Republic of the Philippines its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court
ptember 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND
RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court, Fourth
Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at
the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth
Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. died.5
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District
Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the
Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer,
Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No.
7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the
daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of
the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the
following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the
estate of the decedent.9
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a District
Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman
Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private
respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling
S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10
On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district
court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement
and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12 On December 28, 2005,
petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioners’
opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district
court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it
took cognizance of the said motion.15 The Shari’a District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration.16
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal
dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence.18 In
trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19
Seeking recourse before bn DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED
THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF
A "NOTICE OF HEARING."
V.
RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR
TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION
PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.
In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District Court must
be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to
determine whether it has jurisdiction.20
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of
fact, whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that
there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that
the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however,
set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of
wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the
nature or the aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of
the relief sought in the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does
not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa
descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings."22
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a
"Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as
well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the
decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs
prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of
the decedent.24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and
(2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over
the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a
Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the
defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant27 or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question
of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Shari’a District
Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to
determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim.
If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District
Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the
proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was
denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his
heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a
civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is
misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate
this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong"34necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or
a particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the
decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement
of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.39
Docket Fees
Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is
untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which
contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private
respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1)
whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the
correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the
docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.41 In such a case, the lower court concerned will not
automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of
the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law
with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case
cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be
required to pay the deficiency.44
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover,
the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents
correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the Shari’a District
Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case
constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by
the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no
written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof." 46 However,
the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a
liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result
in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect
in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than
on technicalities.49
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a
Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law
and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will
result in a miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the
rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of
hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.50 The purpose for the
notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51 for the court to determine whether the adverse
party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or
opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the
Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for
reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in
the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for
the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the
said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice
of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined whether it
has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a
probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated August 22,
2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Montaner vs. Shariah District Court
Facts: Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish
in Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners herein are their three children.
Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of
properties before the Shari’a District Court. They claim to be the first family of Alejandro.
Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss becasue Discangcopan failed to pay the correct amount
of docket fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopan’s petition which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s
estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.
Issue: Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for “Complaint” for the judicial partition of properties.
Held: Yes, only because the petitioner children failed to present the clerk of court’s assessment.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees
because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiencyassessment lies
with the same clerk of court. In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction,
because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs
them in accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient
assessment. However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.
In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover,
the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether Disangcopan correctly paid
the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.
JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF DECEASED MUSLIMS
All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators
or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property shall be under
theexclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Courts (Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree
No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines cited
in MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST
DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).
1.1. The Supreme Court held that the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a
Courts, Ijra-at-al-Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe "the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an
answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue
delay" xxxxx Moreover, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because
petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District
Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which
requires an a prioridetermination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District
Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY
20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).
1.2. Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a
District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa
v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715, 719) such as the fact of Alejandro
Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains
an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a
probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled
before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the
private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent(Vda. de Manalo v. Court
of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of
the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said
estate (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST
DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).
1.3. THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION, SETTLEMENT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
IS CONSIDERED A SPECIAL PROCEEDING
The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of
the Rules of Court (Rules) defines aspecial proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." The Supreme Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722). In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of
death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would
allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). Here, the respondents
seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case
in fact. x x x x x Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from
being a party defendant in a civil action (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562 (1999) applies to
a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a
civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party.
x x x As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities (Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to distribute the residual to those
entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001).
1.4. EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF HEARING
The present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because
the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules
on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected(Victory
Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). The purpose for
the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process (Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court
of Appeals,369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999) for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or
opposition (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-
292). In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" (De Borja, et al. v. Tan, et al., 93 Phil.
167, 171 (1953). x x x In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated
January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in
question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said
motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing
for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity
to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the
purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed. x x x To deny the
Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for
the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power
as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a
situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage
of justice. x x x x x In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition
and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding (Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R.
No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198). The court, in its capacity as a probate court,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent (Uriarte v. Court of First Instance Negros
Occidental, et al., 144 Phil. 205, 215-216 (1970). In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs
of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District
Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT,
G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R)
wherein, over their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance
of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence thereof, set
aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased
Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who
died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and
executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased Digna
Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed
on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and
Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the
deceased, for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late wife,
Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot
pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that
shall be administered by the special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner
Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the Will, the Court finds it
impossible for the present time to appoint any person other than the petitioner as special
administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered, for the reason that the properties
mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of the
deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on
each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for appointment
of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the
ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was
heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement, because
respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not present. The court ordered
presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco
Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from
said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the removal
of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment
and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To
this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not
apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition
for his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition
February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix,
and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to
the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds that (a) the law allows only one
special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the
whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a
deadlock between two special administrators would ruin the management of the property, including those of
respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez
was employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-
administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order dictated
open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of
respondent as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March
9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify
the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds
P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an
opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the
probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R);
hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to
or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition)
prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over
the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00
more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla)
which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This
theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla
presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate
the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's
exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at
P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that
even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil.
407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases
where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized
that the amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-
3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045).
Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that
the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which
are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or value
involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the
value of the entire estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire
administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the amount or value of the assets
of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is
to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is,
according to his theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or
approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is
the amount or value of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows
that the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special
administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or
value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value
of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original
jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or less", as
the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this
case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the estate, nor to an order
denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a
fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the
United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to
compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund,
amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected
by the fact that the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly et
al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases,
are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil
action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121
Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special
proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are
not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings.
Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)

The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and not the
combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or value involved
or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the
cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the whole estate of
at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory,
would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.

The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also
inapplicable, because unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.

While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977,
CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes
immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in
controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all
cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be
sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before it".

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with
respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-
administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and
subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be
unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator,
another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the
community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in the event that the
disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas
v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)

In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy, it is
suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the
probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one entered
also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
 ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim
against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-
forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for
failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to
contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket
fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court,
pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
The petition is imbued with merit.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007 However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner, supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.
DECISION Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003. Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on
October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately
₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may
be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to
said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-
personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in
any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against
non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent
are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza
v. Court of Appeals,6the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent
right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some
question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent
upon the principal remedy.7(Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading,
does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction
to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the
administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees
because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the
trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore,
non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a
money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is
squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to
be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise,
personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the
following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-
guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an
opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading
of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel,
or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other
papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal
service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion
must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause
"whenever practicable".
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein,
and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and
liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort
and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation
thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true
that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi1
In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s
is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal
service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally
"might have been superfluous."
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and
the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken
judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to
submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous
and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim
of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of
creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained
in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:
HELD:No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping isrequired only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probateproceeding was initiated NOT by Alan
Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of thepetition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will. Under Sections
1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules ofCourt, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claimsagainst the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
theirrespective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.A money claim in a
probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to berecognized and taken into consideration in the
proper disposition of the properties of the estate.And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to
bring a material but incidentalmatter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not
anindependent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. Itrelates to some
question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with anddependent upon the principal
remedy.
SECTION 2. APPLICABILITY OF RULES OF CIVIL ACTIONS

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in
the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)
In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings. The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of
being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary
actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to
said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring certificate of non-
forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and
the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings
(Sheker v. Estate of Alice Sheker, Medina, G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written
explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6
dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on
petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina.Alice left a holographic
will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City.The trial court issued an order for all
creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliancetherewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money
claim in the amount of P206,250.00representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some
properties for Alice; andanother P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.Medina moved for the dismissal
of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money claimfiled by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did
not attach a certification of non-forum shoppingthereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.