Villa Rey Transit vs.

Ferrer
Best Evidence Rule

FACTS:

Jose Villarama was an operator of a bus company (Villa Rey Transit) pursuant to
CPCs granted him by the PSC. In 1959, he sold 2 CPCs to Pangasinan Transpo. Co.
(Pantranco) with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU
service competing with buyer. 3 months later, Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed
wherein the wife and relatives of Jose Villarama were the stockholders and the
incorporators. The Corporation. then bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando. The
Sheriff levied 2 out of the 5 CPCs pursuant to a writ of execution in favor of Eusebio
Ferrer, Fernando’s judgment creditor. The 2 CPCs were sold at auction with Ferrer as
highest bidder. Ferrer then sold these 2 CPCs to Pantranco . Thus, VRTI filed a
complaint for annulment of the sheriff’s sale of the CPCs in favor of Ferrer and its
subsequent sale to Pantranco. The CFI declared these sales as null and void. Hence,
this appeal. It is the contention of Pantranco that Jose Villarama and the Corporation
were one and the same. Therefore, the non competition clause embodied in the deed of
sale entered into by Jose Villarama is also binding to the Corporation. The evidence
presented by Pantanco to prove its contention is Photostatic copies of ledger entries
and vouchers. Jose Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits,
contending that no evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them since “they
were merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the originals
themselves”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not photostatic copies ledger entries and vouchers though only
secondary evidence of are admissible in evidence?

RULING:

Yes. The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original
is in the custody of the adverse party have been complied with. Villarama has
practically admitted the 2nd and 4th. As to the 3rd, he admitted their previous existence in
the files of VRTI and had even seen some of them. As to the 1st, he said that the
originals were missing and that VRTI was no longer in possession of the same.
However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to
show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. It is enough that the
circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his
control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, on
being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. Secondary evidence is
admissible where he denied having it in his possession. The party calling for such
evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the
exceptions to the best evidence rule is “when the original has been lost, destroyed or
cannot be produced in court.” The original of the vouchers must be deemed to have
been lost as even VRTI admit such loss. Thus, said evidence, though secondary, are
admissible.