IRREGULAR PEN AND LIMITED SWORD: PSYWAR, PSYOP,

AND MISO IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Military History

by

MARCUS S. WELCH, MAJ, U.S. ARMY

M.A., Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri
B.A., Mid-America Nazarene University, Olathe, Kansas

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2011-02

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Major Marcus S. Welch
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14. ABSTRACT
Insurgency and counterinsurgencies differ from conventional warfare in that military strength alone
cannot bring success. Insurgencies are “people’s wars” as the insurgent forces are dependant on the
population for manpower, intelligence, logistics, and security. To combat this support drawn from the
people, comprehensive measures are required consisting of political, military, economic, social, and
psychological efforts. Of these efforts, many experienced counterinsurgents have heavily valued the
pscyhological aspects of counterinsurgency warfare and employed a variety of means to exploit them.
Exploiting psychological warfare means has been considered more than simply trying to gain the
allegiance of a population, commonly known as “hearts and minds.” Thorough psychological
exploitation consists of a systematic approach to combating insurgency, attacking the components that
make up an insurgent organzation, and degrading the conditions that faciliate it. This thesis attempts to
comprehensively evaluate psychological warfare efforts to determine what lessons can be drawn from
past conflict, theory, and doctrine and how to apply the lessons today.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Psychological Operations, Psychological Warfare, Military Information Support Operations,
Counterinsurgency, Propaganda
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
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ii
 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Marcus S. Welch

Thesis Title: Irregular Pen and Limited Sword: PSYWAR, PSYOP, and MISO in
Counterinsurgency

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chair

Daniel P. Marston, DPhil., FRHistS

, Member
Nicholas A. Murray, DPhil.

, Member
Donald S. Stephenson, Ph.D.

Accepted this 16th day of December 2011 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

iii
 ABSTRACT

IRREGULAR PEN AND LIMITED SWORD: PSYWAR, PSYOP, AND MISO IN

COUNTERINSURGENCY, by Major Marcus S. Welch, 218 pages.

Insurgency and counterinsurgencies differ from conventional warfare in that military

strength alone cannot bring success. Insurgencies are “people’s wars” as the insurgent
forces are dependent on the population for manpower, intelligence, logistics, and
security. To combat this support drawn from the people, comprehensive measures are
required consisting of political, military, economic, social, and psychological efforts. Of
these efforts, many experienced counterinsurgents have heavily valued the psychological
aspects of counterinsurgency warfare and employed a variety of means to exploit them.
Exploiting psychological warfare means has been considered more than simply trying to
gain the allegiance of a population, commonly known as “hearts and minds.” Thorough
psychological exploitation consists of a systematic approach to combating insurgency,
attacking the components that make up an insurgent organization, and degrading the
conditions that facilitate it. This thesis attempts to comprehensively evaluate
psychological warfare efforts to determine what lessons can be drawn from past conflict,
theory, and doctrine and how to apply the lessons today.

iv
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was made possible through the assistance, support, advice, and

mentorship of others. My wife, Kellie, contributed countess hours editing and

encouragement. The Art of War (AoW) professors, Dr. Daniel Marston, Dr. Scott

Stephenson, and Dr. Nicholas Murray, opened my eyes to examining warfare in detail

and context. My AoW classmates, Major Eric Haas, Major Michael Gunther, Major

Michael Stewart, and Major Darrel Vaughn, provided great experience and perspective.

Members of the 15th (UK) Psychological Operations Group; the 4th Military Information

Support Group (A); the Special Operation Forces Leader Development and Education

Element, Command and General Staff College (SOF LD&E, CGSC); the Sultan’s Armed

Forces (SAF) and Special Air Service (SAS) veterans of the Dhofar Rebellion; and the

British Army Counterinsurgency Warfare Centre deserve special recognition for

providing their support for this thesis and the AoW Program. The staff and resources of

the Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University, the Hoover Institution

Archives at Stanford University, and the Middle East Center Archive at St. Antony’s

College were instrumental in the research required for this project. Additionally, apart

from his work Why Vietnam Matters, Mr. Rufus Phillips contributed substantial

background material including unpublished psychological warfare materials of the

Vietnam era. Lastly, I owe a great personal debt to the contemporary psychological

warriors of modern warfare. Men like Master Sergeant Gabriel Fabrizio and Sergeant

First Class Rodney Little mentored me on the practical aspects of psychological warfare

with lessons they learned not in the classroom but on the battlefields of Afghanistan and

Iraq.
v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................ xi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 3

Research Methodology ................................................................................................... 4
Terms and Definitions .................................................................................................... 6

CHAPTER 2 EVOLUTION OF US COIN AND PPM DOCTRINE ...............................13

Brief History of US Psychological Warfare and Operations ........................................ 13

PPM Doctrine Linked and Unlinked ............................................................................ 17
PPM Effects and Relevance .......................................................................................... 22
The Shortcoming of COIN and PPM Doctrine: Consensus ......................................... 23

CHAPTER 3 THE CLASSIC COUNTERINSURGENTS AND PPM.............................24

Why Study the Classic Counterinsurgents Views of PPM? ......................................... 24

General Sir Frank Kitson .............................................................................................. 25
Sir Robert Thompson .................................................................................................... 33
David Galula ................................................................................................................. 40
Major General Edward Lansdale .................................................................................. 49
Classic Counterinsurgent PPM Synthesis ..................................................................... 59

CHAPTER 4 COIN PPM OF THE DHOFAR REBELLION ...........................................64

Context of the Conflict ................................................................................................. 64

Framework of the Counterinsurgency, 1970 to-1975 ................................................... 70
PPM Inside the Framework .......................................................................................... 74
PPM Summary: The Dhofar Rebellion ......................................................................... 86

vi
CHAPTER 5 COIN PPM OF THE VIETNAM WAR ......................................................88

Context of the Conflict ................................................................................................. 88

Framework of the Counterinsurgency, 1965 to 1972 ................................................... 95
PPM Inside the Framework .......................................................................................... 99
PPM Organization ................................................................................................... 100
PPM Priorities and Programs .................................................................................. 107
The GVN Image ...................................................................................................108
Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket ......................................................................................114
Revolutionary Development ................................................................................123
Tactical PPM ........................................................................................................... 133
PPM Summary: The Vietnam War ............................................................................. 138

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................141

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 141

Is PPM Essential for Successful COIN? ................................................................. 142
COIN and PPM: Best Practices?............................................................................. 144
COIN and PPM: Doctrinal Relationship Lost? ....................................................... 147
COIN and PPM: Doctrine Not Explored?............................................................... 148
Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 155

GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................157

APPENDIX A Excerpt from FM 33-5 Psychological Operations Techniques and

Procedures (1966) ............................................................................................................159

APPENDIX B Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Comic Book (Valentine, Addendum 1) ...........175

APPENDIX C Lecture Transcript, Edward Lansdale, Military Psychological

Operations: Part One ........................................................................................................182

APPENDIX D Lecture Transcript, Edward Lansdale, Military Psychological

Operations: Part Two .......................................................................................................188

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................198

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................................206

vii
 ACRONYMS

ACTIV Army Concept Team in Vietnam

AID Agency for International Development

AIT Army Information Team

APC Accelerated Pacification Campaign

APT Armed Propaganda Team

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

BATT British Army Training Team

BRIAM British Advisory Mission

CAO Civic Affairs Office

CAT Civic Action Team

COIN Counterinsurgency

CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

CORDS/POD Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development

Support/Psychological Operations Division

CTZ Corps Tactical Zone

DLF Dhofar Liberation Front

DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam

EDCOR Economic Development Corps

GVN Government of Vietnam

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IIBG Imperial Iranian Battle Group

JUSMAG Joint United States Military Assistance Group

JUSPAO Joint United States Public Affairs Office

viii
MAAG Military Assistance and Advisory Group

MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MILDEC Military Deception

MISB Military Information Support Battalion

MISG Military Information Support Group

MISO Military Information Support Operations

NDFLOAG National Democratic Front for Liberation of the Occupied Arabian

Gulf

NLF National Liberation Front

NRP National Reconciliation Program

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OCO Office of Civil Operations

OSS Office of Strategic Services

PDRY Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen

PF Provincial Force

PFLO Peoples Front for the Liberation of Oman

PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf

PO Psychological Operations Objective

POB Psychological Operations Battalion

POG Psychological Operations Group

POLWAR Political Warfare

PPM Psychological Warfare, Psychological Operations, and Military

Information Support Operations

PSYACT Psychological Action

PSYOP Psychological Operations

ix
PSYWAR Psychological Warfare

PWB Psychological Warfare Branch

PWD Psychological Warfare Division

QR Quick Reaction Request

RB&L Radio Broadcast and Loudspeaker

RD Revolutionary Development

RF Regional Force

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces

SAS Special Air Service

SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel

SGA Special Group, Augmented

SMM Saigon Military Mission

TA Target Audience

USIA United States Information Agency

USIS United States Information Service

VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure

VIS Vietnamese Information Service

x
 ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. COIN emphasis in PSYWAR/PSYOP/MISO doctrine ...................................21

Figure 2. PSYWAR/PSYOP/MISO emphasis in COIN doctrine ...................................21

Figure 3. Frank Kitson’s COIN Frame and PPM ............................................................33

Figure 4. Robert Thompson’s 5 COIN Principles and PPM ...........................................40

Figure 5. David Galula’s 4 Laws, 8 Steps, and PPM ......................................................49

Figure 6. Lansdale’s COIN Theory and PPM .................................................................58

Figure 7. Synthesis of Classic Counterinsurgent PPM theories ......................................62

Figure 8. Sealane chokepoints of Yemen and Oman ......................................................65

Figure 9. Salalah enclave surrounded..............................................................................68

Figure 10. Radio Script: Islam Is Our Way, Freedom Is Our Aim ...................................79

Figure 11. Radio broadcasting with indigenous information team ...................................81

Figure 12. Leaflet, “The hand of Allah crushes Communism” .........................................82

Figure 13. 1969 US PPM Command Structure ...............................................................105

Figure 14. 1969 JUSPAO, MACV, and CORDS relationships with Vietnamese peer
organizations ..................................................................................................107

Figure 15. JUSPAO handout illustrating President Thieu’s inaugural address and
JUSPAO “Preamble to the Constitution” leaflet ...........................................110

Figure 16. JUSPAO Resources Control leaflet ...............................................................114

Figure 17. 1970 Chieu Hoi Ministry ...............................................................................116

Figure 18. Safe Conduct Pass (front) ..............................................................................122

Figure 19. Safe Conduct Pass (back)...............................................................................123

Figure 20. JUSPAO Handout #2368 providing eleven hamlet objectives ......................128

Figure 21. Phung Hoang “Wanted Poster” ......................................................................132

xi
Figure 22. Vietnam era leaflet showing financial misuse ...............................................152

Figure 23. RVN propaganda showing Nguyen Van Be with DRV “martyr”
propaganda .....................................................................................................154

xii
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This is the so-called theory that “weapons decide everything,” which

constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective on-
sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people.
Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people,
not things, that are decisive.
— Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War

Insurgency is an irregular method of conducting warfare against an established

state or government. Militarily inferior to the state, insurgency movements lack the

necessary might to directly usurp governmental power and thus rely on indirect and

protracted approaches. To facilitate the approaches, insurgents reach out to the population

for political, logistical, and operational support, and often insurgents employ agitation,

terrorism, and psychological warfare to obtain the required support. Understanding the

insurgents’ dependency on the population, governmental forces or “counterinsurgents”

undertake specialized measures to separate the insurgents from the population’s support. 1

These measures include a combination of military, economic, civic, political, and

psychological aspects. 2 Taken together, the counterinsurgent effort is meant to achieve

1
Censuses, identification cards, traffic control points, ration stamps, travel passes,
curfews, educational policies, land reform, agricultural initiatives, and propaganda
campaigns are all common tactics and techniques applied to deny insurgents support from
the population. See Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of
Counterinsurgency, trans. by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International),
2006), 36-42, 61-63.
2
The US Army defines counterinsurgency as: “Those military, paramilitary,
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat
insurgency.” Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-02, Operational Terms and
Graphics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-47.

1
more than the destruction of the insurgent force but also to overcome the conditions that

enable the insurgency.

Each of the aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN): military, economic, civic, etc.,

contributes to the combined effort although the weighting of each varies with the

circumstances of the conflict. One of the aspects nonetheless constantly remains vital,

and that aspect is psychological warfare (PSYWAR). 3 Successful PSYWAR is essential

in countering insurgency.

Not to be misleading, PSYWAR by itself accomplishes nothing. However, when

applied in conjunction with the multiple other aspects of a COIN operation, PSYWAR

exponentially increases the collective effect. This is because PSYWAR is the one aspect

of a COIN operation which enables, enhances, and exploits the other aspects. That being

stated, trends in recent efforts at countering insurgencies suggest a lack of PSYWAR

emphasis or even a lack of effectiveness relative to PSYWAR application. 4 This de-

emphasis may be the result of deviations from established PSYWAR practices that have

proven successful in previous counterinsurgencies. De-emphasis may also stem from the

loss of particular lessons that made the established PSYWAR practices effective. On the

other end of the spectrum, the de-emphasis also may be relative to the failure of

3
The term psychological warfare encompasses those efforts made to influence, by
persuasion or coercion, an enemy force and those who provide support to that force to act
in manners that contribute to their defeat. Psychological operations and military
information support operations have similar definitions and are more specifically defined
later in this chapter.
4
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the expanding and shrinking relationship between
PSYWAR and COIN is examined in greater detail.

2
PSYWAR to adapt, update, or improve in order to remain an enabler, enhancer, and

exploiter of modern counterinsurgency warfare.

The aim of this thesis is to affirm that effective PSYWAR is a prerequisite factor

in successful COIN operations and those COIN operations that do not emphasize and

effectively employ PSYWAR are likely to fail. In order to substantiate the claim, the

scope of the thesis will establish that central “best practices” exist in PSYWAR support

to counterinsurgency operations such as legitimizing the government, eliciting defection,

and making known the hidden agendas of insurgent organizations. In addition, this thesis

will also illustrate that “lessons lost” occurred in history and in US Army doctrine which

made PSYWAR less effective in supporting counterinsurgency operations and which

eventually led to the marginalization of PSYWAR in COIN doctrine and practices.

Research Questions

Acknowledging that PSYWAR (also Psychological Operations and Military

Information Support Operations) has been historically utilized as a primary aspect of

counterinsurgency operations, this thesis presents and answers four questions about the

means. First, is PSYWAR (Psychological Operations and Military Information Support

Operations) actually essential in counterinsurgencies? Second, what are the best historic

practices associated with these in counterinsurgencies? Third, are there any psychological

“lessons lost” from previous counterinsurgency efforts that could be of benefit today?

Fourth and most crucial, based on the previous three questions, what is still missing in the

US Army’s contemporary applications in counterinsurgencies?

3
 Research Methodology

The body of this thesis consists of three segments organized into five chapters.

The first segment examines how COIN PSYWAR theories evolved and what key COIN

theorists surmised about the role PSYWAR operations. The second segment studies how

COIN PSYWAR theories have been applied. Two case studies are examined, the Dhofar

Rebellion (1963-1975) and the US involvement in the Vietnam War (1965-1972). These

two cases were picked as they represent opposite ends of the spectrum. Though occurring

during the same period, the visibility, scale, and approaches to each COIN operation

differed greatly. To explore and substantiate the segments, primary research is utilized

where possible such as firsthand accounts from interviews, literary works, and period

documents. Secondary sources are used as well when those sources provide information

or perspective not available at a given period. The final segment draws on the previous

two segments in order to draw conclusions and provide recommendations.

In Chapter 2, the origins of US Army COIN and PSYWAR doctrine is examined

relative to current doctrine. The early versions of Field Manual (FM) 31-22, U.S. Army

Counterinsurgency Forces, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 33-1,

Psychological Operations, and FM 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and

Procedures are juxtaposed with the contemporary FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-

24.2, Tactics In Counterinsurgency, FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures, and FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. This portion of the thesis in meant to determine

how and why PSYWAR and COIN doctrine evolved and did that evolution improve

COIN operations or merely change it.

4
 Chapter 3 provides an overview of the COIN and PSYWAR theories of four

twentieth century “practitioner-theorists.” These four COIN practitioners, General Sir

Frank Kitson, Sir Robert Thompson, David Galula, and Major General Edward Lansdale,

all participated in multiple COIN operations throughout the Cold War era. Each was

instrumental in campaign planning and operations. Equally as important, the part that

makes them theorists as well each captured their experiences and theories on paper. Frank

Kitson participated in five counterinsurgencies, ranging from Kenya to Northern Ireland.

He authored several books on COIN, including his most notable Low Intensity

Operations. Robert Thompson fought communist insurgents in Malaya and was also a

key advisor to the South Vietnamese and United States during the Vietnam War. His

Defeating Communist Insurgency and No Exit from Vietnam are now classic works.

David Galula experienced several Far Eastern counterinsurgencies and served in the

French Army during the Algerian Revolution. He authored Counterinsurgency Warfare:

Theory and Practice which is cited as a key reference in the current US Army FM 3-24,

Counterinsurgency. Edward Lansdale was America’s premier Cold War counterinsurgent

thinker, successfully advising the Philippine government during their Huk Rebellion and

spearheading American involvement in South Vietnam. Lansdale published In the Midst

of Wars, documenting his experiences. Each of the practitioner-theorists wrote

extensively on how PSYWAR supports COIN.

The first case study, found in chapter 4, recounts the circumstances and actions of

the Dhofar Rebellion which occurred in southern Oman. A lengthy communist

insurgency, the rebellion was eventually foiled by British intervention. The operation was

conducted out of the eyes of the public and with a minimal number of forces. Aggressive

5
military action, coupled with extensive civil and psychological actions eventually cut off

the insurgents from their support. The war was one of the few where western

interventionist forces successfully defeated a communist insurgency in the twentieth

century.

The second case study, recounted in chapter 5, examines the US portion of the

Vietnam War. The entire conflict, encompassing the first and second Indochina War,

lasted some three decades; however, large scale US involvement took place over a seven

year period starting in 1965. The Vietnam War was termed a “dual war,” being both a

counterinsurgency operation and a massive conventional war. In additional to being a

dual war, the complexity of the war was monumental in its own right by being fought

during the peak of the Cold War and amid great social and political turmoil in the US. In

the midst of the complexity, US psychological warfare and operations were tested and

implemented on a scale not seen before or since. Yet, the war ended unsuccessfully for

the US and South Vietnamese.

The final chapter, chapter 6, provides conclusions and recommendations. The four

research questions are answered in an attempt to provide a comprehensive look at

PSYWAR operations in COIN. The result is recommendations of how current PSYWAR

operations can be improved by building on the foundations laid in the past.

Terms and Definitions

Before proceeding into this study, an understanding of the commonly used terms

and definitions involved must be established. During the past hundred years a variety of

naming conventions have emerged to describe military psychological warfare operations.

6
The most common terms include: Propaganda, 5 Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR),

Political Warfare (POLWAR), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Psychological

Actions (PSYACT), and most recently Military Information Support Operations

(MISO). 6 Colloquial terms such as sykewar, paper bullets, word warfare, and the fourth

fighting arm also emerged. 7 The evolution of terms is confusing as dates, countries of

origin, users, and contexts can change meanings. For instance, in the US Army, the term

MISO replaced PSYOP which replaced PSYWAR; however, PSYWAR also remained a

subdivision of PSYOP. Likewise, although the US currently uses the term MISO, the

United Kingdom (UK) and all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners

continue to use PSYOP, again adding a level of inconsistency. 8

5
The term propaganda came about specifically with the advent of the printing
press. The Gutenberg Press, created in 1440, spread literacy and literature to the masses.
The printing press also assisted the Protestant Reformation to gain substantial support. In
an attempt to combat the reformation, the Roman Catholic Church established the
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide [Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith] in
1622. The Congregatio utilized the printing press to produce tracts and pamphlets for
missionary work, advocating Catholic opinion. The propagation materials became known
as “propaganda.” Martin Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), xxvii, xxxiii.
6
Office of the Secretary of Defense, memorandum dated 3 December 2010,
Subject: Changing the Term Psychological Operations to Military Information Support
Operations.
7
Leo J. Margolin, Paper Bullets: A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World
War II (New York: Froben Press, 1946), 96-97.
8
The United Kingdom commonly abbreviates Psychological Operations as
“PsyOps” versus “PSYOP.”

7
 This confusing dialogue is nothing new. When Brigadier General Robert A.

McClure, 9 the founder of American PSYWAR, was confronted with the question of

similar confusing terms over sixty years ago, he pragmatically stated, “Call it what you

may, international information, propaganda, or psychological warfare, the responsibilities

still rest with us.” 10 Since then, names and definitions have evolved and expanded but the

fundamental understanding of the substance of PSYWAR has remained relatively

constant.

When examining PSYWAR operations in COIN specifically, the term PSYWAR

in its most nascent definition, provides a succinct and applicable description. When asked

to define psychological warfare in 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 11

Supporting Committee provided a basic estimate of PSYWAR as:

[Psychological warfare] is the coordination and use of all means, including moral
and physical, by which the end is attained--other than those of recognized military
operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those
recognized military actions--which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to

9
Major General (MG) Robert A. McClure (1897-1957) was a psychological
warfare and “special warfare” visionary and advocate. He commanded the Psychological
Warfare Branch Division / Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(PWD/SHAEF) during WWII, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW)
in 1950, and founded the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. MG McClure was the originator of contemporary US MISO and was
instrumental in the creation of US Army Special Forces.
10
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army Special Warfare, Its Origins, Psychological
and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1982), 56.
11
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), though a civilian organization, was the
proponent for psychological warfare prior to the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB)
and Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) being established in 1943. The OSS was a
quasi-military organization designed to work behind enemy lines, conducting sabotage,
partisan warfare, and psychological warfare. Though disbanded after the Second World
War, it was the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

8
 achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which
tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or
associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance,
or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of
our own people and allies to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support,
assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

In short, this definition states PSYWAR is the cumulative psychological measures

taken to destroy the enemy’s will or capacity to fight and alienate him from his support

structures. 12 The current definitions of PSYOP and MISO differ slightly, being

broadened to accommodate a wider range of peacetime activities. 13 Throughout this

thesis, the applicable term for the period and conflict are used where specificity is

required to preserve the contextual definition; however, PSYWAR, PSYOP, MISO, and

PsyOps should be understood to have generally the same meaning. 14 Where no one

doctrinal term adequately describes the method or operation, due to the expanse of time

covered or generalness of application, the non-doctrinal term and acronym of PSYWAR-

PSYOP-MISO (PPM) is substituted in this thesis for the ease of reading. 15

12
Paddock, US Army Special Warfare, Its Origins, 11.
13
The US Army defines Psychological Operations as, “planned operations to
convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals,” and Psychological Warfare as, “the
planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of
influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in
such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.”
14
Early references and many British references often use the acronym PsyOps for
psychological operations.
15
The term PPM has no historical or doctrinal precedent and is a construct only
used in the context of this thesis. The term PPM is intended to lesson confusion over
military psychological terms.

9
 Apart from the psychological discourse, the terms Irregular Warfare (IW),

Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Counterinsurgency

are often informally used arbitrarily and have doctrinally evolved over time. The terms

UW, FID, and COIN all have specific definitions in current US Army doctrine; however,

IW does not. IW has been defined by the Department of Defense (DoD) in 2008 as “A

violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence of the

relevant populations(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches,

though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an

adversary’s power, influence, and will,” and includes a variety of operations and

activities such as “counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense;

counterinsurgency; and stability operations.” 16 For the purposes of this thesis, then, IW is

considered an umbrella term for indirect and protracted warfare of which UW, FID, and

COIN are subsets.

The term most often misused in association with counterinsurgency is

unconventional warfare (UW). By obvious reasoning, UW takes on the meaning of all

warfare that is not conventional. This common understanding is doctrinally incorrect.

UW is broadly defined by US Army doctrine contributing to its misunderstanding. 17 The

16
Department of Defense Directive, Number 3000.07, dated 1 December 2008,
Subject: Irregular Warfare (IW).
17
In FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, UW is defined as “A broad
spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration,
predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained,
equipped, supported, and directed by an external source. It includes guerilla warfare and
other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the
indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and
escape.”

10
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines UW more succinctly

as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt,

or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an

underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area.” 18 UW is then a specific term

used for an operation with an aim that is the opposite of COIN, as compared to a general

term describing all operations that are not conventional. 19

The other term closely associated with COIN is FID. According to US Army

doctrine, FID is defined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a

government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free or protect

its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” 20 Although the doctrinal

definition of FID is similar to the doctrinal definition of COIN, in practice FID refers to

increasing the military capacity of a nation and may be conducted in support of a COIN

operation.

With the common understanding established on the definitions of PPM, IW, UW,

FID, and COIN, this thesis proceeds to examine the origins and doctrinal development of

US PPM and COIN in the following chapter. The second chapter illustrates that in early

18
Department of the Army, TC 18-01. Special Forces Unconventional Warfare
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1-1.
19
Although terms such as conventional warfare and conventional military forces
appear consistently in US Army doctrine, including updated 2011 Army Doctrine
Publications, no formal definition exists. For the purposes of this thesis conventional
warfare refers to military combat operations conducted by general purpose forces with
the aim of defeating an opposing national military force.
20
Department of the Army, FM 1-02, 1-84.

11
US Army doctrine, PPM was considered essential in COIN; however, the PPM emphasis

in COIN has eroded in contemporary doctrine.

12
 CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION OF US COIN AND PPM DOCTRINE

Although psychological operations may be effectively integrated to support

military actions in limited and general warfare, it is essential to the success in
both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.
— Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Operations,
Techniques, and Procedures (1966)

Brief History of US Psychological Warfare and Operations

The use of PPM is as old as warfare itself. Ancient military leaders such as the

Persian general Xerxes; the Carthaginian general Hannibal; and Mongol warlord Genghis

Khan, all employed PPM to great effect in their military endeavors. 21 Likewise, PPM has

been integral in US military endeavors since the American Revolution as evidenced in

sophisticated leaflets, handbills, and pamphlets produced during the period. For instance,

Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, which greatly spurred patriotic fervor, was disseminated

as a series of pamphlets. 22 Not until the mid-twentieth century; however, did US military

PPM formalize in doctrine and application.

21
Xerxes, Hannibal, and Ghenghis Khan each conducted psychological warfare as
an integral part of their military campaigns. Xerxes spread rumors of massive archer
formations to intimidate the Greeks. Hannibal sent messengers into Rome warning of a
secret weapon that could not be stopped, smashing Roman will to fight. Ghenghis Khan
creatively fed exaggerations to spies who returned home with tales of limitless hordes of
cavalry and solders so ferocious they dined on wolfs and bears. Paul M. A. Linebarger,
Psychological Warfare (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1948), 3-5, 14-16; Leo J.
Margolin, Paper Bullets: A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II (New
York: Froben Press, 1946), 20.
22
Ibid., 20-24.

13
 PPM, primarily psychological warfare, was employed extensively in early

twentieth century warfare, including the First World War and the Central American wars

collectively known as the Banana Wars; each with varying degrees of organization,

formality, and effectiveness. In fact, the term psychological warfare originated in the

twentieth century when in 1920 British military historian J. F. C. Fuller wrote:

This method of imposing the will of one man on another may in its turn be
replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not even used
or battlefields sought or loss of life or limb aimed at; but, in place, the corruption
of human reason, the dimming of human intellect, and the disintegration of the
moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is
accomplished. 23

Naturally PPM organizations existed in the First World War; the conflict is

known for its extensive propaganda. On the home front, the US Committee on Public

Information (CPI) stirred American passion. 24 Across the ocean, the Propaganda Section

of the G-2, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces (GHQ/AEF),

conducted extensive propaganda operations, mostly in radio and leaflet. However, both

organizations were ad hoc creations and were dissolved following the armistice. 25

The roots of modern PPM, and its relationship to counterinsurgency, were planted

in the Second World War. After thirteen years with no military PPM organizations in the

23
J. F. C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918 (London: John Murray,
1920), 320.
24
The Committee on Public Information (CPI) should not be considered a
psychological warfare organization as its target audience was the American people.
However, it was intended to influence public opinion and generate support for American
involvement in the First World War.
25
Harold D. Lasswell, “Organization of Psychological Warfare Agencies in World
War I,” in A Psychological Warfare Casebook, eds. William E. Daugherty and Morris
Janowitz (Bethesda, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press-Operations Research Office, 1958),
120-126; Linebarger, 62-70.

14
US military, Psychological Warfare Branches (PWB) were established in 1942 at army

theater level, followed by the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) in 1944.

Additionally, the OSS took ownership of some aspects of PPM. Although all these

organizations were disbanded, demobilized, or drawn down after the Second World War,

an organizational skeleton continued to exist.26 Also for the first time in US military

history, a small cadre of experienced PPM professionals remained on active duty;

whereas after the First World War, all PPM experience and continuity were lost. 27

Of those experienced in PPM and remaining on active duty, two were

instrumental in establishing US PPM capabilities and the relationship of PPM with

COIN—Brigadier General (BG) Robert McClure and Colonel (COL) Russell

Volckmann. McClure had commanded the PWD in the Second World War and remained

an advocate for PSYWAR afterwards. Through his initiative, a Psychological Warfare

Center was established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1952 which he commanded. 28

The Psychological Warfare Center became the center for all irregular warfare and the US

26
By 1947, only one operational psychological warfare organization remained in
the US Army. Located at Fort Riley, Kansas, the Tactical Information Detachment was
reflagged as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company in 1950 and formed the
nucleus of psychological warfare capability during the Korean Conflict. It was closely
followed by the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group, established and
deployed to Korea in 1951. A staff organization was also created in 1950, the Office of
the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). The OCPW was commanded by BG Robert
McClure who had formerly commanded a PWB and the PWD. See Paddock, “U.S.
Military Psychological Operations: Past, Present, and Future,” 20-21.
27
Paddock, “U.S. Military Psychological Operations: Past, Present, and Future,”
20-21.
28
BG McClure was later promoted to Major General. McClure retired from active
duty in 1958 and died the following year.

15
Army Special Forces (SF) were formed under it at the same time. 29 COL Volckmann,

who led guerrilla bands in the Philippines against the Japanese and authored the US

Army’s first counterguerrilla manual in 1951, was chosen to oversee the SF

development. 30 Largely because of COL Volckmann’s role in the new organization, the

Psychological Warfare Center assumed responsibility for COIN capability and doctrine

development shortly afterwards. Over the next decade, the center itself did not greatly

increase in size or force structure but created a permanent platform for increasing

irregular capabilities.

The next expansion of PPM capability came about as a result of the introduction

of US combat troops into South Vietnam in 1965. 31 Starting with an ad hoc psychological

operations battalion formed from separate companies, within three years, the force

structure for PPM increased into two full active duty groups. These two groups, the 4th

Psychological Operations Group (POG) and the 7th POG, operated in South Vietnam and

also supported from Okinawa. 32

29
The Psychological Warfare Center included a PSYWAR School, the 6th Radio
and Broadcasting Group, and the 10th Special Forces Group. It was later renamed the
Special Warfare Center, the Center for Military Assistance, and the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare School and Center.
30
COL Volckmann’s FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces was the
first modern US Army counterinsurgency manual and advised a holistic approach to
counterguerrilla operations including “political, administrative, economic, and military
policies, intelligently conceived, wisely execute, and supported by appropriate
propaganda.” Birtle, 134-135.
31
The term PSYOP replaced the term PSYWAR in US Army doctrine in 1962.
32
See chapter 5 of this thesis for greater detail on the 4th POG and 7th POG.

16
 After the war, the force structure decreased again and the 4th POG became the

only remaining active duty PPM capability in the US Army for the next forty years.

Although organizational transformation occurred over those forty years, such as the

establishment of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) in

1987 as the 4th POG’s parent headquarters, PPM continuity was maintained. 33 Currently,

PPM organization and continuity continues to evolve with the establishment of a

provisional second active duty group in 2011. Consequentially, from 1952 to present, the

US Army has maintained continuous and developing PPM capability.

PPM Doctrine Linked and Unlinked

Sixty years after the proponent for psychological warfare and counterinsurgency

doctrine was established, doctrinal development for both should reflect significant

integration of the two. Not so. When the US Army published FM 3-24,

Counterinsurgency in 2006, it revitalized movement and thought on the subject. As stated

in the foreword though, the manual provides a “general approach to counterinsurgency

operations.” This holds especially true for the psychological aspects of COIN, which are

referenced repetitively yet vaguely in the manual. In fact, although included in the formal

definition (Counterinsurgency includes the military, paramilitary, political,

psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency), and

33
The 4th POG has now been reflagged as the 4th Military Information Support
Group (MISG) due to the transition from the term PSYOP to the term MISO. In 2011, the
4th MISG (A) provisionally transformed into a Military Information Support Operations
Command (MISOC), splitting into two groups yet retaining the same cumulative number
of battalions. The second group, 8th MISG(A), provisionally activated in 2011. Each
group contains three Military Information Support Battalions (MISB).

17
characterized as a “key counterinsurgency participant” and a “special requirement” in the

manual, FM 3-24 provides no definitive role, function, or priority for PPM. 34

The companion manual, FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, published in

2009, provides a minimal explanation of PPM application in COIN operations but only as

a subheading under “Information Engagement.” The manual directs psychological

targeting of two universal target audiences, providing three key “facets” or simplified

objectives for each. 35 However, no substantive discourse on integration, analysis, theory,

method, purpose, role, or significance is addressed. 36

Similarly, the current doctrine for PPM focuses on process, method and

capabilities but contains no background or techniques for specifically supporting COIN.

Although FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures, published in 2007, and FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, published with Change 1 in 2009, provide the

intended base and structure for conducting PPM, the manuals are as general in COIN

34
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-1, 2-5, 6-15, B-8.
35
FM 3-24.2 states PPM should target the “population” to: obtain buy-in for
actions that affect the populace; win over passive or neutral people by showing host
nation legitimacy; and encourage locals to provide information about the insurgency to
US or host nation security forces. PPM should also target the ‘insurgents’ to: divide
insurgent leaders and guerrillas, divide insurgents and mass base, and create a means for
insurgents to abandon the movement and return to society
36
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in
Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 4-11, 4-12.

18
substance as FM 3-24 is. In fact, the term “counterinsurgency” itself is not used in either

manual. 37

What makes this occurrence ironic is that the field manuals of the Cold War era

heavily integrated PPM in COIN theory. For instance, though not termed COIN at the

time, the first US Army counterinsurgency manuals published in 1951, FM 31-20,

Operations Against Guerrilla Forces and FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of

Guerrilla Warfare considered PPM as one of the key elements in combating guerrillas

and included discourse on application. 38 Likewise, FM 31-22, US Army

Counterinsurgency Forces, published in 1963, included a chapter on PPM. 39 Rather than

merely acknowledging PPM, as FM 3-24 appears to, or oversimplifying as FM 3-24.2

does, PPM theory and integration were highlighted in the earlier FM 31-20, FM 31-21

and FM 31-22. FM 31-22 even included bulletized psychological objectives similar to

those found in the current FM 3-24.2, but also the publication provided the context and

37
Although current PPM doctrinal publications (FM 3-05.30, Psychological
Operations; FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures; and FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures) contain minimal specificity on supporting COIN operations, future
publications may return to placing emphasis on and providing detail for supporting
COIN. The draft version of FM 3-53, Military Information Support, which will replace
FM 3-05.30, contains some specificity for supporting COIN. The authorized version of
FM 3-53 is expected to be published in 2012.
38
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-21, Organization and Conduct
of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 155.
39
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-22, U.S. Army
Counterinsurgency Forces (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 10, 77-
81.

19
reasoning behind them. Even the later FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, published

in 1967, included the context of PPM purpose, concept, organization, and operation. 40

Similarly, PPM doctrine of the period included theory on COIN. FM 33-5,

Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, published in 1966, contained not

only PPM process and procedure but also included a full chapter entitled “Psychological

Operations in Countering Insurgency.” 41 Covered in the chapter were topics on how PPM

could support Nation Building Programs, Environmental Improvement Programs,

Population and Resource Control Programs, and Counterguerrilla Operations as well how

PPM could combat Subversive Insurgent Psychological Objectives and Subversive

Insurgent Propaganda Organization. 42 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this rise and fall of PPM

emphasis in COIN doctrine and vice-versa, in general.

40
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-16, Counterguerrilla
Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 82-83.
41
The 1955 version of FM 33-5, Psychological Warfare Operations addressed
counterguerrilla operations but briefly.
42
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 33-5, Psychological Operations
Techniques and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 22-
37.

20
 Figure 1. COIN emphasis in PSYWAR/PSYOP/MISO doctrine
Source: Created by author.

Figure 2. PSYWAR/PSYOP/MISO emphasis in COIN doctrine

Source: Created by author.

21
 The contrast of PPM and COIN doctrine of the 1960s with PPM and COIN

doctrine of the present age indicates one of two developments. It suggests (1) either that

PPM was viewed as ineffective or irrelevant and intentionally marginalized in current

doctrine or (2) current doctrine is lacking in addressing a “special requirement”

appropriately. In situation, the detail and the purpose of PPM in support COIN in the

1960s has been deemphasized in post 2001 doctrine.

PPM Effects and Relevance

Part of the difficulty in determining if PPM remains relevant to COIN lies in the

ability to accurately gauge effects. The effects of an artillery fire mission or an Air Force

sortie are often instantly apparent and a direct cause-and-effect relationship is obvious.

However, with PPM effects may take years to become observable and even then cause-

and-effect relationships may be impossible to isolate. Occasionally, obvious effects are

observed such as the case when 1,800 Chinese troops surrendered due to a C-47 aircraft

loudspeaker broadcast in the Korean Conflict. 43 Other effects are quantifiably measurable

such as during a two month period in Europe in 1944 where 25 percent of German

prisoners of war had deserted and of those deserters, 90 percent had safe-passage leaflets

in their possession. 44 While a number of surrenders can be counted, many objectives in a

COIN environment cannot be measured. For instance, how can the action of village

elders refusing to provide aid to an insurgent group be identified and verified?

Consequently, the failure of PPM to influence target audiences may not lead to

43
Paddock. US Army Special Warfare, 94.
44
Margolin, 104.

22
irrelevance but rather the failure to identify, isolate, and verify the effects. In fact, PPM

theorist Paul Linebarger noted this phenomenon in his classic 1948 Psychological

Warfare work:

Psychological warfare is waged before, during, and after war; it is not waged
against the opposing psychological warfare operators; it is not controlled by the
laws, usages, and customs of war; and it cannot be defined in terms of terrain,
order of battle, or named engagements. It is a continuous process. Success or
failure is often known only months or years after the execution or the operation.
Yet success, though incalculable, can be overwhelming; and failure, though
undetectable, can be mortal. 45

The Shortcoming of COIN and PPM Doctrine: Consensus

Doctrine is obviously a valuable tool to counterinsurgent forces. The theory of

developed from the accumulated experiences of multiple perspectives can guide and

shape effective COIN operations. The strength of doctrine though is also its weakness as

cumulative experiences require consensus to become doctrine. Consensus often takes the

edge off innovative theory. The insight of knowledgeable and experienced individuals

can also guide effective operations just as authoritatively as doctrine. The following

chapter attempts to accomplish this: examine the COIN and PPM theories of

knowledgeable and experienced individual counterinsurgents who were not consensus

builders but innovators. Each of these innovative counterinsurgents considered PPM as

paramount in a comprehensive COIN strategy.

45
Linebarger’s book, Psychological Warfare, was widely read by the PPM
practitioners of the Cold War era and influenced their thinking. Of note, two US Cold
War COIN practitioners discussed in the following chapter, Edward Lansdale and Rufus
Phillips, both used the work to gain an understanding of PPM and guide their efforts in
the Philippines and Vietnam. See Linebarger. Psychological Warfare, 1.

23
 CHAPTER 3

THE CLASSIC COUNTERINSURGENTS AND PPM

It is only necessary to stress once again that wars of subversion and counter
subversion are fought, in the last resort, in the minds of people, for the importance
of a good psychological operations organization to become apparent.
— Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations

A person who has been persuaded to do nothing can very soon be persuaded, by
blackmail if necessary, to do something which puts him irrevocably under
insurgent control.
— Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency

If there was a field in which we were definitely and indefinitely more stupid than
our opponents, it was propaganda.
— David Galula, Pacification in Algeria

Use psychological warfare--psywar--to trick, harass, and confuse an enemy, to

raise his fears, to expose his weaknesses. It is an important component of any
campaign against insurgents. Be willing to try the unconventional. An army must
comport itself not only with military alertness but with psychological insights.
— Edward Lansdale, Edward Lansdale, the Unquiet American

Why Study the Classic Counterinsurgents Views of PPM?

During the twentieth century, a unique mixture of ideologies, technologies, and

socio-economic conditions occurred initiating an unprecedented level of irregular

warfare. In the midst of these circumstances, a number of counterinsurgency experts

emerged who had fought to counter these insurgencies and had time to reflect on their

efforts. As a result, several of these scholarly warriors can be considered Classic

Counterinsurgents-combining academic study, first hand experiences, and writing

extensively on the theories formed from both.

In the context of this thesis, four classic counterinsurgents are considered

especially noteworthy: Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, David Galula, and Edward
24
Lansdale. Each participated in multiple counterinsurgency operations, at various levels of

command, and produced the writings that directly affected the tactics of militaries and the

strategies of nations. Though many others have provided extensive thought on insurgency

and counterinsurgency, these four are uniquely qualified to be considered the classics. 46

A key aspect of in each of their counterinsurgency theories is the application of

PPM to support comprehensive operations. All of the stated foundational

counterinsurgents considered PPM imperative to a counterinsurgency campaign and

included their views for the use and goals of the aspect in their writings. An examination

of these original works, free from the interpretations of intermediary scholars, provides

insight in detail and specificity for the use of PPM in current counterinsurgencies.

General Sir Frank Kitson

Serving over forty years in the British Army, General Sir Frank Kitson served in

five separate wars providing an unparalleled breadth of experience to formulate

counterinsurgency theory. Commissioning three years after the end of World War II,

Kitson was involved in several key Cold War counterinsurgencies and peace keeping

operations during the 1950s and early 1960s including the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya,

the Malayan Emergency, the Muscat and Oman Rebellion, and the Cyprus Problem. He

46
A number of other counterinsurgents could be considered classic. In terms of
prevailing contribution to multiple conflicts though, these four stand out. All four
experienced both successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies: Kitson-Oman and
Northern Ireland (note the Northern Ireland operation was considered successful in the
end but during the period of Kitson’s involvement the war was generally not going well
for the counterinsurgent forces); Thompson-Malaya and Vietnam; Galula-Greece and
Algeria; and Lansdale-Philippines and Vietnam. In addition, all four published books that
were influential in shaping counterinsurgency thought and efforts beyond their time of
service.

25
also commanded a brigade in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s before being

promoted to the most senior army positions. 47

Over the years, Kitson authored several books derived from his experiences,

articulating foundational counterinsurgency theory. Kitson published Gangs and

Counter-gangs in 1960; Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-

Keeping, in 1971; Bunch of Five in 1977; and lastly Warfare as a Whole in 1987 after his

retirement from active duty. The works, primarily Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of

Five, provide experienced insight on warfare and more specifically narrate his thoughts

on the importance and application of PPM in countering insurgencies.

An array of experiences, ideas, and reflections are contained in Kitson’s writings.

The paramount argument he conveyed though is the difference between combating a

conventional threat and combating an insurgency. Whereas in conventional warfare the

destruction of the enemy force is the primary aim, the aim of the insurgent or

counterinsurgent is to gain a sizable enough allegiance of the population to sway the

conflict, sizable enough to uphold the government or sizable enough to overthrow the

government, Kitson related. Likewise, he concluded that the use of force to destroy the

enemy becomes a subordinate effort to gaining and maintaining the loyalty of the

population that enables or disables the insurgent’s goals. In Kitson’s own words:

the main characteristic which distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other

forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men’s
47
The Mau Mau Rebellion occurred from 1952 to 1960 in Kenya; the Malayan
Emergency occurred from 1948 to 1960; the Muscat and Oman Rebellion occurred from
1957 to 1959; the Cyprus Problem occurred roughly between 1963 and 1967 though
incidents of organized violence predated and followed; and Northern Ireland occurred
roughly from 1968 to 1980. See Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber
Limited, 1977).

26
 minds, since only by succeeding in such a struggle with a large enough number of
people can the rule of law be undermined and constitutional institutions be
overthrown. Violence may play a greater or lesser part in the campaign, but it
should be used very largely in the support of ideas. 48

Key in this struggle for men’s minds, as Kitson conveys, is the conduct of PPM and he

writes extensively on the subject.

In Kitson’s most famous work, Low Intensity Operations, he discusses the

application of PPM, providing the purpose, the technical process, some tactics, and the

makeup of effective PPM organizations. According to Kitson, the principle purpose of

PPM is to present the attributes of the established government in a manner that is

desirable to the population and conversely countering and discrediting the appeals of the

insurgent force. 49 Governments that fail to establish their attributes as offering beneficial

superiority therefore lack reasonable appeal. Kitson described the mechanical process

behind promoting the government and discrediting the insurgents in three aspects. To

begin with, detailed assessments of the population and circumstances are made by

specially trained personnel. The assessments are then developed into PPM programs and

once accepted by appropriate government officials are made policy. The programs’

arguments are conveyed in products such as leaflets, print articles, radio, and films which

are disseminated to the population. 50 Of note, though communicated in broad terms, the

48
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 282.
49
Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-
Keeping (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971), 77.
50
Ibid.
27
mechanical process Kitson described in 1971 mirrors that of the United States Army’s

current doctrine in use today, specifically Phases II through VI of the PPM process. 51

In the writing, Kitson described one key technique in achieving primary purpose:

exposing the underlying motives of insurgent forces and discrediting the insurgent

organization using the true yet undesirable aspects of the insurgent agenda. He suggested

insurgent groups often obscure their principal aspirations and promote only selected

portions or alternate forms of their agenda in order to gain acceptance from a broader

audience. An example he provided is the Indo-Chinese Communist Party’s promotion of

nationalism to combat the Japanese, and later the French, knowing the promotion of

communism would not be accepted as enthusiastically. Based on this, he argued, by

identifying and making known the “veiled aims,” the moderate segment of the population

may withhold commitment, degrading and possibly isolating insurgent support

mechanisms. 52

An organizational template and organizational peculiarities for PPM units

supporting counterinsurgency operations are also included in the work. About

organization, Kitson stated that each level of command should be supported by an

51
Steps 2 through 6 of the process are Target Audience Analysis; Series
Development; Product Development and Design; Approval; and Production, Distribution,
and Dissemination. Steps 3 through 6 are self explanatory; Step 2 is the most crucial as it
lays the foundation. Target Audience Analysis (TAA) identifies key target audiences
(TA); determines if the TA can conduct the desired behavior; evaluates the conditions the
TA lives in and deals with; determines vulnerabilities in the TA to stimulate the desired
action; determines if the TA is likely to response to persuasion; determines how the TA
can be accessed; develops arguments; and determines how to assess effectiveness. See
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.301, Psychological Operations
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 2007).
52
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 84-85.

28
operational team capable of conducting assessments, providing advice to commanders,

and developing and disseminating propaganda while operating within centralized

parameters. The teams should be capable of conducting interpersonal face-to-face

influence in directed areas as well. In addition, Kitson offered two peculiarities for PPM

organizations: the organizations must rely on indigenous advisors and civilian personnel

may form the organization itself. No foreign military propagandist, no matter how much

of an expert on a region, possesses the same degree of cultural, historical, and geographic

knowledge as natives do, argued Kitson. Therefore, exploiting indigenous talent in the

analysis of a population and in the development of PPM is essential. He also argued that

an army may not always need to provide the core of a PPM organization and cases exist,

like the civilian Information Service used during the Malayan Emergency, where

effective PPM organizations could be staffed by civilians. Kitson caveats this though by

acknowledging the time required to build such an organization may be substantial and

only an army has the capability of maintaining readily available, adequately trained, and

experienced PPM units. 53

Apart from organization, Kitson addressed the timelines associated with PPM

activities. Knowing political agitation generally precedes militant aspects of an

insurgency, such as guerilla warfare and terrorism, he advocated conducting PPM as

early in a campaign as possible. Kitson stated that although governmental progress may

occur at the onset of an insurgency, it fails to reach full potential with the population

53
Ibid., 77-79.

29
unless exploited through PPM. This is the core of the Kitson’s concern for a military

PPM unit as opposed to a civilian led agency. 54

In a following work, Bunch of Five, Kitson elaborated on the use of PPM in the

context of counterinsurgency framework. Kitson used the analogy of a picture frame to

describe his overall theory for an effective counterinsurgency campaign and described

PPM as being fundamental in enabling one side of the frame. The four sides of Kitson’s

counterinsurgency campaign frame are the coordinating machinery, intelligence, law, and

the political atmosphere. The coordinating machinery synchronizes the efforts of all

governmental, non-governmental, and military organizations to ensure all operations are

de-conflicted and work towards centralized goals. Intelligence facilitates understanding

of insurgent organizations, provides background and contact information, and enables

interdiction or exploitation. Law supports the legitimacy and justness of the government

and military counterinsurgency force in national and international venues. Lastly, the

political atmosphere, according to Kitson, generates a receptive response of the

population to governmental actions and programs. This last side of the frame is where the

propaganda battle occurs and PPM is the determining factor in victory or defeat. Kitson

also illustrated the crucial link PPM facilitates in the political atmosphere for the

intelligence side of the frame. 55

Kitson stated the political atmosphere ebbs and flows with the periodic

occurrences of propaganda as PPM is conducted by both sides. Initially, the insurgent has

the advantage in the political atmosphere, Kitson warned. Insurgents initiate their

54
Ibid., 78, 81.
55
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 284-290.

30
propaganda efforts first and antagonize the population towards the government or

governmental policies, putting the government on a defensive and reactive footing. As a

result, PPM by the counterinsurgent force is required to highlight the positive attributes

of the government more effectively than the insurgents can emphasize the negative

attributes of the government, while also discrediting the insurgent organization itself.

This requires active monitoring of insurgent propaganda and conducting countering

efforts by argumentative and physical means, Kitson wrote. The end result of the battle is

the “regaining and retaining” 56 the allegiance of the population in order to ensure the

greatest likelihood of acceptance for governmental programs and actions conducted by

the coordinating agency, intelligence apparatus, and legal system. 57

The allegiance factor is especially crucial relative to intelligence gathering, Kitson

narrated. In Kitson’s frame, intelligence collection is paramount as “the problem of

defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him.” 58 Intelligence of the period

was largely based on information provided from agents, informers, and information

gained from troop contact with the population; what would today be characterized as

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). In order to elicit HUMINT from the population, PPM

was crucial. In Kitson’s words, “All actions designed to retain and regain the allegiance

56
Kitson used the phrase repetitiously throughout Low Intensity Operations and
Bunch of Five.
57
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 286-287.
58
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 95.

31
of the population are relevant to the process of collecting background information

because its provision is closely geared to the attitude of the people.” 59

Also of interest, in both Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of Five, Kitson

addresses a peculiar form of propaganda rarely recognized: the use of marches and rallies

not just as overt opposition a government but also as indirect PPM conducted against

security forces. In this peculiar technique, subversives provoke overreactions by security

forces and exploit then the overreaction; gaining material for propaganda. In Soviet and

Maoist terms, this was called agitation propaganda or agit-prop. The primary aim of an

organized march, according to Kitson, is to first to provoke and exploit overreaction and

second to influence the government to place restrictions on security forces--decreasing

the security forces’ ability to perform their mission. Kitson recognized the technique and

wrote on the subject not to advocate its use by counterinsurgent PPM forces but as a

defensive acknowledgement, in an attempt to preempt insurgent propaganda

opportunities. 60

As illustrated in Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of Five, Frank Kitson’s

knowledge and theories contain substantial insight in PPM employment derived from his

participation in multiple diverse COIN operations and associated reflection. Kitson

contemplated the roles and value of PPM and how it supports his four sided COIN frame.

Although nowhere articulated as a set of PPM principles, PPM tenets can be extrapolated

from Frank Kitson’s collective works and in simplified form are illustrated in figure 3.

59
Ibid., 97.
60
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 293-294.

32
 Figure 3. Frank Kitson’s COIN Frame and PPM
Source: Created by author.

Sir Robert Thompson

The contributions of Sir Robert Thompson to modern COIN theory are as unique

as they are authoritative. Thompson’s unique perspective stems from his years as a civil

servant. As opposed to his peers, Thompson’s experience with insurgencies occurred

while he worked for the British Colonial Civil Service and in civilian advisory capacities.

Although he served in the Royal Air Force with the Chindits in Burma during the Second

World War, the preponderance of his warfare theory was developed while wearing a suit

33
and tie. 61 Serving in a civil capacity, Thompson spent over fifteen consecutive years

involved in COIN operations in Malaya and Vietnam. 62 Serving in various capacities,

including the Malayan Secretary of Defense and heading the British Advisory Mission

(BRIAM) in South Vietnam, Thompson was instrumental in the COIN operations of two

conflicts. In fact, during the Vietnam conflict he personally advised the two South

Vietnamese Presidents: Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu. 63 Later, Thompson also

conducted a special assessment of Vietnam for US President Richard Nixon and

61
Thompson entered the Malayan Civil Service in 1938 but joined the Royal Air
Force (RAF) in 1941 with the outbreak of the Second World War. Though a trained pilot
and an RAF officer, Thompson served in Burma as an air-ground officer, coordinating
aerial resupply operations and aerial fire support for the Chindits who conducted
harassing attacks behind Japanese lines. After the war, Thompson returned to the civil
service. Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills, Memories of Far Eastern Wars (London:
Leo Cooper Ltd, 1989), 1-32, 41-70.
62
Post Second World War, Malaya (now Malaysia) remained a British
Protectorate until 1957. Three years after the end of expulsion of the Japanese, a
communist backed insurgency took place and lasted over a decade. The British assisted
the Malayan government in combating the ethnically Chinese insurgents and eventually
subdued the movement. In the end, the war known as the Malayan Emergency became
one of the few successful counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century. Key to the victory
were resettlement operations known as New Villages and paramilitary security forces
termed Home Guards; an extensive food rationing operation and curfews were also
instrumental. Thompson would later attempt to apply these techniques in Vietnam. See
Robert Thompson, War in Peace, Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945 (New
York: Harmony Books, 1981).
63
Ngo Dinh Diem was the President of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from
1955 until his assassination in 1963-the founding years of RVN. Nguyen Van Thieu was
the president from 1967 to 1975-the final years. Thompson enjoyed a close relationship
with both presidents and was instrumental in shaping early Vietnamese pacification
policies such as the Strategic Hamlet Program and the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) amnesty
program. Thompson, Make for the Hills, 122-130, 158.

34
continued to advise him periodically. 64 In addition to his experience and relationships,

Thompson was also an author.

Characteristic of the foundational counterinsurgency theorists, Thompson

captured his vast experiences and theory in writing. Thompson authored a series of works

on insurgency consisting of Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, No Exit from

Vietnam in 1969, Revolutionary War in World Strategy in 1970, and Peace is Not at

Hand in 1974. Thompson authored, consulted, and edited many other books and articles

on twentieth century military history as well. He also published his autobiography, Make

for the Hills, in 1982, encapsulating his experiences. Of all of Thompson’s writings,

Defeating Communist Insurgency provides the most straight forward articulation of his

counterinsurgency theory and reads like an instruction manual in places. Thompson,

based on his civil experience, notes in the introduction that the work examines

counterinsurgency from more of an administrative viewpoint and less of a military

perspective. 65

In Defeating Communist Insurgency, Thompson articulated his strategy for

defeating an insurgency in the terms of five principles. He stated the first principle is for

a government to have a clear political aim. Creating and nurturing an independent,

socially democratic, and united state with economic and political stability lays the

foundation for maintaining the citizenry’s support, according to Thompson. This aim is

broad, he stated, but is essential in attaining or upholding governmental authority. Rule of

64
Thompson, Make for the Hills, 158, 161, 165.
65
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer
Publishing, 2005), 10.

35
Law is Thompson’s second principle. Acting outside of established law degrades the

legitimacy of the government and degrades its attractiveness, he conveyed. Laws can be

strict and oppressive, such as curfews and preemptive detention, but if applied without

bias among the entire population, are held as legitimate. Such laws can later be rescinded

when conditions permit. Thompson’s third principle is the creation of a comprehensive

governmental plan for combating an insurgency, not just a military solution but

economic, social, and political as well. Balancing and synchronizing civil and military

efforts, he states, provides enduring results-combating the insurgents and the causes of

insurgency simultaneously. The fourth principle is slightly more complex but closely

related to the third. In it, Thompson advocated governmental focus on subversion instead

of guerilla or terrorist activity. By combating the political and ideological wing of an

insurgent movement, he stated, the insurgent’s grasp on the population can be broken.

Breaking the grasp isolates the militant insurgents from their required population based

support mechanisms such as supplies, intelligence, and secrecy. Thompson’s last

principle is securing the base areas first. He acknowledged this may cede rural areas to

insurgent control but safeguarding the largest population centers and developed regions,

provides the government a venue to demonstrate its authority and benefits. 66

In the framework of these five principles, Thompson incorporated guidelines for

the use of PPM. In fact, in Defeating Communist Insurgency, he dedicated an entire

chapter to what he refers to as Information Services. 67 Inside of Information Services,

66
Ibid., 50-58.
67
Information Services were an organizational department of British Colonial
Civil Administrations. The departments were quasi-PPM and Public Affairs offices
36
Thompson stated two audiences are to be targeted: psychological warfare is directed at

insurgents and information work is directed at the population. Both are to be executed in

close coordination with the intelligence organization. 68

For the insurgents, Thompson prescribed four objectives for psychological

warfare: to gain the surrender or defection of insurgents, to create discord between rank-

and-file insurgents and their leaders, to create animosity between the insurgents and the

population, and to promote positive views of the legitimate government. Thompson

elaborated extensively on defection appeals, advocating that combative terms like

“surrender” and “prisoner of war” be avoided in favor more palatable suggestions such as

offering “safe-conduct” to the “misled.” The term “amnesty” should also be avoided, he

stated, as it implies a pardon no matter the extent of crimes committed. Rather, a firm but

fair appeal articulated succinctly informs the reader that crimes will be punished but

justly and legally, acting not only as a surrender appeal but also as a deterrent. Thompson

also expanded on dissension. Insurgents’ “mistakes and human errors” should be

exploited, whether vice or atrocity, to degrade the support of the population and lessen

the loyalty of lesser insurgents. 69

For the population, Thompson offered less of the object of information and more

on the method. In a straightforward manner, he conveyed the aim as pulling the

population to the government’s side and gaining the populations’ backing policy. For the

which worked on behalf of the supported government. Though civilian in organization,

information services generally worked closely with military organizations.
68
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 90.
69
Ibid., 90-95.

37
method, Thompson stipulated truthfulness and authority as key. Paramount to the

legitimacy of the government is credibility, which is maintained by truthful information,

according to Thompson. He narrated a failure of truthfulness, in fact or intent, undoes

integrity of a hundred other efforts. Likewise, Thompson advised that in order to be

respected, an air of authority be present in all governmental propaganda, illustrating

dignity and confidence. Taking an apologetic tone, even if mishaps occur, should be

avoided. Spinning an unfortunate event, by spotlighting the compensation paid or

reconstruction over the collateral damage produces better results he suggests.

Noteworthy, Thompson injected a special emphasis relative to “mistakes,” stating

information services cannot justify mishaps but may defuse a situation with this sleight-

of-hand technique. Lastly, Thompson suggested limiting counterpropaganda efforts as

engaging in propaganda dialogue draws attention to the insurgents’ propaganda. Rather

he advises on promoting the government’s policy and attributes, forcing the insurgents to

counter facts and truth. 70

Not included in the Information Services chapter but relative to PPM were

Thompson’s thoughts on rewards systems. Similar to Kitson, Thompson discussed the

primacy of intelligence and the role PPM plays in intelligence collection, but from a

different angle. Thompson stressed the benefits of effective rewards systems which

offered financial incentives for information leading to the capture or killing of insurgents

or for the recovery of weapons and war materials. In Defeating Communist Insurgency,

Thompson summed up the technique stating:

70
Ibid., 90, 96-97.

38
 If there is a well publicized standard rate of rewards for information
leading to the killing or capture of terrorists and the recovery of weapons, the
natural cupidity of many members of the population soon involves them in the
hunt, particularly if they know that their identity will not be revealed and they will
be paid on the nail in cash in accordance with the results. 71

Among the classic counterinsurgents, Thompson provides a viewpoint no other

does in that he examined insurgency using governmental rather than military

perspectives. Of additionally value, his extensive authorship provided both theoretical

and historical dissections of many insurgency campaigns so that patterns could be

observed. Also, his views on PPM were direct and supported by his first hand

observations of fifteen consecutive years of governmental and military operations. Figure

4 represents a simplified synthesis of Thompson’s discussion on PPM application in

COIN.

71
Ibid., 88.

39
 Figure 4. Robert Thompson’s 5 COIN Principles and PPM
Source: Created by author.

David Galula

Lieutenant Colonel David Galula’s counterinsurgency theory is considered a key

foundational pillar of current counterinsurgency doctrine. As with his peers, Galula’s

writings are born from vast personal experiences; carrying tremendous authority. In 1939

he graduated from Saint Cyr, the French military academy, only months before the

outbreak of the Second World War. After the French capitulation, the collaborating

French Vichy Army dismissed Galula from service, because he was Jewish. So Galula

returned to French Morocco, his previous home, and spied for the Free French until

joining the Free French Army in 1942. With the Free French Army, he saw action in

40
continental Europe, including two amphibious assaults. 72 The conclusion of the war

though, fostered Galula’s relationship with insurgency as he traveled to China working

for the French military attaché from 1945 to 1948. In China, Galula observed firsthand

the final years of the Chinese Civil War and Mao Tse-Tung’s protracted warfare strategy

and associated tactics. Galula was even held captive by the communist guerillas for a

short time. Immediately following, while serving in the United Nations Special

Commission on the Balkans, Galula observed a second insurgency up close, the Greek

civil war. Greek governmental forces defeated the communist insurgents here, with

British and American assistance. He also studied the French-Indochina War and the Huk

Rebellion, though he did not directly participate, making trips to Indochina and the

Philippines while serving as the French military attaché in Hong Kong. Galula’s final

encounter with insurgency came with the Algerian Revolution, where he commanded a

colonial infantry company and applied his observations on counterinsurgency with

substantial though localized success. He also served as the deputy battalion commander

in Algeria for a short period. 73

After surviving a world war, multiple insurgencies, and the French political

turmoil that followed the Algerian conflict, Galula resigned his commission and sought

civilian employment in 1962. During this period, he captured his experiences and theory

in two books. The first work, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, was written for the

RAND Corporation and published in 1963 but remained classified as “confidential” until

72
Ann Marlowe, David Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 21-45.
73
David Galula, Pacification in Algeria (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
1963), 69.

41
2005. The confidential classification significantly hampered access and proportionately

interest. The second writing, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, was

published in 1964 and though valued in certain military circles, remained relatively

obscure until reemerging as a foundational source for the United States’ current

counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Though written on the same

subject matter, the two works differ in scope. The former primarily addresses combating

insurgency at a localized level, chronicling Galula’s actions in Algeria. The latter is

conceptual, addressing counterinsurgency in a broader sense. 74 Both address the

application of action psychologique, psychological action directed at a population, and

guerre psychologique, psychological warfare directed at insurgents and supporters. 75

Drawing from his observations and experiences, Galula formulated four

comprehensive counterinsurgency laws. In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and

Practice, Galula conveyed the four laws and further articulated eight steps to achieving

success against an insurgency nested in the context of the laws, including aims for PPM.

The first law communicates the population’s support is as necessary for the

counterinsurgent as the insurgent. An armed force can drive insurgents from an area, but

the allegiance of a population prevents reemergence and likewise, only with the tacit

support of a population can an insurgency survive. The population, consequently, is the

prize the two forces struggle over, according to Galula. Support is gained through the

active minority is his second stated law. The bulk of populations are relatively

74
Marlowe, David Galula, 2-9.
75
Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, The
Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1964), 56.

42
uncommitted during conflicts, no matter the cause, observes Galula. Smaller “active”

segments commit to a side and are motivated enough to act. Galula advocates

indentifying and influencing receptive active minorities to mobilize the masses, assisted

by an acceptable counter-cause. PPM is crucial to this law. In fact, while discussing the

law, Galula writes, “the main goal of propaganda [is]-to show that the cause and situation

of the counterinsurgent are better than the insurgent’s.” 76 The third law Galula provided

is the population’s support is conditional. The pro-government minority remains silent

and invisible when physically intimidated by insurgents. Only after localized security is

established, can a pro-government minority become an “active” minority. Here, Galula

provides another comment on PPM stating “when a man’s life is at stake, it takes more

than propaganda to budge him.” Galula concluded with a fourth law, intensity of efforts

and vastness of means is essential. Only concentrated efforts and means provide relief

from insurgent control, he argued. Instead of diluting resources across expanses,

successive expansion provides the best testament of governmental control. 77

After describing his four counterinsurgency laws, Galula provided a strategic

counterinsurgency formula and scales down the required actions for ground level

implementation. The formula consists of eight steps: (1) Destruction or Expulsion of the

Insurgent Forces, (2) Deployment of the Static Unit, (3) Contact with and Control of the

Population, (4) Destruction of the Insurgent Political Organization, (5) Local Elections,

(6) Testing Local Leaders, (7) Organizing a Party, and (8) Winning Over or Suppressing

76
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St.
Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 77.
77
Ibid., 74-79.

43
the Last Guerillas. During the first three of the eight steps, Galula placed a strong

emphasis on PPM. In fact, he allocated almost as much space to the psychological facets

of warfare as he did to the maneuver aspects, in the early steps. He articulated this

emphasis as focusing on three key audiences: counterinsurgent forces, the population,

and the insurgents. 78

During the first step, destruction or expulsion of the insurgent forces, Galula

directed a select area to be cordoned by mobile forces who conduct an inward sweep

followed by an outward sweep. He pointed out this concentrates insurgent organizations

for destruction and then expels evasive guerrillas. After the operation, a rearguard of the

mobile force controls the area until follow-on static units can be brought in. To capitalize

on the effectiveness of the maneuver operation, Galula directed psychological work on

the three audiences. Collateral damage and disputes with the inhabitants are inherent

consequences of this maneuver, he acknowledged. To diminish the undesired effects,

Galula suggested counterinsurgent forces be indoctrinated with the understanding that

counterinsurgent forces will be held accountable for “misdeeds.” Also to preempt

military-population clashes, he advised a neutrality appeal be made to the population.

Galula did not advocate an attempt to garner governmental support from the population

during this step, stating it would be premature and counterproductive. Rather a subtle and

achievable argument should be presented, directing the population not to interfere with

the operation or offer any aid to the insurgents. Lastly, Galula focused on the insurgent.

78
Ibid., 107-135.

44
In this situation, if an insurgent force chooses to fight instead of flee, it will be destroyed.

He concluded that goading the insurgent force to fight then becomes the PPM aim. 79

Deployment of static forces is the second step. Galula stated that destroying the

insurgent force or forcing it to flee does not guarantee it will not reemerge. Follow-on

static forces are required to replace the rearguard of the mobile forces, securing the

population from new recruits or additional infiltrations, as well as securing civil

development administrations. These static forces must be garrisoned among the

population, not focused on militarily significant terrain, rather to build common bonds

and start garnering the allegiance of the population. To enable this goal, Galula again

addressed influencing the three audiences. For the counterinsurgent forces, enemy

focused operations will continue but become secondary to population security tasks.

Providing the reason behind the shift in tasks to the soldiers, Galula stated, is vital for two

reasons. Rationale builds buy-in but also, after hearing the reasoning, leaders can identify

soldiers that may not be suited for work with the population-a preemptive measure. For

the population, Galula advocates sending the message that the counterinsurgents are here

to stay. Presenting this argument sways the population from neutrality to support,

gradually. The argument itself is best delivered indirectly, through suggestion for

instance long term leasing of housing or lands. Due to the concentration of

counterinsurgent forces, Galula advocated continuing the same aim as in step one for the

insurgents-provoke them into battle. He suggested an indirect method here as well;

delivering dispersion or surrender appeals may trigger the insurgents to fight due to

79
Ibid., 107-110.

45
pressure exerted on the insurgent leadership. Then the remaining elements can be

destroyed.

The third step, contact with and control of the population, is the last step in which

Galula provides detailed PPM guidance. This step is perhaps the most critical as it

reestablishes authority over the population, isolates the population from the guerrillas,

and gathers initial intelligence. Galula conveyed the population will fear insurgent

retribution for governmental cooperation. To gain contact then, manufactured scenarios

are necessary where counterinsurgent “orders” provide alibis for interaction, like

collective work programs. Control is produced through a number of efforts such as

identity cards, curfews, travel passes, access control points, etc. These are both reinforced

by an increased feel for security, where visible signs of military action continue such as

patrols and ambushes. Also, increased security provides a second alibi for the population

to not directly support an insurgent group. Additionally, with the increased perception of

security and forced contact, informants can be gained, furthering the goals of the step. As

for psychological action and warfare during this step, the chief aim for the

counterinsurgent forces is influencing soldiers to remain cautious while maintaining

friendliness. Galula stated soldiers, once dispersed, will inherently understand safety as

function of a positive relationship with the population. Military vigilance must still be

reiterated though. Three aims exist for the population. The population needs to be

informed why the control measures are in place in order to gain their approval. The

gradual work of dissociating the population from the insurgents must start. Conversely, a

gradual appeal persuading the neutral to slide to the support of the counterinsurgents

must be made. Finally, in the insurgent camp, divide and conquer. A shift in appeal

46
technique is made to address insurgents instead of the insurgent organization. Addressing

the group promotes solidarity, addressing the individual encourages dissention. 80

Throughout the following five steps, Galula provides general guidance PPM, not with the

detail contained at the onset, though.

Of interest, Galula’s first work, the “classified” Pacification in Algeria, contains

much of the same theory as his second work, the “unclassified” Counterinsurgency

Warfare: Theory and Practice. The concepts of the active minority, counterinsurgents

living amongst the population, and sequential expansion of control are all included in

detail in Pacification in Algeria. Even the four laws of counterinsurgency are specifically

included. 81 Not included in Counterinsurgency Warfare though is Galula’s discourse on

the method to achieve “pacification.” He related that during his service in Algeria two

schools of thought existed for counterinsurgency and both were equally inadequate.

Galula framed the problem from two viewpoints, that of the warriors and that of the

psychologists. In his own words, Galula described the former; “At one end stood the

‘warriors,’ officers who had learned nothing, who challenged the very idea that the

population was the real objective, who maintained that military action pursued with

sufficient means and vigor for a sufficiently long time would defeat the rebels.” He also

described the latter; “At the other extreme where the ‘psychologists,’ most of them

recruited among officers who had undergone Vietminh brainwashing in the prison camps.

To them, psychological action was the answer to everything.” 82 This discourse appears to

80
Ibid., 115-123.
81
Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 246.
82
Ibid., 64-70.
47
be the catalyst in which Galula’s comprehensive theory was formed: population

mobilization gained by balancing military action and psychological action.

Galula, equally as experienced as the other classic counterinsurgents, holds a

special position in that his writings on COIN theory and PPM application are

comprehensive yet incredibly detailed. In his writings he provided the overarching

purpose of PPM as affirming the “cause and situation” of the government superior to that

of the insurgents. Uniquely though, Galula also systematically addresses the application

of PPM through the tactical progression of his eight step operation. In fact, he devoted as

much consideration to PPM as maneuver operations in the first three steps. Lastly, all of

the classic counterinsurgents address a balanced approach in COIN, however, only

Galula addresses in detail the two extreme ends of the argument between the “warriors”

and the “psychologists.” A condensed summary of Galula’s COIN theory and application

is provided in figure 5.

48
 Figure 5. David Galula’s 4 Laws, 8 Steps, and PPM
Source: Created by author.

Major General Edward Lansdale

Major General Edward Lansdale is the United States’ long forgotten Cold War

counterinsurgency expert. Lansdale combated insurgencies and revolutionary movements

from the Philippines to Cuba, serving in various capacities from the Second World War

through the Vietnam War. Recruited into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943

and simultaneously working in the Army Military Intelligence Service (MIS), he spent

most of the Second World War stateside performing intelligence, counterintelligence, and

“handyman” work. 83 After the war and through the early 1950s, Lansdale served

83
Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale, The Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1988), 18-25; Jonathon Nashel, Edward Lansdales’s Cold War
(Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 29.

49
extensively in the Philippines as an Army officer and an Air Force officer but primarily

as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent. 84 After years of Japanese domination and

following Philippine independence in 1946, the nation experienced a communist backed

insurgency known as the Huk Rebellion. 85 With the assistance of the Joint U.S. Military

Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and Lansdale’s advice on civic action and psychological

warfare, the rebellion was quelled. 86 Due to his success, Lansdale was dispatched to

Indochina in 1954 to assist the interim South Vietnamese government and to ensure US

interests were maintained and to avoid an eventual communist takeover. 87 More

specifically, he was to “weaken the newly formed northern government of Ho Chi Minh

through whatever means possible and to strengthen the government of the southern

84
Lansdale held a commission in the US Army and the US Air Force but at some
point in the early 1950s became a field operative for the CIA. He never attended flight
training and never held an Air Force command yet became a Major General before
retiring from the Air Force in 1963. See Nashel, 77.
85
The Hukbalahap Rebellion, commonly called the Huk Rebellion, was a post
Second World War communist insurrection in the Philippines. The Huk Rebellion lasted
almost a decade, 1946 to 1954, and was partially a carry-over from the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines. The Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon [People’s Anti-
Japanese Army] was formed during the early 1940s and was guided by the Partido
Komunista ng Pilipinas [Philippine Communist Party]. After the Japanese were driven
from the islands by US forces and Filippino guerrillas, the Huks continued to fight but
against the western oriented Filippino government. Through a series political, social,
economic, and military actions taken by the Phillipino government, the rebellion was
quelled. The conflict was of strategic interest to the United States as after Philippine
independence, many US military bases and ports remained.
86
Nashel, 31-48.
87
The French Indochina war ended in 1954 with the Geneva Peace Accords
stipulating the Vietnam be divided into two provisional states. The southern state became
the western backed Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the communist backed northern state
became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The accords stipulated the two
provisional states hold centralized elections in 1956 to reunite the country.

50
regions headed by Ngo Dinh Diem.” 88 In South and North Vietnam, Lansdale heavily

influenced the political and military landscape and worked extensively on national

building efforts in the south. Departing in 1956, he returned periodically to assess and

advise, and in 1960 drafted the US counterinsurgency support plan for South Vietnam. 89

He returned again in 1965 and served in various advisory roles through 1968. In between

his time in Vietnam, Lansdale was also involved in other irregular warfare initiatives and

served as the executive officer of the Special Group-Augmented (SGA) which planned

Operation MONGOOSE-the subversive overthrow of Cuba. 90

Lansdale, as a COIN practitioner and theorist, conveyed his theories on COIN

differently than did Kitson, Thompson, and Galula. In his one published book, In the

Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, Lansdale communicated his

theories on COIN but in a historical narrative rather than a theoretical model. In it, he

discussed his views and actions to defeat insurgency in the Philippines and somewhat in

early South Vietnam. The work did not include commentary on his Vietnam experience

88
Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast
Asia (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), xi.
89
In 1961 Lansdale submitted a Vietnamese counterinsurgency support plan to the
Kennedy administration for that included a substantial increase in aid in order to slightly
increase the size of the Vietnamese armed forces but double the size of the Vietnamese
paramilitary forces-the Civil Guard. He recommended the situation receive “emergency
treatment” and the “best people” to advise and assist. See Robert S. McNamara, James G.
Blight, and Robert K. Brigham. Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the
Vietnam Tragedy (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 323.
90
The SGA was a special advisory group for the Kennedy administration.
Operation Mongoose was never executed but was later the subject of much controversy
as it included “executive actions,” such as the assassination of Cuba’s President Fidel
Castro and the poisoning of food crops.

51
of the late 1960s though. Also, the work contained no list of principles or framework for

counterinsurgency operations; they have to be extrapolated out of the account. 91

The type of COIN operation Lansdale advocated was holistic in nature including

social, political, economic, military, and psychological efforts. Primarily, he understood

insurgency and counterinsurgency as a people’s war dealing with “real live human beings

out there.” 92 Due to these inclinations, Lansdale weighted the facets of counterinsurgency

with political and psychological tenets having primacy but supported by military and

economic efforts. 93 He communicated this primacy as using the euphemism of the “x-

factor.” The x-factor was simply how people felt about their conditions, movement, war,

etc. Lansdale saw the x-factor as the crucial difference between conventional warfare and

irregular warfare such as insurgency and counterinsurgency. 94

Lansdale’s concept for COIN was best illustrated in the Philippines, where as an

advisor, he brought his understandings to full manifestation. There he addressed the

91
Apart from the PPM concepts conveyed in Lansdale’s’ In the Midst of Wars,
Lansdale presented several lectures where he articulated his thoughts on PPM. Since In
the Midst of Wars includes no specified formula or theory for PPM application in COIN,
the transcripts from two of his lectures are included in this thesis to reinforce the author’s
extrapolated opinion of Lansdale’s PPM theory. These transcripts are Appendix C and
Appendix D of this thesis and are from a lecture series given in 1960 to the Armed Forces
Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The transcripts recount many of the same incidents
found in In the Midst of Wars, and also emphasize Lansdale’s view of PPM as a weapon
system much like artillery. See Edward Geary Lansdale Collection, Box 80, Folder:
Military Psychological Operations and Military Psychological Operations: Part Two,
Hoover Institution Archives.
92
Currey, 307.
93
Ibid., 279.
94
Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not
Learned (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), xiii, xiv, 312.

52
social and political concerns of the rural Filippinos and dealt with the insurgents. To deal

with the sociological and economic conditions of the Filippinos, Lansdale influenced

judicial reform by making military Judge Advocate lawyers available for peasants to

settle land disputes. To provide the people with a political voice, he opened direct

communications between the peasants and the government by implementing the ten-

centavo telegram. To deal with the insurgents, Lansdale and his team spearheaded

Philippine Scout Rangers who conducted small scale counterguerrilla operations. Also,

he offered the insurgents a chance to defect and reintegrate into society. With his help,

the Economic Development Corps (EDC) was expanded and provided surrendered Huks

the opportunity to receive vocational training and land grants. His philosophy on amnesty

programs was simply “why shoot a man if you could talk him into surrendering.” 95 Other

efforts were also created yet these illustrate Lansdale’s approach. 96

More heavily any other prominent counterinsurgent practitioner-theorist though,

Lansdale focused on PPM. This aspect of Lansdale is likely due to his civilian years,

where is worked as a journalist and advertising executive. 97 In PPM, Lansdale took a

two-prong approach, one geared at building support for the government and one aimed at

disrupting enemy efforts. To build support for the government, the Civil Affairs Office

(CAO) was created. Recognizing that the army was the face of the government to most

Filippinos, the CAO set out to “sell” the army to the people. The CAO was the enabler

not the agent; it manifested a small section attached to each army brigade with the task of

95
Nashel, 129.
96
Lansdale, 48-59.
97
Nashel, 25-26.

53
training Soldiers to be “brothers and protectors of the population.” The CAO also

encouraged military participation in civil events and the construction of public works.

Although some resistance was encountered to the “non-military” work, Lansdale

provided practical incentives as:

Troop commanders were not always willing to undertake civic action with their
soldiers because they viewed this action as “political” and therefore outside their
military domain. To persuade them to try it, I pointed out that one reward of
brotherhood was the willingness of the people to talk more openly with the
soldiers. If a commander were to practice civic action honestly and thoroughly, I
guaranteed that it would increase his unit’s “raw take” of tactical intelligence by
100 percent in a week. It often took less time than that. 98

For disrupting the enemy, Lansdale was an incredibly creative thinker and

focused PSYWAR in the most irregular methods. Though he used mass media and

technology, he favored face to face communications in persuasion and innuendo. In

particular he remarked, “The Asia people know that the mouth and the ear were invented

long before the printing press, the camera, and the radio,” illustrating his insight. 99 He

summed up his philosophy as:

Conventional military men think of combat psywar almost exclusively in

term of leaflets or broadcasts appealing to the enemy to surrender. Early on, I
realized that psywar had a wider potential to than that. A whole new approach
opened up, for example, when one thinks of psywar in terms of playing a practical
joke. 100

Many of Lansdale’s “practical jokes” would be illegal in the contemporary environment

and were likely illegal then. Taken in context though, two general principles can be

derived from them.

98
Lansdale, 70-71.
99
Ibid., 42.
100
Ibid., 71.

54
 The first principle could be termed Shepherding. Inside of a counterinsurgency

fight, friendly and enemy population groups can be persuaded, coerced, or otherwise

induced to move to or from a location for tactical or strategic gains of the

counterinsurgent force. 101 On several occasions, Lansdale and his subordinates used

irregular psychological methods to stimulate groups to move into or out of an area. One

of the tactical examples was the vampire incident. At one point during the Huk Rebellion,

a Huk guerrilla force had occupied a particular hill next to a village where a Philippine

army force was garrisoned. The army needed to be relocated due to operational

requirements but could not leave the village to the will of the Huks nor was the garrison

strong enough to push the Huks out. A PPM solution was developed. Based on the

Filippino’s superstitious beliefs, a “PSYWAR team” introduced the notion that a vampire

was in the area. The PSYWAR team planted rumors in the village of vampire sightings,

knowing Huk sympathizers would communicate the rumor to the Huk guerrillas. After

sufficient time passed for the rumor to circulate, the team “silently snatched” a member

of a Huk patrol, drained his blood, marked his neck with two puncture wounds, and put

his body back on a commonly used trail. After the Huks discovered the body the

following day, the entire squadron left the hill, according to Lansdale. 102

One strategic example of shepherding was the Catholic migration. In late 1954

and early 1955, approximately 900,000 Catholic Vietnamese living in northern Vietnam

101
The “principles” are not listed as such in Lansdale’s writings. The principles
are derived from Lansdale’s historical account and listed as principles for ease of
explanation.
102
Other examples of induced movements are provided. See Lansdale, 72-73;
Nashel, 40-41.

55
migrated or were evacuated to southern Vietnam. 103 The added Catholic population was a

benefit to the western friendly and Catholic South Vietnamese leader, Ngo Dinh Diem,

who became president in 1955. Obviously, Lansdale’s PSYWAR operations did not

trigger the migration; a number of circumstances stimulated the movement such as fear of

reprisals against the Franco-friendly Catholics. Lansdale did develop it though.

Disseminating leaflets showing concentric circles over Hanoi, suggesting a US atomic

strike; spreading rumors of Chinese military aggression in northern Vietnam; and selling

thousands of pseudo-almanac predicting dire times for northern Vietnam; Lansdale

exploited existing tension to amplify the effects. 104

The second principle could be termed Boomerang Propaganda. If effectively

studied and authentically replicated, insurgent propaganda can be used to counter the

insurgent’s causes and operations. On multiple occasions Lansdale used this technique

for great effect. One example was the Boycott the Election. During the 1951 Philippine

presidential election, Lansdale used one of the Huk’s slogans against them--“bullets not

ballots.” Lansdale had received reports of a Huk agit-prop cell working in Manila. 105

Through proxies, Lansdale presented a pseudo-directive to the agit-prop cell with the

103
Lansdale, 167.
104
Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-
1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Lansdale, 226; Phillips, 39-40; Nashel,
60-61; Pentagon Papers Volume 1, 579.
105
Agit-prop is an acronym for agitation and propaganda. Agitprop is a standard
technique doctrinally employed by Marxist-Leninist movements and the “peoples”
movements that have followed. The aim of agitprop is two-fold. First, is to encourage and
control seditious acts such as labor strikes, protests, and riots. Second, is to cause
governmental or interventionist forces to over react to the seditious act for the purpose of
further propaganda exploitation.

56
slogan “Boycott the Election.” 106 Being in line with existing precedent, the agit-prop cell

used the slogan in their propaganda efforts and effectively encouraged Huks not to vote.

Though maybe counter to a political-inclusion narrative for counterinsurgency, the act

did assist in assuring in assuring a pro-western government was elected and had a

demoralized effect of the Huks, according to Lansdale. 107

Another example of boomerang propaganda was executed by one of Lansdale’s

subordinates, Rufus Phillips. This incident, Dongs for Piasters, utilized the agit-prop

notion as well. In early 1955, the division between South Vietnam and North Vietnam

was in process. Due to the establishment of the two peer governments and the banking

industry being largely controlled by the French, the value of the South Vietnamese piaster

was influx. During the period, the Viet Minh had also established a currency, the dong.

At some areas, the value of the dong greatly outweighed the value of the piaster. To

exploit this condition and incite anti-Viet Minh sentiment, Phillips used Lansdale’s

technique to produce a Viet Minh pseudo-leaflet offering to exchange dongs or piasters

on a one for one basis. 108 After being disseminated, the pseudo-leaflet did incite a riot of

angry labors who could not exchange their piasters as promised, eroding credibility and

support for the Viet Minh. 109

106
For authenticity, the pseudo-directive was typed on a captured Huk typewriter,
used captured Huk paper, and included secret Huk authenticating identification.
107
Lansdale, 92-93.
108
The Viet Minh pseudo-leaflet was not hastily prepared but was a product of
detailed intelligence and analysis. Former Viet Minh proclamations, paper, type face, and
writing style were all analyzed to recreate credible reproductions. Phillips, 68.
109
Phillips, 67-69.

57
 General Lansdale, in the case of the Philippines, was one of few counterinsurgents

to be successful in the twentieth century. Lansdale’s emphasis on a holistic approach,

heavily weighted with civic and psychological aspects, proved effective when correctly

applied. Although many of his methods may have appeared “unsound”; his pragmatic and

innovative techniques did deliver the cumulative desired effect. Yet a true difficulty

arises in evaluating his concepts. The difficulty lays in his intrinsically covert nature and

in understanding his In the Midst of Wars, though written as a historical account,

arguably contains a few “white lies.” 110 An extrapolated and condensed interpretation of

Lansdale’s views on PPM is illustrated in figure 6.

Figure 6. Lansdale’s COIN Theory and PPM

Source: Created by author.

110
Currey, 329.

58
 Classic Counterinsurgent PPM Synthesis

Synthesizing the cumulative PPM experience of the four classic

counterinsurgents, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, David Galula, and Edward Lansdale;

is no easy task as they each conveyed their ideas in different manners. To add to the

complexity, it must be acknowledged that each classic counterinsurgent’s works

undoubtedly possess some degree of ego, self interest, and interpretation. However, aims,

principles, and in some cases tactics; can be pulled from each practitioner-theorist’s

writing. If patterns can be identified in their works, they may be more useful than

doctrine as consistency found among four separate expert opinions, each compiled

independently, is more valid than conglomerate opinion expressed in doctrine.

First, did the classic counterinsurgents agree on the primary aim of PPM in

supporting COIN? Though phrased in many different expressions, all four of the classic

counter insurgents comment that the primary purpose of PPM in COIN is to induce the

population to support the government over the insurgent. This is evidenced in their own

words:

Frank Kitson: “There has never been much doubt that the main characteristic
which distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they
are primarily concerned with the struggle for men’s minds, since only by
succeeding in such a struggle with a large enough number of people can the rule
of law be undermined and constitutional institutions be overthrown. Violence may
play a greater or lesser part in the campaign, but it should be used very largely in
support of ideas. In a conventional war the reverse ifs more usually the case and
propaganda is normally deployed in support of armed might.” 111

Robert Thompson: “the task naturally falls into two categories: information work
directed at the insurgents (i.e. psychological warfare) and information work
directed at the public. Not only do the two go together, but the first requires very
close co-operation with the intelligence organization. The aim of the first is to

111
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 282.

59
 reduce the will of the insurgents to fight and to encourage surrenders, while the
aim of the second is to rally the population to the side of the government and to
encourage positive support for the government in its campaign.” 112

David Galula: “This truism dictates the main goal of propaganda-to show that the
cause and the situation of the counterinsurgent are better than the insurgent’s.” 113

Edward Lansdale. “Essentially, in a revolutionary ‘people’s war,’ the people of

the country actually constitute the true battleground of the war. Whoever wins
them wins the war.”

Second, did the classic counterinsurgents agree common principles or tactics for

PPM in COIN? This answer is much more difficult to arrive at but some key principles

do resonate among the works. For the purpose of this synthesis, if two of the four classic

counterinsurgents mentioned the principle or tactic in their independent works, it is

considered noteworthy. Though not all inclusive and subject to some interpretation,

agreed upon principles included:

1. PPM amnesty/reconciliation programs (4 mentioned.) All of the classics

discussed amnesty programs. Though PPM organizations do not administer the

programs, PPM is key in the process. Of note, three of four discussed the

significance of the jargon of “return” or “rally” instead of “surrender.”

Thompson and Lansdale discussed the tactic in greater detail; both had

observed first hand successes with the tactic in Malaya and the Philippines. 114

2. PPM requires Propaganda of the Deed (3 mentioned). Kitson, Thompson, and

Lansdale all addressed a necessity for “propaganda of the deed” though they

112
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 90.
113
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 77.
114
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 146-148; Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency,
90-92; Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 225; Lansdale, 48, 129.

60
 did not all use the term, stating PPM must be supported by tangible

improvement or supportable facts such as land grants, a functional

reconciliation program, or the establishment of security. 115

3. PPM enables HUMINT (3 mentioned). Kitson, Thompson, and Lansdale, all

include specific statements in their works indicating that PPM is vital to

enabling and exploiting HUMINT. The principle is suggested in Galula’s

Pacification in Algeria but not explicitly stated. 116

4. PPM must preempt agit-prop (2 mentioned). Kitson and Lansdale both warned

of insurgents inciting riots in order to provoke security forces and create

opportunities for propaganda. 117

5. PPM must uncover Veiled Aims (2 mentioned). Kitson and Thompson

discussed identifying and making known the veiled aims of insurgents such as

the Indochinese Communist party promoting nationalism instead of

communism. 118

115
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 79; Thompson, Defeating Communist
Insurgency, 92, 96; Lansdale, 48, 70-71.
116
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 97, 189; Thompson, Defeating Communist
Insurgency, 88; Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 230, 276, 288; Lansdale, 71.
117
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 41, 85; Kitson, Bunch of Five, 293-294;
Lansdale, 71.
118
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 30, 85; Thompson, Defeating Communist
Insurgency, 23.

61
 6. PPM by civilian agencies may be more effective. (2 mentioned.) Kitson and

Thompson both discussed advocacy for civilian led PPM. Both caveated

civilian organizations require military support during COIN operations. 119

These four men, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, David Galula, and Edward

Lansdale; all practiced and observed PPM in multiple COIN operations and each enjoyed

a different perspective. Some valued PPM more and a few less; some were creative and

others traditional in their approach to PPM application; each though considered PPM an

essential and integral part of a comprehensive COIN campaign. Since each reflected and

wrote separately, no consensus was required; but some patterns were observed. The

following two case studies are evaluated against this derived synthesis. Reduced to its

simplest terms, the synthesis of the PPM theories of the four classic counterinsurgents are

illustrated in figure 7.

Figure 7. Synthesis of Classic Counterinsurgent PPM theories

Source: Created by author.

119
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 79, 188; Thompson, Defeating Communist
Insurgency, 95.

62
 The following chapters include two case studies of how PPM was applied in two

separate COIN conflicts. Each illustrates the essentialness of effective PPM in COIN

operations. Both case studies also provide a number of best practices for COIN PPM.

63
 CHAPTER 4

COIN PPM OF THE DHOFAR REBELLION

Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. Words are far, far
less expensive than bullets, let alone shells and bombs. Then, too, by killing him
you merely deprive the enemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join the
Government forces the enemy again become one less, but the Government forces
become one more, a gain of plus two.
— Major General Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War

Context of the Conflict

At the height of the Cold War, a relatively unknown though strategically

significant war occurred along the southern Arabian peninsula. While the western world

focused on the highly visible conflicts in Vietnam and Israel, a gradual and discreet

struggle occurred -the prize for which was access to the Middle East’s oil reserves. As the

free world pondered the domino theory in Southeast Asia, the communist world pondered

a similar theory for the Middle East where the western world’s oil supply could be

interdicted by controlling just two countries, present day Yemen and Oman. Chokepoints

to the major oil shipping lanes exist geographically where the Persian Gulf opens to the

Arabian Sea (Strait of Hormuz), skirting Oman, and again where the Arabian Sea necks

down into the Red Sea and eventually the Suez Canal (Bad El-Mandab), along Yemen’s

coast (see figure 8). If these strategic bottlenecks fell under the sway of the communist

world the political dynamics of the world could be irrevocably changed due to the

western economies dependency on Middle Eastern oil. 120

120
Roger Cole and Richard Belfied, SAS: Operation Storm (London: Hodder and
Stoughton Ltd. 2011), 17-22.

64
 Figure 8. Sealane chokepoints of Yemen and Oman
Source: Advisor Perspectives, “Global Unrest Continues and Gets More Complicated,”
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/commentaries/guild_33111.php (accessed 5
December 2011).

Compounding the problem was the wide transition from colonial government

systems established by the empires of the previous century. As a continuing result of the

Second World War and a number of “small wars” that followed, socio-political

paradigms were shifting in the United Kingdom -resulting in a gradual reduction of the

empire’s global footprint. Western reduction left many developing countries open to

65
exploitation by communist movements, among them Yemen 121 and Oman. Both states

were British protectorates for most of the twentieth century, with trade and protection

agreements dating back to as early as 1646. 122 Policy shifts though called for a gradual

reduction in British forces abroad, shrinking the envelope of protection that could be

offered.

Yemen was the first to fall. With the withdrawal of British forces in 1967, after

several years of civil war and insurgency, communist revolutionaries took control of the

region. Afterwards, the conglomerate nation became the People’s Democratic Republic

of Yemen (PDRY) and was supported politically and economically by the Peoples

Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), the

Republic of Cuba (Cuba), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 123 Once

established on the peninsula, the revolutionary movement quickly spread to Oman.

The Omani region that bordered PDRY was and is known as Dhofar, and Dhofar

was ripe for communist exploitation. Dhofar, in the mid-1960s, was already in a state of

rebellion against the Sultanate of Oman. Additionally, an earlier rebellion had been

121
“Yemen” is a loose term referencing a region more so than a nation. Yemen
experienced multiple name changes, confederations, political orientations, and border
arrangements during the mid-twentieth century relative to shifting alliances of local
sheikhdoms and emirates. The region or areas in the region have also been known as
Aden, North and South Yemen, the Federation of South Arabia, and the People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen. Different segments of the region were also viewed in
varying manners by the western world, for instance Aden was a British crown colony
from 1936 to 1967 whereas South Yemen was a British protectorate during the same
period. Aden’s seaport made it strategically valuable while most of the peripheral states
held little military, political, or economic importance.
122
Rowland White, Storm Front (London: Bantam Press, 2011), 17-18.
123
Ibid., 18.

66
defeated in the previous decade-with help from the British. The existing rebellion, started

in 1965, was led by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). The rebellion was quickly

usurped by the communist movement from PDRY and reflagged as a movement of the

Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). 124 PFLOAG,

using the proven Maoist tactics of coercion and indoctrination, rapidly gained control

over the rural region except for a few governmental enclaves along the coast where

guerilla tactics could not overcome massed firepower, namely Salalah where the Sultan

of Oman resided (see figure 9). 125

124
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG)
changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
in 1972 and to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in 1974.
Additionally, PFLOAG absorbed the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of the
Occupied Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG), a related communist movement in northern Oman,
early in the conflict. At its height, PFLOAG was estimated to have controlled 2,000
guerrilla fighters and 3,000 auxiliary fighters. By 1975, PFLOAG numbers were
estimated at approximately 400 guerrilla fighters and 400 auxiliaries.
125
Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War, Operation Storm in the Middle East (London:
Green Hill Books, 2005), 25-26.

67
 Figure 9. Salalah enclave surrounded
Source: Middle East Center Archive, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, England.

Apart from the communist provocation, a number of circumstances led to the

rebellion. First, the ethnic majority of Dhofar, known as Dhofaris or Jebelis, were an

ethnic and linguistic minority in Oman. 126 The Dhofaris were similar in appearance and

custom to North Africans, such as Ethiopians and Somalis, more so than peninsula Arabs.

As often occurs in polyglots and multi-ethnic societies, an ethnic tension existed. Here it

was between the Dhofaris and the Arabs. Also, Dhofaris were semi-nomadic herdsmen

who pastured goat, cattle, and camel herds in the mountainous areas of Oman. In the

highlands, the Dhofaris felt few ties to the Arabs of the coastal plains of Muscat and

126
“Jebel” is the Arabic word for “mountain.” “Jebelis” is a colloquial term for
“Dhofaris” meaning “mountain people” similar in connotation to Vietnamese
“Montagnards” or Scottish “Highlanders.”

68
Salalah. 127 As of the late 1960s, Said Bin Taimur Al Busaidi, the Sultan of Oman, had

done little in the way of civil development for the country. Ruling for almost forty years,

the Sultan firmly held all authority in the country as an absolute monarchy. He restricted

travel, education, and medical services. Though heavily reliant on the British, Said Bin

Taimur was vehemently anti-western and viewed “modern” practices as anti-Islamic.

Even after the oil revenues of the late 1960s dramatically changed the economic standing

of Oman, the Sultan refused to develop the country. 128

As a result of communist subversion and support coupled with Omani

governmental shortcomings, from 1965 to 1970, the Dhofar rebellion was fought with

limited success by the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF). SAF commanded and staffed by

British seconded officers and British contract officers, possessed a wealth of combat

experienced leaders. Likewise, with most of the soldiers coming from Pakistani

Baluchistan or northern Oman, the fighting forces were tough and martial. 129 Although

the SAF were effective at counter guerrilla tactics in the countryside and static defenses

of the enclave cities, the flow of arms and political inspiration continued coming from

across the PDRY border. In order to prevent Oman from becoming a second South

Arabian communist proxy state and safeguard Persian Gulf oil trade routes, the United

Kingdom intervened, although in a very discreet manner; a coup.

127
Brian Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, Campaigning in Somaliland & Oman
(Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2008), 60.
128
White, Storm Front, 23.
129
John Akehurst, We Won A War, The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975 (Wiltshire
Great Britain: Michael Russell Publishing Ltd., 1982), 33-35.

69
 Some details remain clouded but the only son of Sultan Said Bin Taimur, Qaboos,

overthrew his father in a coup in 1970. The coup received the backing and support of the

British government and the dynamics of the Dhofar rebellion subsequentially changed.

Qaboos was western educated and a graduate of the British military academy at

Sandhurst. Also, he had previously served in the British army in Germany for a brief

time. His experiences abroad led him to a fundamentally different understanding of

government than his father had held and he opened the country to civil and economic

development. Additionally, Qaboos requested the assistance of other nations in

combating the communist insurgency and empowered the SAF with equipment,

capabilities, and partners to defeat the insurgency. 130

Framework of the Counterinsurgency, 1970 to-1975

Over the next five years, a comprehensive counterinsurgency operation was

conducted which resulted in the eventual defeat of the PLFOAG insurgency. Numerous

factors and circumstances contributed to the victory, some organizational, some

governmental, some diplomatic, and some strictly military. Combined, these factors had a

choking effect on the insurgency, and with time and intensity eventually strangled the

enemy lines of communication (LOCs), recruiting efforts, and political viability.

The first of the initiatives that contributed to the defeat of the PFLOAG was the

introduction of British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel, known as the British Army

Training Team (BATT) while in Oman. Though originally deployed to Oman as the

personal security element for the new Sultan, the role of the SAS quickly grew in

130
Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and
Sword Books Ltd., 2006), 24-25.

70
particularly as the developer of indigenous security forces. The SAS developed the idea

of “turning” the insurgent guerrilla bands to support the Sultan’s government instead of

the communists. Over the period of just a year, the SAS developed five groups of security

forces known as firquats, literally “teams” in Arabic. 131 Through a combination of

military action and persuasion, the SAS recruited, trained, and led several firquats of

local Dhofaris in combat action against the communist insurgents known as the adoo. 132

The program was primarily based on offering Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs) the

opportunity to earn an income in the service of the Sultan. By finding a “coincidence of

aims,” the SAS were able to exploit the existing capabilities of the indigenous fighters

against the communist backed insurgency. 133

The introduction of the SAS though was only part of the solution. Starting in

1970, SAF itself transformed and expanded. Starting out with only two infantry battalions

and some associated support, the size of the force increased several fold over the course

of two years- greatly expanding its capabilities and reach. Quantities and qualities of

armaments also increased as the force was modernized; jets, helicopters, and naval

vessels were either added or upgraded. Also SAF was augmented with Royal Air Force

131
The original five Firquats were all recruited, trained, and led by the SAS or
‘BATT.’ These Firquats consisted of the Firquat Salahadin (FS), Firquat Khalid bin
Waleed (FKW), Firquat Azifat (FAA), Firquat Al Nasr (FAN), and Firquat Tariq bin
Zeead (FTZ). Additional Firquats were formed and utilized by SAF later in the conflict.
Firquat units were far from ideal indigenous security forces, though highly skilled
guerrilla fighters, discipline issues and tribal conflicts plagued their existence. Firqas
often refused to conduct operations, especially if it interfered with their agrarian lifestyle.
132
The term adoo translates as enemy in Arabic. Instead of addressing the
organization PFLOAG, the term adoo was more often used and directly referred to
Dhofari tribesmen fighting on the communist side.
133
Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 14, 32, 36-56, 57-70, 102.

71
(RAF) security personnel, Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineers. Additionally a number

of Royal Marines were “seconded” to SAF, further increasing capabilities as well. 134

In addition to the expansion of SAF and introduction of the SAS, the new Sultan

also reached out to neighboring nations for assistance. In response, the Kingdom of Iran

contributed the Imperial Iranian Battle Group (IIBG). 135 The Iranian contribution by itself

almost doubled the manpower size of the counterinsurgent force in Oman. Additionally,

the Iranian contingent further expanded the heliborne capability for resupply and medical

evacuation. Though considered to have limited offensive capability, the Iranians provided

the preponderance of the static defenses. Likewise, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordon

contributed combat engineers and Special Forces, providing critical support and combat

capability. India and others provided smaller support packages to assist also, such as

medical teams. 136

Apart from the increase in forces, conventional counterinsurgency tactics and

techniques were applied with great success, most significantly the use of border control

measures. Over a few years, successive obstacle belts were constructed, consisting of

134
Gardiner, 25.
135
Iran, under the Shah Reza Muhammad Pahlavi, was a western ally with
especially close ties to the United States. In fact, in 1972 the United States provided Iran
with more foreign aid than it did South Vietnam. At the time, Iran and the United States
were large trade partners with Iranian oil and petroleum products being exported to the
US and American military technologies being exported to Iran. Only after the overthrow
of the Shah by Ayatollah Rullah Khomeini in 1979 did US-Iranian national tensions
come to light on the world stage.
136
Akehurst, 36-38.

72
wire fences and supporting mine fields. 137 The symmetry of Dhofar was well suited for

border control due to the geographic contours the region, an ocean to the south and a

barren desert to the north. The consecutive “lines” were placed perpendicular to the

enemy’s LOCs and when coupled with overwatches and heavy patrolling by SAF and

IIBG, proved to be a particularly effective means of choking out the enemy’s logistics. 138

In addition to the lines, forward outposts established on the border with PDRY with great

effect and some population resource controls were implemented.

Augmenting the military initiatives, governmental reforms were executed. Sultan

Qaboos, using growing oil revenues, committed substantial funds to developing the

country’s infrastructure, including transportation, communications, health care,

education, and simple needs like water; attacking many of the initial root causes of the

insurgency. The socio-political desires suppressed under Sultan Said found fulfillment

under Sultan Qaboos. Similarly, the Sultan promoted reconciliation with the adoo and

offered a general amnesty for those who would renounce communism and “return” to

their families and tribes. The new Sultan though putting great emphasis on military effort,

sought to also destroy the favor and support the adoo enjoyed from their own people,

making his own governance superior to his opponents. 139

137
The obstacle belts were known as the Leopard, Hornbeam, Hammer, and
Damavand Lines. The Leopard Line was completed in 1971 and manned only a short
time. The Hornbeam, Hammer, and Damavand Lines were constructed from 1973 to
1975.
138
Gardiner, 171.
139
Akehurst, 15, 19.

73
 Lastly, the counterinsurgency framework held together with a unified aim that

permeated all operations. The simple statement of To Secure Dhofar for Civil

Development provided a comprehensive understanding for the overall goal of the

operation. 140 The motto communicated the insurgency would be defeated through a

combination of military force and pacification. To achieve this goal, an SAS veteran who

would later also serve SAF, developed the Five Fronts plan. The five fronts plan sought

to combat the insurgency holistically through a combination of intelligence, civic

development, veterinarian, indigenous security force, and psychological operations. 141

Though originally created for solely for the SAS, the Five Fronts became accepted and

formalized through the entire military and civil effort.

PPM Inside the Framework

Nested in the Five Fronts, PPM was not only one of the five pillars of the

operational plan but also the pillar that permeated the other four. PPM was vital in

communicating the Omani governmental agenda, promoting the milestones of civil

development in the pursuit of hearts and minds, shaping the environment to facilitate

intelligence collection, and similarly turning the adoo to serve as indigenous local

security forces. From the strategic corporal to the Sultan, PPM was understood as vital to

combat the insurrection along the jebel. 142

140
Ibid., 65.
141
Cole, 36-37.
142
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch, London, England, 14 September 2011.

74
 An important note must be made about the hearts and minds campaign in Oman.

In modern times, hearts and minds campaigns are often thought of as a function of PPM;

persuading the populace of value of the government over the cause of the insurgent. In

the context of the period though, PPM was thought of as a facet of the campaign, not the

campaign itself. 143 Governmental reforms, services, and development, physical

milestones that could be touched and seen, were the basis of hearts and minds. These

tangibles, exploited by PPM, and coupled with a persuasive national narrative provided

the cumulative hearts and minds campaign.

Similarly, the primary goal of the hearts and minds campaign was more than the

winning of popular support but also as shaping the area for intelligence exploitation. 144

At the time of the Dhofar rebellion, as in modern counterinsurgency operations, human

intelligence was the key to locating and destroying the enemy. Whether by political buy-

in or pragmatic opportunism, hearts and minds provided the canvas that the government’s

victory narrative was painted on. By persuading the population of the eventual victory of

the Sultanate, the tendency of populations to support “the winning side” was exploited

and human intelligence opportunities increased as a result. 145

The PPM campaign itself was executed by a variety of conduits over the course of

the war and carried on another five years after the official conclusion of the conflict.

Much like the Five Fronts plan, the PPM campaign was primarily the brainchild of one

143
Ibid.
144
Ibid.
145
Ibid.

75
man: John Lane. 146 Lane, as he is referred to as in Major General Tony Jeapes’ book SAS

Secret War, arrived in Oman in 1970 with the first of the SAS troops and remained in

country through 1980, although he worked the latter half of his campaign as a civilian in

the Sultan’s Information Services. 147 As the effort progressed, other British information

teams were deployed to Oman in support of the SAS and SAF; however, Lane was the

principal Psy Ops orchestrator and continuity for almost a decade.

Naturally, the PPM campaign was not a one man project. Although originating

with Lane alone, over time, British Army Information Teams (AITs) rotated in and out of

Oman on six month tours. AITs were comprised of a captain and eight to ten men, most

of which were initially trained by Lane. The AITs supported the BATTs, who were on

similar rotational schedules, and SAF. Afterwards, while working for the Sultan’s

Information Services, Lane trained and led civilian indigenous teams as well. Civilian

teams were primarily specialists though such as radio programmers, newspaper writers,

etc. He also counseled and advised the Omani Minister of Information later as well. 148

Lane and his information teams focused their efforts along three objectives: to

support military operational aims; to assist in the military and political defeat of the

dissidents; and to persuade the population of the integrity of the Sultan’s government.

Military operational aims primarily attempted to solicit or induce the adoo, both leaders

and foot soldiers, to surrender or “return.” PPM was also used in direct support of

146
“John Lane” is a pseudonym. Lane’s identity is restricted due to operational
security concerns relative to his association with the Special Air Service.
147
Jeapes, 36.
148
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch.

76
military operations in methods that in modern terms would be called Military Deception

(MILDEC), such as creating ruses with false airborne operations and leaflet drops

indicating the details of future military raids. 149 Defeating the dissidents militarily and

politically was accomplished by communicating factual information of PFLOAG

atrocities and defeats (see figure 10). Promoting the integrity of the Sultan’s government

consisted of advertising development projects and the Sultan’s adherence to Islam. Both

of these facets possessed substantial appeal to the Dhofari audiences. 150

Inside these objectives, Lane developed a resounding slogan to permeate all Psy

Ops products and programs; “Islam is way, freedom is our aim” became the motto of the

conflict to the Dhofaris. 151 The slogan repetitively used on Psy Ops products was the

result of detailed counter-propaganda analysis of PRDY’s and PFLOAG’s propaganda

and activities. Communist doctrine of the time included an emphasis on atheism. The

doctrine did not resonate with Dhofaris, or the Omani Arabs, whose society and history

were deeply engrained with Islam. To reject or deny Allah existed was scandalous in

Dhofari culture and those who did usually did so at the barrel of a rifle. The Kalashnikov

149
A major operation was conducted in October of 1971, Operation JAGUAR,
with the goal of seizing a point of key terrain on the Jebel. In order to minimalize the
number of adoo facing the maneuver forces, deceptive measures were employed
misguide the adoo as to the direction of the attack and to lure the adoo away to other
defensive positions. A number actions were taken to support the ruse, two of which were
executed by the Psy Ops team. First, a leaflet drop was conducted indicating an attack
was imminent but providing the wrong direction of attack. Second, ‘dummy’ parachutists
were air-dropped indicating another direction of attack. The leaflet drop and other actions
are referenced in Jeapes’ SAS Secret War, 136. The ‘dummy’ parachutists is referenced in
a personal interview with an anonymous SAS member, dated 19 September 2011.
150
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch.
151
Jeapes, 60.

77
and other coercive techniques were core to inculcating the Dhofaris to communism.

Killings, beatings, maiming, were all PFLOAG tools for spreading control over the

Dhofari population. PFLOAG even systematically marched hundreds of Dhofari children

to PRDY where starvation, exhaustion, and beatings broke down their wills and re-

educated their minds. So the slogan sought to give the Dhofaris back what the

communists had taken, Allah and the freedom the semi-nomads were accustomed to. 152

The impact of the slogan came to be known years later when a young Dhofari recited it to

Lane, conveying the motto was a traditional saying. Lane acknowledged that it was

indeed a traditional saying but one that he had created. 153

152
Ray, 61-62.
153
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch.

78
 Figure 10. Radio Script: Islam Is Our Way, Freedom Is Our Aim
Source: Middle East Center Archive, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, England.

To carry the slogan and associated arguments to the Dhofaris, the PPM teams

used a number of conventional means; some with creative twists though. The

conventional means revolved around radio and leaflet operations as well as mobile

cinema. The modified means were the use of notice boards, face to face engagement

using proxy speakers, and using word of mouth to reinforce and verify the truthfulness of

PPM products. 154

Radio operations were well suited for the period and region. Dhofar and much of

Oman had no communications infrastructure, no electrical production, and little means

154
Ibid.

79
for the procurement of non-essential physical possessions. In an effort to access the

population, SAF, SAS, and AITs introduced inexpensive Japanese radios to the area. At

first the radios were given out freely to the population and later were sold at great

discount, assuming the Dhofaris would place greater value on the radios if it cost them

something. 155 This led to the creation of broadcasting stations, Radio Dhofar and Radio

Oman, which brought the Sultan’s governmental message to the mountain people. Lane

and information team, primarily staffed by indigenous personnel, used broadcasting and

the transistor radios to highlight the civil development being conducted, differentiate the

government of Qaboos from the government of Said, present turned adoo appeals to

encourage current adoo to return, and encourage adherence to Islam through the

preaching of Imams-all countering the communist narrative. 156 Sultan Qaboos even

personally broadcast on occasion, adding great authority to the broadcasting. 157 Most

significantly, the radio stations facilitated a method to directly counter propaganda

coming from PDRY. PFLOAG’s primary means of disseminating propaganda was

through Radio Aden which broadcast into Dhofar. Though exaggerated and focused on

party-line politics, Radio Aden was listened to. Mimicking PFLOAG’s method, yet

adding verifiable truthfulness, effectively countered PFLOAG’s messaging. 158

155
Jeapes, 37.
156
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch.
157
Ray, 87, 202-205.
158
Akehurst, 30, 80.

80
 Figure 11. Radio broadcasting with indigenous information team
Source: Private collection of a veteran of the Dhofar Rebellion.

The PPM teams also ran extensive leaflet operations, encouraging defection,

unveiling the “guised motives” of the PFLOAG agenda, contrasting Islam with

communism, conveying governmental improvements, and arguing the inevitable victory

of the Sultan (see figure 12). Though no statistical records exist to quantify the

effectiveness of the drops, specific incidents of adoo surrendering with a leaflet in hand

are many. Key to the effectiveness of the defection appeal was the understanding of the

cultural dishonor associated with surrender. To counter this value, appeals were never

made for surrender but rather for reconciliation. The adoo were beckoned to return their

tribal structure, to their families, and to Allah. To assist in maintaining honor, the adoo

were also requested to join a firquat and fight for the Sultan. Payment for their service

81
was also offered, including bounties for weapons and information. Sidestepping the

surrender term, proved very effective. 159 Some leaflets did not include an appeal to

surrender but rather instructions on how to surrender. Simple pictographic instructions

illustrated to the adoo where to go for reconciliation and how to present themselves

safely. Key to the effectiveness of these operations was the follow-on treatment of SEPs.

SEPs, when appropriately returned to their tribes, sent messages back to their adoo peers

reinforcing the truthfulness of the leaflets.

Figure 12. Leaflet, “The hand of Allah crushes Communism”

Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hand_of_God.jpg (accessed 5
December 2011).

Notice boards were also used in common points of transition. Similar to the

billboards of today, notice boards were placed in high traffic areas, in particular entrances

to markets, known as Souks, and at traffic control checkpoints. Primarily, civil

development projects were emphasized on notice boards, reinforcing what Sultanate’s

159
Jeapes, 39.

82
civil development programs or explaining population resource control measures. Though

the population was predominately illiterate, passers-by could ask soldiers on guard or

local “letter writers” about the message. 160

Face to face persuasion was also a crucial means, especially effective when

making use of proxies. Although it might appear odd to the westerner, the firquats often

spoke with the adoo directly as they were often family, extended family, or tribe. The

adoo were at times persuaded by quasi-peer voices to “come over” to the government’s

side. Once again although statistical data does not exist, multiple anecdotes do. The best

known example took place at a small coastal city called Sudh, in 1971. There, in order to

test out the nascent firquat application, a firquat accompanied by a few SAS men entered

Sudh in force. Instead of attacking the adoo directly though, the firquat summoned the

towns’ people and articulated the value of supporting the Sultan over the communists.

Afterwards, the firquat beckoned the adoo and spoke directly with their enemy as well. In

the course of several hours of conversation, the firquat-not the SAS men, were able to

persuade the adoo to “come-over.” As a result, the firquat number in Sudh doubled in one

day, without a shot being fired. The use of indigenous personnel to persuade proved

invaluable as they leveraged existing credibility that external forces rarely possess. 161

Similarly, word of mouth was used to convey talking points or reinforce the

truthfulness of other products. In modern terms, this type of dissemination is referred to

160
Literacy was rare in Dhofar; however, larger villages had designated ‘letter
writers’ who wrote or read letters for the village as required. After a period of trial and
error, local ‘letter writers’ were officially hired by the AITs or Information Services to
read notice boards to the villages on prescribed schedules. See Jeapes, 38.
161
Jeapes, 71-81.

83
as whisper campaigns or rumor campaigns. The technique proved especially useful in

Dhofar as customary greetings often adhered to a prescribed format:

“Peace be upon you”

“And on you peace”
“How is your health”
“Fine, praise be to Allah. And your?”
“Fine also, praise be to Allah. What is the news?” 162

Because literacy was minimal and electronic communications unheard of prior to the

introduction of the transistor radios, this cultural news gathering was custom in any

Dhofari society. Although this dissemination technique was used for delivering specific

messaging at times, it was primarily heuristically used reinforce formal products and

lines of persuasion. 163 Using informal communications, adoo could verify the truthfulness

of leaflets and radio broadcasts. 164

Mobile cinemas were also used systematically in conjunction with Civic Action

Teams (CATs) to promote the Sultan’s development programs and denounce

communism. 165 The films were not propaganda productions but rather commercial films

used as lures to draw the indigenous population to a central location. Before or after the

showing of a film such as Zulu, government officials or Firquats addressed those gathered

162
Ray, 56.
163
Supporting Operation JAGUAR in 1971, SAS deliberately spread news of the
operation via word of mouth as referenced in Jeapes’ SAS: Secret War, 136.
164
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch.
165
Civic Action Teams were SAS teams augmented with civil specialists such as
veterinarians, doctors, and engineers. CATs were similar to current Civil Affairs Teams.

84
and delivered talking points. In Dhofar, where electricity existed in only three or four

towns, the viewing of a film was a major event. 166

The PPM teams also exploited specific adoo atrocities by numerous means simply

by reinforcing the truth. The SAS and SAF decided at an early stage to conduct only

truthful PPM and eventually established a reputation for truthfulness. The attribute

contrasted greatly with the communist propaganda being broadcast from PDRY. Since

many of the adoo listening to the radio also participated in the operations promoted, the

untruthfulness of the station became apparent. Exploiting this facet, when communist or
167
adoo atrocities were broadcast, the broadcast was accepted as true. Although many

adoo atrocities were exploited by the PPM teams and the Information Services, two

incidents were exceptionally noteworthy. The first occurred when a disgruntled adoo was

given a letter and ordered to deliver it to a PFLOAG base located across the border in

PDRY. Instead of delivering the letter, the adoo surrendered to a Firquat along the way.

The letter the illiterate adoo was to deliver turned out to be his own death warrant; he was

to be executed for substandard performance. Seizing the opportunity, the adoo was

solicited to tell his story nationwide by broadcasting it on radio. The second incident

similarly exhibited the values of PFLOAG. After firefight with SAF, two adoo were

gravely wounded and could not travel. The adoo leader decided to execute them in order

to guard them from capture. After some pleading though, the wounded adoo were left to

die but only after being stripped of all clothing and weapons. SAF found the wounded

166
CF20110914W0001, A former member of the Dhofari Information Service,
Interview by Darrell Vaughan and Marcus Welch.
167
Ibid.

85
adoo though before their demise, treated their wounds, and both lived. Again seizing the

opportunity, both adoo agreed to broadcast their experiences in order to encourage

defection. In this case, photographs were taken, leaflets made, and a leaflet drop was

conducted for their comrades to see their fate.

PPM Summary: The Dhofar Rebellion

The Dhofar Campaign did eventually come to an end. In 1975, the rebellion was

officially declared over, although occasional fighting flared up for another few years. The

five fronts of the campaign did cripple the adoo’s capabilities, the sealane choke points

were protected, and the Sultanate became an even stronger and more stable ally. The

counterinsurgency operation was a success and partially due to the PPM support.

When looking at the classic counterinsurgent synthesis chart from Chapter 3 of

this thesis, John Lane’s aims and efforts closely resemble the picture. His aim of

“persuade the population of the integrity of the Sultan’s government,” is exactly in line

with the classic counterinsurgent’s primary aim of “sway the population to the support

the government over the insurgent.” Likewise, the Dhofar PPM campaign addressed

every one of the applicable principles (agit-prop may not have applied to this scenario). A

comprehensive reconciliation program was run to “turn” the adoo to support the

government. The program was credibly reinforced by statements and appeals of adoo

who had “returned” to their families, the government, and Allah. Propaganda of Deed

was conducted providing tangible schools, wells, roads, markets, and payments for

firquat service. PPM was employed to support HUMINT in general terms of shaping a

positive image of the Sultan’s government and in specific measures such as the letter

boxes. PDRY support was unveiled to reveal the masked Marxist-Atheist agenda which
86
was not compatible with the Dhofari way of life. In detail, specific incidences were

exploited to supplement to unveiling, such as adoo carrying his own death warrant. Also,

in this particular instance, the Sultan’s Ministry of Information, was successful in running

the PPM although with John Lane’s assistance and with military AIT and aviation

support.

Many factors undoubtedly contributed to the success of the COIN operation in

Dhofar; from geography to government, a host of dynamics came into play. In the context

of the framework, PPM was employed elaborately and effectively for achieving the

prescribed aims. From Major General Jeapes to Corporal Lane, notable counterinsurgents

viewed PPM not just as an important element of the operation but as a pivotal if not

paramount tool in the effort. In the following chapter, PPM is applied on an exponentially

grander scale but with more contentious results.

87
 CHAPTER 5

COIN PPM OF THE VIETNAM WAR

Yet despite a major and persistent effort, including bringing psychological

warfare experts from the United States, results were disappointing. Except for an
occasional platoon-size group, most defectors were individuals. Mass surrenders
never developed despite our intense psychological warfare efforts, which
apparently could not overcome the enemy’s intensive indoctrination.
—General William C. Westmoreland,
A Soldier Reports

But I could see that actual conditions in the Vietnamese countryside were beyond
his experience and therefore his understanding.
—Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters

The key to the Vietcong success in South Vietnam during the present war has
been their political subversive underground organization, built up over many
years and firmly rooted within the country during the earlier French Indo-China
War. In a People’s Revolutionary War, and Vietnam is no exception, the primary
weapon is the underground organization within the population. The secondary
weapon is the guerrilla forces which depend upon the underground organization
for all their requirements, but which, at the same time, support the advance of the
underground organization into the heart of the threatened government and
country. The political aim is, therefore, dominant and guerrilla operations are
designed to achieve political rather than military results.
—Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam

Context of the Conflict

In contrast to the Dhofar Rebellion studied in the previous chapter, the Vietnam

War was infinitely more complex in terms of scale, scope, and intensity. Also

contrasting, the COIN operation of the Dhofar Rebellion is considered as successful

while the COIN operation in the Vietnam War is commonly viewed as a failure. Many of

the tactics that were applied in each were similar, including the PPM operations, yet

88
many results differed. To understand how the conditions affected the tactics and

influenced the outcome, the context of the war must be examined. 168

The first step in understanding the Vietnam War is acknowledging a more

appropriate title: the Second Indochina War. 169 Although conventional American combat

troops entered the war in 1965, for the Vietnamese, the war started in 1946 in the

aftermath of the Second World War. Up to that point, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had

been collectively known as French Indochina since 1893 when France conquered and

occupied the areas and declared the regions as protectorates. As a result of the Second

World War though, Indochinese governing authority was usurped by the Japanese and

later recovered by the French again, albeit in a weakened state. Political and economic

turmoil wracked post-war France providing an opportunity for revolutionary action in

168
The area of operations was far greater in the Vietnam War than in the Dhofar
Rebellion, as were the sizes of forces employed and combated. The corridor through
which enemy lines of communication (LOCs) passed between the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PRDY) and the Sultanate of Oman amounted to roughly fifty miles;
whereas the LOC corridor between Cambodia and Laos and the Republic of Vietnam,
known as the Ho Chi Minh trail, exceeded six hundred miles. Similarly, while the
opposing force in Dhofar consisted of approximately five thousand insurgents and
supporters at its height, hundreds of thousands insurgents and their supporters
participated in the Vietnam War. Correspondingly, the United Kingdom’s military
presence in Oman was minimal, measured in hundreds. The United States’ military
presence in Vietnam though numbered over half a million at its peak.
169
Failing to understand historical precursors is common in American political and
military endeavors. For the example, the ‘Persian Gulf War’ of 1991 is referred to in the
Arab world as the ‘Second Persian Gulf War’ as a reference to the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-
1988 which triggered the 1991 war. Likewise, the current war in Afghanistan is
commonly understood to have started in 2001, whereas the depth of the conflict extends
back to the 1979 Soviet invasion followed by the Afghan civil war from 1992 to 1996 or
possibly as late as 2001.
89
Vietnam. An independence movement immediately took hold and the First Indochina

War initiated. 170

Through the political and military efforts of a group of communist inspired

Vietnamese nationalists, collectively known as the Viet Minh, over the course of eight

years, the French were driven from Vietnam. 171 The Viet Minh’s key architects, Ho Chi

Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, were students of Mao Tse Tung’s revolutionary warfare

methods and successfully applied a version of his protracted war theory. 172 This conflict

resulted in the Geneva Agreements of 1954, which divided the Vietnam into two

provisional entities at the seventeenth parallel. 173 The northern government, the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), received the support of the USSR and the

Peoples Republic of China (PRC); while the southern government, the Republic of

Vietnam (RVN), was backed by the US. The agreement stipulated elections would be

held in 1956 to reunite the country under one government. Those elections were never

170
John Pimlott, “Ho Chi Minh’s Triumph,” War in Peace: Conventional and
Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945; Thompson, War In Peace, 61-62.
171
Viet Minh translates to “the Vietnamese People.”
172
Mao Tse Tung’s ‘protracted war’ warfare strategy consists of three phases:
(1) Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation; (2) Progressive Expansion, and (3)
Decisive or Destruction of the Enemy. In protracted war, a guerrilla force uses time,
space, and will as weapons to gradually wear down an opponent. Ho Chi Minh and Vo
Nguyen Giap mimicked and modified the ‘protracted war’ theory to war in Vietnam
against the French, against the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and against the US.
See Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1961), 21-22, 46, 95, 98; Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Writings of
Mao Tse Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), 208-219.
173
The Geneva Agreements not only divided north and South Vietnam, it also
declared Cambodia and Laos independent of French rule.

90
held though 174 and a renewal of guerrilla activity ensued in 1959, initiating the Second

Indochina War. 175

Between 1956 and 1965, the political and military viability of South Vietnam was

less than stable. Internal political struggles, religious confrontations, ineffective

governmental reforms, and dependency on foreign aid plagued the nascent

government. 176 Exacerbating the situation, using the remnants of the Viet Minh

remaining in the south, North Vietnam commenced unconventional warfare operations

against the south agitating with the newly branded Viet Cong. 177 Through the tumultuous

period, the US attempted to provide a guiding and supporting hand to South Vietnamese,

with a host of governmental and military advisors as well as related aid packages. 178 Yet

174
Knowing an open election would result in a victory for the communists due to
the greater population of North Vietnam, South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem
refused to permit the reunification elections of 1956 to occur. This decision was
supported by the US President, Dwight Eisenhower. See Robert Thompson. “Vietnam:
The clash between the Republic of South Vietnam and communist insurgents rapidly
involved the worlds’ greatest power in a war it could not win.” Thompson and Keegan,
War in Peace, 181.
175
Pimlott, 61-80.
176
For a more thorough understanding of the turmoil of the Republic of Vietnam
prior to 1965, See Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters; and William E. Colby, Lost
Victory, A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam
(Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989).
177
Viet Cong translates to “Vietnamese Communists.” Apart from Viet Cong, the
terms the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were also used. ‘NLF’ was adopted in 1960 and
replaced with ‘PRG’ in 1969, Viet Cong though was the term most commonly used to
describe the southern Vietnamese communist organization. James S. Olson, Dictionary of
the Vietnam War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 470-471.
178
The US established the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) in South
Vietnam in 1956 to assist in building South Vietnam’s military capacity. It was
augmented by the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) for supplying the
91
all the efforts to stabilize the country and deter communist aggression fell short. After a

presidential assassination, 179 a series of coups, a number of Viet Cong attacks on US

installations, 180 and the Gulf of Tonkin incident, 181 the US initiated air strikes against

North Vietnam in 1964 and committed combat ground troops to South Vietnam in

1965. 182 For the next seven years, the conflict became an American war.

Eleven years before the “American war,” the US Saigon Military Mission (SMM)

and the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) were established to assist the

fledgling Government of RVN (GVN). SMM was a small US Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) element and MAAG a larger wholly military group. With the SMM and

MAAG, came assistance in psychological operations. In fact, US PPM support, started in

military. By the end of 1956, South Vietnam was receiving two hundred and seventy
millions dollars in annual aid, making it the third largest per capita recipient of US aid.
William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2009), 30-33.
179
Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam from since 1954, was
assassinated in November 1963 in a coup led by General Duong Van Minh. The coup
received the tacit support of the US and was followed by more political instability in
successive coups. Ironically, US President John F. Kennedy, who had sanctioned the
coup and indirectly Diem’s assassination, was also assassinated in the same month.
180
The Viet Cong attacked the US advisory compound at Kontum City, bombed
the American frequented Kinh Do Theater, sank the U.S.S. Card while berthed in Siagon,
attacked the Nam Dong US Special Forces compound, mortared the US Bien Hoa
airbase, attacked US billeting at Qui Nhon, and attacked the Pleiku US airbase in a series
of provoking gestures in 1964 and early 1965. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The
History 1946-1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 313, 316, 323, 333, 336.
181
On 2, 4, and 5 August, 1964, the ‘Gulf of Tonkin’ incident occurred where
engagements took place between North Vietnamese torpedo boats and the U.S.S. Maddox
and the U.S.S. Turner Joy. Davidson, 317-320.
182
The first US airstrike on North Vietnam occurred on the 5 August, 1964. The
first US ‘combat’ ground troops arrived in South Vietnam on the 10 March 1965. At the
time, the Marines were requested as airfield security forces. Davidson, 320, 343-344.

92
Indochina as early as 1954. 183 The G-5 PSYWAR staff division of the Franco-

Vietnamese Army, the interim government, and the newly established GVN all received

assistance in conducting PPM. Among other operations, SMM and US Information

Agency (USIA)/US Information Service (USIS) applied psychological techniques against

the Viet Minh to disrupt their takeover of Hanoi in 1955, in extensive pacification efforts

of the south, and even to influence the 1955 RVN elections. 184 Most notably,

psychological operations were essential in compelling over nine hundred thousand North

Vietnamese Catholics to resettle to the south in 1954, protecting the Catholics from

communist oppression while increasing the support base of Catholic President Diem. 185

An important note must be established here about the “American War" as

counterinsurgency effort. The war was a counterinsurgency operation with the objective

of preserving the legitimacy of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) with preponderance of

combat being fought against South Vietnamese insurgents, the Viet Cong. Yet the war

was a “dual war” in which North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units fought as well. 186 As

early as 1964, NVA units infiltrated into South Vietnam, 187 and a number of conventional

183
Robert W. Chandler, War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in
Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), 14.
184
Lansdale, 137-139, 161-162, 224-227, 333.
185
William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc.
1976), 52; Robert J. Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint
United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond (New York: Lexington Books,
2007), 91-94.
186
The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was also known as the People’s Army of
Vietnam (PAVN).
187
By December of 1964, at least three North Vietnamese Infantry Regiments
were infiltrating into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. By the spring of 1965, the
93
battles were fought against them, such as the battles of Ia Drang and Khe Sanh. 188 In fact

at the end of the war in 1975, it was the NVA who delivered the coup de grace not the

Viet Cong. By 1975 though, the “American War” was had been over for two years.

Likewise, substantial US air and naval campaigns were directed against the DRV in an

attempt to degrade support provided to the Viet Cong. Nonetheless, while major

conventional combat operations were directed against the military and infrastructure of

the DRV, counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong was the principal operation during

direct US involvement from 1965 to 1972. General William C. Westmoreland,

commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968,

recounts the primacy of counterinsurgency in his memoirs:

Pacification was the ultimate goal of the Americans and the South Vietnamese
government. A complex task involving military, psychological, political, and
economic factors, its aim was to achieve an economically and politically viable
society in which the people could live without constant fear of death or physical
harm. It was an effort to improve the quality of life, to improve sanitation,
drainage, roads, pagodas, schools, teachers, dispensaries, communications
facilities, administrative offices; and to enable the people to pursue their
occupations: fishing, tilling the land, raising water buffalo, chickens, pigs, and
bring produce to market. Fundamental to pacification was security, and as long as
insurgents were raiding, robbing, molesting, and killing in South Vietnam, the
government forces would have to spend their time keeping the enemy out of the
hamlets and villages rather than improving the welfare of the people. 189

entire 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had infiltrated. Davidson,
324-329.
188
Mai Elliot, RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 145; John Prados, The History of an
Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 227-
230, 240-241.
189
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 68-69.

94
 Framework of the Counterinsurgency, 1965 to 1972

MAAG was replaced by the expanded Military Assistance Command Vietnam

(MACV) in 1962. MACV was a joint military headquarters command, including US Air

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; responsible for directing and coordinating all US

military activity in South Vietnam. MACV was only one arm of the entire United States

Mission though; MACV was subordinate to the US ambassador and working in

conjunction with several non-military agencies such as the United States Information

Agency (USIA)/United States Information Service (USIS), the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), the Agency for International Development (AID), and others. The

organizations collectively, and in cooperation with South Vietnamese peer organizations,

constituted the comprehensive framework of the counterinsurgency effort. According to

General Westmoreland, “it was a complex, awkward arrangement.” 190

Awkward as it may have been, MACV was the primary action arm of the

counterinsurgency effort. Growing from a few thousand troops in 1962, by the end of

1968 MACV amassed troop strength of over half a million. The MACV footprint

eventually covered all of South Vietnam and was divided among four Vietnamese Corps

Tactical Zones (CTZs) for command and control purposes. 191 While responsible for

190
Ibid., 74-75.
191
From north to south, RVN was administratively organized into Corps Tactical
Zones (CTZ) for both military operations and RVN governance. I Corps was the
northernmost zone. II Corps second most northern, focused on the central highlands; it
was the largest zone yet least populated. III Corps included the areas surrounding Saigon
but not Saigon itself which was a separate independent command. IV Corps was the
southernmost zone and focused on the Mekong Delta. See Westmoreland. A Soldier
Reports, 58. For graphical understanding of the CTZs and how US and Vietnamese units
were arrayed by year see Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC:
U.S. News Books, 1983), Appendix F.
95
combating the NVA and Viet Cong militarily, MACV was also made responsible for all

US pacification efforts with the establishment of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support (CORDS) organization early in 1967. 192 In addition to size, reach,

and responsibility, MACV also had continuity in command. From 1964 to 1972, MACV

had only two commanders: General William Westmoreland and General Creighton

Abrams. 193 Although national strategies evolved with time and circumstance, Generals

Westmoreland and Abrams remained the primary orchestrators of applied strategy.

Over the course of the war, three major evolutions in strategy occurred. In the

early years, under General Westmoreland, the efforts were categorized as “big unit war”

with pacification secondary. Westmoreland’s strategy sought to (1) protect logistical

bases, (2) initiate, penetrate, and eliminate enemy base camps and sanctuaries, and (3)

conduct sustained ground combat operations to destroy NVA and Viet Cong main force

units while simultaneously increasing the capability of the Army of the Republic of

192
The term pacification refers to the aspect of counterinsurgency designed to win
the allegiance of a population from an insurgent force through means of governmental
authoritative actions such as agricultural assistance, health initiatives, educational
reforms, public works, security provisions, and similar projects. ‘Pacification’ is also
referred to as ‘Revolutionary Development.’ In RVN, pacification efforts started in 1963
with the Vietnamese led program called HOP TAC or ‘cooperation’ in Vietnamese. HOP
TAC was expanded in 1966 and evolved into the Vietnamese Ministry of Revolutionary
Development. Likewise, both the US Department of State (DoS) and MACV developed
similar organizations. DoS created the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and MACV
established a Revolutionary Development Support Directorate. In early 1967, MACV
assumed responsibility for all US pacification efforts, amalgamating all US efforts into
one organization: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).
Ironically, though controlled by MACV, a civilian appointee headed CORDS.
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 210-216; Elliot, 282.
193
General Westmoreland commanded MACV from June 1964 to July 1968.
General Abrams commanded MACV from July 1968 to June 1972. Olson, Dictionary, 2-
3, 485-486.

96
Vietnam (ARVN) and conducting pacification operations. According to Westmoreland,

based on the political constraints, the strategy was “essentially that of a war of

attrition.” 194 This was the strategy from late 1965 until 1968.

Circumstances and strategies shifted in 1968. Two major events occurred in 1968:

the first Tet Offensive 195 and the command of MACV changed. The Tet Offensive

changed the course of the war. Militarily, the combined Viet Cong and NVA offensive

was a disaster for the Vietnamese communists. The Viet Cong suffered a major loss of

manpower and failed to provoke a general uprising. The magnitude of the offensive

shocked the US public and fed a massive shift in political support against the US war

effort. Also following the offensive, General Abrams took command of MACV and

modified Westmoreland’s strategy. Abram’s strategy was known as the clear and hold

and one-war strategy where the US and RVN armies continued large scale combat

operations but placed additional emphasis on pacification. 196 A key aspect of the one-war

strategy was the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), which applied extensive

194
See Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 145, 149, 153; Turley, 97-100.
195
The first major Tet Offensive initiated on the 30th of January in 1968; a second
major Tet Offensive occurred a year later. Two “mini-Tets” occurred in between them.
The first Tet Offensive consisted of simultaneous attacks on most of South Vietnam’s
major cities and towns, primarily by Viet Cong units. Most notably, battles in the historic
cities of Saigon and Hue (pronounced ‘Wayh’) occurred lasting weeks. In a synchronized
diversion, two NVA/PAVN divisions laid siege to the US Marine outpost at Khe Sanh in
I CTZ beginning on the 21st of January 1968 in order to divert the attention of US forces.
The Vietnamese communists expected to generate a general uprising, none manifested
however. Davidson, 473-525; Turley, 137-156.
196
Elliot, 328-335.
97
resources toward development and employed Vietnamese paramilitary forces to clear and

hold, though a GVN program. 197

The tactical aspects of General Abram’s one-war strategy continued throughout

the American involvement in the war; however, in 1969 political shifts changed the

comprehensive efforts and strategy for the war with concept of Vietnamization. In June

1969, the new mission of MACV focused on building up the Republic of Vietnam Armed

Forces (RVNAF) in manpower, material, and tactical competence. RVNAF was to take

lead and US combat forces gradually redeploy. Over the next three years, RVNAF

reached its greatest height in material and cadre. The war effort expanded, including

operations in Cambodia and Laos in an attempt to degrade infiltration of NVA forces and

diminish supply efforts to the Viet Cong. During the same period, US combat forces

reduced in size from over five hundred thousand to fewer than fifty thousand before the

US declared a cease fire and finalized peace agreements with the DRV in January

1973. 198 The war continued for the South Vietnamese though and on the 30 April 1975,

the Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist.

197
APC started in November 1968, being initiated after the decimation of Viet
Cong due to the militarily failed Tet offensive. APC was organizationally supported by
recently established Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
organization created under MACV in 1967. In APC, the ‘clear and hold’ forces used were
primarily Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF), commonly referred to as
‘roughs’ and ‘puffs.’ RF/PFs were part of the RVN Territorial Forces who primarily
focused on the static defenses of villages, hamlets, and infrastructure. PFs were usually
not uniformed but a localized ‘home guard’. See Elliot, 329; Olson, 4-5, 374, 388-389.
198
Davidson, 531-532; Turley, 182-183.

98
 PPM Inside the Framework

Just as the Vietnam War provided the largest expenditure of aerial ordnance of

any American conflict to date, the war also saw the largest utilization of PPM. In terms of

organization, effort, people, and products, the degree of influence efforts was

unprecedented and remains unsurpassed. Civilian information services and military PPM

organizations were employed on grand scales using established and developing

techniques. The US-USSR Cold War propaganda battles of the 1950s; 199 the PPM

novelties of Malaya, Algeria, and Huk-Philippine counterinsurgency operations; 200 the

effects of “red” PPM experienced by US prisoners of war in the Korean conflict; and the

flurry of early irregular warfare theory developed at the US Army Psychological Warfare

199
In early years of the Cold War the need for PPM was recognized. In 1948 the
US Congress passed the US Information and Educational Exchange Act, Public Law 80-
402 (commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act), authorizing for the first time, funding
for international radio programming to promote ‘a better understanding of the United
States in other countries’. Effort intensified at the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in
1950, with President Harry Truman’s initiation of the ‘Campaign of Truth’ to extol the
virtues of democracy and denounce Soviet socialism. In 1953 President Dwight
Eisenhower created the US Information Agency (USIA) to further expand the effort
(note: The USIA existed until 1999 when USIA responsibilities were transferred to the
Department of State). Decades of international propaganda battles followed but were
most blatant during the ‘red scare’ of the 1950s. See Robert E. Summers, ed., America’s
Weapons of Psychological Warfare (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1951), 11-14;
Ron D. McLaurin, “U.S. Organization for Psychological Operations,” in Military
Propaganda, Psychological Warfare and Operations, ed. Ron D. McLaurin (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 66-71.
200
The British Malaya Emergency (1948-1960), the French Algerian Revolution
(1954-1962), and the Philippine Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946-1954) were
counterinsurgency operations occurring just prior to US combat involvement in South
Vietnam. Each conflict included considerable psychological warfare campaigns and was
studied in great detail by several ‘counterinsurgency experts’ such as Sir Robert
Thompson, David Galula, and Edward Lansdale. Each of these ‘experts’ participated in
one of the previous COIN operations but were also actors in Vietnam to differing
degrees. See chapter 2 of this thesis and Chandler, 14-15.

99
Center 201 created opportunity and demand to apply the US’s expanded PPM capabilities,

especially in a counterinsurgency operation.

PPM Organization

As General Westmoreland indicated about the awkwardness of the organizational

structure of MACV, the PPM organizational structure was likewise complex. USIA/USIS

was the lead US organization for conducting any informational campaign in RVN prior to

deployment of US combat units, yet only one of many organizations engaged in influence

activities. This changed during 1965. To synchronize the greatly expanding psychological

efforts of USIA/USIS, AID, MACV, RVNAF, and the Vietnamese Information Service

(VIS), President Johnson’s administration created the Joint United States Public Affairs

Office (JUSPAO). JUSPAO was essentially an upgrade of the existing USIS in South

Vietnam, but staffed with additional AID and MACV augmentees. The director of USIS-

Vietnam became the director of JUSPAO and the organization was given the

responsibility of operating and coordinating all US civil and military PPM and

informational campaigns in RVN. The JUSPAO was therefore not solely a PPM entity; it

also maintained a Public Affairs function and provided a centralized headquarters for all

PPM in RVN. 202

201
The US Army Psychological Warfare Center was founded in 1952 and later
became the US Army Special Warfare Center in 1956. It was at the center that nascent
US Army doctrine for irregular warfare was developed, including guerrilla warfare and
psychological warfare. Paddock, US Army Special Warfare, 140-150.
202
For additional background on the establishment and responsibilities of the
JUSPAO see Kodosky. Psychological Operations American Style, xiv, 4, 16-18; Robert
E. Elder, The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American
Foreign Policy (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 20; John W.
100
 By itself, JUSPAO was a complex organization, consisting of five major

departments: Office of the Director, Information, Cultural Affairs, North Vietnamese

Affairs, Technical Services, and Field Development, and additionally was peer-partnered

with VIS. JUSPAO was sizable; at its peak it possessed a staff of over six hundred

American and Vietnamese employees, rivaling its military counterparts. Apart from

JUSPAO’s executive responsibilities, the organization conducted PSYOP in direct and

advisory roles, primarily using mass media outlets such as RVN’s Voice of Freedom and

the overt US Voice of America radio stations. JUSPAO delved into television, supporting

Truyen Hinh Viet Nam, a GVN television station, in 1965. Similarly, JUSPAO created a

number of printed products such as the Ngon Song newspaper, and the Huong Que, Gioi

Tu-Do, Long Ne, and Van Tac Vu magazines. 203 Using mass media, JUSPAO focused

primarily on strategic and national level PPM. 204

Synchronization and coordination were also the responsibilities of JUSPAO.

From the US ambassador to the Field Forces, numerous levels of planners, integrators,

and executers were instrumental in the cumulative PSYOP effort. Still four key

organizations were critical to PSYOP under the JUSPAO’s directive guidance: the 4th

Psychological Operations Group (POG), the 7th POG, the 7th US Air Force, and the

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Psychological Operations

Henderson, The United States Information Agency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1969), 243-262.
203
Houng Que, meaning ‘rural spirit’ and Gioi Tu-Do, meaning ‘free world,’
magazines were printed on a monthly basis. Long Ne, meaning ‘mother’s heart,’ and Van
Tac Vu, meaning ‘cultural drama,’ were printed bi-monthly.
204
Chandler, 135-139; Kodosky, 135-139.

101
Division (CORDS/POD). 4th POG was the primary tactical PPM provider in-country

while 7th POG supported PSYOP with print and production capabilities. The 7th US Air

Force (USAF) provided air support for leaflet operations, aerial loudspeaker operations,

and occasional special services. CORDS/POD was the lead for pacification efforts. 205

On the ground in RVN, the bulk of PPM activity was conducted by MACV’s

psychological arm, the 4th POG; albeit, the “in-country” PPM capability required time to

build. Provisionally spearheaded by detachments and companies from the 7th POG, it

took until early 1966 to establish a functioning psychological operations battalion, the 6th

Psychological Operations Battalion (POB) in the RVN. Responding to increasing

demands and growing relative to the total force build-up, in December 1967 a full

PSYOP group was established and remained in-country through the end of 1971. The 4th

POG consisted of four POBs: 6th POB, 7th POB, 8th POB, and 10th POB, allocating one

POB to each Field Force/CTZ. The 4th POG was, in effect, the command and control

center for all tactical PSYOP in Vietnam for the four middle years, 1967 to 1971. 206

Established on Okinawa in 1965, elements of 7th POG provided the initial tactical

PSYOP support to MACV until 4th POG was established. However, its primary

205
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV),
“Employment of US Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,” 7 July 1969, II-3, II-4.
206
4th POG was based in Tan Son Nhut, serving in RVN from December 1967 to
October 1971. 6th POB was based in Tan Son Nhut followed by Bien Hoa, serving in
RVN from February 1966 to June 1971. 7th POB was based in Nha Trang followed by
Da Nang, serving in RVN from December 1967 to December 1971. 8th POB was based
in Nha Trang followed by Pleiku, serving in RVN from December 1967 to June 1971.
10th POB was based in Can Tho, serving in RVN from December 1967 to April 1971.
Additionally, four separate PSYOP companies (19th, 244th, 245th, and 246th) served in
RVN starting in 1966, each of which formed the nucleus of a later POB. Stanton, 237-
238.

102
contribution throughout the conflict was print and production support. To facilitate

support, 7th POG maintained a liaison detachment in Saigon co-located with the 4th POG

headquarters. 207 Apart from production support, 7th POG also provided PSYOP specific

intelligence and analysis such as monitoring of communist media outlets.208

The Air Force contribution to the PSYOP effort was provided by the 7th USAF,

primarily by the 5th and 9th Special Operations Squadrons (SOS) of the 14th Special

Operations Wing. 209 Many USAF elements supported PPM missions on an ad hoc basis;

however, the 5th and 9th SOS was specially tailored and dedicated support for

psychological operations within RVN. Fitted with loudspeaker systems and specialized

chutes for disseminating leaflets, approximately forty aircraft serviced PPM missions in

the four CTZs routinely. 210 In addition to broadcasting and leafleting operations, USAF

also provided additional capabilities such as shows of force and harassing actions such as

207
See Stanton, 237; U.S. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in
Vietnam (ACTIV), II-3.
208
7th PSYOP Group, “Radio Broadcast Monitoring.” Department of the Army,
Pamphlet No. 525-7-2, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of
Military Application, vol 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 534-
536.
209
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), II-3,
II-4.
210
Chandler, 29-30.

103
sonic booms used for psychological effect. 211 PPM was also often integrated into major

bombing campaigns such as Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II. 212

Smallest of the four key organizations was CORDS/POD, which was established

in 1967 and possessed a small cadre of PPM personnel. CORDS/POD was pivotal to the

overall PPM effort though. 213 CORDS itself was a large centralized civil-military

pacification organization established under military, MACV, control. Pacification or

Revolutionary Development (RD), though funded and often spearheaded by the US, was

a GVN program and responsibility. CORDS therefore did not control RD but advised

GVN provincial and district organizations on the program. 214 CORDS/POD likewise

supported GVN RD PSYOP efforts, usually at the provincial level. Being that RVN had

forty-four provinces and CORDS/POD so few advisors, CORDS/POD capabilities were

limited in providing support.

211
Monro MacCloskey, Alert the Fifth Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional
Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air
Warfare (New York: Richards Rosen Press, Inc., 1969), 132-136.
212
Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars
1941-1991, Lessons for Commanders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 28-31, 35-40.
213
Chandler, 239.
214
Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts
and Minds (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 86-98.

104
 Figure 13. 1969 US PPM Command Structure
Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV),
“Employment of US Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,” 7 July 1969, I-5.

Just as key, yet not under JUSPAO’s directive authority, were the South

Vietnamese peer organizations: the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and the

ARVN Political Warfare (POLWAR) battalions. The VIS was the action arm of GVN’s

Ministry of Information; accordingly, it was the equivalent of the JUSPAO and partnered

with it. Its focus mirrored the JUSPAO as well-strategic and national objectives, mostly

using mass media dissemination vehicles. The POLWAR battalions though somewhat

similar to US PSYOP battalions, were not a direct equivalent. As with the US PSYOP
105
battalions, each CTZ had a POLWAR battalion; 10th POLWAR Bn (ARVN) in CTZ I,

20th POLWAR Bn (ARVN) in CTZ II, 30th POLWAR Bn (ARVN) in CTZ III, and 40th

POLWAR Bn (ARVN) in CTZ IV. 215 The POLWAR battalions had a tactical mission

similar to the US PSYOP battalions. PPM was not the only function of the POLWAR

battalions, however. POLWAR battalions were also responsible for indoctrination of

ARVN forces, social services for ARVN forces, and ARVN Post Exchange (PX)

services. In effect, POLWAR battalions conducted influence operations internally and

externally. 216

215
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), II-3,
II-4
216
Jeffrey J. Clark, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973
(Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1988), 29-31.

106
 Figure 14. 1969 JUSPAO, MACV, and CORDS relationships
with Vietnamese peer organizations
Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV),
“Employment of US Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,” 7 July 1969, C-11.

PPM Priorities and Programs

The PPM organizational structure was complicated and PPM management was

equally as difficult. In order to best support operations and in accordance with its

mandate, JUSPAO provided guidance to the PPM organizations which was directive in

nature. Between 1965 and 1972, JUSPAO published over one hundred directives for

PPM organizations in order to integrate, synchronize, and prioritize efforts. 217 While

priorities shifted with circumstance, JUSPAO Policy Guidance # 51-published in

217
Chandler, 277-282.

107
December 1967 which corresponded to the establishment of 4th POG in RVN, provides a

good indicator of the cumulative PPM effort. The policy guidance directs the PSYOP

priorities as:

1. The GVN Image

2. Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket
3. Revolutionary Development
4. Refugee Program
5. Public Safety
6. US Image
7. GVN Mass Media Advisory Effort
8. Telling The Vietnam Story 218

Though taken from a snapshot in time, the top three PPM priorities were enduring

throughout the war and provide insight on what the US Ambassadors, Generals

Westmoreland and Abrams, and the GVN wanted PSYOP to accomplish: promote the

legitimacy, advantages, and achievements of GVN; encourage defection; and exploit

pacification to gain the favor of the rural populace.

The GVN Image

The first JUSPAO priority, to improve “The GVN Image,” was arguably the most

difficult to accomplish. PSYOP assets were directed to assist “the GVN in projecting to

the Vietnamese people a positive image worthy of full allegiance.” 219 However, the

desired image often suffered from the realities of the GVN being that, “the Vietnamese

ruling establishment was dominated by the more educated elite, the new urban rich, and

218
JUSPAO Planning Office, “Priorities in the PSYOP Effort.” Department of the
Army, Pamphlet No. 525-7-2, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case
Studies of Military Application, vol 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1976), 133-137.
219
Ibid., 135.

108
the bourgeoisie left behind by the French. There was still inadequate concern for the

peasant and worker. In this respect the Viet Cong had a more revolutionary image

whatever their ultimate intentions.” 220 To compensate for the situation and maintain

credibility, JUSPAO and MACV PPM programs accentuated the milestones of GVN

achievements while downplaying GVN shortcomings. The PPM efforts centered on

emphasizing the genuine democratic nature of the government, demonstrating military

success by RVNAF; highlighting civic and societal improvement programs, and

explaining populace and resource control measures. 221

Paramount in garnering “full allegiance” of the South Vietnamese to the GVN

was establishing that the RVN was in fact a representative democracy. The first decade of

the GVN’s existence suggested the opposite, producing only a lengthy despotism

followed by a series of military coups. 222 The period of 1955 to 1965 was plagued with

220
Statement made by Ogden Williams during a RAND interview in 1971.
Williams supervised AID and Chieu Hoi programs in the 1950s and 1960s. See J. A.
Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
1973), 66.
221
Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 525-7-2, vol. 1, 133-137.
222
In 1954, a provisional government was established South Vietnam with
Emperor-in-exile, Bao Dai, appointing Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister. The following
year, among some controversy, Diem was declared the first president of the Republic of
Vietnam. Diem was vehemently anti-communist but grew increasingly less popular with
the South Vietnamese people and armed forces. Among other unpopular acts, Diem had
replaced traditional village leadership with political appointees; suppressed opposing
media organizations; forced rural population resettlements in Agrovilles and Strategic
Hamlets; and brutally suppressed Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Hao Hao movements.
Eventually he lost US backing and was assassinated in 1963 during a military coup led by
General Duong Van Minh. A series of military coups followed. General Minh was
overthrown by General Nguyen Khanh, and General Khanh was overthrown by Air Vice-
Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky, who remained Prime Minister until the presidential election of
1967. Although a constituent assembly was elected and a national constitution drafted in
1966, the first twelve years of Vietnamese “democracy” was not so democratic. See
109
factional revolt, violent political suppression, corruption, nepotism, and assassination; all

independent of the Viet Cong and DRV agitation also occurring. Finally, in 1966 and

1967, democratic processes produced local and national elected representative

assemblies, an RVN constitution, and a legitimately elected president, President Nguyen

Van Thieu. PPM assets reinforced the veracity of the democratic processes to assist the

GVN in attaining credibility and soliciting popular commitment. JUSPAO handout #2309

and a “Preamble to the Constitution” leaflet illustrate the efforts.

Figure 15. JUSPAO handout illustrating President Thieu’s inaugural

address and JUSPAO “Preamble to the Constitution” leaflet

Source: Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Field Development Division. National Catalog
of PSYOPS Materials (San Francisco, CA: JUSPAO, 1969).

Robert Thompson, “Vietnam: The clash between the Republic of South Vietnam and
communist insurgents rapidly involved the worlds’ greatest power in a war it could not
win;” Thompson and Keegan, War in Peace, 181-183, 192-193; Phillips, 92, 154-156,
163-164, 203-206.

110
 Second to emphasizing democratic reform was demonstrating RVNAF success in

winning the war. To illustrate this, PPM forces were directed to “assist the GVN in

exploiting ARVN victories, courage, and civic responsibility.” 223 To enable and

encourage the effort, JUSPAO Policy Number 68, Enhancement of RVNAF Image, was

issued. Policy Number 68 provided specific guidance on the mediums and processes for

exploiting RVNAF achievements, both to the civilian population for developing GVN

support and to the RVNAF itself for improving morale. In particular, PPM organizations

were directed to develop products “based on facts and achievements, rather than

generalities which may fit all local situations.” 224 General slogans, such as “ARVN is

here to protect you,” were questionable; whereas specific instances of military victories

could be substantiated. A good example of this specificity is illustrated in the 10th POB

leaflet number 10-1-68 highlighting a milestone victory of an ARVN unit:

Long Phi 9/139 at Kien Phong Province

Two days in a row, Nov. 17 through 19, 1967, the 9th Infantry Division launched
the Long Phi 9/139 Operation, 10 km north of Kien Van district town aiming at
wiping out what remains of the VC 502nd Bn. The VC were defeated seriously in
the assault on Cao Lanh Reformed Training Center on Nov. 7, 1967.
Our forces tangled with the enemy for two days. They caused heavy causalities to
the enemy as follows”
-128 killed at front
-over 200 killed or wounded taken away by their friends
-2 captured
Weapons seized by our troops:
-8 M3 sub-machine guns
-24 Russian built rifles
-1 M1
-3 flare-guns
-M7 Grenade launcher

223
Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 525-7-2, vol.1, 135.
224
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office. JUSPAO Policy Number 68, Enhancement of
RVNAF Image (Saigon: JUSPAO Planning Office, 23 August 1968).

111
 -1 57mm cannon tripod
-1 anti-aircraft machine gun sight
-7,000 electrical fuses
-38 rounds of ammunition for East German build machine gun
-120 57mm shells
-8 Thompsons
-3 East German build rifles
-1 M2 Carbine
-20 75 mm shells
-1,000 12.7 machine gun shells
-50 15 Kilo mines
-6,000 shells for East German built Machine Gun
-20 anti-tank shells
-250 flares
-3 loudspeakers
-82mm mortar sight
-90 81mm and 82mm shells
-10,000 K50 shells
-70 K40 shells
-15 anti-tank mines
-10,000 local grenades
-3 20 kilo explosive boxes
-2 40 kilo floating mines
-1,999 kilos of sulfur and gun powder
-5 Red Chinese built compasses
Gaining the good above mentioned success is because of the brave fighting spirit
of the soldiers of the 9th Infantry Division, the Regional and Popular Forces and
the contribution of the citizens. We won gloriously causing heavy damage to the
enemy.
Believe in the authorities and the armed forces. If so we certainly will
defeat the Communists.

Lastly, yet vital to enhancing the image of the GVN, was explaining the reasons

behind GVN populace and resource control measures to the South Vietnamese people

who often perceived the measures as nuisances. Populace and resource control measures

are undertaken in a counterinsurgency effort to “provide security for the populace, deny

personnel and material to the enemy, mobilize population and material resources, and to

detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents.” 225 Population controls are activities

225
Department of the Army, FM 1-02, 1-147.
112
such as curfews, travel restrictions, censuses, and identifications card issuance; resource

controls are activities such as purchase limits, firearms controls, vehicle registrations, and

trade restrictions. 226 The importance of explaining these measures was deemed so

important that the JUSPAO issued guidance on specific measures such as the 1967

JUSPAO Policy Number 37, National Identity Registration Program, and the 1968

JUSPAO Policy Number 52, PSYOP Aspects of the Public Safety Program (National

Police). A good graphical and textual example of control measure explanations can be

seen in JUSPAO Leaflet 1537 which stated:

The National Police serve the people by resources control.

Through their resources control teams the National Police protect the
resources of the country and prevent them from being diverted into the hands of
the enemy. More and more, the Viet Cong are being deprived of manpower,
weapons, ammunition, and other essentials of war. Their combat capabilities have
been considerably weakened, and their morale is being sapped.

To properly perform their duties the Police inspect cars, buses, boats, and
other conveyances to prevent smuggling and infiltration. They check luggage,
parcels, baskets, and boxes for illicit goods. They also conduct house-to-house
searches in order to ferret out Viet Cong agents, hoodlums, and draft dodgers.

If you encounter minor difficulties because of inspections and searches

please remember that the Police are protecting you and serving the cause of the
GVN. Your cooperation is needed. 227

226
FM 3-24, 5-21; FM 3-24.2, 3-24 to 3-27.
227
U.S. Public Affairs Office, Field Development Division, National Catalog of
PSYOPS Materials (San Francisco, CA: JUSPAO, 1969).

113
 Figure 16. JUSPAO Resources Control leaflet
Source: Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Field Development Division, National Catalog
of PSYOPS Materials (San Francisco, CA: JUSPAO, 1969).

Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket

The JUSPAO second priority, “Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket,” was the most

recognized PPM support effort of the war yet one the most controversial. Chieu Hoi or

“open arms” was the national amnesty program of the GVN that encouraged Viet Cong

foot soldiers to surrender, defect, or “rally” to the government cause. Acting on advice

from British and American advisors, the GVN initiated the Chieu Hoi program in 1963 as

one arm of a comprehensive pacification campaign. Other key components of the

campaign included resettlement projects, known as Strategic Hamlets, and National

114
Police and intelligence operations to capture or kill insurgents. 228 Chieu Hoi was different

though. The premise of the Chieu Hoi program was that Viet Cong guerrillas could be

persuaded to lay down their arms, receive political reeducation, and be reintegrated into

South Vietnamese society. The political and military effect simultaneously strengthened

the GVN and weakened the Viet Cong by shifting manpower from one side to the

other. 229

As pacification campaigns came and went, interest in the Chieu Hoi program

grew and the program evolved. The program, initially managed by the Ministry of

Psychological Warfare, was absorbed into the Ministry of Information in 1966, was

rebranded as the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (MICH) during 1968, and

became a separate ministry in 1970. Along the way, Chieu Hoi program systematically

established “reception centers” in provincial and district centers throughout the nation. At

the reception centers, Hoi Chanh or “ralliers” were to receive medical treatment, housing,

political reeducation, vocational training, and resettlement. Select Hoi Chanh were also

given the opportunity to enter military, paramilitary, or governmental service. 230

228
Sir Robert Thompson, the British Military Advisor (BAM) and Rufus Phillips,
chair of the CIA Rural Affairs Office, were instrumental in selling the idea of a
repatriation program to South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem. Based their
experiences and understandings of counterinsurgency operations in Malaya and the
Philippines, Thompson and Phillips provided Diem with the foundational pillars of his
pacification program prior to Diem’s assassination in November of 1963. The Chieu Hoi
program, once established, endured through multiple South Vietnamese political
administrations.
229
Hunt, 21-25.
230
Koch, 25, 73-88.

115
 Figure 17. 1970 Chieu Hoi Ministry
Source: J. A. Koch. The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971 (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 1973), xxvi.

An offshoot of Chieu Hoi was Dai Doan Ket or the “National Reconciliation

Program” (NRP). In 1967, Dai Doan Ket supplemented Chieu Hoi by expanding the

target audience. In addition to Chieu Hoi’s extension of amnesty, Dai Doan Ket included

the guarantees of assistance in finding employment commensurate to previously held

positions. In essence, Chieu Hoi appealed to the peasant Viet Cong while Dai Doan Ket

targeted Viet Cong officers and Viet Cong professionals such as doctors. 231

In addition to rallying people, an additional facet of Chieu Hoi was a weapons

rewards program. As early as 1964, GVN paid additional bounties for Hoi Chanh

231
Ibid., 36-39.

116
individual arms or for information regarding weapon caches. For Viet Cong guerrillas,

who were often subsistence farmers, the weapons rewards were relatively substantial,

especially for larger items such as crew served machine guns or mortars. 232

Being GVN programs, Chieu Hoi, Dai Doan Ket and rewards for weapons,

MACV did not administer them directly. Similar to the relationship CORDS had with

Revolutionary Development, the US provided “support.” US political, military, and

economic support for Chieu Hoi grew steadily during 1965 and 1966; the creation of

CORDS and a CORDS Chieu Hoi Division in 1967 though significantly improved the

support relationship. 233 JUSPAO and MACV’s PPM units also provided substantial

support from their establishment as well, providing PPM advisors and direct operational

assistance. The aim of the JUSPAO PPM support to Chieu Hoi was three-fold: to

establish awareness of Chieu Hoi, to establish credibility for Chieu Hoi, and to fill its

ranks by inducing Viet Cong to rally. 234

Creating awareness of the Chieu Hoi program was national level responsibility

conducted primarily using a combination of television and radio, and leafleting

operations. By design JUSPAO and VIS undertook the mass media effort and MACV,

supported by the USAF 14th Special Operations Wing, executed leafleting operations.

The awareness drive was not inducement oriented or instructional but informational as is

illustrated in JUSPAO Leaflet #1721:

232
Ibid., 70-73.
233
Ogden Williams was the first director of the CORDS Chieu Hoi Division.
Williams was an experienced AID civil employee that had served in South Vietnam
during the 1950s and 1960s. See Hunt, Pacification, 38; Koch, 26.
234
Koch, 27, 60-69; Chandler, 91.

117
 WHAT THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM MEANS
The aim of the Chieu Hoi policy is to coordinate all efforts to create good
conditions and favorable opportunities for the return of the mistaken elements of
the community of our people, so that they may contribute to national
reconstruction and assist in achieving social justice and freedom.
The Chieu Hoi policy is not a political trick. We need not resort to deceit, because
we have been winning in all fields of military operations and through national
reconstruction the living standards of the people have been greatly improved. The
results so far obtained are concrete proof of our intentions.
The Chieu Hoi program is not a stratagem designed to cope with a particular
situation; instead, the program is a continuing, national program which can help
defeat the Communists and bring peace and democracy to our country. Through it
our people can once again enjoy full happiness.
The Chieu Hoi policy is a policy of indulgence and generosity for the benefit of
those persons who have gone the wrong way and who desire to return to the
country and the people. 235

To establish credibility for Chieu Hoi was more challenging. Potential ralliers had

to be accessed by trustworthy sources that possessed firsthand knowledge of the program:

the Hoi Chanh who had rallied. The Hoi Chanh were exploited to provide credibility in

US and GVN psychological operations in two manners: broadcast and print products

attesting to the validity Chieu Hoi program by Hoi Chanh and with face to face

persuasion by Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) and Van Tac Vu or “Cultural Drama

Teams” composed of Hoi Chanh. 236

Broadcast and print products providing statements by Hoi Chanh attesting to the

good treatment received upon rallying and to the reintroduction benefits of the program

were widely disseminated. Where possible, photographs of the Hoi Chanh, specific Viet

Cong military unit information, or specific regional information were included to

235
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Field Development Division, National
Catalog of PSYOPS Materials (San Francisco, CA: JUSPAO, 1969).
236
The Van Tac Vu were specialized members of the Armed Propaganda Teams
that used music, songs, magic shows, storytelling, and theatrical performances to convey
Chieu Hoi messages. Chandler, 33.

118
substantiate the authorship. In some tactical applications, Hoi Chanh even broadcast

directly using loud speakers. The substance of credibility is illustrated in JUSPAO

Leaflet #1927:

Dear Friends,
I am Huynh Thi Tan, alias “Ba Thanh,” former Assistant Commander of the
558th Regional Company, operating in Tam Chau and An Phu, An Giang
Province. I fought in the ranks with you before, but I have left for reasons which
all of you must know.
You, as well as I, have been fighting for many years, but our struggle has been
exploited. We have been caught in the Communist propaganda net. They regard
us as mere instruments, serving the Party’s red ideology and imperialist
ambitions. We have suffered all kinds of hardships and many of our friends have
died shamefully for a meaningless cause. For us women, we have sacrificed the
love of our families and children to serve the Party. We have suffered
tremendously without any consolation.
I made up my mind to leave the Viet Cong and return to the land of freedom with
the assistance and leniency of the Government. I have found happiness and
confidence in the future again. I sincerely hope that you, especially my fellow
female cadre, will find an opportunity to rally to the National Cause. I know the
Government and the people are always waiting for you.
Hope to meet you again soon! Signed. 237

Face to face persuasion of the APTs and Van Tac Vu was generally viewed as

being the most effective means of establishing credibility-being village elders, families,

and often Viet Cong guerrillas could speak directly with “former Viet Cong.” In a 1972

RAND study of Chieu Hoi indicated that APTs “were invaluable in establishing the

credibility and bona fides of the government, i.e., they were living proof that the

government did not kill or mistreat the Viet Cong who rallied, despite Viet Cong rumors

circulated by ‘Radio Catinat’.” 238 They also had a historical and cultural precedence. The

technique originated with the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1944 and had been used

237
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, National Catalog of PSYOPS Materials.
238
Koch, 93.

119
by the Viet Minh and Viet Cong for twenty years before being adopted by the GVN. 239

Mimicking the communist approach, the RVN APTs and Van Tac Vu visited hamlets and

villages throughout South Vietnam disseminating JUSPAO PPM materials and

presenting Chieu Hoi messages in person. 240

Just as Chieu Hoi evolved and expanded, the APT program grew with it

transforming from two companies in 1964 to seventy five companies by its peak five

years later. The program also migrated from the RVN MOI to the Ministry of Defense

(MOD) the same year. As the program formalized, in-country doctrine was developed for

APT use and the MACV 1969 Armed Propaganda Team Handbook was issued to units

involved with the program. A good understanding of the tactical application of the APT

was illustrated in the sample operations order found in the manual. A typical mission

lasted several days and included rapport building, entertainment, and testimonials from

Hoi Chanh. An excerpt from the manual demonstrates the sequence and pattern:

Execution:
a. Concept of the Operation. The operation be conducted in 6 phases over a seven
day period.
(1) Phase 1: Preparation, See Annex C (Operations Schedule)
(2) Phase 2: Enroute, Establish CP
(3) Phase 3: Distribution of Chieu Hoi psyops materials; group discussions, See
Annex D (Psychological Operations)
(4) Phase 4: Presentations by individual APT members; culture/drama team
presentation, See Annex D.

239
Ho Chi Minh established the first Armed Propaganda Team or Doi Tuyen
truyen Vo trang of Vietnamese use in 1944 as the foundational element of the
Indochinese Communist Party. Likewise, General Vo Nguyen Giap commanded the first
communist propaganda brigade. Propaganda and indoctrination were the central keys to
Ho Chi Minh’s political and military philosophy. Not until 1964 did the GVN create
similar organizations.
240
Chandler, 82.

120
 (5) Phase 5: Group discussions on GVN programs; presentations by individual
APT members, See Annex D.
(6) Phase 6: Return to post. 241

After awareness and credibility, the third aim of the JUSPAO PPM support effort

for Chieu Hoi was to induce Viet Cong to “rally.” The aim included two pivotal facets,

persuading the Viet Cong to rally and providing a method for rallying. Rarely in either

facet was “surrender” used; the actions of “surrendering” and “rallying” may have been

the same but the sociological and psychological dimensions of rallying were determined

to be more acceptable. 242 Also, as with awareness and credibility, a mix of conduits was

used to reach the Viet Cong. Mass media, face to face operations, and leafleting, were all

prevalent; however, leafleting was most prominent in terms of effort.

For persuading the Viet Cong to rally, in 1966 JUSPAO determined five major

appeals for use in all inducement products and published them as directive guidance in

the “The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program,” JUSPAO Policy Number 16. The five major

appeals were fear; hardships; loss of faith in the Communist victory; concern for family;

and disillusionment. The most controversial of the appeals was “fear” which often

manifested as graphic depictions of dead Viet Cong guerrillas in print products. The

controversy though was not over the effectiveness of the appeal but rather that the use of

graphic images reflected negatively on the GVN. 243 The appeals were inline though with

a RAND study published the same year on Viet Cong motivations, and based on

241
Chieu Hoi Directorate, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
(CORDS), Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Armed Propaganda Team Handbook
(Saigon, 1969), 58.
242
Chandler, War of Ideas, 40.
243
Ibid., 44-69.

121
interviews of numerous rallied Viet Cong. The RAND study stated, “conditions most

frequently cited as provoking their rallies were personal hardships, the poor economic

conditions of the family, VC criticism or punishment, the risk of death, and

homesickness.” 244

The second portion of inducement was supplying a method for rallying. “Method”

products provided how-to instructions given to minimize the likelihood of the guerrilla

being killed in the process of rallying. Also, to provide added reassurance Safe Conduct

passes were promoted as official and legitimate documents that guaranteed the bearer

humane treatment by military forces. Ironically, the credibility of safe conduct passes was

so accepted that on occasion Viet Cong believed they could not rally without one. 245

Figure 18. Safe Conduct Pass (front)

Source: PSYWAR.org, “Psychological Operations Leaflet Archive,”
http://www.psywar.org/product_VN0893B.php (accessed 5 December 2011)

244
J. M. Carrier and C. A. Thompson, Memorandum RM-4830-2-ISA/ARPA, Viet
Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1966), 34.
245
Chandler, 73.

122
 Figure 19. Safe Conduct Pass (back)
Source: PSYWAR.org, “Psychological Operations Leaflet Archive,”
http://www.psywar.org/product_VN0893B.php (accessed 5 December 2011).

In cumulatively reviewing the three aspects of Chieu Hoi PSYOP support-

awareness, credibility, and inducement; two problems become apparent. The first

difficulty is in determining cause and effect relationships between PSYOP stimuli and

target audiences actions. A second difficulty arises in separating the effects of

psychological operations supporting Chieu Hoi and the effects of the GVN controlled

Chieu Hoi program itself. The two may or may not be separable. Qualitatively though,

the level of awareness, creditability, and effectiveness of inducement are somewhat self

apparent in that over the lifespan of the program almost two hundred thousand Viet Cong

“rallied,” the equivalent of twenty army divisions.

Revolutionary Development

The third JUSPAO priority, “Revolutionary Development,” focused on the

countryside of South Vietnam. Revolutionary Development (RD) was the title for the

123
GVN program and ministry created to bring the rural population under governmental

control. By bringing security to the countryside and improving socioeconomic conditions

of the rural peasantry, RD was intended to demonstrate governmental capacity; elicit

GVN allegiance; and correspondingly diminish Viet Cong support. Encompassing

political, economic, military, social, and psychological activities, RD was a multi-faceted

program employing a comprehensive approach to extend GVN authority. 246 Of note, RD

in general was also known as pacification, nation building, rural construction and the

other war, among other specific program titles. 247

By the time of the US involvement in the late 1960s, RD consisted of several

programs collectively grouped under the term the New Model. 248 Programs and activities

included relocation of rural communities into fortified hamlet systems; educational and

vocational programs and school construction; establishment and support of local

governance bodies and facilities; sanitation, medical, and hygiene initiatives; and

agricultural enhancement programs introducing new strains of rice, improved fertilizer,

246
Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History United States Army, 1982), 3-4.
247
Between 1955 and 1975 a number of pacification campaigns were conducted in
South Vietnam. Most were similar in activity, such as resettlements and establishing local
security forces, but varied in priority given and resources expended. Titles given of
various efforts included Operation National Security in 1955, the Agroville Program in
1959, the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1961, the Will to Victory Program (Chien Thang)
in 1964, the MACV led Victory Program (Hop Tac) in 1964, the New Model or New Life
Program in 1967, and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (Le Loi) in 1968. Various
organizations oversaw the pacification programs, most notably the Vietnamese Ministry
of Revolutionary Development established in 1965 and the MACV and AID
conglomeration known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
(CORDS) established in 1967. Hunt, 11, 20-21, 25-30, 36, 88, 157.
248
R. W. Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 2-5.

124
and motorized tillers. Based on the components, the New Model was essentially the

continuation of previous pacification efforts although on a grander scale; according to the

first director of CORDS, R. W. Komer, “the 1967-1970 program differs from its

predecessors less in concept than in the comprehensive nature and massive scale of the

effort undertaken, and in the unified management which pulled together the great variety

of sub-programs carried out for the first time on a fully countrywide scale.” 249

To provide the scale, RD was largely funded and administratively overseen by US

agencies; however, it was a GVN program. 250 Unlike other facets of the war, the “face”

on RD programs and activities was “Vietnamese” and the bulk of the ground support

working RD initiatives was indigenous. The support primarily manifested in three

organizations: the RD Cadre Groups, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF),

and the National Police. The RD Cadre Groups were the core of the RD program. The

mobile 59-man groups visited hamlets for extended periods organizing village “self

defense” forces, establishing local governance bodies, facilitating socioeconomic

development, and conducting psychological operations. The RF/PF paramilitaries were

also key and provided regional and district security along roadways and other

infrastructure. Lastly, the National Police dealt with identifying and combating Viet Cong

Infrastructure (VCI). 251

249
Ibid., 3.
250
Hunt, 11-15, 68, 82.
251
William C. Westmoreland, “Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January
1964-June 1968.” William C. Westmoreland and U.S.G. Sharp, Report on the War in
Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1968), 231-232.

125
 To assist in exploiting the RD program and help generate the intended results,

JUSPAO and CORDS/POD assets were directed to “bring RD activities and successes to

the attention of the rural people at whom the program is directed with particular emphasis

on publicizing the rewards of self-help to hamlet and village dwellers.” 252 The directive

required a similar approach to those used in improving GVN image: explaining the

reasons behind programs and accentuating the benefits, while downplaying undesirable

aspects. The undesirable aspects of RD were especially difficult to mitigate as relocation

programs were frequently imposed rather than offered and were usually culturally

undesirable. 253 Likewise, even when rural security improved notably from late 1968 to

1970, fear and intimidation of Viet Cong reprisals remained. 254 PSYOP assets therefore

focused on awareness and benefits, as also illustrated in the 1968 MACV Handbook for

Military Support of Pacification:

Psychological operations are directed at the people in the area as well as at the
enemy. Whether the people be initially friendly, uncommitted or hostile toward
the government, the objective of PSYOPS—as of all RD—is to persuade the
people to support the GVN. To this end, disciplined, well behaved troops showing
friendly, sincere interest in the people and respect for individual rights and
prosperity will have the most favorable impact on the local people. PSYOPS
themes will include explanations of why troops are in the area and what RD can
do for the people by their cooperating with the GVN. Against the enemy, the

252
Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 525-7-2, vol 1, 135.
253
The Vietnamese inhabitants of rural villages were at times forcibly relocated
into Agrovilles, Strategic Hamlets, and New Life Hamlets, after which their existing
homes and villages were burnt down in order to keep them from returning. Also, the
majority of Vietnamese, regardless of religious orientation, practiced the cultural norm of
“ancestor worship” which created deep ties between families and the lands where their
ancestors were buried. As a result of the forced resettlement and cultural insensitivity,
many resettled Vietnamese were highly disillusioned with the hamlet programs. See
Elliot, 407; Phillips, 143.
254
Chandler, 156-157; Phillips, 270-271.

126
 PSYOPS objective is to persuade the individual soldier to stop supporting the
enemy cause and to rally to the GVN through Chieu Hoi and Doan Ket programs.
Hence, PSYOPS themes will stress the positive benefits of RD and sow doubt
about the justice of an enemy cause that opposes RD. 255

For the most part, the tangible positive benefits of RD were the New Life

Development programs available at the hamlets. New Life Development programs

included Education and Culture, Hygiene Sanitation, Land Reform, Agricultural and

Animal Husbandry, Cooperatives, and Public Works. 256 These programs were mostly

administered by the RD Cadre Groups, who by design were also the influence conduit to

the rural populace. Using PSYOP material provided to the Provincial RD Cadre Group

Psychological Warfare Section, the RD Cadre Groups performed face to face

communication similar to the APTs. To support the RD Cadre Groups, JUSPAO

provided a weekly RD newspaper, Viet-Nam Ngay Nay [Vietnam Today], and a monthly

RD magazine, Houng Que [Rural Spirit]; each promoted RD programs and provided

interesting success stories. When available, Van Tac Tu [Cultural Drama Teams] were

also incorporated into RD Cadre efforts. While entertaining the hamlet residents, the Van

Tac Tu also reinforced the GVN message. Specific handbills were also provided to the

RD Cadre Teams as required to promote the specific programs, self defense forces, or

social issues of hamlet life; as here JUSPAO Handout #2368, outlines the eleven

objectives for Ap Doi Moi [New Life Hamlets]. 257

255
Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Handbook for Military Support of
Pacification (San Francisco, CA: 1968), 9-10.
256
Ibid., 18.
257
By 1967, three categories of hamlets were established relative to the degree of
GVN control exerted: the Ap Doi Moi [Real New Life Hamlet], Ap Binh Dinh
[Pacification Hamlet], and Ap Tan Sinh [New Life Hamlet] Real New Life Hamlets were
127
 Figure 20. JUSPAO Handout #2368 providing eleven hamlet objectives

Source: Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Field Development Division, National Catalog
of PSYOPS Materials (San Francisco, CA: JUSPAO, 1969).

The RD Cadre Group efforts were intensive and prolonged events. At times, more

temporary measures were required to boost RD efforts in a specific area. These

temporary RD measures were called Hamlet Festivals, Go Teams, and County Fairs. The

temporary measures were cordon and search operations coupled with civic and

psychological operations, in general “all include the cordoning of the hamlet selected for

the operation, a search of the hamlet by GVN forces, and finally, conduct of PPM for the

designated for development, Pacification Hamlets were in the process of construction and
development, and New Life Hamlets were constructed and developed in accordance with
the established six point criteria (census taken, self defense forces established, hamlet
defense system established, liaison and logistics system organized, social organization
established, and hamlet government elected). Military Assistance Command Vietnam,
Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, Annex A.

128
purpose of evidencing GVN concern for the people of the area.” 258 Hamlet Festivals, Go

Teams, and County Fairs, were combined operations with both US forces and RF/PFs or

National Police though and therefore counteracted to a degree the primary psychological

aim of RD. 259

PSYOP also supported another RD effort geared more specifically in bringing

security to the countryside although not mentioned in the JUSPAO policies. The effort

was called the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) program. Phung Hoang, though originating with

the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was a Vietnamese effort and integral in RD.

The program utilized select RF/PFs, the Special Branch of the National Police, the

Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization, and other Vietnamese assets such as

Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) to “indentify and root out the secret Communist

apparatus within South Vietnam, the so-called Viet Cong Infrastructure, or VCI.” 260 In

essence, Phung Hoang was a human intelligence (HUMINT) and direct action (DA)

program aimed at neutralizing intermediate and higher ranking VCI leaders and

facilitators. 261

The processes and activities of the Phung Hoang program were tremendously

varied. Typically, information collected from Chieu Hoi ralliers, paid informants,

258
Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Handbook for Military Support of
Pacification, 50.
259
Ibid., Annex B.
260
William E. Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My life in the CIA (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 266, 269-270; Hunt, 116, 153.
261
Under Phong Hoang, VCI were categorized into three groups: A-leaders and
formal party members, B-cadre and holders of responsible jobs, and C-rank and file Viet
Cong. Phong Hoang efforts focused on A and B level VCI. Colby, 268.

129
interrogations of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), or Vietnamese children was provided to

intelligence centers, such as Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (IOCC) or

Police Interrogation Centers (PIC), which compiled, analyzed, and verified the

information. 262 If meeting certain criteria, which also varied, actionable intelligence was

provided to an appropriate civil or military organization that attempted to capture or kill

the VCI. Numerous “action” agencies were involved in capturing or killing the VCI

members, PRUs--advised by US Navy SEALs, often were the most active. 263

Most of the US support, and the associated PPM support, for Phung Hoang came

from CORDS. Established in 1968, the “Phoenix Office” of CORDS consisted of a

handful of CIA and MACV advisors that provided guidance, coordination, and support at

national, provincial, and some district levels. 264 The CORDS PPM support for Phung

Hoang focused on one objective-enabling HUMINT. To encourage and facilitate

HUMINT collection, PPM was used to promote awareness of information gathering

campaigns such as the Popular Information Program and Hamlet Information Program; to

publically identify known and suspected VCI members and solicit information regarding

them; and to convey methods for and the importance of reporting VCI. 265

262
Various titles and acronyms existed for various intelligence and operations
centers. In general, military Information and Operations Coordination Centers (IOCC)
included district level centers (DIOCC) and provincial level centers (PIOCC). Civil or
police interrogation centers included district and provincial level centers, as well as
National Police Interrogation Centers (NPIC). Valentine, 79, 80, 131, 230.
263
Valentine, 160, 230.
264
Hunt, 153-154.
265
Valentine, 283-284.

130
 PPM assets, US and Vietnamese, promoted awareness of the information

programs using face to face methods and a variety of broadcast and print means. Specific

products for enabling VCI identification and methods of reporting primarily consisted of

two items; “Wanted Posters” and a Phung Hoang comic book (see Annex B). Although

sounding simplistic, the two products significantly contributed to HUMINT collection. 266

When VCI members were indentified, posters or handouts containing their names

or photographs could be created (see figure 22). The products were then posted in local

areas with appeals for the specific VCI members to rally and for members of the

community, including families, to provide information on their whereabouts. To

maximize the print effort, local village chiefs and hamlet leaders were sometimes

leveraged, through encouragement or pressure, to bring additional emphasis to the local

community. Print products were also reinforced with by portable or aerial loudspeaker

broadcasts likewise calling specific VCI members by name. The violent reputation of the

PRU itself also increased pressure on named VCI members to rally rather than be tracked

down; as being pictured a Phung Hoang wanted poster meant the person was on the

“black list.” 267

266
Colby, 282-284.
267
Colby, 273; Valentine, 282-283.

131
 Figure 21. Phung Hoang “Wanted Poster”
Source: http://www.wg-vietnam.com/images/War/WE-002.jpg (accessed 5 December
2011).

To augment the “specific” wanted posters, the “general” Phung Hoang comic

book was created. Similar in concept to the Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Pass, the Phung

Hoang comic book provided the method for peasants and villagers to report information

concerning VCI activity, and how to do it anonymously. The comic book

pictographically and textually conveyed the intent of Phung Hoang posters, leaflets, and

broadcasts and how villagers could act on the information. 268

Collectively, the task of supporting Revolutionary Development with

psychological operations was likely the most difficult task of all based on diversity of

operations, the number of psychological operators allocated, and the lack of direct

268
The entire Phong Hoang comic book can be found in Valentines’ The Phoenix
Program and in Appendix D of this study. Valentine, 283, Appendix A.

132
control. From accentuating the benefits of New Life Development programs to inducing

villagers to report on neighboring villagers suspected of communist activities, the

spectrum of activity was extraordinarily broad. Oddly, overseeing this broad spectrum

was only a handful of advisors working in CORDS/POD and the CORDS Phoenix

Office. Heavily dependent on the JUSPAO and the MACV 4th POG for material support

and acting almost exclusively through Vietnamese civil and military assets, RD PPM was

administratively and organizationally challenging. The outcome of all the PPM effort

though shares the fate of the RD program itself, it undoubtedly contributed to the higher

effort yet pacification was never achieved.

Tactical PPM

Apart from the JUSPAO priorities, PPM was employed extensively in support of

tactical military operations in Vietnam. 269 Tactical PPM support focused on achieving

short term psychological results to support select aspects of military operations; more

specifically tactical PPM was “employed to prevent civilian interference with military

operations, to exploit individual susceptibilities and weaken the will to fight, and finally,

when warranted by the tactical situation, to induce the enemy to surrender.” 270 The means

used to attain these results were mainly truck-mounted or man-portable loudspeakers,

aerial loudspeakers, and leafleting operations used or coordinated by three- man PPM

269
The tactical level of war is defined as “the level of war at which battles and
engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to
tactical units or task forces.” Tactical PSYOP support therefore deals with the
psychological operations conducted to directly support the tactical missions of military
units. FM 1-02, 1-182.
270
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 33-1, Psychological Operations
U.S. Army Doctrine (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), 7-3.

133
teams. Each of the four US PSYOP battalions and four ARVN POLWAR battalions

provided PPM teams in direct or area support to maneuver units. 271

Preventing civilian interference with military operations was a primary

responsibility of mobile PPM teams and unique to tactical operations. Preventing civilian

interference was, as it is today, predominately conducted using loudspeaker broadcasts to

inform the civilian populace of military operations and to provide directions to them. 272

The loudspeaker broadcasts were usually conducted as an integrated portion during

cordon and search operations. 273 At times leafleting operations were also used

preemptively to mitigate civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.

Most of the tactical weaken the will to fight and induce the enemy to surrender

procedures mirrored the previously mentioned Chieu Hoi and Revolutionary

Development efforts. Although at the tactical level, two novel PSYOP techniques were

developed to assist in short term military goals, Quick Reaction Requests (R) and

Earlyword. QRs were time-sensitive leaflet drops or taped messages for loudspeaker

broadcasts conducted within twenty-four to seventy-two hours of the request. Normally,

271
US PSYOP battalions doctrinally possessed Light Mobile Operations Teams
(Team HA) which facilitated the mobile support of Loudspeaker Operations (Team HB)
and Audiovisual Operations (Team HE). Audiovisual teams more often provided
pacification support and loudspeaker teams more often provided support to combat
operations. ARVN POLWAR battalions possessed similar mobile teams. See Department
of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), III-4, B-4, H-1 to H-6; Jeffrey J.
Clark, The U.S. Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973
(Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1988), 30-31; Stanton,
237-238.
272
FM 33-1, 7-4.
273
Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), B-4;
Bernard W. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974), 37.

134
QRs were used to exploit recent ralliers using personalized themes, such as specific

names and Viet Cong units. The second technique, Earlyword, was an even more rapid

exploitation means and both a technical device and a tactic. Earlyword was a

communications adapter which when fitted in loudspeaker equipped special operations

aircraft, allowed the aircraft intercom system to connect directly to a loudspeaker

bypassing the requirement for prerecorded messages. Using the device, ralliers could be

used to convey messages directly to the battlefield. 274

How thoroughly these techniques and tactical PPM were employed in support of

maneuver operations is difficult to measure. PPM support and integration was limited by

the relatively small number of tactical PPM troops available, especially prior to 4th POG

expansion in 1968. However, several notable examples of tactical PPM support exist

during major combat operations such as during Operation Irving, Operation Geronimo II,

and Operations Cedar Falls.

An important instance of tactical PPM limiting civilian interference and enabling

maneuver options occurred during Operation Irving. The operation was conducted during

1966 in the RVN province of Binh Dinh, located along the south central coast. The

combined US, RVN, and South Korean operation was intended to remove the Viet Cong

forces and political structure from the heavily populated coastal region. During one battle

in the operation, a hamlet with a large Viet Cong presence, Hoa Hoi, was blocked and

cordoned by a US cavalry unit. A heli-borne PPM team then conducted a loudspeaker

broadcast directing the villagers to leave the hamlet and the Viet Cong to lay down their

274
Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), B-4, I-10,
G-7.

135
arms. Though no ralliers manifested, approximately two hundred villagers came out of

the hamlet leaving only Viet Cong remaining. With all non-combatants removed, the

hamlet was pummeled with eight hundred rounds of 105mm high explosive artillery and

AC-47 gunship fires prior to being assaulted the following day. Apart from saving the

lives of the civilians, the PPM technique facilitated a greater array of lethal options to the

maneuver force, inevitably saving US lives during the assault. 275

A similar example of tactical PPM inducing the enemy to surrender occurred the

same year in the neighboring province of Phu Yen during Operation Geronimo II. After a

day of fighting, a US airborne infantry battalion had enveloped the remnants of a Viet

Cong battalion. A three-man tactical PPM loudspeaker team then was employed and

“convinced thirty-five enemy soldiers to surrender.” The remainder of the Viet Cong

were then assaulted and overrun. In effect, the employment of the tactical PSYOP team

removed a platoon sized element from the battle, greatly reducing the size of the force

being opposed during the assault and saving US lives. 276

Aside from the particular instances, Operation Cedar Falls offers an indicator of

how tactical PPM cumulatively affected combat operations. Operation Cedar Falls took

place during early 1967 in the Cu Chi Province of South Vietnam just north of the

capitol, Saigon. Clearing the known Viet Cong stronghold, known as the Iron Triangle,

was the goal of the operation and to do so required the largest single effort of the war.

275
John M. Carland, The U.S. Army in Vietnam, Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to
October 1966 (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2000),
262-269.
276
George L. MacGarrigle, United States Army in Vietnam, Taking the Offensive,
October 1966 to October 1967 (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military
History, 1998), 81-82.

136
The operation was comprehensive in nature with wide hammer and anvil style tactics

directed at the Viet Cong; destruction of extensive Viet Cong underground complexes;

massive population resettlement and the destruction of villages; and intensive defoliation

operations. 277

One of the uncharacteristic results of the nineteen day operation was the unusually

large number of Viet Cong ralliers; in fact almost as many Viet Cong rallied as were

killed in action--540 rallied and 750 were killed. The high percentage of ralliers was

certainly an aspect of the nature of the operation but tactical PPM significantly

contributed to process. During the operation, tactical PPM elements used QR leafleting

with personal appeals and general leafleting with fear appeals but with specific

instructions on where to how and where to rally. The combination proved effective. One

QR leaflet dropped during the operation illustrates the personalized appeal read:

To my dear friends still in the VC ranks, I am Le Van Sa, medic of the medical
team of VH (MB3011). I followed the VC and their false inducement. I found
fault with our people and nation. I have gone the wrong way. I have rallied to the
GVN and have been warmly welcomed, well treated. At the present time I am
very happy at the CH (Chieu Hoi) Center. I also saw my family who are living in
the Resettlement Center of GVN. I send to you this letter so that you too could
rally to the Government side where you can start a new life and see your families.
My dear friends: Hung, Rong, Tieng, Chi, Tu Dan, Minh Nhan, Tha Luong, Tam
Thu, Thanh, Huyen, Lion, Thau, Mong Tieng, Ut and Gan, all of you should
return to GVN as soon as possible. Staying with VC, you will have no place to
hide. You can use any Chieu Hoi leaflet and take the nearest road to report to the
GVN or Allied Military Installations. You will be treated as we are now. There
are more than 300 VC who have returned to the Nation Just Cause in a very short
time. They are having a good living here at the CH Center. They have been well
treated. My dear friends you should rally right now to avoid useless deaths. Tet is
going come very soon. Rally to reunite with your families. The door of the Chieu
Hoi Center is wide open for your return. 278

277
Rogers, 19, 23-24, 61-66, 71-72, 79.
278
Ibid., 56-57, 74-76, 79.
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 Tactical PPM support throughout the war varied greatly by method, emphasis,

and zone. However, the basic three facets of tactical PSYOP support--civilian

noninterference, discouragement, and surrender, were applied extensively and produced

results. In any of the cases where effects were demonstrated, PSYOP was certainly not

the only factor that caused to the outcome. Yet tactical PSYOP did contribute to the

outcome and provided the method for achieving it.

PPM Summary: The Vietnam War

The “American War” portion of the Second Indochina War was unsuccessful. The

effort did not prevent the collapse of the RVN or avert the associated consequences of the

domino theory, as Laos and Cambodia both fell prey to communist aggression in 1975.

However, this does not mean that MACV’s COIN operation was unsuccessful. A number

of external factors, most arguably on the American “home front,” contributed to the

outcome. Inside of the COIN operation, however, the successfulness of the PPM

campaign remains debatable.

When viewed through the lens of the classic counterinsurgent PPM synthesis

derived in chapter 3, the PPM of the Vietnam War did address all of the classic

counterinsurgents’ aims and principles. Yet some aspects were more successful than

others. The classic counterinsurgent’s primary aim of swaying “the population to support

the government over the insurgent” was the same as JUSPAO’s stated top priority, the

“GVN Image.” Massive efforts were applied to garnering the allegiance of the people to

the government through PPM and, during the later years, civic action. In the end though,

the GVN could not overcome its image as a “western puppet” and a despotic government.

138
The government, plagued with corruption and dominated by urban dwelling French and

English speaking elites, failed to sell itself to the rural majority.

Several of the classic counterinsurgent principles were successful, however. The

reconciliation efforts of the Chieu Hoi program, though not solely a PPM function, did

remove the equivalent of twenty enemy divisions from the battlefield. Effects were also

realized in the Propaganda of Deed effort conducted by CORDS and Vietnamese RD

ministry during 1968 to 1970. Although the rural Vietnamese may not have favored the

GVN, they did see tangible effects of its governance. Also, PPM did enable HUMINT

through the Phung Hoang program.

Two other principles though were more questionable, that of the use of civilian

run PPM agencies and uncovering the veiled aims of the insurgents. Although JUSPAO

did operate throughout the war and prioritize and synchronize efforts, it would have not

been possible without the established of the “boots on ground” 4th and 7th Pugs, the

ARVN POLWAR Battalions, and the Special Operations Air Force support. The civilian

JUSPAO was mass media oriented in a land where the majority of the population lived

without electricity. The primary means to accessing the population was leaflet,

loudspeaker, and face to face communication, none of which were within JUSPAO’s

capabilities. Lastly, though many attempts were made to uncover the veiled aims of the

Viet Cong, the true aims of the Viet Cong and the DRV were likely not realized until

1975 when the reeducation programs started.

According to the classic counterinsurgents views, the PPM in Vietnam was

focused on the correct principles and some did produce the desired results, yet

comprehensively failed to achieve the primary aim. PPM efforts in Reconciliation,

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Propaganda of Deed, and, enabling HUMINT all contributed to the campaign. However,

the credibility of the GVN was never established; therefore, the primary PPM task was

not achieved.

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 CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Psychological warfare does not fit readily into familiar concepts of war. Military
science owes much of its precision and definiteness to its dealing with a well
defined subject, the application of organized lawful violence. The officer or
soldier can usually undertake his task of applying mass violence with having to
determine upon the enemy. The opening of war, recognition of neutrals, listing of
enemies, proclamation of peace—such problems are considered political, and
outside the responsibility of the soldier. Even in the application of force short of
war, the soldier proceeds only when the character of the military operations is
prescribed by higher (that is, political) authorities, and after the enemies are
defined by lawful and authoritative command. In one field only, psychological
warfare, is there endless uncertainty as the very nature of the operation.
— Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare

Conclusion

This thesis examined the origins of twentieth century US Psychological Warfare,

Psychological Operations, and Military Information Support Operations (PPM); the

emphasis placed on PPM in US COIN doctrine; the synthesized views of four classic

counterinsurgents; and two PPM case studies. The aim of the thesis was to accomplish

one overarching objective: to demonstrate that effective PPM is vital to success in

countering insurgencies. Concepts discussed in the Conclusions and Recommendations

section are derived from and supported by the research and focused on the singular

objective. Although subject to interpretation, the thesis suggests the emphasis placed on

PPM in COIN has eroded and a number of lessons can be drawn from past PPM

applications.

All attempts have to been made to quantify and substantiate conclusions when

possible; however, due to the nature of the subject matter, that is not always possible.

Psychological Warfare, Psychological Operations, and Military Information Support

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Operations deal with human beings, and human nature is often fickle and subjective.

Although subjective, in the terms of the material covered, the four established

fundamental PPM and COIN questions are answered as follows.

Is PPM Essential for Successful COIN?

All four chapters of this thesis indicate that PPM is not only essential in COIN but

may hold some degree of primacy among the pillars (military, paramilitary, political,

economic, psychological, and civic). Not that the “psychological” facet is, in any way,

independent of the other factors but PPM enables and exploits each of the factors. PPM

supports and exploits military and paramilitary operations and is crucial in enabling

intelligence collection which drives operations. Likewise, PPM exploits the political,

economic, and civic actions to maximize effects.

The examination of the evolution of PPM and COIN doctrine suggests that early

US Army doctrine writers considered PPM essential in COIN. From the original 1951

COIN manual FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces onward, PPM has been

integrally included as a core factor. In fact, FM 33-5, Psychological Operations (1962)

was the first US Army manual to use the term counterinsurgency. However, the emphasis

placed on PPM in COIN has varied over the years (see figures 1 and 2). The observed

pattern is that although PPM emphasis has ebbed and flowed, a downward trend in

emphasis has occurred. Doctrine written during the Vietnam War included the greatest

degree of emphasis, while doctrine written during our current conflicts includes only

vague references placed without context. It appears that PPM, previously a core tenet in

US COIN doctrine, has become intentionally or haphazardly less doctrinally relevant.

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 Also examined was the literature and theories of four classic counterinsurgents to

determine if PPM was essential in their views. Each of the four wrote extensively on

PPM and deemed it vital if not paramount in countering insurgencies. If fact both Robert

Thompson and Edward Lansdale devoted chapters to PPM in their most widely read

works, Defeating Communist Insurgency and In the Midst of Wars. Although each

addressed PPM differently, ranging from “hearts and minds” to “dirty tricks,” all had

witnessed the effects of PPM firsthand in their insurgency experiences and considered

PPM vital. Frank Kitson was especially convinced of requirement for PPM in countering

insurgencies stating, “the main characteristic which distinguishes campaigns of

insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle

for men’s minds.” 279

Similarly, when the COIN campaigns of two radically different cases studies were

examined, both studies indicate PPM as essential. The Dhofar Rebellion in Oman and the

Vietnam War ended with dramatically different results yet PPM was key in each. Dhofar

and Vietnam demonstrate how interventionist and host nation forces used PPM to achieve

milestone results such as evidenced in reconciliation programs and intelligence gathering.

Another indicator of essentialness can be observed relative to the primary aim of each.

PPM in the Dhofar Rebellion primarily sought to “persuade the population of the

integrity of the Sultan’s government” while in the Vietnam War the primary aim intended

to improve the “GVN Image.” In Dhofar, though it took a coup and five years of combat,

the population was persuaded and the campaign ended successfully. In Vietnam, after

twenty-one years of fighting, the “GVN Image” remained less than credible and the
279
Kitson, Bunch of Five, 282.

143
campaign ended unsuccessfully. Of course, this is only one factor in a myriad of

thousands that affected the campaigns; however, it is an indicator of the value of PPM’s

essentialness.

Based on four areas of research: doctrinal emphasis, opinions of classic

counterinsurgents, and two disparate case studies, effective PPM is an essential element

in COIN. The writers of nascent US Army doctrine considered PPM important enough to

include its teachings in every manual. Each of the classic counterinsurgents included

PPM theory in their writings. Also both case studies indicated PPM’s vitality in the

overall success of a COIN campaign.

COIN and PPM: Best Practices?

When addressing what PPM practices have been historically beneficial it must be

noted that effects are based on circumstance. Although a practice may have produced

results in a particular application, similar results may not be reproduced in a different

setting. For enabling military operations in COIN and promoting loyalty to a government,

three key practices are validated in this research, both in the writings of the classic

counterinsurgents and the case studies. Although many interesting and effective practices

were identified, three were consistently proven: (1) persuading insurgents to change

sides; (2) demonstrating governance by propaganda of deed; and (3) utilizing PPM to

enable intelligence operations.

Persuading insurgents to change sides, whether to “come-over” as in Dhofar or to

“rally” as in Vietnam, is key in an insurgency for three reasons. First, since insurgent

manpower is drawn from the population, it decreases the manpower available to the

insurgents. Second, properly “reconciled” former insurgents often become agents of

144
propaganda for the government and thus attest the legitimacy of the government such as

Vietnam’s Armed Propaganda Teams. Third, former insurgents are valuable sources of

background and contact information, which, once extracted, facilitates further military

operations. Major General Tony Jeapes’ following statement clearly demonstrates this

phenomenon: “Then, too, by killing him you merely deprive the enemy of one soldier. If

he is persuaded to join the Government forces the enemy again become one less, but the

Government forces become one more, a gain of plus two.” 280

Tactically this process has two facets: (1) inducing the defection and (2) enabling

the defection. To persuade or coerce insurgents to “reconcile” or “rally” is extremely

complicated requiring significant target audience analysis. Based on the circumstances,

appeals may be hard or soft, such as fear of death or longing to be reunited with a loved

one. Attaining credibility for the offered reconciliation program is best gained through

personal testimonials of former insurgents, such as Vietnams’ Hoi Chanhs. Often the

appeal or PPM provided stimuli are not the overwhelming argument to cause defection

but rather accentuates existing desires. Likewise, defections must be enabled.

Historically, defections have been successfully aided by “safe conduct passes.” Safe

conduct passes or similar items add an additional level of credibility to potential defectors

and offer reassurances of humane, responsible treatment.

Demonstrating governance by Propaganda of Deed is likewise a best practice.

Although not a primary PPM function, it essential that PPM exploit Propaganda of Deed.

In each studied case, whether Dhofar or Vietnam, or any of the classic counterinsurgents’

domains, it is apparent that insurgencies are developed by agitators who exploit existing
280
Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 39.

145
governmental grievances. Whether economic, political, or social, grievances exist in all

governments and not all can be remedied. What is vital in COIN is identifying those

grievances being exploited by agitators and addressing them to invalidate an insurgent

movement. The grievances could be economic disenfranchisement such as land

ownership in Malaya; or political such as democratic corruption experienced in the

Philippines; or social such as ethnic and religious discrimination in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Once identified and addressed, even if not rectified, PPM must exploit milestone tangible

successes so the population can touch, taste, and see benefits derived from the

government. Propaganda of Deed thus becomes the manifestation of the relation between

the government and the people.

The third best practice calls for using PPM to enable intelligence collection, more

specifically HUMINT. The enabling collection takes two forms; one is general and one

specific. The first relates in general to promotion of security and governance. When a

population perceives an established governmental authority and marginalizes fear of

reprisal, the number of people willing to provide information to security forces increases.

Of course PPM cannot provide this security but rather enhances and exploits security.

The second form of enabling is more directly a result of PPM: inducing and enabling

information gathering such as rewards for information programs. Inducing often

manifests in providing a motive for potential informants to report information in

exchange for a benefit such as financial reward, esteem, or the removal of a threat. The

enabling portion requires providing a method to conduct the act while maintaining a

guarantee of anonymity to the informant. Specific methods are countless but in Dhofar,

“letter boxes” were used for cold drops, and in Vietnam, Phung Hoang “wanted posters”

146
included phone numbers to police centers. Today, numerous electronic means are

available and even less personal risk is required from an informant.

As observed in the writings of classic counterinsurgents and case studies, various

PPM practices have been employed. Some traditional methods produced few effects

while some less traditional methods produced great effects –all dependent upon relative

circumstances. The three primary best practices derived in this research were the

“reconciliation,” “deed,” and “HUMINT” practices.

COIN and PPM: Doctrinal Relationship Lost?

The observed COIN PPM “lessons lost” primarily revolves around doctrine. As

COIN and PPM doctrine evolved over the last fifty years, their close association has

grown farther apart. Naturally, COIN is not the only operation that PPM supports and

PPM is not the only facet worth considering in COIN; however, the two are inextricably

linked. And yet, the current US Army COIN manuals, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency and

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, and the current US Army PPM manuals, FM

3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and

FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

have lost what their predecessors possessed (see figure 1 and 2). In fact, the Vietnam era

“Counterguerrilla” and “Psychological Operations” manuals demonstrated the

relationship more succinctly and emphasized in volume and in detail the role PPM serves

in COIN.

Worth mentioning, the 1966 version of FM 33-5, Psychological Operations

Techniques and Procedures provided a full chapter on detailed PPM support to COIN

(See Annex A). The manual contained a comprehensive view of the soft and hard side of
147
PPM ranging from Nation Building Programs to Counterguerrilla Operations while also

addressing PPM support of Population and Resources Control and countering Subversive

Propaganda Organizations. The manual not only provided emphasis on COIN but also

detail on how to support the tenets of COIN. Similarly, the 1963 FM 31-22, U.S. Army

Counterinsurgency Forces and 1967 FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations each

contain far more thorough discussion on purpose of PPM and integration than do current

manuals. Though the newer manuals contain jargon about Information Engagement and

Information Operations, they lack substantive insight, background, and method.

COIN and PPM: Doctrine Not Explored?

What is missing in current COIN PPM? While the current doctrine deficit

includes “lessons lost” from previous manuals, current doctrine also fails to take the

innovative next steps to harness the full capability of PPM. Of note on the “lessons lost,”

many of the previously addressed pacification genre “lessons lost” from the 1966 FM 33-

5 pertain directly to the Essential Services, Governance, and Economic terminology used

in FM 3-24. Likewise, PPM support to COIN Intelligence previously discussed is lacking

as well. What has not been addressed previously is the greater detail and emphasis FM 3-

24 and FM 3-24.2 provides on the insurgent organizations, characterizing them as

Movement Leaders, Combatants (Guerrillas), Political Cadre (Underground), Auxiliaries,

and the Mass Base. 281 Although this description is not new, it was likely ignored in the

past as it often is currently. In fact earlier US Army publications address insurgent

organizations in similar terms. The 1967 FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations

281
Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-11; Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2,
2-3.

148
acknowledges guerrilla organizations are composed of “combat, combat support, and

combat service support organizations and military organizers and advisors, and civilian

political, economic, and psychological organizers.” 282 yet it appears no emphasis on

targeting the full array of the tiers existed. In the classic counterinsurgents’ works, and in

the Dhofar and Vietnam case studies, insurgents were predominately viewed as “leaders”

or “soldiers” and targeted by PPM accordingly. No mention was found in any study that

expanded on the concept.

Many of the classic counterinsurgents addressed separating guerrillas from

leaders and the population from the insurgents. In fact even FM 3-24.2 emphasizes two of

the three directed PSYOP message to the insurgents: (1) “Divide insurgent leaders and

guerillas,” and (2) “Divide insurgents and mass base,” yet no thought is given to how

PPM can influence other components of the insurgent organization.

What must also be addressed is an emphasis on targeting the political cadre and

auxiliaries to separate or neutralize the capability they provide. Though not nearly as

visible as the leaders and combatants, the political cadre and auxiliaries are

intermediaries that maintain an insurgent organization. The FM 3-24 defines the political

cadre and auxiliaries as follows:

Political Cadre. The cadre forms the political core of the insurgency. They are
actively engaged in the struggle to accomplish the insurgent goals. They may also
be designated as a formal party to signify their political importance. The cadre
implement guidance and procedures provided by the movement leaders. Modern
non-communist insurgencies rarely, if ever, use the term “cadre”; however, these
movements usually include a group that performs similar functions. Additionally,
movements based on religious extremism usually include religious and spiritual
advisors among their cadre.

282
Department of the Army, FM 31-16, 22.

149
 Auxiliaries. Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who provide important support
services. They do not participate in combat operations. Auxiliaries do the
following:
• Run safe houses.
• Store weapons and supplies.
• Act as couriers.
• Provide passive intelligence collection.
• Give early warning of counterinsurgent movements.
• Provide funding from lawful and unlawful sources.
• Provide forged or stolen documents and access or introductions to
potential supporters.

Since the political cadre and auxiliaries are often semi-legitimate citizens and

participate in society, efforts to “rally” them may not be effective. However, pressure can

be applied to disengage them from activities that support insurgent organizations or at

least degrade the support provided. Influencing cadre and auxiliaries is a difficult task but

can be accomplished if intelligence and circumstance allow. Especially susceptible are

those cadre and auxiliaries who perform a public service or require travel or commerce in

the conduct of their support. Cadre such as political officers (spiritual advisors),

recruiters, financiers, and propagandists; and auxiliaries such as couriers and logistical

“mules” fit in this category.

The capability of political officers or spiritual advisors to provide support to an

insurgent group may be degraded or neutralized if circumstances permit. For instance,

Kitson’s advice of uncovering the “veiled aims” of insurgent groups can be applied to

individuals or subgroups. 283 In modern terms, this tactic might be likened to the

“character assassination” methods seen in political races. If a cadre member or

subgroup’s status in the insurgent organization requires upholding moral codes,

283
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 84-85.

150
philosophical disposition, or the conduct of “good works,” failure to maintain behavioral

norms may degrade established authority and thus lessen effectiveness. Of note, key in

the process of character assassination or highlighting “veiled aims” is specificity. Just as

the JUSPAO recommended using “facts and achievements, rather than generalities” in

building up the RVNAF image; claims that can be substantiated work equally as well for

degrading an image. 284 When circumstances permit, concepts such as uncovering the

“veiled aims” can be applied in detail and lessen the capability of a political cadre

member or group to execute their role.

A similar concept can be applied to insurgent recruiters. Recruiters may solicit

potential recruits with a variety of appeals such as esteem building, social responsibility,

nationalism, ethnic hatreds, religious duty, or financial incentives. Recruitment appeals,

once identified, may be combated in detail through the use of a counterargument

delivered by a credible personality or group, such as the GVN Hoi Chanh. Also, the

recruiter may be personally attacked by illustrating examples of deceit, personal

cowardice, vice, selfish motivation, etc., where specific examples exist. Whether

attacking the appeal or the recruiter, insurgent recruitment may be degraded.

Likewise, insurgent financiers and financial support may be offset by illustrating

examples of financial mismanagement or misuse. Charitable donations and “taxation”

often fund and supply insurgent organizations. By highlighting discrepancies between

advertized intentions and the actual of use funds or material support, some support may

be withheld. Of course, this applies more towards donations than forcible taxation and

varies with circumstance. As with the previous political cadre, if the donation or taxation
284
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, JUSPAO Policy Number 68.

151
system cannot be effectively attacked, the financier or tax collector may be attacked as a

group or individual highlighting excess, extravagance, or misuse where applicable.

Figure 22 illustrates a Vietnam era PPM attack on Viet Cong taxation of rice, indicating

the rice as being consumed by the traditional Vietnamese enemy, the Chinese.

Figure 22. Vietnam era leaflet showing financial misuse

Source: Robert W. Chandler, War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), 185.

Of the political cadre, no effort is more overt than that of the propagandist.

Traditionally, whether Huk or Taliban, propaganda efforts are relatively centralized in

themes, products, and methods. By examining a sufficient quantity of insurgent

propaganda, core psychological objectives can be extrapolated and targeted in general or

152
in detail. General targeting involves attacking fundamental contradictions or undesirable

aspects of an insurgent program, as in the Marxist-Communist agenda of the adoo.

Though espousing the slogan “Dhofar for the Dhofaris,” the adoo sought to impose a

communism system which was contrary to the native tribal system and religious

practices. In return, the Sultanate’s Information Services adopted the slogan “Islam is our

Way, Freedom is our Aim.” The Sultan’s slogan highlighted the distinctive feature

between the two forms of governmental and attacked the communist program in general,

degrading its effectiveness. 285 Propagandists can also be attacked in detail by illustrating

exaggeration, discrepancies, or deceit in specific instances, degrading the credibility of

insurgent propaganda. No historical example better demonstrates a detailed PPM attack

than the case of Nguyen Ban Be. Be, a Viet Cong ammunition bearer, was captured

during a small attack by ARVN forces in 1966. Not knowing his fate, Viet Cong

propagandists assumed he had been killed along with his companions and selected for a

“hero emulation” propaganda campaign. A fictitious account of Be’s final stand was

widely circulated, and Be became well known across the RVN. Once it was discovered

that Be was alive, RVN and US PPM forces exploited the situation, and gave Be a

massive amount of publicity. The attack in detail, supported with photographic evidence,

discredited the “hero emulation” campaign and the Viet Cong propaganda apparatus. 286

285
Jeapes, 26-27, 38, 60, 133.
286
Chandler, 139-145.

153
 Figure 23. RVN propaganda showing Nguyen Van Be with DRV “martyr” propaganda

Source: Robert W. Chandler, War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1981), 144.

Lastly, auxiliaries are the most difficult to target as their activities are minimal in

scope and often are coerced. If the situation merits though, auxiliaries may be induced to

cease support to insurgents or lessen the amount or kind of support provided. Performing

functions such as transporting or caching war materials or providing sanctuary,

auxiliaries can be inundated with knowledge of governmental penalties for aiding

insurgents. More specifically, auxiliaries can be made aware of risk and danger brought

into their own homes and to their own families as a result of insurgent support. Being that

auxiliaries are generally less committed to an insurgency than combatants or political

cadre, when properly stimulated, they can play a vital role in breaking an insurgent chain

of support.

Apart from political cadre and auxiliaries, an additional aspect that has not been

recognized is Edward Lansdale’s sixty year old concept of Shepherding. Lansdale

effectively employed the technique at tactical and strategic levels to influence political

and military circumstances during insurgencies. To be effective, intelligence and

154
circumstance must exist to support it but Lansdale did induce insurgents to leave an area

through creative PPM and also drew them into areas where they could be targeted. He

also applied the concept to non-combatant populations causing villages to move of their

own initiative in the Philippines and convincing Vietnamese Catholics to resettle as

well. 287

Recommendations

Taking into account lessons learned from Dhofar and Vietnam as well as Iraq and

Afghanistan, PPM practitioners must to continue to progress and refine the strategies and

tactics for supporting COIN operations. In particular, a training and operations focus

must be integrated in COIN doctrine and operations not in general but in detail and with

contextual purpose. In addition to the “lessons lost” of Vietnam era doctrine which

provided specific PPM guidelines in Nation Building, Environmental Improvement

Programs, and Population and Resource Control Measures; and the classic

counterinsurgents’ thoughts on how PPM supports HUMINT; a step forward must to be

taken to effectively combat all tiers of insurgent organizations. While breaking the link

between insurgent leaders and the guerrilla combatants and between the insurgent

organizations and the mass base remains crucial; attacking the political cadre and

auxiliaries is an equally important and indirect method to degrade insurgent operations.

What is absolutely essential in the big picture is that counterinsurgency

practitioners understand the nature of the conflict they engage in. Insurgency and

counterinsurgency are not primarily military struggles but rather battles of wits where

287
Lansdale, 72-73.

155
patience, narrative, and allegiance are the determining factors. People cannot be killed

into allegiance but given patience and the proper narrative, allegiance can be attained and

insurgency defeated. PPM is the military commander’s essential tool for this problem.

156
 GLOSSARY

Agitation. Incitement, an appeal for action. It is based on the existence of a grievance, am

impelling situation, or the occurrence, often by design, of a dramatic or atrocious
incident.

Armed Propaganda Team. A team made up of Vietnamese ralliers under the Chieu Hoi
program. Members of the Armed Propaganda Team were selected from ex-Hoi
Chanh and are given training in face-to-face psychological operations procedures.

Counter-psychological operations. Actions taken to detect and counteract hostile

psychological activities.

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and

civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Counterpropaganda. Programs of products and actions designed to nullify propaganda or

mitigate its effects.

Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Guerrilla Warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or

hostile territory by irregular, predominately indigenous forces.

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government

through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to

influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to
benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.

Psychological Warfare. The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions
having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and
behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of
national objectives.

Special Operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped

military and paramilitary forces to achieve, military, political, economic, or
informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of
157
 military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of
conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations
frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility
techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from
conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operation
techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and
dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

Subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or

political strength or morale of a regime.

Target audience. An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of

psychological operations.

Target audience analysis. The process by which potential target audiences are identified
and analyzed for effectiveness, accessibility, and susceptibility.

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to

inculcate fear; intend to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the
pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or idealogical.

Unconventional Warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations,

normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate
forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying
degrees by an external source. It includes guerilla warfare and other direct
offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect
activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.

158
 APPENDIX A

Excerpt from FM 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (1966)

CHAPTER 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN COUNTERING INSURGENCY

Section I. CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOlOGICAl OPERATIONS IN AN INSURGENT

ENVIRONMENT
38. General
Counterinsurgent operations consist of mili·
tary, political, soeial, economic, and psyehologi·
cal actions undertaken by the local government
to modify and ultimately eliminate the root
causes of insurgency; accomplished through the
development and modernization of the country
as well as the development of a participant
society.
39. Supplementary Instrument of National
Power
·In an insurgent environment, the elements
of national power are nonnally fully com·
mitted. It is natural, therefore, .to find opera-
tions being conducted to change the attitudes,
emotions, opinioll.!l, and behavior of the popula.
tion, the government establishment, an.d the in-
surgents. Specific psychological operations are
conducted to e&use the planned changes desired
by the government. These operations do not
replace current political, economic, and mili-
tary operations but are blended into them to
optimize the likelihood of government success.
An example of such an operation is the llltl-
nesty program which encourages defection.
Military intelligence gains cooperative sources
of information; the military doesn't have to
klll or rout out these individuals; the police
can register and maintain surveillance over de-
f•.etors; and the government has an oppor-
tunity to show its friendship and sincerity to
everyone in the nation through its treatment
of these persons. The amnesty program relies
heavily on tbe contrast between a seeut·e life
and the shadowy, bunted life of an insurgent
facing a continuous threat on hls life. The pro-
gram would not work without such contrast.
40. Insurgency and Un~nventlonal Warfa,.
Although psychological operations may he
~fl'Mtlvely integrated Ill •upport m ilitary ac-
tions in limited and general warfare, it is es-
sential to success in both counterinsurgency
and unconventional warfare. An lnsurgeney,
whether or not it Is subversive and externally
directed and assisted, occurs only where there
are economic, social, and political envirorunents.
which breed discontent, It is apparent, then,
that any long-lasting solution will require more
than tacit approval of government policies.
Thls environment of discontent is sought by
s ubversive agencies; and they base their at-
tempts to establish broad, mass, organizational
s upport for insurgency upon these seed-beds
o! incipient or latent insurgency. Not only must
appropriate ana sincere governmental actions
be .tsken to eliminate such sources of discon-
tent, hut appropriate psychological campaigns
must be energetically pursued to deny the in-
surgent his base of support, to give the nation
a sense of unity of purpose, and to justify
restrictive and repressive control measures
taken du.ring counter¥Uerrilla operations.

.Section 11. SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE AND NAnQN.BUlLDING PROGRAMS

41 . General ing programs. To build support tor a legal,
No ,tactieal counterinsurgent program can be nontotalitarian government, the government
effective for long- without major, nation-build- must be worthy of that support. Thus, any

22 AGO 11tOA

159
lWiullon lo the ut..urgency mu.al satisfy the
JlOiillclll demandJI of the insurg-ency F<>r this
reru<On, milllnry actiON and llK.)'chologicnl op.
erntion>~ mu..t be subordinate to U1e political
ltlhen~ and ita short· and long·mn~rc ®manti$,
The IUitiun undergcvlnsr the stre..ses of a suU.
v•rsivc in~rurgency mu•t develot• " plan which
will includ~ !W!curity u wcll as de•elot•menl.
for there muort he envircnn•ent.al lmproven1ent
lllonj!' with the m~~&ures ror population and
rO!Sourcc.• eonlrol and counterguerrilla ot•erl'.-
tioM
42. The Notion-Building Programs
" Grpt·ntl, "'llliOn·bUllding programs take a
variety o! fol"'l15; IUid lll>Ychulug:ical 01•~niiom
t•lay ~ vital role in c••cry L•t>ecl of all lhe t>ro-
lfl'&llll by building morale, engoenderlng cohe·
••ve lrfOUP feelm~""· a.~isUng ch·ic action. and
creating nnd dil!l!eminahng Informational pro-
lfrllll\S: In abort, llelllng the ~rol(riUllJ! by word
and deed Lo the lclcal JlOpulahon.
b. SupJ>tll t. AU ~1'110ns as.cclnled with the
~·wernm~>nlestablishment nre, '" effect, prop&·
gaDdists and good-will ambuudora Cor the
national program. They must be made to ne-
t'lptthiR n!l<]>Olllnbility or the prognull.~ will he
fullle. After all. i Nurgency ia a n.,gaUve reac-
hon to KOvemment, and I(Overrunenl!ol em·
rto)'fCI and representatives must belp pmve
Lh~ JUVunmcnt'R honorable Jnlelltions throul[h
thrir own conduct The Pt"OPie mu~t be con·
viD<M that the government is not ju~t to be
to!.nlted, bul that it is to be desired •nd
i• "orlh ROI•JIOrting with labor, intelligence.
t.axe., :md the many other fomu; o( C<K>peraUon
which create •lability.
t. Nrtd for Dt v• lopintt Nulit,nt~l Unitv. Na-
honahsm, e•..,n 1C developed before nat1on&l
indepmMnce is gnlned dces not aototlllltitally
J11Larllnli>e th~ delft(!(' of nationAl unity """en-
tlal to Lhe functioning of a modern Rlltion·
&tat... The &J.IIML of nnlionallam and the .slrul!·
rle (or mdependence ofbln creates an illui!Ory
....me of nnuonal unity. Once independeoce ts
~rhl~\·t'<l, hnwt'Ver, the old ethmc, lmguistic,
rdhrlo~. tribal, elan, Md regional loyalties
reulll!rt thellllleh'l!'l The mo~l disruptive di•i·
6Jtoll5 uppear wherever large rnclal minorities
pvrform key i'<'r>nnmic rnl~ o\ddltionally,
theoe develOtJing IK!cielles may havt! highly
Lralnerl cosmopolitan lntelleetuah at ooe ex·
ln!me and t>easants and tribal membera ut the
oth"" eud of the value sy.slems. Under U1e.e
&LraininJI' tcJeial nnd economic conditions, the
role of indivi.dualll and Jl'l'~>UI••· .. pJlrllc.l~JADta
in th~ soeteties, is oflen under-valued and
nusunden~tood. Strong and elrective alate.s an
important: but to defeat 11n tnsuJ1Nncy, I>Dwer
should be widely shared among rrou1•
lhrougboul the i!OCiely. Covernments which
cannoL gain and mrunt.ain the support of major
JI'I'OUps within Lbeir ctJuntry and cannot aali•fY
physical and J>S)'choloflcnl needs by J>UltlnJI'
thesc Jrroups tn work on ~olllltru~Uve ta.sks will,
1n lhe long-run l.~~t in.'leCune and vulnerable lo
violent overlhrrw. Thus, IUllion·building Ia nni
on!)• a trultleJ· of ~nomic development, but a
bond of un1ty muNL be develn~d betwec'n the
t~eovle and the goverrunenL Nalionul unity may
be developed by the provam.' sutQCested below.
Notional eth011 and pride must also he devel·
vped. DeetH•ooted, 8tl0n latJeoU8 patriotism
ccmel! only after jfeneralionij of mternrtion and
"ith the de,·clopmenl or a commonality of in·
lA! rests and values.
d. PalftJholopical Ol•jrrtil'" Wltirh /J,•r·rwp
Notit>ttal U,.itJI. Any U.roa~. u.nll.od «roup bu
a quality which we call $1>irit, esprit de corp&.
elAn, o.r mornle. Th.is fcelinll' about the lrfOUfl
is llhared by the ~up'• nnembe ..... 1t •• an in-
Lnnglble, a pride, a cnmamd~ie, and un emo-
lloMI atlaehmenl nr cohes1on which li'IVI!;I
strength and meanln~r to the lftOUJ'l 11.11d ltl
mrunbers.. By estllbUshinll' Jlrt>JI'TIUI\ll wh1ch 1!10·
pha,<;l7.e\ the I"C)'cholog;eal objecth·es, hy •trt''-"
ing groUt> tmrticipatlon aetl\'itiC!S, one ean
develop national umty.
(I) Rraliatic, 1/'0rlltwltilr pnaJa. Croup!l
mult J~ltiafy some or man'a wan~.
Crou11 memhe~hq• must reap te\\'IU'ds
fer efforts expended. and the!!~ &onls
mu>~l be of g'n!lduat.ed lmJlOrtunce
based UJlOn the <'fforl required to
nchleve the rewnrd. Tu lllu.,trale, re-
ward• may be grndunted from
''lbanks.. Lo a Moolll of llonor. For lbc
mAJority of t>el'>o<IO.."- reward~ 3hould
be fl't'<Jllenlly Bl!d eaaily achie\·ed.
L<lniC·Min~ eeoiii)Jnje ll'(>nls are de-
•irable; howe,·er, a wal(e incrt'ase (or
23
160
 governmental employees or a needed and political g{\therings are often so
·bridge over a river Is more readily emotlonaUy ·stimulatlna- that the per-
tranalated into a positive reaction sons in · attendance attempt over and
than would a hydroelectric power .ov.er astain.,to relive the experience.
project which would take 15 years to ,, ..., Thifi~n :1>.t ~n .in ,the,alumni attend-
complete. . This long-range projeot . lna-;.<-loo.,btllb,<rames,,.and then going
would have to be broken down into " :· t.dO!fll!. iJI~v~e , loeJc:•~ J'OOm "just to
numerous stages or hu,dles to achieve l<' • , ,, ·,Jtatl!;ltO!lJihttll»Y«I!' or<Jn,the .prolifera-
the desil'ed sense of aeeomplishment ,,,. · ' · after
necessary in developing nation&l
unity.
(2) S e-nse of 1)1'esUge. Man wants reeog- ··
nition of his merit and :•
ment of his efforts in the
behalf. The desired sense of prestJ~:e
is derivo!d from those members
group that the individual
to impress. An iildlvlclual' ·atou
necessanly want
but he does
within .that
to him. 1ri
is often
tended farr1ily;:: tll1
Even

amost
source of
modem, n ~~=~~~~~:::::~~m:f::
tratehis
give. ful'ther, ana.;;~~~~;:'e~~;:.©~:,~.'·.
life. for
would give It for his , wife or
becatll!e of his close and continual in• ,
' teraetion with all the Mell\bers of,thl8 ;
primary, functional group. Failure or
laek of willingness to commit himself
would destroy his sense of prestige
and would likely ·result in his elimi-
nation from the group.
(3) Seme of belonging. Membership in a
group must provide emotional re-
waros. Men gain ·a sense of satisfac- .are
tion and security from belonging to ": ·society
strong, cohesive groupe. Entel'tainers, · ftt 11he· un-
religious leaders, and politicians all ,-~qw:~•9JinlrP.ll&~~,;(~,,,al.ld ~t.nxiety.
recognize 'the value and emctlonal re- tn ·lfeOOJ!H\:t q,[tll-·lf9ti.IA&'s. people
sponse associated with collective ac- . ·~r,·for.." ~~llm4UoM'~ ·:tor · their
tivity. Group singing, football rallies, ·si~ti<l!l>~,te~,o:Uheir~v;ants. This

24 ACO f'l'tOA

161
 often . · Joo.ds. , .to. over-slmplifleatlon
whlc!J, ,pi~~CftS,tbe ·govel'1ll!lent .in a bad
. , ligllt, ~W4<.4911*1l0YS unity; therefore, it
. \8, e6¥,11lJaJ,:tl!at a thorough informa-
ti~!J<% :,P.!'911t:am be instituted with
<. t!·~~xa'!!!• 1honesty, and sincerity as
cor~r~~Jnes. This interest in keeping
informed will generate
.., well as contribute
belonging.
succe88. A group
~~)~;r®~::h~~~~~.
,!
worked together success-
In, the past is led to expect sue-
,p>rl'}\.,.1'\fM: .~ the future. Thus, realistic e~­
. :;d i!h88IS . on national successes Will
·.. enhance national unity through the
· .. people's desire to be on a "winning
team." In a political world, no one
wants to associate with a loser, thus
the long-range plans and . progl)aJlls
must reflect positive attitudes ·and
goals. In this program it · is. essential
,,; • · to assure that the current gOvernment
"" . . will be in ·otllce long efter·the .subver-
sive insurgent efforts are de'feated··and
the disillusioned are brought · baek
into the nation as participe.nt.·mem-
bers. · UJl$tream, flooding the river banks which have
(7) Sen11e of purpose. A high· purpose,
such as supporting the :national gov-
•·· ; ernment through the trials and tribu-
....: lations of everyday life, is important
nr · in developing national unity. Groups
'! . under pressure need ·a cause to justify
, ,., and Inspire their efforts and sacri-
~.' ·'· fiees during ·an insurgency. The cause
Ji •• or purpose must have an emotional
.r-. •· appeal because most people under
Jr• • pressure tend to follow their emotions.
"'1 To" achieve an appropriate sense of
,~ . . purpose which will appeal to men
'to with differing interests, the constitu-
bi: . tion·, charter, or laws must be !;>road
\o ·. enough to permit. local and regional
,.,, • leaders to live within its ·bounds, yet
still to (ts sense of · purpose.· A na-
_,, . tion's policies and long-range obj ec-
1,. . .tiv'!S should • be stated so that . the
~:· ,, . P.eQple will kno)V :w.hy it would be .de-
.. sirable .,to Jive with th~· . governing
,body rat!l~r than with the subversive
162
"a"overnment" which is also attempt-
ing to win the allegiance of the people.
43. Psy chological Operations Support of
Environmental lmprowment Programs
"· Ptwpose. An environments) improvement
program is designed to' develop· faith and con-
fidence in the legally constituted government of
the country where counterlnsurgent operations
are taldng place. This program must stimulate
cooperation and support among- appropriate
segments of the populstion. The ·degr<!e of co-
operation and support from the civil population
will retlect their attitudes toward the govern-
ment. Environmental improvements $hould in-
volve constructive programs designed to restore
or give the civil community a condition of nor-
malcy and a manner of daily living which will
eradicate, or at least ·diminish, the causes for
iUSaft'ectlon and insurgency. Un.fortunately,
these· programs must be Justilled as .well 88
implemented to insure populsr support, for
improvement does not mean the same thing to
all peoples. To illustrate, a hydroelectrie power
plant is recognized as being nationally desirable
when it will provide jobl! and servie<!s for thou-
sands. However, when a dam must be built
been tribal home.~ for centuries, these people
will not ni!M!sarily 8@e the hydroeledri4! plant
as desirable. To retain these people ·as willing
participants in the society, the desirable and
necessary feaures of bot h the project and the
displacement must be thoroughly and convinc-
ingly sola to the leaders and opin·ion formers
of the affected tribes. Similarly, a new, straight,
hard.:Surfaced road may be desired ·to decrease
motor maintenance ·and improve sjJ.eed and effi-
ciency of transpotation in an area; but mer-
chants and towns to be by-p&Med must be con-
vinced of the necessity and cfesirabllity of this
new road which · will decrease their businesses.
lnequitfes and Injustices must b& recompensed
or they will show 't he government's laek of sin-
cere interest in th'e welf&l'!l of the people.
b. Plann.i:..U. During .the incipient or latent
stages of an ,lnsurg~ney, . j'he .maJority of the
country~s psychological operations efforts
should· be dit..icted to;.v,ard& the support of en-
vironments! improvement · programs. Such
programs as militllry ci:vic action, economic de-
•~IQpcnf'lliAI profl'IJIII IUid 1101 tical and aoclal ~ 'l<."t~ Pfrcholodul pttat ''" b the in·
irllprm-..m.nt ~ lh<>uld receive tM ma· •~nm» t ihruuJb ..-bit n.aUonal and mltUIUI•
forfl¥ of the propapnda •t!ortA. f'opalauon Icy ,..Js and tl: r ntrrrtla hliB are n·
and , . _ , _ conuot and man~ Ol>-

ea-
pialnal \\ t ut an ate e ~I
.ratloas _ , _ ahaald .......... •ut.ta.d _..,w... p,.,....... __,..,. ~tlon row
~ prqrams. ,.llh -pba.als on p.!u.
!he tDt&l " t prDJram
llil:z and ll"a11Uq nr;uimuenb. At the natlOII&l ~
Ind. the procnma ant ~ and~
l'rimarilJ 1.11 IIU fy the c::lUJft Gl disa!'!'ftlo
t and lu
Uoc &m!O!>S of u ..
't1lde I!IICJ &1lli ~ tical.
c=~=llc, -'aJ. Wy and I•JdiOiosiul IIIC!-
bo:s lA &!I ~ ana. f'Wia ..... pro-
rnnu adl ua lll1lft ~td
.... ~tfod. Tl:nr lln>enma uh • Ta1Wtr
f t Thr1
lcnl rd rm ==nil¥ n'~Jca
1111mu!a!.l! nrt•nro af
~:cr.:t c1 k>cal ..-<~Ua~
arrku!Uzral and
~ htsllh -:.Uiilm_
UozW fKiliUU. and tJW llf
aiOdal~

Ill lllJRI!llMtlQ tn1onnatlon a>1I<UII-

In: lh~ pn>J>OSC:d 1lans for KC-'llc.
poUIJol and lt>CiaJ 1m1 ro.-ement.
Populcrl...., ond
,"'111'0- •-tU&
44. PsycMiogicol Op.rahons Support of
Control

1:! 1 ilo..doc.atlll!l' 1~ popu!Atllll!l throudl Th - " ' IIA m 1 I>C! ~ted from hil
m»a n•.dla, . . well u IJT ~liJtJ a IICIGrtr ( support tim IUJII r1 II within lh~
rom:nun ty ~en ce by pablish n: and foal populatl 11 Tl ua, a 1111m.ary IArlfC't r r
hrtNl•lOIJUIII' ntnn1 and du·c-.,Uves. PIJ"holo2iea1 operall0115 b tho local. dvl!bn
II) •:xp» DJ th• Q • o( dUat!~oD po Jatlon. Olr«t appal to !hf.' J:Uttrflla, who
,..hlch are lllllnu!actur...d and !a Ja. =1 be a ranallt dlH'Inl! lhb acet'lrralinJII 1'1-
dou.: In lhorl, a>UIIId']n'Op:lpllda. ol ~.may P•t little ...,.ult, but he may
(IIWIJTnll Jm>UPI may have mn- be at!ecud U he H<ll hb liOIU'CO o( food, modJ.
dacttd •udl an actl.-.. propapnd.a d a1ld manJ.t Ill' 1or11ro away from him.
ampaln lht 0.. people an no Al!od:n primary IAtWft !oomd ill the rovem-
lonpr nocor:ue a...t dlstlllpish bc-- ment A 10•a nment cllllcial5 must be
twfffl ralalld bnaa'fned ~) C<ICn'i:lad ol 11 n!ar 111111 pcu pea
t4) Ba ldlq and mllfomnr =nle af Tt:e'.r ..Uvltios ~ !WOW of
til. P'lJ!" 11-, lllllil&J7 IU wdl &I the adl .. ~ IICtilms. abaald
chill&Jl. acUW17- au aDd a - of
(6) f'tlflltln: ,.., ~ Ow cat..,..a;Mn"b • doltJ a=d covatr7
dl'oru 1M 1.&11 a 1111 ., - for atMn.
ban.~~--...... and the
tJ PJVJ..ru. and Ow tuJ.-utrmal
M:tloD lhe ~ of warfal"lt
the IAr)' and Ill ~ apUI&t 1M ft1ab.
"""~ I'I&!L) ~ the PiJc:holoJ:i.

163
 eal operations ed'ort· should <~hlft its emphasis
from •nvl-ronment&llm,prbvkment to population
and re&O~ ol)nfn.l,• Long-range improve-
ment plana ma"'ft11t be'dlsearded, but the va lue
of altort-nt'lia'fl''llfth-impaet improvement pro-
g11llll8 will 111.-llndloe' readi-ly identi~Md with the
govemmeliM~rest 11n the people's problems
than' "Will OS>~ •taking years to complete.
Clvlo"U~~ects are well suited to thi!l
hiRIV"1511Ytl«tlt>ifcat impact. Where the commu-
i~~;~~-tPl~~!•~·n~eedbetween
i
be met
should the popu-
localquickly
or paramilitary forces
tiie government.
p of the area. Ps,yeholozical support ot the clear
Population Mid Re1rmrcea Control Pt'o-
00!\trol me1.111ures imposed in counter-
. ~m~;~t;~·c~:u~~rta~II legitimate as well 88 sub-
·~ The population must be fore-
hrtperldtng rl!Strtctlons and the Justl-
·l(!€iil~c•n: •'fllr'·them. They •hould be informed of
os•enlta w~l'eh will accrue from obedience and
tfildia2&t'ds and penalties that will , apply for
vlliiAtlotis -of the regulations. Pro~ams whieh
~n.· efl'eeti.~elY isolate the ·guerrilla from hia
~Al!e of material and Informational support in-
dude curfews; roadblocks and cheek points;
cl§~trcSl of food sup)>lie~; cont.·ol of medical sup.
· Ijl!.~'; r~trat!on of all personnel, firearms,
t_ijilaportat!on, and fuels; establishment of
·~'f life" hamlets for persona displaced by
·~r and hold" operations; spot checks of
OM"roet in transit ; and the Isolation of key in-
l¢all&tlonJ and Areu. Each of these efforts will
l'eQUire A thorourh study of the functional
groups and tit$- key communicators,
elfectlvenll&s and Its susceptibility
be studied In light ot the specific eulture
\he needs of that en'IIT9nment and the
•ltJJ!tin:~ate .eoverrunent. For UUa reason, vaat
detailed amounts ot 8oototoeical and
1'-i'Mlilm>polloaiieal information iA required to d&-
·velop a meaningful psychological OJl'!rations
!:,CJnpalgn to chanp the attitudes and. behavior
of) & apeclJic group to favor .governmental pro-
The ' needs ot the people ·must be
jUinea.an4 'blended •With the needs of the gov-
~~::tlf· 'PeOPle are eon'II need that it Ia in
il lnte~t to support the government
'thMl the" inilutgents, then the controls
ltl'l)ar·rltlrsmayl\ie Minoved ..'Fhe ~pie them-
164
selves will then wlll!ngly a:nd aettvely aas!st
the government in controlling the area.
'
b. P81felwlot*o,l Opemtio~ P..ogrom4 Sup-
porting Specj.fic.f"P'Jirtic,. and Ruource. Con-
trol Progrll!'ft,8. SPil!litle p;ograma which m!rht
be encountered during population and reeourceAS
control operations are clear and hold operatioM
and relcation operatiot1J. Clear and hold
operations are concentrated in a specific, b!rh
priority area experienciJ)g overt insurgency.
Clear and hold operations are intended to
create a seenr.e physical and J)8Ycholoirical en-
vironment and establish governmental control
and hold operations will assist In gaining the
willing support of· the population to obtain
their participation in the governmental pro-
grams for counterinsurgency.
(i. ) Ge?!erctl c()lt.8iderotion8 in clear anct
lw!ct operations. Since clear and !told
operat ions expand outward from a. se-
' eure "base, progrartls should be con-
duetiid with:iri the secure base to In-
sure k high degree of s~pport as well
as .to maintain unit and population
morale. Psychological operations per-
sonnel must encourage host country
agencies to stress proper conduct and
behavior in dealings with the popula.
tion. The military, paramilitary, and
police often .establish reputations ot
being . ,oppressive, h&rsh, unsympa.-
thetic,-.and corrupt. Sueh reputations
can be eliminAted by proper conduct
and through supporting p~opaganda
eamp&igm, which iU11minate the posi-
~ve. .aetions-and values of the torees.
· A .Jew,•.rash, •undlsclpJin\'(1 aets wi.ll
•· jeop&l'dize J)Opular support and the
.en.~ operatiol). ln an, ar..a to be
·-. .. cleared, initial paychologjpal opera.-
tions programs implemented should
seek to make .the population neutral.
Clearly w,rlttsn ·and easily understood
them~ and dlf'eotlves sh,.uld be uUd
to encQur.age ·<Xl()Mration. Compensa-
·•· tion shouldbe·made,for ,dilm•ies lf.the
. D.perati(\n, p~ra ..durjng . tlte early
phyes, of iMU1'8;~{1CY•. ,T'It empl>aals
1
should be on equitable, rapid settle.
mel)'t,Gf claims. A-t the s11me time. m,IJJ.
 l.aey ch C IICti<>lla, IU<h IUO Jl'l..ll~al .,.r r<•h~ un1t.a .. """'!1\lal to malnl.aln
• lalanu t.o lnju..-.1 cniU~na leon april do rn~ IPid alt.a•n a 6<'1U4 o(
als~t with the military tiWAtlon and aatiOIUII unl1.)' II• 1 eountry dii[D}-
not ~till# from tiM o!'fflltl lUll turla ahould t... ~-nw:el ID • i11t
and pocl the I ramiloury (~
"''o rtmet!U ol the mlaaloa) will "'"
011 Gldl ~ local
date tll• llstllity of tl:luproo!fd and
!ajand '*'..... aDd will. with proptt
l'fOp:lPI>da 5Ul>JI')I't. PGI tM bbme for
polltlal, litary. ~ ~uca·
llno•J-4bl!vld '- iwe>:l&cbed f<W !Mir
!be en1lrt sttuatao~~ 011 tlw alloa~n
tri -s partkipatloD m
G1 tlw i~ ~ Collr;wiJ:jr &n! ecmt=llt ty lllJd ~
Thl5 ,. caatrfbate t.G a bdta' IIJid6.
~-'*" ol JII'OPilPI'da ~­ staJ>d I and CIIUOD bet~
tt>ml4 •hldl aUs:irt .,. ~tp;
the balll:l:lal ~ and u.. ilocal
"MiliW'1 ~ aJ:d ~ aro 1lbd ,.. w bal leo.Mra
...m bo n&e•ecl •lmt wppart loG w
the cov~l.
1
~ ames.~- Th~ bandiU, ~ &o
VJ!1td b)' • ha.-e 13I T rn11 ll...:a'CI&C tacticAl
dutro)'l!d ~ plcuant. Eood old daya.. Ul Ia ~ rrad Uy WUhdn..11. C:OD•
"\\. ftlllil g<l~t'f'll-)fd." ..,.. kl1lll si5\mt• th th~Abililt of panm.IIIIAr')"
U lhe r:uHTilla b hlln!, )''U Will "'" faou. to assume rej!OI 1\Jihty fur lhe
nuun 111 the curubal &u.e." If rc•>rl'1l· aftll, p eh ·lo~-ICAI opuaUtliiS pro-
mrnl froi'Cdl lU'e {t'ft!h an•l ~ly f o llnllllll " I (Oillo un~•·r more euc11.rl>l
aeUun, paychuloJt>eAI opcutinM lu•uld of ltrr~!nrl"l no l••hucal aubdu•wu1111.
•nc:<>Utllll~. ' " - pt~woke, lh• vucr· Th• m• lrt:Millll thn uiUnual<' !lt!Ct!ltl
rlllu lnlo stAnwnr awl 1\rhlln~:. It <>1 th• au rrilw ehoulcl ~used. ll.l!lllS
th~t n1n, 1t woll ahQW thrtr •uknt!IA o~ lou! inl<'rul. "'en th ottabll•h·
llfld "cowa'l'dlf'' Wll)"'l. In A.o!a, lb• men\ of 1> 10011 n~WNhffi• ....t ~Ill
lnaurwmt'• tear of Clgbuna 11111v be Pl)'dl~ OJI"'IIUcms lnma ....
mated to '-in!: Cact, !,It!!! forclag h m ~; lllllf r r hlnld ~ local •1 Ul
Into a ftsht. Ouce ~ In batt!~ be nationAl r:oall aad obJ<cth Such

(2)
may bo lind lUll! dstrQ1M
n,.....w......r plcu._ Oace w
clnred. Lhe best
am~ as
~ ~
~=~~r:Of'
0
ma•
r as ~lalln-
taft local. poUskal
and ~- ahouJd be>
the pa tkm a of
tlom c=s!st ol inf~ the popo-
0'1111 alfa.an &I
tx. lh&1 thr ....,. b occu~ To dfrc:t
thil. police or paramlliWT fCI"Cll!S alfalra of ,Ute.
ahtcJd br r "" w tal b<aliTo aDd a m ft'lcc:ation
~ tniJIIJI, Pi0i1411i sboald 1:-..lal- ~ acd locidspnkrr
Uat«< 10 illal ~lar (arr5 cc bo prvridt'!~
rdWM far wr mfnJnns. I'I)'Choo al..a1 pm!inr a!ld ld
k>ldrAI 0Jl61ltioaa proltf'&IIU 111'9 ~ td1 th peoJI • lo nd transport&
al~1..t ln ot&Liiab aDd maintAin «on uon f pnct ral (proml;o of b ll~p.
Mt>nt<' amonr Lt-• Dtwly H.,.lal l<t' m-awaUo11 from 8Urrr!Ua-domlo
fort'~. !IICJ"''JL<t>d mo!h aUQb 11f lh"" ''*t"'l &rt'U m&)' 111'1"- ~c lllll11bcr
Cun:ca CAll lA! achil!\'ed !.1 aut! ll(l.t' 1. of rdllt••l'll) flur•ns: till! m~>,l!ll>tlll.
ll.. u JIIU'adt'll and awaro.l ~r ..rnonlt· opeellll utt•ntlun n•u•t llt! Ji'•'" l.n
"'hirh n~ugnUet! dealrahl~ IM'hav1ur tTetnJl {!of hnflt r lot;c-AUJ.t'Li la may lw Uu~
ou~h as brllYI'l')'. tummunl\y •~rvlro. tll'lll lmt>r lntt u( th r<.'C<~l!x<od 11'1~·
d•rl<>muy, IIIICJ'i~. or""'*~ · L·:qull· en•mm~ hatrudlonl to w m!hlllry
ohlt ln'll\lnf'llt or popular,.....,.,.. pMn· 11nlu k u~l aci!JM lcHpinjr ranulle
mll1t.&l')' fnfttl, and ~!ar mlbury i ,.u....., provld~q linu~ n;,;dlal
afuontloa • ...trunr thr .,.ru,_ In a

21

165
 10 aro1 an~ [rud&dl) mann••, Jiving
11pidal attention w lho .,e~ and r;.
firm. Thtt Initial UDI•,...Io~ ~hood
at lb.. ~ cmtrr lml'ot"U.nl.
It .-M t... In ad>""' ,.1 •tasft of cnn-
.ut:ctlott, t pqo.a!b!.. 11M IDCiude
-~ Ill: =~ ~-.~
opentlaal sbt>uld mform alld el\UT•
lain w lh ~ ~ nplaln
alttmat~ ~::3 for h ::r mr<tlcal
U!::s!Jill!ee. and bald dutn"batl<m u
&ppnlllnalr. ~ cmtr'l dpo-
lllrr f ranrilla Wlltraton a In
l"'l!'h!.l, •114 """"'~ folloor-up
Jrftllll for ...,..t.inar&y n ~ nuttle-
lll<'ll1 elf n.
~ IU•ot"'t • Pros ''"""' Tlto•"•· LeAflc-u,
kllldJI'f'lkoon&, radl•o. tilms, n• ... I'•~Wn. and
!ate-U> fatw p.MIWl loon can I>@ U~UI In oillal'llll•
n•l• Jymhe>ht T>l"fiPilllllltla d1 IJ:ll' l '·
(I) Ad• frtl«! thr exiiiiA!h<t' 11111 uc., ...,.
pH,.hrru~nL'\ of thf! naUou't\ J •·(•Jfl ~ms.
I;!) r'#r ua•le tht lncal reo•plt•, • ll'hl•ltnsr
porrilla aaxdiari~ aa.l unoltr..mufloi
,~..-~ .... that lhelr •>bJ.CIIVP.II """ ""
abta1tW<l lhrou,b apodfir, ~rial
nqotlauon rathrr lhAII lhrv~~~:h !rllc'r
r!lla wllJ'hn 11C11ritl
(S) llhllitrate 1M f11illity IUid tnnble CIOR
t;f ruuri\la wvflU'e and :.s ~<>tal el!rrt
apoa lhe ! = e>f u..,
aat
I 4} \hal 11» r;uttnlla 1110' t PJdw!utical nlo<:o aDd pral:lnm Wllllld be
baa eoamr l1!lder thto cuatm of a tll1nl
pmrn ..tlkh ls &alar lhe cunt!lc1 ID
fllrlhrr u•• "'"' eeda In u..........
( $) Dnphnme the fan tlw trnafn ln-
Slll"111'111 '-1m~ ...... in .....til)" barn!lb
wbo _,_ ~ a>!Wr.wallCIC' of lhe •ar
tor thrlt' o.., pnwmal plra
Ull flnn11 lh• weglu l•f nt•:rna• hltl
f>Uulk IIIIIDIOil lC> l...u UJ••Il
parq natlnrat *C:LI\el~ IUI*I••rth1,: d"
KUf'tMtla {tJJ-ce in llA nlt• n11t t~ u' cr-
lhlf''-' tha leg-ttin'lllle- 1fU\t•rtlh4•1ll
17) t xplll n th~ n,...eo ·':\· r.. r l••l"''atil•n
C.•ht r I mul .ru.-rrll .a mQHIMU1 Cft&o
l.lnl II~IC.'t'llli<>DI
(ll) t:x~ u.. w~ u1 1.11• luu~..t
ldccloJy
tL Pupltlt~tu,. at d Rr~trwrer• CoHI1cH llhJ't'-
1 •~•. Undu apprupnat.t ttrcum.•l.aJia!s. thi!H
lh...,-, .ad ot I rr• dktalPd by lhl! Inca! tn-
•iroiUI>Ollt. tan W U..,.l lh a t'C>UD!HWUI"f""l
01-era_~ to CJ r:&l.:! a fAl-"''O"ahie lm.a,.. .. of tJw.
lf.citimal• ~· ADd ID ddtro,' ;h., em:>
tlflCAI attxhmrot of the local PP.OP!• :o thr IA-
onll"Jl"'!lt - T1:e lC>lal cldl-at c.! the UWl~l
' rm C>CXVD •hnl U.. real • ~n
Qlii"'J (I{ lb. 'l:ft~C)' J;aq We= IUICO\'n'<d
and dimlaated and when 1M miDib ' thf' pop.
ulaucn ba.-. bml road tl<med u. avp;>ort co>.
~t~alldpo!icl& ~
Pf'C>o thfl flilJ«t.i\P ... -~~b ..... - - ....JIIInrt ,.,
all dtmmts of tM popa2atlo!t ((or tl:to ic'pl !:"'.
>ProJDrDt and ta p~ To a«omplilb lhia,
l h - Uld ptOP'&J11& ahould diTid.o the mal 1
O'ltmrnu of the pe>,•ulatioll from 4lilraidtnl ..1...
ni.Ent. !~!lur \ ,· tt ~"' lt'rrrtnall~ d.l.&llr-
45. Psychological Operations Support of
Counterguerrilla Operations
Tb~ m1llt.&n collltnllnd• r mu•t !.o a•ur.. nf
not only tht ,.... II• n• c, ...,tol<•Jrial, t.J1l m lt•
!llrY IMUe, l.ut aOO h• mll•t i>l' A•atc of tht
~··rholoJI'ICAI ImpACt of oach ul thae t!.'<m••nu
upe>o u.~ f>')t>ulatlon, hE. o•n troupa. and lh•
l~u in ad! milituy ~tlon C'Otl
dnrt...t aplnn U.. «Uftfril'-. JU\-.1111' U.la
a war-..., t ~ DOt 11«<5Unlv f»>iow that a
!o."lDlllized ~ Of!C'T*U.... camp:o ~
wonld be blclad<d 11 "f!f)' CJp<n!UOII, bat
~ l.'hlm&~ IIIX'ft:U MJ:eDds UJ>OII U:t.
kwln''a ••are:~ r tlle pn'«PW:ns ef both
tlle C<"l'WtaDto aDd tlle nm>...,tmtan:s. P.z
pa iww:< b!o ahrnra that 11W1T o:uz::::;andml
llft too llttl nn;huil to 1llp ~
IISl*tS ~f t&IT DPC'ftti<JIIm. Too ol'tm, lonl'·
ran,. poUlla! objl'f'th • arr aacr!tia!d f(Jf' 1m!
..,..,.,. 1M al rar
na. l' hey ·~ta Uloi
I!Wc.b~. pn•JX'rb • ntl<m and l!llfoi'Ct!ll .,.,.uJd
lhlrd oiliminat.: l41a pn•bl~n•
11 In uttliCAl lllu•l "'"'· ~~~~ pa~~h·I~Jr•rul
ur><'m\tt~n• pla11 •huuld rnrlud~ nrth·itiNI •II·
n-clt; J luWill'll lh~ lllllllrj!CIIIJ, lh" ci\'lJIAn JM>II
ulal "" In lh•· 111 111"11.111~ vlc~nhy, IUid lbe l.rl••l•
eo lllliiUUid In (nnnlltiun llrt•J!Tillll For e11U11&>1•
he!ure '"" <illi'IDII an atlMk Cln a ll1U11lf<l,
elrilisn:s u the ar~A ahould ,_,~ lilatly In•
fOftJIII:I<>II collCl'!'llinl' thdr rule m u.., opm1
166
 tion, J)ossible benefits, or. pote)ltilll . dangers.
This informAtion sho~ld be written .On, the Jocal
dialect to avoicjany .misunderstanding. ,,. · •
b. Maintaitling the fighting spirit '' 6'i'"lii~ .
armed military and· paramilitary ~oreefif '' -~
priority job. Higher pay, awards; ..pril' · ' ·
and other prestige-related actions. rna
to promote and sustain devotion and ·dedf&ffiij~
to the nation In the face of wbat is ob~io~~tiJ
dangerous job in an insurgency. Ot utm<iilf.filii"
por'tance Is the need for the gover'ninend8 pr;!'
sent a picture of calm assuranc.! of ulti'Ma't'e
victory. ·· ·
c. Divisive themes should be used towards the .
insurgents. There may be numerous well-ln-
tention.e d insurgents. These people, whose sense
of natloosllsm or frustration motivates them,
should. be separated from the subversive insur-
gents or Communist cadre. Proof of external
support .!>f. the i~urgentl\, P.ersonal intrigu.e,
character trai.ts contrary to the local culture,
and divergent motivation., are some exam\)tes
of divisive themes which may be appropriate:
. d. A nationally recognized amnesty program
for the reintegration of insurgents who are
captur.ed or who surrender should be carefully
planned and conducted. Amnesty ralliers should
be carefully segregated from captured, bard-
cot·e, Communist c.ad·r e. The judicious use of
Pl'O,p aganda .t hroughout the t·etraining cycle that the
would inform the· amnesty ralliera of the· gov, •· ~n:;.; .,,. have estab.
ernm·etttal aid prograiUll, and objectives and
lll't'l~tNIWi•~r'~•r toli!S that are played
would contt:ast these against the aubvenive·in-
surgent's. met(lods,. goals, and ambitions. Once ' upon' ·relationships or ·
the amnesw...ptogram is .successfully impie- i'el~t~lve'Btatu\1. g't'Oll't) ~alui!a are ftrmly held,
mented; every, effort •must be mAde to inform it is hlglt1{ unlll('ti)> that individuals would
guemllas .of li~w .and , why .they should· rally violata .'Sueh·,gtoul) vattltudes to· ach.ieve indi-
under the· ,provhiGDB· J>f, the ~rogrnm. It is im· vidual needs <it a· tower order of preference. A
perative that•psl1ell:Clio&'lc.eJ •l).perations .sup,Jl:Ort- devout Jew will not' eat ham. A norm'al Ameri-
ing this ..pr.ogr~9~··eentra"'v ;cw.ntro)led, .~pt can mothe'r'w!n' not kill or harm her·chitd. An
· the, messages·rt\ndi< ~tBI'iJiho.\llclr.b.e1 primarily Asian• will · hot lose· face. The psychological
responsive •to local·· nee'di'!rilfid>'IQcel•!.insurgenls. opet·ations.olllcer mi1St have•close·l'iilations with
Aerial
I •
thi.s
• ;
tll'e Intelligence eoltlmuriity·'t&- determine these
d~PIY'fl~!l<vUlliea'Mld'tbW!'tb o~Uil\tt¥ program
aeceptil\~' lli' ~11Si%lit\~i~7~d·'.~e··target
aoMIIieb~~lcei~ 'mu~<&d~e will
of· ., ., W~~til••~·o~ his self-
iuat bea~n }J)( ~J"'~"'!''l'~n.J~we .m ini&g$ -~~~llii-~IIIJ# ·he Is re-
which re<:ently .ha~jl ·""!'i'•''"'~"'· •'fl'"~' :lf.~~~~,Mt~Jill··situa­
e~uill!, or•which:have ,othef,known,,l)r .su~~ tianat ·t~~~.dlili&lilQll; a<'(~Ol~tion, etc.

167

an ,insurS'eney. is basically
individuals who are op.
of the .leS'ally 'constituted
iro•rram~~. ways and means must
·~~~~~~~~a~t majority of these
Ullllt.J:IIe • is not only serving
but is the best qualified
;-qt;J~Iers:hip for them. The vast major-
~111 . be reached by mass
'ae.E~to,fa•ce pe1imasion and properly
1\Ctlon programs are also ex-
;.;f;.;;t;,,@ in appealing to. the ~gets
Faee-to-faee communications
?.'J' ....,'""I''~ to be the most effective means
mrmn>v at~itudes . because the
audience feels that he is. then eapa-
!'t~~~~ eredlbility, sinee~itY, and the
<; and meaning of the speaker.
if· taee.<ro-'faee persuasion the most
but the propagandist· may' also take
of ImmediAte feeilbaek arid modify
h'iillloa..,• .., better suit the need.s of the spe-
·:~~l~~:h•!~Q~u~es::tions• can be heard and
ie . possible .t he propagen-
ldent!J:Y' 11-nd appeal to''!key·coromunl-
"opinlon ·formers" :within the se-
ktflt··~~·~t group,(s) fo~ they are the most
lll9~1\1~1 .1n their and Sj:Qpe. In spite of·
rll~~;~'di~~;;;;~p to funefi.ona.~.grouPS. the
~l jS limited ·t o the three
the il!iru~ent nation:
•v~J~~~f~~ establi.shinent, the eivlllan pop-
~' ln.surgents, f6r ·there are many
l!t~~i:Stlons:' vihicl are of value. '
Govel'll'lllent- Establishment . .
l»flrlo\li:taliY• .p~litar.Y.,i·civi-1 lj!!l'Viee, and
elementa . of:. the a-overnroent
1\l.ls.h)l)l!nt .. make' .an ex'eel.l~nt, tefget audi-
. ~ll~: F)~•. tlley should
ill~t)n ~~ing .!!te govern-
in· control, en.suring their reten-
.,,,,..~, 'th~e chain-ot;eomnililid.or organi-
...... ~····~·· lii'lliready' eStablished, mak-
168
·ing communications' a natural and accepted
thing. ·Third, these iovernment representatives
collectively 'and individually ·give the govern-
ment iU! image. Whiit they do or fail to do re-
fleei'A the J)olie:Y ·of the liovernm~nt either
directly or fndirelitly; whether '·tlrey recognize
it or not. · ·',·, ~
(1) Program,., Spee(fic prognms should
~ initiated to . P.~omots respected be-
havior patterns; ,elimin11~e corruption,
graft, and peed; prom.ot<! Sl\erifice for
the national good al)d ser.viee; promote
a sense o.f responsibility to self, com-
munity, and government; encourage
greater response to the . needs and
desires of the civil population; pro-
vld<l for ·local participation · by the
civilians in · their own .local govern-
ment; eliminate the imaS'e of ruthless-
ness; · inform the government estab-
lisbml!ilt of ·govemmental programs
whieh··are· serVing the developmental
aims · o~ the people; reward faithful
governmental employees as·a step in
the long-range goals of eliminating
·( .. subversive. Insurgency.
(2) Actioll8. Civic action , programs, · em-
phasizing self-help and cooperative
efforts, are an example of the efforta
which will perform two extrel)'leiY-iD;l-
portant functi~n.s. Such programs will
J:>ejp convince the -local citizens.. that
the gov.ernment is sjnc.erely on their
side. ;Th~ . governmental emplo)fee'!. in
their,pe,- role of benefaeto~, wlll. begin
:.8SSUI\ling, .thes~ ,resPQnaJbl,ll~es and
ileeo,me •. "th,e gQllernm'!nt ~ a. eon,
scien~e." This elran,ge ftotn enforcer
·Ul· •helpet.ds ·an !)\•er1;.• eommitmen.t
which will Irrevocably change. the per-
sonality ...and·. attlbude.. .o'f Individuals
· arrd 'groups· if properly·eondueted and
supervised! Those'in>volvad·will be·par-
tieipanllli··lil the de~eloprnen:t ·ot' 'their
e~>untry, · hopefully ·committed· oo the
·, · sef'viee of· tlie 'people :and·' the' govetn~
..• ,.,.. · meQJ;.t.. ,; , ,, •. :J·, l; \:\. : .. .
·('8) Inftfoti:vit:' S'elzll)!r ' the ' economic, po-
, . . ' '"'' lltlcall; soolaf, ai$11 'milltaey ltYftiative Is
:· 'lm]lortaiit iti''ae!ii(!'Yf!ikrf ·complete vic-
 tory ovet· the subversive irumrgepts. • ;< .
When· on the defell8ive, only U!mJ)OO;-
ary and short-range victories can ..l?fa
achieved. 'The majority of countries
beset with -1118urrency are predoffii·
nan~ agrarian, therefore, t4e .flPY,·
ernments which remain witb.ii~,tl\e
urban areas, either physically or
psychol.ogically, will remain defensive
and wiU lose. The government should
adopt themes which miglit be used by
the insurgents, deprlvi~ them of the
psychological advantage. Insurgents
must be kept on the defensive whlle
the govertunent remains on the attack
and retains· the initiative. ·
(4) Adv~nt.aOes. 'The image of. a people's
go.v ernment; . regard~s ot its exact
form, . will cream a cooperative atti-
tude within the population. Rapport
"~II pennit the a-overnment. access to
information and support and will ac.
·eelerate the el.imination of the insur-
gency. · ·.
-c. Target. The Civil.ian Population. In addi-
tion to the psychological obJectives mentioned
under developing ' national unity, there are
other important .factors to consider when ad-
dressing the clvilili.n population; but the need
to stress· ultimate 1victory is paramount. The · · school,
people wilt· ·remain · either apathetic or hostile
If there is ·dollbf about the government's ability ·" 'unctional ·
to win· and 'ltetatn ' control; beeause Commu- ·." ·'J t<·k'WIIPS't:iv~'r'to; fOlltei' tlie develop-
nists, " wh~n tiilillif· over an· ' area, normally .,,.. '>'iJ lfi'et'lt·~ t:tulllil~nM :.priile· and a sense of
liqlildare, .tlu'8d#Jii1'popular 't'rial.s," those who
have sUp'ported'" We government:· Supporrers ·, ·'"f· •ifaWJtlltJ ~tl'slbility.' AU other or-
of the ~orroejlfl1'~g;)ized; legal 'government ,,. l'':iiniZ~~~:· th~U'gtj<lut the country
who are · n St· J.llllilfd&:red• 'are usually sent to • " lmoiM.''II<ide\tcoiu:aged to demohstrare
schools· where: tifelr'·r1$1f.:gullt Js built up and thetr'~~\.\p~ort · on a voluntary baSiS: ·
they ·develop·'.s-yi:i'lptb!Dl' ;of •wtthdTawal 'as the 'enl(':~v,;~a's and . c~nsidera!;io'risca'n .
Communist tihoufli~efollm•!t"&bil>f.wertical and · be ~!lvelopoo to. reinfo~,' d~~!Jible,
horizontal · contreiii\< ~··n~eshes and cooperative behavior. Although out-
strangles ·them: 1Mtllen~;61. ·~~,stare. One ward manl~estation ·Of govern'nlental
can understand{,i·Di tl):ili ll'~lf;;!t!i~le!uctance '• ' · support ·does· not 'ldways'<tl!etm ' active
to support .the,Jegi!J. 1 gQI'ft~~n~JI)alltil it Is "!r·. ..... ' and mor&l ·
~latively clear,, thji~ ~e.~~v~r\!J9.•.11t~ win.
· ;; '''·' ' tend ··t<{l~~~:~:~~~~
(1) P1'0gra.m8. ·' Wo~t,i~· . ,. ''ci~~
an.d..~ei'Vices.,~)\ r.~Y ~(J!Ve~l
, le;.oeiJ. A~. the !Uit<f~~l , )~y ., ~omm~n
. , govet'Dffi~nta:j !l'IPi~~~o.~, goils, and
AGO I"TttA

169
 aln, onallfm<las o:ppnrt oi 11M ~·
ef"'lmmrDt..
(!) JlllWJltQn ""*
1M -Jar -
port of 11M ~to Ia - u a l to
Ow rittoty ... ~ lhe allltbmo<! ..,..
bt~ of a lll'ftlhcant ... t.nBh* 11>-
u oor of th•
&UJ'II'eti<:Y, th~ pos-uiMI n
ma,~... pa~al \aJ1I'OU oi lllr ill-
au~ It must abo be a t.1 tarpt
of ~lbnak row~·· ..,..
chalalial prvcnm. ~
,....~hu-totM~
and~ <!uri... thr lnnp~<m ~
of ID>UrntiQ' and Ill tb~ )lhUC'S of
IIIAII'Vti>C) ll<'fon' romplett lllSI <If
coatro1 within an ar The and•-
.._ can be raditr attMlied and
rudMd ulltll lhe thnat beeocxs 110
- f f t that lhe populatloolla a1raltl to
&upp>rt tbo ~nuDOI\. 11w ~
wbo a.-. fnat.,.tod •othln Ill• d..-ol-
"'''111 M\lcm wall t"'l"'"~ fa\'onobl)·
tn U•• 1\nol ""'""'a11dlot wbn olffrs a
.......,nable aolutina to their lr0tl"ll·
tlotu.. T1H> thrutmed IIO"~t bas
to ~ lhe sm;b!fta and pollll
llw _ .. ~ tM P'"*.,_,.tal
oabrtlotlll of tl-.ese ~ therfl>r
lo~lnar th• ln""rr~nt to "'act to the
Jtl>Vomm•nl'a tlforl lnoltad of talun,
th~ lnotlauv .. Tho lnaurarent mwt be
compel!fd to a.ulllllll! tbo aff11S!• ..
n. iltiUI"PlW DICit DOt be permlu.d
to - tbdr M>IOb In an amrwm>m':
of .~!o<l fi"'IJ1mitmm and ....
.tJa. .,... JU,Wi CUWftt mast t&C4aiw
tho political U\U"' of llw lllb\~rd~
lh,...ol and must plan and o•O<"Uio an
t!l'mlft counter p~ n.. bur-
4!f'll b Up:!ll lhe ~ and ill
a6Ybon to lf'::c;pltc tb pnlblom '"""
to f'On'frt L Sod<t,J wilh lb IMttb
and .teln to nma1 ..........bb'
ttable CIIIIIOIJtloD. with ro:tMe•t.!. nile
of law. and with kaown ID~roo!aUon­
ololpa. lo ""'"' rtftt)tl\e to d~\dnp..
- t.al propapoda thAa to nwlu-
tlou.,- pnGI!Jes and b!ondltJ.-"'ftttl
Adftne CQCI(!;I.Iom be ~~
and ~ urtr ll on!er to brlot-
t.t tbe lrtlftf!llmnl. ~ tho bnn
170
t.a.... bftn o.lnd by lAAL tho
f'lllt of Ia• Ia dlspu'..r, ud ~
I:1WfTilla lllllll terrorist artlo Aft
, : brt""' t1w ..,d t zlc:al op-
"ratielm n!tiaUY~ m&7 otitJ be l'!>o
ph>td by 1 "'~rty pbnnl.... rani•
,,.Irn ...,,1"',.,;... th• lntt•mal d..r......
pblls.
<L Tu•..t. T'lw ·~ DICe a okter
llliDood !.w &o:DCll raUorn In dlnct
~ toU.. ~of U..ldooloc'
Dpol> Qldl \be l bP!>d, tho hJPb'
IQDtin\ed •-llm'1 m-r aot be ftlnrrable lA>
t•tC>J,.ll&11rb. llelnw th•m. howeur, with on both
tile nrtoCAI pohtJral oJ'II'I'IlluUoa and lhr borl·
1011tal fuDC\Joul J'I'OQP or~U!UUOGO, ~~ .,..
a oumbrt f .-ublrnble u>d! vi4.W. ud puupo.
no.. ~Ole ndlrld=alo ud puupo aa
bot ~ cft"ectiTII;r to bi'Dd!t tho ,.....
~..- ..-.1 to Rdl.-.e ,.u-1 Obj«\\na.
(II /'t011••m• l'11'1Cr&rnl •·hich may I.e
ouH•~~&!ul •ll'ahi.OI lu•ur,enu ""uld
lr~tho.S. l.ht followl1111: thom>M. tlovtal••
theme. •«kiaz 011 dUferw~ I
l •nc ca4ro. ns:Mdta. aupporton, aDtl
tM loeal population, &llti-m«ale
tbcme ouch U ddNta, lad! of 11111'-
port. Uolo\.ioll. hornmct.nna. hanl-
&hipa. •horta...,., ell'., illetral an•l ter•
runabt' ar-uun.s OM-ana ca~Cul nnt \1)
un\e .., ir:nn• whi<h wlll cauao ~~~~
drlliana to .-.r beforo U.~ hmu·
pll1) mat "" aed "' f«m driliaa
t..tlll\1 apiMl OM I:Do:1....m. aa>o
...sty l&eDI!I ....,. be IIISed to exploit
&ll7 ~Y ..,. ~ .,..tJon wblch
may clenlop as a rwult of altltud•
e hat~J'<3, a nt1 re• ardJ ma' tJ. colf•re<l
for ldcct IDSUrrm' Ioden f r •-.ri-
- auDI!L Lrlllmq lhaWd be ....
ftec-.-.1 II)' tM
~ nlher thall
"'"'r11!1lm1u..
aa4 aD of
panaU
f dopWJc ~ of ----=·
nDWO .,J1t. A 11 oucb .,.,.ram& ahoald
I'"I'CC'Piu! lhe clill'o.-.ncu ID olAlla and
orlrio of the illlll......,t.. SJIC'dllt,
.....,. loc>llud ~ ruultiDar
fram nrrft1. ll<nlB~ lnte~
•ill ,.Wid max retum 011 U..
p~ a!med tllY&nh u.. I=Rr·
l[t'li\5 and tbt'!r local IRIPI'Oi'tfn
 (2) ActiQtUl. All media may be used . amn~~l' leall,e~ hf:ie 1;>een found
against insurgents; however, slnee effective when readily available and
they are normally closely controlled easily seerett(l ·by' the insurgent.
and guarded .aiaJnst host govern· 'Every'' etl'olt .• should . be made to
ment proparanda. they are often ·•·· take·:. ail'liatltare'' of iu1y fears whieh
inaccessible to televitsion, . moviea, • · ti\:~·>'Jn8u\ieri'l:s ·~evelop ·or ·Wold ·wlth
radio, and printed media. Neverthe- · 'i-esteet':·,to'' 1f&'e · verilinerit forces,
les.s, many ingenious methods may be ·' ' ' ··'tli4ih·''W'i!iij>O~'·o·l~liy ··aaaiiitanoe the
devised ·to overcome these handicaps ·.1!1 ~Hosit'1eo'ililtey' 'fiil:at'lt'-t>e getting. Addi·
and inerease oommunieation• with .•, ,,, • .'1·:tilblial0 ~lrt:liDiS ·. are' !fiseussed in
the insurgents: Safe ·. oond\ll>t .'<and• ··.'·'' >:Jt(M~y··~ 11'1.f'1!~1: 1 :.·. ·
.~ . .'~f r ~l 1f.'$(~ ~);f) ,lli~·;.~~~·;,t ~~·<•11~::-;';ll,•! '·: ;•
. ,,., '•. /~.;.!>:.• IW\j !·, ·J ~;'f,l :~; tt~i; I)~ ~!i!J:'.l:,•· ••I 1 '1 ; '
Section Ill. S.!JBVIR&M IIM""O.NDAY-Oidi~·Sr,(Nl:ltCADNIZATION
•. , . ,; i : .. •;:.,:·i , ;.l••·$r.'p(.fo~ 1 , ~n ~Rr~f!· · .t.fH':rl i tun: ~i:f.~i"''l'f•i .....
·, !• . ;.,,.. ' "•'"'''' -.ri.J ill!~hf~6llal""liero" "Cli'n ·often be de-
s~~yed ~liT'11 ., j~~~~ (~S'o ~~Ul' '!J •. · ·
In . an insbNerl.'eY·. ihe :~··
1
r-, 11 ~ D~J.J;:[N~ ~ v,ih'lw·: ~. ' r'::. •• ... , • :
idenflfy, sinoe li~ eaiiiiJt' ' .,)>."~~ ·· nj\,J11fptp;nt ,1!llJ~!x,.,h to eon-
oombat . iio~ dOeS lie 'dlkp'ita... . .~~ _.,. .m~.. •. ...
· :.;:,.•~~e'l.::. .t.:.:} f··
...m.s. ·eo ·er. ~.., '<tJ'~~w ..•~-·-IP.?~<r'JiY\ .,q,.,.! ,..e.. population
Pa '"" """'""" - - ~ 1 m ti\!IL~~l'lf@~i•~!ll ;II~~ · ~t served by
externally ciontrolle'd or si)OriSored 'snb~e'rsi~e' th.e · &:9~fiiJU\\tii.B.P~·~~p~d, .P'!r..holog-
lnsurgeneies. 'Thet!e' oorl8i&tenclts, •onee reeog. i~,.\V~~t>~~)9Pi)!g; •,l,\l\tio~s. whose in·
nlzed, enable 'the propagandist to better com- t:ernaMoJII!l;,llq,~li!I!!JI~·-AAvJ!...~n, arbitrarily
bat the threat. The )118J,tl'8'ency Will have cer- e~J1Aia4e4 :..•¢~ ,.;~\If,., ~~!fed powerful
tain recognizable objectives, methods; and or· grop~ .. (~,. C;i,§JlS~"~nd.~ f$1nilies, and
ganizatlons whieh' make its appeal• and false rellgipus.:seet,.,~ ,;VIhi#l JH\·'1~. !?een. eontl'OIIed and
blandishments readily aeeepted and difficult to ~p~te<! kY. ~~ ~li~1H'!HW ·~~~ .~ . a colonial
elimin&te. · power. Ol!te. iD,4~{)ell,~~ce)l~ ..jl~n aebieved
and the former arbl~ ..is, removed from the
48. Svbvenlve Insurgent Psychological scene, the power..balanee ..nw4fly.,sJ\ifts rap.
Objectives · idly. Groups whleh .. h~d be,en 1\el<j.. ln eheek
a. One J>iyeholo~eal objective of the Insur- become free to exp~ their. ~~ntent with
gent is tO convince the10cal populace that local the new power structure. Subvel'8ive insur-
goal..s ·and aspiratio,n.s ·are identical to those of gents look for these psyehologl~al weaknesseS
and vulnerabllltiea to exploit. Timely use of
the !nsurgepi. In its f9rin~tive stares. an in-
sura-ency ,is weajs .~d neej)s to identify itself force!! thus created can f!leilitate tile establish·
with the g<)als. and lll!Pirations 9f the local pop- ment of a new. power balance and lead to
ultimate seizure of POWer by the insurgents.
ulati~il. t:Yl>tc~i the.mes wh~cli have enabled in-
surgencies to . achieve the imap of popular Social, eoon.omie, . PQii,tical, ethnic, .a,nd relig-
ious l)ljnorltl~ a(e typical l[l'OUJ)S whieh should
her<>(lS · ar.e .~ntl-e<?l,ciN~\sm, nat!.onali.sm, and
lane!, reform,_. Br ,,.alj~'1ll' . ~lves wlth
~e . st)fdj~ ~.,..deter.111!ne tb.e 1\ftt~ and ex·
~n,t ..?,f tJle~;fTl!S~~tlPJ!s, .&Jl!l.-1 ~11' ,!Iegree of
poPUlar ~t?iratio,ns•.,1;!\e}: .. g.~~ a num-
ber pt po~itlo,:e -!"'~.OilS .At . whleh dt~~l\r~~Y" ~~~~ ~ M~,,., ~ep,l govern-
~re ~ormed , ~~;oo~~-.~~jr-1 "$ .. · they IJ}fD~ .,~rl',e5~:;;'1-Ff. ,!IWJ ,!P~ffi'!W. fl'!lMps wbieh
are ostensibly ~r,vl~...t~e.,p~,. n , lfNibl of ·~e ~\11!,~.~. ~~w~~,!l!fJ~tfi·Me, ~.fl!t·l Anclud!ng
people. Loel\1 !11l!!!l'~nt,,!,a~f!;l1tlffilally wlll ~~~~ lfl: 'd\J~A'~I\IIItM,~!l~Y.>r workers
not ,adJnit e~te91Bl, .ponll9.~~~ r'~~~ons but ~!\.i,I.\P,y,at2rJJaw&-~ · . f<!l. .>ltJlll women
Will hold.:~P tl)ei,.r .. ip?er!l#o~,,l)ll88AQI\- for the '!!. .t..t:\1!!¥1~ ~~~~ ~ f~'~,s masses
ultimate fr,eedoil) an~. : i)1deP,~pdenc\\ of . the c~,;~ ~FA- ,!tmh;~ .eil,Jit~es an,d
people. By prov.JII&' ,!lXterll!ll .!IPOD~t,'Shl.p, the iclt\91.!\8'11'11 ~,Rit~i!'lu~ ~ir<,e,~'lTh .Immediate,
34

171
 ,1)\ier-elmpllfted anawol'll or releases from their
lml•lnU!on•,
e. A third objective of the Insurgent Is to
eonvlnce the country that the government and
Its leade'rahlp is unworthy of leading the
people. The prewnee of graft. greed, corrup-
nepotlam. aeandal, and inflnlte varieties
faults make it very difficult, If not im-
lo hld a from the lnsuraent propagan-
The Insurgent propagandist will
people f.!ld determine thoee areaa
there are common eomplainta along eeo-
moral, or political ground&. He will
governmental ~pe8'Q&ts on
can vent .t heir feelings. Even
aa drou.r bta, floods, and other
which cre.te anxietie.t and
will be u~ by tho insurgents to
the i'OVernment's Incompetence.
psyeholorical objective of the
la to destroy national morale and
In the government. Once the insur-
are trained 4nd properly organized,
'IIH~·~Jlln rnawlnr Away at the governmentAl
in outlylllg rural or moutiteinou.s
arGU are so remote that the in-
terroristic actlvltie3 deistroy the
11$1):1!1~1~% law and order under the lelr&l ·govern-
lt existed before), and the govern-
do little to provide neeeesary. ufety
undue expenditure of Ita scarce
: ··""''"'" reS<I•Il.re~oa Both the local inhabitAnts
lnaurrent.s reeogni•e the
belpktuneu once Insurgent
been organi!ed and e.rtab!Uhed In
aru.s. It becomes then extremely
llfjl!eO'It for the 'rovernment to reeortahlisb eon-
In the legally constitUted government,
I!NmaJI'lJY becAuse o! sanctions and retribution
ineurrent4 exact from the local
~.!~·~~~~~ the Instant the government forces
Sirna ·of cooperation with the govern-
I
ll~:!!~,"; au~ ~ cause the individual to be
at1er a Hlt-crltlelsnl session. Through
actions the· ruerrlllaa Meg!n expanding
olandeaUne ba&ee using aeleetlve terror
aotll~•to ·create .r.n envlronm~nt of fear, while
that th•· government.. eanoot protect
lle\41e<>ple o~ properly administer the area. By
iliw•tl:•,tl<~tr' the l'neptlt ud6' of t he'' #livem~nt
172
and at the same time plai:ill&' their own shadow
government in every hamlet and village, they
begin takill&' over the admlnlat ratlve func-
tions of government. ·Ultimately, the govern-
ment is left In Its barracl<a and compounds and
the Insurgents and .people are. left to the rest of
the country. National morale or a senae of
unity as a nation-state is virtually nonexistent
at the time of independence, and It is a simple
matter for the lnsur~l:9 to eontlnuousi.Y force
the government to show ita brutal, harab, and
arbitrary nature through ita eounterlnsurrent
't actics. The insurgent eneoura.~ the govern-
ment to create an image of ruthleaneJill by forc-
ing it to carey out lndlscrlmli)ate artillery and
aircraft bomliing of hamlets where Insurgents
have · been supported or by any of the many
other uses of force lo dei.troy the lnsurienta
and their· bases: ·
, e. Another psychological objective of the in-
surgent is· to eonvince_·the wo•·ld and the 'lci<:al
population that tlie motives ot nations &8.111st..
ing the th·reatened ·; government are flllse.
Throua-h ·national and · international . media, the
insurgent will attempt lo malirn ·the motives
of all assistAnce to the local government. Eco-
nomic exploitAtion, neo-colonialism, lftnocide,
and et.pitAii!nl seeking tllw materialS and
markets are some of the numerous theme~~ used
to elicit sympathy and support.
f. Another objective of the in~urgent le to
convince the people that the tnaurgenl:9 will win
the political struggle. Both the tnaurgent and
the government will have this program In
common. Popular support will be aft'orded to
the side .which Ia most likei.Y to win. If the
conlest Js in doubt, the !peOple may be &J)<IIheti e
...;th willing, open support being dlllleult to
gain for either aide. Althourh the side with
the rreatest organizational and leadership
capability will have a decided · advantage. The
insurgents ·have both vertical and hori:ontal
organizations which provide· adminis trative
control. Their horizontal' control organiutlona
provide not only ·for participation, but for
propaganda as well'. Threatened governments,
aa currentlY c'onstituted, ileldoin have· orrant-
zat!ions·which etiUid generate a'-l-olu'ntary &e!IJIG
of· belonging· to the t.~lion, nor' do they- recog-
nize the ·heed for ; the ··))ci~ul~ to be · able· to
exi>resa itself. The government is compelled to not ea~~ily. recoqv~rted to the government eide,
Us.. the older organizations, denying ~heir 11se but must t.e differentiated from the insurgent
to the insurgent. This gives the insQrgent a cadre.
big operunr with the restless youth, women, · 'l' .,.., ··
:::.!~~·~~h;.,;,:::.o~~~~:~::!;:~ ~?- ''~~ly.~ i:)~~~~e~nt Propaga~da
ments use. traditional devices which keep f~!- .•, ,.,.,·~;:l'~at.~ . . ··
ings of frustration alive am<>ng the · i><wHl.l\· "'"fili'Parll\liN.'~Siltiversive irusurgents avoid dis·
tion, and reduce or slow down . th~ .rat'!· ~.t -ellin1itt>.tlita'' Pi'llliQganda In a vacuum. They act
which m<>dernization and de:velopmel,lt .~,k#l ·oll'•'!lllflf''j)te~W' thlit the most effective ·propa-
lrustituted. In addition to t!\is . 1!1!;l!;IUI)·~qJ~»I ll!'&fidll.'ll!'i0lli8ll 'lit an audience which is already
advantage, the insurgen~ i~ ~:r~j)~·1 W.J.ltfl!l ~ly.•.atlli!millti&f' ··'to their cause. The emer.
upon the theoriee w4i~ .~~~~ ~nNwml9.~>>1"#111\~~'.l$.~({(!t~ee · so peychqlogically cap.
by lllarx, Lenin, .and •.~Ml·i 'J;,.e.JH,Ili,>tfl J\IJIII· ltii'f'ed'.llle-s'· llpon' 'th-e prior· creation of an
bra~ the · !'l~V\W1\li~:, 1 9f ,,t,qe,... ~f4!1 ·gM liialpll-~'l!lll~!" '/:lf'''C~titrols: Th!s .is not . \<>
eap•tallsm ...,<t .t\i,~..YJ,~~ .o~,~ - ·~ ~i'tlllfltl~e·lfo'vetnment estabhsh.m ent and
munism, peoples derrioq~i~..~~· . · ~~ ·~a~lon. ~t llil'ge does. not receive ·
they may des!re !0. Rr<>n; ~u _, l!r · 'pn(lti; but rather that tile
terpretatfon of these revohtti9,JW"Y !··!~4¥~· . . ' eicpe*ded against those over.
Selectively exploiting surprise, ambushes, and ,;ho.Di ··tl('~lillve control (whether
trape,. the insurren~ ·leaders ean . tell ' their .t<ltal-ll>r jps~·.AIIt.inae.~:.dlolll'!l of <iarkness)·. ·
forces of great victories; and at the same· time, . . , . , . <!
sin~ t!'ey eontrol their media eloliely, they can ~ 'b:fim~~."~~~~.~ ~.:~ontrols esta~
mi~rruze the effect of ~efeats .. They emph~lze l.l~~.!~,,of,~~~.\,PM§i~,an!l a. psychological
thetr military, econo!Wc, soe1al, and ~litical na~.~e.,.• 1.~ . <;9P~J\Ol.~,,,;lllltw· , ior the subtle
aceo~pilshn:'~nt.~ and either avoid or mter- ble~n.J .-q~ Qo.tb,:;,·P.!llliti¥11 , 8 ppeal.s (such ~
pret negatne 1ssues. Pl:Omlses· of an .ao~~al.,mlstl'ibutlon ·Of land In
u.' Insurgent leaders a1eo attempt to eon- a villap) .and.'negative·aanct>ions :fo~ noneon· ·
vi nee every guerrilla, supporter, and sympa- fonnity, · The sanctions· •l'llli' 'the' ··.gamut of ·
thber that he or she sh<>uld ·be a propagandist. emotional •appeals t'rGnr isolation 'and rejeetl<>n
Schools, propagandist speeches, cultural shows, from certain group activities : to ·seJf-eriti·
books, and radio programs are used to give cism, group accu.sAti61), and group criticism;
the people in · inaurgent controlled areas a eon- to 6-week visits to remote training camps, to
tr<>lled understanding of the situation. How. . death. Unrepentant landlords and usurers are
ever, the real energy. and force for the lnsur- often given the harshest sentences to pi'ove the··
gency comes· from the cadre training programs sincerity oi the insurgent government in. deal-.
where a fanatiecZe'al is· developed; The cadre ing harshly with tho$e w.ho do not hold the :
are l!irhly motivated through a $eries of trau- best interest of the people foremost•.:t'he .Joeal ·
matic training sessions.- Once trained, these
cadre go out to esW>Iish land•'oi"ganize their populati9n ls .of~ri re.qulr~ to ~it. in judgment
home-town regions. Through, ·:the .•a.l'ee'tive use . ln such eases. Wbe,u_ the·,ll~·i~t: of. i'UUty Is
.o f· terror and the threa~.qf ·vlbflince;·tbe ·non- ~nount;ed"'~!-·.j)j!OJ11#1 !'lie· !lAked! if ·the· indi·
believer, Isolated from :llll' group;<suppol"'ls '[l~~~~t sf!9)ll!i: rbe,, i,l'lloll~<b leniency; · thereby
Wlbich would oppose the, tnau~genti eause,, ds ~oWJillK"~'~e,l)ien!rn ~~yole.nt .nature of this
forced lnto compliance . wltht..ins!l>l'~nt.: aims ;;~J!l~'ls .:19..'(~~11\llf.!l~~·.·, Such ,controls ond n·
and objectives. Even nonbelleY.e.r s C)OilJJ>lv..;mtl! ~iv.i_q.HIIlham~.t!!lli'!~l9ed and· lnteneilled ·in a ·
instructions to strike, tMry, and assjat tbro."lrll ~~.,tl\,hiO!\.bf.,the. political oraanizatlon
unsp*en or implle~ ~til.. Throl\8b, Pll<lPt~ <>~ tJte ~ge~, ~~~JI¥,~n•Ul"&'entdeaden insist on
control of media, D!ess&,e'$f!, .and. sij;,).at\ol).$),,.q, $t;-lf!;,0 o~g~~tiQIUI~· ~Pllne .among:'their
vironment, nnmeoous V(IUII)g. supporters can ~0 0n~.l tl>i"·<J;i~~llne ,J..s, es.?lhlillhed,.,thq
fle and Ill'<! elicited. Tl!,ese mlsi.lli<lfld·,P<ic:~Pie.JU"O ~.em~d ·<l!seM>IinB. among..the ·; targe~ ;group.

173
 This .vertical organization ·is one key to effec- people single him out a.s a malingerer. The
tive control and dissemination of propaganda. cadres encourages es.cb individual to extend
It characteristically takes months or ev,.n years his affiliations with other "liberation" groups,
to establish the shadow political organization. thereby increasing his l'I!Sponsibili ties to the ·
At the same time, certain horizontal organiza- point of total absorpton of )).is time in the
tions are formed which act as pro·paganda cause of insurgency, while the cause is never
transmission belts. Both of these two basic committed to the individual. The individual
organizations are responsive to a unified, cen- is closely supervised and criticized 'to the pOint
tral, political command at any ¥~ven level of that he develops a sense of pseudo-paranoia..He
administration (village, district, regional, feels that everyone is watching his every move '
etC.). - and that he is slowly, but surely, being isolated
c. Vet tical Orqa.,iJ:ahon. The primary fune- . and insulated from the funetlonal groups to
tion of the vertical-political organiution is which he formerly belongjld. · !1\'hile this Pro-
to administer both the command system and cess is going on, the organization continuously
the training of. new admlniatrative eacfres. In makes' him eommit bim!!<jJf to the "people's"
an insurgent-controlled; "liberated" area, the cause 11»d persuades him to participate. iti com-
organiiational structure at the vlllage level munal a'ctivitiea, 'Gre.dually, the&e organiia·
would be beaded by tile village party soecretary, tions take over ll)l social, .political, economic,
· assisted · by a deputy secretary. Responsible cultural, and military controls. The isolation
·tothem would be various sUbsections or com- iuld fear generated in the indivldlial makes it
llll but impossible to coll~tively fight· the sys-
mittees · (economic and finance, SEeurlty, edu- tem. . :.
cation, .culture, etc.)·." Cailre · would · fill tb~se
political .posts. They W:ould ll$ten ' to radio e. PuTpo8e: of' tile O,.ga1>izati®. T-he lndl·
. bro11de~sts from Hanoi,' Peking, or other Com- vidual is encouraged to participate, 'always. in
munist sources and 'a dapt the issues di~ussed · an 'atmosphere eontrolled by the skilled agita-
by these sources directly to the local 'issues. tion and propagaiula: cadres. Such'l>articlpatibn
One week the international stress may be on is the real meaning of·"people's democracy'' in
.anti-Americanism; another it may be anti- a "Uberated area.": Olice the vertical and 'hOri-
colonialism. In this Wjly, the local insurgent zontal oi'gt.Dlzations' have been eai'tifUlly 'eatab-
jumps on the ba11d,wagon and benefits from lished, a potent arid controlled arena for inces-
·.news around the wo,ri~·M well a.s from locally sant subversive' propaganda exist$. The vertical
. generated lllus~rationA.an4 P,'TOpaganda. orga11ization replaces ·the. legally constituted
d. Horizontal 0rgi>nizati<>tl8. The ·h.orizontal · government, The .horizontal organl.zations give
organizations are designed to satisfy the the necessary facade of demooracy, for · these
human need to participate. These mti8S in·gani- m~ propaganda organiZI!ti9!l.$ permit the
zations.are organized and controlled by the sulr people ·:to express and discuss their problems,"
V!!rs(ve ir:umrgent ;cadre. Oeca~ionally a r~g­ ~ven solve their' problems, so long a,s there i,s no
nized J'o cal.leader will become titular head of con8ict ,with the insurgent, vertical organiz,.;.
these front organizations to .provide an im- tiona and.· the party cadre.. Theretore, .these
age of popular silpport and participation. The eloae,ly .knl~. ,inte~vined control organizations
ll)Wlt . be,\ ~~nra.veUed and disentangled ·before
mass associations ue design~ to encompass
everyone in •tl\e oommunity" fii\Ci' 'ate · given :,Jlllye}tolorieal. ~J~Uation& personnel can reach
··nameS' which ·imply' 'brotid p'artlelpation .such efl'ective and..susei!ptible target audiences with-
· as: Lfbe'ratio" ;Women,! 'Lib'iiri>UO'Ii' Youth, Lib- in "liberated areas." The beat solution is to
eratiO'I• Fa~-mer8, and Liberation ··Workers. In foresee the•Jl.~!i~m ,nature· of the problem and
a. controlled area, ·initially, everyone'·:mu$1) be- forew~rn the ~I gov.e tnmeut and . as many ,
long to at least one: such· organization; tlie•in- 'Qf the, ):eople e~ P9$8ible 89 that the p.eople wiD
dividual is then .given certain t,.ak& t.Dd respon- kno.w what th~ 11',81. natur e 9( th~ Cboi~ 1$.
eibilities which· h~,ill!ust .accom·p lish in the .;Wheth~r th~ ·~!i~era~ Lareas" ,a;.e lost by poUt-
name. of tire "teople's:~ .Q~p}lizt~tion. If he leal njli~>"e~ 9:· C011Q,uered, by, d0fault, the · paj:.
;l!hirks these, taslq!•. he .,r;n,u.~~ · co)}fesa or have terns: and eonsisten¢iea are.av.ailable tor study.
AGO 5ftoA

174
 APPENDIX B

Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Comic Book (Valentine, Addendum 1)

APPENDIX

Addendum I: Psyops Comic Book:

"PbuJlg Hoang Campaign"
....... (<0.._.. ....,. , .... (jQ diAh
ong 6.t va OUm 01Ch PhW~g
Hotng (M•. •~•• Fuolfr u d clu:
..._..... O pc,..;u,) ,.,.a. .. ,...
k.J...;

-
Captloc 2. SWMUtY: Mt. Ba
Ul6 hn family lin' pR'scr.ll)'
litincin Phong 11wlbt'ilb~.
nut "d• tS aC'rualty pan iJI
1M nali(wu.IIK 1e1Ti1ol)' bur is
«ill infdtrat~ bra ou.mbtr ot
Corrunw::uSt dn:neub; tben-
IUrE, Phnc:na leaden ha'"
taktn m.ili1ary I(U()O apiru.1
l.b.-m. nle)' m.~voo tl"bu·
5i:asc.ic' OC,JOpCnlic)n from 1be
'hllat;ru.• hs 11 tnu11 ot lbi:s,
and ~~~ a..'I:Ufilt' i.nfot.
matioo pro\~ by loo:ll reo-
pit , n.aoy CoolllWOis.l c-.:lr'l:$
b.i\'C: beeo anQ!ed. Tht:K Clf·
C\liUU&OCCi hdp you flilow
1he swry ot Mr. Be'a faouJy.

('..aput~t~ l Tbt CNC:I Com·

m111115U luJI I.MC)CCnl pt(!pk:
-.:.UUI

175
4Jl = Appendi:c
Caplioo ... Followm, is 1be
De'Wl: "'l'h.b mominc •t llitlc:
A.M.., • Lunbtc:na wu ~
up by 1 Commuai$1 mine fi¥t
Uometcn outtide l'lluna
Hiep villqc. Two ch.ildrtrt
•~ft killed, thttt women
"a'OlltiCkd. The Comrrnuiliu
cootioue tOt~ people!..

Capdoo $. " H~.hntt1U.!"

..Wb,. m you ao lite?"
..Jklfo, brotbtr aM ••
ser, J un ~ I am late. I ltf1
early c.his~. bu.t~bad
10 Mop •t
the brider Mause
i1 wu dtstr'O)'fd by • Com·
rmuUst bamb. We btd to wait
for d1e bridte 10 be repairtd
br • mililley ft~JineeMa
unit."

~ 6. ··Mr. e•. you Itt

Nktd lj) .,.,. tum cu eo the
Libcn.tioo FfOIIll"
•

176
 "-"'""=433

Cll)don.7. ''This yew dtt crop

b poor~ bvt tht Communists
&'liD coUeet tueL lt •• -
mble sioatioo.. I haft lard
tbm b much ICCI.lrity m
Pt.u~ Pb.lil Yillase. There
w:es att 001 coiJmtd by the
QlmmWiisu aoy more thulb
10 the Pboc:oix opmtloa. (
woodcr wbytudlatt~
btl DOC 03U:1e tO out ftli9}"
"'Ped!aps bcqvte: . .
boity prvrjdu tbtm 11rith iD-
fOn:nadoo! This aftfti!OOO the
Phoc:na opmtioo qeau
llOSttd • nociot at tilt U!ttt•
~ J will so •nd tct it
I"OIIIarTOW."

Caption 8. ""WhWt .. - ·. my
frictlds?"
"'Thttt art 111>'\'1 clattp:r-
01» Coc:rurwnht c.clm ~
mOW' villltt...

~#- _.
..........
·-----·
~
C.prion ' · Here are the rwo
C:lrw:rn.uUu C:ldru ~ by
tbe Pboteb Opemion., The
watlltd j:Uter . , . : .. Dear
comPMriota, U )'CIU kDow the
~ pba_ ofcbt twoabo'ft-.
named ()wnmupjot caclrc$,
J'!b« DOtify the natloeal ~
lice or die~ £orces.. You
wiD bt mr.-udcd, llftd )'OCit
name .;u be k.tpt wcm."

177
434 = Ap......,.
C.pdM 10.
case says,
Tho"""--
'"Com:pettiots,
pkut hdp yoar ao•a IAIICDt
.,. providinl information in·
dialtinc lht ltidJ:n&; place ol
lWO CoolmuniJIJ, 8a Luoaa
and H.U Oon. You will be: re-
w;vdoed, Uld )WI Dl.tD¢ will
bt kepi iecm:'
'"Did JOU bm that OD tbe
nw.r
.... btw lt ahady. It is
euct)y lhe arne as it bas bceo
pt)Sied OD tbt waU at the lf'l.
ltl1«ticcl of tbe villqe."

Uptim II. "~. tbt~ aruo

IIIlQ)' k:a.tkuJ..

.. ....... ....... \_-"· ~·~·

• ..: •• • Cli
,....,.
• )

Captlcclll. ,.Hooey, wbu do

th.ey MY ill lhMc lcalka?'
'"Tbty art lht Mmt •
lbo6e -upolters, .. wdl as
lhc fliQOI KC mts CCI lbe ~·
dJo JUt~ . Tbe rwo Qlm.~
I:IIUIJisn fb L!JOa8 ""' Hli
Gem 1ft ~ bidirlg ill
our~ in onkf 110 ~
tuet. I ..., ~ 10 re-
pwtao•bc l'llombt()pentiocl
Commit!« b«::ute I bow
their bidiag plaoc."

178
 ~ u. ••Wbeft ate you
soii:IS » c.wly?"'- -
'"I Ul'l JO{nc C<l1bediuricl
headquat1cn 10 report tbc:M.rt
Wht1 haPI>('OCd b$f c-isfu."

CAption 14. "!:>tar Sit, (be

two Comai\U\i$&$10'1 WUU ate'
hiclinf in my ~· TbC')' are
bkllac
Ill die bwle num~
800bymynlbst~
1"bey onl)' fl) N $t .h1. If
JOll fUCCCICd in·~ than,
plette 1t.«p rtJ:f name &ee.rcd"'
'"l'hM!It yea, M.-. &,
)'OW aaullt wW bee ~ JC.
em.'' ('1'bt Phocni1 Opmt-
tioll prorick!l t«Uriiy ud
J)ro'pcricy C<l !he peopLe.)

179
 C.JXiCIII 16. ''The nro Como
mWihtt arc: nry ~I"'Oill.
We CliJl oaly '-'~ peace and
$0CC'IIti(f wbtll lhcy arc ~
Nnd."

CaptiCIII ) 7. ·•Laditt, <b) you

knOW !hat tbt IWO O:Jmmo.
nis1s are crprurtd? P'rorD IWIIJ
oo ow ri1lagt wiD be -.attt.
Thm: will be DO tn0rt liS'!IIIS>
sitl8tloos cr cu c:olleaon.
Tbe Pbocn.ix orutl.ioa is my
efi'tuiyt!..

\
Captioo 1&.. ..Mr. & , 8n.ee
1M rwo Comnw.ni:ns ue •
ru«d. Cut vill.st is •• s-tt·
Too bad they tn ita jail! IC
tbtf MUn:wd lo OUf' ~ide be· "
rorelwld, it could btve bttft
bttttt for lhan!,.
..They are ob«inatt !a-
deed. H~ they I"C'tUt''lied lile
Mr. 1'\w.¥ lftlll'l Lofl3' Dim
""""· ....,. «ruiftty - " '
ba~ miortd tbt JM'H'I•
mmt'• cl.tmeocy. Mt. ~
• OoOW mmited 1rilh hi! (~~m .
ay...

180
181
 APPENDIX C

Lecture Transcript, Edward Lansdale, Military Psychological Operations: Part One

Lecture, Armed Forces Staff College

Norfolk, Virginia, 7 January 1960
By: Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF
(Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense, Special Operations)

MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

I.

In our brief time together today, I plan to introduce you to the Ol.d..est
weapon known to man outside of bare hands -- psychological warfare. ;b-.
bright and bushy-tailed staff officers, you will need to know what _psycholog'-
ical warfare is, how it fits into the scheme of military affairs today, and hbw
to use it most wisely.

u.
First of all, then, what is psychological warfare? It is an action,
usually propaganda, which you take to influence the will of other peopl,e,
usually the enemy, to support the gaining of your military objective in war.

Some examples wUl illustrate this definition: Joshua's use of noise at

Jericho -- and :modern usage, such as bugle-blowing by the Chinese Commu-
nists in Korea. Tamerlane1s piling up the bones of the slam into a huge
pyramid at one conquered city to show to envoys from other cities and
frishtening the:m mto surrender -- and the blackmail of nations by Hitler
with his ne-,.sreel movies of Stuk~Panzer teams in action. The tatooing of
the a.rma of lds ac:4diers by Tran: Hung Dao to stiffen their wUl to defeat Kubla:fr.
Kbizi. - - and such xnodern concepts as, 1'Diake. the world safe for Dexnocracy"
Ol:! •'bl:.tt .F.oQ Fie~. "

182
183
 immediate staff, the Assistant to the Secretary for Special Operatiicms 11¥.
the main burden for this task.

ln the Joint Staff, the planning and staff work of psychological ope~ona
is carried out by the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division of J -5. E#h of the
Armed Services has a staff section for paycholopcal warfare, as part of
operations. ln the MUitary Commands, the J -3 or the G-3 has a staff section:
for psychological warfare.

Remember these m.Uitary psychological planners when you start work-

ing on operational plana. Always include a section in your planninl for paychQ~
lopcal support. We have paid a costly price amce 1945 for neslectins the
psycholopcal part of our operations until recently and let the Communiate' set
way ahead of us. We caunot afford any more neglect.

IV.
Now, let1 a have a brief time with some of today1 s psychological
operations.

Although, as staff officers, you will be concerned mostly with atratepc

planning, it will be more useful to you today if 1 deal with tactical operations.
This should help give you a more baa1c understanding of the weapon. It's not
much good to plan the strategic use of a weapon, if you don 1t know what 1t
can do.

Several weeks ago, Leon Delbecque viaJ.ted Washington and we had a

chance to talk with each other. He is the French Deputy who sparked the
formation of the Fifth Bureau in the French Army and the operations of ita
Revolut:iOii&ry Warfare in A11eria. We agreed that there were many fine
tecbniciana in Paycholopcal Warfare today, that many of the staff officers
m bOtli Anlied Forces wen lon1 on book theory but short on practical appli-
ca.~~. and that the beat paychololical operator is born rather than tramed
\A;_tfdl job.

184
 -- and with, I hoped, a ribald sense of humor. Humor -- bawdy h\IJD.O:I!'t
slapstick, the practical joke, and Olymp1an humor -- all can add the final
touch of practical effectiveneu to a psychological operation.

Not long ago, in England, the Communists inspired an ~a.-American

campaign. Painted letters saying "Go Home Yank" started appearmg on
walls. A bright individual visited these sips and painted m the addition,
"via TWA. 11 The Br1tish were highly amused and the campaign stopped.

The Agit-Prop folks of the Viet Cong Communist Party in North

Vietnam have a macabre sense of humor. About this time last year, they
sent an agent in to poison the food at the prison camp of Phu Loi in South
Vietnam. At the deadline time they had given the agent for his operation,
before he had a chance to report, Radio Hanoi went on the air with simu•
lated outrage against the Americans in MAAG-Vietnam for po1soning a
thousand prisoners at Phu Loi. Later, it was changed to ten thousand.
It didn1t matter that no American had visited the prison at Phu Loi. It
didn1t matter that their aaent had cold-feet at the last moment and failed
to carry out his assignment. Nobody was poisoned at Phu Lo1. Yet, it
was a joke with a pay-off. The workers of North Vietnam contributed days
of free labor, the school students collected funds --for the highly-publicized
"victims"-- funds the Party could use. The Americans in MAAG and the
Free Vietnamese have hardly found this funny. But then, the victims of
bad jokes seldom do. Perhaps, some day, the people in North Vietnam
will also catch on. This is part of manlcind1s hope today.

In 1950, I found myself serving as an adviser to the Philippme Armed

Forces on vanous aspects, including psychological warfare, of their cam-
palp againet Communist Huk guerrUlaa. This was in the lull after World
War D. We had no Psywar oraanizations or training in our Services, so
as a substitute I talked to everyone I could find who had had psywar experi-
ence iii. World War D. I will pass along to you the moat usefulleuon I
J.e•mecl :from them -- a combat concept which they called "The Eye of God. "
U ~ ~ variatiOid. Maybe, some day, yeu wUl remember this in an
BOiii ofineed &Jicl it wUl help you.

185
186
 you mel aoo4·bf ...
f court • the wa1 no 111rian4 Ia the ruka. ' 01-U• ol Ba&tltt
lntrarmlltlClm had coma from may aourcea, ca•eAallJ pal topdatw ewe• tJae
ka. But, tb bi'OW&It li'OID the r Ulullf ataaapecle4 die Hak eqa&4zoo.
would leav theb h14illl plue GD the l'llll. Ao4 dla ...p&c-.. woa14
or1Wla. Who wa1 W1 "triad m cba &Db 7 h . . . of a. CCIIIl....
1 w 1
IDlCllO\ll
1 a ret aemy •PY? ODe or more fJI. llw caaandn
q ok kaDI roo court would be Wd .... tile eupec
a--.. ••
Jadl.. plbr
au d. Thu•, aome iDfoi'DlatlOD adroitly ued, waal4 I»I'IDI a1lold
Wilber of ca•ualtiel u could a campaay of tnopa ia iii'''*~ Opt.
v.
Now, it l• time to clo•e tbi1 little talk. I bape it baa awlllauMS ~
reat ill mllltazoy plycholoalcal operatiald. If 1.t baa, dlere &l'e __,.
book• em the 1ubject from which you can leam more. Olle t. zudl17 •
to you u4l• well worth reactiDa. It la &be Azm'/ l'leld ~~~a~Nat•
eycholoalcal Warfare Operati=• 11, FY 33-5, aD4 ccmt.Uu maD'/ tdau
4 deacrtption• of technique•.
But, U you don1t have time to read, tbell pleaae rememlMr eaaa.tldlll
the talk thl• moZ'DlDa. You ucl eve~ other military mD ba tlae rn
o ltl S.l the tal'aet of aome of the moat eldlle4 ;pa~al att.ack
4 hal eve» aeen. U the Commumebl deem t1l:liJ attack WOZ'IIl •• YerJ
U of thebt I'IIOURII •• in talented manprwer .ad q e ..... •• tJMa
t 'b tporut of tbil powerful weapcm wileD yaa plaa tbe • • of r•cna
t • Be alen to the. fact that lt u:Uta. Jacbld• it Ia .._. pa
aa &I at.U offlcel'l. Oil the •tall with ycm wUl be a eecdaD . . . . . .
---~~~ &l'fal'lo !At thUD. iD OD. 'JG'U plmml... tD c - . ap
l' th paycholopcal aupJIOI't of tile ......._ Ia
fiDe eapGD Jd.ch e baft ~ tDO
hup ua ac1tieYe CIID.Z' ..uGDal ob,lec:..,• •

187
 APPENDIX D

Lecture Transcript, Edward Lansdale, Military Psychological Operations: Part Two

folk , Vir pm a
- Arm ed For ce• Staf f Col le1e , Nor
~eeDU:·e
Mu ch 196 0
Col one l Edw ard G. La:o.adale
e
Off ice of the Sec reta ry of Def ens

RAT IOM S: PAR T TW O

WL ITA RY PSY CHO LOG ICA L OPE
I.
I 1av e
baa bee n pe n a cop r of the talk
I ba.Ye bee n told tha t eac h of you ly an iDtr oda ctio :D ~th e sub ject
the lut cla8 8 m Jan uar y. The
talk wu real
aom e
loai cal ope rati ons ", aketcbi.aJ ill. aam e defi Dit: loDs ,
"mi lita. .ry pay cho cea •ful
·-··....- - bow we are oraa .niz ed
to ope rate , and de•c ri'bJ Da one auc
IGJieZ'atiiD& tech niqu e for com
bat.
hap s
lut talk 1ecl me to c:GDClude tha t per
Qle atio na by the claa a afte r the y wou ld be to
the mo at help ful thin a I cou ld
do in our brie f tim e to1 ethe r toda rati ons .
aide of the ope
than the orga niza ttoa al
&c :a.a 'bow to ope rate ", rath er u brip at and bue hy- tail ed
l ope rato r•. The a,
So I wil l talk to you aa pote ntia er wha t a pyc hol opc al ope rati on
miJ ht rem emb
ata & ol&.c:era in the futu re, you
with yoa .r •taf f plan nfn l•
~ a.-- and be bet ter able to fit it in
oper atic maJ rale a. The n, I wil l Jive
Tod ay. I wil l ske tch in the bui c ahoW.d
aga inat the Comm111118ta. The one
.,._ aom .e cu e hist orie s of ope rati ons
~yam zem emb er the
oth er.

n.
wea paa , uid e from
war fare ia prpb ably maa a old e•t
1
,~17,!C~Loattc1al iYe w~ or in the
it in toda y'• dirt y, littl e, aec:~:et
emb er D tha t it ia a weapcm--a:o.d that a
Jlllif..:iiiJQ~~l~ thin g to l'em
mdq ue use ~ ita own effe c:t.

188
189
 v.

The third rule is to put acrou your idea in an unders~dable way tp

people you want to have react. What they will react to is not neceuarily
you react to. There is no sense in printing leaflets for p.e,ople who can•
:read., in using precocious ideas which might be diverting at a cockta!l
but which shrink to nothing under primal needs, in assayil;lg the terro.ris-
superstitions of jungle or rice paddy in terms of a Pennsylvania fa:r_myard,
trellardllaiiS of how close these seem to you as a foreigner. Get your activating
across in terms and in a way that the receivers wUl understand, accept,
react in the way yotl desire.

VI.

~ a footnote to these three basic rules, remember humor--even :if it

is a grim practical joke that oDly you can afford to smile at. Humor is often
the test of a good psychological operation, since humor is constructed on the
~ailfi;ea of mankind--and skilled playing on these frailties increases the
eflectiven4!1SB of the psychological weapon. Those of you who knew Admiral
Ji4iles 1 operations in China should recall the nsks his Chinese agents took to
wall-~t slogans poking fun at the Japanese. In some instances, the main
motiv.ation of volunteers who risked death doing this was the appeal of playing
& prJUik<.

vn.
remember and honor
Psychological opera-
say one thing earnestly, and then prove that
acJ,:ilif otherwise. There are times when troop
•:i'Y;1 ~~"l~{il.Y• J""e discipline, w.ill speak far more i.oudly
There is no sUbstitute for Uving your beJ.iefS.

190
 1 tbaae vUJ.a.Je%8. that fht. .PNi-~
ll_le<llkel~•• leafl.e\11 1 aad bZM dcaat ll do ia tel1•n
ita &l.. Ulii p by'-~~~~~~
.... their &iea cl- .,. . . the athe r .we p:mv ed
So, iJ1• tim• to .... ~
ow. hen l . . . •taztiDal to mua trate al~eady.
T~ aU c.aae em
cue hiato :n.ea . Thu e 'Will be DeCe aaazi ly brief .
.J' by miU tuy men of the F:r.ee Yo~ld.,
I'P~K"•LQ,_. apiD .at the Comm UD18 t eDeiD

vm.
The firat two an datec1 m the F.dl of 19M .
the nonh of Vi.et um.

The Bacg .roun d. An umil dice1 batm to WI

ae the Gend 'a ,Aare~enl
lh •~· The Aare emen t a'pllt
o£ 19M . had elide d the 8-ye u F:raa co-V ietmb
llel. the DOrthe~ gohr.g to the
Vietn am into two count ri.ea at the 1'ftll Para
Free VietD amea e • .Az:m ed for~ea,
Comm :mda t Vietm inh1 the aouth ezD.t D the
were to be evacu ated to their
whic h bad been. m cCIIdlic:t thzoa ahou t the co~,
~eapecti.ve ueu acc.o zdbaa tD a detai
led plaD. eDdin g in 300 days , in May 1955 .
acite to vote on the futu.ee of
In J'liD.e 1956 . the VietD amea e waal d hold a plebi
:thm cO\JD.tq'•
what the Comm UDia ta had
The PZQ bl.-: Refle cti.Ye thnng bt wu pvea to
stice . One coucl uaion wu that thay expe cted
in m1:D.d wheu tiler dicta ted thill armi
llel split Vietn am to give
tp -.lathe~- ple!U cite in 1956 . The -17th Para
~ Qem mmi• ta tJur ~o~ of the
popa latiaa aDd Com mwd at contr ol meth ods
o~ to them . .A. the Free Vietn ames
e
~ that~ Wblll d be laY
11 Thld , it wu impe rativ e to shift
IIJD. ~une 19561 we c:nmn rit B111C1c1e.
:Ql8 In the North to the Free South .
~·~·~&am the Cown mnnia t CCJilb
caa..a JIIIjlft lJ'1 neaz ly Z-mm iOD. peop le would .:have to move . The
·..:~;fa'f!!f.1ij:r:(~-~~~ liD make peop le wllaa
e famil ies had been on the same land for
.allli blaw a 1aDil mDODB atran gera many hund reds of

191
vW.ase. hinta of aexual relaticma iJDpo~~ecl aa the wam.ea. and fiDall.y, a C~eae
UDit D&me. The end cancl11J1101lWoald be that the hated Chlneae. in tbia c.aae
the Communiat CbiD.eae. really controlled the pappet Vletminh and had alz:e&dy
moved a Chi.Com di.Yiaion into a Yilla&e north of Bau.ol. IIDd. were actmslike
juat the brute• the people expected them to be. Memorlea ol Chinen occupa-
tion in 19.&5 were freah. The rumors took hold hec•u•e they were jut what
the people expected. Several weeks afte:rwazda. s.aol Hal Duong. and
Haiphong were buaaial with reporta ol the preaeace of 3 to 5 ChlCom divi•io.na
in Vietnam. People had aimply embelliahed the G-5 rumor operation- in the
re-telliD&.

The blac:k operation waa ~ed upaa a fake VletmiDh leaO.et. The leaflet
waa moat coaviacms. It appeared to be frGID the aecret Vletmiah aecurity
orsaniu.tioa in Haacn--ia l&Jl&11&1e1 in local prial:ing. ill local paper in tone.
It asked the local iahabitanta to reuuuam Hanoi, reaaaured that there would
be an orderly take-over bJ the VietmiDh. ukecl ruideata and ahopkeepera to
inventory all personal belongiuaa, told bow to liat theae properly, iacluding
money, and then became cwerly reaaauriJa& tbat the CammUDiata would reapect
these peracmal belon&inl•· Q( ccnarae. tbi.a reaaaaras.ce •parked the recollec-
tion that the CommUDiats sure u hell dida't respect peraaaal property. The
effe.ctiveneaa of thia black leaO.et and ajm,)ar on.ea, wu aa.c:h that the Vietminh
used radio broadcasts to dea.oaa.ce theua u fakes. However. the leaflets were
ao true to style tbat moat of the Commnni•ta maida llaDoi. laqhed at these
broadcuta, thlnldnl they were aecret French or Yiebaauleae efforta to dis-
credit the Party'• work, and the leaO.eta remabaed effective for weeks.

The third example ia datecl ill late 19.54. The place is Cochin-China,
hundrecla of mllea aoatb. of Hauai.

The bac:Jqc~ is much the aam.e u pven ill the first two examples.
ODl.y, tblli tlm.e1 It cODCe:nd the YletmlDh forces wJd.c:h were ill the South or
VietDam, aDC1 whD woald. have to be ..acaat.ed by Camm.UDiat ahipping to
la1at:DW1h te:rdtozy 110zth. of the 11th PanD.el. Paliah aldps were used for
.,.,_Jdnl the Ytetmiah iMHaJJy at Cap St. J'acqaea. A 1070k at these
~ed that t1uly weze Americall Lilaerty aldpa pea. tD the Sovieu
,~~~« ~ n mut appaz_tiad:J' :aat patnteoJ e.ce tlurT tea u.s. •hi~
a xa8.ly. l:itawplala loak. .ADil. at the aame time, the
~-.o11-:"'...~..-.thlit tlte U.S. Ravy. 1111111 al:'llar Free Wo.rld Navies,
IP<I!"•!It.-.aeailft1D nfa&aea &am tile Hozth.. The iDitlal
~it.:.tl!!•~~~~·'llb waa ID dlarp tJaat these a....t force•
~~-~~---._ tut•apoz:ta. Let m.e remark
, . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .h--mul jdt

192
193
194
195
196
 Anc1 thirdly, note that each operation fi~ed into local acceptJW :e-.om
tone, in ita me11aae . and in the medium used.

One final point ahould be made. The Allan men who carried ou~ theae
opel'ation a were dedicated patriots. They had to be, because in these and
abnllar operation s, they pledged their lives toward• the aucce11 of w;bat
they did-- without expectati on of reward other thaD having a coun~ry m wbM:h
thell' cbUdnn could grow up u free men. This, too, is our bond ol. brothflr-
hoocl with them. It prompt• me to conclude tbi1 talk wUh a peraonal obaer-
vatlO»I the belt American p1ycholo glcal operator s I have known have had a
deep aplritual kinship with our unpaid Continen tal troops at V8lley: Fo.rge,
wlth the men on both aides in the Sunday morning woods at Sbiloh, and, yea,
with the "Thomaa itea 11 of thia century, the teachers sent by the War Depart-
ment to 1tart free public schools througho ut the PhUippin es, often at risk of
llfe. Tbia kinship carries them past the pitfalls of a pragmati sm which is
merely ahallow aelfishne aa--and keeps them atune to the far deeper, moving,
tJ'Ue objective s of the American people. These are the objective s which
wanQly bond together the freedom loving people througho ut the world and
are the great strength which gives meaning to all of our actions bringing the
eventual defeat of the Commun ists.

197
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