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AirDefenceSystemDefensiveAids

TechnicalReportAPA­TR­2009­0604

byDrCarloKopp,AFAIAA,SMIEEE,PEng

June2009

UpdatedApril,2012

Text,LineArt©2009­2012CarloKopp

June2009 UpdatedApril,2012 Text,LineArt©2009­2012CarloKopp

Whilemobilityhasbecome,sincethe1980s,theprincipaldefenceemployedbySurfacetoAirMissilebatteriesto

evadeattack,defensiveaidsarebeingdeployedincreasinglyasstandalonecomponentsoraspartofintegrated

defensivepackagesonradarsandotherkeyIADScomponents.DeployedS­300PMU/SA­10C5P85SUsmartTELof

theSlovakianArmy(Image©MiroslavGyűrösi).

theSlovakianArmy(Image©MiroslavGyűrösi). Introduction DefensiveAidsforIADSComponents RWE­1MissileA

Introduction

Introduction

The1990swereaperiodofimportantchangesinhowRussiandesignersandtechnological

strategistsviewedtheproblemofairdefence.Whilemobilityemergedasadesignissueduring

the1980s,astheSovietPVOmovedfromstaticsemi­mobileSAMbatteriestofullymobile

batterieswiththedeploymentoftheS­300PS/PMSA­10B/CGrumble,theintroductionofmore

comprehensive defensive aids for air defence system components became a priority after DesertStorm.

The1999AlliedForceaircampaignwasapivotalevent.Serbian9M9Kvadrat/SA­6Gainful

SAMbatterieslargelyevadeddestructionbyuseofdisciplinedshoot­and­scoottactics,andthe

SerbiansclaimedthatmanyAGM­88HARManti­radiationmissileswereseducedbyemitting

decoys.

CurrentRussianthinking,emulatedcloselybytheChinesePLA,istoconstructairdefence

systemswithcomprehensivedefencestomaximisethesurvivabilityofallsystemcomponents.

Thistechnologicalstrategyiscentredinseveralkeyideas:

1.Maximum mobility for all IADS components, encompassing not only missile battery engagement radars and TEL vehicles, but also battery and sector acquisition and surveillanceradarsandpassivesensors. 2.Active defence of high value IADS components such as radars by the deployment of

missilefamily,andthePaveway,JDAM,JSOWandSDBfamiliesofweapons.

3.Deploymentofdedicatedmobilecounter­ISRElectronicCounterMeasuresequipmentsuch

astheSPN­2/3/4andSPN­30/40systems,todefeathighresolutionmultimoderadarsin

combataircraft.

4.DeploymentofoftencomprehensivedefensiveaidssuitesonradarsorwithSAMbatteries,

tofrustrateterminalseekersinPGMsaswellasISRsystemsusedtotargetsuchPGMs.

Defensiveaids,whetheroperatedindividuallyoraspartofasuite,usuallycompriseamixof decoys, camouflage, and specific countermeasures intended to disrupt or degrade the operationofspecificcategoriesofsensororguidedweaponterminalseeker.

Abroadarrayofproductsisnowonoffer,someasstandalonecomponentslistedincatalogues,

andsomeaspartofexistingequipments.Unclassifiedtechnicalliteraturediscussesarangeof

techniquesfordefeatingARMsandemitterlocatingreceivers,rangingfromcoherentdecoy

emitterstointentionaldistortionofthewavefrontproducedbyaradartointroduceerrorsinto

interferometricDFreceivers.

WhatweareobservinginIADScomponentprotectionismirrorimageofthe1960seffortto

equipcombataircraftwithonboardthreatwarningsystemsanddefensiveaids,reflectingthe realitythatamodernlongrangeSAMbatteryisanexpensiveasset,withalatemodelS­

300PMU1/2batterypricedatUS$100MtoUS$200M,dependingonconfiguration.

Thiswebpageisintendedtodescribemanyofthebetterdocumenteddefensiveaidsavailable

forIADScomponents.

DefensiveAidsforIADSComponents

forIADScomponents. DefensiveAidsforIADSComponents RWE­1MissileApproachWarningSystem

RWE­1MissileApproachWarningSystem

RWE­1MAWSwithitsfourlowUHFbandYagiantennasdeployed(viaR.D.Fisher).

RWE­1MAWSwithitsfourlowUHFbandYagiantennasdeployed(viaR.D.Fisher).

TheChineseRWE­1isaradio­frequencybandactiveMAWSintendedtoprotectSAMbatteries

fromattackbyanti­radiationmissilessuchastheAGM­88HARM/AARGMseries.Itisemployed

to trigger emitter shutdown and activation of active emitting decoys. The manufacturer's

brochureclaimsadetectionrangeof40km/21.6NMI.

DFcapabilityislikelytobeviaamplitudecomparisonbetweenchannels,providing~10°DF

accuracy,adequateforcueingdecoys,orcueingpointdefenceweaponsliketheLD­2000to

acquire,trackandengagetheinboundmissiles.

VNIIRT34Ya6EGazetchikEMAWS,DecoyandCountermeasuresSystem

LD­2000 to acquire,trackandengagetheinboundmissiles. VNIIRT34Ya6EGazetchikEMAWS,DecoyandCountermeasuresSystem
The VNIIRT 34Ya6E Gazetchik E series of systems combine a MAWS and radiating decoy capability

The VNIIRT 34Ya6E Gazetchik E series of systems combine a MAWS and radiating decoy capability intended to defeat seekers in anti­radiation missiles, with a capability to deploy aerosolsandchafftodefeatradarandelectro­opticaltargetingsystemsandguidedmunition seekers.

Thesystemprovidesthefollowingcapabilities:

1.MissileApproachWarningSystem(MAWS)todetectinboundARMs.

2.ChaffdispensertodefeatMMWIweaponseekers.

3.Aerosol(smoke)generatortodefeatelectro­opticalseekers/sensors.

Thesystemiskeyedtoemitbytheradarsystemitisdefending.Todatetherehavebeenno

disclosuresonwhethertheGazetchikisacoherentemitterusingareferencesignalfromthe

radar,orwhetheritsynthesizesitsowndecoywaveform.VNIIRTstatementsontheGammaDE

wouldindicateacoherentcapability.

Anumberofconfigurationsareofferedwithandwithoutdispensercapability,andwithband

specificemittercapability.VNIIRTofferthesystemintegratedwiththeGammaDEseriesofL­

bandAESAradars.

bandAESAradars. Зонаобзора: Coverage:

Зонаобзора:

Coverage:

обнаружителяПРР:

MAWS:

поазимутуград.

Azimuth[deg]

поуглуместа,град.

Elevation[deg]

излученияотвлекающихустройств:

DecoyEmitter:

поазимуту,град.

Azimuth[deg]

поуглуместа,град.

Elevation[deg]

Вероятностьзащиты:

P k :

отоднойПРРтипаХАРМ

SingleHARMMissile

отоднойПРРстепловой,телевизионнойилиактивнойрадиолокационной

головкамисамонаведения

SingleARMwithheatseeking,televisionoractiveradarseeker

Режимбоевойработы

OperatingMode

Системаэлектропитания

PowerSupply

Наработканаотказ,ч:

MTBF[hr]

обнаружителяПРР

MAWS

отвлекающихустройств

Countermeasures

Среднеевремявосстановления,ч

MTTR[hr]

Времявключения,с

Setuptime

Времясвертывания(развертывания),мин.

Stow/DeployTime[min]

360

+10­+90

360

+10­+60

неменее0,85

notlessthan85%

0,85­0,95

85%­95%

автоматической

automatic

отзащищаемойРЛС

providedbyradar

500

500

0,5

30

60­90(взависимостиот

комплектации)

Dependentondefended

system

GazetchikEaccessorycomponents.

GazetchikEaccessorycomponents.

GazetchikEaccessorycomponents.

KBRIntegratedAnti­RadiationMissileDefensiveSuite

KBRIntegratedAnti­RadiationMissileDefensiveSuite

TheByeloRussianKBRIntegratedDefensiveSuitecombinesaDopplerMAWS,multipleemitting

decoysandachaffdispenser/smokegeneratortoprovideadefensivecapabilityagainstARMs

andMMWI/EOguidedPGMs.

ItisintendedtodegradetheaccuracyofairborneemitterlocatingsystemsandARMseekers,

andprovidearadarcrewwithearlywarningofanattackinprogress.

Параметры

Значение

Parameters

Value

ЗонаобнаруженияПРРпоазимуту

360°

MAWSDetectionAzimuth

ЗонаобнаруженияПРРпоуглуместа

10­90°

MAWSDetectionElevation

ДальностьобнаруженияПРРтипаHARMcвероятностьюP=0.95

DetectionRangevsHARMTypeARMwithP d =95%

7.5км

Радиальнаяскоростьобнаруживаемыхцелей

RadialVelocityofDetectedTargets

ЧастотныйдиапазондетектораПРР

FrequencyRangeARMDetector

Времясканирования(просмотра)зоныобнаружения

SearchVolumeScanDuration[sec]

Времяготовностибезпроверкифункционирования

StartuptimewithoutBIT[sec]

Времяготовностиспроверкойфункционирования

StartuptimewithBIT[sec]

200­800м/с

СрываетнаведениеПРР

DisruptsARMSeeker

0.15c

4c

30c

TetraedrSRTZ­2TMAnti­RadiationMissileDecoySystem

Tetraedr in Belarus offer the SRTZ­2TM Anti­Radiation Missile defensive package for the

upgradedPechora2TM/mobileSA­3GoaSNR­125­2TMengagementradar.Theyhavealso

statedthatderivativesareavailablefortheS­75/SA­2GuidelineandlegacyS­125/SA­3Goa

SAMsystems.ThesystemisintendedtodefeattheAGM­88A/B/CHARM,theAS.37Martel,

MBDAALARM,Delilah,Kh­31andKh­58,aswellasloiteringARMsintheclassoftheAGM­137

TacitRainbow.

ThesystemisclaimedtobeeffectiveagainstARMhomingseekers,ARMguidancepackages withGPSmidcoursecontrol,andisclaimedtoprovideacapabilitytodefeatMMWIandEO/IR

seekers.ClaimedPkis95%forasingleroundHARMattack,93%foratworoundattackand

90% for a four round attack, with Ps for the SRTZ­2TM cited at 93%, 92% and 90% respectively.

Unlikecompetingdecoyswhicharedeployable,theSRTZ­2TMisaselfpropelleddesigncarried

onaMAZ­63176x6truck,withanintegral20kWdieselgeneratorand5minuteshoot­and­

scootcapability.

Thedesignisunusualinthatitemploysapairofantennas,eachwithpressurisedwaveguide

feeds,oneismountedontheroofofthetruck,theotheronadeployabletelescoping5metre

boom.Aphasecontrolmoduleisemployedtocreateavirtualphasecentrefortheemitterpair, with the decoy acting as a false target generator. The decoy receives emissions from the defendedradarviaaseparatereceiverchannelandusesthesetosynthesizethecoherent

seductionwaveform.Antennaazimuthcoverageis360°andelevationcoveragebetween15°

and80°.

TetraedrhavenotdisclosedwhetherDRFMtechnologyisusedinthewaveformgenerator,nor

havetheydisclosedwhatothercountermeasuresmaybecarriedbythesystem.

DefenseSystemsKRTZ­125­2MAnti­RadiationMissileDecoySystem

DefenseSystemsKRTZ­125­2MAnti­RadiationMissileDecoySystem KRTZ­125­2MOI­125EmitterModule. The joint
DefenseSystemsKRTZ­125­2MAnti­RadiationMissileDecoySystem KRTZ­125­2MOI­125EmitterModule. The joint

KRTZ­125­2MOI­125EmitterModule.

The joint Russian­ByeloRussian Defense Systems company is producing an emitting decoy

systemfortheirupgradedS­125MPechoraM/mobileSA­3Goasystem.DesignatedtheKRTZ­

125­2M,thedecoywasdevelopedtoprotecttheUNV­1LowBlowengagementradarfromARM

attacks.IthasbeenexportedtoEgyptandderivativedesignsforotherformerSovietSAM systemsareonoffer [2] .

ThesystemcomprisesanOI­125BScontrolunitwhichdrivesviaradiolinkinterfacessixOI­

125 Emitter Modules, which are typically arranged in a ~300 metre diameter circle, with

configurationsoffourtotwelveemittersavailable.TheOI­125BSishascableorradiolink

interfaces to the UNV­1 engagement radar's UV­74 synchronisation controller and UV­82 missile uplink transmitter. A test set, spare parts package and mains/generator power

supply/chargerareincluded.TheOI­125emittermodulescanbepoweredbycableorfrom

internalbatteries.ThewholesystemistransportedbyUral­43206x6truck.

Inoperation,theemittersareunderthecontroloftheOI­125BSwhichderivesitstiming

informationforemissionfromtheUNV­1LowBlow.EachV­polemitterwillmatchorexceed

the EIRP of the Low Blow transmit channels. Each emitter has an internal frequency

synthesiserwhichistunedtowithin±1MHzoftheUNV­1carrierfrequency.Thecontroller

monitorsthestatusoftheemitters,andifanincomingARMdestroysanemitter,automatically

reconfiguresthearray.

CitedP k is~90%forasingleroundARMattack,and~80%foratworoundattack.

CitedP k is~90%forasingleroundARMattack,and~80%foratworoundattack. DefenseSystemsviaMiroslavGyűrösi.

DefenseSystemsviaMiroslavGyűrösi.

TheKRTZ­125­2MdecoysystemistransportedbyUral­43206x6truck(AvtomobilniyZavodUral).

TheKRTZ­125­2MdecoysystemistransportedbyUral­43206x6truck(AvtomobilniyZavodUral).

Almaz­AnteyOU­1RelocatableDecoyforOsaAKM/SA­8Gecko

OU­1decoy(Images©MiroslavGyűrösi). RevealedfirstattheMAKS2005show,theOU­1isarelocatabledecoysystemdesignedforthe

OU­1decoy(Images©MiroslavGyűrösi).

RevealedfirstattheMAKS2005show,theOU­1isarelocatabledecoysystemdesignedforthe

OsaAKM/SA­8GeckoSAMsystemupgradepackage.Itemploysacirculararraywithtwelve

pairedtransmitandreceiveantennasoperatingat7.5GHz,andeachcovering30°inazimuth

and40°inelevation.Averagepoweriscitedat50Wwithpeakpulsepowerat40kW,and

powerconsumptioniscitedat300W.

and40°inelevation.Averagepoweriscitedat50Wwithpeakpulsepowerat40kW,and powerconsumptioniscitedat300W.
Upgraded9K33M3OsaAKM/SA­8Gecko. AviakonversiyaGPS/GLONASSGNSSSignalJammers
Upgraded9K33M3OsaAKM/SA­8Gecko. AviakonversiyaGPS/GLONASSGNSSSignalJammers

Upgraded9K33M3OsaAKM/SA­8Gecko.

Upgraded9K33M3OsaAKM/SA­8Gecko. AviakonversiyaGPS/GLONASSGNSSSignalJammers

AviakonversiyaGPS/GLONASSGNSSSignalJammers

Upgraded9K33M3OsaAKM/SA­8Gecko. AviakonversiyaGPS/GLONASSGNSSSignalJammers
AviakonversiyahighpowerGNSSjammer. AviakonversiyalowpowerGNSSjammer.

AviakonversiyahighpowerGNSSjammer.

AviakonversiyahighpowerGNSSjammer. AviakonversiyalowpowerGNSSjammer.

AviakonversiyalowpowerGNSSjammer.

Aviakonversiya have widely marketed their satellite navigation signal jammers, and these

deviceswereclaimedtohavebeenusedbySaddam'sregimeduringthe2003OIFbombing

campaigntodegradetheaccuracyofUSJDAMsandotherGPSaidedPGMs.

TheHeadofAviakonversia,DrOlegAntonov,inaRussianmediainterviewstatedthattheirlow

powerjammerdesignhasanEIRPof~2­3Wattsandaneffectiverangeof~50km,andthe

highpowerderivativehasanEIRPof20Wattsandeffectiverangeof~150km.Thejamming

waveformhasnotbeendisclosed.

While more sophisticated CRPA antenna technology and active nulling will be effective in rejectingthejammers,lesssophisticatedequipment,especiallylowcostmanportableand vehicularequipmentislikelytobesusceptible.

]

LPPU­83SelfPropelledTELARDecoy

vehicularequipmentislikelytobesusceptible. GPSAidedGuidedMunitions[Clickformore ] LPPU­83SelfPropelledTELARDecoy
TheBelarusbuiltLPPU­83isaselfpropelleddecoyintendedtovisuallyemulatethe9A83

TheBelarusbuiltLPPU­83isaselfpropelleddecoyintendedtovisuallyemulatethe9A83

TELARusedbytheS­300V/V­1/SA­12Giant/GladiatorSAMsystems.Thedecoyisbuiltonan

extendedPT­76lighttankchassis,andusesactuallaunchtubesfromexpendedmissilerounds.

MKT­2,MKT­3andVolchitsa­KRCamouflageNetting

Stowed30N6­1FlapLidengagementradarcoveredwithcamouflagenetting (©MiroslavGyűrösi).

Stowed30N6­1FlapLidengagementradarcoveredwithcamouflagenetting (©MiroslavGyűrösi).

TheMKT­2,MKT­3andVolchitsa­KRcamouflagenettingaredesignedtoconcealairdefence

equipment from electro­optical/thermal imaging and microwave band ISR systems. Band coverageincludeslongwave,midwaveandshortwaveinfraredbands,andmicrowaveradar bandsfromMMWdowntoL­band.

RosoboronexportDescription(Cite):

Camouflage sets are designed to conceal air defence assets and installations from reconnaissancecarriedoutwith:

assets and installations from reconnaissancecarriedoutwith:

opticaldevices­againstvegetation(MKT­2L,MKT­3L),desert/steppe(MKT­2P)andsnowy

(MKT­2C)backgrounds;

opticalandradarsystems(MKT­3LR);

optical, thermal imaging and radar assets (light­weight radio­dispersing camouflaging sets:VolchitsaKR­LandVolchitsa­KR­LG–againstsummervegetative,Volchitsa­KR­P– desert/steppeandVolchitsa­KR­C–snowybackgrounds).

Typical camouflage sets consist of 6­12 standard 3x6m sheets joined with quickly undone

seamsmadeofstitchedcords.Standardsheetscompriseakapronnetlikebasewith50x50mm

meshsize,backlinedwitha3­5mmdiameterkaproncordalongtheperimeter.

Thenetbaseholdsdifferentitemsinterweavedinaccordancewithdistortion­paintingpattern: 1.MKT­2L (P,C,3L) 50x220mm

Thenetbaseholdsdifferentitemsinterweavedinaccordancewithdistortion­paintingpattern:

1.MKT­2L (P,C,3L) 50x220mm strips/festoons made from dyed in mass and matted polyethylenefilm;

2.MKT­3LRfestoonsmadefromtwo­sideconducting,dyedinmassandmattedpolyethylene

film;

3.Volchitsa­KR50x220mmstripsorfestoonsfrommetallizedtwo­sidepaintedpolyethylene

terephtalatefilm.

Theabovesetsprovidethefollowingadvantages:

terephtalatefilm. Theabovesetsprovidethefollowingadvantages: resistance to water (moisture), fuel/lubricant (petrol,

resistance to water (moisture), fuel/lubricant (petrol, diesel fuel, oil) and detergent effects;

operabilityinawidetemperaturerangefrom­40°Cto+50°C;

self­extinguishingcovermaterial(withoutresidualsmouldering);

adaptabilitytocamouflagingstructuresofdifferentsizeandconfiguration;

availabilityofsparepartkitsforin­fieldrepairs;

convenientdeliverpackages(incoveredrollswithsparepartsanddocumentation).

availabilityofsparepartkitsforin­fieldrepairs; convenientdeliverpackages(incoveredrollswithsparepartsanddocumentation).

References/Sources

References/Sources 1.Manufacturer'sWebsites 2.MiroslavGyűrösi,RussiaDevelopsDecoytoCounterUSHARMMissiles

1.Manufacturer'sWebsites

2.MiroslavGyűrösi,RussiaDevelopsDecoytoCounterUSHARMMissiles,JanesMissilesand

Rockets,Vol.10,No.3,March,2006.

3.MiroslavGyűrösi,DecoyVehicleCanMimicS­300VLauncher,JanesMissilesand

Rockets,Vol.6,No.8,August,2002.

4.MiroslavGyűrösi,SRTZ­2TMprotectionsystemoffersanti­radiationmissiledefence,Janes

MissilesandRockets,Vol.11,No.11,November,2007.

ImagerySources:RussianMoD,Rosoboronexport,manufacturers,MiroslavGyűrösi.

LineArtwork:©2000­2009CarloKopp