Coordinates: 42.36197°N 71.

05562°W

Big Dig
The Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CA/T), known unofficially as the Big Dig,
The Central Artery/Tunnel
was a megaproject in Boston that rerouted the Central Artery of Interstate 93, the
Project
chief highway through the heart of the city, into the 1.5-mile (2.4 km) Thomas P.
O'Neill Jr. Tunnel. The project also included the construction of the Ted Williams
Tunnel (extending Interstate 90 to Logan International Airport), the Leonard P.
Zakim Bunker Hill Memorial Bridge over the Charles River, and the Rose Kennedy
Greenway in the space vacated by the previous I-93 elevated roadway. Initially, the
plan was also to include a rail connection between Boston's two major train
terminals. Planning began in 1982; the construction work was carried out between
1991 and 2006; and the project concluded on December 31, 2007 when the
partnership between the program manager and the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority ended.[1] Metropolitan Highway System

The Big Dig was the most expensive highway project in the US, and was plagued by Overview
cost overruns, delays, leaks, design flaws, charges of poor execution and use of Other name(s) The Big Dig
substandard materials, criminal arrests,[2][3] and one death.[4] The project was Location Boston
originally scheduled to be completed in 1998[5] at an estimated cost of $2.8 billion
Coordinates 42.36197°N
(in 1982 dollars, US$6.0 billion adjusted for inflation as of 2006).[6] However, the
71.05562°W
project was completed in December 2007 at a cost of over $14.6 billion ($8.08
billion in 1982 dollars, meaning a cost overrun of about 190%)[6] as of 2006.[7] The
Route I‑90 / I‑93
Boston Globe estimated that the project will ultimately cost $22 billion, including Operation
interest, and that it would not be paid off until 2038.[8] As a result of a death, leaks, Work begun 1982
and other design flaws, Bechtel and Parsons Brinckerhoff—the consortium that
Constructed 1991–2007[1]
oversaw the project—agreed to pay $407 million in restitution and several smaller
[9] Opened 2002
companies agreed to pay a combined sum of approximately $51 million.
Traffic Automotive
The Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway
is a roughly 1.5-mile-long (2.4 km)[10]
series of parks and public spaces, which
are the final part of the Big Dig after
Interstate 93 was put underground. The
Greenway was named in honor of
Kennedy family matriarch Rose
Fitzgerald Kennedy, and was officially
dedicated on July 26, 2004.

Contents
Background
Origin
Cancellation of the Inner
Belt project Boston's highway system before and after the Central Artery/T
unnel Project
Mixing of traffic
Mass transit
Early planning
 Obstacles
Construction phase
Engineering methods and
details
Final phases
Coordinated projects
Surface treatments
Public art
Impact on traffic
Operations Control Center
(OCC)
Problems
"Thousands of leaks"
Substandard materials
Fatal ceiling collapse
"Ginsu guardrails"
Lighting fixtures
See also
References
External links

Background

Origin
This project was developed in response to traffic congestion on Boston's
historically tangled streets which were laid out long before the advent of the
automobile. As early as 1930 the city's Planning Board recommended a raised
express highway running north-south through thedowntown district in order to
draw traffic off the city streets.[11] Commissioner of Public Works William
Callahan promoted plans for an elevated expressway which eventually was
constructed between the downtown area and the waterfront. Governor John
Volpe interceded in the 1950s to change the design of the last section of the
Central Artery putting it underground through the Dewey Square Tunnel.
While traffic moved somewhat better, the other problems remained. There was
Traffic on the old, elevated Central Artery
at mid-day in 2003 chronic congestion on the Central Artery (I-93), an elevated six-lane highway
through the center of downtown Boston, which was, in the words of Pete
Sigmund, "like a funnel full of slowly-moving, or stopped, cars (and swearing
motorists)."[12] In 1959, the 1.5-mile-long (2.4 km) road section carried approximately 75,000 vehicles a day, but by the 1990s, this
had grown to 190,000 vehicles a day. Traffic jams of 16 hours were predicted for 2010.[13]

The expressway had tight turns, an excessive number of entrances and exits, entrance ramps without merge lanes, and as the decades
passed, had continually escalating vehicular traffic that was well beyond its design capacity. Local businesses again wanted relief,
city leaders sought a reuniting of the waterfront with the city, and nearby residents desired removal of the matte green-painted
elevated road which mayor Thomas Menino called Boston's "other Green Monster".[14] MIT engineers Bill Reynolds and (eventual
state Secretary of Transportation) Frederick P. Salvucci envisioned moving the whole expressway under
ground.

Cancellation of the Inner Belt project

Another important motivation for the final form of the Big Dig was the
abandonment of the Massachusetts Department of Public Works' intended
expressway system through and around Boston. The Central Artery, as part of
Mass. DPW's Master Plan of 1948, was originally planned to be the downtown
Boston stretch of Interstate 95, and was signed as such; a bypass road called
the Inner Belt, was subsequently renamed Interstate 695. (The law establishing
the Interstate highway system was enacted in 1956.) The Inner Belt District
was to pass to the west of the downtown core, through the neighborhood of
Roxbury and the cities of Brookline, Cambridge, and Somerville. Earlier
controversies over impact of the Boston extension of the Massachusetts
Turnpike, particularly on the heavily populated neighborhood of Brighton, and
the additional large amount of housing that would have had to be destroyed led
to massive community oppositionto both the Inner Belt and the Boston section
of I-95.

Building demolition and land clearances for I-95 through the neighborhoods of
Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and Roslindale led to secession threats by Hyde Park, Zakim Bunker Hill Bridgeover the Charles
Boston's youngest and southernmost neighborhood. By 1972, with only a River under construction, looking north.
minimum of work done on the I-95 right of way and none on the potentially The old elevated Central Artery crossing is
massively disruptive Inner Belt, Governor Francis Sargent put a moratorium to the right.
on highway construction within theMA-128 corridor, except for the final short
stretch of Interstate 93. In 1974, the remainder of the Master Plan was
canceled, leaving Boston with a severely overstressed expressway system for the existing traf
fic.

With ever-increasing traffic volumes funneled onto I-93 alone, the Central Artery became chronically gridlocked. The Sargent
moratorium led to the rerouting of I-95 away from Boston around the MA-128 beltway and the conversion of the cleared land in the
southern part of the city into the Southwest Corridor linear park, as well as a new right-of-way for the Orange Line subway and
Amtrak. Parts of the planned I-695 right-of-way remain unused and under consideration for future mass-transit projects.

The original 1948 Master Plan included a Third Harbor Tunnel plan that was hugely controversial in its own right, because it would
have disrupted the Maverick Square area of East Boston. It was never built.

Mixing of traffic
A major reason for the all-day congestion was that the Central Artery carried not only north–south traffic, but much east–west traffic
as well. Boston's Logan Airport lies across Boston Harbor in East Boston, and before the Big Dig the only access from downtown
was through the paired Callahan and Sumner tunnels. Traffic on the major highways from west of Boston—the Massachusetts
Turnpike and Storrow Drive—mostly traveled on portions of the Central Artery to reach these tunnels. Getting between the Central
Artery and the tunnels involved short diversions onto city streets, increasing local congestion.

Mass transit
A number of public transportation projects were included as part of an environmental mitigationfor the Big Dig. The most expensive
was the building of the Phase II Silver Line tunnel under Fort Point Channel, done in coordination with Big Dig construction. Silver
Line buses now use this tunnel and the Ted Williams Tunnel to link South Station and Logan Airport.

As of 2015, promised projects to extend the Green Line beyond Lechmere, to connect the Red and Blue subway lines, and to restore
the Green Line streetcar service to the Arborway in Jamaica Plain have not been completed. Construction of the extension beyond
Lechmere has begun.[15] The Red and Blue subway line connection underwent initial design,[16] but no funding has been designated
1.[17]
for the project. The Arborway Line restorationhas been abandoned, following a final court decision in 201
The original Big Dig plan also included theNorth-South Rail Link, which would have connected North and South Stations (the major
passenger train stations in Boston), but this aspect of the project was ultimately dropped by the state transportation administration
early in the Dukakis administration. Negotiations with the federal government had led to an agreement to widen some of the lanes in
the new harbor tunnel, and accommodating these would require the tunnel to be deeper and mechanically-vented; this left no room
for the rail lines, and having diesel trains (then in use) passing through the tunnel would have substantially increased the cost of the
ventilation system.[18]

Early planning
The project was conceived in the 1970s by the Boston Transportation Planning Review to replace the rusting elevated six-lane
Central Artery. The expressway separated downtown from the waterfront, and was increasingly choked with bumper-to-bumper
traffic. Business leaders were more concerned about access to Logan Airport, and pushed instead for a third harbor tunnel. In their
second terms, Michael Dukakis (governor) and Fred Salvucci (secretary of transportation) came up with the strategy of tying the two
projects together—thereby combining the project that the business community supported with the project that they and the City of
Boston supported.

Planning for the Big Dig as a project officially began in 1982, with environmental impact studies starting in 1983. After years of
extensive lobbying for federal dollars, a 1987 public works bill appropriating funding for the Big Dig was passed by the US
Congress, but it was vetoed by President Ronald Reagan for being too expensive. When Congress overrode the veto, the project had
[19]
its green light and ground was first broken in 1991.

In 1997, the state legislature created the Metropolitan Highway System and transferred responsibility for the Central Artery and
Tunnel "CA/T" Project from the Massachusetts Highway Department and the Massachusetts Governor's Office to the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority (MTA).[20][21] The MTA, which had little experience in managing an undertaking of the scope and magnitude of
the CA/T Project, hired a joint venture to provide preliminary designs, manage design consultants and construction contractors, track
the project's cost and schedule, advise MTA on project decisions, and (in some instances) act as the MTA's representative. Eventually,
MTA combined some of its employees with joint venture employees in an integrated project organization. This was intended to make
management more efficient, but it hindered MTA's ability to independently oversee project activities because MTA and the joint
venture had effectively become partners in the project.[22]

Obstacles
In addition to political and financial difficulties, the project faced several environmental and engineering obstacles. The downtown
area through which the tunnels were to be dug was largely landfill, and included existing Red Line and Blue Line subway tunnels as
well as innumerable pipes and utility lines that would have to be replaced or moved. Tunnel workers encountered many unexpected
geological and archaeological barriers, ranging from glacial debris to foundations of buried houses and a number of sunken ships
lying within the reclaimed land.

The project received approval from state environmental agencies in 1991, after satisfying concerns including release of toxins by the
excavation and the possibility of disrupting the homes of millions of rats, causing them to roam the streets of Boston in search of new
[23] the process had taken some seven years, during
housing. By the time the federal environmental clearances were delivered in 1994,
[24]
which time inflation greatly increased the project's original cost estimates.

Reworking such a busy corridor without seriously restricting traffic flow required a number of state-of-the-art construction
techniques. Because the old elevated highway (which remained in operation throughout the construction process) rested on pylons
located throughout the designated dig area, engineers first utilized slurry wall techniques to create 120-foot-deep (37 m) concrete
walls upon which the highway could rest. These concrete walls also stabilized the sides of the site, preventing cave-ins during the
continued excavation process.
The multi-lane interstate highway also had to pass under South Station's seven railway tracks, which carried over 40,000 commuters
and 400 trains per day. To avoid multiple relocations of train lines while the tunneling advanced, as had been initially planned, a
specially designed jack was constructed to support the ground and tracks to allow the excavation to take place below. Construction
crews also used ground freezing (an artificial induction of permafrost) to help stabilize surrounding ground as they excavated the
tunnel. This was the largest tunneling project undertaken beneath railway lines anywhere in the world. The ground freezing enabled
safer, more efficient excavation, and also assisted in environmental issues, as less contaminated fill needed to be exported than if a
traditional cut-and-cover method had been applied.[25]

Other challenges included existing subway tunnels crossing the path of the underground highway. To build slurry walls past these
tunnels, it was necessary to dig beneath the tunnels and to build an underground concrete bridge to support the tunnels' weight,
without interrupting rail service.

Construction phase
The project was managed by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, with the Big
Dig and the Turnpike's Boston Extension from the 1960s being financially and
legally joined by the legislature as the Metropolitan Highway System.[26] Design
and construction was supervised by a joint venture of Bechtel Corporation and
Parsons Brinckerhoff. Because of the enormous size of the project—too large for
any company to undertake alone—the design and construction of the Big Dig was
broken up into dozens of smaller subprojects with well-defined interfaces between
contractors. Major heavy-construction contractors on the project included Jay
Cashman, Modern Continental, Obayashi Corporation, Perini Corporation, Peter
Kiewit Sons' Incorporated, J. F. White, and the Slattery division of Skanska USA.
(Of those, Modern Continental was awarded the greatest gross value of contracts, Construction sites of the "Big Dig"
joint ventures included.)

The nature of the Charles River crossing had been a source of major controversy throughout the design phase of the project. Many
environmental advocates preferred a river crossing entirely in tunnels, but this, along with 27 other plans, was rejected as too costly.
Finally, with a deadline looming to begin construction on a separate project that would connect the Tobin Bridge to the Charles River
crossing, Salvucci overrode the objections and chose a variant of the plan known as "Scheme Z". This plan was considered to be
reasonably cost-effective, but had the drawback of requiring highway ramps stacked up as high as 100 feet (30 m) immediately
adjacent to the Charles River.[27]

The city of Cambridge objected to the visual impact of the chosen Charles River crossing design. The city sued to revoke the project's
[28]
environmental certificate and forced the project planners to redesign the river crossing again.

Swiss engineer Christian Menn took over the design of the bridge.
He suggested a cradle cable-stayed bridge that would carry ten lanes
of traffic. The plan was accepted and construction began on the
Leonard P. Zakim Bunker Hill Memorial Bridge. The bridge
employed an asymmetrical design and a hybrid of steel and concrete
was used to construct it. The distinctive bridge is supported by two
forked towers connected to the span by cables and girders. It was the Leonard P. Zakim Bridge
first bridge in the country to employ this method and it was, at the
time, the widest cable-stayed bridge in the world,[29] having since
been surpassed by theEastern span replacement of the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge
.

Meanwhile, construction continued on the Tobin Bridge approach. By the time all parties agreed on the I-93 design, construction of
the Tobin connector (today known as the "City Square T
unnel" for a Charlestown area it bypasses) was far along, significantly adding
to the cost of constructing theUS Route 1 interchange and retrofitting the tunnel.
Boston blue clay and other soils extracted from the path of the tunnel were used to cap many local landfills, fill in the Granite Rail
Quarry in Quincy, and restore the surface ofSpectacle Island in the Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area.

The Storrow Drive Connector, a companion bridge to the Zakim, began carrying traffic from I-93 to Storrow Drive in 1999. The
project had been under consideration for years, but was opposed by the wealthy residents of the Beacon Hill neighborhood. However,
it finally was accepted because it would funnel traffic bound for Storrow Drive and downtown Boston away from the mainline
roadway.[30] The Connector ultimately used a pair of ramps that had been constructed for
Interstate 695, enabling the mainline I-93 to
carry more traffic that would have used I-695 under the original Master Plan.

When construction began, the project cost, including the Charles River crossing, was estimated at $5.8 billion. Eventual
cost overruns
were so high that the chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, James Kerasiotes, was fired in 2000. His replacement had to
commit to an $8.55 billion cap on federal contributions. The total expenses eventually passed $15 billion. Interest brought this cost to
$21.93 billion.

Engineering methods and details

Several unusual engineering challenges arose during the project, requiring unusual
solutions and methods to address them.

At the beginning of the project, engineers had to figure out the safest way to build
the tunnel without endangering the existing elevated highway above. Eventually,
they created horizontal braces as wide as the tunnel, then cut away the elevated
[31]
highway's struts, and lowered it onto the new braces.

Final phases

Temporary supports hold up elevated

Central Artery during construction.

Interstate 93 Tunnel
On January 18, 2003, the opening ceremony was held for the I-90
Connector Tunnel, extending the Massachusetts Turnpike (Interstate
90) east into the Ted Williams Tunnel, and onwards to Boston Logan International Airport. The Ted Williams tunnel had been
completed and was in limited use for commercial traffic and high-occupancy vehicles since late 1995. The westbound lanes opened
on the afternoon of January 18 and the eastbound lanes on January 19.

The next phase, moving the elevated Interstate 93 underground, was completed in two stages: northbound lanes opened in March
2003 and southbound lanes (in a temporary configuration) on December 20, 2003. A tunnel underneath Leverett Circle connecting
eastbound Storrow Drive to I-93 North and the Tobin Bridge opened December 19, 2004, easing congestion at the circle. All
southbound lanes of I-93 opened to traffic on March 5, 2005, including the left lane of the Zakim Bridge, and all of the refurbished
Dewey Square Tunnel.

By the end of December 2004, 95% of the Big Dig was completed. Major construction remained on the surface, including
construction of final ramp configurations in theNorth End and in the South Bay interchange, and reconstruction of the surface streets.

The final ramp downtown — exit 20B fromI-93 south to Albany Street — opened January 13, 2006.[32]
In 2006, the two Interstate 93 tunnels were dedicated as the Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. Tunnel, after the former Democratic speaker of the
House of Representativesfrom Massachusetts who pushed to have the Big Dig funded by the federal government.

Coordinated projects
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was required under the Federal Clean Air Act to mitigate air pollution generated by the
highway improvements. Secretary of Transportation Fred Salvucci signed an agreement with the Conservation Law Foundation in
1990 enumerating 14 specific projects the state agreed to build.This list was affirmed in a 1992 lawsuit settlement.[33]

Projects which have been completed include:[33][34]

Restoration of three Old Colony Commuter Raillines

Expansion of Framingham Line to serve Worcester full-time
Restoration of the Newburyport/Rockport Line
Six-car trains on the MBTA Blue Line, requiring platform lengthening, station modernization, and all new train cars
MBTA Silver Line service to the South Boston waterfront
1,000 new commuter parking spaces[35]
[36]
As of 2014, several mitigation projects were incomplete:

Green Line Extension to Somerville and Medford

Fairmount Line improvements
Design of the Red-Blue Connector at Charles Street (under petition to remove from list)
Some projects, such as restoration of Green Line "E" Arborway service, were removed from the list of mitigation projects and
replaced with other projects with similar air-quality improvements.

Surface treatments
Some surface treatments, that were part of the original project plan, were dropped due to the massive cost overruns on the highway
portion of the project. For example, the North Point Park was created as part of the project, but it ended without constructing
pedestrian bridges to neighboring parks.The bridges were later funded by theAmerican Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
.

Public art
While not a legally mandated requirement, public art was part of the urban design planning process (and later design development
work) through the Artery Arts Program. The intent of the program was to integrate public art into highway infrastructure (retaining
walls, fences, and lighting) and the essential elements of the pedestrian environment (walkways, park landscape elements, and
bridges). As overall project costs increased, the Artery Arts Program was seen as a potential liability, even though there was support
and interest from the public and professional arts or
ganizations in the area.

At the beginning of the highway design process, a temporary arts program was initiated, and over 50 proposals were selected.
However, development began on only a few projects before funding for the program was cut. Permanent public art that was funded
includes: super graphic text and facades of former West End houses cast into the concrete elevated highway abutment support walls
near North Station by artist Sheila Levrant de Bretteville; Harbor Fog, a sensor-activated mist, light and sound sculptural
environment by artist Ross Miller in parcel 17; an historical sculpture celebrating the 18th and 19th century shipbuilding industry and
a bust of shipbuilder Donald McKay in East Boston; blue interior lighting of the Zakim Bridge; and the Miller's River Littoral Way
walkway and lighting under the loop ramps north of theCharles River.

Extensive landscape planting, as well as a maintenance program to support the plantings, was requested by many community
members during public meetings.

Impact on traffic
The Big Dig untangled the co-mingled traffic from the Massachusetts Turnpike and
the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels. While only one net lane in each direction was
added to the north–south I-93, several new east–west lanes became available. East–
west traffic on the Massachusetts Turnpike/I-90 now proceeds directly through the
Ted Williams Tunnel to Logan Airport and Route 1A beyond. Traffic between
Storrow Drive and the Callahan and Sumner Tunnels still uses a short portion of I-
93, but additional lanes and direct connections are provided for this traf
fic.

The result was a 62% reduction in vehicle hours of travel on I-93, the airport
tunnels, and the connection from Storrow Drive, from an average 38,200 hours per
day before construction (1994–1995) to 14,800 hours per day in 2004–2005, after
the project was largely complete.[37] The savings for travelers was estimated at $166
million annually in the same 2004–2005 time frame.[38] Travel times on the Central
[39]
Artery northbound during the afternoon peak hour were reduced 85.6%.

A 2008 Boston Globe report asserted that waiting time for the majority of trips
Traffic exiting the Thomas P. O'Neill
actually increased as a result of demand induced by the increased road capacity. Jr. Tunnel onto the Zakim Bridge.
Because more drivers were opting to use the new roads, traf
fic bottlenecks were only
pushed outward from the city, not reduced or eliminated (although some trips are
now faster). The report states, "Ultimately, many motorists going to and from the suburbs at peak rush hours are spending more time
stuck in traffic, not less." The Globe also asserted that their analysis provides a fuller picture of the traffic situation than a state-
commissioned study done two years earlier, in which the Big Dig was credited with helping to save at least $167 million a year by
increasing economic productivity and decreasing motor vehicle operating costs. That study did not look at highways outside the Big
[40]
Dig construction area and did not take into account new congestion elsewhere.

Operations Control Center (OCC)

As part of the project, an elaborate Operations Control Center (OCC) control room was constructed in South Boston. Staffed on a
"24/7/365" basis, this center monitors and reports on traffic congestion, and responds to emergencies. Continuous video surveillance
is provided by hundreds of cameras, and thousands of sensors monitor traffic speed and density, air quality, water levels,
temperatures, equipment status, and other conditions inside the tunnel. The OCC can activate emergency ventilation fans, change
.[41][42][43]
electronic display signs, and dispatch service crews when necessary

Problems

"Thousands of leaks"
As far back as 2001, Turnpike Authority officials and contractors knew of thousands of leaks in ceiling and wall fissures, extensive
[44] A $10 million contract, signed off as a
water damage to steel supports and fireproofing systems, and overloaded drainage systems.
cost overrun, was used to repair these leaks. Many of the leaks were a result of Modern Continental and other subcontractors failing
to remove gravel and other debris before pouring concrete. This information was not made public; engineers at MIT (volunteer
[45]
students and professors) performed several experiments and found serious problems with the tunnel.

On September 15, 2004, a major leak in the Interstate 93 north tunnel forced the closure of the tunnel while repairs were conducted.
This also forced the Turnpike Authority to release information regarding its non-disclosure of prior leaks. A follow-up reported on
"extensive" leaks that were more severe than state authorities had previously acknowledged. The report went on to state that the
$14.6 billion tunnel system was riddled with more than 400 leaks. A Boston Globe report, however, countered that by stating there
were nearly 700 leaks in a single 1,000-foot (300 m) section of tunnel beneath South Station. Turnpike officials also stated that the
[45]
number of leaks being investigated was down from 1,000 to 500.
The problem of leaks is further aggravated by the fact that many of them involve corrosive salt water. This is caused by the proximity
of Boston Harbor and the Atlantic Ocean, causing a mix of salt and fresh water leaks in the tunnel. The situation is made worse by
road salt spread in the tunnel to melt ice during freezing weather, or brought in by vehicles passing through.[46] Salt water and salt
spray are well-known issues that must be dealt with in any marine environment. It has been reported that "hundreds of thousands of
gallons of salt water are pumped out monthly" in the Big Dig, and a map has been prepared showing "hot spots" where water leakage
is especially serious.[47] Salt-accelerated corrosion has caused ceiling light fixtures to fail (see below), but can also cause rapid
[46]
deterioration of embeddedrebar and other structural steel reinforcements holding the tunnel walls and ceiling in place.

The much larger than expected volume of water that must be continuously pumped consumes a correspondingly larger amount of
electrical power, and will cause the pumps to wear out much sooner than originally estimated.

Substandard materials
Massachusetts State Policesearched the offices of Aggregate Industries, the largest concrete supplier for the underground portions of
the project, in June 2005. They seized evidence that Aggregate delivered concrete that did not meet contract specifications. In March
2006 Massachusetts Attorney GeneralTom Reilly announced plans to sue project contractors and others because of poor work on the
project. Over 200 complaints were filed by the state of Massachusetts as a result of leaks, cost overruns, quality concerns, and safety
[48]
violations. In total, the state has sought approximately $100 million from the contractors ($1 for every $141 spent).

In May 2006, six employees of the company were arrested and charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States. In July 2007,
Aggregate Industries settled the case with an agreement to pay $50 million. $42 million of the settlement went to civil cases and $8
million was paid in criminal fines. The company will provide $75 million in insurance for maintenance as well as pay $500,000
[49]
toward routine checks on areas suspected to contain substandard concrete.

Fatal ceiling collapse

A fatal accident raised safety questions and closed part of the project
for most of the summer of 2006. On July 10, 2006, concrete ceiling
panels and debris weighing 26 short tons (24 tonnes) and measuring
20 by 40 ft (6.1 by 12.2 m) fell on a car traveling on the two-lane
ramp connecting northbound I-93 to eastbound I-90 in South Boston,
killing Milena Del Valle, who was a passenger, and injuring her
husband, Angel Del Valle, who was driving.[50] Immediately
following the fatal ceiling collapse, GovernorMitt Romney ordered a
"stem-to-stern" safety audit conducted by the Illinois engineering
firm of Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc. to look for additional
Boston traffic crawls over a closedTed Williams
areas of risk. Said Romney: "We simply cannot live in a setting
Tunnel entrance in Boston duringrush hour on July
where a project of this scale has the potential of threatening human 11, 2006, the day after the collapse.
life, as has already been seen".[51] The collapse and closure of the
tunnel greatly snarled traffic in the city. The resulting traffic jams are
cited as contributing to the death of another person, a heart attack victim who died en route to Boston Medical Center when his
ambulance was caught in one such traffic jam two weeks after the collapse.[52] On September 1, 2006, one eastbound lane of the
connector tunnel was re-opened to traffic.[53][54]

Following extensive inspections and repairs, Interstate 90 east- and westbound lanes reopened in early January 2007.[55] The final
piece of the road network, a high occupancy vehicle lane connecting Interstate 93 north to the Ted Williams Tunnel, reopened on
June 1, 2007.

On July 10, 2007, after a lengthy investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board found that epoxy glue used to hold the roof
in place during construction was not appropriate for long-term bonding.[56] This was determined to be the cause of the roof collapse.
The Power-Fast Epoxy Adhesive used in the installation was designed for short-term loading, such as wind or earthquake loads, not
long-term loading, such as the weight of a panel.[57]

Powers Fasteners, the makers of the adhesive, revised their product specifications on May 15, 2007, to increase the safety factor from
4 to 10 for all of their epoxy products intended for use in overhead applications. The safety factor on Power-Fast Epoxy was
increased from 4 to 16.[57] On December 24, 2007, the Del Valle family announced they had reached a settlement with Powers
Fasteners that would pay the family $6 million.[58] In December 2008, Power Fasteners agreed to pay $16 million to the state to
settle manslaughter charges.[59]

"Ginsu guardrails"
Public safety workers have called the walkway safety handrails in the Big Dig tunnels "ginsu guardrails", because the squared-off
edges of the support posts have caused mutilations and deaths of passengers ejected from crashed vehicles. After an eighth reported
death involving the safety handrails, MassDOT officials announced plans to cover or remove the allegedly dangerous fixtures, but
only near curves or exit ramps.[60] This partial removal of hazards has been criticized by a safety specialist, who suggests that the
[60]
handrails are just as dangerous in straight sections of the tunnel.

Lighting fixtures
In March 2011, it became known that senior MassDOT officials had failed to disclose an issue with the lighting fixtures in the O'Neill
tunnel. In early February 2011, a maintenance crew found a fixture lying in the middle travel lane in the northbound tunnel.[61]
Assuming it to be simple road debris, the maintenance team picked it up and brought it back to its home facility. The next day, a
supervisor passing through the yard realized that the 120 lb (54 kg) fixture was not road debris but was in fact one of the fixtures used
to light the tunnel itself. Further investigation revealed that the fixture's mounting apparatus had failed, due to galvanic corrosion of
incompatible metals, caused by having aluminum in direct contact with stainless steel, in the presence of salt water.[47][62] The
electrochemical potential difference between stainless steel and aluminum is in the range of 0.5 to 1.0V, depending on the exact
alloys involved, and can cause considerable corrosion within months under unfavorable conditions.

After the discovery of the reason why the fixture had failed, a comprehensive inspection of the other fixtures in the tunnel revealed
that numerous other fixtures were also in the same state of deterioration.[63] Some of the worst fixtures were temporarily shored up
with plastic ties.[46] Moving forward with temporary repairs, members of the MassDOT administration team decided not to let the
Deval Patrick's administration.[64]
news of the systemic failure and repair of the fixtures be released to the public or to Governor

As of April 2012, it appeared that all of the 25,000 light fixtures would have to be replaced, at an estimated cost of $54 million.[46]
The replacement work is mostly done at night, and requires lane closures or occasional closing of the entire tunnel for safety, and was
estimated to take up to 2 years to complete.[46] As of April 2016, replacement of the light fixtures is still ongoing.

See also
Massachusetts Turnpike
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Megaproject
Vincent Zarrilli – critic of the Big Dig who proposed the Boston Bypass
Alaskan Way Viaduct replacement tunnel– similar project in Seattle, Washington
Carmel Tunnels – similar project in Haifa, Israel
Central-Wan Chai Bypass – similar project in the areas of Central, W an Chai and Causeway Bay, within Victoria City,
Hong Kong
Cross City Tunnel – similar project in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Dublin Port Tunnel – similar project on a smaller scale inDublin, Ireland
Gardiner Expressway – an elevated freeway inToronto with similar future plans
Autopista de Circunvalación M-30, Túneles de la M-30 and Parque Madrid Río – similar project along the banks of
Manzanares River, Madrid, Spain
Blanka tunnel complex– similar project in Prague, Czech Republic and the longest city tunnel in Europe (6.4 km /
4.0 mi)
 Yamate Tunnel – similar project on a larger scale inTokyo, Japan

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els-state-engineers) on 20 July 2011. Retrieved 11 July 2011.

External links
Official site
Project map
Boston CA/T Project History at MIT Rotch Library
PBS.org – Central Artery
Powell, Michael, "Boston's Big Dig Awash in Troubles", Washington Post, 2004-11-19, Retrieved on August 9, 2006.

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