Delsan Transport Lines vs.
C&A Construction waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the
Facts: Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to
construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was
completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA. M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and
operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose
of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank.
Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report that a typhoon was going to hit
Manila. Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor
power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his
crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power
barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the
power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the
deflector wall constructed by respondent. The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 46, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the
damage was caused by a fortuitous event.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary
precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the emergency rule, it absolved petitioner of liability
because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation.
It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held
liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon Katring, which is an act of God.
On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed. Hence this petition.
Issue: WON Capt. Jusep was negligent and WON petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 for the
quasi-delict commited by the captain?
Ruling: 1. Yes, he was negligent. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21,
1994. As early as 12:00 midnight, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which
unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that
the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is
not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the
present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt.
Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the
lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. He cannot claim that he
report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise.
Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very
cloudy and there was no weather disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances of
finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was very
near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in
other ports.
2. Yes, the petitioner is solidarily liable. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury
to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the
employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty. The defense
raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep because the latter
is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that the required diligence
of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection, but also to the supervision of employees.
It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is
still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.
Lilius vs Manila Railroad
Facts: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first
time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no
knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was
nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or
eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several
people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed
down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he
did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black
mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were
hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every allegation
thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and
coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
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The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said
judgment.
Issue: WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages
Ruling: Yes. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the
opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company alone,
for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by
of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad;
and, on the part of its employees — the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post
at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of
a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising
their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law
requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates
or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
Picart vs Smith
Facts: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive
blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the
road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In
so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away
or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When
he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing
the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
Issue: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done
Ruling: Yes. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in
the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Pantranco North Express vs. Baesa
Facts: Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary
of the Baesa spouses. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph,
a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter
Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through
her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
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PANTRANCO alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. CA upheld RTC in favor of Baesa.
Issue: WON the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the
collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence
Ruling: No. Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as
a defense to defeat claim for damages. For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it.
There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he
saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve
the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return
the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction. Even
assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he
had no opportunity to avoid it.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the
peril is or should have been discovered.
Vergara vs. CA
Facts: An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by private
respondent against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August
1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner,
rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which
were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte
operated said cargo truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to
respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said
cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private respondent) and that the said accident was an
act of God for which he cannot be held liable."
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue: WON petitioner is guilty of negligence
Ruling: Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or
negligence is not tenable. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict
are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act
or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner.
The issue of whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was
passed upon by the trial court. The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we
are not prepared to now disturb, show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was
sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of
negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police
report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed
to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another
bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to
mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot
be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident
preventable.
Umali vs. Bacani
Facts: A storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana
plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio of said municipality and near the transmission
line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live
electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground under the fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so
he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw
Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then and there
of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it
but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
Sometime after the barrio captain and Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3 years and 8
months old whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken
line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was
only after the electrocution of the child that the broken wire was fixed on the same morning by the
lineman of the electric plant.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and
manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy’s death electrocution could
not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the
banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his
employee Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents
of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.
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Issue: WON petitioner is guilty of negligence for the death of the child
Ruling: Yes. A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants’ employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution.
First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the
incident standing on an elevated ground and which were higher than the electric post supporting the
electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily
seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being
blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the
electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible
damage the storm could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and
property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could
have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.
Third, employee Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was
already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a
danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent
anybody from approaching the live wire.
On defendants’ argument that the proximate cause of the victim’s death could be attributed to the
parents’ negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily see
that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants’ employees
resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody,
even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same fate that
befell the victim.. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due
to the parents’ negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he
accidentally touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this
case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants’
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner’s liability for injury caused by his employees’ negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which states:
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion
of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the
employer is primary and direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may
escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent
damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their
work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court.
Bustamante vs. CA
Facts: At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand
truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT
259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the
body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the
driver’s seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out
and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.
The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other
in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the passengers. It could not be determined
from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of
the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The
Court of Appeals ruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate
cause of the collision.
Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.
Ruling: The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of
whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the
latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third
persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action
which could have avoided the injury. The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at
bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs
of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
Cadiente vs. Macas
Facts: Bithuel Macas while standing on the shoulder of the road was bumped and run over by a Ford
Fiera, driven by Cimafranca which resulted to the amputation of both legs up to the groins of the victim.
Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of Atty. Cadiente, who however,
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claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera since he
already sold it to Engr. Jalipa on March 28, 1994.

The victim's father, filed a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before
the RTC of Davao City. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa. Jalipa, however, filed
a fourth-party complaint against Abubakar, to whom Jalipa allegedly sold the vehicle on June 20, 1994.

The RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa
jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence. The Court of Appeals
denied their appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue: 1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, hence not entitled to
recover damages. 2. Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally
liable to the victim.

Ruling: 1. NONE. Records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the
shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder
was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading
passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said
uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing
down, took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and
recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he should be when the
unfortunate event transpired.

2. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily
responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. In the case of Villanueva
v. Domingo, we said that the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner
who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as
not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured.
Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the
misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the
respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two
remaining limbs.