RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
G.R. No. L-37652 December 26, 1984
VIRGINIA B. PRADO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. RAFAEL SISON, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXVII, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Procedure; Elements of a Prejudicial Question.—For a civil action to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Same; Same; Bigamy case should be suspended upon filing of annulment suit concerning
the second marriage grounded on lack of consent thereto.—The foregoing requisites being
present in the case at bar, the suspensive effect of a prejudicial question comes into play.
The Solicitor General’s opposition to the suspension of trial in the Bigamy Case on the
allegations that the civil action for annulment was belatedly filed after petitioner had faced
trial in the Bigamy Case and only to stave off prosecution; that the grounds for annulment of
her second marriage are bereft of factual basis and truth in that petitioner would not have
waited for two (2) years from the filing of the bigamy charge, or for almost four (4) years from
the celebration of the second marriage, before filing the annulment case, if she had valid
grounds to annul the same; that she had freely cohabited with Julio Manalansang for about
six (6) months after their marriage; and that even her mother was present during the
marriage ceremony, are all defenses which may be raised in Annulment Case, and which
must still be proved. Should petitioner be able to establish that her consent to the second
marriage was, indeed, obtained by means of force and intimidation, her act of entering into
marriage with Julio Manalansang would be involuntary, and there can be no conviction for
the crime of Bigamy.
Same; Same; Same.—And while it may be, as contended by the Solicitor General, that the
mere filing of an Annulment Case does not automatically give rise to a prejudicial question
as to bar trial of a Bigamy Case, considering the gravity of the charge, petitioner cannot be
deprived of her right to prove her grounds for annulment, which could well be determinative
of her guilt or innocence. The State is not thereby deprived from proceeding with the criminal
case in the event that the Court decrees against petitioner in the Annulment Case. Prado vs.
People, 133 SCRA 602, No. L-37652 December 26, 1984
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Whether or not a pending civil suit for annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question in a Bigamy Case is the issue involved in this Petition for certiorari & Prohibition.
On August 5, 1971, an Information was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXVII, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5877 (the Bigamy Case) charging petitioner
Virginia B. Prado with the crime of Bigamy, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October 1969, in Saigon, South Vietnam, at the
Philippine Embassy which is an extension of Philippine Sovereignty and therefore
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having been
previously legally united in wedlock with one Arturo R. Espiritu without said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract, a subsequent and second marriage with one Julio Manalansang.
Contrary to law. 1
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over the marriage solemnized in
Saigon, as it is outside Philippine territory and the case does not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, which allow enforcement of criminal laws outside the Philippine Archipelago.2 Opposition based on the
principle of extraterritoriality was filed by the prosecution. Dismissal was denied by the Trial Court, which Order was assailed by
petitioner in a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-36344. 3 We resolved to dismiss the same
"for being premature, an appeal by way of review on certiorari in due course being the proper remedy. 4
On July 21, 1973, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an action for
annulment of her Saigon marriage (Civil Case No. C-2894) contending that her consent
thereto was obtained by means of force and intimidation, and that she never freely
cohabited with her second husband, Julio Manalansang. The case was subsequently
transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City, docketed as
Family Case No. 029.
On July 23, 1973, a "Motion to Suspend Trial by Reason of the Existence of Prejudicial
Question" was filed by petitioner in the Bigamy Case. The prosecution opposed the same
maintaining that it was merely a device resorted to by petitioner to delay the disposition of
said criminal case.
Respondent Court denied suspension of trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
reiterating her argument that a prejudicial question exists, which must first be resolved as
the same would be determinative of her guilt or innocence. Reconsideration was denied on
September 19, 1973, the Trial Court ruling that the Motion to Suspend was only a scheme to
unduly delay the hearing of the case. Thus, this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition seeking
the annulment of said Order.
On November 16, 1973, respondent Court, motu proprio, suspended the proceedings in the
Bigamy Case upon being informed of the pendency of the present Petition before this
Court. 5
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 6
The foregoing requisites being present in the case at bar, the suspensive effect of a
prejudicial question comes into play. The Solicitor General's opposition to the suspension of
trial in the Bigamy Case on the allegations that the civil action for annulment was belatedly
filed after petitioner had faced trial in the Bigamy Case and only to stave off prosecution; that
the grounds for annulment of her second marriage are bereft of factual basis and truth in
that petitioner would not have waited for two (2) years from the filing of the bigamy charge,
or for almost four (4) years from the celebration of the second marriage, before filing the
annulment case, if she had valid grounds to annul the same; that she had freely cohabited
with Julio Manalansang for about six (6) months after their marriage; and that even her
mother was present during the marriage ceremony, are all defenses which may be raised in
the Annulment Case, and which must still be proved. Should petitioner be able to establish
that her consent to the second marriage was, indeed, obtained by means of force and
intimidation, her act of entering into marriage with Julio Manalansang would be involuntary,
and there can be no conviction for the crime of Bigamy.
And while it may be, as contended by the Solicitor General, that the mere filing of an
Annulment Case does not automatically give rise to a prejudicial question as to bar trial of a
Bigamy Case, considering the gravity of the charge, petitioner cannot be deprived of her
right to prove her grounds for annulment, which could wen be determinative of her guilt or
innocence. The State is not thereby deprived from proceeding with the criminal case in the
event that the Court decrees against petitioner in the Annulment Case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of September 19, 1973 is hereby set aside. As the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5877 had already been suspended, the same shall be
resumed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the final determination of Family Case No.
029 of the former Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City, if the same has not
yet been terminated, and if the Decision in the latter case should so warrant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the
Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Elements; The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.—The rationale behind
the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage; Concubinage; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The
pendency of a case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to a
concubinage case.—The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending
the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is
that for the purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.—In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the import of said provision is
that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; The accused in a case for
concubinage need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.—So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like
the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A subsequent pronouncement that the accused’s
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a charge for concubinage—he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.—With regard to petitioner’s argument that
he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null
and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense. Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova
cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court held that: “x x x Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; He who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for concubinage.—In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has noterred in affirming the Orders
of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage. Beltran vs.
People, 334 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to
review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A.
Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No.
98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case
against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at
the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2 petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information6 against them. The case, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 61. 1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case,
petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari,
questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9 dated
January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said
Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result
from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the
civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the
evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be
avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of
marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity
then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never
existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because
he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage
an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for
purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of
said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a
final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case
of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this
Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties
to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders
of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Criminal Procedure; Informations; Designation of Offense; It is required that the acts and
omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information.—
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be alleged in the Information. The real nature of the crime charged is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the
offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by
reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
Same; Prejudicial Questions; The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.—A prejudicial
question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending
a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
Abunado vs. People, 426 SCRA 562, G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting
petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the
Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but
returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-
marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon
Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second
marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San
Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On May
18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal
trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation
in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and
Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed
but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused
is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage
was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be alleged in the Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information
and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in
the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the
Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the
specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage
with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San
Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16,
1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10,
1989which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in
the month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information
clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore, that the information was defective is
untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have
been raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently
established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the
alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on
appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the
effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he
entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and
convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal
action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a
public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by
a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a
prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been
suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.
The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period
which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term
should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.—Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender
has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second
or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.—It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding
that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Same; Same; He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.—The Court recently upheld the
ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Same; Same; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; It is a settled rule that the criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.—It is a settled rule
that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear
then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the
second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for
bigamy against him. Capili vs. People, 700 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili
and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a
pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of
Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared
null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of
the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
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RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or
incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the
legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for
the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision
dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying
the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said
decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others,
that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this
above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not
determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this
Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the
accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley
G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City
which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second
marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s
decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE
OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND
DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER
P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL
AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043,
IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF
THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS
AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS
IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL
BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
8
RULE 111 – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – 4 CASES
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE
BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL
AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF
THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY
RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK
IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for
being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the
crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the
crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant]
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled
that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished
as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner
from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality
of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing
of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February
1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.