G.R. No.

81032 March 22, 1990

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE and SPORTS, represented by EDNA V. AZURIN,
ANASTACIO RAMENTO and HON. ONOFRE D. CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA V. NAVARRO, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
The question presented in this petition is whether or not the reassignment of Gloria Navarro as principal
from Carlos Albert High School to Manuel Roxas High School, both in Quezon City, is valid.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On January 1, 1981, respondent Gloria V. Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II. Her
appointment was without reference to any particular school, and merely states —
You are hereby appointed Secondary School Principal II in the Division of City Schools,
District II, Quezon City, Ministry of Education petition and Culture, National Capital Region,
with compensation at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six Pesos
(P18,636.00) per annum, effective January 1, 1981. . . .
For some years, however, her station as high school principal had been at Carlos Albert High School.
Sometime in 1982, petitioner Edna B. Azurin in her capacity as Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon
City, effected a reshuffling of all high school principals in Quezon City in the exigencies of the service, as
all of the principals had been overstaying in one station for more than five (5) years. As a result of said
reshuffling, respondent Navarro was reassigned from Carlos Albert High School to the Manuel Roxas High
School without demotion in rank nor diminution in salary.
On August 25, 1982, however, respondent Navarro wrote a letter to petitioner herein Edna B. Azurin,
requesting for a reconsideration of her transfer or re-assignment and citing her achievements as an
administrator of Carlos Albert High School as her reason therefor.
Petitioner Azurin denied the said request explaining that respondent Navarro's new assignment was made
in the exigencies of the service and precisely in recognition of her capabilities as school administrator, and
that since respondent Navarro had already spent ten (10) years as principal in Carlos Albert High School,
she was accordingly advised to consider her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger
projects for Manuel Roxas High School.
Despite the denial of her request for reconsideration, respondent Navarro gave notice to petitioner Azurin
that she would not comply with her new assignment allegedly because the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers states that no principal/teacher could be transferred without her consent and that the reasons for
her transfer are not plausible.
Thereupon, respondent Navarro appealed to Regional Director Anastacio C. Ramento who rendered a
Decision on October 6, 1982, holding that aforesaid transfer is proper and in accord with law as it was done
in the exigencies of the service.
Still dissatisfied with the said Decision, respondent Navarro appealed to Minister Onofre D. Corpuz, in a
letter dated October 15, 1982.
In a Resolution dated November 11, 1982, Minister Corpuz denied the said appeal, holding that the transfer
of respondent Navarro is proper and lawful since it is the prerogative of the superintendent to reassign
personnel in his division in the exigencies of the service, and considering that the appointment of
respondent Navarro does not state any specific school, her transfer could be effected without violating the
law and rule on transfer.
Inspite of said resolution, respondent Navarro refused to comply with the lawful directive of her superior.
And, without elevating the matter to the Civil Service Commission for exhaustion of administrative remedies,
said respondent immediately filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against Edna Azurin, Anastacio Ramonte and Honorable Onofre D. Corpuz before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q-37025 and assigned to
Judge Ricardo Tensuan.
On February 25, 1983, Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the petition for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.
On March 9, 1983, petitioner filed its Answer stating that Navarro is not entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction and her action deserved outright dismissal since she failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
that her re-assignment was being made in the exigencies of the service and does not constitute demotion

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in rank and salary, hence, not in violation of R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers; that her reassignment was in accordance with MEC Circular No. 28, series of 1962,
directing transfer or reassignment after service of more than five (5) years in one station to avoid the
teacher's becoming stale or unchallenged and to avoid over-fraternization with associates which could be
detrimental to the service.
On March 17, 1983, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration in respect of the Order dated February 25,
1983, which motion was denied in an Order dated May 3, 1983.
Accordingly, on July 25, 1983, petitioner filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition
for certiorari. This case was docketed as AC G.R. No. 01266.
After hearing and oral argument, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a Decision on November 25,
1983 setting aside the Orders dated February 25, 1983 and May 3, 1983.
After resumption of the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-37025 before the Regional Court, petitioner thru counsel
moved for the dismissal of the complaint therein on the ground that Navarro's petition before the Regional
Trial Court had been rendered moot and academic by the Decision in AC-G.R. No. 01266, wherein it was
stated that her reassignment is valid since she had not been appointed to a specific station and that
Navarro's petition states no cause of action as she failed to appeal her reassignment to the Civil Service
Commission.
After successive hearings and the filing by Navarro of an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and a reply by
petitioner, an Order dated August 27, 1986 was issued dismissing Civil Case No. Q-37025. A Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Navarro was denied in an Order dated October 17, 1986.
On appeal by Navarro (CA-G.R. SP No. 11305) the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision (penned by
Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa and concurred in by Justices Jorge Coquia and Josue Bellosillo) declaring
null and void the Orders dated August 27, 1986 which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-37025 and October 17,
1986 which had denied Navarro's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the present recourse.
In deciding for Navarro, the Court of Appeals applied Republic Act No. 4670 known as the Magna Carta of
Public School Teachers. The provisions of the law which are relevant to this case are the following:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to promote
and improve the social and economic status of public school teachers, their living and
working conditions, their terms of employment and career prospects in order that they may
compare favorably with existing opportunities in other walks of life, attract and retain in the
teaching profession more people with the proper qualification, it being recognized that
advance in education depends on the qualifications and ability of the teaching staff and that
education is an essential factor in the economic growth of the nation as a productive
investment of vital importance.
Sec. 2. Title-Definition. — This Act shall be known as the "Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers" and shall apply to all public school teachers except those in the professional staff
of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons engaged in classroom
teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school
librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing
supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated
by the Government or its political subdivision; but shall not include school nurses, school
physicians, school dentists, and other school employees.
Sec. 6. Consent for Transfer — Transportation Expences. — Except for cause and as herein
otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to
another.
Were the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to
another, such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously
notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the
teacher believes there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the
Director of Public Schools, or the Director of Vocational Education, as the case may be.
Pending his appeal and the decision thereon; his transfer shall be held in
abeyance: Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be made three months
before any local or national election.

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 Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the
Government if his transfer is finally approved. (pp. 439-440, 128 SCRA)
Citing the case of Maderazo Jr. vs. Baylon, 128 SCRA 440, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
reassignment of Navarro is contrary to law because it is without her consent and over her opposition and
that the reason for the reassignment was not plausible.
The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides that
except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his consent
from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that
the teacher concerned is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Thus:
The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specification.
Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In
appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to
remain — even as public service dictates that a transfer be made — in a particular station.
Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following statement
in Ibanez vs. Commission on Elections (1967 Phil. 257, 264, L-26558, April 27, 1967):
That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its
protection extends not only against removals without cause but also against
unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated, are tantamount to
removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee.
However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in
the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, et
al., G.R. No. L-20574, February 26, 1965.) Such that the rule which
proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure
is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not
merely assigned — to a particular station (Miclat V. Ganaden, et al., G.R.
No. L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-18352,
August 30, 1963). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, supra] (pp. 123-124, Rollo)
The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she
could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school.
(Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could
not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment
would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the
exigencies of public service require even without her consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra,
27 SCRA 138, 143 —
Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence.
Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not
impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang
Elementary School by appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads
thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public
Schools, Department of Education", without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore
claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station.
She may be assigned to any station as exigencies of public service requires, has no right
of choice. (p. 123, Rollo)
It should be here emphasized that Azurin's letter of August 12, 1982, clearly stated that Navarro's
reassignment is in the exigencies of the service. It was explicitly mentioned that her re-assignment is a
recognition of her capabilities as administrator in improving the Carlos Albert High School and that she
should look at her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas
High School. Moreover, her reassignment was the result of a recognition/reshuffling of all principals in the
Quezon City public high schools in the exigencies of the service pursuant to MEC Circular No. 26, Series
of 1972. This circular refers to the policy of the Ministry of Education that principals, district supervisors,
academic supervisors, general education supervisors, school administrative officers and superintendents
are to be transferred upon completion of five (5) years of service in one station. Such policy was based on
the experience that when school officials have stayed long enough in one station, there is a tendency for
them to become stale and unchallenged by new situations and conditions, and that some administrative
problems accumulate for a good number of years.

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In the case at bar, the reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarro's reassignment were far from
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Navarro had been assigned as principal of Carlos Albert High School for
more than ten (10) years. She was ripe for reassignment. That she was a model principal was precisely
one of the reasons for recommending her for reassignment so that her management and expertise could
be availed of in her new assignment. Apart from the presumption of good faith that Azurin enjoys, We
believe that her recommendation for Navarro's reassignment — for the latter to share the benefits of her
expertise in her new assignment plus the recognizable fact that a relatively long stay in one's station tends
towards over-fraternization with associates which could be injurious to the service — has a substantial
factual basis that meets the requirements of the exigencies of the service.
The Maderazo ruling cited by the Court of Appeals in its Decision is not applicable in the instant case. The
case involved a district supervisor who was being transferred without the reason for such transfer being
stated. At the time of his transfer he was already 61 years old and due to retire. These circumstances are
not present in the case at bar because the reason for Navarro's reassignment was stated and made known
to her.
With the foregoing, the conclusion is thus inescapable that there can be no violation of the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers in this case.
Finally, respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not elevate the matter
of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section 24 (c) PD No. 807, otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree which provides:
(C) Transfer. — A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is equivalent
in rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.
It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which
case, the employees concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee
believes that there is no justification for the transfer he may appeal his case to the (Civil
Service) Commission. (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 125-126, Rollo)
By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing Special Civil Action No. Q-37025,
respondent Navarro is indubitably without cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one rendered DISMISSING Special Civil Action No. Q-37025 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22586 February 27, 1969
JULIANA B. BRILLANTES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARIANO R. GUEVARRA, defendant-appellee.
Agripino A. Brillantes and Celestino A. Brillantes for plaintiff-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz for defendant-appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:

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This appeal, solely "on questions of law" 1 tests the applicability of the constitutionally secured tenure
provision to a 1962 administrative order requiring the transfer of principal teachers who have completed
five years or more of service in one station, under which appellant, a principal assigned to Sinalang
Elementary School, Bangued, Abra, was reassigned in 1963 to head the Peñarrubia Elementary School in
Peñarrubia of the same province.
Upon the issue tendered, we turn to the facts:
Juliana B. Brillantes had been in the government service for 34 years. She was a PNC and BSE graduate
with Junior and Senior Teacher eligibilities. On June 6, 1929, she started as a classroom teacher in the
Manabo Elementary School, Bangued, and thereafter was transferred to different stations: Bangued,
Peñarrubia, Sinalang, Padre Gomez and Bangued East Elementary Schools. 2 On September 1, 1951, she
was assigned to Sinalang Elementary School in Bangued as acting principal thereof. She continued as
principal in that school when she was permanently appointed, effective July 1, 1952, as "Principal
(Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education", in an appointment dated
December 29, 1954. 3 When the Sinalang Elementary School was converted into a division pilot
demonstration school, she was officially designated on September 19, 1961 principal thereof by the
Superintendent of Schools, then Federico B. Ablan. 4
Controversy started when Mariano R. Guevarra, the new Division Superintendent of Schools, released
Division Letter 31 on April 16, 1963, advising all the elementary school principals in Abra of their respective
new station assignments. 5 The transfers were made by authority of a Department of Education directive
dated September 11, 1962 and an implementing order of the Director of Public Schools, Circular 28, series
of 1962. 6
A copy of the division letter, which served as a transfer order, was received by Juliana Brillantes. Her new
station assignment was Peñarrubia Elementary School in the town of Peñarrubia situated six kilometers
from her hometown of Bangued.
Juliana Brillantes wrote Mariano R. Guevarra on April 24, 1963 requesting that she instead be assigned to
the Bangued West Elementary School or be allowed to remain in Sinalang Elementary School. Three
reasons were cited by her: (1) as she was a native and resident of Bangued, her husband a professional,
with their child who was born abnormal requiring personal attention, her transfer would work hardships on
her family; (2) her transfer was not required by the exigency of public service because there was no
complaint against her as principal of Sinalang Elementary School or against the principal of Peñarrubia
Elementary School; and (3) that the transfer was disciplinary in character and was made without due
process of law. 7 The Superintendent stood firm.
On July 2, 1963, plaintiff filed the verified complaint below. 8 Named defendant was Mariano R. Guevarra,
the Division Superintendent of Schools. Said complaint sought a declaration of nullity of the transfer order,
moral damages resulting therefrom and preliminary mandatory injunction. It averred that defendant acted
in excess of his authority, in abuse of discretion and in violation of the Civil Service Law in issuing Division
Letter 31; that her transfer was a demotion in rank, disciplinary in character, and yet she was not accorded
due process of law.
Defendant Mariano R. Guevarra answered on July 8, 1963 and opposed the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. The lower court granted the writ after hearing and upon the filing of the
required bond.
After trial on the merits following a partial stipulation of facts, the lower court rendered its decision of October
24, 1963 dismissing the complaint without costs, dissolving the injunction and cancelling the bond.
On October 31, 1963, plaintiff moved to reconsider upon the ground that paragraph (a) (3) of Section 318
of the Service Manual, 9 Circular 28 and Division Letter 31, are unconstitutional, for they amount to her
removal, a violation of her security of tenure protected by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution. On
November 14, 1963, defendant opposed. On November 20, 1963, the court perfunctorily rejected
reconsideration.
Plaintiff appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff, against the insistence of school authorities that she proceed to Peñarrubia Elementary School
pending appeal, refused to occupy the position for the reason that such action might be construed as a
waiver of her right to appeal and render the issue academic. Instead, on December 5, 1963, pending
perfection of her appeal, she registered in the court below a motion for status quo. Opposed by defendant,
the motion was denied by the lower court on December 17, 1963. On August 6, 1964, she reiterated her
request in this Court by filing a Petition for a Declaration of Status Quo Pending Appeal. 10 The provincial
fiscal, representing defendant Superintendent, offered no objection to the petition, 11 gave a retroactive

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application to Circular 18, series of 1964, which modified Circular 28, series of 1962, to the effect that
transfers of principals must first be approved by the Director of Public Schools. But the Solicitor General
opposed the petition, 12 against which plaintiff filed a refutation. 13
An administrative charge for insubordination was instituted against Juliana B. Brillantes. On September 29,
1964, the Commissioner of Civil Service decided the administrative case for the insubordination against
plaintiff by dismissing her from the service. Upon appellants motion for reconsideration of her dismissal,
this sentence was modified on June 23, 1965 by reducing it to suspension for ten months without pay
coupled with a warning.
Plaintiff thus petitioned this Court that status quo be maintained and that the Commissioner be ordered to
show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt for declaring her guilty of insubordination pending
appeal before this Court.
Finally, on March 22, 1966, this Court resolved (a) to deny the petition for declaration of status quo; (b) to
defer action on the petition that the Commissioner of Civil Service be required to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt and that the decision and resolution of the Commissioner finding plaintiff
guilty of insubordination be declared null and void ab initio, until the decision of this case on the merits.
1. Arguing that an appointment as principal in the Bureau of Public Schools and assignment to a particular
school are inseparable, plaintiff maintains that her unconsented transfer to another school by virtue of an
administrative directive amounts to a removal — prohibited by the Constitution and the Civil Service Act —
which cannot be done unless for causes specified by law.
Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her refuge
behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds
upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But her
first appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary
School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education, 15 without mentioning her station. She
cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular
station. She may be assigned to any station as exigency of public service requires, even without her
consent. 16 She thus has no right of choice.
The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specific station. Otherwise, the
constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has
consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain — even as public service dictates that a transfer be
made — in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following
statement in Ibañez vs. Commission on Elections: 17
That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service
system, is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals
without cause but also against unconsented transfers which, as repeatedly enunciated, are
tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the
availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon "the nature of
the appointment" (Hojilla vs. Marino, et al., G.R. L-20574, February 26, 1965). Such that the rule
which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon
the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely assigned— to a particular station
(Miclat vs. Ganaden, et al, G.R. L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro vs. Valencia, et al., G.R. L-18352,
August 30, 1963).
We hold that the transfer order by itself is not constitutionally infirm.
2. The attack against the September 11, 1962 directive of the Department of Education and Circular 28,
series of 1962, of the Director of Public Schools dated December 3, 1962, is as misdirected.
By the foregoing directive and circular, a policy exists that certain school officials, amongst them elementary
school principals, whose salaries are payable from the national funds are to be transferred upon completion
of five years of service in one station in order to prevent a situation where they become "stale and
unchallenged by new situations and conditions" and "administrative problems accumulate". 18
The administrative order applies only to principals, supervisors, superintendents and administrative
officers whose salaries are payable from the national funds and who, presumably, hold appointments of the
same nature as plaintiff's, that is, without specific station. The order cannot therefore be violative of the
constitutionally enshrined security of tenure. The only secured right of a holder of an appointment without
specific station is the position itself but not the station to which he may have been assigned.
The charge that the order is arbitrary may not be entertained. The Department of Education directive of
September 11, 1962 is a valid exercise of the rule-making power of the Secretary of Education governing

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the internal regulation of officers under his Department. This power is granted to him by Section 79(B) of
the Revised Administrative Code, quoted as follows:
SEC. 79(B). Power to regulate. — The Department Head shall have power to promulgate, whenever
he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations, orders, circulars, memorandums, and other
instructions, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and
efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for
the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of
said Department; ....
In the same manner then, the implementing order of the Director of Public Schools in Circular 28, series of
1962, as well as the implementing letter of defendant Division Superintendent of Schools dated April 16,
1963 are not tainted with arbitrariness.
3. Besides, the Department of Education directive left the door open for exemptions to the policy. It says:
"Individual cases requiring exemption from this general policy [of transfer upon completion of five years]
may be submitted to this Office for appropriate decision." The Secretary of Education could thus authorize
such exemption.
But plaintiff did not make any formal application of this nature with the Secretary of Education. If we treat
her request made with the Director of Public Schools as equivalent to an application for exemption with the
Secretary of Education, we cannot easily downgrade the former's decision denying her request. For, we
perceive no abuse of discretion.
Of course, she went to court on questions of law. By jurisprudence, this suffices to take her case out of the
operative area of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Even in this, however, her cause
must fail. We find nothing illegal or unconstitutional about her transfer.
4. Dissentient, plaintiff insists that her unconsented transfer is a demotion in rank and therefore disciplinary.
In which case, so she argues, the transfer cannot be made without any previous investigation. She thumbs
with meticulous care the difference between Peñarrubia Elementary School to which she was transferred
and Sinalang Elementary School which she occupied. The first is not a pilot demonstration school. It is six
kilometers from her hometown and has only thirteen teachers. On the other hand, the latter, being a pilot
school located in her hometown receives funds from the ICA-NEC and is already staffed with twenty-three
teachers.
Indeed, the WAPCO Classification Pay Plan 19 categorizes principals into Principal I and Principal II.
Principal I has a staff of seven to twenty-five teachers. Principal II has a faculty of more than twenty-five
teachers. Transfers must be made in accord with this classification. 20 A principal I may not be transferred
to a school having more than twenty-five teachers. In turn, a principal II may not be transferred to a school
with a faculty of twenty-five or less teachers. In the same manner, transfers must be made within the same
salary range. When, however, the number of teachers in a particular school, which previously had only
twenty-five or less teachers, increases to more than twenty-five, the Division Superintendent of Schools
should make a recommendation to effect a reclassification of the principal assigned to that school to
Principal II. 21
It is on this last point that plaintiff anchors her complaint. That just as she had almost reached the required
number of teachers under her staff to enable her reclassification to Principal II, she was transferred to
Peñarrubia Elementary School with only thirteen teachers. This, according to her, delays her promotion to
Principal II. It is, she stresses, a demotion in rank, disciplinary in character.
But, again, this claim must be brushed aside. It is, at best, speculative. Who can say whether Sinalang will
soon or will eventually have more than seventy-five teachers? The point is that plaintiff is a Principal I.
Peñarrubia Elementary School, with its thirteen teachers, belongs to the Principal I classification. Plaintiff's
transfer therefore did not reduce her rank of Principal I.
Nor does it delay her promotion. Promotion or demotion is from the rank of Principal I to that of Principal II
and vice-versa. If her transfer is a demotion prestige-wise, it should not be allowed to hamper the demands
of public service. Plaintiff is a principal of a pilot school. Her experience as such is needed in other schools.
Public service would not be enhanced if she were allowed to stay permanently in Sinalang Elementary
School.
The fact, too, that her former station is a pilot demonstration school does not give plaintiff a higher rank
than Principal I. The conversion of the Sinalang Elementary School to a pilot school involves no promotion
in rank. A principal of an ordinary school and that of a pilot school have the same qualifications. 22
We find no reason to disturb the lower court's statements on this point, viz:

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 As to plaintiff's allegation that her chance of promotion to Principal II is remote inasmuch as in
Sinalang Pilot Elementary School there are 23 teachers while in Peñarrubia Elementary School
there are only 13 teachers is not only denied by the defendant, but Circular No. 22, Series of 1960,
of the Bureau of Public Schools dated July 20, 1960, entitled "Merit and Seniority Ranking System",
Exhibit "6" (Roll of Exhibits), shows that in the selection of personnel for promotion to higher
positions several items should be considered in preparing the rank list of elementary school
principals, such as (a) educational qualifications, (b) civil service eligibility, (c) efficiency, (d)
experience and (e) educational leadership and executive ability, so that the number of teachers
under the supervision of the candidate is not a factor to be considered. Moreover, G.L. No. 77 dated
June 1, 1959, of the Director of Public Schools, Exhibit "11" (Roll of Exhibits), states that "...
Elementary school principals in schools with 25 or more teachers are classified as Elementary
School Principal II and those assigned in school with less than 25 teachers (sic) are classified as
Elementary School Principal I". 23 So that it is immaterial whether plaintiff as Elementary School Principal I should have 13 or
23 teachers under her. Consequently, plaintiff's transfer to Peñarrubia Elementary School does not in any way affect her rank as Elementary
School Principal I. It is further contended by plaintiff that her transfer in question was a demotion because it was not only motivated by
personal reasons, on account of a misunderstanding with the herein defendant, but also because her choice of station was disregarded, ...
result of which would work hardship to her family, hence, defendant's act was illegal and arbitrary... this contention defendant vehemently
denied, for if that were true, he could have ordered plaintiff's transfer to a school farther away from her home than Peñarrubia. Aside from
this, however, the evidence shows that she was not the only one who was transferred to another station but also all the other elementary
school principals, whose respective assignments were made for public interest. The fact is also clear that her transfer to Peñarrubia
Elementary School does not affect her promotion rank and salary. This fact is corroborated by the Certificate of the Record Clerk of the
Division of Abra dated July 31, 1963 to the effect that as Principal I for the year 1963-64, she will receive an annual salary, based on
WAPCO Pay Plan, the amount of P3,432.00, instead of her present salary of P3,264.00 (Exh. "5", Roll of Exhibits). In other words, there is
no demotion to speak of, since there is no reduction in her position, rank, or salary as a result of such transfer. There being no reduction in
position, rank, or salary, this Court is of the opinion that the act of the defendant in transferring the plaintiff is not disciplinary in nature. 24
5. Surely, the argument that defendant acted arbitrarily because there was no complaint filed against plaintiff
as Principal of Sinalang Elementary School and that therefore her transfer was not required by the exigency
of public service is a narrow concept of the meaning of public service. The reason put forth by defendant
that her efficiency and her experience as Principal in a pilot school would spur the improvement of small
schools is enough to justify her transfer. 25 It is in the interest of public service. 26 Her know how may be
utilized more effectively in Peñarrubia Elementary School. 27
6. In a case like the present, where appeal is pending resolution in the Supreme Court, school authorities
should be cautious in charging — before the Civil Service Commission — a school teacher with
insubordination for failure to comply with their directive, subject of appeal in an appellate court and which
was not stopped by injunction. While the interest of the service may be urged in enforcing such directive,
factors there are which should outweigh the exercise thereof whilst the court case remains unresolved.
First, plaintiff acted in good faith believing that her refusal to obey the transfer was legally defensible. She
felt that a wrong had been committed against her. Her transfer — from her post as principal teacher in a
pilot elementary school with 23 teachers in the provincial capital, Bangued, her place of residence — meant
inconvenience as well as loss of prestige. For, she was to be transferred to a small town with but only 13
teachers. In this situation, it is not so easy to erase from her mind the thinking that transfer took the form of
disciplinary action, even if, as later found, some such thoughts were misconceived. She went to court for
redress. She had faith in the administration of justice. She entertained the belief that to bow to the demands
of her superiors pending her appeal would jeopardize such appeal. This is, of course, a mistake. But again,
it is quite understandable.
And then, public officials should not give cause for suspicion on the part of their subordinates that
persecution has taken the better part of discretion. At the time the transfer here involved took place, the
superintendent's authority to transfer in the interest of the service could easily be abused. It would seem to
us, on the face of subsequent events, that such practice could have really generated low morale amongst
the teachers. That power was, in fact, reduced when Circular 18, series of 1964 — while this case was
pending appeal — was promulgated by the Director of Public Schools. That circular exacted approval by
the Director of Public Schools, prior to implementation, of any transfer plan to be made by the Division
Superintendent. 28 Then came the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, Republic Act 4670, approved
on June 18, 1966. A teacher may not now "be transferred without his consent from one station to another"
except "for cause and as herein otherwise provided". The Magna Carta enjoins that "[w]here the exigencies
of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another, such transfer may be effected
by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the
reason or reasons therefor." If the teacher believes there is "no justification for the transfer", he may appeal

Page 8 of 36
his case to the Director of Public Schools or to the Director of Vocational Education, as the case may be.
And, pending his appeal and the decision thereon, "his transfer shall be held in abeyance". 29
On top of all these is that implementation of the power to transfer, pending appeal in the appellate courts,
may bring about an undesirable conflict of opinion. Suppose by reason of an insubordination charge, a
teacher is dismissed? And then thereafter on appeal the Court pronounces judgment in favor of the teacher?
In this particular situation, it is, indeed, dangerous to allow the Commissioner of Civil Service to dip his hand
into a question that still awaits final resolution by courts of justice.
So it is, that this Court is duty-bound to nullify the decision and resolution of the Commissioner of Civil
Service first dismissing plaintiff and thereafter reducing her penalty to 10 months' suspension without pay. l awphi1.nêt

7. Finally, there is no point in ordering the Commissioner of Civil Service to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt for finding plaintiff guilty of insubordination pending her appeal before this Court.
The Commissioner's decision and resolution aforesaid came as a result of an administrative charge.
Defendant had not previously applied to this Court to inhibit the Commissioner from trying the administrative
charge pending appeal. As aforesaid, there was no injunction. There was then no court order, violation of
which could have given cause for contempt.
For the reasons given, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 359 appealed
from is affirmed; however, the June 23, 1965 decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service administratively
sentencing herein plaintiff-appellant Juliana B. Brillantes to ten (10) months' suspension from service
without pay, is hereby declared null and void.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee
and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1R.A., p. 72.

2Exhibit 6.

3Exhibits A and 2; emphasis supplied.

4Exhibit I.

5Exhibit M.

6Exhibit 4.

7Exhibit K.

8Civil Case 359, Court of First Instance of Abra, entitled "Juliana B. Brillantes, Plaintiff, versus

Mariano R. Guevarra, Defendant," for "Declaration of Nullity, Injunction and Damages." .

9Paragraph (a) (3) of Section 318 of the Service Manual (Third Revision, 1959) provides that "[t]

transfers of elementary school principals ... may be made by the division superintendent, but in
each case a report of the transfer or change in assignment should be submitted to the Director of
Public Schools immediately." Exhibit 8.
10Rollo, p. 48.

11Rollo, p. 59.

12Rollo, p. 62.

13Rollo, p. 71.

14Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause as provided by law."

15Emphasis supplied.

16Miclat vs. Ganaden, L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro vs. Valencia, L-18352, August 30, 1963.

171967B Phild. 257, 264, L-26558, April 27, 1967. Also cited in: Suarez vs. Commission on Elections,

1967C Phild. 167, 170; Co vs. Commission on Elections, 1967C Phild. 133, 135; Salazar vs.
Commission on Elections, 1967C Phild 136, 138; Real vs. Commission on Elections, 1967C Phild.
899, 901; Braganza vs. Commission on Elections, 1967C Phild. 359, 361; and Amponin vs.
Commission on Elections, 1967C Phild. 903, 904.
18Exhibit 4.

19Of February 1, 1956, Exhibit 10.

20General Letter 77 of the Director of Public Schools, June 1, 1959, Exhibit 11.

21Id.

22Tr., August 1, 1963 (Millare), pp. 78-79.

23Under the WAPCO Classification Pay Plan of February 1956 aforesaid — Exhibit 10 — principals

of elementary schools with a faculty of more than twenty-five teachers" are classified as "Elementary

Page 9 of 36
 School Principal II" and those in schools "with staff of seven to twenty-five teachers" as "Elementary
School principal I".
24R.A., pp. 49-51; Emphasis supplied.

25Tr., August 1, 1963 (Millare), p.87.

26Sec. 32, Civil Service Law, R.A. 2260.

27Miclat vs. Ganaden, supra; Jaro vs. Valencia, supra.

28Rollo, pp. 59-60.

29Section 6, Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92869 October 18, 1990
ZENAIDA ORCINO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and RUFINA B. MOTI, respondents.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioner.
Thelma S. Panganiban-Gaminde Rogelio C. Limare and
Cresencia A. Violante-Pedrosa for Civil Service Commission.
Fernando T. Collantes for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner questions the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which reversed the findings of the CSC Merit Systems Board and the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports on the validity of the private respondent's reassignment. She contends that if the CSC resolutions are
sustained, it would result in the "triumph of discourtesy and insubordination over that of order and efficiency in the performance of official duty." (Rollo,
p. 2)
On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the declaration of excess teacher in the Malvar
Elementary School, her transfer by the Division Superintendent of City Schools to another school, and other
acts of harassment constitute removal not for cause but because of personal ill-motives of the petitioner.
The comments filed by the private respondent and the Civil Service Commission are treated as answers
and the petition is decided accordingly. Significantly, the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner and
recommends that the CSC resolutions be set aside.
Rufina B. Moti was appointed "National (City) Elementary Grades Teacher" in the Division of City Schools,
Manila on September 1, 1970. Her status was "Regular (Permanent) Reappointment." The position to be
filled was "Item No. 15-702, RA 4092 (Intermediate).
The controversy which led to this case arose at the beginning of school year 1984-1985 when the student
population of Malvar Elementary School significantly decreased. Classes in the intermediate level were
reduced from eleven to ten resulting in an overall excess of one teacher. There was, however, a vacancy
in Grade IV in the primary level.
Following the "Guidelines Governing Excess Teachers", Circular No. 10, Series of 1982 of the Division of
City Schools, the 58 teachers of Malvar Elementary School were evaluated. The performance rating showed
that Rufina B. Moti ranked No. 55 with Rebecca Estrella, Elena Morelos, and Rosario Alarcon ranking Nos.
56, 57, and 58 respectively. When length of service and relative fitness were added to performance ratings,
Rufina B. Moti ranked last. She was, therefore, declared as excess teacher. When efforts to find an
acceptable position in the intermediate grades were unsuccessful, she was assigned to the Grade IV class.
Respondent Moti refused to accept the new assignment and insisted on any class provided it was in the
intermediate grades. The refusal prompted petitioner Zenaida Orcino, principal of the school, to recommend
that Ms. Moti be reassigned to another school. The then Superintendent Josefina Navarro assigned the
respondent first to Lakandula Elementary School and later, to Moises Salvador Elementary School.
Instead of complying with the order of the Division Superintendent, respondent Moti filed a protest with the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). The MECS sustained the Superintendent's order and
ruled that Ms. Moti's transfer to Moises Salvador Elementary School was justified by the facts and the law.
The respondent decided to go to the Civil Service Commission.
The CSC Merit Systems Board ruled that the reassignment of Ms. Moti to another school was in order and
dismissed her complaint. On appeal to the Commission itself, the CSC set aside the orders of the Merit
Systems Board and ordered Ms. Moti restored to her former position of Grade VI classroom teacher.
Disciplinary action against Orcino was also ordered. Hence, this petition.

Page 10 of 36
The petitioner raises the following arguments in her petition:
I
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GRAVELY ERRED IN INTRODUCING
MATTERS BELIED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
II
THE COMMISSION A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THAT APPROPRIATE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION' BE METED ON PETITIONER ZENAIDA ORCINO WHO ACTED
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER AUTHORITY AND SUSTAINED BY HER SUPERIORS.
III
THE COMMISSION A QUO REVERSIBLY ERRED IN DEPRIVING PETITIONER
ZENAIDA ORCINO THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE CHARGES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN THE LATTER'S APPEAL WITH THE COMMISSION.
IV
THE COMMISSION A QUO ERRED IN REINSTATING RUFINA MOTI DESPITE HER
PROVEN ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION AND ADAMANCE CLEARLY INIMICAL TO THE
SERVICE. (Petition, pp. 5-6)
As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies like
the CSC, giving them a certain measure of finality. However, the rule is not without clearly defined
exceptions. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals (in this case, the Civil Service Commission) are not
conclusive and may be set aside when:
xxx xxx xxx
... (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures;
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and
appellees [Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 648 {1967}]; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents [Garcia v. CA, 33 SCRA 622 {l970}]; and (9) when the finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence
on record [Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 {1970}]. (Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA
167, 172 [1974])
In Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Association - Natu v. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd.(76
SCRA 50 [1977]), we ruled that factual findings of a quasi-judicial institution which are not supported by
substantial and credible evidence do not bind this Court, e.g. the findings and conclusions have no basis in
the records or are contrary to the evidence on record or the factual determinations of an appellate body are
contrary to those of the initial fact-finding agency. (See also San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 128 SCRA 180 [1984]; Cuales v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121 SCRA 812
[1983]; Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 831 [1989]; Villamor v.
Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 574 [1988]; Ongsiako v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 627 [1987];
Metro Port Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365 [1984]; and Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v.
Metro Port Service, Inc., G.R. No. 83613, February 21, 1990)
In this particular case, both the Regional Director and the Minister of the MECS and CSC's own Merit
System's Board sustained the recommendations made by the petitioner and upheld the actions of the
Division Superintendent of City Schools. We have examined the records carefully and agree with the
Solicitor General that the questioned CSC resolutions are not supported by the evidence on record.
There can be no question that the decreased enrollment in the Malvar Elementary School led to a reduction
of classes. Faced with an excess of teachers it was the duty of the petitioner as school principal to
recommend a solution to the problem.
There is no factual basis for the CSC conclusion that the reassignment of respondent Moti to another class
or another school violated her security of tenure and the statutory restriction that any reassignment should
not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
A reassignment from Grade VI to Grade IV involves no reduction in rank, status, or salary. There is no
showing in the records that there is less honor in teaching Grades I to IV than in teaching Grades V to VI.
It is erroneous for the CSC to even intimate that an intermediate teacher is demoted when asked to teach

Page 11 of 36
a lower grade. The best teachers should welcome assignments to teach Grade One as this is where young
minds need the best guidance and inspiration from talented and dedicated mentors. In this case, the
reassignment was not only justified but also necessary.
As to whether the transfer from one school to another was disciplinary, the records show that respondent
Moti was appointed "National (City) Elementary Grades Teacher" in the Division of City Schools, Manila.
(Annex 1, Petition; Rollo, p. 88) The Solicitor General correctly observes that her appointment is without
specific station and does not specify any assignment as Grade Vl teacher. As Elementary Grades Teacher,
she could be assigned to any public elementary school in Manila and ordered to teach any Grade or subject
within her competence.
The entries in the lower half of her appointment paper, alongside and below the signature of the appointing
authority are merely informative, specifying where she would be assigned and stating some personal data.
The Solicitor General states that "these words do not constitute the appointment." (Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment, p. 16) Among them are - Position to be filled: Item No. 15-702, Page No. 303, RA 4092
(Intermediate); Authorized Salary Range 35, Authorized Salary Rate 3264 and such entries as title, place,
and date of teacher's examination, maiden name, performance rating, highest educational attainment, last
station, who recommended her, etc. (Rollo, p.88)
The respondent cannot rely on her initial assignment to fill a specific vacancy in the Intermediate Grades in
a particular school as giving her a vested right to that item. She can be assigned to any grade anywhere in
the City of Manila in the best interests of the service.
Neither can the alleged length of experience of the respondent strengthen her case. The CSC finding that
Ms. Moti taught Grade VI for 13 years is pointed out by the Solicitor General as contradicted by the
evidence. It was only in 1983-1984 or the year before her questioned transfer that she was assigned to
Grade VI-2. (Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, p. 14)
The CSC disregarded the record before it-the revised check list to determine the allotment of teachers
based on number of classes, the maximum teaching loads in specific subject areas per teacher, the number
of subject preparations, and the table on how the number of classroom and special teachers for a certain
number of pupils and grades is determined. The records show that all relevant factors were considered
when MECS and the Merit Systems Board reviewed the Superintendent's action and sustained it. (See
Original Records, pp. 48-65)
There are other findings of the CSC which are contrary to the records.
The CSC stated that there could have been no reduction of intermediate classes from eleven (11) to ten
(10) because in 1984-1985, there were still the same five sections in Grade VI. This is non-sequitur.
"Intermediate" consists of Grades V and VI, not Grade VI alone. Moreover, teachers in those grades teach
according to subject areas instead of teaching all subjects in one class of one grade. This matter was
thoroughly studied by the Division Superintendent and she was not misled on the number of classes and
teachers in the entire school before she issued the appointments and transfer orders. There is likewise
nothing arbitrary in the selection of the respondent as "excess" teacher. She ranked 58th out of 58 teachers
evaluated for performance, length of service, and relative fitness.
The CSC found something wrong in the transfer of Merly Evangelista to Malvar Elementary School and the
reassignment of a provisional substitute teacher as elementary grade teacher. It also questioned why
respondent Moti was reassigned to Grade IV and then transferred to two other schools in June and July,
1984.
The records show that when Ms. Moti became an excess teacher and pending her assignment to Grade
IV, she was asked to do office work, library work, and other assignments. There is nothing wrong in this.
She could not be twiddling her thumbs while being paid her usual salaries. She was given her choice of a
morning Grade IV class, with three other teachers yielding to her. When she refused, another teacher was
assigned to the morning class. When she also turned down the remaining afternoon class, another teacher
was appointed. Precisely, the reassignments and the appointments subject of her complaints were
prompted by the changes in school population and her stubborn refusal to obey lawful orders. A cooperative
attitude and a certain degree of flexibility are required of all who profess to be educators.
The CSC found personal motives, bias, and injustice behind the petitioner's acts. That there is bad blood
between the petitioner and the private respondent is apparent from the records. On June 27, 1984 or one
day before the petitioner recommended to Superintendent Navarro that Ms. Moti be declared an "excess
teacher", the latter filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan alleging among others that Ms. Orcino was
collecting P1.00 each from teachers who failed to sign the city share payrolls and P10. 00 each for the
purchase of an image of the Sto. Nino for the school premises. This was, however, immediately denied by

Page 12 of 36
some teachers who claimed that there were contributions for whoever was following up their payrolls at City
Hall and for the Sto. Nino, but these were purely voluntary on the teachers' initiative and Ms. Orcino had
nothing to do with them. The complaint was dismissed by the Tanodbayan on March 20, 1985 (Original
Records, pp. 4-9; pp. 93-96)
On the other hand, Ms. Orcino filed also on June 28, 1984, a complaint with the Superintendent of City
Schools against Ms. Moti charging her with non-cooperation in specified school activities, reading
newspapers during rehearsals for graduation exercises even with the Principal and Assistant Principal
around, talking and laughing during baccalaureate mass to the annoyance of the priest, refusal to submit
lesson plan and record book and to sit with the evaluators of the performance ratings and other acts of
defiance of specified school regulations. The charges were found valid and Director Modesta G. Boquiren
of the MECS National Capital Region fined Ms. Moti the equivalent of five (5) days salary. (Original Records,
pp. 38-47)
The private respondent charged Ms. Orcino with coercing and embarrassing her and telling her to stop
attending meetings of teacher associations, cease making representations for better professional and
economic benefits of teachers, avoid joining delegations to Malacanang for the upgrading of teachers'
benefits, etc.
Significantly, in all these charges and counter charges, the petitioner was sustained by the Division
Superintendent, Regional Director, Department Head, and CSC Merit Systems Board. Only the CSC arrived
at different findings without, as earlier stated, any factual basis on record for its conclusions.
At any rate, even assuming that the CSC is correct and that its findings are not based on surmises and
presumptions, there is no explanation why the petitioner, a purely recommendatory authority should be the
one penalized and disciplined while the Superintendent of City Schools who ordered the transfer and the
higher MECS authorities who did not reverse it, remain free of blame. If there was any abuse of authority
or arbitrariness, the Division Superintendent of City Schools who makes all the appointments, transfers,
and other personnel action should have been charged and not the Principal. The Superintendent could
have rejected the recommendation to transfer Ms. Moti and ordered her retention in Malvar Elementary
School and the petitioner would have been bound to obey.
As earlier stated, an appointment as "Elementary Grades Teacher" in Manila means that the teacher can
be assigned to any school in Manila. The choice of grade, subject area, primary or intermediate level,
school, and district is pure policy and the determination as to the capabilities of the teacher and the
assignment where she would be most useful are, in the absence of arbitrariness or whimsicality, best left
to the administrators concerned. In Brillantes v. Guevarra (27 SCRA 138 [1969]) this Court held that an
excellent principal in a model and centrally located school may be transferred to a struggling school in a
less attractive community to improve standards and to "spur the improvement of small schools" (at p. 149).
In other words, the interest of the service may dictate that the worst school should get the best principal.
The same principle applies to classroom teachers. No one has the vested right to balk at difficult
assignments ordered for the best interests of the service. There would be nothing disciplinary in this and
other transfers.
Because of the bad blood existing between Ms. Moti and Ms. Orcino, the Division Superintendent of schools
had to choose between transferring one or the other. Since Ms. Moti was clearly at fault, Superintendent
Navarro exercised her sound discretion in reassigning the private respondent to another school. We see
no error, much less grave abuse of discretion in her choice.
Our ruling in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 637, 652-654 [1970]) on transfers that are valid and which do
not amount to removal squarely applies:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Concededly transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfer's
can be effected without the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hearing, and
even without the consent of the employee.
The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." were the
appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or
reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary.
Thus, one who is appointed principal in the Bureau of Public Schools and is designated to
head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal of another school.
And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies
only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule
does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head

Page 13 of 36
 of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the
service of the agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel
management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service
cannot be objected to. Neither does illegality attach to the transfer or reassignment of an
officer pending the determination of an administrative charge against him, or to the transfer
of an employee from his assigned station to the main office, effected in good faith and in
the interest of the service pursuant to Section 32 of the Civil Service Act.
And even assuming that Ms. Moti was not at fault, it is not what pleases her but the best interests of the
service which form the primary criterion. In labor cases where relations between an employee and his
employer are so strained or where an employee would no longer be useful because his employer has lost
trust and confidence in him, this Court has ordered full backwages plus separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement even where the employee was eventually cleared of the charges. Paramount are the
continued health and best interests of the company and all its other employees. (Bautista v. Inciong, 158
SCRA 665 [1988]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]; Quezon Electric
Cooperative v. National Labor Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 88 [1989]; Philippine Associated Smelting
and Refining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 174 SCRA 550 [1989]; and Citytrust Finance
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 157 SCRA 87 [1988]).
The CSC should adopt the reasons behind the above policy when considering the setting aside of
reassignment or transfer orders. Where the discipline and morale of a teaching force, the peace and quiet
essential to the learning process, the welfare of the student body, and the educational standards of a school
require that unseemly wranglings and squabbles should be abated, remedial acts such as those questioned
in this case should be sustained.
It is not the welfare of the parties alone which is considered when disciplinary action involving classroom
teachers or school principals is taken. The school children, their parents, other teachers, the community
and nation are all affected by what goes on in a school. Their interlocking interests dictate that prudence
and caution should be exercised when nullifying remedial transfers and other corrective actions. Except
when there is strong showing of willful and arbitrary conduct, the school administrators deserve all the
assistance they can get in maintaining discipline in their schools and solving the problems of education.
There is no showing of arbitrary or ill-motivated conduct in this case. The resolutions of the respondent
CSC are, therefore, tainted by grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned RESOLUTIONS of the Civil Service
Commission are SET ASIDE. The private respondent's COMPLAINT is DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated August 7, 1990 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

THE SUPERINTENDENT G.R. No. 166435

OF CITY SCHOOLS FOR
MANILA, ESTHER JUANINO,
MA. LUISA QUIONES and
SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
v e r s u s CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
MA. GRACIA AZARCON,

Page 14 of 36
and MELINDA AONUEVO,
Respondents. Promulgated:

February 11, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 40848 and its resolution[3]denying reconsideration.

Respondents Ma. Gracia Azarcon and Melinda Anouevo, public school teachers
assigned at General M. Hizon Elementary School (GMHES) in Tondo, Manila, joined
the unauthorized mass action of public school teachers held from September 17 to 19,
1990.

On September 20, 1990, then Department of Education, Culture and Sports

(DECS)[4] Secretary Isidro Cario filed various charges[5] against those teachers who
participated in the aforementioned mass action. Respondents were among those charged
and placed under preventive suspension.[6] They were later found guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and were consequently dismissed.[7]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed their dismissal to the Merit System Protection Board
(MSPB) which, however, dismissed their appeal for lack of merit.[8]
Respondents elevated the MSPB decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In its
August 3, 1993 resolution,[9] the CSC agreed that respondents acted without due regard
to the adverse consequences of their actions which necessarily resulted in the suspension
and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice of the students.[10] It, however, modified the
penalty to six months suspension without pay. The CSC took into consideration the
period of time respondents were out of work and ordered their automatic reinstatement
to their former positions without back salaries.[11]

On the strength of the October 3, 1993 CSC resolution, respondents requested petitioner
Dr. Erlinda G. Lolarga, superintendent of city schools for Manila (superintendent), to
reinstate them at GMHES.[12]

On November 22, 1993, petitioner superintendent informed her co-petitioner Ma. Luisa
Quinoes, GMHES principal, that respondents [could] no longer be assigned any teaching

Page 15 of 36
loads because all teaching positions in GMHES [had] been filled.[13] For this reason,
respondent Azarcon was assigned to A. Lacson Elementary School (ALES)[14] while
respondent Anouevo was transferred to Plaridel Elementary School (PES).[15] Despite
their respective transfers, respondents retained their permanent status and grade/subject
assignment.[16]

However, respondents refused to accept their new assignments. They instead moved for
the implementation of the August 3, 1993 CSC resolution in the CSC. They also insisted
on reporting at GMHES while their motion was pending.[17] Since respondent Azarcon
did not report to her new station, petitioner Esther Juanino, ALES principal, considered
her absent without official leave beginning December 16, 1993.[18]

On January 18, 1994, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with
damages and application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO)[19] against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155.[20] The RTC issued a TRO on January 21,
1994.[21] After hearing, however, it denied respondents' application for a writ of
preliminary injunction in an order dated February 15, 1994.[22] Respondents moved for
the reconsideration of that order.

On October 20, 1994, the CSC, acting on respondents' motion for implementation,
ordered the immediate reinstatement of respondents as teachers at GMHES.[23] It ordered
Director Nilo P. Rosas of the DECS National Capital Region, the schools superintendent
of Manila and the GMHES principal to reinstate respondents at GMHES without
prejudice to any future assignment to other schools should the exigencies of the service
so require.[24]

Petitioner superintendent informed the CSC that, although respondents had been
reinstated as public school teachers, there was, however, no vacancy in GMHES. Thus,
they were assigned to schools that lacked teachers (ALES and PES respectively). In
consideration of these facts, the superintendent inquired if the October 20, 1994 CSC
resolution had been substantially complied with.[25]

On November 20, 1995, the CSC, through commissioner Thelma Gaminde, responded
to the superintendent's query. It opined that because respondents had been receiving their
salaries since November 30, 1993, they were deemed reinstated and were presumed to
have been discharging their functions as teachers.[26]

Consequently, on February 28, 1996, the RTC denied respondents' motion for
reconsideration (of its February 15, 1994 order). According to the trial court, the
November 20, 1995 CSC letter rendered respondents' motion moot and academic.[27]

Page 16 of 36
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the February 15,
1994 and February 28, 1996 orders of the RTC.[28]

On June 17, 2004, the appellate court granted respondents' petition. It found that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. The October 20, 1994
CSC resolution unequivocally ordered the reinstatement of respondents at
GMHES.[29] Thus, they should first be reinstated at GMHES before they could be
transferred to another station.[30] Accordingly, the CA granted respondents' petition. It
set aside the February 15, 1994 and February 28, 1996 orders of the RTC and ordered
the reinstatement of respondents to their former positions in GMHES without prejudice
to any future reassignment to other schools as may be directed according to the policies
and rules of the DECS.[31]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied. Thus, this petition.

Petitioners assert that they substantially complied with the October 20, 1994 CSC
resolution when they reinstated respondents as public school teachers albeit in different
stations.[32] The nature of respondents' appointments allowed reassignment to any station
within the City of Manila.[33]

We agree with petitioners.

Section 6 of The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (RA 4670) provides:
Section 6. Consent for Transfer-- Transportation Expenses. Except for cause and as
herein otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one
station to another.

Where the exigencies of service require the transfer of a teacher from one station
to another, such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall
previously notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons
therefor. If the teacher believes there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal
his case to the Director of Public Schools or the Director of Vocational Education, as the
case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon, his transfer shall be held in
abeyance; Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be made three months
before any national or local elections.

Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the
Government if his transfer is finally approved. (emphasis supplied)

For a transfer or reassignment of a public school teacher to be valid, the following

requisites must be satisfied:
1. the transfer or reassignment was undertaken pursuant to the exigencies of
service;

Page 17 of 36
 2. the school superintendent previously notified the teacher concerned of his/her
transfer or reassignment;

3. the teacher concerned was informed of the reason or reasons for his/her transfer
and

4. that the transfer was not made three months before a national or local election.

With regard to the first requisite, in Department of Education v. CA,[34] we held that the
appointment of teachers does not refer to any particular station or school.[35] They are
not entitled to stay permanently in one station[36] because their assignments are subject
to the exigencies of the service.

The exigencies of the service, as mentioned in Section 6 of RA 4670, should be viewed

in the light of Section 1, Article XIV of the Constitution which provides:

Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible
to all.

The accessibility of quality education determines the exigencies of the service. Thus,
assignments undertaken for purposes of improving the educational system and/or
making education more accessible are valid.

In this instance, respondents' six-month suspension meant that their students would have
had no teachers for the duration of their suspension.Hence, other teachers had to be
assigned to take over.[37] When respondents requested their reinstatement in the last
quarter of 1993 (which was the middle of the school year),[38] there was in truth no
vacancy in GMHES.
Because there was no vacancy in GMHES, respondents were reinstated as public school
teachers but were assigned to schools where there were vacancies (particularly ALES
and PES). Petitioners therefore not only implemented the October 20, 1994 CSC
resolution but also addressed the lack of teachers in ALES and PES. Petitioners' solution
was correct, commonsensical, valid and constitutional. Their collective acts were geared
towards ensuring the accessibility of quality education to the pupils concerned.

On the second and third requisites, because respondents were able to extensively and
exhaustively question the legality of their transfers, they were clearly apprised not only
of their respective transfers but also the reasons therefor.

Page 18 of 36
With regard the fourth requisite, respondents were effectively transferred on November
22, 1994.[39] The nearest national elections to that date were on May 11, 1992 and May
8, 1995 while the most proximate local election was on May 9, 1994. Respondents were
clearly not transferred within three months before any national or local election.

All things considered, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
February 15, 1994 and February 28, 1996 orders. The October 20, 1994 CSC resolution
qualifiedly ordered respondents' reinstatement at GMHES[40] (i.e., without prejudice to
future reassignment as the exigencies of the service may require[41]). Thus, respondents'
reinstatement as public school teachers, despite the change of station, substantially
complied with the October 20, 1994 CSC resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 2004 decision and
November 22, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40848
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 15, 1994 and February
28, 1996 orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155
are REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Page 19 of 36
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (deceased) and concurred by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis (retired) and Mariano C. del Castillo of the Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals. Dated June
17, 2004. Rollo, pp. 49-59.
[3]
Dated November 22, 2004. Id., pp. 61-63.
[4]
Now Department of Education (or Dep-Ed).
[5]
Rollo, pp. 17, 64-65. The September 20, 1990 memorandum provided:

This OFFICE has found on the basis of the report of the Principal that a prima facie case exists against you for grave
misconduct, neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service law[s] and rules or reasonable office regulations,
refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service [and] absence without leave committed as follows:
1. Joining unauthorized mass actions without filing requisite leave of absence for the period of September 17-
19, 1990.
2. Ignoring report-to-work directives issued by superior officers.
3. Unjustified abandonment of teaching posts without securing prior permission or approval from the proper
authorities for the period September 17-19, 1990.
4. Non-observance of Civil Service laws and implementing rules and regulations.
5. Non-compliance with reasonable office rules and regulations.
6. Incurring unauthorized absences without approved leave.
7. Other violations similar to the above. (emphasis provided)
[6]
Id., p. 65.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id., p. 66.
[9]
CSC Resolution No. 93-2898 signed by CSC chairperson Patricia Sto. Tomas and commissioners Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr.
and Thelma P. Gaminde. Id., pp. 64-66.
[10]
Id., p. 66.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Letters dated October 19, 1993. The letters were sent to the office of petitioner Ma. Luisa Quinoes, GMHES principal.
Quinoes forwarded the letter to the superintendent of city schools in Manila. Id., pp. 67-68.
[13] st
1 indorsement of the division of city schools. Id., p. 70.
[14]
Id., p. 72.
[15]
Id., p. 71.
[16]
Id., pp. 71-72.
[17]
Letter dated November 26, 1993. Id., p. 73.
[18]
Letter dated December 21, 1993. Id., p. 74.
[19]
Docketed as SCA No. 560.
[20]
Rollo, p. 22.
[21]
Id., p. 23.
[22]
Order dated February 15, 1994. Penned by Judge Fernando L. Gerona, Jr. Id., pp. 76-79.
[23]
Resolution No. 94-5725 signed by CSC chairperson Patricia Sto. Tomas and Commissioners Ramon P. Ereeta, Jr. and
Thelma P. Gaminde. Id., pp. 84-85.

Page 20 of 36
[24]
Id., p. 85.
[25]
Id., p. 55.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Penned by Judge Luis R. Tongco. Dated February 28, 1996. Id., pp. 86-87.
Petitioners' certificate of non-forum shopping made no mention of what happened to the petition for prohibition and
mandamus respondents filed in the RTC.
[28]
Id., p. 49.
[29]
Id., p. 58.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Id., pp. 58-59.
[32]
Id., pp. 29-34.
[33]
Id., pp. 34-43.
[34]
G.R. No. 81032, 22 March 1990, 183 SCRA 555.
[35]
Id., p. 562.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Supra notes 7 and 8. Note that the original penalty imposed (by the DECS and affirmed by the MSPB) on respondents
was dismissal from service. Thus, they were out of service for more than six months.
[38]
Note that CSC Resolution No. 93-2898 was issued on August 3, 1993 and that respondents asked petitioners for their
reinstatement on October 19, 1993.
[39]
Supra note 13.
[40]
Id., p. 55.
[41]
Id.

EN BANC

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION G.R. No. 179255

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
VENUSTO D. HAMOY, JR., NACHURA,
Respondent. LEONARDO DE CASTRO, and
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Page 21 of 36
Promulgated:

April 2, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

This treats of the petition for review of the decision[1] and resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 May 2007 and 7 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 96837
entitled, Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr. v. National Transmission Corporation & Civil Service
Commission, ordering the immediate return of Venusto Hamoy, Jr. to his original
position as Vice-President for VisMin Operations & Maintenance.

The antecedents follow.

The National Transmission Corporation (petitioner), through Resolution No. TC
2003-007[3] dated 5 February 2003, appointed Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr. (respondent) as
Vice President under Item No. 700010-CY2003 VisMin Operations & Maintenance.
Accordingly, petitioners President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Alan Ortiz (Ortiz)
issued on 1 March 2003 Civil Service Commission (CSC) Form No. 33 which states that
respondent has been appointed (VICE-PRESIDENT JG-18) VICE-PRESIDENT SG-28 with
PERMANENT (status) at the National Transmission Corporation.[4] Respondent assumed
his duties on 1 March 2003.

On 19 January 2004, Ortiz issued Office Order No. 2004-173 detailing respondent
to petitioners Power Center-Diliman, under the Office of the President and CEO, to
handle Special Projects.[5] Office Order No. 2004-173 was later amended by Office
Order No. 2004-1229[6] under which Ortiz assigned respondent additional duties of
providing over-all supervision, monitoring and control of all activities related to the sale
of petitioners sub-transmission assets and placed under his supervision certain
personnel of the Sub-Transmission Divestment Department.

In a memorandum dated 24 January 2005 from petitioners Human Resources

Department, respondent was notified of the impending expiration of the temporary
appointment of some of petitioners key officials and the fact that he was being
considered for one of the positions to be vacated.[7] Yet on 15 February 2005, Office
Order No. 2005-0256 was issued designating respondent as Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of

Page 22 of 36
the Power Systems Reliability Group (PSRG), concurrent with his duties as Vice
President for Special Projects.[8]

On 16 February 2005, respondent wrote Ortiz, asking that he be returned to his original
assignment as Vice President of VisMin Operations & Maintenance. He reasoned that
his detail under Office Orders No. 2004-173 and No. 2004-1229 already exceeded one
(1) year, and that his designation under Office Order No. 2005-0256 violated Section 2
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 2002 because he did not give his consent
thereto.[9]However, on the same date, Office Order No. 2005-0284 was issued
superseding Office Order No. 2004-173 and amending Office Order No. 2005-0256, the

latter order stating that respondent was designated as OIC of the Power Systems
Reliability Group (PSRG).[10]Respondent was thus constrained to write another letter to
Ortiz, requesting reconsideration of Office Order No. 2005-0284 and reiterating the
reasons he cited in his previous letter.[11]

On 1 March 2005, Ortiz issued a memorandum informing respondent that his detail to
the Presidents Office was no longer in effect and, in view of the vacancy created by the
expiration of the temporary appointment of the Vice President of the PSRG,
respondent was designated as its OIC. He further stated that the matter of
reassignment would be formally raised at the Board meeting and, should the Board
confirm it, a corresponding Office Order would be issued reassigning respondent as
head of the PSRG.[12] On 27 April 2005, the Board issued Resolution No. TC 2005-
018,[13] approving and confirming respondents reassignment to PSRG, and announcing
the opening of selection for the position of Vice President for VisMin Operations
& Maintenance.

Respondent appealed to the CSC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. TC
2005-018 and Office Order No. 2005-0284 on the ground that the reassignment
violated his security of tenure. [14]

In Resolution No. 061030 dated 8 June 2006,[15] the CSC denied respondents appeal. It
found that respondent failed to show that his reassignment was tainted with abuse of
discretion. According to the CSC, the position to which respondent was appointed was
classified as a third-level position, which was not station-specific, and thus he could be
reassigned or transferred from one organizational unit to another
within the same agency, without violating his right to security of

Page 23 of 36
tenure.[16] Moreover, the CSC ruled that his detail did not exceed the one-year period,
as it was superseded initially by his reassignment; and that his designation and
reassignment had both been done to meet the needs of the company, without making
him suffer reduction in salary status and rank.Respondent sought reconsideration of
the decision, but his motion was denied by the CSC through Resolution No. 061840
promulgated on 16 October 2006.[17]

Respondent brought the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) which disagreed with the
findings of the CSC.Citing the Administrative Code,[18] Home Insurance Guaranty
Corporation v. Civil Service Commission,[19]and Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service
Commission,[20] the Court of Appeals held that only presidential appointees belong to
the third-level or career executive service. Thus, respondent, having been appointed by
petitioners president and not the President of the Philippines, occupies a second- level
position only.[21] The appellate court also ruled that respondents position was station-
specific, despite the absence of a place of assignment in CSC Form No. 33, since the said
form specifically referred to petitioners Board Resolution No. TC 2003-2007, which
indicated that his appointment is to the position of Vice President under Item No.
700010-VisMin Operations & Maintenance. The position of respondent being station-
specific, his reassignment could not exceed one (1) year per Memorandum Circular No.
2.[22]

The Court of Appeals also discussed the various personnel movements effected on
respondent. Thus, when he reported to his new assignment as Vice President of Special
Projects per Office Order No. 2004-173, as amended by Office Order No. 2004-1229,
such movement was a reassignment and not a mere detail, since there was a movement
from one organizational unit to another within the same department or agency; that is,
from his station at the office of the Vice President VisMin Operations & Maintenance
to the Office of the President and CEO. Respondent remained in his place of
reassignment beyond 16 February 2005 because he was designated additional duties,
virtually extending his reassignment beyond the one-year period. The third personnel
movement on 16 February 2005, as OIC of the PSRG, was also a nullity because it
extended further his original reassignment, and worse, the appointment was made
despite respondents vigorous objection, said the Court of Appeals.[23] Finally, it
concluded that while respondents position, rank and salary had remained unchanged
throughout the said movements, he suffered much financial deprivation, considering
that he had to spend for his own travel expenses to Cebu City to be with his family.[24]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on 7 August
2007 for lack of merit.[25]

Page 24 of 36
Before this Court, petitioner imputes the following errors to the Court of Appeals, thus:

a. in classifying the position held by Hamoy, Jr. as TransCo Vice President as a mere second
level and not a third level position;

b. in declaring that presidential appointment is a requirement for a position to be classified

as belonging to the third level thus disregarding the clear provisions of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 21, series of 1994 and prevailing jurisprudence;

c. in holding that Hamoy, Jr. was appointed to a station-specific position;

d. in classifying the first movement of Hamoy from his original assignment in the VisMin
Operations and Maintenance to the office of the president as a reassignment and not a
detail;

e. in declaring that Hamoys reassignment was not made in accordance with civil service
laws, rules, and regulations.[26]

On the other hand, respondent maintains that he was appointed to a second-

level position and, thus, he is not under the Career Executive Service (CES). He adds that
he was, in fact, appointed to a station-specific position. Moreover, he claims that his
reassignments were made in violation of the rules and constitute constructive
dismissal.[27]

The petition has no merit.

In arguing that respondent belongs to the CES, petitioner invokes Memorandum
Circular No. 21, which reads in part:

1. Positions covered by the Career Executive Service

(a) x x x

(b) In addition to the above identified positions and other positions of the same category which
had been previously classified and included in the CES, all other third level positions of
equivalent category in all branches and instrumentalities of the national government,
including government owned and controlled corporations withoriginal charters are
embraced within the Career Executive Service provided that they meet the following
criteria:

1. the position is a career position;

2. the position is above division chief level;
3. the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and
managerial functions.

Page 25 of 36
 Petitioner also cites Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO)[28] and Erasmo v. Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation[29] to show that a
presidential appointment is not required before a position in a government
corporation is classified as included in the CES. [30] We are not convinced.

The Administrative Code specifies the positions in the Civil Service as follows:

Section 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service.( 1) Classes of positions in the career
service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as
follows:

(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which
involve non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory
capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief levels; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.[31]

Positions in the CES under the Administrative Code include those

of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
the President.[32] Simply put, third-level positions in the Civil Service are only those
belonging to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the President of
the Philippines. This was the same ruling handed down by the Court in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission,[33] wherein the Court declared that the CES
covers presidential appointees only.

In the said case, the CSC disapproved the Office of the Ombudsmans (OMBs)
request for approval of the proposed qualification standards for the Director II position
in the Central Administrative Service and Finance Management Service. The OMB
proposed that said position required Career Service Professional/Relevant Eligibility for
Second Level position. According to the CSC, the Director II position belonged to third-
level eligibility and is thus covered by the Career Executive Service. Settling the issue,
this Court ruled thus:

Page 26 of 36
 Thus, the CES covers presidential appointees only. As this Court ruled in Office of the
Ombudsman v. CSC:

From the above-quoted provision of the Administrative Code, persons

occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. xxx (emphasis
supplied)

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person
occupying the Position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by
the President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he need to possess CES
eligibility.[34]

Respondent was appointed Vice-President of VisMin Operations & Maintenance

by Transco President and CEO Alan Ortiz, and not by the President of the Republic. On
this basis alone, respondent cannot be considered as part of the CES.

Caringal and Erasmo cited by petitioner are not in point. There, the Court ruled that
appointees to CES positions who do not possess the required CES eligibility do not enjoy
security of tenure. More importantly, far from holding that presidential appointment is
not required of a position to be included in the CES, we learn from Caringal that the
appointment by the President completes the attainment of the CES rank, thus:

Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by
the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES
rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the recommendation of the
Board. This process completes the officials membership in the CES and most importantly,
confers on him security of tenure in the CES.

To classify other positions not included in the above enumeration as covered by the CES
and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of
tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either in (1) vesting
the appointing power for non- CES positions in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or
(2) including in the CES a position not held by presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code[35]

Interestingly, on 9 April 2008, CSC Acting Chairman Cesar D. Buenaflor

issued Office Memorandum No. 27, s. 2008, which states in part:

For years, the Commission has promulgated several policies and issuances identifying
positions in the Career Service above Division Chief Level performing executive and managerial
functions as belonging to the Third Level covered by the Career Executive Service (CES) and

Page 27 of 36
 those outside the CES, thus, requiring third level eligibility for purposes of permanent
appointment and security of tenure.

However, the issue as to whether a particular position belongs to the Third Level has
been settled by jurisprudence enshrined in Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 95450 dated March 19, 1993 and Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
v. Civil Service Commission; G.R. No. 162215 dated July 30, 2007, where the Honorable Supreme
Court ruled citing the provision of Section 7(3) Chapter 2, Title I-A, Book V of Administrative
Code of 1987, that the Third Level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service
(CES). Positions in the Career Executive Service consists of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board (CESB), all of whom are appointed by the President. To classify other
positions not included in the above enumeration as covered by the CES and require appointees
thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to
unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either: in (1) vesting the appointing
power for non-CES positions in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or, (2) including in
the CES a position not held by presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

xxx

While the above-cited ruling of the Supreme Court refer to particular positions in the
OMB and HIGC, it is clear, however, that the intention was to make the doctrine enunciated
therein applicable to similar and comparable positions in the bureaucracy. To reiterate, the
Third Level covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative Code of
1987 and those identified by the CESB as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Consequently, the doctrine enshrined in these Supreme Court
decisions has ipso facto nullified all resolutions, qualification standards, pronouncements
and/or issuances of the Commission insofar as the requirement if third level eligibility to non-
CES positions is concerned.

In view thereof, OM No. 6, series of 2008 and all other issuances of the Commission
inconsistent with the afore-stated law and jurisprudence are likewise deemed repealed,
superseded and abandoned. x x x[36](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioner can no longer invoke Section 1(b) of Memorandum Circular (MC) No.
21, it being inconsistent with the afore-quoted Office Memorandum and thus deemed
repealed by no less than the CSC itself.

Having settled the nature of respondents position, we now determine the validity
of respondents reassignment from Vice President for VisMin Operations &
Maintenance to Vice President of Special Projects under Office Order No. 2004-173, as
amended by Office Order No. 2004-1229.

Page 28 of 36
The Revised Rules on Reassignment[37] provides in part:
Sec. 6. x x x. Reassignment shall be governed by the following rules:

1. These rules shall apply only to employees appointed to first and second level positions in
the career and non-career services. Reassignment of third level appointees is governed by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1.

2. Personnel movements involving transfer or detail should not confused with reassignment
since they are governed by separate rules.

3. Reassignment of employees with station-specific place of work indicated in their respective

appointments shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one (1) year. An appointment is
considered station-specific when the particular office or station where the position is located
is specifically indicated on the face of the appointment paper. Station-specific appointment
does not refer to a specified plantilla item number since it is used for purposes of identifying
the particular position to be filled or occupied by the employee.

4. If appointment is not station-specific, the one-year maximum shall not apply. Thus,
reassignment of employees whose appointments do not specifically indicate the particular
office or place of work has no definite period unless otherwise revoked or recalled by the Head
of Agency, the Civil Service Commission or a competent court.

5. If an appointment is not station-specific, reassignment to an organizational unit within the

same building or from one building to another or contiguous to each other in one work area or
compound is allowed. Organizational unit refers to sections, divisions, and departments within
an organization.

6. Reassignment outside geographical location if with consent shall have no limit. However, if
it is without consent, reassignment shall be for one (1) year only. Reassignment outside of
geographical location may be from one Regional Office (RO) to another RO or from the RO to
the Central Office (CO) and vice-versa.

7. Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest of public service unless
proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive dismissal x x x

a) Reassignment of an employee to perform duties and responsibilities inconsistent

with the duties and responsibilities of his/her position such as from a position of
dignity to a more servile or menial job;

b) Reassignment to an office not in the existing organizational structure;

c) Reassignment to an existing office but the employee is not given any definite duties
and responsibilities;

d) Reassignment that will cause significant financial dislocation or will cause difficulty
or hardship on the part of the employee because of geographical location; and

Page 29 of 36
 e) Reassignment that is done indiscriminately or whimsically because the law is not
intended as a convenient shield for the appointing/disciplining authority to harass
or oppress a subordinate on the pretext of advancing and promoting public
interest.[38] [Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner claims that respondent was not appointed to a station-specific

position because his appointment paper, CS Form No. 33, does not indicate any specific
work station.[39] This being the case, he is entitled to security of tenure with
respect only to the position of Vice President, and he may be reassigned from his
original assignment in the VisMin Operations & Maintenance to his new assignment in
the Power Systems Reliability Group.[40] On the other hand, the Court of Appeals,
relying on Board Resolution No. TC 2003-2007, which indicated that respondents
appointment was to the position of Vice President under Item No. 700010-VisMin
Operations and Maintenance, held that his appointment was station-specific.[41]
We do not agree with petitioner. It is not disputed that an appointment is considered
station-specific when the particular office or station where the position is located is
specifically indicated on the face of the letter of appointment (Form No. 33). In this
case, the letter of appointment itself makes specific reference to a Board Resolution,
by virtue of which respondent was appointed as Vice President for VisMin Operations
and Maintenance, thereby rendering the Board Resolution an integral part of the letter
of appointment. The letter of appointment states:

Republika ng Pilipinas
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION
Diliman, Lungsod ng Quezon

MR. VENUSTO D. HAMOY, JR.

National Transmission Corporation
Diliman, Quezon City

MR. HAMOY:

Kayo ay nahirang na (VICE PRESIDENT JG-18) (VICE PRESIDENT SG-28) na may katayuang
PERMANENT sa Pambansang Korporasyon sa Transmisyon sa pasahod na EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY
SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS ( P856,320) piso. Ito ay magkakabisa sa petsa
ng pagganap ng tungkulin subalit di aaga sa petsa ng pagpirma ng puno ng tanggapan o
appointing authority.

Page 30 of 36
 Ang appointment na ito ay REEMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO TRANSCO BOARD RES. NO. 2003-
07 DATED 2/5/03 bilang kapalit ni N/A na N/A at ayon sa Plantilya Item Blg. 7000010 CY2003,
Pahina ______.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
Sumasainyo,

ALAN T. ORTIZ, Ph.D.

President & CEO Puno ng Tanggapan

MAR 01 2003
Petsa ng Pagpirma

The pertinent portions of Board Resolution No. TC 2003-007 read, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. TC 2003-007

xxx

WHEREAS, after careful evaluation and deliberation of the qualifications of the applicants
consistent with the Boards Guidelines, the following executives are hereby appointed as
follows:

a) x x x

xxx

j). Item No. 700010-VisMin Operations &Maintenance-

Mr. Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr.

APPROVED AND CONFIRMED, February 5, 2003.[43] (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, it is clear from the filled-up Form No. 33 or the letter of
appointment that the appointment was issued pursuant to Board Resolution No. TC
2003-007. The appointment papers explicit reference to the Board Resolution, which in
turn cited Item No. 700010-VisMin Operations & Maintenance, indicated that
respondents work station was the VisMin Operations & Maintenance. As VisMin stands
for the Visayas-Mindanao, the Vice-President for VisMin Operations, who is
respondent, necessarily has to hold office in Cebu where petitioner has offices for its
Visayas-Mindanao Operations.

Having been appointed to a station-specific position, whatever reassignment may be

extended to respondent cannot exceed one year.

Page 31 of 36
A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another
in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. A detail, on the other hand,
is a movement from one agency to another.[44] Respondentsmovement from the Office
of the Vice-President Vis-Min Operations & Management in January of 2004 to the
Office of the President and CEO in Diliman, Quezon City to handle Special
Projects on 16 February 2004 was a reassignment, as he was moved from one
department to another within the same agency. Necessarily therefore,

such movement should last only until 16 February 2005, or one year thereafter.
However, respondent was designated additional duties on 16 February 2005, which
further extended his stay in the Diliman office. When respondent was designated as
OIC of the PSRG, his reassignment was extended once more. In addition, the
reassignments were made without his consent, nay, despite his objections. These
personnel movements are clear violations of the Revised Rules.

All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 May 2007 and 7 August 2007, respectively, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Page 32 of 36
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Page 33 of 36
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 51-73; Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with the concurrence of Associate Justice
Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[2]
Id. at 75-76.
[3]
Id. at 77-78.

Page 34 of 36
 [4]
Id. at 79.
[5]
Id. at 81.
[6]
Id. at 82.
[7]
Id. at 426.
[8]
Id. at 84.
[9]
Id. at 85-86.
[10]
Id. at 83.
[11]
Id. at 87-88.
[12]
Id. at 89-90.
[13]
Id. at 93-94.
[14]
Id. at 95-97.
[15]
Id. at 150-178.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 199-207.

[18]
Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title I (Subtitle A), Chapter 2
[19]
G.R. No. 95450, 19 March 1993, 220 SCRA 148.
[20]
G.R. No. 159940, 16 February 2002.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 60-63.

[22]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Memorandum Circular No. 2 ( MC No. 2), which provides rules on appointment
and other personnel actions,and covers employees appointed to first and second level position in the career and non-
career service, provides a one (1) year restriction on reassignment outside the geographical location if without the consent
of the employee.

[23]
Rollo, p. 69.
[24]
Id. at 70-71.
[25]
Supra note 2.
[26]
Id. at 13-14.
[27]
Id. at 396-423; Comment dated 3 October 2007.
[28]
G.R. No. 161942, 13 October 2005, 472 SCRA 577.
[29]
436 Phil. 689 (2002).
[30]
Rollo, pp. 19-22.

Page 35 of 36
 [31]
Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title 1 (Subtitle A), Chapter 2, Sec. 8.
[32]
Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title I (Subtitle A), Chapter 2, Sec. 7(3).
[33]
G.R. No. 162215, 30 July 2007, 528 SCRA 535.
[34]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 162215, 30 July 2007, 528 SCRA 535,542.
[35]
Carignal v. Philippine charity Sweepstakes Office, supra note 28 at 584, citing the Rules and Regulations of the
CES Board.
[36]
Civil Service Commission Office Memorandum No. 27 (2008)
[37]
REVISED RULES ON REASSIGNMENT, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 04-1458,
dated 23 December 2004

[38]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NO. 04-1458 (2004), Sec. 6.
[39]
Rollo, pp. .21-22.
[40]
Id. at 23.
[41]
Id. at 67.
[42]
Id. at 79.
[43]
Id. at 77-78.
[44]
Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book V. Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter V, Section 26(6) and (7).

Page 36 of 36