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G.R. No.

96177 January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990,1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:

That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a
prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty.3

At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust
operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of
Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:

Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a
NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to
conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received
from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado
Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the
house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also
described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-
wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to
be marijuana.

The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned
as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation
Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned
as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he
had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian
vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego
and Sgt. Biong.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group
positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could
see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who
came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari
Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back
and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and
inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions
and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani
joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.

At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another
boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second
time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari
Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked
money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has
given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the
NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he
had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").

In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name
— Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-
bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more
marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory,
Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped
"RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.

Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the marijuana
specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results
for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry Report
D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in
court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen written with red ink on
each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the
test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry
Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)

T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial, the words "buy-
bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the
receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature
thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory
(Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked
"RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").4

For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife.
The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:

[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga
City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a
male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his
wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was
open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were
NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had
a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose
contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother,
Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari
Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.

Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City.
Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was
reduced into writing. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated
that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign
because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the
assistance of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.

Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed
which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa
was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-
examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three
NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single
question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been
maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.

Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he
had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was
afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had
a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.5

After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana
and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of
P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary imprisonment.6

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.

The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation,
neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no
witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.

Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the
appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter.7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt.
Belarga on the same day.8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following
day.9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt.
Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga
City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a
marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.

Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached the house.
Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana. 12 Sgt. Ani gave
him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana
which he handed to Sgt. Ani.13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. 14

After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right
hand.15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the
appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16

The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted
in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally
untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.

The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is without merit.
The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through
this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the
following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between
the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.17

The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana
while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has
been held to be not crucial18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the
consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco,19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the
commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant
may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.

The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that
since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly
witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette
from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the
appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.

People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were certain that the
appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court
rejected this claim, stating that:

This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are with
contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.

Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes because according
to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13,
1984, p. 10).

It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the
distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters. 21

In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani.
What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's
testimony reads:22

Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari Musa?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please tell us?

A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded,
I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he was met by one person and
later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw that
Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the
house and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100
meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was
marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to
be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a
surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same
day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of
marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14,
1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00
marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville,
Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned
themselves in strategic places;28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place. 29

The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled
that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the
poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence,
direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the
prohibited drug

The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM
agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents,
the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find
it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt.
Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the
corner of the kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried
marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the
trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence.33

Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by
providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any
evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35

While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are
recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant
is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."37

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon
the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of
the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation
conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing.
They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 41

In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant husband was
selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it.
There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers,
after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a
brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used
as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before
the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute
a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized
drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 46

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money
which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic
bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents
had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the
police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the
NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.
They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case
could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then,
that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to
be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the
plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer.48

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained
in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of
marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and
MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine
C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors
— several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event,
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of
the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and
things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of
a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly
object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it
affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291
F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was
taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution
of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the
search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the
answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating
a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed
in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it
fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights
— that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as
the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search
warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to
an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired,
is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
20After
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. reviewing
previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter
of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon
which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state
or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right
to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the
admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on
which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment
is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is,
therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable
in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit
it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason
why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly
abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room
No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records,
papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records,
papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein,
but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would
appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory
now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents
of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the
search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the
twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court
on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are
therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void the
searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to
move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with
which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places
other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view
even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of
this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and
future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants
and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore
unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether
or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were
illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a
determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the
requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places
other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts
have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects
gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives "standing";
and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2,
1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned
by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing
as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296
F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United
States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States,
8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United
States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area,
be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his
pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was
that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases
which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections
of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing
we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable.
(Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13,
1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move
for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary
and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within
the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which
the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched
premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of
the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is
unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely
historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in
the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often
only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to
have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several
corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return
and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled to
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure
were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so
obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary
standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert
Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is
under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United
States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme
Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that
the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged
to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant
organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First —he had a sufficient interest in the property seized,
and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully
searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and
seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of
the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two
notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that
several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed
at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended
that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because
the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to
enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling
a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The
defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the
seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private,
personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not
even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held
invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return ofall the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell.
The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the
records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the
mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M.
Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule
even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether
he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498
(1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. The
factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the
illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed
against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the
extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or
places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably
show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and
seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized,
be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them
as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents
and things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued
the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically
mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great
clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases
not criminal in origin or nature.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues
that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to
determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses
(e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as
the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in


Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by
the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death
for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court
in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule
124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his
loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s
absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could
be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at
the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment
(the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion
remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367


Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as
the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,


its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused,
in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is
not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring
clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes
(as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming
them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional
crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a
way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There
are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding
penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that
the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to
person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands
on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a
crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated
Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-
crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes.
Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate
fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of
quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring
second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of


Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied
to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused
for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since
then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges,
the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc,
per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in 1960
by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova,
J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred
the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade,
El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution
of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries
arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s
inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter
were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property
for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising
from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice
J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one
and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused,
a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory
decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless
imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot
be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v.
Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second
case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the
case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case
No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were
filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these
two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the
Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal
filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance,
upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the
order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to
his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of
Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and
reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before
the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the
evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have
been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis
of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said
State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said
ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the
Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized


Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46); and (2) when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent
acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling
under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should
such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied
Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony,
in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing
the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge
with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes),
even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves
only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as
grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v.
Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but
if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one
for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except
for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under
the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined
under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of
quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each
as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep
inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent
to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar
a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could
not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court
in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the
number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided,
not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of
the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44627 December 14, 1978

LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner,


vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON,
and FELIPE AIZON, respondents.

Geronimo Pajarito for petitioner.

Dominador L. Natividad for private respondents,

ANTONIO, J.:

Original special civil action for certiorari.

Private respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch 11 (respondent
Judge Alberto V. Seneris, presiding), with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence or a violation of Section 48 of Republic
Act No. 4136. The pertinent portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about May 9, 1975, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. SB-
511 owned and operated by FELIPE AIZON, operating on the public road, and without taking the necessary
precautions, considering the width, traffic, visibility, grades, crossing, curvatures, and other conditions of the
road, so as to avoid accident to persons or damage to properties, did then and there, through reckless and fast
driving, caused the said Isuzu Passenger Bus to turn turtle, as a result of which, the persons of MYRNA
PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING, both passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger bus
sustained injuries on their persons which caused their death. (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In view of said plea, the court rendered judgment convicting him of
the offense charged and sentencing him "to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis the amount of P12,000.00
... ."

After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon for the indemnity of
P12,000.00, but the same was returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency. Whereupon, petitioner Lucia S. Pajarito, mother
of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis, filed with the court a quo a motion for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution and
served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito Aizon as alleged in the Information. Felipe Aizon
opposed the motion on the grounds, to wit: (1) that he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question having been
sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of transfer has not been executed because the full price has not
yet been paid; and (2) that in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as
the indemnity is concerned.

The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito,
was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case. Said the court:

It is therefore, the well considered opinion of this Court that a separate civil action must be filed by movant Lucia
S. Pajarito against Felipe Aizon in order to enforce the subsidiary liability of the latter under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the enforcement of tile subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be filled under
the same criminal case, under which the subsidiary liability was granted; that respondent Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of
Joselito Aizon, was given his day in court, as he was furnished a copy of the motion for issuance of the Subsidiary Writ of
Execution, to which he filed his opposition; and that, although not made a party in the criminal case, the employer, Felipe Aizon,
should have taken active participation in the defense of his employee, Joselito Aizon.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment to the petition which We consider their Answer, maintain that to enforce the
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a separate civil action must be filed against the
employer because under our present judicial system, before one could be held subsidiary liable, he should be made a party
defendant to the action, which in this case is not legally feasible because respondent Felipe Aizon was not accused together with
Joselito Aizon in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) for Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence.

Obviously, the question to be considered here is whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate civil action. Under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution
of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action
or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant. As explained in Ramcar, Incorporated v. De Leon: 1 "When no civil
action is expressly instituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly instituted with the
criminal action.' That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same completeness as any
of the two normal persons composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary
processes provided by law."

Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the
employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. 2 The subsidiary civil liability
of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. In Martinez v. Barredo, 3 this Court
ruled that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between
the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary
liability.

... The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common sense
dictates that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should
not be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment,
unless those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to
automatically set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous, to say the least,
to suppose that the driver, excelling 'Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', could be guilty of reckless negligence in so far as
his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could be free from any blame when said
indemnity is sought to be collected mom his employer, although the right to the indemnity arose from and was
based on one and the same act of the driver.

The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not
one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which
enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal
negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in
the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's
subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almelda et al. vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S.,
476, 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco us. Onrubia, 46 Phil., 327; Province
of Ilocos Sur us. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p.
403)

It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep
interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of
the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and consequently doing
away with the practice of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the
part of the employer shall have been satisfied. (At pp. 3-4)

In Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 4 this Court further amplified the rule that the decision convicting the employee is
binding and conclusive upon the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but also with regard to its amount
because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. That is why the law says that his liability
is subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow an employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would
be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court." And this Court, in Miranda, further explained that
the employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by
law.

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee, but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It
is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is
also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded
against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court, for the enforcement of his subsidiary
liability, that he was not given his day in court . (At p. 675. Emphasis supplied.)

The conclusiveness upon the employer of the judgment of conviction sentencing the employee to pay civil indemnity, for the
enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 was again reiterated in Manalo and Salvador v. Robles
Transportation Company, Inc., 5 where the Court ruled that the sheriff's return submitted in evidence in the action against the
employer, Robles Transportation Company, Inc., showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the
insolvency of the driver, is a prima facie evidence of the employee's insolvency. Similarly, this Court ruled that the defendant's
insolvency may be proven by the certificate of the Director of Prisons that the employee is serving subsidiary imprisonment; 6 or
by the certificate of the sheriff that the employee has not satisfied his pecuniary liability and that no properties have been found
registered in his name. 7

Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and 103
of the Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also with regard
to its amount, this Court stated in Rotea, 8 that in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other
function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it
even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision.

In view of the foregoing principles, and considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of t he
bus but only claims now that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no important purpose to require petitioner
to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. Under
the circumstances, it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary
expenses. At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that
all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. 9 There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment
has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question
of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.

The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the owner and operator of the in fated bus as he sold it already to
Isaac Aizon, father of the accused Joselito Aizon, is a matter that could be litigated and resolved in the same criminal case. In
support of his opposition to the motion of the complainant, served upon him, for the purpose of the enforcement of his subsidiary
liability Felipe Aizon may adduce all the evidence necessary for that purpose. Indeed, the enforcement of the employer's
subsidiary civil liability may be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a
logical and integral part of the case itself. This would certainly facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending
parties. "The purpose of procedure", observed this Court in Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 10 "is not to thwart justice.
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice." In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts "to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of their rival claims. Thus, the Rules require that they
should be liberally construed "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 11

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Court in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) dated July 27, 1976 and August 14, 1976 are
hereby set aside. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged
owner and operator of the passenger bus. Costs against private respondents.

Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur, but to make matters clearer, I must add that the only issues open at the hearing to be held by the court a quo are: (1)
whether or not Felipe Aizon was the owner of the vehicle driven by the convicted accused, Joselito Aizon, or, whether or not he
was the employer of said accused at the time of the commission of the offense on May 9, 1975, and (2) whether or not said
Joselito Aizon is insolvent. As stated in the main opinion, the judgment in the criminal case is conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to his civil liability but also with regard to its amount which is that found in the judgment of conviction. In other
words, what is to be decided by the trial court is not strictly speaking the subsidiary liability of the employer, Felipe Aizon, for the
judgment in the criminal case is deemed to include that liability, but only the two issues related to it that I have mentioned.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack
of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the
Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian
of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal
of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of
errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107,
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES
OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE
HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY
MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability,
was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact
that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father,
was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability
not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73
Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and
not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case.
But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil
liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than
the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved
by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated
civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results
of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain
of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code
of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-
delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the
new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code,
which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura,
an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of
the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29
to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his
father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id.,
Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings
of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards.
"The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to
be developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article
38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to
the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy 1 (petitioner) seeking to
annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 2002 2 and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal
(respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot
his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple
gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4

On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.5

However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order, 6 likewise dated September 12,
2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word
"Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as
that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."7

On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder.
Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide
case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his
plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty. 8

On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the
Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted
and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case for
Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide
placed him in double jeopardy.

In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal
or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting
the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for
Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of
aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent
judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from
Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again for the same
offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank
qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of
the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been
arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.

In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for
Reconsideration, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED.

Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this case. Further, the Order dated
October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide stands. 13

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic mitigating 14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the
crime of homicide to murder.

On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND
VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
ALREADY TERMINATED.15

Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the
amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard
of rank," which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s
ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is
erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating
circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more
serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial
amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.

Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash the
Information for Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express
consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.

Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the
motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the
ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide
upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after
initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to
establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that
the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the
previous case.

Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not
placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case
was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.

In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment
would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such amendment
was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda.

Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance
of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule
of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal
questions.17

In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation of the provisions on
amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the
fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment
but against being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of
the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the
Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner
--

Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his express consent, he cannot
anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the
information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder,
is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18

is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, to wit --

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section
11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In
such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of
the proper information.

First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee
v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to
the substitution of the information or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant
pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must
be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of
the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has
to plead anew to the new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information
after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the
new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge,
hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a
substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially
charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant
a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt
to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.20

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in the caption
of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its
replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e.,
the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal. 21

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is
necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information. 22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are
identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case;
neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the same
was only a generic aggravating circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment
made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and
subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.

Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded
to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. 24

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 25

It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same
offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.26

Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his express consent, which
is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the
case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.1âwphi1

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but
not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph
of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again --

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule
119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:

SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In
such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of
the proper information.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different from the offense
proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in
which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section
14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
a part of those constituting the latter.28

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the
Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended
by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of
the homicide case.

Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering that the original
Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again
a violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been
terminated earlier.

We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic
aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating
the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,


vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993
in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan,
disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring
"unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v.
Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that
said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of
Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing
on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal
case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition,
and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).

On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion stated that while the
information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities
of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R. No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.),
we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of particulars).

At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that they would
file only one amended information against petitioner.

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion
for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and
ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment
on the 32 Amended Informations was set for April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).

Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding
Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by
this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).

Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue
of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed against her. Petitioner claims that
Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public
statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine
Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said
order reflected a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:

I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would stop
Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her.
Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores without
Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons,
what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping
Miriam but I contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).

The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads as follows:

(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to travel, whether
the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office
at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with
the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending
(Rollo, p. 158).

In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been
charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."

The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in
connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged,
thus:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does
not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said
accused (Rollo, p. 36).

It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to
issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in
defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no
exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever
touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against
the Sandiganbayan.

Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with
three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D.
No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias
on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).

Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the
information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained
inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.

In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity of the issues
involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported
in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation
was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-
assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted
a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review,
normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290;
G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing
of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-
defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603
[1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in
good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of
persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including
the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other
words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an
indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners
although there may be instances where both elements concur.

Re: Delito continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended
Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo,
pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the
splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into
the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.

We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one
information to be file against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as
"continuous crime."

In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito
continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity
of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).

According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the
mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law,
p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed.
pp. 53-54).

Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same time and at
the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).

(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of
time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).

(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437
[1926] ).

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on
behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10
SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees
for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas,
97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).

On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and
the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were
committed on two different occasions.

(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses
committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one
purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the
installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing
machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer
made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under
special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits
(People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the
contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.

The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses has troubled
also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging
to the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the
"separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the
doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there
are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous
act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People
v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for
the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate
charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR
2d 1179).

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the
application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order
No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or
about October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word
"aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one amended
information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division):

On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the accusation against
Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications
of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding
directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32
accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was
done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single
harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the
adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p.
59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is
AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:

While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-
Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view,
the effect of foreclosing the issues there involved.

Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed
for the Court by
Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that opinion directed the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases
Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.

I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court
seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect
were spelled out in detail in my dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:

The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, being the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the
legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving
unwarranted benefits and advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused.

Contrary to law.

Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of Executive Order
No. 324 approved applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that the Executive Order "does not allow
the legalization of the same."

Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain Conditions,"
dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:

(a) when the public interest to warrants:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may
prescribe.

Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation for waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order
provides, among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines before January 1,
1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing
of his application."

Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived
after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens
who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of qualified
aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 — to
apply for waiver of passport requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324,
approved such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of
Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case
in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was
expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its
provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order
(paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial
or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in
nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:

11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of
individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.

12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to
aliens likely to become public charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much
of those provisions as relates to a single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d)
those relating to national security and members of subversive organization.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the
Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public
interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens
excluded from entry into the Philippines include:

(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions
of this Act.2

Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds
of exclusion may be granted.

It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted
official acts of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324.
There is no question that the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor children
of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity."
It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable)
excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has
pretended that petitioner had anypersonal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees specified in
paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use.
It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to]
charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal
information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear,
however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an
allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts
disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted
benefit or advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver
of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or
construction given by petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor
children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of
Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring
family unity — there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit
of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be
deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.

It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or
implementing regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the implementation
of such a stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in
many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias
Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an administrative
interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for
such interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who has so acted,
something far graver that error of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal
intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As
noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.

My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a
legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing
to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any
additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is
entitled to have legal questions like that before this Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a
public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.

I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime.Indeed, if
the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would
follow for the administration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the
criminal information here would appear to be that public officers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory
provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent
to profit personally by any such interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate
paragraphs supplied)

The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case


No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are
still going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed. Had this
Court ruled on the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should
be terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go
through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as
criminal is the very issue at stake.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.

Romero, J., concurs.


G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to death on March 22,
1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito
Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the
victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his
death.

Contrary to Law. 1

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito
Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused
his death.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which
would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his own will.2

All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.

The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:

In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres
Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri,
Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace and
order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th
PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes
claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and
assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.

Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan,
who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio
Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in
company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba;
and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey,
Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim
Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western
part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo
Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was
seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters
away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at
the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to
be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly
without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several
successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western
gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the
canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out rushing
from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco
in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that that happened again Mario." Meanwhile,
Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at the Octagon
cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside
the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo
advised Tabaco — "Mario relax ka lang" — "Mario keep calm." They stood face to face holding their rifles and
when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to
disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who
happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to
adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan — injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador
Berbano — injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his Face and
right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints. 3

Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is as follows:

Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco
with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on
March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out that there
were several persons inside the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long,
and were seen in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the
said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions that if they did not have the
authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surly have confiscated the same from them. It was
his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit. Accused thus seated himself at the lowermost seat (first step)
of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.

At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost seat of the
slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been
officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be
known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the air and directed to
the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by
burst of gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave
and rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards
the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him,
(accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax
lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons.
Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding
downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went
off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident, accused had
to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him.
The following morning, accused surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass
by, not on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar
Regunton which he did not know at the time he surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr.
and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo.4

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In
giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:

From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree on what
actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the
shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco
who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or others, since the
accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit arena.

In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. "Where there are directly conflicting
versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and
circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony
for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries,
Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-
2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).

Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra
and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola,
Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito
Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death
of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio
Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in
both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio
Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front
row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group
at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor
Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated
by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) meters away from the accused,
which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well lighted at that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out rushing from
inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and
neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling — "what is that happened again Mario," while the latter told him —
"Mario relax ka lang keep calm." After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun assisted
by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his
Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused
Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo. 5

The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun
was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already empty.

The court a quo said further:

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine that
time?

A: Yes, sir with magazine.

Q: Do you have the magazine now?

A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.

Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?

A: Yes, sir, I examined it.

Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?

A: No live bullets, sir. (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990
session, stenographer L. Tamayo).

Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:

PROSECUTOR ATAL:

Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this gun,
M-14, and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?

A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.

Q: How many bullets in all?

A: Twenty, sir.

Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?

A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer,
May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the cockpit
arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. 157-158, record).

ATTY. ARRIOLA:

Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know whose picture is this?

A: Picture of spent shells.

Q: How about Exh. "R-l", do you know what is this?

A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1,
1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact that he was
really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified
to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. "S", p. 188, record).

Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder before Branch
6, of this Court. (Exh. "T", p. 187, record).

The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin,
Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the incident with ring of
truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the
deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No.
1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat.
Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately
after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the
accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their corroborative testimonies
constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances
proved reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in
the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused, as the
ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA
138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable, and to require direct testimony
would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper protection of society. (People vs.
ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is no
adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus be held
responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's
brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule that they have
regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5(M), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court).

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not inspire
confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not shot the
four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or row
in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much lower
elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot aforesaid victims, as maybe gleaned from
the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.

The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra
and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed
his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at
the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could have been around 5
meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were
then facing south, face to face with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr.
Rivera, where the gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion
of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right
clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.

In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head above the
hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base through and through. Wound
No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position
of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher
than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet
ricocheted.

It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed were all
cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have rebounded or
deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of
the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at the place
where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers,
the same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially
as in this case, when the accused stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra
testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said
cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.

In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is overwhelming
and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds — inflicted upon him during the grappling
of the subject gun (Exh. "K").

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there being no
competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as
the accused was clearly and positively identified.

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the shooting
to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as
well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo. 6

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience, the Court
finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito
Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been
prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the
accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum period,
with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims — Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,000.00
subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total
civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful
collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.

2 In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one (1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to
Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00
to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment
of the appropriate docket fees in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. "K" and "K-2") the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC Company, Aparri,
Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th
PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the
said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the rules.

4. The accused to pay the costs.

5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent preventive
imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC;
as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).

SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis ours)

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present appeal on the following grounds:

(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the deaths of
Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.

(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury
sustained by Benito Raquepo.

(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.

The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the
credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on
appeal, 8 unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de
Guzman, 10 thus:

In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses
and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that
sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The
record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer
or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked
down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not
show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge
trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict. 11

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of
credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of
Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.

1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March
22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at
their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his companions.

Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:

COURT:

Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?

A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.

ATTY ARRIOLA:

Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?


A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)

Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come from?

A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.

Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?

A: I had to seek shelter, sir.

Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: He was hit, sir.

PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:

Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if you
know?

A: M-14, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?

A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.

Q: Was that all you gathered?

A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Three (3) shots, sir.

Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?

A: Successive, sir.

Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right side?

A: None, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard gun
shot, will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?

A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port) arm
position).

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

A: He fired the gun, sir.

Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you returned,
what did you see?

A: I saw two dead persons, sir.

Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?

A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.

Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?

A: Less than a meter, sir.

xxx xxx xxx


Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as you
mentioned?

A: They have similarity, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your
companions?

A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

Q: Where were you facing?

A: We were facing south the arena.

Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?

A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.

Q: From what direction?

A: Infront of us, sir.

Q: Where was he, was he in your front?

A: He was in the first row of seats.

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?

A: Somebody was killed, sir.

Q: Who was that?

A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

A: Many, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in succession
or automatic?

A: Automatic, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A: An army man, sir.

Q: How long have you been employed with the army?

A: Five (5) years, sir.

Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with a M-14 being fired?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say that
these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?

A: I was outside the cockpit, sir. 12

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat
downward, is it not?

A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.

Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself at
the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?

A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.

Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr.
witness?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report, did
you notice if he had a gun with him?

A: He passed by our back, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was shot?

A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.

Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?


13
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir.

For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

ATTY. ARRIOLA

Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What part of the cockpit?

A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.

Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How were they arranged?

A: In rows, step by step, sir.

COURT:

Q: How many rows?

A: Four rows, sir.

ATTY. ARRIOLA:

Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.

Q: And how about you?

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.

Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place where
you stayed?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?

A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?

A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if there
was untoward incident that happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?

A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm?

A: M-14, sir.

Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?

A: Because I saw it, sir.

Q: What did you do also?

A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.

Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened to him?

A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle I was also wounded."

Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".

Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor
Arreola?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the accused
Mario Tabaco?

A: Before the shooting, sir.

Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the first
time prior to the shooting incident?

A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.

Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario Tabaco?

A: He sat on the first row of the seats.

Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Mario
Tabaco, the accused sit?
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:

Q: How far?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.

Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part of the
cockpit?

A: A little to the west, sir.

Q: An you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the cockpit?

A: We were on the northwest.

Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?

A: A little bit west of us, sir.

Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late Arreola
on the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what
you mean?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor
Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you mean?

A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.

Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were together
with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?

A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.

Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco
considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your
direct examination you immediately sought cover?

A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola was
dead already?

A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.

Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?

A: Yes, sir, in our place.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: In our place, sir.

Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he was
also hit.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: You don't know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.

Q: You do not know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir. 15

The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and
his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His
account of the incident is as follows:
PROSECUTOR ABAD:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?

A: Inside the cockpit, sir.

Q: Where were you also?

A: I was at the stairs, sir.

Q: When you saw him what happened if any?

xxx xxx xxx

A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got
down, sir.

Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?

A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.

Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?

A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.

Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?

A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to hide
myself, sir. 16

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?

A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went off
and that's the time I took cover, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?

A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside. 17

Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the above-named eyewitnesses for the
prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule
that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight
than his bare denial and explanation. 18

Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well settled is
the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 19

2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when they testified that it was
accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera,
who examined the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the ex-mayor shows that the
assailant was on the same level as the ex-mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher
level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the
lowest while the ex-mayor and his companions were seated at the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however,
is untenable.

Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the
cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired
at them. 20

The above-quoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to
have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than
the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound was inflicted. 21

Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-
fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.

Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito
Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of
Co located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit
arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He
told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who
was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him
on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away
from his left side, was hit at his testicles.

Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt.
Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While
thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report
from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom
he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing
accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-
appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to
horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant squeezed
the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to
take away the gun from accused-appellant.

Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.

Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would
not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without
merit.

Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun from port arm position to
horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22

Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban,
his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of
the consequences it might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.

Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in
accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetuashould have
been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder
charges. The trial court explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:

Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one
Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400).
(Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).

Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed;
first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second,
when the offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (delito complejo) and/or complex proper
(People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which should have
been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been prosecuted under one
information, involving four (4) murder victims.

The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive
automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered victims, under
the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil.
975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.

Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the deaths of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively,
were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty —
is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the killing have been
attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of
defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree
(People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby
reduced to a single Penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson
Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the
death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused
Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense
is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day
to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
that should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day
of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus
P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN No. 1492932, "K-2" — magazine of M-14 and Exh.
"L" — Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful
weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more
than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to witness Rosario
Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the lower and upper bleachers of the
cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent
empty shells (Exh. "R" and "R-1"). 23

We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial
court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single
shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous(emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.

Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama 25 (not People vs.
Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons.
Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound
crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one
bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco
entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its
magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent
shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the
contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case
killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously.
As stated therein:

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five
persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons
injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article.
Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the
factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon
the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally
liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although
apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and
each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated
homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed
successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with
its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-
machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger
and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but
the number of bullets which actually produced them. 30

The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime
is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found
that there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that
the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme
Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from
one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of
murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is
thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:

Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate
murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only
applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths
are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate
crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly
to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts
of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202124

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252.
The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder
in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus, directed upward toward
the left upper abdomen."

and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused took
advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.2

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted
Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the
occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils
and who are minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo
submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the
crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting incident.
Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the
Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded
only as to appellant.5

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the
Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot
wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the
shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used.6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family
lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the
supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into
view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto
identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at
katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak.
Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over
his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the
direction where his family huddled together in their hut. 7

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters were wounded. His
wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children
out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the
doctors' attempts to revive her.8

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous
altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for
molesting his daughter.9

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of
Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the
house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he
and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10

Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the
evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto.
Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case
No. 7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double
Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion
Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to
suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine
Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount
of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple
Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina,
Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming
appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. 13

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court issued a
Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will
no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA. 15

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to
state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used
to kill Norberto’s children.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect.
Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA.16

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with
two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young
daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside
their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.


xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?

A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were

having one firearm each?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?

A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?

A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?

A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic) down face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?

A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?

A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

x x x17

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters because, as ruled by the
trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the
commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such
case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto
together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired
from appellant's firearm that killed the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. 19 The presence of any one of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder. 20 The trial court correctly ruled
that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:

x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002
at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta,
Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused
despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were
unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old
and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when
they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims
helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of
the night. x x x 21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v. Fallorina,22 the
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally
attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if
the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the
offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the
words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s
finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall
of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as
ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all
the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine
Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed. 25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning that all three
assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and
inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no
real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial
matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this
Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the
trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their
conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses'
credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x. 29

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify
a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution
evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the
prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which
appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple
Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to
penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of
2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several
acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not
Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with
the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the
rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge
of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused
two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in
a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations,
he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.31

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-
G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised
Penal Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the
offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first
kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts
result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive and
indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family.
When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill
several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified
as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime."36

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating
circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to
that effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused
took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. 37

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short
firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied
by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused x x x38

In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of
the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of
the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. 40The testimony of Norberto established the fact that
the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is
death for each of two (2) counts of murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder
without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision
mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or
anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages
awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or
temperate damages in some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by
the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory
damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable."

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when
appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall
be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is
not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed
by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim
for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it
is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the
accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only
imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified
and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.44

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court
of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood
to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered
by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 46 and Article 222047 of the
Civil Code. x x x.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and
suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." 48 They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering,
and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors
of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental
distress."49

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral
damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate
to the suffering inflicted."50

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded.
It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of
moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity. 52

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, 53 the theory being that
there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 –
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may
be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 55

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its
broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order
and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription
of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift
to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary
or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 57 requires aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information
should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court
to effectively determine the proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil
aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle
the victim to an award of exemplary damages.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to
deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also,
in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness
of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco,
Sr.,62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00, 63 despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance.
The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346,
prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under
RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws,
and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under
certain circumstances.65 Under the same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in
general,66 mutiny on the high seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except
when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for
the same purpose;73kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; 74 robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason
or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped
in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on
the following crimes:

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article 320, death
results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or
military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5)
when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when
committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.

From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single indivisible penalty, all
of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in
the application thereof:

1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty
in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the
presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.

But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death
penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when
the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC. 79

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the
principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender."82

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court
has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable
by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal
law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity."84 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased
to ₱100,000.00.85

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages
without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and
necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was
increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided
by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual
penalty imposed.1avvphi1

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but
due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest
jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying
aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as
exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating
circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes x x x."91

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary
aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact
that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the
number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary
aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48
of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the following doctrines
are noteworthy:

In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime,
has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in
the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules
on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another
[complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of
firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses." 95

In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may
take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such
felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery,
or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.97

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. 98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances
(treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As
in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:99

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They
aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in
this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered
helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife
by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia
(treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no
special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances
proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as
generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. 100

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and
what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each,
and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is
another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime
committed.

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide 101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of the
victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were
the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because
the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of the robbers dies. 102 This is also applicable in robbery
with rape where there is more than one victim of rape.

In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was committed and
proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated
when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and
another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount
of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be
awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime
proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome
of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the
crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder,
the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.

In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers) sustained
injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the
component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime
which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a
robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with
homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is
understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, 103 which is the use of violence or the use
of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the
purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the
damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide, death under
tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be
₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00
exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven
but not alleged in the information.

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the
trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount
to be awarded as temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious by the fact
that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The
increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such
crimes and wastage of lives.

In summary:

I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00


II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:112

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse;
and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex crimes
where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, 113 Robbery with Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional
Mutilation,115 Robbery with

Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or Carnapping with
Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape,
Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds 125 and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00


b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention,
the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity
of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are
themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional rape
committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages
unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death
under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, 127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no stages, i.e.,
Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information, 128 in
addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of
₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for
attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the course of the
rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following: 129

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if not for
a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does
not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. 131

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of
the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For
the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of this decision until fully paid. 132

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto Estores and Roger
San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred.
Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people
who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel,
who insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis
for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that
on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who
was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster
the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young
daughters.

After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only attaches if
the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.133 In this case, the
case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak
of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace
and Claudine Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following
amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He
is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy
Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision.
The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability
of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

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