VOL.

356, APRIL 19, 2001 671

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals

*
G.R. No. 114286. April 19, 2001.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST

CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, CONTINENTAL CEMENT
CORPORATION, GREGORY T. LIM and SPOUSE,
respondents.

Evidence; Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, especially

if they affirm factual findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed by the Supreme Court, unless these findings are not
supported by evidence.—On the first issue respecting the fact of
overpayment found by both the lower court and respondent Court
of Appeals, we stress the time-honored rule that findings of fact
by the Court of Appeals, especially if they affirm factual findings
of the trial court will not be disturbed by this Court, unless these
findings are not supported by evidence.
Loans; Banks and Banking; Letters of Credit; Interest Rates;
Compensation; It would be onerous to compute interest and other
charges on the face value of the letter of credit which a bank
issued, without first crediting or setting off the marginal deposit
which the borrower paid to it—compensation is proper and should
take effect by operation of law because the requisites in Article
1279 of the Civil Code are present and should extinguish both
debts to the concurrent amount.—Petitioner’s contention that the
marginal deposit made by respondent Corporation should not be
deducted outright from the amount of the letter of credit is
untenable. Petitioner argues that the marginal deposit should be
considered only

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

after computing the principal plus accrued interests and other

charges. However, to sustain petitioner on this score would be to
countenance a clear case of unjust enrichment, for while a
marginal deposit earns no interest in favor of the debtor-
depositor, the bank is not only able to use the same for its own
purposes, interest-free, but is also able to earn interest on the
money loaned to respondent Corporation. Indeed, it would be
onerous to compute interest and other charges on the face value of
the letter of credit which the petitioner issued, without first
crediting or setting off the marginal deposit which the respondent
Corporation paid to it. Compensation is proper and should take
effect by operation of law because the requisites in Article 1279 of
the Civil Code are present and should extinguish both debts to the
concurrent amount.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Floating Rates of Interest; Trust
Receipts Law; A stipulation for a floating rate of interest in a letter
of credit in which there is no reference rate set either by it or by the
Central Bank, leaving the determination thereof to the sole will
and control of the lender bank is invalid; While it may be
acceptable, for practical reasons given the fluctuating economic
conditions, for banks to stipulate that interest rates on a loan not
be fixed and instead be made dependent upon prevailing market
conditions, there should always be a reference rate upon which to
peg such variable interest rates.—Neither do we find error when
the lower court and the Court of Appeals set aside as invalid the
floating rate of interest exhorted by petitioner to be applicable.
The pertinent provision in the trust receipt agreement of the
parties fixing the interest rate states: I, WE jointly and severally
agree to any increase or decrease in the interest rate which may
occur after July 1, 1981, when the Central Bank floated the
interest rate, and to pay additionally the penalty of 1% per month
until the amount/s or installment/s due and unpaid under the
trust receipt on the reverse side hereof is/are fully paid. We agree
with respondent Court of Appeals that the foregoing stipulation is
invalid, there being no reference rate set either by it or by the
Central Bank, leaving the determination thereof at the sole will
and control of petitioner. While it may be acceptable, for practical
reasons given the fluctuating economic conditions, for banks to
stipulate that interest rates on a loan not be fixed and instead be
made dependent upon prevailing market conditions, there should
always be a reference rate upon which to peg such variable
interest rates.
 Same; Trust Receipts Law; Where the debtor received the
goods subject of the trust receipt before the trust receipt itself was
entered into, the transaction in question is a simple loan and not a
trust receipt agreement.—The recent case of Colinares v. Court of
Appeals appears to be foursquare with the facts obtaining in the
case at bar. There, we found

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

that inasmuch as the debtor received the goods subject of the

trust receipt before the trust receipt itself was entered into, the
transaction in question was a simple loan and not a trust receipt
agreement. Prior to the date of execution of the trust receipt,
ownership over the goods was already transferred to the debtor.
This situation is inconsistent with what normally obtains in a
pure trust receipt transaction, wherein the goods belong in
ownership to the bank and are only released to the importer in
trust after the loan is granted. In the case at bar, as in Colinares,
the delivery to respondent Corporation of the goods subject of the
trust receipt occurred long before the trust receipt itself was
executed. More specifically, delivery of the bunker fuel oil to
respondent Corporation’s Bulacan plant commenced on July 7,
1982 and was completed by July 19, 1982. Further, the oil was
used up by respondent Corporation in its normal operations by
August, 1982. On the other hand, the subject trust receipt was
only executed nearly two months after full delivery of the oil was
made to respondent Corporation, or on September 2, 1982.
Same; Same; Certainly, the payment of the sum of
P1,832,158.38 on a loan with a principal amount of P681,075.93
negates any badge of dishonesty, abuse of confidence or
mishandling of funds on the part of the borrower, which are the
gravamen of a trust receipt violation.—Respondent Corporation
cannot be said to have been dishonest in its dealings with
petitioner. Neither has it been shown that it has evaded payment
of its obligations. Indeed, it continually endeavored to meet the
same, as shown by the various receipts issued by petitioner
acknowledging payment on the loan. Certainly, the payment of
the sum of P1,832,158.38 on a loan with a principal amount of
only P681,075.93 negates any badge of dishonesty, abuse of
confidence or mishandling of funds on the part of respondent
Corporation, which are the gravamen of a trust receipt violation.
Furthermore, respondent Corporation is not an importer which
acquired the bunker fuel oil for re-sale; it needed the oil for its
own operations. More importantly, at no time did title over the oil
pass to petitioner, but directly to respondent Corporation to which
the oil was directly delivered long before the trust receipt was
executed.
Corporation Law; It is hornbook law that corporate
personality is a shield against personal liability of its officers—a
corporate officer and his spouse cannot be made personally liable
under a trust receipt where he entered into and signed the contract
clearly in his official capacity.—We are not convinced that
respondent Gregory T. Lim and his spouse should be personally
liable under the subject trust receipt. Petitioner’s argument that
respondent Corporation and respondent Lim and his spouse are
one and the same cannot be sustained. The transactions sued
upon were

674

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

clearly entered into by respondent Lim in his capacity as

Executive Vice President of respondent Corporation. We stress
the hornbook law that corporate personality is a shield against
personal liability of its officers. Thus, we agree that respondents
Gregory T. Lim and his spouse cannot be made personally liable
since respondent Lim entered into and signed the contract clearly
in his official capacity as Executive Vice President. The
personality of the corporation is separate and distinct from the
persons composing it.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Delos Reyes, Bañaga, Briones and Associates for
petitioner.
     Gil Venerando R. Racho for private respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for review

1
seeks to partially set aside
the July 26, 1993 Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 29950, insofar as it orders petitioner to
reimburse respondent Continental Cement Corporation the
amount of P490,228.90 with interest thereon at the legal
rate from July 26, 1988 until fully paid. The petition also
2
seeks to set aside the March 8, 1994 Resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals denying its Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On July 13, 1982, respondents Continental Cement
Corporation (hereinafter, respondent Corporation) and
Gregory T. Lim (hereinafter, respondent Lim) obtained
from petitioner Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
Letter of Credit No. DOM-23277 in the amount of
P1,068,150.00. On the same date, respondent Corporation
paid a marginal deposit of P320,445.00 to petitioner. The
letter of credit was used to purchase around five hundred
thousand liters

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Cezar D. Francisco and concurred in by

Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras and Buenaventura J. Guerrero;
Petition for Review, Annex “B”; Rollo, pp. 76-93.
2 Petition for Review, Annex “C”; Rollo, p. 95.

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
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of bunker fuel oil from Petrophil Corporation, which the

latter delivered directly to respondent Corporation in its
Bulacan plant. In relation to the same transaction, a trust
receipt for the amount of P1,001,520.93 was executed by
respondent Corporation, with respondent Lim as signatory.
Claiming that respondents failed to turn over the goods
covered by the trust receipt or the proceeds thereof,
petitioner filed a complaint for sum 3
of money with
application for preliminary attachment before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. In answer to the complaint,
respondents averred that the transaction between them
was a simple loan and not a trust receipt transaction, and
that the amount claimed by petitioner did not take into
account payments already made by them. Respondent Lim
also denied any personal liability in the subject
transactions. In a Supplemental Answer, respondents
prayed for reimbursement of alleged overpayment to
petitioner of the amount of P490,228.90.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the
following issues:
 1) Whether or not the transaction involved is a loan
transaction or a trust receipt transaction;
2) Whether or not the interest rates charged against
the defendants by the plaintiff are proper under the
letter of credit, trust receipt and under existing
rules or regulations of the Central Bank;
3) Whether or not the plaintiff properly applied the
previous payment of P300,456.27 by the defendant
corporation on July 13, 1982 as payment for the
latter’s account; and
4) Whether or not the defendants are personally4
liable
under the transaction sued for in this case.

On September
5
17, 1990, the trial court rendered its
Decision, dismissing the Complaint and ordering
petitioner to pay respondents the following amounts under
their counterclaim: P490,228.90

_______________

3 Docketed as Civil Case No. 86-38396; Record, pp. 1-11.

4 Pre-Trial Order, p. 3; Record, p. 236.
5 Penned by then Presiding Judge Bernardo P. Pardo, now Associate
Justice of this Court; Record, pp. 435-438.

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676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals

representing overpayment of respondent Corporation, with

interest thereon at the legal rate from July 26, 1988 until
fully paid; P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
partially modified the Decision by deleting the award of
attorney’s fees in favor of respondents and, instead,
ordering respondent Corporation to pay petitioner
P37,469.22 as and for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT

APPELLATE COURT ACTED INCORRECTLY OR
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS OVERPAYMENT
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE
PETITIONER IN THE AMOUNT OF P490,228.90
 DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
COMPUTATION MADE IN THE DECISION AND
THE ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF
PAYMENTS WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MANNER OF
COMPUTATION OF THE MARGINAL DEPOSIT
BY THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT IS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH BANKING PRACTICE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE AGREEMENT AMONG
THE PARTIES AS TO THE FLOATING OF
INTEREST RATE IS VALID UNDER
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE CENTRAL
BANK.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THE TRANSACTION AT
BAR AS A TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION ON
THE BASIS OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND FOR
WHICH RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE
THEREFOR.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SPOUSES LIABLE UNDER6
THE TRUST
RECEIPT TRANSACTION.

The petition must be denied.

On the first issue respecting the fact of overpayment
found by both the lower court and respondent Court of
Appeals, we stress

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6 Petition for Review, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 17-18.

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
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the time-honored rule that findings of fact by the Court of

Appeals, especially if they affirm factual findings of the
trial court will not be disturbed by this7 Court, unless these
findings are not supported by evidence.
Petitioner decries the lack of computation by the lower
court as basis for its ruling that there was an overpayment
made. While such a computation may not have appeared in
the Decision itself, we note that the trial court’s finding of
overpayment is supported by evidence presented before it.
At any rate, we painstakingly reviewed and computed the
payments together with the interest and penalty charges
due thereon and found that the amount of overpayment
made by respondent Bank to petitioner, i.e., P563,070.13,
was more than what was ordered reimbursed by the lower
court. However, since respondents did not file an appeal in
this case, the amount ordered reimbursed by the lower
court should stand.
Moreover, petitioner’s contention that the marginal
deposit made by respondent Corporation should not be
deducted outright from the amount of the letter of credit is
untenable. Petitioner argues that the marginal deposit
should be considered only after computing the principal
plus accrued interests and other charges. However, to
sustain petitioner on this score would be to countenance a
clear case of unjust enrichment, for while a marginal
deposit earns no interest in favor of the debtor-depositor,
the bank is not only able to use the same for its own
purposes, interest-free, but is also able to earn interest on
the money loaned to respondent Corporation. Indeed, it
would be onerous to compute interest and other charges on
the face value of the letter of credit which the petitioner
issued, without first crediting or setting off the marginal
deposit which the respondent Corporation paid to it.
Compensation is proper and should take effect by operation
of law because the

_______________

7 Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102967, 10 February 2000,

325 SCRA 259, citing Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 670 (1998)
and Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351 (1998).

678

678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals

requisites in Article 1279 of the Civil Code are present 8and

should extinguish both debts to the concurrent amount.
 Hence, the interests and other charges on the subject
letter of credit should be computed only on the balance of
P681,075.93, which was the portion actually loaned by the
bank to respondent Corporation.
Neither do we find error when the lower court and the
Court of Appeals set aside as invalid the floating rate of
interest exhorted by petitioner to be applicable. The
pertinent provision in the trust receipt agreement of the
parties fixing the interest rate states:

I, WE jointly and severally agree to any increase or decrease in

the interest rate which may occur after July 1, 1981, when the
Central Bank floated the interest rate, and to pay additionally the
penalty of 1% per month until the amount/s or installment/s due
and unpaid under 9
the trust receipt on the reverse side hereof
is/are fully paid.

We agree with respondent Court of Appeals that the

foregoing stipulation is invalid, there being no reference
rate set either by it or by the Central Bank, leaving the
determination thereof at the sole will and control of
petitioner.
While it may be acceptable, for practical reasons given
the fluctuating economic conditions, for banks to stipulate
that interest rates on a loan not be fixed and instead be
made dependent upon prevailing market conditions, there
should always be a reference rate upon which to peg such
variable interest rates. An example of such a valid variable10
interest rate was found in Polotan, Sr. v. Court of Appeals.
In that case, the contractual provision stating that “if there
occurs any change in the prevailing market rates, the new
interest rate shall be the guiding rate in computing the
interest due on the outstanding obligation without need of
serving notice to the Cardholder other than the required
posting on 11 the monthly statement served to the
Cardholder” was considered valid. The

_______________

8 Civil Code, Art. 1290; Abad v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 191 (1990).
9 Exhibit “A.”
10 296 SCRA 247 (1998).
11 Emphasis ours.

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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
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aforequoted provision was upheld notwithstanding that it
may partake of the nature of an escalation clause, because
at the same time it provides for the decrease in the interest
rate in case the prevailing market rates dictate its
reduction. In other words, unlike the stipulation subject of
the instant case, the interest rate involved in the Polotan
case is designed to be based on the prevailing market rate.
On the other hand, a stipulation ostensibly signifying an
agreement to “any increase or decrease in the interest
rate,” without more, cannot be accepted by this Court as
valid for it leaves solely to the creditor the determination of
what interest rate to charge against an outstanding loan.
Petitioner has also failed to convince us that its
transaction with respondent Corporation is really a trust
receipt transaction instead of merely a simple loan, as
found by the lower court and the Court of Appeals. 12
The recent case of Colinares v. Court of Appeals
appears to be foursquare with the facts obtaining in the
case at bar. There, we found that inasmuch as the debtor
received the goods subject of the trust receipt before the
trust receipt itself was entered into, the transaction in
question was a simple loan and not a trust receipt
agreement. Prior to the date of execution of the trust
receipt, ownership over the goods was already transferred
to the debtor. This situation is inconsistent with what
normally obtains in a pure trust receipt transaction,
wherein the goods belong in ownership to the bank and are
only released to the importer in trust after the loan is
granted.
In the case at bar, as in Colinares, the delivery to
respondent Corporation of the goods subject of the trust
receipt occurred long before the trust receipt itself was
executed. More specifically, delivery of the bunker fuel oil
to respondent Corporation’s Bulacan plant commenced 13
on
July 7, 1982 and was completed by July 19, 1982. Further,
the oil was used up by respondent 14
Corporation in its
normal operations by August, 1982. On the other hand,
the

_______________

12 G.R. No. 90828, 5 September 2000, 339 SCRA 609.

13 TSN, 19 April 1989, p. 9; Exhibits “9” and “10”; Record, pp. 301-302.
14 Ibid., p. 12.

680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals

subject trust receipt was only executed nearly two months

after full delivery of the oil was made to respondent
Corporation, or on September 2, 1982.
The danger in characterizing a simple loan as a trust
receipt transaction was explained in Colinares, to wit:

The Trust Receipts Law does not seek to enforce payment of the
loan, rather it punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in
the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another
regardless of whether the latter is the owner. Here, it is crystal
clear that on the part of Petitioners there was neither dishonesty
nor abuse of confidence in the handling of money to the prejudice
of PBC. Petitioners continually endeavored to meet their
obligations, as shown by several receipts issued by PBC
acknowledging payment of the loan.
The Information charges Petitioners with intent to defraud and
misappropriating the money for their personal use. The mala
prohibita nature of the alleged offense notwithstanding, intent as
a state of mind was not proved to be present in Petitioners’
situation. Petitioners employed no artifice in dealing with PBC
and never did they evade payment of their obligation nor attempt
to abscond. Instead, Petitioners sought favorable terms precisely
to meet their obligation.
Also noteworthy is the fact that Petitioners are not importers
acquiring the goods for re-sale, contrary to the express provision
embodied in the trust receipt. They are contractors who obtained
the fungible goods for their construction project. At no time did
title over the construction materials pass to the bank, but directly
to the Petitioners from CM Builders Centre. This impresses upon
the trust receipt in question vagueness and ambiguity, which
should not be the basis for criminal prosecution in the event of
violation of its provisions.
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts
to facilitate collection of loans and place them under the threats of
criminal prosecution should they be unable to pay it may be
unjust and inequitable, if not reprehensible. Such agreements are
contracts of adhesion which berrowers have no option but to sign
lest their loan be disapproved. The resort to this scheme leaves
poor and hapless borrowers at the mercy of banks, and is prone to
misinterpretation, as had happened in this case. Eventually, PBC
showed its true colors and admitted that it was only after
collection of the money, as manifested by its Affidavit of
Desistance.
Similarly, respondent Corporation cannot be said to have
been dishonest in its dealings with petitioner. Neither has
it been shown
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Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
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that it has evaded payment of its obligations. Indeed, it

continually endeavored to meet the same, as shown by the
various receipts issued by petitioner acknowledging
payment on the loan. Certainly, the payment of the sum of
P1,832,158.38 on a loan with a principal amount of only
P681,075.93 negates any badge of dishonesty, abuse of
confidence or mishandling of funds on the part of
respondent Corporation, which are the gravamen of a trust
receipt violation. Furthermore, respondent Corporation is
not an importer which acquired the bunker fuel oil for re-
sale; it needed the oil for its own operations. More
importantly, at no time did title over the oil pass to
petitioner, but directly to respondent Corporation to which
the oil was directly delivered long before the trust receipt
was executed. The fact that ownership of the oil belonged to
respondent Corporation, through its President, Gregory
Lim, was acknowledged by petitioner’s own account officer
on the witness stand, to wit:

Q After the bank opened a letter of credit in favor of

Petrophil Corp. for the account of the defendants
thereby paying the value of the bunker fuel oil what
transpired next after that?
A Upon purchase of the bunker fuel oil and upon the
requests of the defendant possession of the bunker fuel
oil were transferred to them.
Q You mentioned them to whom are you referring to?
A To the Continental Cement Corp. upon the execution of
the trust receipt acknowledging the ownership of the
bunker fuel oil this should be acceptable for whatever
disposition he may make.
Q You mentioned about acknowledging ownership of the
bunker fuel oil to whom by whom?
A By the Continental Cement Corp.
Q So by your statement who really owns the bunker fuel
oil?
ATTY. RACHON:
  Objection already answered.
COURT:
  Give time to the other counsel to object.

682

682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals

ATTY. RACHON:
  He has testified that ownership was acknowledged in
favor of Continental Cement Corp. so that question has
already been answered.
ATTY. BAÑAGA:
  That is why I made a follow up question asking
ownership of the bunker fuel oil.
COURT:
  Proceed.
ATTY. BANAGA:
Q Who owns the bunker fuel oil after purchase from
Petrophil Corp.?
15
A Gregory Lim.

By all indications, then, it is apparent that there was really

no trust receipt transaction that took place. Evidently,
respondent Corporation was required to sign the trust
receipt simply to facilitate collection by petitioner of the
loan it had extended to the former.
Finally, we are not convinced that respondent Gregory
T. Lim and his spouse should be personally liable under the
subject trust receipt. Petitioner’s argument that respondent
Corporation and respondent Lim and his spouse are one
and the same cannot be sustained. The transactions sued
upon were clearly entered into by respondent Lim in his
capacity as Executive Vice President of respondent
Corporation. We stress the hornbook law that corporate
personality is a shield against personal liability of its
officers. Thus, we agree that respondents Gregory T. Lim
and his spouse cannot be made personally liable since
respondent Lim entered into and signed the contract
clearly in his official capacity as Executive Vice President.
 The personality of the corporation
16
is separate and distinct
from the persons composing it.

_______________

15 TSN, 12 April 1989, pp. 4-5.

16 FCY Construction Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 270
(2000), citing Rustan Pulp and Paper Mills, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 665, 672 (1992).

683

VOL. 356, APRIL 19, 2001 683

People vs. Salanguit

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant

Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29950 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Kapunan,

JJ., concur. Pardo, J., No part.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—The penal provision of Presidential Decree

(P.D.) 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation
covered by a trust receipt—it is not limited to transactions
in goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped, stored or
processed as a component of a product ultimately sold.
(Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16 [2000])
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust
receipts to facilitate collection of loans and place them
under the threats of criminal prosecution should they be
unable to pay it may be unjust and inequitable, if not
reprehensible. (Colinares vs. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA
609 [2000])

——o0o——

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