G.R. No.

L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
-versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.

Facts: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the
Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence 3 witnesses, who in turn,
affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary
Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.

In the said Will, the testator named and appointed the petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor
of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. On December 5, 1952, the testator
and the petitioner were married before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely,
his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to
herein petitioner.

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children
filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of
the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting
with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision.

Held: No, the respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of
the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.

XXX

If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of probate
 or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-
on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for
solution.

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned
in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his
Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
-versus-
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.

Facts: The late Isabel Andres Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 at the age of 85. The private respondent Lutgarda
Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with
her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latter’s residence prior and up to the time of her death.
The private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the probate
of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating the petitioner as the
principal beneficiary and executrix. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed
in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

The petition was opposed by the petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales assailing the document purporting to be the
will of the deceased on the following grounds:

1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative

2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with
law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses. From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda
Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in
question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence
adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed
and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the
deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allowed probate.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that, Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness
to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These
Articles state:

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb,
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this
Code.

Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty
and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more)
is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind,
deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. The SC reject the petitioner's contention that it must first
be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness
and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the
contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.

The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, which is
Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from
the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must
accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is
competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the
rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under
Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be
credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on
record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to
be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In
other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court
allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for
respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible
witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.