Margaret Canovan Hannah Arendt's Reflections On Philosophy and Politics - Socrates or Heidegger

New School
Socrates or Heidegger? Hannah Arendt's Reflections on Philosophy and Politics

Author(s): MARGARET CANOVAN
Source: Social Research, Vol. 57, No. 1, Philosophy and Politics II (SPRING 1990), pp. 135-165
Published by: New School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970581
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Socratesor /
Heidegger? /
HannahArendt's /
on
Reflections /
Philosophy /
and POlitiCS / byMargaretcanovan
JlTannah Arendt liked to say that thinkingis an endless

processthatproducesno settledresults:"likePenelope'sweb,
it undoes every morningwhat it has finishedthe night
before/'1In general,thisdescriptionof intellectuallifedoes
notfitArendtherselfverywell,sinceherreflections manifestly
did produce resultsin the shape of a complex networkof
conceptsand distinctions whichshe developedand constantly
reused. There is, however,one train of thoughtrunning
throughout hermatureworkthatreallydoes havetheshifting,
unstable characterthat the metaphor of Penelope's web
suggests,and throughwhichwe can perhapseavesdropon that
never-ending internaldialogueof thethinkerwithherselfthat
Arendttook to be the essenceof philosophy.The subjectof
thisdebate,and one ofArendt'smajorpreoccupations, wasthe
relationbetweenthoughtand action,philosophyand politics.
The sourcesof her concernwiththistopiclay in her own
experiencesfollowingHitler's rise to power. Formerlya
brilliantphilosophystudentwithlittleinterestin politics,she
1H. Arendt,The
LifeoftheMind(NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,
1978),vol.
p. 88.
I, Thinking,
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring1990)
136 SOCIAL RESEARCH
was catapulted into concern withpublic affairsby the shock of

Nazism, and turned her energies for a time to practical
activitiesas a member of the Jewishcommunity,2and later to
reflectionsupon the momentous advent of totalitariandomi-
nation. Only by way of politicalphilosophydid she eventually
findher wayback to philosophyproper. Evidence thatthiswas
indeed a homecoming can be found in a remark to an old
friendaftershe had been invitedto give the GiffordLectures
thatbecame The LifeoftheMind. She told Hans Jonas thatshe
felt she had done her bit in politics,and from now on was
going to stick to philosophy.3 In the last year of her life,
indeed, she went so far as to declare publiclythat for all her
praise of the public realm she herselfwas not a politicalanimal,
and that her early decision to study philosophy had "implied
already, even though I may not have known it, a non-
commitmentto the public." For, as she added, "Philosophyis a
solitarybusiness."4
A Tastefor Tyranny
If Arendt'sown lifeas philosopherand citizensuggesteda

certaintensionbetweenthoughtand action,anotherpersonal
experienceforcedon her attentionthe possibilityof a much
starkeroppositionbetweenthem.In 1933,whenArendtand
her fellowJewswere exilesor in danger,MartinHeidegger,
her former teacher and lover and the man who had
representedfor her the summitof philosophicalthinking,
alliedhimselfpubliclywiththeNazis.His infatuation
wasbrief
As Arendtafterward
but shattering. remarkedof the period,
¿ E. HannahArendt: ForLoveoj theWorld(London:Yale University

Young-Bruehl,
Press,1982),pp. 117, 138-139,143-144,148.
3 H.
Jonas, "Acting,Knowing,Thinking:Gleaningsfrom Hannah Arendt's
Work,"SocialResearch
Philosophical 44 (1977): 27.
Unpublished speech on theSonningPrize,1975,ArendtMbb,Box 70,
receiving
pp.7-8.
SOCRATES OR HEIDEGGER? 137
"theproblem. . . was not whatour enemiesmightbe doing,

but whatour friendswere doing."5The experiencebrought
home to her the unpalatablefactthatHeideggerwas not the
only great philosopherto have had a taste for tyranny.
Exceedinglyfewdistinguished thinkershad eversympathized
withthe kind republicanpoliticalactionshe now valued so
of
highly,and Plato,thefounderof Westernpoliticalphilosophy,
had been even more hostileto democracythan Heidegger.
Could it be, Arendtcame to ask herself,thatthereis some
incompatibility betweenphilosophyand politicsbuiltintothe
natureof each activity?
It is in thewritings
ofArendt'slasttwenty-fiveyearsthatthis
preoccupation comes to the surface.Beforethen,her wayof
accountingforHeidegger'sNazism,and solvingthe problem
of philosophyversuspoliticsas faras he was concerned,seems
to have been to devaluehis philosophytowardthelevelof his
politics. In an essay on German "Existenz Philosophy"
publishedin thePartisanReviewin 19466she gavea hostileand
slightingaccount of Heidegger,comparinghis philosophy
unfavorably withthatof KarlJaspers,her otherteacher,who
had alwaysopposed Nazism. Althoughthe articledoes not
explicitlydiscuss political philosophy,there are obvious
politicalovertonesin Arendt'sclaimthatHeidegger'sphiloso-
phyis characterized by"egoism,"in contrastto thestressupon
communicationand openness toward others in Jaspers's
thought.Furthermore, Arendtsuggeststhatthelatterwas not
only more humane but also more philosophically
advanced
than Heidegger's.ApparentlyJaspers,who had behaved so
muchbetterpolitically, was also thebetterphilosopher,
so that
philosophyand politicsseemedto be in harmony.
We cannottellhow farthispositionsatisfiedArendtat the
time. All that is certainis that withina few years of the
publicationof theessayon "ExistenzPhilosophy"she came to
5 HannahArendt,
DYoung-Bruehl, p. 108.
H. Arendt,"WhatIs ExistenzPhilosophy?"
Partisan
Review8 (Winter1946): 13.
138 SOCIAL RESEARCH
see thingsvery differently.Her bitternessagainst Heidegger

did not survivereunion withhim during her visitto Europe in
1949-50. 7 Avidlyreading his laterwritings,she once more saw
him as the transcendentphilosophicalgenius of the time,8and
was consequentlyfaced once more with the problem of how
such profundity in philosophy could coexist with such
stupidityor perversityin politics.
For the rest of her life Arendt reflectedupon the relation
between philosophyand politics9and, more broadly,between
thoughtand action,and her reflectionsled her in twodifferent
directions.They led her in the firstplace toward what she
herselfand many of her readers would consider one of her
major discoveriesin politicalphilosophy,but theyalso directed
her toward a train of thoughtthat was less obviouslyfruitful,
thoughfascinating.It is withthissecond, ultimatelyunresolved
trainof thoughtthatthispaper willbe chieflyconcerned. First,
though, let us take note that it was Arendt's sensitivityto the
uneasy relationsbetween philosophyand politicsthat led her
to the claim, familiarto readers of The Human Conditionand
BetweenPast and Future,that most of the "great tradition"of
Western political philosophy from Plato onward had given a
systematicallymisleading impression of the nature and
potentialitiesof politics. For whereas philosophy in general
7
Young-Bruehl,Hannah Arendt,p. 246.
0 Cf. H.
Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty,"in M. Murray,ed., Heideggerand
ModernPhilosophy (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1978), pp. 293-303.
9 Two
quite different lecture courses on this topic survive among Arendt's
manuscripts:"Philosophyand Politics:The Problem of Action and Thought afterthe
French Revolution,"1954, Arendt MSS, Box 69, and "Philosophyand Politics:What Is
PoliticalPhilosophy?"1969, Box 40. See also letterfromArendt to Gertrud and Karl
Jaspers, 25/12/1950,in Hannah Arendt-KarlJaspers:Briefwechsel 1926-1969, ed. L.
Kohler and H. Saner (München: Piper, 1985), p. 196; letterfromArendt to Kenneth
Thompson, RockefellerFoundation, March 1969, Arendt MSS, Box 20, p. 013824.
The relationbetween politicsand the lifeof the mind is the subjectof a book by Leah
Bradshaw, Actingand Thinking:The Political Thoughtof Hannah Arendt(Toronto:
Universityof Toronto Press, 1989). Bradshaw's claim (pp. 7, 68, 100) is thatthereis a
"dramatic reversal"in Arendt's thoughton these matters,a "radical break" between
her earlier "political"worksand her later preoccupationwiththe lifeof the mind. My
argument in the present paper, based on study of Arendt's manuscripts(to which
Bradshaw does not refer),is quite different.
arose,accordingto Arendt,from"wonder"at thephenomena

of theworld,10 politicalphilosophywas alwaysthe "stepchild"
of philosophy,11 neverpopularwithitsgrudgingparent.Ever
since the condemnationof Socratesby the Atheniandemo-
crats,whichprovokedPlato to dreamof makingthe citysafe
for philosophersby givingthempower,politicalphilosophy
has been based lesson theauthentically politicalexperienceof
actingamong othersthan on the experienceof the philoso-
pher, who thinksin solitudeand then has to cope withan
uncomprehending world when he emergesfromhis reflec-
tions. Politicalphilosophy,in other words, has looked at
politicsfromthe philosopher'spointof view,notfromthatof
thepoliticalactor.
Accordingto Arendt,thishas had a numberof unfortunate
results.In the firstplace, politicshas been downgradedand
has lostits dignity.The immortality forwhichGreekcitizens
strovecouldnotcompetewiththeeternity to whichphilosophy
gave access,and whichcast all aspectsof the vitaactivainto
such disrepute that action became confused with other
Politicshas as a resultbeen misunderstood
activities. eversince
eitheras a formofwork,thefabrication of objects,or as labor,
thebusinessof keepingourselvesalive.Fromthephilosopher's
pointof view,politicscould in anycase be onlya meansto an
end, not somethinggood in itself.It was thereforeeasily
misinterpreted as a formoffabrication, bestdirectedbya ruler
who understandsthe end to be achieved.The notionof a
single ruler ratherthan a pluralityof actorswas naturally
congenialto philosopherswho werelookingfora singletruth
to overridepluralopinions.Politically, the greatdisadvantage
of thispointof viewwasthatitimplieda lossof understanding
of human plurality,the factthat (as Arendtnever tiredof
repeating),"men,not Man, live on the earthand inhabitthe
10H. Arendt,TheHumanCondition of ChicagoPress,1958),p.

(Chicago:University
302.
11Arendt, and Politics,"
1954,ArendtMSS, Box 69, p. 023358.
"Philosophy
140 SOCIAL RESEARCH
world."12But philosophers were not much concerned with

freedom of action. Possessing the truth,they sought not to
persuade the masses but to compel them,eitherby threatening
themwithdivine punishmentor by using deductive reasoning.
Meanwhile, they gave the coup de grace to an authentic
understandingof politics by capturing the crucial notion of
freedom, which they reinterpreted to mean a private or
internalconditionratherthan freedomto move and act in the
public world.13
Thoughtand Action
Arendt'saccountof the way in whichtraditionalWestern

understandings ofpoliticshavebeen distorted byphilosophical
preoccupations is of course highlycontroversial,but it can be
briefly summarizedherenotonlybecauseit is wellknownbut
also becauseitis notsomething thatArendtchangedhermind
about.Once her reflections on the relationsbetweenphiloso-
phy and politicshad directedher attentionto it,she did not
significantly alterher position.But those reflections led her
also to a seriesof questionsthatwerelesseasilyanswered,and
on whichshe continuedto meditatefor the restof her life,
trying out different answerswithoutfindingdefinitesolutions.
How deep does the tensionbetweenphilosophyand politics
go? Has it been essentiallyan unfortunateaccident,which
arose out of the specificeventsof Socrates'death and was
12
Arendt,Human Condition, p. 7.
13Arendt,Human Condition, 12-17, 85, 185, 195, 222-230, 234-237; H. Arendt,
pp.
BetweenPastand Future:Six Exercises in PoliticalThought(London: Faber & Faber, 1961),
pp. 107-116, 145, 157. See also B. Parekh, Hannah Arendtand theSearchfor a New
PoliticalPhilosophy (London: Macmillan, 1981), chs. 1-2. According to Arendt, the
conquest of politics by philosophy had been so complete that even those- notably
Marx- who had made a conscious effortto escape these traditionaldistortionshad
failed. Only in the crisis of the mid-twentieth century,when the traditionhad been
shattered by nihilism in philosophy and totalitarianismin politics, had it become
possible to look afreshat the central featuresof politicalaction.
perpetuatedbyhistorical contingencies, but whichwe can put

behind us now that the traditionis broken?Or does it go
deeper than that?Do thoughtand action possess inherent
characteristicsthat make tensionsbetween philosophyand
politicsinevitable?Is philosophya search for absolutetruth
and iron consistencythat gives the philosophera natural
sympathy withcoercionand tyranny? Or is the thinkingin
whichthe philosopherengagesan activity thatis as freeand
unproductive of results as action itself? Is philosophical
thinkingan inherentlysolitary,antipluralistactivitythat is
possibleonlyin withdrawal fromtheworld,as theexamplesof
Platoand Heideggersuggest?Or, on thecontrary (as we might
concludefromlookingat SocratesorJaspers),does philosophy
at itsbestactuallyneedcontactwithothersin a publicworld,
and implytherecognition of pluralityand communication with
others? And supposing that philosophicalthinkingdoes
involvea withdrawal fromthe world,mustthisstandingback
destroycommon sense and disqualifythe philosopherfor
politics,or mightit actuallyguardhimagainstthoughtless evil
and freehiscapacityforpoliticaljudgment?
During the last twenty-five years of Arendt'slife reflec-
tions upon this knot of questions appear continuallyin
her publishedand unpublishedwritings,but it is possible
to identifytwo overlappingphases of her thought:one in
the early 1950s, perhaps not unconnectedwith her re-
union withHeidegger;the other,laterphase linkedwiththe
trialof Eichmannand thecontroversy thatfollowedher book
aboutit.
Whetheror notArendt'searlierphase of reflections on this
subject was connected with Heidegger, it was undoubtedly
linkedto Marx,whoprovidedthebridgethatled herfromher
own specialbrandof philosophicalhistoryto somethingmore
readilyidentifiableas politicalphilosophy.Afterfinishing The
Origins whichhad concentrated
ofTotalitarianism, mainlyupon
142 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Nazism and its antecedentsin the "subterraneanstream"14of

European experience, Arendt embarked upon a companion
study which was to have traced the "totalitarianelements of
Marxism."15 Unlike the Nazi version of totalitarianism,
Stalinism had a respectable philosophical ancestry reaching
back to Marx and beyond, and the studywas never completed
because as soon as Arendt set about relatingMarx to the great
traditionof Western thought16a vast and uncharted field of
reflectionopened before her, parts of which she explored in
The Human Conditionand in BetweenPast and Future.11Her
publishedand unpublishedwritingsfrom the early 1950s
reveala bewildering numberof connectedthought- trains,but
one of the keypointson whichtheytend to convergeis the
trialof Socratesand its implicationsforWesternphilosophy
and politics.In her manuscriptsfor the time,indeed, it is
possibleto findsketchesfora kindof mythof a philosophical
Fall- a storywhichshe evidentlyfound tempting,although
notentirely convincing.
The storygoes likethis.In thedaysof theearlyGreekpolis,
beforeacademicphilosophyhad been invented,thecitizensof
Athensliveda lifein whichthoughtand actionwere united.
This primordial unitywas symbolized bythewordlogos,which
meantspeechas wellas thought.Greekpoliticswas conducted
throughthislogos,and thesignificance of thiswentbeyondthe
factthatactionwithinthe polis was carriedon by means of
persuasionratherthanforce.It also meantthatin thecitizens'
endless talk, action disclosed thought,while thoughtitself
14H. 3rd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967),
Arendt,TheOriginsof Totalitarianism,
p. xxxi.
15In
April 1952 Arendt was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for work on this.
See Correspondence withthe Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, Arendt MSS, Box
17, p. 012648.
16In 1953 Arendt delivered a course of lectures entitled "Karl Marx and the
Tradition of WesternThought." Two verydifferentmanuscriptversionsremain,and
it is the preliminarydraftthat is particularlyrelevantto the mattersdiscussed here.
Arendt MSS, Box 64.
17
Applicationfor renewal of Guggenheim Fellowship,Jan. 29, 1953, Arendt MSS,
Box 17, p. 012641; Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt,p. 279.
informedthe actionsof the citizensas theypersuaded one

another.18 Withinthe publicrealmthatformedbetweenthe
realitycouldappearand be seen fromall sides,19
citizens, while
withinthis kind of politics,based on speech and uniting
thought and the
action, pluralityand freedom of menhad full
play. By contrast,once action and thoughtwere separated
fromone another,each tended to degenerateinto coercion
thatdeniedthatplurality and freedom,actionbydegenerating
intospeechlessviolenceand thoughtintoa kindof single-track
logicalreasoningthatwas no less hostileto human plurality
and spontaneity.
It was fromthe Athenianpoliticsof public speech that
(according to Arendt) Socrates' version of philosophical
thinkinggrew.For thiswas a kind of thinkingthatwas not
divorcedfromor opposed to politics,butwas itselfa matterof
movingamongothersin the publicworldand exploringtheir
opinions.Each person has his own opinion,his doxa,which
represents thewaytheworldappearsto him,so thatthereare
as manyopinionsas thereare separatepersonslookingat the
commonworld fromdifferentpointsof view. But whereas
Platowouldlateraspireto replacethesepluralopinionswitha
singletruth,Socrateshad no suchintention. All he was trying
to do was to encourageeach personto speak his own opinion
coherently. "Maeuticsto Socrateswas a politicalactivity,
a give
and take,fundamentally on a basis of strictequality,whose
fruitscould notbe measuredbyresults,arrivingat thisor that
generaltruth."20 Far fromaimingto discoveran authoritative
truththat would bringdiscussionto a conclusion,Socrates
evidentlyregardedtalkingamongfriendsabouttheworldthey
had in commonas an activitythatwas worthwhile in itself:
"Socratesseemsto have believedthatthe politicalfunctionof
18
Arendt, "Karl Marx and the Tradition," firstdraft,pp. 11-18; "Philosophyand
Politics,"1954, pp. 023361-366; Arendt,Human Condition,p. 27.
19Cf.
"Einleitung: Der Sinn von Politik,"Arendt MSS, Box 60, pp. 010, 13.
20
Arendt, "Philosophy and Politics," 1954, p. 023400; Cf. "Karl Marx and the
Tradition," firstdraft,pp. 30-31; also this issue, p. 81.
144 SOCIAL RESEARCH
the philosopheris to help establishthiskind of common world,

builton the understandingof friendship,where no rulershipis
needed."21
It seems, then, that there was a time when thought and
action,philosophyand politics,were not separated or opposed.
Arendtexplicitlystatesthatthese modern distinctionsare not a
matterof course, but are the result of events, above all the
result of Socrates' death.22 For the fate of Socrates not only
drove Plato into enmityto politics:it also made him doubt his
teacher's whole philosophical approach. In the light of
of talkingto the masses was obvious.
Socrates' trial,the futility
Instead of tryingto persuade them, Plato opposed to their
opinions the absolute truthwhich appears only in the solitude
of philosophical thinking,and which must then be imposed
upon others,whethertheyare coerced by the forceof logic or
by threatsof divine punishmentin a life to come.23
The Viceof Solitude
Tragic as this storyof philosophy'sFall may appear, its

implicationis thattheoppositionbetweenthoughtand action
that has plagued Westerntraditionsis not inevitable.If
Socrateshad notbeen condemned;ifhe had nothad a disciple
ofPlato'sgeniusto reactto hisdeath;iftheGreekpolishad not
alreadybegun a declinethatfavoredthe pretensionsof the
philosophers;if Christianityhad not reinforcedthe hierarchy
of thoughtand action; in short,if circumstances had been
otherwise,apparently, and
philosophy politics need never have
been divided. If one links togetherthese reflectionson
Socrates'authenticallypoliticalphilosophywithsome of the
observationsArendtlater makes about politicalthinkingas
21Arendt, 1954,p. 023403;cf.thisissue,p. 84.
and Politics,"
"Philosophy
¿¿Ibid., 023366.
p.
" Arendt,Between Hastand future,pp. lUY-llb; Karl Marxand tne iracution,
first
draft,pp. 29-30,33-34; "Philosophy 1954,pp. 023395-399;cf.this
and Politics,"
issue,pp. 74-80.
practicedbyphilosophers likeJaspersand Kant(whichwe will

examinelater),one can producea plausibleinterpretation of
her positionas straightforwardly anti-Platonist,
implying that
philosophyand politicshad been in harmonyonce and could
be again,in spiteof all thetraditional distortions.
Arendt'spositionis byno meansas simpleas that,however;
in fact,it is notsimpleat all. It is notso mucha positionas an
internaldialogue,continuallygoing back and forthbetween
alternative standpoints.Evenin theseearlymanuscript lectures
on "Philosophy and Politics"thatdescribetheSocraticstateof
grace from which Plato and subsequent philosophyfell,
Arendtadmittedthattherewereotherand morefundamental
reasons for the uneasy relationsbetween philosophyand
politics.These deeper tensionsshowedthemselves even in the
case of Socrates and in spite of the fact that he was a
thoroughly philosopher.For althoughSocratesdid not
political
claimto be an expertin possessionof a specialphilosophical
truth,he wasdifferent fromothercitizensin beingoverwhelm-
inglyconcerned with truthin thesenseof trying to makeevery
person he talked with speak his opinion more coherently.
Inevitably,this search for truthtended to have a corrosive
effect on opinions, underminingthem without putting
anythingin theirplace.24And if a latentconflictbetween
loyaltyto thepolisand loyalty to thetruthcan be foundevenin
Socrates, in Plato'scase the tension was intensifiedand given
theoretical expression.ArendtsuggeststhatPlato'santipolitical
utopiarepresentedan attemptto resolvea conflictthatwould
havebeen presentevenwithoutthetrialof Socrates,namely,a
conflictwithinthe philosopherhimselfbetweentwo kindsof
experience,thelifeof thecitizenand thelifeof themind.For
Plato,thisbecame a conflictbetweenthe body and the soul,
whichthe soul mustwinif it is to be free.The soul mustrule
over its body as a freecitizenrules over his slaves,and this
internaldominationin itsturnbecomesforPlatothemodelfor
24 and Politics,"
1954,p. 023408;cf.thisissue,pp. 90-91.
"Philosophy
146 SOCIAL RESEARCH
rule over the citizens by philosopher kings. As the analogy

reminds us, Arendt was aware of another reason why the
tempting picture of thought and action united in the polis
could not be altogethersustained. At several points in these
early manuscripts she admits that the institutionof slave-
owning had already opened a gulf between "knowing" and
"doing" in practical affairs, and placed the experience of
rulershipat the base of Greek politics.25
However tempted Arendt might have been, therefore,by
the image of an original Socraticharmonybetween philosoph-
ical thoughtand political action, she acknowledged from the
firstthat there may be somethingin the activityof thinking
that makes philosophers typically unsympathetic to free
politicalaction and inclined to favor tyranny.Even before she
wrotethe manuscriptlectureson "Philosophyand Politics"that
we have been looking at, she had already reflected upon a
possible link between philosophyand totalitarianism.The link
between the two is the process of logical deduction, and
Arendt makes the connection in some manuscriptreflections
on totalitarianismwhich appear to belong to the same
thought-trainas her essay on "Ideology and Terror." The
latter,firstpublished in 1953 but incorporated into the later
editionsof The Originsof Totalitarianism,containsreflectionson
the logicalityof totalitarianideologies, and the appeal of this
iron consistencyto lonelymass-men.26In the manuscript,as in
"Ideology and Terror," Arendt goes on to distinguishbetween
this forlorn "loneliness" and the condition of "solitude" in
which "we are never alone but togetherwith ourselves."27All
25
E.g., "Philosophyand Politics,"1954, pp. 023368-369. For anotherindicationthat
Arendt's views on this matterwere far from settled,see an aside in her notes for
"Lectures on the Historyof PoliticalThought" at the Universityof Californiain 1955
(Arendt MSS, Box 41, p. 024084), where she says that"ancient philosophy. . . speaks
out of the polis-experience"and pays littleattentionto action because polis-life,unlike
earlier Green experience, did notencourage action.
26Arendt,
pp. 472-478.
Originsof Totalitarianism,
¿/
Arendt,"On the Nature of Totalitarianism, second MS, Arendt MSS, Box 69, p.
19.
the same, she says that because solitude is the necessary

conditionforphilosophicalthinking, "philosopherscannotbe
trustedwithpolitics."28Not onlydoes theirdesireforpeace in
whichto thinkundisturbed givethema bias in favorof strong
government;the problemgoes deeper than that,for their
withdrawalinto thoughtleads them to emphasize solitary
experiencesat the expense of those thatdepend on human
plurality.Since the politicalphenomenonthatmostdepends
on pluralityis power,whichis generatedby many people
acting together,29one man on his own must either be
powerlessor parasiticupon theconcertedpowerofothers,like
the tyrant.One reason for the historicaffinitybetween
philosophersand tyrants, however,is thatlonelyphilosophers
have discovered"thatin the humanminditselfis apparently
something whichcan forceotherpeople and therebyoriginate
power,"30 namely,the forceof logic."Logicality, thatis mere
reasoning without regard for facts
and experience,is thetrue
viceof solitude."31
It is importantnot to oversimplify Arendt'spointhere,for
she is certainlynot equating philosopherswith the mass
supporters oftotalitarianism.The kindofensnarement tologic
that she is talkingabout is the "vice of solitude": not its
necessaryaccompaniment,but somethingthat is liable to
happen when a man slips from solitude into loneliness.
Solitudeitselfis somethingthatphilosophersneed notonlyin
orderto be togetherwiththemselves, but so thattheycan be
"potentiallytogether with everyone"and ask "the eternal
questions of mankind."32The slide from solitude into
lonelinessand itstyrannical is,in orderwords,a kind
affinities
of occupationalhazard of philosophy.Althoughthesemanu-
28
Ibid., p. 19a.
Cf. Arendt,HumanCondition,pp. 199-203; H. Arendt,On Violence
(London:
AllenLane, 1970),pp. 41-56.
30Arendt,"Natureof Totalitarianism,"22.
p.
31Ibid., 17.
p.
32Ibid., 19a.
p.
148 SOCIAL RESEARCH
scriptreflectionssuggestthatphilosophyhas politicaldangers,
they seem to imply that support for tyrannyrepresents a
deformation of philosophy rather than its natural conse-
quence. Support for this view can be found in the two essays
on Karl Jaspers that Arendt published in 1957 and 1958, in
which,speaking in tones of warm admiration,she saysthat,for
Jaspers,truthemerges onlyin communication,so thatthinking
"is a kind of practicebetween men, not a performanceof one
individual in his self-chosen solitude."33 Because Jaspers's
thoughtis so closelylinked to the world and to other people, it
is, Arendt says,"bound to be political."34
Reading the two Jaspers essays might leave one with the
impression thatJaspers, "the only philosopher who has ever
protestedagainst solitude,"35was to Arendt a model of what
philosophy should be. Like the 1946 article on "Existenz
Philosophy,"however,these essays need to be read withsome
caution,rememberingthe strongpersonal motivesArendt had
for expressing loyalty to her teacher and close friend,
particularlyin pieces writtenfor celebratoryoccasions. It may
be more significantthatqualificationswhichare to be found in
The Lifeof theMind, writtenafterJaspers's death, had already
occurred to her twentyyears previouslywhen she wrote (but
did not publish) a lecture on "Concern withPoliticsin Recent
European Philosophical Thought."36 For although Arendt
acknowledgesin thislecture from 1954 thatJaspers'sstresson
communicationas a central feature of philosophy harks back
to "authenticpoliticalexperiences,"recallingthe ancientGreek
logos which was both thought and speech, she nevertheless
expressessome doubts about the politicalrelevanceofJaspers's
33 H. Arendt,"Karl
Jaspers: Citizen of the World?" in Men in Dark Times(London:
Cape, 1970), p. 86.
34 H. Arendt,"Karl
Jaspers: A Laudatio," Men in Dark Times,p. 79.
35Arendt,Men in Dark Times, 86.
p. ' * '
%F> -r-ki' 1. .1 A •_-T»_l!.t! 1 O A «.i Iftt/l A 1 a. ' K O O Ti ~ -.
ueiiverea io ine /'mencan ronucai sciente /'5sociauun ni lyyt, .rviciiui ivioo, dua
56. Three successive drafts survive in manuscript. References below are to what
appears to be the final version,except where indicated. Cf. Young-Bruehl, Hannah
Arendt,p. 281.
philosophyof "communication." For communication "has its

roots, not in the public-political in
sphere,but the personal
encounterof I and Thou, and this relationshipof pure
dialogue is closerto the originalexperienceof the thinking
dialogue in solitudethan any other. By the same token,it
containsless specifically politicalexperiencethan almostany
relationship in our average everydaylives."37Twentyyears
in
later, TheLifeoftheMind,she wouldstatecategorically, with
specificreference to Jaspers, thatalthough under exceptional
circumstancesthe internal dialogue of thought can be
extendedto includea friend,itcannotprovidea paradigmfor
politicsbecause "itcan neverreachthe We, the truepluralof
action."38Consequently(to returnto Arendt's1954 lecture),
Jaspersdoes not succeed in solving"the problemwhichhas
plagued politicalphilosophyalmostthroughoutits history,"
whichis thatphilosophy is concernedwithmanin thesingular,
politicswith men in the plural.39
The mostremarkablefeatureof this1954 manuscript is the
surprising to
(not saybizarre)suggestion that the philosopher
whomaybe able to showus thewayout of thisdifficulty is,of
all people,MartinHeidegger.The Nazi fellowtravelerwhom
we haveseen Arendtdismissing in her 1946 essayon "Existenz
Philosophy" as the of
philosopher "egoism,"nowappearsas a
guide to thinkingabout pluralisticpolitics. By way of
justificationfor this unlikelyaccolade, Arendt points to
Heidegger'sconceptof the "world"(whichdid indeed form
thebasis on whichshe builther own verydifferent concept),
together withthehintsofa recognition ofhumanplurality that
Heideggergivesbyspeaking of human beings as "the mortals"
rather than as "man." Since Arendt herselfadmits that
"Heidegger has never articulatedthe implicationsof his
position,"40 it seems likelythat she was reading her own
37Arendt,"Concernwith
Politics,"p. 023258.
38Arendt, theMind,2: 200.
Lifeof
dyArendt,"Concernwith
40Ibid., 023259.
Politics,"p. 023258.
p.
150 SOCIAL RESEARCH
political philosophy into his writings,revealing a pathetic

eagerness to rescue him fromthe politicalcompany he himself
had chosen. The factthatall thisis clearer in the firstdraftof
the paper41 and is cut down to "hints"42in the final version,
suggests a triumphof discretionover inclination,which may
also explain why the paper remained unpublished. Arendt
concluded the paper by drawing up an agenda for a new
political philosophy which would reformulate the relation
between philosophy and politics, drawing not only upon
Heidegger's concept of "world"and Jaspers'snew viewof truth
but upon the French existentialists'new stresson action. Above
all, though, an authentic politicalphilosophywould have to be
based on wonder at the realm of human affairs;and Arendt,
perhaps beset with doubts about her own qualifications for
undertakingthe projectjust described, remarks that philoso-
phers,withtheircommitmentto solitude,"are not particularly
well equipped" for this.43
To sum up so far,then,we can findin these earlyreflections
from the 1950s two alternative views of the political
implications of philosophy, associated with two pairs of
opposed philosophers, Plato versus Socrates and Heidegger
versus Jaspers. When Arendt is focusing on Plato or
Heidegger she is inclinedto fear thatphilosophyis intrinsically
solitary,antipolitical,and sympatheticto coercion, whereas
when she concentrateson Socrates or Jaspersshe is temptedto
believe that true philosophy may be communicativeand in
harmony with free politics. No sooner does she formulate
either side of the dilemma, however,than she qualifies it and
triesto find some way of mediatingbetween the two sides that
will allow her to avoid having to choose between them.
41
Arendt,"Concern withPolitics,"firstdraft(marked as such in what appears to be
Arendt'shandwriting),pp. 12-15.
42
Arendt,"Concern withPolitics,"p. 023259.
™
Ibid.,p. 023260.
PoliticalThinking
The problemof reconciling philosophyand politicswas not

something in which Arendt took a merelyacademicinterest,
butone thatwascentraltoherownenterprise oftrying to think
afreshaboutpolitics. Anotherworkofpoliticalphilosophy which
she plannedbutneveraccomplished, to whichTheHumanCon-
ditionwouldhavebeen a prolegomenon, was to havebeen con-
cernednot onlywitha reexamination of traditionalconcepts
and a systematic examinationof actingin thepublicrealm,but
also with"a discussionoftherelationbetweenactingand think-
ingor betweenpoliticsand philosophy."44 And it was thisthat
was the Achilles'heel of the enterprise.Clearly,the authentic
politicalphilosophy at whichshe aimedcouldbe feasibleonlyif
therewereno insuperablebarriersbetweenpoliticsand philos-
ophy: onlyif philosophicalthinking, providedit were of the
rightkind,couldin principlelivein harmonywithpolitics.But
whereasshe could findsome plausiblegroundsfor thinking
thatthiswas so, bothhistoryand her own experienceof phi-
losophyprovidedplentyof reasonsfordrawingthe opposite
conclusion.Arendtneverwrotetheprojectedbook on politics,
butone of theeventsthatdivertedher,thetrialofAdolfEich-
mann,did giveadded impetusto herreflections on politicsand
philosophy, her
perhapsleaving bytheend ofherlifenearerto
whatmighthave been a resolutionof the problem.The two
relevanttrainsof thoughtto whichherreflections on theEich-
manncase contributed, according to Arendt'sown testimony,
concernedon theone handtherelationof politicsto truth,and
on theothertherelationbetweenthinking and morality.45Let
us look firstat her essayon "Truthand Politics."
44
Proposalforbook,"IntroductionintoPolitics,"
Correspondence withRockefeller
Foundation,ArendtMSS, Box 20, p. 013872,probably1959.
45Arendt,"Truthand Politics,"NewYorker,
Feb. 25, 1967,pp. 49-88, reprinted
in
theenlargededitionoí Between
PastandFuture(NewYork:VikingPress,1968)witha
noteon its provenance,p. 227. "Thinkingand Moral Considerations: A Lecture,"
SocialResearch
33 (Autumn1971):417.
152 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Since this essay arose out of the controversyover the

Eichmann trial,it is not surprisingthat the political implica-
tionsof tellingthe truthabout mattersof historicalfactshould
be Arendt's prime concern. Nevertheless, she connects this
withthe ancientconflictwhichshe had identifiedin her earlier
manuscriptwritingsbetween the lifeof the citizen,who moves
among plural opinions, and the life of the philosopher, who
seeks in solitude for an unchanging truth.46These philosoph-
ical truth-tellersare not only withdrawnfrom the world of
political opinions, but are constitutionallyhostile to it and to
the freedom that it represents:"Truth carries withinitselfan
element of coercion, and the frequentlytyrannicaltendencies
so deplorablyobvious among professionaltruth-tellers may be
caused less by a failing of character than by the strain of
habituallylivingunder a kind of compulsion."47In contrastto
this solitary submission to the imperatives of philosophical
truth,Arendt describesa quite differentkind of thinkingthat
is specificallypolitical. This is the deliberation of the citizen,
moving about among his fellowsin the public world, paying
attentionto their points of view and achieving an "enlarged
mentality" comparable to that which Kant had thought
necessaryforformingaestheticjudgments. "Politicalthoughtis
representative.I forman opinion by consideringa given issue
fromdifferentviewpoints,by making present to my mind the
standpointsof those who are absent. . . ."48
Although the Eichmann case evidentlyintensifiedArendt's
interestin such matters,the distinctionshe makes in thisessay,
between philosophical thinkingwhich is oriented to truthand
politicalthinkingwhich is concerned ratherwithopinions and
judgments,in factechoes much of what she had said earlier in
an essay on Lessing originally published in 1960. On that
occasion, pointingout that Lessing positivelydelighted in the
46
Arendt,"Truth and Politics,"p. 235.
47Ibid.. d. 239.
48
Ibid.,p. 241.
diversityof human opinions and rejoiced that mankind had

not been endowed with access to a single, uniformtruth,she
had praised Lessing's thinkingfor its freedom and humanity.
Thinking, she said, was to him one of the ways of moving
freelyabout among othersin the world,and so great had been
his commitmentto freedom thathe had refused to be coerced
by truth itself, or even by the demands of consistency.49
Instead of pursuing truth, or looking for results from his
thinking,he had engaged in unending discourse of a kind that
humanizes the common world through continual talk about
common affairs.Arendt writesof Lessing withgreat sympathy,
and in her reflectionson him it is easy to hear echoes of her
praise ofJaspers'sopen and communicativephilosophy,as well
as remindersof the account of Socrates' politicalthinkingthat
we have seen her giving in her lectures on "Philosophy and
Politics." It is important to recognize, therefore, that she
explicitlydistinguishesthe kind of thinkingLessing engaged in
fromphilosophy. "Lessing's thought is not the (Platonic) silent
dialogue between me and myself,but an anticipated dialogue
withothers."50In other words, as in her essay on "Truth and
Politics,"Arendt appears to distinguishbetween two kinds of
thinking,one of which is authenticallypolitical because it is
orientedtowarddiscoursebetweencitizenswithdifferentviews
of the common world, whereas the other is authentically
philosophical because it is solitaryand oriented toward truth.
Truth and solitude, it seems, still separate philosophy from
politics.
There can be no doubt that Arendt's characterizationhere
of philosophers (as opposed to political thinkers51)as seekers
after absolute, proven truth would have been endorsed by
49Arendt,"On
Humanityin Dark Times: ThoughtsaboutLessing,"Menin Dark
Times,p. 8.
»"Ibid., p. 10.
ElsewhereArendtspecifically distinguished frompolitical"writ-
"philosophers"
ers" who "writeout of politicalexperiences."Course at CornellUniversity,
1965,
"Machiavelli
to Marx,"ArendtMSS, Box 39, pp. 023453,023468.
154 SOCIAL RESEARCH
most of the great historicalphilosophers. One reason for the

ambiguityof her position,however,is thatArendt had herself
grown up with a very differentconception of the task and
potentialitiesof philosophy, namely, Jaspers's vision of a
philosophy without results and without proof. As we have
already seen, she suggested in her lecture on "Concern for
Politicsin European Philosophy"that this new and more fluid
conception of philosophy might help to bridge the gulf
between philosophy and politics. Her own commitmentto it
can only have been strengthenedby the factthat Heidegger in
his laterwritingsadopted a similarposition.His magnum opus
of the 1920s, Beingand Time,had (as Arendt observed52)been
startlinglyoriginal in content but traditionallysystematicin
form. By the time Arendt came to write her own Life of the
Mind,however,it would become possible forher to preface the
volume on Thinkingwith an epigraph from Heidegger that
surpassed even Jaspers in its modesty:
Thinkingdoes notbringknowledgeas do thesciences.

Thinkingdoes notproduceusablepracticalwisdom.
Thinkingdoes notsolvetheriddlesof theuniverse.
Thinkingdoes notendowus directlywiththe powerto act.53
The interest of this for our present purposes is that

alongsidethe distinctionshe was developingbetweenphilosoph-
ical and political thinking,Arendt also had available to her
another distinction,between two conceptions of philosophy:
the traditionalconception,according to whichphilosophyaims
at true doctrine,and the modern one, common both to Jaspers
and the later Heidegger, according to which it is an endless
motionthatdoes not produce results.Consequently,in spiteof
her numerous referencesto Plato's quest for absolute truth,
52
Arendt,"Existenz Philosophy,"p. 45; Cf. LifeoftheMind 1: 15.
53
Arendt, Life of theMind 1: 1. In "Martin Heidegger at Eighty,"p. 296, looking
back with affectionand reverence at Heidegger the teacher, Arendt saw him as a
"thinker,"exploring pathways of thought that did not lead to conclusions, and
expressed doubts whetherhe could be said to have a "philosophy"as such.
Arendt'slaterworkscontainincreasingly explicitclaimsthat
thisis not somethingthatauthentically philosophicalthinking
can be expectedto supply.Alreadyin TheHumanCondition she
had distinguished between"thought,"whichproducesnoth-
ing,and "thegreatphilosophicalsystems," which"can hardly
be called the results of pure thinking" because theirauthors
had to stop thinkingin order to build thesestructures.54 In
laterwritings she spellsout the implicationthatthesereified
systemsmisrepresent the authenticthinkingof theirauthors.
Since antiquity, she says, "philosophershave exhibitedan
annoyinginclinationtowardsystem-building, and we often
have troubledisassembling the constructions theyhave built
whentrying to uncoverwhattheyreallythought."55 Elsewhere,
in an essaytreatingSocrates-who taught no doctrine- as the
paradigmof the thinker,she suggeststhatphilosophersmay
have composedtheirtreatisesfor"themany,who wishto see
results."56Her final and most complete treatmentof the
subject,thevolumeon Thinking in TheLifeoftheMind,claims
unequivocally thatauthentic thinking is and alwayshas beenan
endlessprocess,whichdoes not produceresultsand whichis in
any case concernedwith"meaning"ratherthanwith"truth."
The contraryconvictionof philosophersfromPlato to early
Heidegger that philosophy,and their own philosophyin
particular,could yieldtruth,is therediagnosedas a natural
mistakearising out of the confusionof "thinking"with
"knowing," particularly withmathematical certainty."Philoso-
phers have always been to
tempted accept the criterion of
truth-so validforscienceand everydaylife- as applicableto
theirown ratherextraordinary businessas well."57
The complementof Arendt'sgrowingcertainty thatphilo-
sophical thinking cannot supply truth was of course her
conviction,constantlyreiteratedin her writings,that our
54Arendt,Human
p. 170.
Condition,
55Arendt, at Eighty,"
"Heidegger
56Arendt, p. 298.
"Thinkingand MoralConsiderations,"
p. 426.
57Arendt,
LifeoftheMind1: 62.
156 SOCIAL RESEARCH
fullest and most reliable knowledge of reality can only be

gained fromthe plural perspectivesof many persons, moving
about freelyin a common public space and viewingobjects and
issues from all sides. If, as this seems to imply, the kind of
knowledge at which philosophy has traditionallybut mistak-
enly aimed is in factto be found in the verylocation in which
political action takes place, it might seem that the long rift
between philosophyand politicscould in principlebe healed.58
Thinkingand theWorld
As we haveseen,manyofArendt'scomments on therelation
betweenphilosophyand politicscontrastthe openness and
pluralismof politicalthinkingwith traditionalphilosophy's
questforcoercivetruth.Butwhatifauthentically philosophical
thinkingis as endlessand inconclusive a businessas political
discussionitself?Whatif Plato and the earlyHeideggerwere
mistakenaboutthe natureof theirown activity, and Socrates,
Jaspers,and the later Heidegger right?Are the barriers
betweenphilosophyand politicsremoved,makingway fora
new harmony?Up to a point,Arendtdoes seem to have
believedthatthiswas so. Afterall, the revisedconceptionof
philosophyunderminesthe ancientdreamof the philosopher
kingwhocan overridepoliticalopinionsbecausehe has access
58
E.g., Human Condition,pp. 50, 57. There is a very interestingmanuscript in
German (undated, thoughevidentlysubsequent to the Hungarian Revolutionof 1956)
in which Arendt actually interpretsthe freedomof the ancient Greek citizens as
freedom to grasp reality in its fullness by moving about between the different
perspectivesfromwhich plural men view theircommon world ("Einleitung: Der Sinn
von Politik,"Arendt MSS, Box 60, pp. 010, 13). At this point in Arendt's thought,
political action and the philosophical search for truth seem very close together. A
notable featureof thismanuscriptis thatechoes of Heidegger are particularlyaudible
in it: Arendt's reflections sound like an amended and "politicized" version of
Heidegger's claim that freedom for human beings means allowing truthto appear in
the "open region" constitutedby human "Dasein." (M. Heidegger, "On the Essence of
Truth," Basic Writings,ed. D.F. Krell [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978], p.
127).
to theabsolutetruth.As Arendthad remarkedin 1954 in her

lecture on "Concern with Politics in Recent European
PhilosophicalThought,"one of theconditionsfora renewalof
politicalphilosophywas preciselythatphilosophersshouldno
longerclaimanyspecialwisdomin politicalaffairs.59 Unfortu-
nately,however,thisdoes not mean that all the barriersare
down, and thatthereis no longerany necessarydifference
betweenauthenticphilosophyand the kind of free political
thinking thatArendtattributed to Lessing.For althoughin her
later writingsArendt detached philosophyunambiguously
fromthequestfortruth,she insistedevermorestrongly on the
otherobstaclethatdividesphilosophyfrompolitics,namely,its
solitariness:
thefact,as she sees it,thatphilosophydemandsa
withdrawal of the thinkerfromthe world.60In TheLifeofthe
MindArendtreaffirmed whatshe had been sayingthroughout
her work:thatthinking is a dialoguebetweenme and myself
thatcan takeplace onlyin solitude,awayfrompublicaffairs.
Political philosophy,therefore,seems still to be a self-
contradictory enterprise:forhowis thepoliticalphilosopherto
withdrawn
be sufficiently tobe able to practicephilosophy,and
yetsufficientlyattuned to the public world to understand and
appreciatepublicaction?
In anotherof theessayssparkedoffbytheEichmannaffair,
a brilliantmeditationon "Thinkingand Moral Consider-
ations,"61Arendttriedout an ingeniouswayof bridgingthis
gulfbetweenthethinkerand theworld.Reflecting thereupon
the apparentconnectionbetweenEichmann'sevil deeds and
his sheerthoughtlessness,
she suggestedthattheremayafterall
be somepracticalusefulnessin thinking, and thatthethinker's
withdrawalfromthe world may in the end feed back into
action.For althoughthe innerdialogueof thought,practiced
paradigmatically by Socrates,cannotdeliveran authoritative
59"ConcernwithPolitics," 023251.
en _
p.... - . .. .
Ct., e.g., Lectureson Philosophyand Politics:What Is PoliticalPhilosophy?"
1969,pp. 024429; 024445-6.
611971.See note45 above.
158 SOCIAL RESEARCH
answer, or provide instructionson what one ought to do, it

does have certainimplications,mainlyof a negative kind, that
can make a differencein timeof crisis.For one thing,the habit
of being alone withoneselfin the internaldialogue of thinking
activatesnot onlyconsciousnessbut conscience,settinglimitsto
what one can do, simply because one will have to live with
oneself afterwardin full consciousness of one's deeds. Again,
thinkingquestions all certainties,making it impossible for the
thinkerto driftwith the crowd and adopt generallyaccepted
opinions withoutscrutiny.Most positively(though Arendt did
not enlarge upon the suggestion in this essay), thinking
liberates "the facultyof judgment . . . the most political of
man's mental abilities."The abilityto judge what is right or
wrong may be absolutelyvital "in the rare momentswhen the
chips are down."62
The implication of these reflectionsappears to be that if
Eichmann had been capable of reflectivethinking,he could
never have become a Nazi; the life of the mind would have
immunized him against it. For a thinker tryingto connect
philosophy and politics, this must have been a comforting
conclusion,but it was scarcelyone in which Arendt could rest.
For the obvious ripostewas that,in thatmomentin 1933 when
the chips were down, thinkingof the most profound kind did
not apparentlydo anythingto save Heidegger from support-
ing Nazism, at any rate for a time. Arendt did not comment
directlyupon thisdiscrepancy,but it is surelyrevealingthatin
another article published in the same year as "Thinking and
Moral Considerations,"in celebrationof Heidegger's eightieth
birthday,she offereda quite differentaccount of the practical
implicationsthat follow from the thinker'swithdrawalfrom
the world. Stressingonce again the need forthatwithdrawalif
thinkingis to be possible,she suggeststherethatwhereas lesser
thinkerswithdrawinto the solitude of thought from time to
time, Heidegger is one of the few who has actually taken up
62
p. 446.
and MoralConsiderations,"
"Thinking
"residence"in the"abode" of thinking. And in contrastto her

argument in "Thinking and Moral Considerations"that
solitarythinking mayliberatesound politicaljudgment,in the
Heideggeressayshe suggeststhatit is more likelyto weaken
thethinker's commonsenseand to incapacitatehimforlifein
theworld.Thaïes, gazingat the stars,fellintoa welland was
laughedat forhis pains; Platoembarkedupon the preposter-
ous enterpriseof tryingto turna tyrantinto a philosopher
king;and Heideggertooentirely misjudgedthesituationin the
worldwhen he emergedbrieflyfromhis reflections to give
countenanceto Hitler.63
Socratesor Heidegger?Whichis the bettermodel for the
politicalimplications of philosophicalthought?The factthat
these two essays date from the same year, 1971, reveals
somethingof the internaldialogue still going on within
Arendt'smind concerningthe relationsbetweenphilosophy
and politics.It is therefore
particularly to read the
interesting
Lectureson Kant's PoliticalPhilosophy
that date from the same
period,because Arendtbelievedthatshe could findin Kant
one unquestionably greatphilosopherwhocould be said to be
in harmonywithfree politics,both in the practicalsense of
sympathizing withrepublicsratherthan withtyrants, and in
thetheoreticalsenseof havinga lesssolitary
and morepolitical
conceptionof what was involvedin philosophyitself.Kant
held,accordingto Arendt,that"companyis indispensablefor
the thinker,"64and thatalthoughthinkingitselfcan be done
in
only solitude,it cannot be done effectively withoutthat
freedomto communicateand to exchangeone's thoughtsin
publicwhichenablesone to enlargeone's mindbyincorporat-
ing the insightsof others.65Kant'scriticalthinkingdepends
upon "publicuse ofone's reason,"66and feedsbackintopublic
63Arendt,
"Heideggerat Eighty,"
°* H. Arendt, pp. 301-303.
Lectures
onKant'sPolitical ed. R. Beiner(Chicago:University
Philosophy,
of ChicagoPress,1982),p. 10.
b5Ibid., 40, 42.
w
pp.
Ibid.,p. 3y.
160 SOCIAL RESEARCH
life in its turnby questioningauthoritiesand accepted assump-

tions67and making possible impartialjudgments. Arendt's ac-
countof Kant is stronglyreminiscentof her pictureof thatother
freethinker,hiscontemporary, Lessing,withone veryimportant
difference:Lessing,whose thoughtwas so thoroughlypolitical,
was not a philosopher,but no one could possiblydeny thattitle
to Kant.We mightthereforebe temptedto suppose that,afterall
her deliberationsabout the relationsbetween politicsand phi-
losophy,Arendthad at last found themreconciledin Kant,and
taken him as her model of the trulypoliticalphilosopher.
Alas, as usually happens withArendt,the case is not so sim-
ple. For one thing,her apparent solutionis reached onlybyway
of an interpretationof Kant that is highlyselective,not to say
perverse. In her lecturesshe purportsto find in the Critiqueof
Judgment Kant's "unwrittenpoliticalphilosophy,"airilydismiss-
ing the factthathe had writtenhis own,68as well as choosing to
ignore for the moment those rigidlydogmatic featuresof his
moral philosophythatshe had elsewherestigmatizedas "inhu-
man."69Furthermore,even if she could reinterpretKant in a
waythatmade possiblea reconciliationbetweenphilosophyand
politics,this does nothingto alter the antipoliticalstance of so
many of the other philosophers whom she admired, Plato,
Spinoza, Nietzsche,Heidegger. In TheLifeoftheMind she con-
frontedthe problem again, drawing attentionnot only to the
habitual withdrawalof the thinker70but also to the lack of
sympathywith freedom shown by almost all philosophers. It
seems likelythatshe intended in her unwrittenthirdvolume to
tackle her persistentdilemma once again, and perhaps to ad-
umbratea modusvivendibetweenphilosophyand politics,based
on a distinctionbetweentwodifferentkindsof reflectivethink-
ing: on the one hand purely philosophical thought,which is
67
Ibid.,p. 38.
68
Ibid., p. 19. Cf. P. Riley,"Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth and Politics,"Political
Studies35 (1987): 379-392.
69 Kant withLessing.
Arendt,Men in Dark Times,p. 27. Arendt was here contrasting
/u
Arendt,LifeoftheMind, 1: 75, 197.
solitary and on theotherhandjudging,which

and unpolitical,
linkedto theworld.
is intrinsically
Speculatingaboutthe intendedcontentsofJudging,the un-
written of
thirdvolume TheLifeoftheMind,is a rashundertak-
ing. bothMaryMcCarthy,
Nevertheless, who editedthemanu-
scriptafterArendt'sdeath,and RonaldBeiner,whoeditedthe
Lectureson Kant'sPoliticalPhilosophy,
have argued plausiblythat
theKantlectureswouldhaveformedthebasisforthevolume.71
If so, it mightwellhavebeen concernedamongotherthingsto
describea formofreflective thinking distinguished fromphilos-
its
ophybydrawing impetus from public lifeand feedingback
intothe world.It is certainly suggestivethat,as Beinerpoints
out,Arendt'sinterest in the facultyofjudgmentchangedover
time.Afterportraying itin herearlierworkas a partofpractical
political she
action, included itin herfinalbookas partofthelife
of the mind."The moreshe reflectedon the facultyofjudg-
ment,themoreinclinedshe was to regarditas theprerogative
ofthesolitary (thoughpublic-spirited) contemplator as opposed
to theactor."72 In the lightof whatwe have seen of her long-
continuedreflections on the tensionbetweenphilosophyand
it
politics, may be that one of the motivesbehindher shiftof
emphasiswas the searchfora formof reflection thatwas not
intrinsicallyhostileto as
politics, philosophy seemed tobe. If this
wasindeedthereason,however, itwouldgivethestorya further
ironictwist, forthisnewbridgefromphilosophy topolitics would
havebeenbuiltat thecostofshifting herownfocusfromaction
to thought.As RonaldBeinersays,"Judgment is ... caughtin
the tensionbetweenthe vitaactivaand thevitacontemplativa (a
dualismthatpervadesArendt'sentirework)."73
If we attemptnowto sum up Arendt'spersistent reflections
on philosophyand politics,can we say that she made any
progress?Did any fragmentsof Penelope'sweb survivethe
71M.
McCarthy, "Editor's Postface," in Arendt, Life of the Mind 1; R. Beiner,
"InterpretiveEssay," in Arendt,Kant'sPoliticalPhilosophy.
72Arendt,Kant'sPoliticalPhilosof)hx.
d. 92.
73
Ibid.,p. 140.
162 SOCIAL RESEARCH
continualunravelingthatwe have seen her engaged in? Some,

we mustanswer,but witha great many loose ends. As we have
seen, Arendtreflectedthroughoutthe 1950s on twoalternative
picturesof the relationsbetween philosophyand politics.The
first,associated withPlato and the Heidegger of Beingand Time
and Nazi fellow-traveling, suggested that philosophical excel-
lence could be bought only at the cost of tyrannicalsympathies
in politics,because the philosopher'ssolitude and his quest for
truthmade him hostileto pluralityand freedom. The second,
associated with Socrates and Jaspers, suggested that, on the
contrary,authenticphilosophy is communicativeand not ori-
ented towardexclusivetruth,so thatthe historicaltensionsbe-
tween philosophersand free politicshave been merelycontin-
gent. In the course of her reflections,and greatlyaided by
Heidegger's renunciationof philosophy'sclaim to provide an-
swers,Arendt moved part of the way toward the second posi-
tion, removing one of the barriers between philosophy and
politicsby affirmingthat(contraryto the aspirationsof mostof
the great philosophers) philosophy does not establishor seek
for truth. The other obstacle, solitude, was harder to shift.
When she thoughtof Socrates,philosophicalsolitudeseemed to
providea safeguardagainstmoral and politicalerrors,but when
she thoughtof Heidegger Arendt'sconfidenceevaporated. Her
reflectionson Kant suggest that if she had been able to finish
TheLifeoftheMind,she would have concluded that philosoph-
ical thinkinghas two sides to it and is a mixed blessing froma
political point of view, in that although solitarythinkingcan
facilitatejudging, whichis politicallybeneficial,it isjust as likely
to deprive the thinkerof all common sense in politicalaffairs.
The specterof Heidegger the Nazi haunts Arendt'sreflections,
forcingher again and again to tear up her attemptedresolu-
tions and to startagain.
InternalDialogue
Hannah Arendtwas herselfa philosopherturnedcitizen

end our attemptto trace
Let us therefore
and politicalthinker.
her thought-trainabout the relation between philosophy and

politicsby turningher reflectionsback upon her own activity.
To what extent was she able to overcome in practice the
obstacles to authenticpoliticalphilosophywithwhich we have
seen her wrestlingin theory?
Arendt was herselffree frommanyof the occupational vices
she attributesto philosophers. Her thoughtbetraysno fond-
ness for tyranny,no lack of sympathywith freedom and plu-
rality,no cravingforabsolute truthor iron consistency.Neither
can she be accused of the sheer unworldlinessto which she
attributedHeidegger's ill-fatedforayinto politics.Watchingthe
events of her time with intense interest,she sought always to
"thinkwhatwe are doing,"74to "reconcileourselvesto reality,"75
and to respond directlyto politicalexperience.76Nevertheless,
we would do well when reading her work to bear in mind her
reflectionsupon the difficultiesthatbeset politicalphilosophy,
and we would be wise in particularnot to forgether reiterated
assertion that thinkingis a solitarybusiness. Clearly, this was
true not only for Plato or Heidegger but (in spite of her in-
tenselyarticulatemarriage and many friendships)for Arendt
herself,77and the solitude of the thinker,while mute in itself,
marks her writingsin a number of differentways. One such
revealingfeatureof her workis itscurious self-sufficiency. For
all her deference to Jaspers'semphasis on communication,de-
spite her praise of Kant's "enlarged mentality,"in strikingcon-
trast to Lessing's public disputation, she herself in her pub-
lished worksdid not in general engage in dialogue withanyone
except herself.78One of the reasons why her books seem so
Arendt,Human Condition, p. 5.
'J H.
Arendt, "Understandingand Politics,"PartisanReview20 (1953): 377.
hvents,past and present ... are the true, the only reliable teachers of political
scientists"("Reflectionson the Hungarian Revolution,"included as an epilogue in the
second editionof OriginsofTotalitarianism [London: Allen & Unwin, 1958], p. 482). Cf.
BetweenPast and Future,p. 14.
77On Arendt'shabitof
retreatinginto intellectualtrances,see M. McCarthy,"Saying
Goodbye to Hannah," New YorkReviewofBooks,Jan. 22, 1976, p. 10.
78And
sometimes,implicitly,with Heidegger. Cf. L.P. and S.K. Hinchman, "In
164 SOCIAL RESEARCH
exoticallyoriginal to her readers is preciselythat theypay no

attentionwhateverto the preoccupations of existingpolitical
and academic communities.79 When she interpretsotherthink-
ers, her interpretations are notoriouslyidiosyncratic,80 often
findingin the thinkerconcerned fascinatingthingswhich he
himselfnever intended to say. Similarly,although her reflec-
tionsoftenarise fromsomethingthathas happened in the pub-
lic world, theyrapidlyleave the event itself,going off on fur-
ther explorations of the byways of Arendt's own spacious
intellectualrealm. She herselfwas under no illusionsabout this.
A perhaps rather rueful footnoteto the essay on "Truth and
Politics"informsus that the reflectionsit contains arose from
the Eichmanncontroversy, "but may . . . serve as an example of
what happens to a highlytopical subject when it is drawn into
thatgap between past and futurewhich is perhaps the proper
habitat of all reflections."81Reading her is thereforeless like
receiving a contribution to public debate than like eavesdrop-
ping on her own internaldialogue.
The consequence is thatalthough Arendt managed to avoid
many of the occupational defectsof the political philosopher,
she could not entirelyevade the dangers of solitaryreflection.
One of these, fromwhich her work continues to suffer,is the
danger of being misunderstood. When she wrote about
controversialissues such as poverty,race, the place of morality
in politics,or the activitiesof the Jews,her readers supposed,
naturallyenough, thatshe was takingsides in currentdebates,
and did not realize thatin most cases she was simplyfollowing
up some aspect of her own reflections,tryingto make sense of
the world in her own terms.And ifbeing misunderstoodis one
Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism," Review of

Politics46 (April 1984): 183-211.
/ySheldon Wohn,
reviewingThe LifeoftheMind,commentedon Arendts majestic
indifference toward the existing literature that surrounds her subject matter"
("Stopping to Think," New YorkReviewofBooks,Oct. 26, 1978, p. 16).
80Cf. P. Sternand T.Yarbroueh, "Hannah Arendt,"AmericanScholar47 (1978): 376.
81
Arendt,"Truth and Politics,"p. 227.
danger,misunderstanding is, of course,another.Her practice

of tryingto understandeventsby drawingthemintoher own
mental space and ponderingthem there produced many
fascinatinginsights,but carried the risk that her own
imaginative constructionsin theirveryrichnessand originality
mightget betweenher and the realityabout whichshe was
tryingto think.Justas she continually read herownviewsinto
thinkersshe was tryingto interpret,so she also read into
historyand politicstheresultsof herownefforts to makesense
of the world.In spiteof her distrustof grandtheoriesof the
kind produced by Hegel and Marx, her own accountsof
totalitarianismand revolutionare vividand dramaticimagina-
tiveconstructions,offensiveto soberhistorianswhoare blessed
withless powerof reflection.
For all that,Hannah Arendtleavesus withtwoconundrums
to ponder.In thefirstplace,is thereindeeda gulfbetweenthe
singlevisionof the philosopherand the inherentpluralityof
politics,and to the extent that this is so, what are its
implicationsforpoliticalphilosophy?82 And secondly,howis it
thateavesdropping on theprivatemeditations of thesesolitary
thinkersenablesus to learn somethingabout the world?For
whateverthe inconclusiveness of Arendt'sreflections,
we are,
surely,the wiser forhaving shared them.
82Cf. M.
Canovan,"Arendt,Rousseauand HumanPlurality in Politics,"
Journal
of
Politics
45 (1983): 286-302.The problemsArendtraisesconnectwiththoseraisedby
RichardRorty,for instancein "The Priorityof Democracyto Philosophy," in M.
Petersonand K. Vaughan, eds., The VirginiaStatuteofReligiousFreedom:200 Years
After
Press,1988),pp. 257-282.
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
*I am indebtedto the BritishAcademyforawardswhichenabledme to consult

Arendt'smanuscripts, preservedin theLibraryof Congressin Washington.Papersin
thiscollectionare referredto belowas ArendtMSS, withreferencesto theLibrary's
longpage numbers wherethesehavebeenstampedon themanuscripts, and otherwise
to Arendt'sownpage numbers.I am also grateful toJeromeKohnforhiscomments
on an earlierdraftof thispaper.

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Socrates or Heidegger? Hannah Arendt's Reflections on Philosophy and Politics

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JlTannah Arendt liked to say that thinkingis an endless

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring1990)

was catapulted into concern withpublic affairsby the shock of

If Arendt'sown lifeas philosopherand citizensuggesteda

¿ E. HannahArendt: ForLoveoj theWorld(London:Yale University

"theproblem. . . was not whatour enemiesmightbe doing,

see thingsvery differently.Her bitternessagainst Heidegger

arose,accordingto Arendt,from"wonder"at thephenomena

10H. Arendt,TheHumanCondition of ChicagoPress,1958),p.

world."12But philosophers were not much concerned with

Arendt'saccountof the way in whichtraditionalWestern

perpetuatedbyhistorical contingencies, but whichwe can put

Nazism and its antecedentsin the "subterraneanstream"14of

informedthe actionsof the citizensas theypersuaded one

the philosopheris to help establishthiskind of common world,

The Viceof Solitude

Tragic as this storyof philosophy'sFall may appear, its

practicedbyphilosophers likeJaspersand Kant(whichwe will

rule over the citizens by philosopher kings. As the analogy

the same, she says that because solitude is the necessary

philosophyof "communication." For communication "has its

political philosophy into his writings,revealing a pathetic

The problemof reconciling philosophyand politicswas not

Since this essay arose out of the controversyover the

diversityof human opinions and rejoiced that mankind had

most of the great historicalphilosophers. One reason for the

Thinkingdoes notbringknowledgeas do thesciences.

The interest of this for our present purposes is that

fullest and most reliable knowledge of reality can only be

to theabsolutetruth.As Arendthad remarkedin 1954 in her

answer, or provide instructionson what one ought to do, it

"residence"in the"abode" of thinking. And in contrastto her

life in its turnby questioningauthoritiesand accepted assump-

solitary and on theotherhandjudging,which

continualunravelingthatwe have seen her engaged in? Some,

Hannah Arendtwas herselfa philosopherturnedcitizen

her thought-trainabout the relation between philosophy and

exoticallyoriginal to her readers is preciselythat theypay no

Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism," Review of

danger,misunderstanding is, of course,another.Her practice

*I am indebtedto the BritishAcademyforawardswhichenabledme to consult

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