AVIATION SECURITY

AVIA 2701 – Week 5 2018

Categorised as rare, possible or certain - Likelyhood of risk

QUIZ
1) Protection of the landside/airside barrier is the most important aspect of airport security T/F
2) Airport operators are responsible for meeting ICAO Annex 17 requirements T/F
3) Airport operators are required to develop and implement a National Aviation Security Program T/F
4) The airport operator’s security program can be presented using a variety of methods T/F
5) The ATSR require all airport operators to establish an Airport Security Committee (ASC) T/F
6) An ASC has senior representatives from organisations likely to respond to an airport security incident T/F
7) An airport operator is obliged to report security incidents T/F
8) An airport operator must report all security events to the Secretary of Home Affiars T/F
9) Sterile Areas may only be accessed by those who have undergone some form of security screening Queen doesn’t T/F
10) The airport operator is responsible for controlling access to the airside though leased premises T/F
11) In Australia there are a number of different identification card issuing authorities T/F
12) Passengers are screened using biometric devices T/F
13) Passenger screening requirements differ from country to country T/F
14) Checked baggage is screened for improvised explosive devices T/F
15) Australian law requires the screening of all people accessing the airside T/F
16) The Counter Terrorist First Response capability is provided by airport operator staff T/F
17) ICAO standards require security measures to be included in the design of new airport facilities T/F
QUIZ
The airport operator’s security program must demonstrate
(a) The airport’s operator’s capacity to meet specific obligations
(b) A proactive approach to managing aviation security
(c) That activities and strategies for managing security take into account relevant features of
airport s operation
(d) An awareness of aviation security responsibilities
(e) All of the above

Access control methods include

(a) Physical barriers
(b) Security guards
(c) Biometric systems
(d) Identification cards
(e) All of the above
QUIZ

Obtaining an ASIC depends upon

(a) the airport operator carry out a background check of the applicant which is found to be
satisfactory
(b) the applicant having a need to access secure airport areas occasionally
(c) the applicant having an airside driving authority
(d) the applicant having a criminal history
(e) documents that establish the identity of the applicant being verified.

Checked Baggage Screening is aimed at detecting

(a) items prohibited by Quarantine regulations
(b) weapons
(c) prohibited items
(d) explosives
(e) drugs
QUIZ

One role of the Airport Security Committee is to

(a) Control the response to an aviation security incident on the airport
(b) Plan airline security exercises
(c) Train staff in security requirements
(d) Review the TSP
(e) Do all of the above
 Week 5
Airline Security
UNIT OBJECTIVES

• A little about Qantas airline security

• Background
• Regulatory Scene
• Transport Security Programs
• Security Management Systems
• Security Measures

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A little About the Industry

• 900+ airlines
• 22,000+ commercial aircraft
• 57 million plus jobs
• Almost 4 billion plus passengers
• estimated US$2.2 trillion of world economic impact
• Worth protecting?

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Locker Bomb

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A little About Qantas

• Qantas is the world's second oldest airline

• Founded in the Queensland outback in 1920
• Australia s largest domestic and international airline.
• Employs approximately 33,000 people
• 140 destinations in 37 countries – 57 in Australia and 83 in
other countries

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Jetstar (overseas)
Jetstar Asia - Qantas Airways Limited (QAL)
owns 45.04% of Orangestar Pte Limited, which
owns and operates the value-based intra-Asia
airlines Jetstar Asia and Valuair, based in
Singapore.
Jetstar Japan - QAL owns 40% of Jetstar Japan
with Japan Airlines and Mitsubishi.
Jetstar Pacific - QAL owns 18% stake in
Vietnam s Pacific Airlines in July 2007. Now
operating as Jetstar Pacific Airlines.
Jetstar Hong Kong – QAL owns 33% with Shun
Tak Holdings and China Eastern Airlines.

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Fiji Airways
Qantas also holds a 46.3%
shareholding in Fiji Airways,
formally Air Pacific

Operating A330-300, B737-800,

B737-700, ATR 72, ATR 42 and
Twin Otters

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Jetconnect

Jetconnect or Qantas New Zealand

is a 100% wholly owned subsidiary.

Qantas operates more than 230 domestic flights a

week within New Zealand 8 B737-800 aircraft

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 QantasLink

QantasLink (including Network Aviation) – 100%

wholly owned subsidiary operating to 56
destinations using 82 aircraft, including B717-
200, Dash 8-200, Dash 8-300, Dash 8-Q400,
Fokker F100 and Emb120

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 Jetstar ANZ

90 aircraft including B787-800, A330-

200, A320-200 and A321-200

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Qantas Freight

5 aircraft, including 4 (ex AaE) B737-400s

and one B767-300F
Qantas - Mainline

At 1 July 2015, the Qantas

Group operates a fleet of
303 aircraft with Qantas
mainline operating 131
aircraft including , B747-
400ER, B747-400, B737-
800, B737-400, A330-300
and A330-200.

48,900,000+ passengers

17
Other Qantas Businesses

• Snapfresh (soon to be sold to Dnata)

• Network Aviation - FIFO
• Jets Transport Express
• Jupiter Air
• Qantas Holidays
• 90+ companies
• Over 900 facilities worldwide

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A little About Qantas Security

• Located in SYD, MEL & CGK

• 24 Staff
• Three Teams
– Corporate
– Qantas & Jetstar Operational
– Programs
• Over 1200 security contractors

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 Basic Structure of things

• ICAO (Conventions, Annex 6 and Annex 17)

• Domestic and International Laws
• Government Agency Requirements (also IATA)
Airlines are required to develop their own:
• Airline Security Programs
• Airline Policies
• Airline Procedures

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ICAO

• High level
• Generic standards
• One size fits all approach which varying
isnt the greatest way of doing things, due to
operating sizes and
• Lowest common denominator
• Slow to react to changes in environment
• Only binding on States not Airlines/Airports No punishments

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Australian Legislation

• Air Navigation Act 1920

• Aviation Transport Security Act 2004
• Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005
• Crimes (Aviation Act) 1991

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International Legislation

• NZ Civil Aviation Act 1990

• NZ Rules Part 108 and 129
• ECAC 185/2010
• UK Aviation Security Act 1982
• US Federal Rules 1546
• Many others

Each country has their own legislation, above are some examples - ensure you remember for exam

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IATA Club for airlines - lobby airline interests

• Industry Association
– Global lobbying
– Clearing house
• 190 member airlines
• Non airline affiliates
• IOSA program IATA Operational Safety Audit Program
• Security Management Systems

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Security Management Systems (SeMS)

• Based on Safety Management System principles

• Part of the IOSA Program
• Required for all IATA Airlines
• 13 Elements

10 Years
behind the
SeMS

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SeMS

• "SEMS is a standardized approach for implementing the

security processes outlined in our air carrier security
program, SEMS' business like approach is helping us integrate
security into the culture and guiding principles of our
corporation."
Rich Davis, Director Corporate Security,
United Airlines Inc.

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SeMS
• Sets out an organisation s security policies
• States an intent to manage security as an integral part of its
overall business processes.
• Developed in conjunction with a threat assessment mechanism
and risk management programme.
• Formalise security best practices.

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SeMS

• Organisation-wide approach to security through the

development of a security culture as well as a system-wide
security model encouraging and dependent on close co-
operation between all stakeholders and regulators.
• What is ‘culture’? Most difficult element to maintain
– the way of life, especially the general customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at
a particular time (Cambridge Dictionary)

• What is a Security Culture?

Text

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What is SeMS
Exam - 13 different elements of SeMS the most
difficult is security culture. Discuss security culture

A structured, Data Driven Approach To Security Management*

Senior Mgmt
Endorsement Security Staff Evaluation

Incident Risk
Head of Security Threat
Reporting & Management
Investigation Assessment

Security Dept.
Corrective Action
SeMS Org. and Staff Selection
Mechanism

Quality Control & Emergency Response

Most difficult aspect Effective
Quality Assurance Procedures
Security Culture Security Ops

Security Training Program Security Awareness Training

Courtesy of IATA Ops Forum Montreal, 17 April 2007

* United Airlines

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SeMS
Traditional Approach
† Historically, aviation security focused on compliance with increasingly
complex regulatory requirements. This approach has worked well up until
the September 11, 2001.
† This approach to security reacted undesirable events by prescribing
measures to prevent recurrence. Rather than defining best practices or
desired standards, such as an approach aimed at ensuring minimum
standards we met.
Future Perspective
† In order to keep security risks at an acceptable level with the increasing
levels of activity , modern security management practices are shifting
from a purely reactive to a more proactive mode.
† Regulations are now focusing on security outcomes, requiring operators to
manage their own risks.
† Security Management Systems enable effective risk management.

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Security Culture
Senior
• Arguably senor management commitment and a security
culture are the hardest SeMS elements to implement and/or
prove exist within an organisation.
– For Example:
o What is the security culture of Group Security?
o What is the security culture of Qantas?
o What is the security culture of Jetstar?

• Security culture is somewhat about Attitudes and

Behaviours

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Security Culture

Data Collection, Audit, Feedback & Review

Awareness and Programs implemented

Desired Culture Identified

Increased Security Output

No Culture Known,
Discernible Implemented
Culture and Measured

SeMS - Most difficult aspect to monitor

and control

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Evolution of a Security Culture
Generative
Increasing Security is how we do business round
here
Informedness
Proactive
We work on the problems that we still
find

Calculative
We have a system in place to manage all
risks
Increasing
Reactive trust
Security is important, we do a lot every
time we have an incident

Pathological
Who cares as long as we’re
not caught

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Management Commitment

Security Management levels

Low Medium High

Risks

Qantas
Security Risk

REACTIVE PROACTIVE PREDICTIVE

Security Efficiency

Inefficient Very Efficient Highly Efficient

Repeat Failures Fix Latent Failures Optimal Ongoing Performance

Adapted from and with acknowledgment to Capt. Dan Maurino

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Organisational Culture

• Benefits
– Minimises risk
– Minimises operational disruptions
– Enhances compliance
– Improves employee moral

36
 Reason Model (Swiss Cheese)

Profit over security / lack of training / blame culture / cutting corners - SYSTEM FAILURES

Poor equipment / poor lighting / bad weather

Policies / Procedures / Training / Oversight

Curtesy: Australian ATSB 2003
No rest breaks / Not following procedures / non use of security equipment - INDIVIDUAL FAILURES

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Violations

• Culture = Behaviour = Actions (Violations)

• Three types of Violation

– Routine - individual cuts corners

– Necessary - to get the job done
– Optimising - for kicks

• Violation + Error = Incident/Accident

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Just Culture
• Blame Culture
– under reporting of near misses
– suppression of information
– fear of job loss

• No Blame Culture
– total immunity once reported
– anonymity? (some schemes do and other do not)

• Just Culture
– requires trust in management (system must be documented)
– reports reviewed by committee - must be feedback
– negligent or criminal acts result in disciplinary action taken

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How does it all work?

• ICAO cannot provide a precise guidance on responsibilities.

• Rule makers vary greatly in their capacity to understand and
implement international standards.
• Those that cannot understand their international obligations,
place considerable pressure on the airline to impose a range
of security measures to protect a flight.

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Australian Government s Approach

• To set a regulatory framework that is risk based, threat

driven and outcomes focused .
• Involved in consultative meetings with the industry to attempt
to find a balance between government policy and operational
implementation.
• The Government is involved in promoting a policy of
operational sameness with near neighbours.
Government does not has a SeMS
Airlines do and airports have begun introducing SeMS

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Australian Regulatory Environment

• The Department of Home Affairs

• Aviation Transport Security Act 2004
• Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005
• Notices, Instruments and Directions
• The then DOTARS criticised by the ANAO
• Who to hold responsible – one class of persons?

Collaborative approach is more effect, who is meant to be responsible

for aviation security

42
The Act

• The Act provides the necessary powers to the Department of

Home Affairs from the Parliament.
• It outlines what regulations can and cannot be made.
• It outlines the penalties available for certain breaches.

43
The Regulations

• Provide specific requirements on Aviation Industry

Participants (as defined) and other individuals.
• Outline in some cases how and when to do or not do
something.
• Outline the penalties against AIP and individuals.

44
Notices, Instruments or Directions

• Provide specific requirements under specific regulations to act

either permanently of temporarily in a certain manner – eg
Screening Notices
• Directions have a 3 month time limit.

45
TSP
• AIP audited against the regulations
• AIP audited against TSP regardless of content
• TSP should be used by AIP for staff education
• TSP should be transferable across States
• TSP outlines protective security measures
• Australian TSP contains too much administration

46
 SCOPE OF AVIATION SECURITY

• Size of world industry means it is a massive undertaking

• Requires
– Worldwide co-operation
– Commitment to security at all government and industry levels
– Application of and compliance with agreed international standards
across state boundaries
– Consideration of economic viability of airlines and airports
• Does not involve protecting aviation against
– Criminal activities (law enforcement)
– Border control activities (customs and immigration)

47
APPROACH TO AVIATION SECURITY
• Risk based and outcome focussed
– Can t be mitigated to zero but to an acceptable level
• 80% of risks common to all airlines or airports
– Tailored to the specifics of the airline or airport
• Layered approach to protection
– Safest aircraft departure (in security terms) is aircraft with
no passengers, baggage, catering or cargo
– Aviation security is about reducing risk as these elements
are added to the aircraft
• Strengthened by lessons from past events and
application of technology

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Layered EXAM - Essay
Approach Car park
side areas
Airport security can be compared Land
to the layers of an onion with
n cing with acc
security increasing through each
r fe ess
t e ile areas
Ster
layer

ime

po
a
side re

ints
Per
For the exam

as
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consider some
of the other Aircraft
layers, all these
lays protect
TSP – Risk Context Statement

† ATSR regulations state that the TSP must set out an outline of
the objectives of the TSP, including:
– (a) a statement outlining the local security risk context of
the airline including consideration of its location and
seasonal and operational factors; and
– (b) a list of general threats and generic security risk events
to people, assets, infrastructure and operations; and
– (c) an outline of the people, assets, infrastructure and
operations that need to be protected.

50
 International Operations

Qantas Passenger Charters High

Australian Airlines Freight Charters Medium

Major Codeshares Low

Threats?

• What do you think at the top security threats facing a major

airline today?

• Regional Oil prices/Food prices

• Cyber
• Transnational Terrorism
• Political Stability
• Cargo

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Access Control

• Primary responsibility of the airport operator

• All organisations with facilities on the boundary of the
landside/airside including airlines must also implement
security controls to prevent unauthorised access through their
facility.
• Difficult with buildings such as cargo facilities where the
movement of transport and cargo is necessary from landside
to airside and reverse.

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HKG

54
HKG

55
Security Seals – Bus windows

56
Security Seals

57
Access Control

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Swiss HQ

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Swiss HQ

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BKK Freight Facility

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ZRH

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Identification Cards
• Airlines issue ID cards to their crews and staff.
• Crews need ID cards to permit passage at airports (eg
international), including apron areas.
• These company cards provide employees access and
recognition at airline facilities and leased areas of airports.
• In Australia, Issuing Bodies and are normally Airport
Authorities.

63
Temporary Visitors Pass - HKG

64
Flight Bookings & Reservations

• Security for the airline commences at the reservations stage.

• Sales agents are trained to identify suspicious behaviour and
potentially fraudulent activity at booking stage.
• Odd itineraries, too many questions concerning particular
routes or aircraft types all should start alarm bells ringing.

65
Flight Bookings & Reservations

• This is also the point at which some airline reservations

systems interact with government watch lists to look for
matches. Some of these systems are automated within the
reservations systems, others are manually completed.

66
Watch Lists Dont need to remember these

• TSA Watch lists

• APIS
• AQQ
• APP
• Security Flight
• US Exit
• ESTA

67
Check-in & Checked Baggage

• Another check and balance in a layered approach.

• Staff are taught to recognise unusual/suspicious behaviour by a
passenger s body language, answers to questions, baggage
requests etc.
• “Check-in” was the point at which the airline accepts
responsibility for the passenger s baggage.
• Baggage is reconciled against the passenger and the destination
on the ticket.

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AKL

69
Check-in & Checked Baggage

• For international flights the identification of the passenger is

required. This is not true for domestic passengers. Why?
Identification is a boarder force requirement not a security requirement
• Is not checking the identity of a passenger at check-in for an
Australian domestic flight a security issue for the airline?
• Checked baggage screening is not looking for weapons and
prohibited items, but rather explosives and improvised
explosive devices. Why?
• Checked baggage is reconciled against each passenger to
ensure that a passenger and their checked baggage travel
together. Why?

70
BAH

71
Transfer Checked Baggage

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CBS - BKK

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HKG - CBS

74
Bomb Blast Chamber

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Bomb Blast Chamber

76
Passenger Screening

• ICAO statistics reveal that the vast majority of incidents of

unlawful interference with aircraft happen via the passenger
stream.
• Looking for weapons and prohibited items. Why?
• Once screened it is important then to ensure that these
passengers do not mix with non screened passengers or
persons prior to boarding.

77
Passenger Screening

• Special arrangements can be made for the screening of

medical patients, persons in custody, VIPs and other special
category of passengers.
• In some countries, VIPs are exempted from screening. This
privilege is normally in accord with the Vienna Convention on
diplomatic relations dated 18 April 1961.

78
Passenger Boarding & Reconciliation

• Electronic boarding card readers.

• Boarding pass - check-in counter, passenger s home
computer or from a self service kiosk.
• Passenger face to boarding pass to passport check.
• Biometrics
• Aircraft door checks / Head counts by the crew to ensure
passengers are not boarding the wrong aircraft.

79
Baggage Tag - Reconciliation

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Baggage Reconciliation

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Passenger & Baggage Reconciliation

• Fail to Board rules;

• Checked baggage screening / AAA;
• States are required to comply with standard 4.5.3 of Annex
17;
• Manual to totally electronic matching process;
• Australia applies the strict meaning of the standard;
• Some exemptions exist – can you name any?

82
Enhanced Flight Deck Doors (Annex 6)

• Standard 13.2.2 states:

– From 1 November 2003, all passenger-carrying
aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in
excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity
greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight
crew compartment door that is designed to resist
penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and
to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This
door shall be capable of being locked and unlocked from
either pilot s station .

83
Enhanced Flight Deck Doors
• Door must remain closed and locked during flight except when
it is required for egress and access.
• Procedures to manage the opening of the door
• Communication with the flight deck.
• Many airlines have installed CCTV.
• ’Lock down procedures.
• Unserviceable / Safety Issues.

84
A380 Flight Deck

85
Aircraft Pre Departure Searches

• Interior and exterior – accessible areas.

• Who performs search? – sign off.
• Special tool .
• Airline security seals.
• Size of the aircraft - millions of dollars per year.
• Timing of search – sequential or concurrent
• Crew must be onboard – guarding.

86
BKK Aircraft access searches

87
BKK

88
Terminal Security - Vehicles

89
Front of House Security

• What is the ‘Front of house’?

• Where does “Landside” start
and Finish?
• What are the main issues?
• Who is responsible?

90
Catering Security

• Introduction of prohibited items via catering.

• Regular suppliers / screening and search.
• Catering facility security and transportation.
• Decanted products.
• Catering carts - locked and sealed.
• Evidence of tampering.
• Double catering.

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BKK - Catering

92
Catering Seals

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Catering Cart

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Catering Carts

95
Cargo Security

• Greatest attention by regulators;

• Known Shippers / Regulated Agents/ Accredited Agents;
• When and who to secure?
• Who carries the ultimate risk?
• Securing the supply chain;
• Inspecting, examining or screening?
• US requirements – MSP Chp4, NCSP, ACAS.
Medical Suppliers have stricter security
standards as an industry and do not require
extensive screening from air operator.
CARGO IS EXAMINED NOT SCREENED

96
Freight

97
Freight Security

98
Security Training

• General Security Awareness training;

• Crew training;
• Freight employee training;
• Defensive tactics & behavioural recognition;
• Screener training;
• Airside employee training;

99
Persons in Custody Required to go from A to B

• Requests and Assessment.

• Permission for uplift.
• Escorted or not.
• Dangerous Persons
• Notification to crew – seating / handling
• Codeshare and international obligations

100
 In-flight Passenger Management

• A growing problem - unruly passengers

• Captain s power - Tokyo Convention
• Jurisdiction - Beijing Convention 2014
• Prevent an in-flight incidents in the terminal
• Flyer Rage - high density seating, fear of flying, poor service,
consumption of alcohol with prescription drugs, consumption of
duty free liquor, security rules, combined behaviour of groups -
football teams
Beijing Convention is responsible for looking after jurisdiction overview for incidents that occur on
passenger flights. Who is responsible for court proceeding, etc.
Tokyo Convention - Gives the Captain power to restrain passengers if need be.

101
In-flight Passenger Management

• Restraining equipment.
• Armed air-marshals - The pilot in command, as required by
Annex 17, is always informed when such personnel are on
board.

102
Bomb & Associated Threats

• Responsibility for assessment.

• PTI - Hoax or genuine. Positive Target Identification (PTI)
• Notification and reporting.
• Search processes - genuine declaration.
• Issues for the airline if control is taken away.
• Training and preparation of key staff is critical.

103
Crew Security Procedures
• Crew members treated the same as passengers.
• Crew baggage:
– control of baggage when checking out of hotels;
– control of loading of baggage onto crew transport;
– possession and checking in of baggage
• Crew slips – personal safety

104
Crew Screening - ZRH

105
Overnight Aircraft Security

• Unattended for long periods.

• Remove all access steps, aerobridges and the like, close (lock
if possible) access doors.
• Guarding – security seals.
• Motion detector cameras.
• Return to service checks

106
Codeshare Flights Consistency in security standards with
codeshare partners

† Some areas of policy disparity are:

– the carriage of firearms in the cabin of aircraft by law
enforcement officers;
– the assessment of bomb threats;
– The assessment and handling of Persons in Custody;
– the inspection of rush tag or mishandled bags;
– special measures taken by airlines regarding cargo (cooling
off period).

107
MANPADS
• 2003 - Arkia Airlines B757 after departing Mombasa Airport in Kenya.
• Since the 1970s, shoulder fired or man portable air defence systems (MANPADS)
have successfully attacked at least 43 civil aircraft with 30 of these resulting in
aircraft destroyed. Approximately 1,000 passengers and crew have died in these
attacks.
• Last event in 2013 - Egypt
• Admittedly most of these attacks have occurred in or close to traditionally called
war zones .
• Ironic that the organisations offering solutions and defences are the same
organisation developing and manufacturing the MANPADS.
• Estimates for systems to be fitted to commercial aircraft range between $1m and
$3m per aircraft, plus ongoing maintenance costs.

108
MANPADS

• Given estimates of MANPAD inventories range between 350,000 and

500,000 it is quite a task.
• There are three basic types - Infrared; Line of sight (aim and fire); and
Laser beam.
• The general capabilities of this equipment is that it is portable, relatively
inexpensive, has a range up to 6 miles (9km) and a ceiling of
approximately 20,000 feet.
• Obviously the most vulnerable phases of flight and successful attack will
be during take off and landing.
• Size and speed are important survival characteristics.
• The US DHS is taking an aggressive approach to counter the threat of
shoulder-fired missiles to civilian commercial aviation.

109
A380 Under Floor Crew Rest

110
Great Record Keeping

111