G.R. No.

L-65935 September 30, 1988

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUÑGA JR., respondents.

Labaguis, Loyola, Angara Law Offices for petitioner.

Juan C. Navarro, Jr. for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, Filinvest Credit Corporation implores us to declare the nullity
of the Decision 1 dated September 30, 1983 and the Resolution 2 dated December 16, 1983 of the
Intermediate Appellate Courts 3 (now Court of Appeals) which were allegedly issued with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, and with patent denial of
due process. 4

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: 5

This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS
Machineries Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a passenger
minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, 1978 and for which
he executed a promissory note (Exhibit "B") to cover the amount of P62,592.00 payable monthly in the
amount of P2,608.00 for 24 months due and payable the 1st day of each month starting May 1, 1978
thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980. On the same date, however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him
in favor of the Motor center, Inc. (Exhibit "A"). The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment was assigned to
the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of the plaintiff. Nestor Sunga claimed that on
October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit
Corporation upon orders of the branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los Santos, without any receipt, who
claimed that he was delinquent in the payments of his vehicle. The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC
(Exhibit "Y") and after proper verification from the office of the Filinvest, the said vehicle was
recovered from the Crisologo Compound which was later released by Rosario Fronda Assistant
Manager of the Filinvest, and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of the compound. The police blotter of the
Integrated National Police of Dagupan City shows that Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the
153rd PC Company sought the assistance of the Dagupan police and one Florence Onia of the Filinvest
explained that the minibus was confiscated because the balance was already past due. After verification
that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia admitted it was their fault. The motor vehicle was
returned to the plaintiff upon proper receipt.

After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision 6 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows, to wit:

(1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to pay the plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. the
following damages, to wit:

(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00

(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
(c) Actual damages 500.00
(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00

(2) And to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied with the aforecited decision, the defendant (petitioner herein), interposed a timely appeal
with the respondent court. On September 30, 1983, the latter promulgated its decision affirming in toto
the decision of the trial court dated July 17, 1981, "except with regard to the moral damages which,
under the circumstances of the accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00." 7 As the reconsideration of said decision proved futile in view of its denial
by the respondent court in its resolution of December 16, 1983, the petitioners come to us thru this
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner alleges the following errors: 8

It is a patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and a bare denial of petitioner's
constitutional right to due process of law, when the respondent Court completely ignored the assigned
errors in the petitioner's Brief upon which private respondent had joined issues with petitioner.

In resolving the appeal before it thru matters and questions not raised at the trial or on appeal, by either
of the parties, respondent Court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion.

When the respondent Court granted private respondent MORAL DAMAGES in an exaggerated and
unconscionable amount, respondent Court exceeded the bounds of its discretion, amounting to an
absence or lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent Court had NO authority to increase the award of DAMAGES to private respondent when
the latter did not appeal the decision because private respondent considered the judgment (questioned
by petitioner on appeal) as "perfect", "sound" and "wise" (at pp. 17 to 20, Brief for Appellee).

In relying upon a BILL pending before the Batasan Pambansa to buttress its judgment, the respondent
Court acted contrary to law and jurisprudence, making of its judgment a NULLITY.

The extensive citation and adherence by the respondent Court on (sic) its decision in the case of
"Edilberto Rebosura, et al. versus Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, December 17, 1983"
(which is non-doctrinal and under question in the Honorable Supreme Court) is not warranted in law
and jurisprudence, and amounts to a grave abuse of discretion.

The various assignments of error may be synthesized into the sole issues 9 of. Whether or not the
respondent court a) in allegedly ignoring the various assigned errors in petitioners brief; b) in resolving
issues not raised at the trial and on appeal; c) in increasing the amount of moral damages; and (d) in
adhering to its decision in Edilberto Rebosura et al. vs. Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, as
well as to Batasan Bill No. 3075, which is yet to be enacted into law, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Contrary views are espoused by the parties in this case. Petitioner maintains that it was patent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and a bare denial of the petitioner's constitutional
right to due process of law, when the respondent court completely brushed aside the assigned errors in
its brief. 10 It asserts that the constitutionality of the contractual stipulation between the parties
embodied in the documents denominated as Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage was not in issue in
the court a quo and neither was the same raised on appea 11 and therefore should not have been passed
upon based on the premise that the appellate court should not consider any error other than those
assigned or specified. 12 Further, it submits that the controversy on appeal is capable of adjudication on
other substantive grounds, without necessarily treading into constitutional questions. 13 It is also the
petitioner's submission that the increase in the award of moral damages from the P30,000.00 adjudged
by the trial court which was not appealed by respondent Sunga who felt that the award was "perfect,"
"sound," and "wise," to a "whopping P50,000.00" imposed by the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) amounted to a grave abuse of discretion. 14 Thus, the increase in the
award which the respondent appellate court justified by the accounting error committed by the
petitioner, should not be countenanced, as the same had no legal basis. 15 It rationalizes that the
respondent court's invocation of a pending bill in the legislature, Batasan Bill 3075, to support its
decision, is untenable. 16 Lastly, it deposits that Rebosura is riot on all fours with the case at bar and
therefore adherence thereto was misplaced, 17 citing the following distinctions: 18 1) In Rebosura,
there was unlawful entry while in this case, there was none; 2) in the former, the plaintiff did not breach
the contract whereas in this case there is a finding by the court a quo of such violation; 3) in the former,
the contract was denominated Deed of Sale with Reservation of Title, while in this case, the contracts
referred to are the Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage; 4) in the former, the defendant Oropeza
was an unpaid seller while the plaintiff Rebosura was the buyer, whereas, in this case, the petitioner is
the promissor-mortgagee while Sunga is the promissor-mortgagor; 5) in the former, there was no notice
of delinquency and repossession, whereas, in this case, there is notice and demand; and 6) in the former,
the contract was in fine print, whereas, in this case, it is not so.

On the other side, the private respondent maintains that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion,
stressing that a careful reading and understanding of the assailed decision would manifest that all
assigned errors were resolved, citing portions of the decision which dealt specifically with each of the
errors assigned. 19 He maintains that the award of moral damages, impeached as exaggerated and
unconscionable, is justified by the prayer in the appellee's (respondent Sunga's brief, to wit: FURTHER
REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE
PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR. 20 Lastly, the private respondent submits that the references to
Batasan Bill No. 3075 and Rebosura were mere passing comments which did not in any way detract
from the validity of the assailed decision. 21

After carefully considering and weighing all the arguments of both protagonists, we hold that the
respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral
damages and in granting litigation expenses. In those respects, the petition is granted and to that extent
the questioned decision is modified.

There is no gainsaying that the plaintiff-appellee (respondent Sunga did not appeal from the decision of
the court a quo which awarded him the sum of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. "Well settled is
the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not
himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones
granted in the decision of the court below." 22 Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well
settled rule when it increased the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00,
notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court,
an act indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Certiorari lies when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. 'without jurisdiction' means that the court acted with absolute want of jurisdiction. There is
"excess of jurisdiction" where the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same or acted without
any statutory authority Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phils., 182; Salvador Campos y CIA vs. Del Rosario,
41 Phil., 45). "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 83.) or in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Talavera-Luna vs.
Nable, 38 Off. Gaz., 62). 23

Or, as held in the recent case of Robert Young vs. Julio A. Sulit, Jr., 24 "(F)or certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of civil law and common law tradition."

We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair
amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances." 25 Be
that as it may and in amplification of this generalization, we set the criterion that "in the case of moral
damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the
trial court ... . Moreover, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the
injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels ... ." 26

There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries
Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is entitled to moral damages due to the unwarranted seizure of the
minibus Mazda, allegedly because he was delinquent in the payment of its monthly amortizations,
which as stated above, turned out to be incorrect. 27 No doubt such intent tainted private respondent
Sunga's reputation in the business community, thus causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Considering, however,
that respondent Sunga was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three days, that is, from
October 21, 1978 to October 23, 1978, possession of which was restored to him soon after the
accounting errors were ironed out, we find that the award of moral damages even in the sum of
P30,000.00 is excessive for it must be emphasized that "damages are not intended to enrich the
complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured
parties have undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. In other words, the award of moral
damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and
therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted." 28 Moreover, "(M)oral damages though
not incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 29

It behooves us therefore to reiterate the caveat to lower courts "to guard against the award of exorbitant
damages that are way out of proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case and which time
and again, this Court has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the
assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced restraints and measured objectivity. 30

We do not agree with private respondent's argument that the increase in the award of moral damages is
justified by the prayer in its brief, to wit: FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST
AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR. Such statement is
usually extant in practically all pleadings as a final statement; it is rhetorical flourish as it were and
could not be a substitute for appeal as required by the rules for "the appellee cannot seek modification
or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief, unless he has also appealed therefrom." 31

With regard to the award of litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00, the same is hereby disallowed,
there being no price for litigation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to
P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation expenses is ELIMINATED. The rest of the judgment is
AFFIRMED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan
City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City
Government of Caloocan.
ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of
garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the
residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped
everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992,
this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of
the leachate3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams
could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.7
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop
and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among
the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at
the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the
problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA
issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its
Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate,
Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA,
the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the
people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the
time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the
pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that
under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by
the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598
with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr.
John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the
foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from
dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders
of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer
for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the
aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan
City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the
Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition,
required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within
ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from
exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12,
1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent
motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the
respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is
therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the
respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately
set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted
or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference
was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the
Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and
review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a
rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days
from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease
and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development
Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the
said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary
restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to
cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was
lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in
conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of
this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made
an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by
the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now
docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of
Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper
interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order16 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise
ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment
and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the
question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to
question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of
the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On
the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of
Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended,
the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers
and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of
1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and
its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions
and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for
the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit
issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or

instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above
provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial
functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution
of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its
nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does
the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority
to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin
authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and
welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by
exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive
Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers
and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized
in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority,
the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for
the development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction
under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open
dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a
clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project
was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting
among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and
LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue:
Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop
dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation
of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,23 cannot be stamped as
an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA
to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution."24 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to
the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly
was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake
to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when
the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred
by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not
necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.26 In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist
order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27
the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease
and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the
1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment.
This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."28 It is to be borne in mind that the
Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure
under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and
its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the
City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute
"necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private
sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases
which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad
powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to
issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related
issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July
19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from
dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA, SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ,

AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION),
EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed PEREZ, respondents.

Romulo A. Deles for petitioner.

Jose Valmayor for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

A joint decision was rendered in CAR Case Nos. 827, 828 and 829 of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations stationed in San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) because the six plaintiffs who are the
petitioners at bar all alleged that they are share tenants of the defendants; that the defendants diverted
the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their
great damage and prejudice: and that they were told by the defendants' overseer to vacate their
respective areas for they could not plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They prayed that they be
declared as leasehold tenants and that the defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees and different
kinds of damages.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:

WHEREFORE, coherent with the foregoing, this Court, in judgment, hereby:

1) Declares all the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases to be maintained as agricultural lessees in
peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings;

2) Prohibits defendants from closing and/or disrupting the free flow of water supplying plaintiffs'
landholdings;

3) Declares the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 23, 1982 to be permanent;

4) Orders plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms in the fixing of their
lease rentals;

5) Orders the defendants to pay all the six plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases individually moral
and exemplary damages in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, each;

6) Orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00; and

7) Dismiss all other claims and counterclaims of the parties for lack of merit (Rollo, pp. 28-29.)

The defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which in turn rendered the following
judgment:
WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects,
with costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 37-38.)

In this petition, the prayer is for the reinstatement of the moral and exemplary damages and the
attorney's fees which had been awarded by the trial court on the ground that the Intermediate Appellate
Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in eliminating them.

In awarding damages and attorney's fees, the trial court said:

This Court has likewise noted the manifestation submitted by plaintiffs on June 3, 1982 wherein they
have attached photographs of their dried-up landholdings and wilted palay crops. The allegations in this
pleading and the accompanying pictures were never rebutted by the defendants.

In view of this circumstances, this Court holds the opinion that between the period of the inspection by
the PC Team on February 24, 1982 and June 13, 1982 when plaintiffs' manifestation was filed, there
has been complete closure of water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings which resulted to the drying up of
the same that greatly hampered the healthy growth of the palay crop. This Court does not believe that
the disruption of the water supply which led to the very poor harvest is due to the fault/negligence of
the plaintiffs.

Under the law, the landowner has an obligation to keep the tenant in the peaceful and continuous
cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of possession, such as the act complained of, is violative
of the law.

The Honorable Court of Appeals, thru Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, in June 23, 1982,
promulgated a decision in the case of Buenaventura Garcia, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Eduardo Jalandoni,
Salud Garcia and Chester Garcia, defendant-appellees, which ruling is relevant to the above-entitled
cases when the said Honorable Court state:

The law forbids the use of tenants like balls on a pool table, whacked and volleyed and pocketed at the
whim and caprice of the player, or their positions placed on the auction block like slaves to be sold to
the highest bidder. Such a calamitous situation erode wholehearted dedication to the soil; it is
destructive of the system itself, as such an attitude takes away the freedom the emancipated tenants
won under the aegis of the New Republic.
The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and exemplary damages in
the further sum of P5,000.00 to be paid by defendant Eduardo Jalandoni. Let this be a warning to those
who flout the lofty purpose of the agrarian reform program.

Plaintiffs have all their legal rights to protect their interests under the law in filing these cases, for what
the defendants have done to them, and as such they are entitled attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 27-28.)

Upon the other hand, in deleting the questioned award the Intermediate Appellate Court said:

However, We are not inclined to sustain the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees. There is no evidence showing that, in dealing with plaintiffs, defendants acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. There is no showing either that attorney's fees are recoverable under Art:
2208, Civil Code. (Rollo, P. 37.)

Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a measure of moral damages.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of
the same code and the latter stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them
vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the
latter by the unjustified diversion of the water.

The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants acted in an oppressive
manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)

It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's fees but the size of the
fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound discretion of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the decision under review is modified and each of the plaintiffs
is entitled to the following to be paid by the defendants jointly and severally:
Moral damages — P1,000.00

Exemplarly damages — 500.00

Attorney's fees — 1,000.00

P2,500.00

The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA,
JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL,
and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said
petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six
per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph
6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the
rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic),
bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines
had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate
the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
— usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of
the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and
noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations
as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the
full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of
the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute,
on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION,
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof,
they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and
purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American
Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III, SACHA DEL ROSARIO, JOSE
P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z. RODRIGUEZ, and ENECERIO MONDIA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Pelaez, Adriano & Gregorio Law Office for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari 1) respondent court's decision which sets aside the order
of default rendered by the trial court and 2) respondent court's resolution dated April 18, 1986 denying
petitioners' (plaintiffs-appellees' therein) motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration
of its decision. 1

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a public nuisance
with damages against defendant (private respondent herein). After being granted four (4) extensions of
time to file an answer, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on February 27, 1981 upon the
ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant case and for lack of cause of action.
However, the motion was denied by the court on April 3, 1981, a copy of which decision was received
by the defendant on April 23, 1981. On May 5, 1981 defendant filed a motion for reconsideration
which motion was denied on July 7, 1981.

Instead of filing an answer, petitioner filed with Us in G.R. No. 57593, Daytona Construction &
Development Corporation vs. Rodriguez, et al. a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review, but it never filed one, prompting Us to issue a resolution dated October 5, 1981 informing the
parties and the trial court that no petition for review was filed within the period that expired on August
15, 1981.

Upon motion of plaintiffs, the court declared the defendant in default on November 4, 1981, and
authorized the plaintiffs to present evidence ex-parte. Upon learning of the said order, the defendant on
November 9, 1981 filed a motion to set aside the order of default and a motion to admit answer with
counterclaim which motions were denied by the lower court in an order dated November 23, 1981.

On June 30, 1982, the court a quo rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and against defendant, its
dispositive portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the operation of the cement hatching plant of the defendant corporation as a nuisance
and ordering its permanent closure;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr. the amount of P250,000.00 as
moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal damages;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III the amount of P200,000.00 as
actual damages, the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal
damages;

4. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff SACHA del Rosario the amount of P20,000.00 as actual
damages, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal
damages;

5. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Zenaida Z. Rodriguez the amount of P100,000.00 as
actual damages, the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal
damages; and

6. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 63-64, Record on Appeal)

In an order dated July 9, 1982, the trial court upon motion of plaintiffs granted execution pending
appeal it indeed appearing as alleged in the motion that the continued operation of the cement batching
plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health and property."

On July 23, 1982, defendant filed a petition for relief which was however denied by the lower court.
On July 29, 1982, defendant filed a petition for injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court which
found the petition unmeritorious. 2 The appellate court promulgated on October 5, 1983, a decision
denying due course to defendant's petition.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Appellate Court, defendant went on appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 66097) which, after the submission of plaintiffs' comment
and defendant's reply thereto, denied its petition for lack of merit.

The petition for injunction having been denied by both the IAC and this Court, defendant pursued the
remedy of appeal in respondent IAC, assigning the following errors.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED APPELLANT IN DEFAULT DESPITE

THE FACT THAT ITS FAILURE TO FILE ITS ANSWER ON TIME WAS DUE SOLELY TO THE
NEGLIGENCE OF ITS COUNSEL AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS
THAT IT HAD FILED COULD HAVE VERY WELL STOOD AS THE ANSWER OF THE
APPELLANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
AND WHEN IT RENDERED JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT AGAINST THE APPELLANT ON
GROUNDS AND/OR BASIS NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST THE
APPELLANT.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IN
THE FACE OF THE REASONS PRESENTED TO IT AS BASIS FOR SUCH RELIEF.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN DESPITE THE APPEAL HAVING BEEN DULY
PERFECTED, IT DETAINED THE CASE WITH IT AND THEREAFTER, ISSUED AN ALIAS
WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WITHOUT APPROPRIATE PRIOR NOTICE TO THE
APPELLANT. (pp. 1-2, Appellant's Brief)

On March 21, 1986, respondent court promulgated its decision, the decretal portion of which is as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another one entered,
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and thereafter, to render judgment
accordingly.

No pronouncement as to costs.

Notice of respondent Court's decision was received by plaintiffs-appellees thru counsel on April 3,
1986. Plaintiffs filed on April 15, 1986 a motion for extension of 30 days from April 18, 1986 or up to
May 18, 1986 to file a motion for reconsideration. However, on May 10, 1986, they filed a 24-page
motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on April 23, 1986, defendant's opposition to the motion for extension and counter-motion
to enter final judgment were received by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs countered with a reply filed April 29,
1986. (Annex "C-2") Plaintiffs' counsel was surprised to receive on April 24, 1986, respondent Court's
resolution dated April 18, 1986, denying the motion for extension. Plaintiffs requested respondent
Court to treat their aforesaid reply filed on April 29, 1986 as a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution of April 18, 1986, received by them on April 21, 1986, the request being contained in their
opposition dated May 22, 1986, to defendant-appellant's motion to strike out the said opposition
attached thereto as Annex C-3 " Neither the motion for reconsideration (converted from the reply filed
on April 29, 1986) nor the motion for reconsideration of the decision itself was acted upon by
respondent court.

Hence this petition to review, petitioners alleging that "Respondent court's challenged resolution
purporting to deny appellees' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is a
nullity because the decision in Habaluyas v. Japson case, 3 solely relied on by the said resolution has
been made by the Supreme Court to operate prospectively and thereby rendered inapplicable to parties
situated as petitioners are, in order precisely to spare them from unfair and unjust deprivation of their
right to appeal."
In Our resolution, promulgated May 30, 1986 in the Habaluyas case itself (G.R. No. 70895), We set
aside the original judgment therein, thus:

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

In the case of Gibbs vs. Court of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for
certiorari and ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the judgment
within the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect, and, consequently, the record on appeal
was allowed. The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration could not be granted.

In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 178), a
division of the Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement that a motion to extend the
reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not authorized or is not in order.

The Intermediate Appellate Court 4 is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been dismissed on
the basis of the original decision in this case.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved
that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied
prospectively from the time herein stated The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their
fight to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly
prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. ... (pp. 3-4; Resolution dated May 30, 1986 in G.R. No.
70895; emphasis supplied)

This Court further elucidated:

1). Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion petition for new trial or reconsideration
may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (p. 4, emphasis supplied)
The above new rules are made effective no earlier than June 30, 1986. In the instant case, respondent
Court's decision was received by plaintiffs on April 3, 1986. Plaintiffs or petitioners herein filed on
April 15, 1986 a motion for extension of 30 days from April 18, 1986 or up to May 18, 1986 to file a
motion for reconsideration. On May 10, 1986, plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time was not intended for delay but upon showing of good cause, to
wit: "for lack of material time due to heavy pressure of work on the part of petitioners' counsel
presently taking charge thereof, what is more the counsel handling this case was doing so for the first
time in substitution of Atty. Emmanuel Pelaez, who was recently appointed Philippine Ambassador to
the U.S"

It is clear therefore that petitioners' motion was based on good cause and was filed opportunely making
the act of respondent Court unwarranted in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file its
motion for reconsideration.

Another important issue raised by the petitioners is that the "subject decision which purports to set
aside the order of default rendered by the trial court is a nullity because respondent court arbitrarily
ignored in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction 1) the conclusive effect of the
trial court's final and unappealed order denying defendant's motion to set aside the default order," and 2)
the res judicata effect of the appellate court's final judgment in the injunction case aforementioned
upholding the trial court's order granting execution of its Judgment pending appeal and, necessarily, the
default order as well 3) the law of the case effect of the appellate court's express ruling in the said
injunction case sustaining the default order.

Petitioners' contentions merit our consideration.

It has been Our consistent ruling that a default order, being interlocutory, is not appealable but an order
denying a motion or petition to set aside an order of default is not merely interlocutory but final and
therefore immediately appealable. 5

Since the trial court's order of November 13, 1981, denying defendant's motion to set aside the order of
default was appealable but was not appealed by defendant, the necessary conclusion is that the default
order became final. Clearly therefore, respondent Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the finality of the default order.

The validity and finality of the default order was upheld by the judgment of the Appellate Court in the
injunction case (which passed upon the merits of the issuance of an order of execution pending appeal)
by virtue of the principle of res judicata and the doctrine re the law of the case.
There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue the order of execution
pending appeal. The order categorically stated that there was a need for the closure and stoppage of the
operation of defendant's (Daytona Construction) cement batching plant because it posed "a great
menace to the neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial court thus stated:

From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly any question that the
cement dust coming from the batching plant of the defendant corporation is injurious to the health of
the plaintiffs and other residents in the area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated
by the day and night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious discomfort and untold
miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and causes them damage. It is
thus a nuisance and its abatement justified. (Decision, p. 5; p. 90, Rollo)

after taking into consideration evidence presented by plaintiffs (petitioners herein) as follows:

The evidence shows that the defendant is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines with business address of 252 Don Mariano Marcos Avenue (actually South
Zuzuarregui Avenue), Quezon City. It was issued by the Quezon City government a business permit
(Exhibit B) for the manufacture of road and building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates,
with cement batching plant. Among the conditions set forth in the permit are that the said batching
plant shall (1) institute measures to prevent dust emission during the manual charging of cement from
bags to the receiving hopper of the bucket elevator of the batching plant; (2) remove all sediment
deposit in the settling of tank for process water and proper maintenance should be observed at all times.
While the original permit issued to the defendant stated that its operation at the place shall "not (be)
beyond Dec. 31, 1979" (Exhibit B-2), it was somehow allowed to operate way beyond said period.

Plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez Ill testified that he has three parcels of residential lots adjacent to the
Daytona compound. He informed the Court that his property, with an area of 8,892 square meters has
been over-run by effluence from the cement batching plant of the defendant. The sediment settled on
the lots and all forms of vegetation have died as a result, and the land tremendously diminished in value.
His three lots are located in a prime residential zone and each square meter in the area is easily valued
at P500.00. While he would like to sell at least a part of his property, he finds no buyer because of its
condition. It would cost him no less than P250,000.00 to be able to repair the damage done to his
property, and since its present condition has been existing during the five years, he claimed that the
interest on his loss would be about P5,000.00. He has agreed to his counsel's fee of P200,000.00.
Zenaida Rodriguez testified that she owns a lot with an area of 1,500 square meters. Two thirds of this
area has been damaged by the cement dust, emanating from the defendant's cement batching plant. The
continous flow of cement dust into her property affected her deep well, their source of drinking water,
and most of their fruit-bearing and ornamental trees dried up. She also said that she has had sleepless
nights and became nervous as a result of the batching plant operation. Even her previous pedigreed
poodles have been afflicted by all sorts of illnesses, many of them dying in the process. She claimed to
have sustained damages amounting to P370,000.00.

SACHA del Rosario testified that her house has to close its windows most of the time because of the
dust pollution and her precious plants have been destroyed by the cement powder coming from the
constant traffic of trucks and other vehicles carrying the product of the batching plant passing through
her area. She claims damages amounting to more than P100,000.00.

A chemical engineer, Alexander Cruz, said that the effluence deposited on the properties of Ernesto LL.
Rodriguez III and Zenaida Rodriguez has a very high PH 11.8, and the soil is highly alkaline and
cannot support plant life; that pollution coming from the batching plant can cause stomach disorder and
skin problems; that the place of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III is bare of grass and the trees are dying,
(Exhibits J, J-1 and J-2 and that there is also a high degree of calcium on the property in question.

Witness Guido L. Quiban a civil engineer, testified that on the basis of his examination of the property
of Rodriguez I I I affected by the pollution, it would cost at least P250,000.00 for the excavation filling,
concreting of canal and rental of equipment to repair it or restore it to its status quo ante.

Lawyer Ernesto R. Rodriguez, Jr., the 70-year old father of both Ernesto Ill and Zenaida Z. Rodriguez,
submitted a medical certificate that he had recently been taken ill with acute bronchial asthma,
hypertension and atherosclerotic heart disease. (Exhibits L, L-1 to L-4). His physician, a specialist
graduate from the University of London and connected with various hospitals in Manila, advised him
against exposure to environmental allegens, specifically cement dust and pollution. He also submitted
as exhibits various newspaper clippings (Exhibit M and excerpts from a book (Exhibits N and N-1
showing that pollution can irritate the eye, sear lungs and destroy vegetation, raise blood pressure,
increase cholesterol levels, interfere with sleep, cause ulcer, trigger heart attacks and the like; that it is
the common denominator of respiratory diseases, especially asthma chronic bronchitis, bronchial
asthma and emphysema and that polluted air can develop abnormalities in lung function.

Dr. Raul I. del Rosario, a neighboring physician, testified that he had treated several patients who
traced their sickness to the pollution caused by defendant Daytona batching plant. He said that cement
dust produces broncho-pulmonary obstructive diseases, broncho fibriotic lesions which may produce
cardio pulmonary complications, and the people living in the neighborhood of the batching plant are
the most susceptible to these diseases. He reported many cases of bronchial asthma in both children and
adult who live in the vicinity of the cement batching plant and these cases have been intermittently
admitted and discharged from the Quirino Labor Hospital where he presently works as a resident
physician. He had intended to open a medical clinic at his residence but he could not do so because the
washings from the cement mixers are dumped on the access road in front of his house and when these
washings are dried up they pollute the neighborhood, rendering his intended medical clinic unfit and
impractical for the treatment of patients, particularly those suffering from respiratory ailments.

Another lawyer, Eliseo Alampay, Jr., who likewise resides a few meters away from the site of the
Daytona batching plant, testified that the said plant is certainly injurious to the health; that the cement
dust are agents of lung ailments, impair the growth of plants and even kill the birds in their cages; that
it is a demonstrable nuisance because its uncontrolled engine noise and night long pounding prevent the
neighborhood from being able to sleep soundly and peacefully. He told the court that there was a time
when he felt like organizing the whole neighborhood into a demolition team to forcibly dismantle the
entire Daytona plant because "the authorities concerned apparently have chosen to close their eyes and
leave us to our miserable plight." He said that the homes in the community all look dirty and dusty
because of the pollution that the batching plant of the defendant causes. (Decision in Injunction Case,
AC-G.R. No. 14602-SP, pp. 10-14)

Anent the default order, the appellate court in the injunction case said:

From the foregoing, it appears that petitioner was recreant in failing to file an answer after respondent
judge denied its motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion to dismiss was denied in the order of the
lower court under date of April 3, 1981, a copy of which was received by petitioner on April 23, 1981.
A motion for reconsideration of the order of denial filed by petitioner on May 7, 1981 was denied by
said court on July 7, 1981. Instead of filing an answer promptly, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, but it never filed one, prompting the
Supreme Court to issue a resolution dated October 5, 1981 informing the parties that no petition for
review was filed within the period that expired on August 15, 1981. Inspite of the Supreme Court's
resolution, petitioner still failed to file any answer or pleading to arrest the running of the prescriptive
period. It was only on July 23, 1982, when petitioner filed its Petition for Relief which was nine (9)
months after the Supreme Court's resolution was issued. Petitioner's assertion in its Petition for Relief
that the failure to file the answer was caused by "the unforseen sickness of its corporate secretary who
has custody of the records necessary for the preparation of its defense" cannot be taken without much
doubt and hesitation. Petitioner did not even point out who was the supposed corporate secretary or
explain why the records were in the possession of the corporate secretary instead of the counsel
handling the case. (Decision in Injunction case, p. 16; emphasis supplied)

With reference to defendant's allegation that it thought that the period within which to answer (after its
motion to dismiss had been denied) had been suspended by its having filed a petition for review before
the Supreme Court, same is without merit. The circumstances of the case point to a deliberate desire to
delay: the corporation, governed as it is by knowledgeable business executives, should have taken steps
to prevent its being declared in default. The corporation waited six (6) months before verifying the
status of the case: in the meantime it had been declared in default, a judgment by default had been
rendered against it, execution was already pending before it woke up to file the case at hand.

We agree with Justice Luis A. Javellana in his concurring opinion in the injunction case before the
appellate court, thus:

Petitioner's conduct here appears to me to be tainted with fraud and intended simply to delay the
disposition of the case. When its motion to dismiss the complaint was denied, and its motion for
reconsideration of that denial was, Unwise denied, it manifested its intention to elevate these orders to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Yet, it did nothing to this end. The purpose of the ploy is
obvious. Once it had announced its intention to go to the Supreme Court, it effectively suspended the
proceedings in the trial court, or, at least, that was the effect. This enabled it to continue with its
operations and it would have done so indefinitely if it had not been declared in-default and private
respondents allowed to present their evidence. It is quite apparent that petitioner really had no intention
of elevating the case to the Supreme Court otherwise, it would not have allowed the extended period
given to it by the Supreme Court to lapse without filing the petition. Or, if it was in good faith, there it
should have informed the trial court that it was no longer pursuing its remedy in the Supreme Court
after it had decided that it is no longer availing of such remedy. Instead, it concealed this fact from the
trial court and the adverse party, and allowed matters to take their course. It was not until it received the
adverse decision that it frantically sought to set things right I do not think that petitioner deserves any
consideration for trifling with the administration of justice. (pp. 3-4; emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is
hereby rendered REINSTATING the decision of the trial court with the modification that all awards for
nominal damages are hereby eliminated. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Padilla and

G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON.
VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN,
respondents.

Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is the center of this
controversy.

The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette,
received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz,
ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring
with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's
permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of
other document.

At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to
comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents. In compliance with
said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the
operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by
the then National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau) and is now
at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-
pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor
ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injunction against private respondent with the court a quo which is presided by the
respondent judge. In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it alleged
therein that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April 14,
1989, herein parties adduced their respective evidences. The respondent judge, April 19, 1989, found
that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, hence, it
ordered as follows:

In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 to answer for
such damages that respondents may sustain should petitioner eventually be found not entitled to the
injunctive relief hereby issued, let a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION issue ordering the
respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and other person acting in his behalf and stead to immediately revoke
his closure order dated April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume its normal business operations
until after the instant case shall have been adjudicated on the merits without prejudice to the inherent
power of the court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at any given time.

SO ORDERED.

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on April 28, 1989, upon petitioner's posting a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00.

Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration dated May 3, 1989. Said motion for
reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989. Petitioner's counsel failed to appear and the hearing
proceeded with the Provincial Prosecutor presenting his evidence. The following documents were
submitted:

a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc., prepared by one Marivic
Guina, and her conclusion and recommendation read:

Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory
may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company
should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational.

b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond containing signatures of residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan Governor of the Province of
Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988, complaining about the smoke coming out of the chimney of the
company while in operation.

Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower court, on June 14, 1989, issued an order (a) setting
aside the order dated April 28, 1989, which granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b)
dissolving the writ consequently issued.

A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner. Said motion drew an
opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private respondent.

Resolving the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent judge issued an order dated
August 9, 1989, denying said motion for reconsideration.1

Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner in the
Court of Appeals seeking to annul and set aside (a) the order issued by the trial court on June 14, 1989,
setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of August 9, 1989, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989. In due course the petition was denied for lack
of merit by the appellate court in a decision dated January 26, 1990.2 A motion for reconsideration
thereof filed by petitioner was denied on August 10, 1990.

Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. Six errors are alleged to have
been committed by the appellate court which may be synthesized into the singular issue of whether or
not the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its question decision and
resolution.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse
of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve
the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether
there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a
business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of
Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application
for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality
but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation
until further orders and it was required to bring the following:

(1) Building permit;

(2) Mayor's permit; and

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.3

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.4 The alleged NBI
finding that some of the signatures in the four-page petition were written by one person,5 appears to be
true in some instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole the many
signatures appear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio
that he has not received any complaint on the matter6 must be because the complaint was sent directly
to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by
Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of
petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been
installed.7
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead
presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6,1987.8

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.9
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to
control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court and the
appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.

Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning
industry.1âwphi1 It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment
and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health,
nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARNACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME BLANCO, JR.,
ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER, VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS,
ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, ROBERT KUA, GEORGE LEE, GUILLERMO
LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER
GO, AMADEO VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI,
MARCOS ROCES, RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P.
ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG,
BARANGAY DASMARIAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY,

Petitioners,

- versus -

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 145328

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.

Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:

March 23, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.[1]
In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.

With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their battle cry, petitioners, all
residents of Dasmarias Village, are clamoring for the reversal of the decision[2] dated 3 May 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000,
denying their motion for reconsideration.

The assailed decision[3] of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through
its cables erected from Sucat, Paraaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.

But, first, the facts:

Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with
a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt
Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the
Sergio Osmea, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmarias
Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners homes are.
Said project later proved to be petitioners bane of existence.

Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible
adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of
published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to
electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.

Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They aired this growing concern to the
NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them.

NAPOCOR received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who in his Privilege
Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the cavalier manner with which NAPOCOR ignored safety and
consultation requirements in the questioned project.

Petitioners brought their woes to the attention of Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella, Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy, wherein NAPOCOR was asked to shed light on the petitioners problem. In a
letter dated 8 November 1999, NAPOCOR President Federico Puno stated that NAPOCOR was still in
the process of coming up with a win-win solution to the concerns of the Dasmarias Village and Forbes
Park residents.[4]

In a letter dated 10 August 1999 addressed to Congressman Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, NAPOCORs

President wrote:
We have discussed the matter with the Dasmarias and Forbes residents and we have come up with four
(4) options on how to address the problem, to wit:

Option Cost

Option 1: Transfer the line to Lawton Avenue P 111.84 million

(proposal of Dasmarias/Forbes)

Option 2: Maintain 12 meters distance along P 77.60 million

the village

Option 3: Construct an underground line P 482.00 million

Option 4: Reroute along C-5 and South Luzon P 1,018.83 million

Expressway (combination of overhead

and underground)[5]

Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impass, with petitioners vying for the
relocation of the transmission lines to Fort Bonifacio on one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a
12-meter easement widening, on the other.[6]

Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint[7] for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on
the hazardous effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves
and their families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they had failed to achieve through
amicable means with NAPOCOR and prayed, inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the
transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.

On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order[8] in Civil Case No. 00-352, which
temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through the said project. The pertinent portion of the said order reads:

Acting on the plaintiffs Urgent Omnibus Motion, it appearing that the subject area will be energized by
midnight tonight based on a report taken from Representative Joker P. Arroyo by plaintiffs counsel, so
as not to render moot and academic the instant case, as prayed for, defendant National Power
Corporation is ordered to maintain the status quo and/or be enjoined from energizing and transmitting
high voltage electric current through its cables for forty eight (48) hours starting 4 oclock in the
afternoon today and ending 4 oclock in the afternoon of 15 March 2000.[9]
By order[10] of 15 March 2000, the trial court extended the restraining order for 18 more days.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to
Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or
Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects
of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government, particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought
the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an
infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among other public utilities
for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful
activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR.[11] The trial court articulated that an injunction was
necessary to stay respondent NAPOCORs activation of its power lines due to the possible health risks
posed to the petitioners. Asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the view that
Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects
do not find application in the case at bar because of the health risks involved.

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and installing high voltage cables
to the steel pylons erected near petitioners homes and from energizing and transmitting high voltage
electric current through said cables while the case is pending final adjudication, upon posting of the
bond amounting to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that petitioners will pay all the damages the
NAPOCOR may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the
petitioners are not entitled thereto.[12]

In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR filed with the Court of
Appeals was later amended to include the prayer for the nullification and injunction of the Order dated
3 April 2000 of the trial court.

In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order, with the
following fallo:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed orders of the respondent court, dated March 13, 2000 and April 3, 2000, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.[13]
In the Court of Appeals rationale, the proscription on injunctions against infrastructure projects of the
government is clearly mandated by the above-quoted Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, as
reiterated by the Supreme Court in its Circulars No. 2-91 and No. 13-93, dated 15 March 1991 and 5
March 1993, respectively.

As their motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of success, petitioners, in a last attempt at
vindication, filed the present petition for review on the following arguments:

I.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS WERE

PURPOSELY DESIGNED TO ADDRESS MATTERS OF EXTREME URGENCY WHERE THERE
IS PROBABILITY OF GRAVE INJUSTICE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY.[14]

II.

THE RULE ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MERELY REQUIRES THAT UNLESS

RESTRAINED, THE ACT COMPLAINED OF WILL PROBABLY WORK INJUSTICE TO THE
APPLICANT OR PROBABLY VIOLATE HIS RIGHTS AND TENDS TO RENDER THE
JUDGMENT INEFFECTUAL.[15] (Emphasis in the original.)
Fundamental to the resolution of the instant petition is the issue of whether or not the trial court may
issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation
of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree
No. 1818.

Petitioners clutch on their stand that Presidential Decree No. 1818 could not be construed to apply to
cases of extreme urgency as in the present case when no less than the rights of the petitioners to health
and safety hangs on the balance.

We find the petition to be imbued with merit.

Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing
restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, No court in the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure
project. Realizing the importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different circulars to
implement this particular law.

Presidential Decree No. 1818[16] prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government
infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,[17] Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit
courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the
pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects
and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities, this rule, however, is
not absolute as there are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818
prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition
extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside
this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented
from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.[18]

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the
NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill consciousness
among them.

To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondents failure to conduct prior consultation with them, as
the community affected by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code
which provides: no project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned is
observed.

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally protected right to health
and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on
prior consultation with the affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial
court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these
questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support in Section 3 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when
it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (3a) (Emphasis
supplied.)

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will
probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR
probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court
of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses such as cancer and
leukemia to exposure to electromagnetic fields. The records bear out, to boot, a copy of a brochure of
NAPOCOR regarding its Quezon Power Project from which will be supplying NAPOCOR with the
power which will pass through the towers subject of the controversy. The NAPOCOR brochure
provides that because of the danger concomitant with high voltage power, Philippine laws mandate that
the power lines should be located within safe distances from residences. And the Quezon Power Project
mandates an easement of 20 meters to the right and 20 meters to the left which falls short of the 12-
meter easement that NAPOCOR was proposing to petitioners.

Likewise on record, are copies of letters of NAPOCOR President Federico Puno to Rep. Arnulfo
Fuentebella, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy, stating updates on the negotiations being
undertaken by the NAPOCOR and the Dasmarias Village and Forbes Park residents. Also on file is the
Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999 of Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who denounced
the cavalier manner with which NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation requirements in the
questioned project.

With a member of Congress denouncing the subject project of NAPOCOR because of the very same
health and safety ills that petitioners now hew to in this petition, and with documents on record to show
that NAPOCOR made representations to petitioners that they are looking into the possibility of
relocating the project, added to the fact that there had been series of negotiations and meetings between
petitioners and NAPOCOR as well as related agencies, there is ample indicia to suggest to the mind of
the court that the health concerns of the petitioners are, at the very least, far from imaginary.

Indeed, if there is no cause for concern, NAPOCOR would not have been stirred to come up with
options to address the woes of petitioners, nor would Congressman Escudero have fired away those
strong words of censure, assailing what to Congressman Escudero smacks of a cavalier manner by
which the NAPOCOR has responded to earnest pleas for a review of its practice of installing massive
pylons supporting high tension cables in densely populated areas.[19]

True, the issue of whether or not the transmission lines are safe is essentially evidentiary in nature, and
pertains to the very merits of the action below. In fact, petitioners recognize that the conclusiveness of
their life, health and safety concerns still needs to be proved in the main case below and they are
prepared to do so especially in the light of some studies cited by respondent that yield contrary results
in a disputed subject. Despite the parties conflicting results of studies made on the issue, the possibility
that the exposure to electromagnetic radiation causes cancer and other disorders is still, indeed, within
the realm of scientific scale of probability.
Equally important, we take judicial notice that the area alluded to as location of the NAPOCOR project
is a fragile zone being proximate to local earthquake faults, particularly the Marikina fault, among
other zones. This is not to mention the risks of falling structures caused by killer tornadoes and super
typhoons, the Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated along the typhoon belt.

Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected communities of a
government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement. In fact, there appears a
lack of exhaustive feasibility studies on NAPOCORs part before making a go with the project on hand;
otherwise, it should have anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in.

These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as sufficient basis to engender the
cloud of doubt that the NAPOCOR project could, indeed, endanger the lives of the petitioners. A
preliminary injunction is likewise justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not
NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the court
could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a
wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial discretion.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act
complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the
act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court,
probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from
injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and
permanent injunction.

Pending the final determination of the trial court on the main case for damages, of whether or not the
NAPOCOR Project infringes on petitioners substantive right to health and pending determination of the
question of whether there was non-observance of the prior-consultation proviso under the Local
Government Code, it is prudent to preserve the status quo. In Phil. Ports Authority v. Cipres
Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc.,[20] we held:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order,
requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative
remedy to ensure the protection of a partys substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in
the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or
extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be
useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

At times referred to as the Strong Arm of Equity, we have consistently ruled that there is no power the
exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an
injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very
clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there
is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury
being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and
maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by
the defendant, than to establish a new relation. (Emphasis supplied.)

What is more, contrary to respondents assertion, there is not a single syllable in the circulars issued by
this Court enjoining the observance of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which altogether and absolutely,
ties the hands of the courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. What Circular 2-91[21] dated
15 March 1991 seeks to enjoin is the indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions. The same holds for
Circular 13-93[22] dated 5 March 1993 and Circular 68-94.[23] And, in Circular No. 7-99, judges are
enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of temporary
restraining order and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion that its
issuance or grant was for consideration other than the strict merits of the case.[24]
There is not a hint from the foregoing circulars suggesting an unbridled prohibition against the issuance
of temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.

In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government
infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by
disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of
the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to
disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land.[25]

Lest we be misconstrued, this decision does not undermine the purpose of the NAPOCOR project
which is aimed towards the common good of the people. But, is the promotion of the general welfare at
loggerheads with the preservation of the rule of law? We submit that it is not.[26]

In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety should be the primordial
concerns over presumed economic benefits per se as alleged by the NAPOCOR.

Not too long ago, the Court, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc.,[27] upheld the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals enjoining the implementation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authoritys
proposed action of opening of the Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. We were categorical -
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the
people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run
roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the
MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general
welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of
law.[28]

In hindsight, if, after trial, it turns out that the health-related fears that petitioners cleave on to have
adequate confirmation in fact and in law, the questioned project of NAPOCOR then suffers from a
paucity of purpose, no matter how noble the purpose may be. For what use will modernization serve if
it proves to be a scourge on an individuals fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but,
ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of its desired quality?

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000. The Order
dated 3 April 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 00-352 is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this
special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves
as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire
the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to
information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No.
L-63915, April 24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973
Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to
the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information provided for in the
Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in another
mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the
purpose of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383
[1948]).

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill
of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7
of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development." The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided
for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He
challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He
calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this
particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission
to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved
by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said
party from the enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil.
1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he
possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It
is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil
service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an
unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition,
Rollo, p. 3).

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even
those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to
whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * *
*" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:

* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. To

say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular
information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido
vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged
obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring
the present suit.

2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the
part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights
in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of
their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be
constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed
upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its
part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a
sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter
expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents,
papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New
Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an
imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability.
We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the
nature of said duty:
* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra,
at 39). (Emphasis supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public
records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs.
Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity,
we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to
see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is
not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the
officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra
at 388). (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight
of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on
the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We
recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to
do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations
which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the records
may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents
and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may
be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to
regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs.
Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed
against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records
in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant
to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the
rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to
regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A
distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a
particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded.
The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government
agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised
solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the
duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive
question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern

is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v.
Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion
enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making
(87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32,
1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular
public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of
the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to
grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall
and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by
the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to
the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs.
Ozaeta, supra, the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those
real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The
Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as
far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for
their respective positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie
in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of
the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed
to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are,
and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility,
if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as
in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty
of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying
the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner
Valentin L. Legaspi.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.