ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs PP | January 11, 2016 | J.

Leonen passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring, retention, training and testing of
 Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel security screening personnel; In coordination with the appropriate agencies
 While buying a ticket in Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo, he allegedly left his and/or instrumentalities of the government, formulate, develop, promulgate
bag on the floor with a porter and implement comprehensive security plans, policies, measures, strategies
 Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x- and programs to ably and decisively deal with any threat to the security of
ray scanning machine for inspection. Cutie Pie Flores, operator of the x-ray machine, transportation systems, and continually review, assess and upgrade such
saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called security plans, policies, measures, strategies and programs, to improve and
the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then enhance transportation security and ensure the adequacy of these security
 Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in measures;
the affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag  Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by the Office for
 Igot told Officer Abregana that there were firearms in a bag owned by Dela Cruz Transportation Security, including the National Security Programme for Sea
 The bag was then inspected and the following items were found inside: three (3) Transport and Maritime Infrastructure
revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items; and four (4) live  It is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper vehicles within its ports
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.  port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions
 Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by and deemed agents of government
law. He was also informed of his constitutional rights  vs airport checks: there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when
 Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of coming into airports or ports of travel
firearms  second point of intrusion—when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and
 Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with the violation of called the attention of the port police officer
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas o port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the
Pambansa Blg. 881: safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already
 Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray
scanning machine
 RTC found Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
W/N petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. YES
Pambansa Blg. 881
o proved the following elements: "(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the  third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy occurred during petitioner’s
fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or submission to port security measures
permit to possess the same." o In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and
o presented the firearms and live ammunitions seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show that
o presented three (3) prosecution witnesses who testified that the firearms were petitioner presented his bag for scanning
found inside Dela Cruz’s bag o There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the
o presented a Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any application for license search of his personal effects
o when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
 RTC also found the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest
thus, valid
even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113
o when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
o petitioner is now precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search when he
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest
voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition, petitioner’s consent
even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113
to the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive
 RTC dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No. 8294
circumstances
o Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that
o cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that there was no valid consent to the
the person arrested committed ‘no other crime.’
search because his consent was premised on his belief that there were no
o also charged with violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution
prohibited items in his bag. The defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence
No. 7764
would be found does not automatically negate valid consent to the search when
 CA affirmed RTC. Defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved
incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured against the
by improper motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit
totality of the circumstances.
 CA also denied MR.
 consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs search
 Dela Cruz:
o Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are
o well[-]acquainted with [the] inspection scheme [at the] ports.
allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . .
o would not have risked placing prohibited items such as unlicensed firearms inside
effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws.
his luggage knowing fully the consequences of such an action.
o Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search
o He left his luggage with a porter. Someone must have placed the unlicensed
o requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising
firearms inside his bag during the period he was away from it
police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of
o there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search
customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house
 no actual intention to relinquish his right against WS
o CAB, search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not
 It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his
conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by
luggage. . . . [H]e believed that no incriminating evidence w[ould] be found
the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws.
 Respondents:
 prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
o there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure,
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid
thus warranting his conviction.
authorization to carry the firearms outside his residence during the period designated
o caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers and four (4) live
by the Commission on Elections. He was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic
ammunitions when his bag went through the x-ray machine
Port, which was a public place.
o this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted by airport
 When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the
personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures
burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of
o Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and seizure. Dela
evidence does not equate to the reversal of the presumption of innocence. Petitioner
Cruz voluntarily gave his consent to the search
failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the
intent to possess the illegal firearms.
W/N petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal firearms within the
 When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is
meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of
not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. YES
prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the
 Section 2(a) of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764: During the election
act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a
period from January 14, 2007 it shall be unlawful for: Any person, including those
crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of residence or place of business, to
things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be
bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places including
criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose
prohibited act is done freely and consciously
firearm includes airgun, while deadly weapons include hand grenades or other
 a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
explosives, except pyrotechnics
mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
 Section 261(q) of BP 881: The following shall be guilty of an election offense: Carrying
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although
intent to possess on the part of the accused. Criminal intent here refers to the
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the
This is not important in convicting a person under PD 1866. It is sufficient that the
Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered
accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to
a residence or place of business or extension hereof.
possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without
 first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to
criminal intent.
port personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-
 Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession cannot be
ray machine station
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon
o Standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state
agents or authorized government authorities. Items seized pursuant to a
OTHERS
reasonable search conducted by private persons are not covered by the
 The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for
exclusionary rule
violation of RA 8294/Illegal possession of firearms.
o W/N port personnel were private persons: history and organizational structure of
o Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be
the Philippine Ports Authority
convicted for illegal possession of firearms if another crime was committed.
 Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through
Executive Order No. 513
DENIED
 Cebu Port Authority was created to specifically administer all ports located in
the Province of Cebu
 Office for Transportation Security was designated as the "single authority
responsible for the security of the transportation systems [in] the country[.]".Its
powers and functions included providing security measures for all
transportation systems in the country: Exercise responsibility for transportation
security operations including, but not limited to, security screening of
PP vs MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA | June 18, 2014 | J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
 Police officers Mariano and Ramirez received a complaint from a truck driver
regarding a traffic dispute between him and a taxi driver. The dispute led to the 2
passengers of the taxi cab, one of them being Calantiao, alighting from the vehicle
and firing guns.
 When the police officers found the taxi cab, the 2 passengers alighted therefrom,
fired their guns towards them (police officers), and ran away.
 The officers gave chase and were able to subdue the passengers. They recovered
from Calantiao a black bag containing 2 bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a
magazine of super .38 stainless with ammos. A .38 revolver was recovered from
Calantiao’s companion.
o Results from the PNP Crime Laboratory showed that the 2 bricks were indeed
marijuana.
 In his defense, Calantiao testified that the police officers gave chase after his
companion made a "f*ck you" sign towards them in a traffic dispute. After they were
chased and subdued by the officers, they were subjected to body frisking and their
wallets and money were taken. Police officer Mariano then allegedly prepared some
documents and informed them that they will be charged for drugs
 Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
 RTC found him guilty.
o drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search
after he was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police
officers.
 CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
o The police officers were acting on a legitimate complaint and had a reasonable
suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the
offense
o The search and subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and
valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest

W/N the marijuana found in Calantiao’s possession is admissible as evidence. YES.

 Appellants:
o It was discovered via an illegal search
 The marijuana was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the
apprehending officers’ "plain view”.
o Its custodial chain was broken.
 The item was marked at the police station
 This case was not under the “plain view” doctrine. Instead, it is a valid warrantless
search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest.
o Plain view:
 The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
 CAB, the police officers purposely searched Calantiao upon his arrest. The
police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in his
possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
o Warrantless search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest
 Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
 Its purpose is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach. Thus, it is a reasonable exercise of
the State’s police power to protect:
 (1) Law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person
they have lawfully arrested; and
 (2) Evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee.
 In this case,
 The marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within
his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag
or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it.
 As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it
was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search.
 The police officers did not violate the chain of custody rule.
o RA 9165 Section 21 (1): The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof
o Failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, such as immediately
marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody
because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items.
o Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the
seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain
and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done:
 (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator
 (2) immediately upon confiscation.
o CAB, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned
over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination.
 The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
"to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach."
o It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee.
 The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy. In
order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence
 In this case, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims.
CA AFFIRMED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA | July 20, 2001 | J.
Kapunan

 Acting on tip supplied by a police informant that Compacion, then barangay captain,
was growing and cultivating marijuana plants POs conducted a surveillance of the
residence of Compacion in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental
o saw 2 tall plants in the backyard suspected to be marijuana
 POs formed a team. They applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive
Judge Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge informed them that he did not
have territorial jurisdiction
 The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there in the evening,
then went to the house of Executive Judge Javellana to secure a search warrant. They
were not able to do so because it was nighttime
 Nonetheless, the team proceeded to Compacion’s residence
o Compacion allegedly opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was
immediately asked about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he
planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from
migraine. They then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6425. and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then
uprooted the suspected marijuana plants
 Initial field test: +
 plants were turned over to the PNP crime lab where they were weighed and tested
o the microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test all
yielded positive results
 Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 (known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659
o on or about 1:30 o'clock A.M., July 13, 1995, at Negros Occidental, he planted,
cultivated or cultured two (2) full grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as
"Marijuana plants"
 Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty
 TC convicted (in flagrante)
o (T)he said two plants were the very corpus delicti of the crime
 Hence, present appeal
 Compacion: TC erred:
o In holding that Exhibit "F"/two marijuana plants wrapped in plastic, is admissible in
evidence inspite of the fact that the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens
of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist were the ones purportedly planted
and cultivated by the accused, and of the fact that the prosecution failed to
establish the evidence's chain of custody
o In holding that the warrantless search of the residence and seizure of two plants ,
leading to the subsequent arrest of the accused, were valid on the ground that the
accused has committed the crime of cultivating the said marijuana plants in
violation of Sec. 9, RA 6425 in open view, inspite of the fact that they had to enter
the dwelling of the accused, and in admitting in evidence the said plants against
the accused, inspite of the fact that the said plants were the fruits of the poisonous
tree
o Wrt search and arrest: At 1:30am, he heard somebody knocking outside his house.
He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4)
persons who he thought were members of the military, entered. None of them
asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. After about 20
minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the
backyard. One of the military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here
at your backyard" to which accused-appellant replied: "I do not know that they
were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my
wife". After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the
men took pictures of him and themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside the
house where he and the military men spent the night. At around ten o'clock that
same morning, they brought him with them to the city hall. Accused-appellant saw
that one of the two (2) service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with plants.
He was later told by the military men that said plants were marijuana. Upon arrival
at the city hall, the men met with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged
marijuana plants. A picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with
the alleged marijuana as back drop.

W/N the WS and WA were valid.

 GR: A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of 1987C AIII S2 and S3(2)
 E: 7WS
 CAB, WS, not under 7WS
o did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted
o act of Compacion in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises
and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not
be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless
search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were
intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed
 To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right
o No necessity and urgency
 Compacion was already put on surveillance, POs earlier approached judges
o Not plain view
 Elements: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain
view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
o It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the
plants involved herein were indeed marijuana plants: had to conduct a field test
using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed
marijuana plants, had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations
 Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree

ACQUITTED
RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO vs CA and PP | January 15, 2002 | J. PUNO  CAB, Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied
 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a acquiescence
routine patrol in Laguna, spotted Caballes’ passenger jeep unusually covered with
"kakawati" leaves. ACQUITTED
o Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle.
o When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale
and nervous.
o With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of conductor wires owned by NPC
o Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that
they came from Cavinti (8km away)
o Caballes and the vehicle were brought to the Police Station. Danilo Cabale took
pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned
over to the PS Commander
o Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
o Charged with the crime of theft (stole 360kg wires; P27k)
 Caballes: denial and alibi
o he is a driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since
1988 although his ID has already expired
o while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez
who requested him to transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in
Cavinti. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last trip. On his way to Santa
Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his
superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos
advised him to proceed with the loading. After receiving those instructions, he
went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so
the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati leaves.
He was intercepted by POs
 RTC convicted: WS
o before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched
must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle
 CA affirmed
 Hence, present petition
 Caballes: flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol,
merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause

W/N the WS was valid. NO

 GR: inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against
unreasonable searches and seizures + exclusionary rule
 E: 7WS
 CAB,
o Not moving vehicle
 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches
are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints
 BUT there should be PC. PC signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged
 One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" which has
been declared to be not illegal per se so long as for public order
 Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance
is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2)
simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area
 CAB, police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection.
They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks
 when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched
 CAB, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers
who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of
the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves. The fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with
kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause"
 In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential
report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in
his vehicle
o Not plain view
 object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight
 CAB, cable wires were placed in sacks and covered with leaves.
o Not consented search
 At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity,
which is not "consent"
 The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances (age of
defendant, whether he was in a public or secluded location, whether he
objected to the search or passively looked on, intelligence of defendant,
presence of coercive police procedures, defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found, nature of the police questioning, environment in which
the questioning took place, vulnerable state of defendant)
 it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.
 CAB, When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached
petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive” For all intents and purposes, they were informing,
nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANTONIO C. ESTELLA | January 21, 2003 | PANGANIBAN, J

 Prior to November, 1996 – RTC Judge Romulo Estrada issued a warrant for the
conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Masinloc, Zambales.
 Nov 20 – POs based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They
coordinated with the members of the PNP and barangay for the enforcement of the
search warrant
 On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair
located about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of
appellant, and being rented by appellant's live-in partner, named Eva. They
approached appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed
appellant the search warrant
 While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried
marijuana fruiting tops.
 The team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and his live-in partner. They
found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained four (4) big bricks
of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver
o The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team
seized and signed a receipt for the seized items.
 The suspected marijuana dried leaves were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory: +
 Estella was charged for violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425
 Estella pleaded NG
 RTC convicted
 Hence, PP
 Estella: Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing
marijuana and likewise having any firearm.

W/N WS valid. NO
 Appellant claims that the hut, which was searched by the police and where the
subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him.
o To support his claim, he presents a document that shows that the subject hut was
sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon Eclarinal.
 The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was
bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. "Narding" Estella. Other than SPO1 Buloron's
uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to
prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant
 testimony of Barnachea shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella and
rented by someone named Eva. The attempt to make it appear that appellant
occupied it, or that it was under his full control, is merely conjectural and speculative
 Neither do we find merit in the OSG's argument that appellant cannot deny
ownership or control of the hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting on a rocking
chair and drinking coffee.
 trial court erred in adopting the prosecution's dubious story. It failed to see patent
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies about the search
undertaken.
o SPO1 Buloron, the prosecutions principal witness, testified that appellant had
allegedly gone inside the hut; and that the latter had done so to get his stock of
illegal drugs, which he turned over to the police. Ironically, Captain Barnachea,
who was purposely presented by the prosecution to corroborate SPO1 Buloron's
story
 Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in
possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that
there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could
have been no search incident to a lawful arrest.
 Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence
of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still
cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law.
o Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule
126.
o However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the
person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can
destroy.
o CAB, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within
appellant's immediate control
 Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search, if he was neither
the owner nor the lawful occupant of the premises in question. Besides, as we have
noted, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding these crucial
circumstances were contradictory. They erode SPO1 Buloron's credibility as a
prosecution witness and raise serious doubts concerning the prosecution's evidence.
This Court is thus constrained to view his testimony with caution and care.
 appellant constantly questioned the legality of the search
 without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution failed to
establish his guilt with moral certainty. Not only did its evidence fall short of the
quantum of proof required for a conviction, it has also failed to present any evidence
at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

ACQUITTED
ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR vs PEOPLE | September 2, 2015 | J. BRION

 Prosecution’s version : PO1 Tan and CA (civilian agent) Tangcoy were ordered by their
superior to man the South Wing of Roxas Boulevard one August evening in 2002 when
they saw Homar jaywalking. He was immediately accosted and was told to use the
pedestrian crossing.
 Homar picked up something from the ground prompting Tan and Tangcoy to frisk him.
They found a knife and soon enough, a plastic sachet which they suspected contained
shabu.
 Homar’s version: He claimed he was on his way home that night from selling imitation
sunglasses when the police stopped and frisked him despite his refusal and accusing
him of being a “holdupper.” They allegedly forced him to go with them, confiscated
his kitchen knife (to cut cords) and investigated for alleged possession of shabu.
 RTC: Convicted Homar due to presumption of regularity in the arrest and
straightforward testimony of the arresting officers.
 CA: Affirmed the RTC based on Rule 113, Section 5 (a) which enumerates the
instances when 1 warrantless arrest is permitted. Homar committed jaywalking in the
presence of Tan/Tangcoy so the arrest was valid.
o (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
 The subsequent frisking and search were incident to a lawful arrest under Rule 126,
Section 13 . 2 Likewise, he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of shabu.
o Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest . — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
 Homar’s arguments : Shabu is inadmissible because the arrest was unlawful. He was
not committing any crime and no criminal charges were filed against him. Also,
Section 13 only contemplates those “which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense.” The sachet of shabu had nothing to do with
jaywalking.
 Respondent’s position: Non-filing of a criminal charge does not render the arrest
invalid. Besides, he can no longer question his arrest since he already submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court

W/N valid WS. NO

 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the
public welfare, the exercise of this power and the implementation of the law should
not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens. To determine the admissibility of
the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search
which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.
 Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary
 Police alleged that Homar committed jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in their
presence. The prosecution has to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest,
otherwise, the corpus delicti (in this case, the shabu) will be in admissible.
 To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer.
 The prosecution was not able to discharge this burden, particularly that Homar was
actually committing a crime. They did not identify the place where Homar allegedly
crossed and that it was illegal to cross that area. He was also not charged with
jaywalking.
 NOTE: The filing of a criminal charge is not required to prove a valid warrantless arrest
because the prosecution still has to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest.
 Presumption of regularity: This cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused still enjoys this constitutional
right until proven otherwise by the prosecution.
 Accost vs. Arrest: The police testified that they “accosted” Homar when he jaywalked.
However, this is different from an actual arrest as contemplated by the Rules on
warrantless arrests. See Doctrine 3.
 No arrest preceded the search because they did not intend to bring him under
custody or restrain his liberty. The lack of intent was further proven by the absence of
criminal charges against him. Intent only came after they allegedly confiscated the
shabu. The shabu was not recovered immediately after the alleged lawful arrest but
only after the initial search.
 Intent to arrest is indispensable because otherwise, any evidence obtained in violation
thereof will be inadmissible (Luz v People).
 Despite having actively participated in all the proceedings, this waiver does not
automatically carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized.
 The shabu as evidence is inadmissible and precludes conviction.

ACQUITTED
TERRY VS. OHIO | JUNE 10, 1968 | C.J. WARREN
Rule of Law:
 FOURTH AMENDMENT. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
 Weeks vs. US (Exclusionary Rule)  this rule holds that evidence obtained through a
Fourth Amendment violation is generally inadmissible at criminal trials. Evidence
discovered as a later result of an illegal search may also be inadmissible as "fruit of the
poisonous tree," unless it inevitably would have been discovered by legal means. This
rule enforces the Fourth Amendment by providing a remedy and disincentive.
 Ohio Revised Code, Section 2923.01  no person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife,
dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his person. Authorized law
enforcement officers are exceptions.
 Meaning of Frisking or Pat down Search  A search of a person’s outer clothing
wherein the one who searches runs his/her hands along the outer garments to detect
any concealed weapons. (This is usually done while hands are raised and is used for
inspection in tight-security places and sometimes even in malls without metal
detector apparatus.)
F:
 Cleveland Police Detective McFadden was at his usual patrol-in-plain-clothes in
downtown Cleveland. He had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35
and had been patrolling that vicinity for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years.
 His attention was attracted by two men, Terry and Chilton, standing on the corner of
Huron Road and Euclid Avenue.
 His suspicion further arose when one of the men left the other one, walked southwest
and paused for a moment to look in a store window, walked a short distance, turned
around and walked back, pausing once again to look at the window only to rejoin his
companion at the corner, where they talked briefly.
 These series of motions were repeated about 24 times by the two men alternately.
 At one point, they were joined by a third man (Katz) who talked to them briefly and
then left. Soon the other two followed the third man in the front of Zucker’s store.
 Officer McFadden suspects that the two men are planning a robbery (“casing a job, a
stick-up”). Fearing also that they may have a gun, he considered it his duty as police
officer to investigate further.
 He approached the 3 men and identified himself as a police officer and asked for their
names to which the men “mumbled something” in response. This prompted Officer
McFadden to grab Terry and spin him around so that they were both facing the other
two men.
 He “patted down” the outside of his clothing and felt a pistol at the left breast pocket
of Terry’s overcoat. He reached inside but was unable to remove the gun. He then
ordered the 3 men to enter the store.
 Inside the store, he removed Terry’s overcoat completely, removed a .38 caliber
revolver, and ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands raised. He then
pat down the other two and retrieved another gun from Chilton and none from Katz.
 He took all 3 men to the police station, where Chilton and Terry were formally
charged with carrying concealed weapons.
At Trial Court:
 A motion to suppress the guns was filed.
 The prosecution said that the guns were seized following a search incident to a lawful
arrest. This theory was rejected by the trial court as McFadden had no “probable
cause” to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons.
 The motion to suppress, however, was also denied on the ground that McFadden had
“reasonable cause” to believe that the accused were acting suspiciously warranting
interrogation.
 Trial Court: The officer, having reasonable cause to believe that they were armed, had
right to pat down the outer clothing of the men to protect himself. A “frisk” of outer
clothing for weapons is different from a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The
frisk is essential to performance of the officer’s investigatory duties. Without frisking,
the answer to a police officer’s interrogation would have been a “bullet”. Thus, a
pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible. (Issue of admissibility of evidence with
regards to the Fourth Amendment)
 Chilton and Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty. They were found GUILTY
however by the trial court as affirmed by the CA. The Ohio SC denied their appeal as
there was no “substantial constitutional question”.
 The US SC, however, granted their certiorari to determine the admissibility of the
revolvers as evidence in light of possible violation of rights under the Fourth
Amendment (applicable to the state via Fourteenth Amendment and Mapp vs. Ohio).
W/N WS valid YES
On Applicability of Fourth Amendment
 The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. (Meaning: It may be violated not
only when the search or seizure was done at home. It applies even to people on the
street)
 Terry and Chilton had reasonable “expectation of privacy” while walking down the
street.
 This right to personal security is now measured with regards to a warrantless search
and seizure on the street.
 On the one hand, it is argued that the police need flexibility in performing their duties
on city streets and thus there should be a difference between search-and-seizure and
stop-and-frisk. They say that a police must be permitted 1) to “stop” a person for
interrogation upon suspicion of connection with criminal activity, and 2) to “frisk” for
weapons upon suspicion that he is armed. On the other hand, the argument is that
the police must be strictly limited by the law to protect personal security and to
ensure judicial control over intrusions made by the police. (Meaning: As it is the
judges who issue required warrants = judicial control)
 The exclusionary rule has been seen as a way to discourage lawless police conduct and
as tool to ensure judicial integrity (when evidence is admitted, the conduct producing
that evidence is as if legalized).
 However, the exclusionary rule has limitations. It cannot be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that much
conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional
protections. (Like in this case – a stop and frisk is similar to unwarranted intrusion but
is a legitimate investigative technique)
Whether and When There was A Search and Seizure
 Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person. Also, a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of
a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is a "search."
Hence, stop-and-frisk is within the Fourth Amendment’s contemplated search and
seizure. The question would now be whether it was “reasonable”. This is because
even a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment
by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.
 Officer McFadden thus seized and searched petitioner. The question is now whether it
was reasonable for him to do so at such point in time.
The Reasonable Cause
 Since the police conduct – swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observation
of the officer – is not subject to the procedure for warrants, the issue cannot be about
probable cause.
 There is a need to balance governmental interest in suppressing crimes and individual
rights against invasion of privacy. (balancing test was done)
 Reasonable Test: The police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.
 Objective Standard to Test the Facts: Would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that the action taken was appropriate?
o Anything less than this violates the Fourth Amendment as mere actions based on
“hunches”.
o Good faith on the part of the officers is NOT enough as it would be subjective. The
rights of the people enshrined in the Fourth Amendment will be subjected to the
discretion of the police.
 Government Interest:
o Effective Crime Prevention and Detection  recognizes that a police office may (in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner) approach a person for
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest. (McFadden’s suspicion for robbery falls within this idea)
o However, the issue is not the properness of McFadden’s investigation but the
justification for his invasion upon Terry’s personal security by searching him for
weapons. We are dealing with more than mere governmental interest!
 More Immediate Interest:
o The police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him. (Meaning: What the police officer can do to protect himself from the
people suspected to be linked to criminal activity)
o When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others, he is allowed to take necessary measures to determine whether
the person has a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
 Private Interest:
o Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe,
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.
 Petitioner: A police officer may search for weapons only when the situation evolves to
a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest.
 This has two weakness in reasoning:
o It fails to account the traditional limitations upon the scope of searches. It makes
no distinction between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for
weapons. (Meaning: What petitioner suggests is NOT “search for weapons”
contemplated this case but a “search after arrest”. One is like pre-arrest and the
other post-arrest. Think of when policemen point their guns at a criminal, makes
him raise hands to the air, and then searches him for other weapons before
putting him in handcuffs. That is a post-arrest search.)
o It assumes that the law of arrest has already worked out the balance between the
particular interests involved here -- the neutralization of danger to the policeman
in the investigative circumstance and the sanctity of the individual. An arrest is a
wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for
weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different.
 Arrest  intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed
 Protective Search for Weapons  less intrusion upon sanctity of person
 There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man, in
the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger.
 In determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.
Reasonable Search and Seizure by McFadden
 On the facts, a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing
petitioner was armed, and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was
investigating his suspicious behavior.
 The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that
these men were contemplating a daylight robbery -- which, it is reasonable to assume,
would be likely to involve the use of weapons -- and nothing in their conduct from the
time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as
a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.
o The trio’s departure from the original scene to Zucker’s store does not indicate
abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at some point.
 The sole justification of the this particular kind of search is the protection of the police
officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for
the assault of the police officer. It is not justified by any need to prevent the
disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime.
o McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions.
He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their
garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed
the guns. He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his
clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a
weapon.
J. Fortas | Dissent
 A stop and search should not be permitted absent “probable cause”.
 "To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the
totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of
lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through
a constitutional amendment."

J. Harlan | Concurring
 The problem now is what makes a frisk reasonable.
 On the record before us, Ohio has not clothed its policemen with routine authority to
frisk and disarm on suspicion; in the absence of state authority, policemen have no
more right to "pat down" the outer clothing of passers-by, or of persons to whom
they address casual questions, than does any other citizen.
 In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an
encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on
an encounter, to make a forcible stop. (Meaning: The officer must have a right to be
in the presence of the suspect) Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to
frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an
articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. (Meaning: No more question to be asked
to suspect)

J. White | Concurring
 This is concerning the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to
anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not
be detained or frisked, but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way.
 However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me
the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are
directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it
may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.
 It is temporary detention, warranted by the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the
protective frisk for weapons.
 If weapons are found, an arrest may follow. If none is found, the frisk could still be
preventive for the message of suspicion it sends.
But if the investigative stop is sustainable at all, constitutional rights are not
necessarily violated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly
in the process.
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | July 22, 2015 | J.
PERLAS-BERNABE

DOCTRINE
 To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained
and confiscated during unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the fruit of a poisonous tree. Such pieces of evidence are
therefore inadmissible.
 The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and
this process cannot be done in the reverse.
 While the stop and frisk is an instance wherein a warrantless is allowed, the same
cannot be done without probable cause based on the circumstances.
 For a warrantless arrest to operate the following elements must be met:
o Person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime; and
o Such act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer (there is
personal knowledge on the part of the officer).

IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Alvin Comerciante (accused) [Commerciante]
Erick Dasilla (person Comerciante was standing with, was eventually acquitted before
Comerciante) [Dasilla]
Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent of NARCOTICS Group) [Agent Radan]
PO3 Bienvy Calag II (arresting officer) [PO3 Calag]

 30 July 2003 – Agent Radan and PO3 Calag were on a motorcycle patrolling the area
on their way to visit their friend.
o On the way to visit their friend
o Cruising at a speed of 30 KM/HR along Private Rode, Mandaluyong
o Spotted at a distance of ten (10) meters, two (2) men in front of a jeepney
o Men were identified as: Comerciante and Dasilla
 Men were standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements"
 One of them was handing plastic sachets to the other
o At five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer and arrested
the two men, confiscating two small plastic sachets containing shabu.
 After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence
subsequently granted by the RTC, which resulted to Dasilla's acquittal.
 Comerciante failed to file his own demurrer and the RTC considered this as him
waiving his right to do so and ordered him to present his evidence
 Comerciante averred, in his defense, that:
o PO3 Calag was looking for "Barok" a notorious drug pusher.
o That after being arrested, they were asked money in exchange for their release.
o When they failed to meet the demand, they were brought to another police
station and underwent inquest proceedings.
 The RTC ruled on 29 July 2009 that Comerciante was guilty of violating Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165
o RTC ruled that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless search since the officer
saw Comerciante in plain view carrying the sachets.
o Sentenced to twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
o Ordered to pay the fine of Php 300,000.
 Comerciante appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed his conviction on 20 October
2011.
 With the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Comerciante filed a Rule 45
petition with the Supreme Court.

W/N CA correctily affirmed Comerciante's conviction. – No.

 The evidence against Comerciante is inadmissible as it was procured through an
unlawful search (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). The same should result in his
acquittal.
o The OSG's argument, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, was that the
warrantless arrest was valid pursuant to the stop and frisk rule, and hence
Comerciante's conviction should be upheld.
o However, the SC held that:
 There was no lawful arrest.
 Because it is highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has
perfect vision, would be able to identify from 10 meters, while moving at a
speed of 30 km/hr on the motorcycle, miniscule amounts of shabu inside two
(2) very small plastic sachets as held by Comerciante.
 There is no overt act that could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to
rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed,
was currently committing, or was about to commit a crime.
 The acts of standing around with a companion handing over something cannot
be considered as a criminal act.
o Hence, there being no lawful arrest, the evidence procured is inadmissible, being a
fruit of the poisonous tree.
o Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures." (People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427
[2014]).

ACQUITTED
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO VS REBECCA BIONG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND WON the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause
STYLE OF PONGKAY TRADING | DECEMBER 4, 2013 | J. BRION whiplash injuries.
 On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North Avenue, Quezon  Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial
City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary
Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the when the signal light turned red. A evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and
few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck owned by Rebecca Biong and driven Dra. dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury
by Joel Primero containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial.
violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. accidents cause whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or is
Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
any other visible physical injuries. their judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and
 In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’
the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she
could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda  In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of
Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and
that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s
nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical favor. Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare
therapy to alleviate her condition. assertion and has no leg to stand on
 Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical
therapy. She then consulted other doctors in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-
surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the
compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and
neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement
of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession
since June 2000 despite the surgery.
 Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her
injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued
Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She
alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and
claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and
an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
 At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a
hostile witness. Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm
because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and
authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The
medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also
chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations. Meanwhile, Joel testified
that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck.
 In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when
they met several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she
observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Joel.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra.
dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.
 The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

Who has the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury?
 In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges
has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations
are not evidence.
 In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s
negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must
establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.

WON the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay.
 The medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based
on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person
who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
cannot be given credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the
present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and
its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.

WON Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that
she was not presented as an expert witness.
 Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary
witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in
evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the
witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.43 On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may
be received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he shown to possess.44
 However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert
testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special
knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie
in a simple exposition of the expert’s opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance
that the expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve
as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is
founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value
for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary
witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of
whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial,
nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause
and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez vs
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL
AUGUSTO GOMEZ vs ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during the pendency of the cases
below and substituted by his surviving wife, LUZ BAYSON GOMEZ, and children namely:
ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., MA. RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, MA. TERESA G.
BLOOM, MARIANO B. GOMEZ, and CARLOS B. GOMEZ) and ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR |
February 6, 2007 | J. Chico-Nazario
 CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and ANGEL, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers,
respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are
the children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.
 On February 15, 1980, petitioner instituted these cases: (1) Civil Case No. 36089 and
(2) Civil Case No. 36090.
In Civil Case No. 36089
 Plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who died on November 6,
1979, was the owner of the following real properties:
(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name;
(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name,
(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Pasig, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 268396 in her name;
 That after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared
and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said
document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to Rita and Jesus; that
the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor,
Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgement on the said document was antedated
to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendants sought the
cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of
new ones in the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.
 Thus, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and
void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that TCT Nos. be reinstated or be replaced by titles
in the name of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be
ordered to pay damages.
 Defendants denied the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that the said
document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the
said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to
private defendants, as early as April 20, 1979. Defendants thereafter prayed for
damages.
In Civil Case No. 36090,
 The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute
owner of the following personal properties:
(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par
value of P75,000.00 and covered by Stock Certificate No. 003;
(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of
First Philippine Holdings Corporation with a total par value of P118,530.00 covered by
Stock Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613 (2,040 shares) and A-
09018 (2,370 shares);
(c) Jewelries and collectors items, contained in Consuelo Gomezs Safe Deposit Box
No. 44 at the PCI Bank, Marikina Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980
per Order of the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;
(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706,
Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893, Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration
Certificate No. 0140373 valued at P200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo
Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643,
Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate
No. 0358757, valued at P50,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued interests on money
market placement with the BA Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-
0116 dated March 9, 1978.
 That after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently prepared and/or caused to
be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document Consuelo
donated the above described properties to defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that
the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor,
Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgment on the said document was antedated to
April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendant Ariston, Sr., in
December 1978, effected or tried to effect a change of the LTC registration of the 2
vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money market
placements with BA Finance and received checks in the sums of P187,027.74
and P4,405.56; that with the exception of the jewelries, which are with the bank,
defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to benefit from the use of the
2 vehicles and from the dividends earned by the shares of stocks.
 On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of
Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that
defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver the stock certificates, jewelries,
collectors items, and vehicles in his possession plus all the cash dividends earned by
the shares of stock and reasonable compensation for the use of the 2 motor vehicles.
 Defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer, denying the material
allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation is valid
and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document
being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to defendants, as
early as April 20, 1979; and that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to
use, enjoy, possess and own these properties. Defendants thereafter prayed for
damages as well.
 In its joint decision, the trial court dismissed the complaints. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN IN NOT
GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE EXPERT OPINION OF THE NBI REPRESENTATIVE, WHICH THE
LOWER COURT ITSELF SOUGHT – NO
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses
PETITIONER- The only direct evidence presented on this matter is the testimony of
Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner of the NBI.
RESPONDENTS - They presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of
Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence presented
by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were
signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary Public Jose
Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the
respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr., who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
1. Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the
signatures of the donee were jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were
typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies of the Deeds were encoded
first, and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and circumstantial
evidence ensued. Petitioner’s expert Torres claims she is certain of the answer: the
signature came first. Respondents’ expert Cruz, on the other hand, says that it is
impossible to determine which came first accurately.
ZENAIDA TORRES FAILED TO CONVINCE THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE DEEDS OF DONATION
WERE NOT PREPARED IN ONE SITTING.
 To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of
Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402 are genuine. This is contrary to the allegations
of Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged that the signatures of Consuelo were
forged. In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario
wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank, and thereafter, said
Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.
 Furthermore, Torres admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies on the
matter of Questioned Documents, except on one or two seminars on Questioned
Documents. She admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a Chemist;
she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar work on the
subject matter at issue.
 Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen
the typewriter used to type the Donations 401 and 402 before she made the report;
that there were no variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the typewritten
documents were concerned; that there were only variances insofar as the horizontal
alignments are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had wanted to incorporate a
document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of a signature, the normal step to be
taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment, which can be seen via the naked
eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment, as admitted by her, was
perfect.
 In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is loose, the
horizontal alignment will have a variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have
no variance, and there would be nothing sinister about this. She had to admit this,
because she was confronted with an authority on the matter, more particularly the
book of Wilson Harrison (vide Exhibit 17).
 She admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the photographs of the
two Donations 401 and 402, which photographs she later on enlarged. She admitted
that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2) Donations, she had not put
the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when the photographs were
enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when a
typewriter pitch measure is not used, when photographing the documents.
 In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the
testimony of Torres was completely discredited (Vide TSN of May 19, 1986).
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
 Cruz testified that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one continuous
sitting. He elucidated clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.
 To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite
typewriter.
 Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the
entire documents. As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and
402 were prepared in one continuous sitting, because if not,the color tone will most
probably be different.
 He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in
agreement. He explained how he arrived at this conclusion. As per Cruz, by using an
instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the Criminal
Research Co., Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical
alignment from the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment. In
fact, he showed to the court the enlarged photographs, indicating clearly that all the
vertical alignments are all in order. He also found out that the horizontal and vertical
alignments are in agreement.
 He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words Know All Men By
These Presents and the words That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino,
and a resident of 24 Pine Street, New Marikina Subdivision, Marikina, there is a slight
disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment.
 He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the spacing is because
the typist sometimes tries to push the variable spacer; the button on the left side of
the roller, and if you press that round button, there will be a variance spacing namely
one space, two spaces, and three spaces; and these are not attached so there is a
variable in the spacing.
 Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this signifies that
there was typing in one continuous sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-
insert it again, there are differences in the left hand margin. All of his findings appear
in the blow up photographs which were marked as Exhibits 31 to 34.
 He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian
inserted the date 21st and 1 (page number), 401 (document number), I (book
number), and 82 (series); and also his signature Jose R. Sebastian and his PTR Number
(vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25, 1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved
futile.
 As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature Consuelo C. Gomez was
written before the typewritten name Consuelo C. Gomez. In the second round of
analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial
court arrived at the same conclusion:
ZENAIDA TORRESS FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER
O, WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER
N. BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN
NAME CONSUELO C. GOMEZ CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE
CONSUELO C. GOMEZ.
 The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities that it
is impossible to determine accurately which came first, because there were no
intersections at all. In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as
follows:
If we considered the intersection of two writing strokes or the intersection of writing
and typewriting the majority of problems are covered. Substantial, repeated
intersections of two writings offer a higher probability of success than a single
 indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke crossing another which only very
infrequently can produce a clear indication of the order of writing.
 The trial court added: in fact, common sense, without more, dictates that if there are
no intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which came first. The Court of
Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial court.
2. Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed
expert, as opposed to Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by
respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground
that he had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr.
 We agree with petitioner that positive evidence is, as a general rule, more credible
than negative evidence. However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who
testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it is
impossible to remember what never existed.
 Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to
testify on their findings in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to
forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may
be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is
unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say
that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence
when it comes to expert witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived
at their conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.
 On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the
larger proportion of the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a
knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually reproduces, literally or in
substance, conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent
names responsible for them.
 In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their
observations. Francisco Cruzs statement that no finding or conclusion could be arrived
at, has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets
of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten words
Consuelo C. Gomez barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature
Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten
words and handwritten signature do not even touch.
 In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that no finding or conclusion can be
arrived at, was found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating
that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The former
expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by
both experts.
3. Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon
originals of both Deeds of Donation that were then in the possession of the
Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his
tests, with respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of
Ariston, Jr.
 Suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents. After the
examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the Quezon City Hall. The
carbon originals of said Deeds were among the documents burned in the
fire. Petitioner never rebutted respondents manifestation concerning this incident,
nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.
4. Other than the above allegations, petitioners attack on the entire testimony of
Francisco Cruz rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida Torres was
court-appointed, Francisco Cruzs testimony was solicited by respondents, one of
whom had previously solicited such testimony for another case.
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this
Court held: The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character
of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which he testifies, and
any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. … The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence
of an abuse of that discretion.
 Thus, while the expert witness possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she
testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial
court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during
trial, as well as with the witness deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the
witness stand.
 The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances
in its determination of the expert witness credibility, as it is in a better position than
the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no
evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination,
the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
OTHER ISSUES:
Alleged patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation
 All alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these alleged
irregularities affects the validity of the subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes fraud
or foul play. It is true that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged.
However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal examination of the exhibits,
had revealed such a questionable physical condition.
o Legal documents contained in 8 x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even
uncommon. The same is true with regard to single-spaced legal documents; in fact,
petitioners Supplemental Memorandum was actually single-spaced.
o That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties
in two sheets of paper does not militate against their authenticity. Not all people
equate length with importance.
o The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR
number and the date and place of issue are found in the right-hand side of the
name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with
respondents that it is irrational, impractical, and contrary to human experience to
use another page just to insert those minute but necessary details.
 The only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of
Donation that truly give us doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively small
margins on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof, and the alleged inclusion
in Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by Consuelo. However, these
doubts are not enough to establish the commission of fraud by respondents and to
overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of crime or wrong. Good faith is
always presumed. It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the
same, who, in this case, is the petitioner.
Payment of donors tax before the death of Consuelo
 We agree with the Court of Appeals in ruling that there had been no antedating or
falsification of the subject Deeds of Donation:
(1) the finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the donors tax
of the properties subject of the donation, as evidenced by the PCIB check she
issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on
9 October 1979, in the amount of P119,283.63, and
(2) the testimony and certification dated 22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that
the said documents were acknowledged before him on 21 April 1979.
Respondents had presented evidence to the effect that Consuelo made an
initial payment of P119,283.63 for the Donors Tax on 9 October 1979, while
respondent Ariston, Sr., supplied the deficiency of P2,125.82 on 4 December
1979.
 The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner did not present any
evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated, thus,
letting the presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties
stand. This is in contrast to respondents’ direct evidence attesting to the payment of
said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
 Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the
notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this
Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian. Petitioner posits that
the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his
credibility as a witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative
proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed
others to distort the truth.
 It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally
a witness for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court
prohibits petitioner from impeaching him.
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to
witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared
by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified
reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an
adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence
of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by
the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
 This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for
him as being worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the
witness would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to
make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of
destroying his credit, if he spoke against him.
 Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an
unwilling or hostile witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in
relation to Section 11of the same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to
impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements,
and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastians subsequent
dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case.
Alleged unusual circumstances relative to the execution and notarization of the subject
Deeds of Donation
 This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her
properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an
airplane. While many believe these days that taking the plane is the safest way to
travel, this has not always been the case. The fear that planes sometimes crash, now
believed to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of air
travelers. Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds
were completed to the satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly
wanted to have the documents signed and notarized before she left for abroad.
DENIED
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BRIAN MERCADO y SARMIENTO
 July 27, 2007, acting on a tip from a confidential informant that accused-appellant
was selling shabu, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) of
the PNP organized a buy-bust operation
o PO3 Galvez was provided with 2 one hundred-peso bills which he marked on the
right portion with his initials "RG"
o When the informant pointed to accused-appellant, PO3 Galvez approached him
and said, "[p]’re, pa-iskor naman", offering to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. He then
handed the buy-bust money and accused-appellant brought out from his pocket 3
pieces of plastic sachets, chose one 1 and gave it to PO3 Galvez.
o PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a police officer, arrested accused-appellant, and
gave the pre-arranged signal to his companions by scratching his nape.
o When SPO1 Moran rushed in, PO3 Galvez marked the plastic sachet with
"BMS/RG" and told SPO1 Moran about the remaining 2 plastic sachets in accused-
appellant’s pocket. SPO1 Moran then frisked him and confiscated the items which
he marked as "BMS/FM-1" and "BMS/FM-2".
o They brought accused- appellant and the confiscated items to the SAID-SOU office
in Samson Road, Caloocan City, and turned them over to the investigator, PO2
[Randulfo] Hipolito, who prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment
receipt and request for laboratory examination.
o Qualitative examination conducted on the confiscated 3 heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, each weighing 0.02 gram,
yielded positive
 The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, in 2 Informations
 Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
o He was walking home when a jeepney with police officers on board suddenly
stopped in front of him. PO3 Galvez asked accused-appellant where he came from.
He answered that he just came from driving his jeepney showing the police officers
his driver’s license. Accused-appellant was then forced to ride in the jeepney and
brought to the police station and was told to produce P10k in exchange for his
liberty, otherwise, a case would be filed against him
 RTC convicted
o evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently satisfied the quantum required
for accused- appellant’s conviction
o fact of sale was sufficiently established upon showing the complete detailed
manner of negotiation of said sale, exchange of consideration, and handing of the
subject
o as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer
was accepted by the accused-appellant, and the dangerous drugs delivered to the
former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of goods
o testimonies of the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation
appear credible and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive
o denial of the accused- appellant and his mere allegation of extortion were found to
be unsubstantiated
 CA affirmed
o failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the
accused illegal, nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the
accused of the illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment operation
 What is of utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity and
maintenance of the evidentiary value
o It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal; when a party desire the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection
o procedural lapse did not render accused- appellant’s arrest illegal or the evidence
adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance with Section 21, the issue is not
of admissibility, but of weight – evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given
the evidence
 evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the charges
o during trial, accused- appellant neither suggested that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of the suspected drugs that could affect their integrity and evidentiary
value nor objected to their admissibility
 Hence, PP
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition
 The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court
o This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain.
o It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit.
 As to failure to comply with Sec 21: failure to undertake the required photography
and immediate marking of seized items
o "marking upon immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending team
o not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value
o Also, under R128 S3, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be]
accorded it by the courts
 No provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the
non- admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21
 The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight — evidentiary merit or probative value — to be
given the evidence.
o From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution
established that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the
moment he was arrested, during the time he was transported to the police station,
and up to the time the drug was submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination. The same witnesses also identified the seized drug with certainty
when this was presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs,
there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast
doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court.
DENIED

W/N WS valid. YES

 For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven:
o (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and
o (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor
 for illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the same
law, the prosecution must establish the following elements:
o (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug;
o (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
o (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug
 Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buy-bust
operation showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu
o PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange
o accused-appellant was fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and
prohibited considering that when PO3 Galvez told him, "pre, pa-iskor naman," the
former immediately answered, "magkano?
o Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked, and
subsequently identified
 By way of emphasis, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary
o As a matter of fact, aside from accused-appellant’s mere denial and alleged
extortion against him, no evidence was ever presented to prove the truthfulness of
the same
o if these were simply trumped-up charges against him, it remains a question why no
administrative charges were brought against the police officers
 Furthermore, this Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a
method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be.
o "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT" | May 19, 2004 | Per Curiam o To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, 3 requisites must
concur:
 Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide  (1) there is more than one circumstance;
 On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old  (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel  (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
Dawang. beyond reasonable doubt.
o They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, o (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend the victim,
 At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, o (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels;
left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her o (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged
husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in wife
the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home o (4) Appellant was seen near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting
 Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar;
house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the o (5) Judilyn saw appellant going down the ladder of the house wearing a dirty white
house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked shirt, and again wearing a black shirt;
appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber o (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn was approaching;
 At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant o (7) Salmalina saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the
descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead;
towards the back of the house o (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by
o appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back a rope;
and forth o (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines
 At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with
time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery;
o She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." o (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina
 In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights o (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be
in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide compared with the DNA profile of the
to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked appellant are identical
Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the o (13) Appellant escaped two days after
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was  Yatar: DNA evidence should be excluded. Right to remain silent as well as his right
tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she against self-incrimination. SC: NO
felt a lifeless body o The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
 Judilyn and her husband arrived. Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her compulsion
intestines protruding out of her stomach o It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination
 SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa but as part of object evidence.
went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn o Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
 The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved
beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt o appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted
splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel. in open court
 When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of  Yatar: DNA evidence should be excluded since resort thereto is tantamount to the
Kathylyns’s death. However, he was placed under police custody. application of an ex-post facto law. SC: NO
o No ex-post facto law is involved
 July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police
o The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
"Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from
probative weight of the evidence presented.
the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him
 Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. Pleaded NG
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts undeniably link
 RTC convicted
him
 Hence, automatic review
o Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility
to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places
W/N the judgement of conviction was meritorious. YES
are located in the same barangay.
 The testimonies of the witnesses are afforded credibility as the Supreme Court will
o He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene (5mns)
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of
 The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence
witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
reasonable doubt.
misinterpreted.
o Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain
o TC is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and
a conviction.
observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.
o Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
 As to evidence:
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to
o 11 stab wounds, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out; estimated
act conscientiously upon it.
time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m
 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
 within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking
nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that
o although the Postmortem Report indicates that no hymenal lacerations,
the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.
contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, the doctor discovered the
o In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, the present case passes the
presence of semen in the vaginal canal
test of moral certainty.
 Dr: introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through
o However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the
sexual intercourse
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction
o sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her
when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue
 it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she
o subsequent testing showed that the DNA of the sperm specimen from the vagina
last saw the victim alive in the morning. She witnessed the appellant running
of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back
 The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA
 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the
tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification
latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts
from the school."
of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus,
 Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant,
getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
AFFIRMED
 under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the DNA
evidence obtained which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and
reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
 US jurisp: pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable
 It must be noted, however, that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
 CAB, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. She
testified that it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination
 Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, as presented
in the facts of this case, proves beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
o Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused,
to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime.