FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.

, Secretary, Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T.
DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY
and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999]
Case Digest
FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station

III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as
it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver,
private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the
Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division
(PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente
Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in
the documentation of the narra lumber.

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of
the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the
truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-
267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the
cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate
of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber
Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden
Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee
and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10

which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the
following documents:
1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by
the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
2. Sales Invoice;
3. Delivery Receipt; and
4. Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles
issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and
the six-wheeler truck.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the
narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said
order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-
wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on
advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the
issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the
panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.

On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist
from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release
and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for
Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in
the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the
same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original
documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs
and/or their representatives x x x".

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners
refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC
of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the
subject properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the
Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a
constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a
Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the
Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash
bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners
for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents.
Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash
counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been
set for hearing on March 30, 1989.

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but
was also denied for the same reason.
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in
contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24
hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court
dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in
the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of
P180,000.00.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by
the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and
bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of
the writ of replevin was mandatory.

As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals
believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private
respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated May 18, 1990.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and
the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary
injunction.

RULING:

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are
subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby,
by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the
lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless
appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head may not be
reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the
confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for

reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper
authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a
replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's
filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The
mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements
of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance
of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action
for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment
thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the
administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of
replevin prayed for by the private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject

properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond
the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed
to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the
1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under

SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of
forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized
forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the
appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations
applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their
right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to
confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court
in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute
indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby
violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of
court could be committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent
presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from
enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders
had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render judgement
of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said
respondent judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the
Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against petitioners.

Tano v Socrates (Environmental Law)

Tano v Socrates

GR No. 110249

August 21, 1997

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance

N o. 15-
92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE B
ANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FRO
M JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

ISSUE:

Is the ordinance valid and constitutional?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 2 of Article X I I reads: The State shall protect the nation'

s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic z one, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens. The Congress may, by law , allow small-
scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as w ell as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishw
orkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

• Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of social

justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based
on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. x x x x x x x x x Sec. 7. The State
shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support
to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance,
and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall ex
tend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share
from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

• General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).

RULING:

YES. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution

enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under
Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi),
458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:

(1) to establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five years, and

(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities. It is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of
Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the
Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be
that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of
municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters. In
closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for
exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to
protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing In the herculean
task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local
government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more
vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future
generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their
response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an

ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto
Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and
shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for
5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying
that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional
on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of
law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held
that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under
the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides,
Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s
marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the

state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the

enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of
the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila

Bay

GR No. 171947-48

December 18, 2008

FACTS:
The complaint by the
residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen wa
y
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decre
e No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL
defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to
class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,

Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate

the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––
Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it
s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies
concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of su
ch water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20.
Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter
to contain , remove and clean -
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In
case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned
shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or
entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On
the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where
its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general
application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the
pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by

Mandamus. While the implementation of the
MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describe
s as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is

institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction
 GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through

Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or
affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in
the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly
passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar
as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA
prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes
a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law,
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police

power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as
opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities
to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
 G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN
RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA
MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS
REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA
and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING
CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL;
BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.;
 MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA
VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL;
AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO
PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M.
DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON
FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA
No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and
sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the

municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
“Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in
the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big
fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish
cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen
operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the
LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation
of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be
effected.

Issue
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority
or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise
jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Held
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA
prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.

The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.

The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the
charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended.

Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as
are by its charter vested on it.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police

power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as
opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities
to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

(Romero[1], 1994)

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

(Romero[1], 1994)
FACTS

· The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a

complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to
stop the operation of the City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of
the residents and the pollution of the surrounding water.

· LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been

maintaining the open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management
Bureau of the DENR. They also found the water to have been directly
contaminated by the operation of the dumpsite.

· LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government
and other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or
kind of garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.

· The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
to file an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and
sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health
and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.

· LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control

Law that the review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the
Court of Appeals and not the RTC.

· RTC denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary

injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during
the pendency of the case.

· The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage.

· The residents seek a review of the decision.

ISSUE

WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature
and effect was injunctive.

THEORY OF THE PARTIES

City Government of Caloocan: As a local government unit, pursuant to the
general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, they have the
mandate to operate a dumpsite and determine the effects to the ecological
balance over its territorial jurisdiction.

LLDA: As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and

adjudicatory powers and functions by RA No. 4850, it is invested with the
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to various
provisions in EO No. 927.

RULING

YES.

1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the

quality of human life and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and
surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.

· While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication

Board under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it does
not preclude mandate from special laws that provide another forum.

· In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is

mandated to pass upon or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local
government offices and agencies within the region and their underlying
environmental/ecological repercussions.

· The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over
the case when the DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the
representatives of the city government, LLDA and the residents.

2. LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.

a. Explicit in the law.

· §4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may
be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

· While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power “to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order” in that language, the provision granting authority
to “make (…) orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution”, has the same
effect.
b. Necessarily implied powers.

· Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order” was not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect.

· While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such

power as expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a “toothless”
paper agency.

· In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled

that the PAB has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
on prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.

· LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation
of the projects within the LagunaLake region, and this includes the
implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.

CASE DIGEST

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., vs.THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FACTS:(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
[hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other
forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum
order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the
Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of
the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to
expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

Issue: w/n TLA 356 is null and void

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds
several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor
of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the
MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration
of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which
cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA
No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under
the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity
of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its
letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting
reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters
as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations,
106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6
SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA
374]. . Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner
until 1986,

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of

certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a
reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is
whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative
orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition
ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87
and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in
1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse
to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a
petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time
frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done
within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition
for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from
the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding
to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118
SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable
period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal
consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27,

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed
Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the
period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from
the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the
writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of
certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is
precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general
application of the rules enunciated above.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing
the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have
indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements
entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In
fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent
administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with
regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future
programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the

renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and
the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological
system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially
in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the
country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of
flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous
and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having
been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the
supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet
the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to
ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check
further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is
expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal,
79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v.
Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7
SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R.
No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No.
L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218,
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January
28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637,
July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests
of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the
pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the
wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and
the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources
[Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183;
Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-
26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than
suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of
timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the
adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged
irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging
concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if

done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of
fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and
exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special
favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this
power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed
public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore,
should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion
on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the
implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and
wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the
Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to
issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs
sought.WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 79538

Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc
October 18, 1990
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the
Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in
1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau
to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President
and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters

within there scope without need of interference by the courts of law. These
administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues
within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res
judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The
rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line
with the latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in
view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their
duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court
cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of
discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that
petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.

Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills
Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon
completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is
that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This
was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511.
Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic
Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both
lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use.
Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued
contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706
was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an

industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in
the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264

of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or
RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally
construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act.
Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously
passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order
and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a
conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and
noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial
establishments.

ORTIGAS & CO. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST
CO.

G.R. No. L-24670 14 December 1979

Santos, J.
FACTS:

Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to
the public. It sold to Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong by sale on
instalments. The vendees then transferred their rights and interests over the
aforesaid lots in favour of one Emma Chavez. The agreements of sale on
instalment and the deeds of sale contained the restriction that “The parcel of
land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for
residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones
or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.”

Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma Chavez in the name
of Republic Flour Mills. Ortigas and Co. claims that the restrictions were
imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification
and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big
landed estate. Feati Bank, on the other hand, maintains that the area along the
western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a
commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27 s-1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. Later on, Feati Bank commenced construction
on the said lots for a building devoted to banking purposes. It refused to
comply with the demands of Ortigas & Co. to stop the said construction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the

contractual obligations assumed by the defendant.

HELD:

Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule

is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power, i.e. “ the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety of the general welfare of the
people.” This general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of
doubt, so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the
economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in the
community. The only exceptions under Section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act
(R.A. 2264) are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between a
province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other
hand. Said case is not present in this petition.

Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial

and commercial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard
or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS ATIENZA (2008)

26 Nov 2017

[545 scra 92; G.R. No. 156052; February 13, 2008] Constitutional Law| Police
Power

FACTS:
Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et.al. filed a petition against Hon. Jose
L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No.
8027, reclassifying the Oil Depot in Pandacan Terminal, from industrial to
commercial area and to cease and desist from operating their businesses from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance.

Oil companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron as well as DOE sought to intervene and
asked for the nullification of said ordinance. The oil companies assert that
they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of Ordinance
No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property rights. They allege that
they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate.

On the other hand, the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban

Development of the City of Manila who recommended the approval of the
ordinance cited:
1. The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas,
aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
2. The depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
3. It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and
4. In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread
to the neighboring communities.
ISSUE:
Whether the enactment of the ordinance a legitimate exercise of Police Power.

HELD:
Yes. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected

to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare.However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect
public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the
end in view.

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They
allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However,
based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life
enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police
power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should
prevail.

SC reiterated the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.

SHARE THIS:

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA;
Regalian Doctrine
 GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native
title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to alienate the same.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing
rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining
Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service
contract and is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our
natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either
Technical or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law,
its implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and
technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,
provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set
aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full
control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a
private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial,
marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or
given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the
business.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS,

Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS,
Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES,
Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a

exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized
under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15,
1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40,
adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between
the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that
they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and
develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA
in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case
is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR)
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP
likewise contended that the annulmentof the FTAA would violate a treaty
between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of
Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting
fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine
which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states
that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for
the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources.
By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the
public domainthrough license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a
given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights
to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or
other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now
allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of
the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid
insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute
employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the
1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as
service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a
service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the
State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention
of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalizationrequirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or
connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-
products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the
same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken
together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens.
These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress.
Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.