s at the right. This scenario, in fact, was affirmed by the police report of the
incident [Exhibit "B"]. It is not quite logical that the jitney, in allegedly overtaking the bus
from the right came from the right shoulder of the road, a rough road merely 5 meters in
width [Exhibit "F"] and even diminished by two (2) meters because of the encroachment
at the sides [TSN, 11-6-02]. No evidence was shown that the jitney came from the right
shoulder. The jitney then loaded with eggs for delivery, was about to negotiate the left
lane towards the feeder/barangay road intersection, and it would be illogical in such a
situation that the jitney driver would take the right shoulder. The foregoing suggest the
fact that the bus overtook the passing vehicles at the right lane and in the course thereof,
the jitney in front that was about to negotiate the left lane, was hit.24
Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking
the vehicles running along the right lane of the highway from the left lane, the available
evidence readily points to such fact. There were two continuous yellow lines at the
center of the highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area should overtake
another on either side of the road. The "double yellow center lines" regulation, which
this Court takes judicial notice of as an internationally recognized pavement regulation,
was precisely intended to avoid accidents along highways, such as what happened in this
case. This prohibition finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation
and Traffic Code), Section 41(e).25 Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision
was an intersection. Section 41(c)26 of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or
passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of
highways, among others. Thus, by overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only
violating the "double yellow center lines" regulation, but also the prohibition on
overtaking at highway intersections. Consequently, negligence can be attributed only to
him, which negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner.
This prima facie finding of negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by
Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to petitioner is
warranted.1avvphi1
The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM, pursuant to Article 2176, in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides—
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the section (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees.27 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer
must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.28
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any other
evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption
of its negligence as Dimayuga’s employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the
damages sustained by petitioner.
As regards the award for actual damages, we, however, concur with respondent that the
award of P400,000.00 for the damage to the jitney is not warranted, considering that the
evidence submitted to support this claim was merely an estimate made by A. Plantilla
Motors. The same reason holds true with respect to the amount of damages for the
destroyed cargo of eggs, considering that the document submitted by petitioner to
support the claim of P142,210.00 was merely a Certification,29 as the information found
thereon was supplied by petitioner herself per the number of pieces of the different eggs
and the corresponding price per piece.
To warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages for repair to damage sustained,
the best evidence should be the receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual
amount expended.30 However, considering that it was duly proven that the jitney was
damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of eggs was
indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost were not proven, we deem it
appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way of temperate damages. Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.31 We, however, sustain the trial
court’s award of P1,327.00 as regards the medical expenses incurred by petitioner, the
same being duly supported by receipts.32
The award of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs
of suit are sustained, the same being in order and authorized by law. Although the basis
for the award of attorney’s fees was not indicated in the trial court’s Decision, we deem it
justified as petitioner was compelled to litigate before the courts and incur expenses in
order to vindicate her rights under the premises.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case
No. SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages
is reduced to P1,327.00, and, in lieu of actual damages with respect to the damage or loss
sustained with respect to the passenger jitney and the cargo of eggs, the amount
of P250,000.00 is awarded by way of temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
3.2 When DRIL is not applicable
Reyes vs Sisters of Mercy Hospital
Facts:
Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around days. Home
medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic. He was then
attended by Dr. Marlyn Rico.
Since typhoid fever was common at that time, the Widal test was performed and he was
found positive for typhoid. Thereafter, Dr. Marlyn Rico indorse Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie
Blanes. Suspecting that that Jorge had typhoid fever, Dr. Marvie Blanes ordered that
Jorge be tested for compatibility with chloromycetin, an antibiotic. Such test was
conducted by Nurse Pagente. As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered
500 mg of the antibiotic. Another dose was given 3 hours later.
Subsequently, Jorge Reyes developed high fever and experienced vomiting and
convulsions. He then turned blue due to deficiency in oxygen – cyanosis – and died. The
cause of death was stated to be “ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia and
typhoid fever.”
The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Sisters of Mercy,
Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community Clinic contending that the
death of Jorge was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin.
Petitioners contend that Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal
test, diagnosed Jorge’s illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the
administration of the antibiotic chloromycetin. Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the
administration of the second dose of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin barely 3 hours
after the first was given.
Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, (Chief Pathologist of the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital)
who performed an autopsy on the body, testified that Reyes did not die of typhoid fever
but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic reaction or chloromycetin
overdose.
Issue(s):
WON there was medical malpractice. (No)
WON res ipsa loquitur is applicable. (No)
Ruling
Dr. Apolinar Vacalares is not a specialist of typhoid fever and he is thus not qualified to
prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis. While petitioners presented Dr.
Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, the Court did not find him to be so as he is not a
specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore, although he may have
had extensive experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do one
on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes.
It is also plain from his testimony that he has treated only about three cases of typhoid
fever. On the other hand, the two doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts
on the subject. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose specialization is infectious diseases
and microbiology and an associate professor at the Southwestern University College of
Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has already treated over a
thousand cases of typhoid fever. According to him, when a case of typhoid fever is
suspected, the Widal test is normally used, and if the results of the Widal test on Jorge
Reyes had been presented to him along with the patient’s history, his impression would
also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the treatment of the
disease, he stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice. Respondents also
presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who is a member of the Philippine and
American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine Board of Pathology, and
chief pathologist at the MetroCebu Community Hospital, Perpetual Succor Hospital, and
the Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical Center. He corroborated Dr. Gotiong’s
testimony that the danger with typhoid fever is really the possible complications which
could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as liver and cerebral complications.
(res ipsa loquitur – not applicable)
There is nothing unusual about the death of Jorge Reyes (absence of 1st requisite
that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent). In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after
professional medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or
extraordinary about his death.
Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days
unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows
that he had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical help came too
late for him.
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a
suit against a physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did
not produce the desired result.
AFRICA v CALTEX
FACTS:
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the
underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and
the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and
Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was
being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove
this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire.
Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a
concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD:
Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the
transaction speaks for itself”) which states: “where the thing which caused injury,
without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and
the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation,
that the injury arose from defendant’s want of care.” The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons
who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur
is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence
as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury
complained of.
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO,
and TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
FACTS:
Pedro T. Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck loaded
with ten (10) big round logs which was parked along the right side of the National
Highway. A warning device consisting of a kerosene lamp was placed three or four
meters from the back of the truck. However, Godofredo Isidro’s truck, driven recklessly
by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured. The
collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the ground.
As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left
leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated thereby rendering him
incapacitated for work depriving him of his income.
Defendant Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven
by Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a
truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the truck
allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane.
Respondent Isidro posits that a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle
which has the right to be on the highway and that it was incumbent upon the driver as
well as the helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist
negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle.
Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is
shifted to the petitioner, for the immobile cargo truck had no business to be there.
Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the
driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was
fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
The trial court rendered its in favor of Layugan and the Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party
complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants. In its decision it stated that in the
case at bar the burden of proving that care and diligence was observed is shifted
evidently to the plaintiff. Absent such proof of care, will evoke the presumption of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, on the part of the driver of the parked
cargo truck as well as plaintiff who was fixing the flat tire of said truck.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the decision of the respondent court is correct in finding the petitioner
negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for itself).
2. If the doctrine is inapplicable, then who is negligent?
RULING:
1.
The respondent court wrongfully applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence
is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the
presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome,
where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of
negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Once the actual cause of injury is established
beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no
inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the
evidence, as in this case.
2.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel
Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. When an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer. In disclaiming liability
for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has
already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his
responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to remind him to be careful in
driving.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked
truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed which is sufficient in the eyes of the
Court. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the
right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the
truck. But despite this warning, Daniel Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo
truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his
left forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee when
gangrene had set in.
It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he did not check his
vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the
brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident
could have been avoided. The fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver
to be careful in his driving is not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence.
The Court holds that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability
with his driver to the petitioner. There is no proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the
selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and
thus prevent damage to others.
E. Defenses
A. Due Diligence
G.R. No. 116617, November 16, 1998
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO
TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V.
ROSALES AND LILY ROSALES, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa
was its driver assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27. The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza
Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the University of the Philippines Integrated
School.
MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing
Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City.
Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa,
MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS).
ISSUE:Whether or not MMTC sufficiently proved diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Musa.
HELD:
No.
If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the law presumes that the owner was
negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary. Employers may be
relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of
their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service records. with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish
these, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
MMTC sought to prove its exercise of diligence employees by presenting mainly
testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. While there is no rule which requires that
testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or
even object evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses’ testimonies dwelt on
mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that
there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on
vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants
are given tests to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, but there is
no record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the said examinations
before he was employed.
b. Accident or Fortuitous Event (The act of God doctrine) – Art. 1174 of NCC
G.R. No. L-29640 June 10, 1971
GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and MARIA G.
ABAD, respondents.
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioner.
Jose A. Buendia for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Guillermo Austria petitions for the review of the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeal (in CA-G.R. No. 33572-R), on the sole issue of whether in a contract of agency
(consignment of goods for sale) it is necessary that there be prior conviction for robbery
before the loss of the article shall exempt the consignee from liability for such loss.
In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having received from
Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be sold on
commission basis or to be returned on demand. On 1 February 1961, however, while
walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been
accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the face, while the other snatched her
purse containing jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry allegedly
taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant. The incident became the subject of a
criminal case filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against certain persons (Criminal
Case No. 10649, People vs. Rene Garcia, et al.).
As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value notwithstanding demands,
Austria brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against her and her
husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages. Answering the
allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses set up the defense that the alleged
robbery had extinguished their obligation.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and ordered
defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the former the sum of P4,500.00, with
legal interest thereon, plus the amount of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees, and the
costs. It was held that defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery, or, if indeed it was
committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty of negligence when she went home
without any companion, although it was already getting dark and she was carrying a
large amount of cash and valuables on the day in question, and such negligence did not
free her from liability for damages for the loss of the jewelry.
Not satisfied with his decision, the defendants went to the Court of Appeals, and there
secured a reversal of the judgment. The appellate court overruling the finding of the trial
court on the lack of credibility of the two defense witnesses who testified on the
occurrence of the robbery, and holding that the facts of robbery and defendant Maria
Abad's possesion of the pendant on that unfortunate day have been duly published,
declared respondents not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a
fortuitous event, and relieved them from liability for damages to the owner. Plaintiff
thereupon instituted the present proceeding.
It is now contended by herein petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
there was robbery in the case, although nobody has been found guilty of the supposed
crime. It is petitioner's theory that for robbery to fall under the category of a fortuitous
event and relieve the obligor from his obligation under a contract, pursuant to Article
1174 of the new Civil Code, there ought to be prior finding on the guilt of the persons
responsible therefor. In short, that the occurrence of the robbery should be proved by a
final judgment of conviction in the criminal case. To adopt a different view, petitioner
argues, would be to encourage persons accountable for goods or properties received in
trust or consignment to connive with others, who would be willing to be accused in court
for the robbery, in order to be absolved from civil liability for the loss or disappearance
of the entrusted articles.
We find no merit in the contention of petitioner.
It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a
person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the
human will (or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence must render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the
obligor must be free of participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 1 A
fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms, floods,
etc., or by the act of man, such as war, attack by bandits, robbery, 2etc., provided that the
event has all the characteristics enumerated above.
It is not here disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed the victim of robbery,
and if it were really true that the pendant, which she was obliged either to sell on
commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the robbery, then the
occurrence of that fortuitous event would have extinguished her liability. The point at
issue in this proceeding is how the fact of robbery is to be established in order that a
person may avail of the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, which
reads as follows:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared
by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
It may be noted the reform that the emphasis of the provision is on the events, not on the
agents or factors responsible for them. To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is
not necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence should be found or
punished; it would only be sufficient to established that the enforceable event, the
robbery in this case did take place without any concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and
this can be done by preponderant evidence. To require in the present action for recovery
the prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order to establish the robbery
as a fact, would be to demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil
case.
It is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor for reason of a
fortutious event, such debtor must, in addition to the cams itself, be free of any
concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. 3 This is apparent from Article 1170 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, providing that:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.
It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the City of Manila and its
suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes against persons and property that renders
travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and
protection, the conduct of respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning alone to her house in
the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable value would be negligent per se and would
not exempt her from responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are not persuaded,
however, that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in 1961, when the
robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached the
levels attained in the present day.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that to allow the fact of robbery to be
recognized in the civil case before conviction is secured in the criminal action, would
prejudice the latter case, or would result in inconsistency should the accused obtain an
acquittal or should the criminal case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court finding
that a robbery has happened would not necessarily mean that those accused in the
criminal action should be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those actually
accused did not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did
take place. The evidence to establish these facts would not necessarily be the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals under review, the
petition in this case is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Southeastern College vs Court of Appeals
FACTS: Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while
petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On October
11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila.
Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents
house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L.
Reyna.
In their report, they imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the
building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be
ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondent. It then
recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of
persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a
structural hazard.
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC for damages based on culpa aquiliana.
They alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing
them to stay temporarily in others houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner
P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as
exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus costs.
Petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating
typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof
giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school
building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top
condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond
human control such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought
thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect that subject
school building had a defective roofing structure, found that, while typhoon Saling was
accompanied by strong winds, the damage to private respondents house could have been
avoided if the construction of the roof of [petitioners] building was not faulty. Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courts disposition by reducing the award of
moral damages from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.
Issues:
1. Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents
resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof
 ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within the legal
contemplation, due to fortuitous event.
2. Whether or not the ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence.
Held:
1. Yes. Petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage
caused by the typhoon. Article 1174 provides that:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he
be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person
who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing
damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the
effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man whether it be from active
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
The lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that
subject school buildings roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position
especially when battered by strong winds. Based on such finding, the trial court imputed
negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence
which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or
care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence
engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a
negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be
guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the
omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.
2. It bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative
of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and
conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in establishing the
culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted
by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building after
the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of
actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective
of the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a
wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the
victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet.
The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted
to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioners school building. Private
respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said school
building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation
from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the
construction of such building was basically flawed.
There is no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court.
We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling
was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents house.
Private respondents claim for actual and moral damages as well as attorneys fees must
fail. Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. More so because
no bad faith or willful act to cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral
damages.
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss
they actually incurred. It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be
actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. Private
respondents merely submitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of
their subject building.
Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals (138 SCRA 553)
Facts:
MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila and bounded for Cebu. Its officers were aware
of the upcoming typhoon Klaring that is already building up somewhere in Mindanao.
There being no typhoon signals on their route, they proceeded with their voyage. When
they reached the island of Romblon, the captain decided not to seek shelter since the
weather was still good. They continued their journey until the vessel reached the island
of Tanguingui, while passing through the island the weather suddenly changed and
heavy rains fell. Fearing that they might hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility, the
captain ordered to reverse course the vessel so that they could weather out the typhoon
by facing the strong winds and waves. Unfortunately, the vessel struck a reef near
Malapascua Island, it sustained a leak and eventually sunk. The parents of the passengers
who were lost due to that incident filed an action against Filipinas Pioneer Lines for
damages. The defendant pleaded force majeure but the Trial Court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower stating
that the incident was a force majeure and absolved the defendants from liability.
Issue: Whether of not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for damages and presumed to be
at fault for the death of its passenger?
Held: The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer Lines failed to observe that
extraordinary diligence required of them by law for the safety of the passengers
transported by them with due regard for all necessary circumstance and unnecessarily
exposed the vessel to tragic mishap. Despite knowledge of the fact that there was a
typhoon, they still proceeded with their voyage relying only on the forecast that the
typhoon would weaken upon crossing the island of Samar. The defense of caso fortuito is
untenable. To constitute caso fortuito to exempt a person from liability it necessary that
the event must be independent from human will, the occurrence must render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, the obligor must be
free from any participation or aggravation to the injury of the creditor. Filipina Pioneer
Lines failed to overcome that presumption o fault or negligence that arises in cases of
death or injuries to passengers.
Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable occurrence, yet,
having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather bulletins at intervals of
six hours, the captain and crew were well aware of the risk they were taking as they
hopped from island to island from Romblon up to Tanguingui. They held frequent
conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence required of very cautious
persons, 9 they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that
extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the
passengers transported by them with due regard for an circumstances 10 and
unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to
overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries
to passengers. 1
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. ALA INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147349. February 13, 2004.
Facts:
The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT building of
the NAIA airport was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent ALA. Respondent
made the necessary repair and waterproofing.
After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received partial
payments. Progress billing remained unpaid despite repeated demands by the
respondent. Meanwhile petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that
respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion date.
Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its claims.
The trial court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. Both parties executed a
compromise agreement and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment based on the
compromise agreement. The Court a quo rendered judgment approving the compromise
agreement. Under the said compromise, petitioner shall pay within the period of 30 days.
For petitioner’s failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a motion for
execution to enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed the delays to its
being a government agency. The trial court denied the respondent’s motion.
Reversing the trial court, the CA ordered it to issue a writ of execution to enforce
respondent’s claim. The appellate court ratiocinated that a judgment rendered in
accordance with a compromise agreement was immediately executory, and that a delay
was not substantial compliance therewith.
Issues:
1) WON the decision based on compromise agreement is final and executory.
2) WON non-payment by petitioner was due to a fortuitous event.
3) WON execution in favor of respondent is proper.
Ruling:
1) YES. A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or
forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory. Such
agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its
identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a
judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Judges therefore have
the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it.
2) NO. The Christmas season cannot be cited as an act of God that would excuse a
delay in the processing of claims by a government entity that is subject to routine
accounting and auditing rules. A fortuitous event is one that cannot be foreseen or,
though foreseen, is inevitable. It has the following characteristics: (a) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. None of these
elements appears in this case.

Furthermore, Christmas season is not a caso fortuito, but a regularly occurring event. It is
foreseeable, and its occurrence has nothing to do with the processing of claims. Also, to
be free from liability, the Christmas season must have been the sole and proximate cause
of the failure to pay by petitioner, which is not present in this case. As a matter of fact,
petitioner was at fault since it should have taken proper measures to avoid delay in
payment, considering that upon entering into the Compromise, it knew that the 30-day
period to pay would end during the Christmas season.

The act-of-God doctrine requires all human agencies to be excluded from creating the
cause of the mischief. Such doctrine cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of loss or injury. Since the
delay in payment in the present case was partly a result of human participation --
whether from active intervention or neglect -- the whole occurrence was humanized and
was therefore outside the ambit of a caso fortuito.

Petitioner was negligent and incurred a delay in the performance of its contractual
obligation under the judicial compromise. It thus created an undue risk or injury to
respondent by failing to exercise that reasonable degree of care, precaution or vigilance
that the circumstances justly demanded,]and that an ordinarily prudent person would
have done

3) YES. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement.
Thus, non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified execution. It is the height
of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous event its delayed payment.
Petitioner’s explanation is clearly a gratuitous assertion that borders callousness.