Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in
the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906,
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the
25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and
issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of
the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of
the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose
it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the
registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it,
even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied
by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same
theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him,
he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to
have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus
lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition
for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot,
including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch
all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having
all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once
a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding
for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an
action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz,
17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175
Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does
an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no
innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are
foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the
burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the
registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the
torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does
not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles
only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not
be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateralproceeding and not
even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land
which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that
future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are
not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can
not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession.
Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription
(section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All
persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at
page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R.,
155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152;
Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however
that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of
title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter
of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack
in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land
the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest;
and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder
of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this
country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the
same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p.
237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice,
or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern."
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened
for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may
such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a
portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do
not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right
of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in
the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other
things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different
persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the
registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or
purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case
depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act,
even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other
express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule
for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule
which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real
intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case
land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two
different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument
of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served
with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they
became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose
their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not
set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be
to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system
is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered
title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land
cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration
and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip
of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it
all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured
their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or
right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of
the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the
appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he
was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in
the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the
registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906.
"Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the
subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in
court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for
impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning
the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked
by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,
that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule
between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the
owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before
the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title,
or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt
upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections
38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and
be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak
of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of
the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right
or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable
to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the
provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the
wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is
the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections?
May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the
original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their
lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be
included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said
sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be
protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase
"innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee?
The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued
until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged
with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so
recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it
contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so
well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real
Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords
Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what
the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was
ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be
absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages
to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage
is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the
courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea
of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May
a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of
its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from
such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved
from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had
no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all
persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory
upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can
plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know
the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It
would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from
the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a
part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another,
not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should
not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of
land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of
the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what
the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior
original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his
successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to
establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections,
should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully
included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought
under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all
subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could
Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in
his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus
had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold
his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of
land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes
the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of
the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting
from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in
the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with
the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We
believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his
successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a
mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate
who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate
and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one
who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should
suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has
obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens
system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will
be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who
has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should
be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having
and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the
error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate
issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other
duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for plaintiff-appellant.
Eduardo P. Arboleda and Jesus S. Rodriguez for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province
of Negros Occidental, the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey of
Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in addition to
attorney's fees and costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal taken by the
defendant, this judgment was, however, set aside by the Supreme Court (see
G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise, ordered the case
remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after which another decision was
rendered by said court of first instance dismissing plaintiff's complaint and
ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The
case is, once again, before us, this time on appeal by the plaintiff, the subject
matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan,
consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the
aforementioned cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares,
originally registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot
378 has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued on August 25, 1916, in
the name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the
aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents
as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable installments,
as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February 8, 1924, said Original
Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name. Meanwhile, or on
March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose
Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-
2). On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda,
including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first
mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These
transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, including said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295, covering Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance
of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated
September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda,
including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151 — which, owing to its subsequent loss, had
to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 — in the name of
the Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later, or on
November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares,
son of Jose Banares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments,
subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain in the
Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this
contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the
installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, on September 29, 1949, the Bank
executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of
Title RT-1371), in plaintiff's name (Exhibit O).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda
in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose
Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For
this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favor of Carlos
P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of
the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the Bank, on September 29, 1949,
plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot
378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.
Immediately, thereafter, or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations
with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation and, not being
satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present
action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired
Lot 378 in the year; 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that
immediately after the commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took
possession of said lot and began the construction thereon of the provincial
hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said lot
publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner thereof; that, "for
some reason or other and for cause beyond comprehension of the defendant
title thereto was never transferred in the name of said defendant"; that said lot
had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 16269 (dated December 31, 1937); and that plaintiff had acted
in bad faith in purchasing said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then
that the provincial hospital was where it is up to the present, and did not declare
said lot in its name for assessment purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that
Alfredo Montelibano, the controlling stockholder, president and general manager
of plaintiff corporation, was the first City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to
the support, operation and maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer,
dated November 8, 1950, defendant alleged, also, that the aforementioned
expropriation case was "amicably settled as between the parties herein, in the
sense that the ... Province of Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in fact pay
to Jose Benares the assessed value of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration
pertaining to said lot in excess of its assessed value which was paid by the
Province would be donated and was in fact donated by said ... Jose Benares in
favor of the Province purposely for hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant
herein had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
This decision appealed from in effect decided this question in the affirmative and
declared that plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the defendant, in view of which it
ordered the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is predicated,
substantially, upon the following premises, namely that case No. 3041 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the expropriation of the hospital
site of said province, was actually commenced on January 26, 1924; that,
among the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the
aforementioned cadastral survey, belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it,
on July 10, 1926, to the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the
corresponding transfer certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2) was issued on July 12,
1926; that, according the testimony of Jose Benares, the expropriation of Lot
378 was settled amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000; and that
defendant's failure to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot
378 was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of Lot No.
405-B" in the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and
credence, because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the
plaintiff and its president, for the former believes that the latter had
"manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been four
(4) litigations between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have been finally
decided against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he
testified to having been paid P12,000 by the Government, although, at the rate
of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to sell Lot
378; he should have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq. meters; (b) he
claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or 1925",
about "2 or 3 days" after the Government had taken possession of the land, and
to have sent the money next day to Pilar Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged
to have received the said sum of P12,000 on November 7, 1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco,
former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares
asserted that there was a written compromise agreement between him and the
Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely oral; and (b)
Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot 378,
the assessed value thereof, which was P430, and to donate to the Government
the difference between this sum and the true value of the property, but Benares
affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare, which he rejected, and that
he later demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the Government agreed to pay,
although, subsequently, he said that Rafael Alunan and Mariano Yulo had
prevailed upon him to accept P1,000 per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso
Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the
expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case "was
not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the acquisition
of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in 1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no
compromise agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had
been reached and that the expropriation had not been consummated. For
instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its
filing and the publication in the newspaper of the corresponding notices (Exhibit
1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the
Government, followed by the cancellation of the certificate of title in her name
and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the Province,
when contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment and of a
transfer certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly
suggest that no such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot 378 had
been made or reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March
12, 1921, and this mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was not
cancelled until September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have been
expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not
made a party in the expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in favor
of the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not
belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated
subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and participation. What is
more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935 (Exhibit R),
promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly
stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410, forming part of said Hacienda and
designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and 410-A, had been expropriated by
the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the
expropriation case and the chances are that the case was dismissed. The Court
had to examine carefully and minutely every single piece of evidence adduced
by both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the mystery. The Court
believes that the failure of the government to secure the corresponding transfer
of title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms a part of
Lot 405-B. This conclusion was arrived at after examining closely the plan,
Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the subdivided lots were properly
identified by lot numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the plan
encircled with red pencil, marked Exhibit X-1, is not labelled with the
corresponding lot number and that portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in
question, where the hospital building was constructed. This plan was prepared
for the government on May 12, 1927 by public land surveyor, Mr. Formento,
embracing lots covering over 22 hectares for the Capitol and hospital sites. The
fact that this particular portion was not labelled with the corresponding lot
number might have misled the authorities to believe that it formed a part of lot
405-B, which adjoins it, although separated by the creek. This lack of
reasonable explanation why the government failed to secure the corresponding
certificate of title to lot 378, when there is sufficient proof that Jose Benares was
paid and he executed the deed of sale in favor of the government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the
conscientiousness and moral courage that account for the well earned
reputation and prestige of the Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to
concur in the foregoing view. To begin with, there is no evidence, and defendant
has not even tried to prove, that the expropriation case had ever been dismissed
insofar as Lot 378 is concerned. Hence, the lower court merely speculated
about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was dismissed." By the way,
the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela, for he
testified that the expropriation case was still pending in 1934, when he ceased
to be the provincial treasurer, and the record before us suggests that since the
Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925 and completed the
construction of the hospital in 1926, there were no further proceedings in said
case..
With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever
that the authorities had been "misled ... to believe" that the portion at the lower
corner of said plan — which was enclosed, during the trial, within a circle in red
pencil, and marked as Exhibit X-1 — formed part of Lot 405-B, which had been
expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact, said portion, Exhibit
X-1, is not part of the land covered by the plan Exhibit X. A close examination of
the latter shows that the boundaries of said portion are not delimited on the plan.
More important still, on the right hand side of Exhibit X, the following appears in
bold letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403,405,
406, 407 and 410 Bacolod Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial Government
of Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said
enumeration and the explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to
the "Capitol Site", negates the possibility of its being mistaken by any body,
much less by government engineers, as including the hospital site, and, hence,
said Lot 378. Lastly, the very evidence for the defendant herein, specially the
assessor's field sheets and declarations of real property for tax purposes
(Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the Government had always regarded
Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In any event, said
possibility of mistake, if any, which would be remote, cannot suffice to warrant —
in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary — the conclusion that Lot
378 has already been acquired by the Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and
applied by him to the payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount could
not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly
agreed therefor, its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00. In this
connection, it should be noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings for
the hospital site, another expropriation case for the Capitol site, affecting
another property of Jose Benares, appears to have been instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may have mistaken the
payment for his land included in the Capitol site, as one intended for Lot 378,
which was affected by the hospital site. And this possibility may amount to a
probability when we consider that he erroneously believed that there had been
only one expropriation case, instead of two cases, against him, and that Lot 378,
was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in favor of the Philippine
National Bank. Evidently, he did not have, at least, an accurate recollection of
the events or transactions affecting his properties, and, hence, his testimony
may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged
acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be the
exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of
plaintiff's president to the effect that he did not know until 1949 that the land on
which the Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held that plaintiff
was "not a purchaser in good faith for having constructive knowledge of
defendant's possession of the property at the time it was bought by the plaintiff",
because Carlos P. Benares — whose right to buy the Hacienda Mandalagan
from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff — "is a part owner of the Capitol
Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein"; because the hospital was
already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot was declared in the name
of the Government" and "when plaintiff bought the lot in 1935 the purchaser
should have inquired as to its location and improvement"; because "it took the
plaintiff 14 years to sleep over the supposed rights to take possession of lot No.
378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that lot No. 378 was erroneously or
inadvertently included by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q & R) executed by the
Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiff subdivision and that same lot
was occupied by the defendant government for the provincial hospital for the
last 34 years, as owner thereof".
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did
not know until 1949 that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the provincial
hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known
to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such knowledge be deduced
from the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares,
for even the latter appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties.
Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently know that there were two (2)
expropriation proceedings effecting said properties: that the P12,000 received
by him from the Government was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was
one of the properties mortgaged by him to the Bank.
"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid
possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except when the
party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry (Tiburcio vs.
PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940,
March 30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13791, February 27,
1961). In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an
established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the
provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or
before the expropriation case for the hospital site had begun, said lot was
mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly registered,
as well as annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, was not cancelled
until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378
was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which acquired title
thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on
November 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter,
subsequently conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as well as when the bank
executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on September 20, 1949,
the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that sugar
centrals as well as banks are known to have an array of experienced and
competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified in assuming
that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were
satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were
constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In short, we
find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant,
we are of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot
378 is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what
is due by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to
recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time
when possession thereof was actually taken by the defendant, plus
consequential damages — including attorney's fees — from which
consequential damages the consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted,
with interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from
and after the date of said actual taking. The case should be remanded,
therefore, to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the date of said
actual taking and the amount of compensation collectible from the defendant,
and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs
against the defendant. It is so ordered..
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS
AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY.
HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432
and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two
(2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the
filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution
dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517
of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in
the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the
names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of
possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to
honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No.
4517. The Court, after considering the private respondents' opposition and
finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession
be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of
demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for
review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court.
As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March
25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No.
62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25,
1983. The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs
of possession and demolition issued in the respondent court should now be
implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court
was filed only to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the
respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but
futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and
that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the
filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26,
1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status
quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the
issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before
the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and
(2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court
was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic pending the
Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues
already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil
Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and
demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private
respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the
resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then
Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984,
dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the
Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983.
The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on
May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January
7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First
Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and
that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the
same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null
and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid
and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed
for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo,
Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case before this
Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661
filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial
Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of
this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon.
Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to
register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to
issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432
Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on
another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another
Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator
for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986
and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through
counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register
of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the
Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S.
Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of
possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per
its Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby
ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed
for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order
of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986
which was granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986.
Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period
granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of
this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new
Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of
the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez,
private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a
motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986
and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-
25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in
the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by
implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo — 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in
G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of
our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the
execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for
appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to
trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions
in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds
AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles
numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-
106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case
(Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and
annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was
upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12,
1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the
new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in
another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of
is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners,
the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to
immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-
111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based
on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of
the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land
and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice
of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate
of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-
111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No.
15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs,
versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject
Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the
registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or
proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens
was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral
proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69,
Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme
Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12,
1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for
reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case
No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds
to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the
Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners'
Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order
dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason
why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing
the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on
the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear
in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who
allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042,
p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera
and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge
Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other
co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R.
No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in
the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos
over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently
obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983
long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full
implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No.
64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of
possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No.
4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing
the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure
that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens
serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the
particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the
same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.
(Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I
Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18
SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in
this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of
Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to
the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been
filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and
undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under
peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by
the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where
the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are
unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the
Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis
pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara
Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register
of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently
forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may
also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been
misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact
he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871
prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984
to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court
below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various
pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the
petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT
No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register
of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens
certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to
the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any
deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where
any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of
Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to
the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party
in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of
Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The
statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments
in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language —
the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command
or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is
mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in
nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal
standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice oflis pendens annotated in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the
proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the
Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land
Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendensannotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517
of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never
have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the
wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents
involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens
Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order
of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are
SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18725 March 31, 1965
JOSE MA. LEDESMA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
FELIX VILLASEÑOR, movant-appellant.
Sicangco, Estino, Sison and Associates for petitioner-appellee.
Gabriel Benedicto for movant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Felix Villaseñor, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his
deceased father, Eusebio Villaseñor, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin the Register of Deeds of
the same province from registering a deed of sale by which the deceased
conveyed to Jose Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name, to wit, Lots Nos.
2532-C and 2533-B of the Cadastral Survey of Bago, Negros Occidental. The
reason given for seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was fictitious
and that the signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. The vendee, Ledesma, who
had not been impleaded as a party-defendant, intervened in the case. On
October 3, 1960 the court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed
the petition.
Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own petition in the cadastral
record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds be ordered to register the
aforementioned deed of sale. The ground alleged in the petition was that Civil
Case No. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued
therein had been dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either to
the Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the allegations
in the petition, issued the corresponding order for registration. In compliance
therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of title in the name
of the deceased Eusebio Villaseñor and issued new ones in Ledesma's name.
On October 8, 1960, again upon Ledema's petition, the court ordered the
cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still new ones,
also in his name.
Villaseñor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this
appeal upon their denial.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed from
because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant or to furnish him copy of
the petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No. 5662 and
not in the cadastral proceeding; (3) the court had no power to order the Register
of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question when the same was being
contested as fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in the name of the
supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the Register of Deeds had
improperly refused to register the deed of sale, the proper remedy should have
been a suit for mandamus.1äwphï1.ñët
We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it. To
be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5662 was
dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's petition the obstacle to
the registration of the deed of sale was removed. The effect of the dissolution
was immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been perfected
from the order of dismissal (Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Taco v.
Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is only as far as the Register of Deeds was
concerned, his duty under the circumstances — if the document was on its face
registrable — being administrative and ministerial. The lifting of the injunction,
however, or even the dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the court in
the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant, considering that the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 3662 was not yet final. The court knew of the pendency of that case and of
the fact that the relief sought therein by appellant was precisely to prevent
registration. Irrespective of the propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued,
that is, whether or not mandamus should have been resorted to, the least that
the court a quo should have done was to afford appellant proper notice and
hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections to the registration and present
evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's attention to the fact that the
question had not yet been definitely settled in the civil action since the order
dismissing it was not yet final.
It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial duties
under the law, to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and
quite another thing for the court itself to order the registration. The former does
not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties such as are required
in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of
a court judgment. The court a quo, in anticipating the action of the Register of
Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at the same time
preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by
appellant.
The orders appealed from are hereby set aside, with costs against appellee.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel
of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and
covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office
of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale
and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused
by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his
letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is
considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New
Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the
surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the
existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial
settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be
procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their
father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of
Agusan on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register
of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding
transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a
ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that
he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent
reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the
petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by
appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of
Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that
"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the
petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will
lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere
desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission
of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his
refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the
register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of
competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the
duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to
their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid
excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require
that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby
be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or
constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of
registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must
first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo &
Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic
Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted
with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that
it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step
to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to
the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing,
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section
4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. —
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be
taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or
other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest
does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter,
the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either
upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which
he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and
thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the
records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the
parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in
interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the
issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the
petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be
submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which
shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This
administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have
recourse to the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is
affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1äwphï1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC
Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos
Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548)
and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that
the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to
be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land
described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided
two-thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land
is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated
in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales
of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of
three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with
respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the
vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest
of the vendor. ...

Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...

xxx xxx xxx

Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo,
this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said
undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...

Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...

Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana
Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to
said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...

Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...

The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains
an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates
of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the
name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal
request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the
name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly
because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548
had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make
the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a
resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy,
the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described
in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided
portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers.
Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there
are now three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession of
the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be
surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three
co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a
court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to
have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.ñet
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would
want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their
possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of
the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner
to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance
with such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the
presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it
speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the
property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners
in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their
favor was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously
assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely,
that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a
voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the
register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the
case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably
issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land
Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies
was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until
otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several
copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be
adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated
on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized
to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the
land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to
carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease
to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in
upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since
the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of
the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia
Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving
spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too
general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the
partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest
therein — subject of course to the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is
not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the
deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-
thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half
share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold
portions of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the
character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the
different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of
donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the
rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices
of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
MELITON GALLARDO and TERESA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARTA VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE AGANA, VISITACION AGANA KIPPING, PEDRO V. AGANA,
MARCELO V. AGANA, JR., TERESITA AGANA SANTOS and JESUS V.
AGANA, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the
decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
promulgated on May 22, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69946 entitled Meliton
Gallardo and Teresa Villanueva v. Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, et al. (Rollo,
p. 37) affirming the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of Laguna 8th
Judicial District, Branch II, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna) dated January 20, 1982, which dismissed the complaint for
Quieting of Title in Civil Case No. SC-1492 and declared the plaintiff's
(petitioner's herein) Re-constituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-6293 (No.
23350) as null and void (Record on Appeal, pp. 215-216).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is in full accord with the evidence and
the law and is hereby therefore affirmed in all its part. Costs against plaintiff
-appellants
SO ORDERED.
The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in
Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially
covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924
owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva (former Justice of
the Peace of the Municipal Court, Cavinti, Laguna), pursuant to Decree No.
150562 issued in L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 136, Cad. Case No. 1 (Record
on Appeal; Answer, p. 28).
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin
of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the
daughter of Pedro Villanueva.
On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to
them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog
(Annex "B" of the complaint) that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro
Villanueva conveying and transfering the property in question in favor of the
petitioners (Record on Appeal, Exhibit "B", pp. 9-10) which deed is reproduced
as follows.
Ako, Pedro Villanueva, 66 taong gulang, balo at nananahanan sa municipio ng
Cavinti, lalawigang Laguna at Kapuluang Pilipinas, alang-alang sa halagang
LIMANG DAANG PISO (P500.00) salaping filipino, na sa akin ibinayad ng mag-
asawa ni Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva, tagarito rin sa nasabing
municipio, lalawigang at kapulwan sa hinaharap ng kasulatan ay sinasaysay ko
na aking inilillwat at pinagbili ng biling patuluyan sa nasabing mag-asawa
Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva, sampo na sa kanilay mangagmamana at
hahalili, ang aking isang palagay na lupa na nabubuo sa limang luang na
tubigan, punlang kalahating kabang palay at saka dalatan o katihan na may
isang kabang palay na hasik, tumatayo sa nayon ng Kanlurang Talaongan,
sakop nitong municipio ng Cavinti at napapaloob sa mga hangganang
sumusunod:
HILAGAAN, Braulio Villanueva at Modesto Ribera
SILANGAN, Braulio Villanueva.
TIMUGAN, Braulio Villanueva, Ilog Kaliraya at Jacinto Toque
KANLURAN, Jacinto Toque.
Ang pagaaring ito ay tunay kong pananarili sapagkat aking nabili sa
magkakapatid na Aniano Gallardo, Zacarias Gallardo at Perfecto Gallardo at
natatala sa Registro ng Amillarmiento dito sa Cavinti sa ilalim ng Blg. 22888, at
walang ano mang ipinagkakautang ni pinanagutan kaya at magagamit na nitong
aking pinagbilhan ang kanilang matuwid na maipamana at mailiwa sa iba.
Gayon ding sinasaysay ko na akoy umaakong mananagutan dito sa aking
pinagbilhan, tungkol sa pagaaring ito na ang katibay ay aking ipagsasanggalang
laban sa kanino mang maghahabol.
Dapat tantoin, gayon man, na ang pagaaring ito ay registrado na sa Registro de
la Propiedad nitong lalawigang Laguna, subalit at sa isang kamalian ng
pagkakasukat tungkol sa lawak at laki, ay hindi pa natutubos ang kanyang titulo,
kaya at kung maisaayos na ang nasabing titulo ay saka na ipatatala sa
pangalan nitong aking pinagbilhan upang lalong malagay sa katahimikan itong
aking pinagbilhan.
At sa katunayan ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito dito sa municipio ng Cavinti,
Laguna, ngayong ika sampung araw ng Agosto taong isanglibo siyam na daan
at tatlompu at pito (1937).
(LGD) PEDRO VILLANUEVA
Nagfirma sa hinaharap ni
(LGD) BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA
JUAN VILLANUEVA
Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled on the basis of the
private document of sale (Exhibit "B") and a new certificate of title was issued in
the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293
(No. 23350) on January 4, 1944, particularly describing the land as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 401 of the Cadastral Survey of Cavinti) with the
improvements thereon, situated in the municipality of Cavinti, Bounded on the N
and NE., by Lot No. 403; on the SE by Lot No. 393 and the Caliraya River; and
on the SW by Lot No. 515. Area — Eighty One Thousand and Three Hundred
(81,300) Square Meters, more or less. (Record on Appeal, Annex "A," pp. 7 and
9).
During the Second World War, the records as well as the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Laguna, where the original of their new transfer certificate of title
was kept, were completely burned. Accordingly, by virtue of an Affidavit of
Reconstitution dated December 2, 1958 (Record on Appeal, Annex "DD," pp. 41-
42) and upon presentation of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, the title
was administratively reconstituted and the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) in the name of the
petitioners (Record on Appeal, Annex "B", pp. 7).
On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro
Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Record on
Appeal, Annex "C", pp. 10-13). However, on December 6, 1976 a joint affidavit
was filed by Pedro G. Villanueva, Jr. and Restituto Villanueva withdrawing their
adverse claim on the said parcel of land, with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna (Record on Appeal, Annex " D, " pp. 13-14).
When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to
settle said controversy amicably. Several demands made by herein petitioners
upon private respondents Marta Vda. de Agana to withdraw her adverse claim,
failed.
On December 9, 1976, said private respondent executed a Deed of Conveyance
and Release of Claim (Record on Appeal and Annex "AA", p. 35) wherein the
parties agreed, among other things, to the following:
That in consideration of the said transfer and conveyance over a 1,000 square
meter portion mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, the VENDEE (Marta
V. Agana) does hereby withdraw the adverse claim mentioned above; (Rollo, p.
119).
However, when private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana refused to
sign an Affidavit of Quit-claim (Exhibit "9; " Record on appeal, p. 195), petitioners
instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo
S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the
Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977, demanding that their title
over the questioned land be fortified by a declaration of ownership in their favor
and avoiding the af/recited Deed of Conveyance and Release of Claim (Record
on Appeal, pp. 1-7). Accordingly, private respondents in their answer countered
that the Deed of Sale in Tagalog and petitioners' title over the land be declared
void ab initio, among other demands (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-35).
On January 20, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its
decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the
reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio Record on
Appeal, pp. 208-216).
The dispositive portion of said decision (Record on Appeal, pp. 215-216) reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs, as follows:
a. declaring as null and void the private document dated August 10, 1937 written
in Tagalog (Exhibit B);
b. declaring as null and void plaintiffs' reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title
RT-6293 (No. 23350) (Exhibit F) and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna
to issue a new reconstituted or to reinstate Original Certificate of Title No. 2262
issued on April 2, 1924 in the name of Pedro Villanueva within thirty (30) days
from the finality of this decision;
c. declaring the heirs of Pedro Villanueva as the owners of the property in
litigation and ordering the plaintiffs and her agents and those acting for in their
behalf to vacate the land in question and surrender the possession of the same
to the heirs of the late Pedro Villanueva thru Marta V. Agana;
d. declaring all buildings; plantings and improvements introduced by the plaintiffs
forfeited in favor of' the defendants:
e. ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the defendants the sum of
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
f. ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay defendants the sum of
P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees: and
g. ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay defendants the sum of
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal on February 10, 1982, followed by an
appeal made to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate
Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
On August 30, 1984, the Court in its Resolution without giving due course to the
petition required the respondents to comment on the said petition (Rollo, p. 50).
However, the counsel for private respondents failed to file comment on the
petition for review on certiorari within the period which expired on September 17,
1984. Thus, in the Resolution of January 7, 1985 the Court, required counsel for
petitioners to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him (Rollo, p. 51).
On February 23, 1985 respondents filed their comment (Rollo, p. 57).
Considering respondents' comment as answer the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda
(Rollo, p. 104).
Private respondents and petitioners filed their respective memoranda on May
18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 117) and on June 7, 1985 (Rollo, p. 143) respectively. On
July 1, 1985, the Court resolved to consider the case submitted for deliberation
(Rollo, p. 168).
Petitioners, however filed a Supplemental Memorandum, with leave of court on
May 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 169) which was noted by the court in its resolution dated
June 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 188).
In its petition petitioners raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBIT B DOES NOT
TRANSFER OWNERSHIP, THE SAME BEING NULL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
ARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF- APPELLANTS
CANNOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LAND BY PRESCRIPTION
UPON THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO TITLE TO REGISTERED LAND IN
DEROGATION OF THAT OF THE REGISTERED OWNER SHALL BE
ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT STATUTE OF
LIMITATION HAS SET INTO THIS CASE; AND,
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFlCATE OF
TITLE NO. RT-6293 AS NULL AND VOID.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of
petitioners.
It is admitted that the land in question is formerly covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 2262, issued in the name of Pedro Villanueva and that the
cancellation of said OCT No. 2262 and the issuance of the reconstituted
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) are based either on the
Affidavit for Reconstitution of Teresa Villanueva and not of Pedro Villanueva, or
the unnotarized deed of sale of August 10, 1937 (Annex "B" for plaintiffs), held
void by the lower court and by the Court of Appeals. As a consequence TCT No.
RT-6293 (No. 23350) was likewise held void ab initio. (Record on Appeal, p. 20).
As to the validity of the Affidavit for Reconstitution, affiant Teresa Villanueva
testified on December 19, 1980, that she did not know anything about the
reconstitution of their title as it was their children who took charge of the same
and that she never participated in the said reconstitution. In fact she never
appeared before the Notary Public and this testimony was corroborated by the
testimony of Eleuterio Rebenque, entry clerk in the Office of the Register of
Deeds who never made any categorical affirmation that said Teresa Villanueva
appeared at said office. (Rollo, p. 43).
Consequently, the crux of the matter now centers on whether or not the
unnotarized deed of sale purportedly executed on August 10, 1937 by the
primitive owner Pedro Villanueva, in favor of petitioners, can be considered as a
valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land
registerd under the Torrens System. Corollary thereto, it becomes necessary to
examine other matters surrounding the execution of the alleged document of
sale (Exhibit B).
Petitioners claim that the sale although not in a public document, is nevertheless
valid and binding citing this Court's rulings in the cases of Cauto v. Cortes, 8
Phil. 459, 460; Guerrero v. Miguel, 10 Phil. 52, 53; Bucton v. Gabar 55 SCRA
499 wherein this Court ruled that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.
The contention is unmeritorious.
As the respondent court aptly stated in its decision:
True, as argued by appellants, a private conveyance of registered property is
valid as between the parties. However, the only right the vendee of registered
property in a private document is to compel through court processes the vendor
to execute a deed of conveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration.
Plaintiffs-appellants' reliance on Article 1356 of the Civil Code is unfortunate.
The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in
whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the essential requisites
for their validity are present. The next sentence provides the exception, requiring
a contract to be in some form when the law so requires for validity or
enforceability. Said law is Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other
things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall
certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated."
Such law was violated in this case. The action of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized
and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale.
With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act
496 (now Sec. 112 of P.D. No. 1529) provides:
Sec. 127. Deeds of Conveyance, ... affecting lands, whether registered under
this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in
accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey,
encumber, ... or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the more
prolix forms heretofore in use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be
signed by the person or persons executing the same, in the presence of two
witnesses, who shall sign the instrument as witnesses to the execution
thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed by the
person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall
certify to such acknowledgement substantially in the form next hereinafter
stated. (Emphasis supplied).
It is therefore evident that Exhibit " E " in the case at bar is definitely not
registerable under the Land Registration Act.
Likewise noteworthy is the case of Pornellosa and Angels v. Land Tenure
Administration and Guzman, 110 Phil. 986, where the Court ruled:
The deed of sale (Exhibit A), allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of
Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their
right to the parcel of land. WhiIe it is valid and binding upon the parties with
respect to the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is not sufficient to convey
title or any right to the residential lot in litigation. Acts and contracts which have
for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real
rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.
Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of
the assailed document, the trial court found that said private document (Exhibit
"B") was null and void and that it was signed by somebody else not Pedro
Villanueva. Such findings of fact besides being based on the records, were
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
The contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against
the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors (Umbay vs.
Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]). The right to recover possession of registered
land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership
(Umbay vs. Alecha,supra, citing Atun v. Nuñuz 97 Phil. 762; Manlapas and
Tolentino v. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298, 308: J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 117
Phil. 110, 113-114) where land has been registered under the Torrens System
(Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390; Umbay v. Alecha, supra) because the efficacy
and integrity of the Torrens System must be protected (Director of Lands v. CA,
120 SCRA 370). As prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose
objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great
distances of time and suprising the parties or their representatives when the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or
death or removal of witnesses ( Senoan v. Sorongon, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
In the matter of laches, the Court aptly stated in the case of Marcelo Sotto v.
Pilar Teves, et al., 86 SCRA 155 [1978] that "in determining whether a delay in
seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential
relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration.
A delay under such circumstance is not as strictly regarded as where the parties
are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied
between near relatives, and the fact that the parties are connected by ties of
blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay."
In the case of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Alfonso Lim, 123 SCRA 464, 480
[1983]), the Court ruled that laches cannot be asserted by a mere possessor
without claim of title, legal or equitable because for laches to exist, there should
be a showing of delay in asserting the complainant's right. The complainant
should have knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and an opportunity
to institute a suit. Delay is not counted from the date the lot was sold to the
buyer but from the time of entry of the defendant or from the time the
complainant came to know of the occupancy for that is the only time it could
possibly have demanded that he get out of the premises or could have instituted
a suit. In the case at bar, it will be noted that what transpired was an
administrative reconstitution, essentially ex-parte and without notice, thereby
lending credence to the claim that private respondent Marta Agana was
unaware of such reconstitution and possession until she discovered the same in
the Office of the Register of Deeds in 1976. As such it cannot be claimed that
she slept on her right as from that time on, it is undeniable that she filed her
adverse claim on the said lot.
After a careful perusal of the case, there appears to be no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of
the trial court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES
COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court in
CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case No. N-506, G.L.R.O.
Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry,
Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. " The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the
bigger portion of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A
together with the improvements thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal
age, widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City,
Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15
meters wide which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial
Road and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties of the
Province of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province. The
oppositions of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Philippine
Fisheries Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of 2.6864 hectares
which is enclosed in red pencil and is found inside Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit
is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final let the
corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo)
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution
dated December 14, 1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is —
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive
Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or
varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief
for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described
in Plan Psu-150727, containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were
the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged
among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land having bought them
from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought
the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands
opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which
could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been
in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30
years prior to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other
hand anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific
portions of the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of
approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps and are within
Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista,
Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject
parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted
in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of
Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on
August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as
oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and
control of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to
the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of
the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after
excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall
of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15
meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
assigning the following errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND
AND LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE
UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE
APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD
BEEN PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE
TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the
Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for
reconsideration of the same hence the present petition with two (2) assigned
errors, basically the same issues raised with the respondent court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR
STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE
SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS
PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE
REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN
QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20, Brief for the Petitioners, p.
105, Rollo)
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System,
11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion
of the public domain. These are more particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1",
"B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest, consisting of 19.4080
hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-
A," is now the center of controversy of the present appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed
facts that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project
No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of
February 18, 1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect that the area in
question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court in affirming the
decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the controverted portion of
19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block "B,"
L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the public forest not
susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit convincing
proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural
purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands. Respondent
court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a controverted
parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be settled by
competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land registration
proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to submit to the court
convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture
than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent court
did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force particularly where, as in
the case at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the
government taking any positive step to dislodge the occupants from their
holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by purchase."
(p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our impression that
private respondents claim the rule of prescription against the government.
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the
controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the
municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as
lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly
therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry
to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more
valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of
whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said forest land
had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original applicant of the
lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49, cited by private
respondents themselves in their brief, We held —
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40
Phil. 10), it is again held, that whether a particular parcel of land is more
valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a
fact which must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the
particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in
each particular caseunless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside
said land for forestry or mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis)
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that-
... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under
either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all
public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the
taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the
Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber
land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines
the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral
but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the
President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the
respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is
within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry,
the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which
cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a
rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET
ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, declaring that:
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting
of 11.1863 hectares of coconut land and admittedly within the disposable portion
of the public domain are hereby ordered registered in the name of the applicant
Filomeno Gallo and/or his successors-in-interest as provided for by the Public
Land Law; and
2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A,"
consisting of 19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public domain of
the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore inalienable.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO
MARTINEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA
TANALEGA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions
dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan,
Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a
common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly.
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an
application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land,
situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093
square meters, more or less.
On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to
the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.
On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an
opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private
appropriation.
On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:
Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez
during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land, subject matter of this
application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land was
assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-
opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his report
and/or comment as to whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the
lower court a report stating.
That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is
entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of
Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097.
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito
Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for,
having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or
less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of the
land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng
kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation purposes
only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that
possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner.
Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of
Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since
1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is
devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the ones
tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one hand,
and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the other;that eighteen (18)
hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.
While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked
on the land of the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less; that
said Luisito Martinez inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay
only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the land,
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for
registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed
as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2)
parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less,
and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly
described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by
Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively.
On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued
by the Commissioner of Land Registration.
On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a
report within ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has been issued
patents or is the subject of any pending application for the issuance of patents.
Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to
submit within the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued
a title or is the subject of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed
a report in the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration
"do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of
Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative Code." Later,
on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed
in the lower court another report or manifestation stating "that Plans (LRC)
SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, when
plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission does not appear to
overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and
records of said Land Registration application will be subjected to further
examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court is
received in this Commission to determine whether or not a patent or title has in
the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."
At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower
court issued an Order of General Default against all persons, with the exception
of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office
of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo Martinez represented by Atty.
Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their respective oppositions,
On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the
Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for
are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent
herein), testified in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Miguel
Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her
documentary evidence in support of her application for registration. On the other
hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and submitted
documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the provincial fiscal's
office in this case.
At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27
years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely,
notoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said
land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land" in the
same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land
for the years 1970-1972.
Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were
the ones working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents,
on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when
the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands were planted to
palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables.
Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he
had known Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; that she was
the one managing the planting and improving of the land; that he used to see
Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito del Rosario worked
on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him that in
1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.
At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for
the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B.
Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the
tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an
approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and
described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for
Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry as
such on February 16, 1972."
The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa
Llamas, to testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also failed
to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her
alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the
applicant had possessed the land as owners.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions,
dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject
parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and
Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public
land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such
being the case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the application for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likewise
stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by
voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory
registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in
order.
It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, 1 the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely
inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan,
Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No.
626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared
Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the
lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an
answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be
allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the
claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot
numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township
or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining
lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express
grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest,
the answer need state the length of time property was held in possession and
the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during
which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in
possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest
claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have
been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if
any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In
the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their
answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their
claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the
portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them. The
Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its
decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the
subject land, under the doctrine ofres judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in
rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from
re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must
necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the
respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area
applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long
the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to
submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept
of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not
approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission.
The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by
respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are
expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries.
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character
and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby
reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III,
ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA,
EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS
CITY, respondents.
 DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period
provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the
reversion of property acquired through such means.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR CV No. 44568. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE and
RECALLED."2
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA thus:
"On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed with the
District Land Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .
3899 hectares, more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. "A"; Exh "9").
It appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was executed
under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his
investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office, Bureau of
Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas City
approved the application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the applicant.
On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent
was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration
and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15 Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was issued to
[respondent] by defendant Register of Deeds.
"On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-
complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the
District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City,
for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
[respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal
Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his
Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management
Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil
proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of [respondent].
"In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage
Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank
(hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of
P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was
annotated at the back of the title.
"On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against
[respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas
City covering Free Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an
area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City.
"On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent] died.
He was substituted by his wife Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely:
Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga, Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga.
Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga III.
xxx xxx xxx
"After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion decreed as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of Free Patent
Application No. 3358 and issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the
name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio and
the court orders:
‘a) the cancellation of the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering
Lot No. 1, Mli-06-000020-D with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less,
located at Dumulog, Roxas City;
‘b) the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent No. (VI-
2) 3358 in the name of Felipe Alejaga;
‘c) the land covered thereby as above described is reverted to the mass of the
public domain;
‘d) the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine National
Bank, Roxas City Branch, to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of above
described Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 to the Register of Deeds (now
Registries of Land Titles and Deeds), Roxas City;
‘e) the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original Certificate
of Title No. P-15 and the owner’s duplicate copy of said title surrendered by
above stated defendants;
‘f) defendant’s, Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed.
"Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr.’"3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation
that respondents had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through
fraud and misrepresentation.4 The appellate court likewise held that, assuming
there was misrepresentation or fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for
reversion should have been brought within one (1) year from the registration of
the patent with the Registry of Deeds.5
Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that
Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free
patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.6 The CA added that petitioner had failed
to support its claim that the lot covered by respondent’s free patent and title was
foreshore land.7
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
"I

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case is already final
and executory as against respondent PNB.

"II

The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has proven the
allegations to the Complaint.

"III

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action for reversion
is unavailing."9

Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the
grant of the free patent and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title issued
in consequence thereof.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent
Alejagas’ free patent and Certificate of Title.10 It also avers that Respondent
PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested right
over the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven open,
actual, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land for more than 30
years.11
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt by
Respondent PNB of a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3,
1993 as alleged by petitioner.12 Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on
November 9, 1993, within the 15-day reglementary period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition -- the
presence of fraud -- is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review
factual matters.13 However, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions,
because the findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the
evidence on record.14
We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party
alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.15 The
circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in
each case.16 It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in
as many different ways.17 Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear
and convincing evidence.18
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of
evidence before the trial court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the
patent.19 This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over the
lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of
which were20 ignored by the Court of Appeals.21
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the
procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.22 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in
the application are true.23
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the
municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse
claimants the opportunity to present their claims.24 Note that this notice and the
verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an
application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.’s Application for Free Patent25 was
dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation &
Verification Report26 prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District
Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27,
1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the "necessary
investigation and verification in the presence of the applicant." Even if we accept
this statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot be condoned
because, obviously, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation
allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the Public
Land Act.27 As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
verification should have been done only after the filing of the application. Hence,
it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own investigation
and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the
Application for Free Patent.28 It must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist
that an investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it preceded
the filing of the application.29
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is
not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no
signature.30 Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty31 is thus misplaced. Since Recio’s signature does not appear on
the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption that an
investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually conducted.
Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the Verification &
Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will
later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever
existed -- is overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been
successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not
actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as
"independently relevant." A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the former’s
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating
the hearsay rule.32
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-
examination, the Investigation Report33 he had submitted to the director of the
Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report
that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay.34 On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio
may be considered as independently relevant.35
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the
making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue36 or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact.37
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he
had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly
admitted by the trial court.38
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioner’s contention that
the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.39 Such fraud is a ground for
impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title.40 The invalidity of the patent is
sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in consequence
thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former.41 Verily, we must
uphold petitioner’s claim that the issuance of the Alejagas’ patent and title was
tainted with fraud.42
Second Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the
reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public domain.43 On the other
hand, the Alejagas claim that, pursuant to Section 32 of PD 152944 -- otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree -- the one-year period for reversion
has already lapsed.45 Thus, the State’s Complaint for reversion should be
dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued,
the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent
becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter.46 However, this
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.47 Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrant’s already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is
not a mode of acquiring ownership.48
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,49 the State --
even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to
the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.50 Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by
the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in
securing the title.51
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked
by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud.52 Public
policy demands that those who have done so should not be allowed to benefit
from their misdeed.53 Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by
the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud by private
individuals.54 This is settled law.55
Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas’ title was validly issued, there is another
basis for the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public
domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 14156 proscribes the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead
within five years from its grant.57The prohibition against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application.58
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title to,
or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or any
improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title or
interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the approval of
the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and if
such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than education, charity, or
easement of way.59
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 335860 was approved and issued on
March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-1561 was
issued on the same date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of
the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan62 in
the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate itself that
the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from
the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of
land covered by OCT No. P-15.63 In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then
Cashier III of respondent bank, even admitted that the PNB was aware of such
restriction.
"COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you
credit investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have personally
examined this?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] patent?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979.
A Yes, your honor.
COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the
government or within five years from its issuance?
A Yes, your honor.
COURT Why did you recommend the loan?
A Because it is just a mortgage."64
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely
within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land
Act.65 A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the
foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the
property.66
As early as Pascua v. Talens,67 we have explained the rationale for the
prohibition against the encumbrance of a homestead -- its lease and mortgage
included -- an encumbrance which, by analogy, applies to a free patent. We
ruled as follows:
"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of
the patent."
Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free patent
constitutes sufficient ground for the nullification of such grant, as provided under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which we quote:
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred
and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be
unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of
the property and its improvements to the State."
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies the
award and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the state, as
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals:68
"The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of
land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant
of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of
the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain."69
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years
from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel
land granted to him. The mortgage he made over the land violated that
condition.70 Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain,
pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156951 September 22, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASIG, RIZAL,respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, intervenor
x-------------------------------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, represented by HON.
SECRETARY ANGELO T. REYES, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, GENERAL NARCISO
L. ABAYA, intervenors
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 173408 September 22, 2006
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, MGEN. MARCIANO ILAGAN (Ret.), MGEN.
PONCIANO MILLENA (Ret.), BGEN. JUANITO MALTO (Ret.), BGEN.
RAYMUNDO JARQUE (Ret.) and COL. DOMINADOR P. AMADOR
(Ret.),petitioners,
vs.
L/T. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., respondent.
x-------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, the
issue of ownership of a large tract of land.
In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines seeks
to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated January 28, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the dismissal by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, of the Republic’s complaint for
declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title against the herein private
respondent, the Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI).
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and
five (5) retired military officers pray that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr.,
the present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), be
asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for having
announced time and again that the military officers and their families in the
contempt action would be ousted and evicted from the property subject of the
main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by
the Court.
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment2 to the petition in G.R.
No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), followed by
the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined causes with the
petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The Court, per its
Resolutions dated September 3, 2003,3 and September 29, 2003,4 respectively,
allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding petitions-for-
intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were ordered
consolidated.
The Republic’s recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following
backdrop:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No.
4235 establishing a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley – later
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The
proclamation "withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and reserve[d] for military
purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] … the
[certain] parcels of the public domain [indicated in plan Psu-2031]" situated in
the several towns and a city of what was once the Province of Rizal. On its face,
the proclamation covers three (3) large parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No. 2
(portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3 with an
area of 15,912,684 square meters and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128
square meters are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort
McKinley, Rizal. Specifically mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit
within its boundaries are the American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq.
m.), the Traffic Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular area
(100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined
areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them open for
disposition. These are Proclamation No. 4616 and Proclamation No. 462,7 both
series of 1965, excluding portions of the reservation and declaring them the AFP
Officers’ Village and the AFP EM’s Village, respectively, to be disposed of under
Republic Act (R.A.) 2748 and R.A. 7309 in relation to the Public Land Act (C.A.
141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172 dated October
16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to the same laws aforementioned, save
those used or earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions of the
reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and the Signal
Village, all in Taguig, Metro Manila.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A.
7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to own, hold and administer
portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the
President10 and to dispose, after the lapse of a number of months, portions of
Fort Bonifacio.11
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels
of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as or are
situated in what is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio.
As may be gathered from the pleadings, military officers, both in the active and
retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing
units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP on the JUSMAG area.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives
of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 1508412 - in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG
area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property covered thereby as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-
2031) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. …
containing an area of …(398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd
76057, being a portion of parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in
Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. … containing an area of
… (1,320) SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.)
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a
notarized Deed of Sale13purportedly executed on the same date by then
Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase price as written in the
conveying deed wasP11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department
of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October
30, 1991 deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken
by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are embodied in his
Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. 815-1093.14 Its highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale … issued in favor of the Navy Officers
Village Association (NOVA) … containing the … signature of "ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR." … designated as "Q-961" ….
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale … issued in favor of SHAI … containing the
signature of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." ... designated as "Q-962….
xxx xxx xxx
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures
"ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted,
under stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lens, with the aid of
photographic enlargement … reveals that there exist fundamental, significant
differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the
standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner in
execution of strokes; that of the standard/sample signatures show free, rapid
coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of
letters/elements.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked
"Q-961" is a product of TRACING PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample
signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same
person.
The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a
TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
REMARKS:
The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO
G. PALAD, JR." are still in the process of examination.15
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum
Order No. 17316 directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute
action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the
Navy Officer’s Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the
reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed
with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title
suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 63883 and eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the Republic
alleged that fraud attended SHAI’s procurement of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph
No. 5 of the complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void
owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is
spurious as the purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are
no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged
payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable,
being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.17
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material
allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as the
October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic is
estopped to deny.18 SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price
indicated in the deed as evidenced byOfficial Receipt No. 6030203-C dated
October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which the
Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the Deed of
Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit
"B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and "B" as
its Exhibits "1" and"2," respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it would
appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due execution and
genuineness of Exhs. "A" and "B."19
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document
Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and
asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit "A" is a forgery. For his part,
Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and
denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding office
outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not
have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area
which, apart from its being outside of the LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the
first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved around the absence of
bureau records respecting SHAI’s application to acquire, payment of the
purchase price and Psd-76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084. 20
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the
person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought with him PNP QDR
No. 001-96 and testified that Palad’s signature in Exhibit "A"(same as Exh. "1")
is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying
that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one
Engr. Eugenia Balis,21 followed by the payment in full of the contract price. Atty.
Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal, also testified about his
having endorsed to Palad a letter-inquiry he received from SHAI respecting the
authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palad’s response-letter dated January 23, 1992
(Exh. "10"), according to Atty. Garcia, is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must
be genuine as it emanated from the Registry’s office on the basis of the October
30, 1991 Deed of Sale.22
On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit "10" and an LMB official
would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia.
Eventually, in a decision23 dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the Republic’s complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15,
1991 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the deed
in question as no longer part of the FBMR.
Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454.
In the herein assailed Decision24 dated January 28, 2003, the appellate court
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic on the threshold abstract submission that
the CA "completely ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of
substance which, if duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of this
case."
In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the "what-can-be-
raised" line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the issues
raised therein, particularly those bearing on the authenticity ofExhibit
"A"/"1," are mainly questions of fact, adding that the matter of the inalienability
of the area purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon during the pre-trial
stage.
The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the reasons proffered
above.
While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far
from absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,25 citing Floro v. Llenado,26 for one,
suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court
to review the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in … and subsequent
cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the
judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; 6) …; 7) …; 8) …; 9) when the [CA] manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the
findings of facts … are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three
of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAI’s stance about the petitioner Republic being barred
from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the same
at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule, as
articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro,27 is that the
determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of others
on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the rationale for such
preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as possible the trial
out of the realm of surprises and back-handed maneuverings. And lest it be
overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in pre-trials is,
as Bergano v. Court of Appeals28 teaches, citing Gicano v. Gegato,29 subject to
exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the importance of the same rule,
the Court is possessed with inherent power to suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operations whenever the demands of justice so
require.30
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-trial
conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to tackling the question of
inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal than factual. As it
were, the element of surprise is not really present here. For the issue of
inalienability, which is central to the Republic’s cause of action, was raised in its
basic complaint, passed upon by the CA and, before it, by the trial court31 and
of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the
land alleged sale was part of the … [FBMR]. Now as part of the …[FBRM] do
you know whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those
government lands that has been assigned to other government agencies that is
no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that
because the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose
under the DND ….32 (Words in bracket added.)
At any rate, Palad’s testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent
SHAI. It even cross-examined said witness.33 The rule obtains that the
introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the pre-
trial order amounts to implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try
such issue.34
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the
clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during the period
material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or
cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of
the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the
military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republic’s and the intervenor’s parallel assertions are correct.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of
the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its
branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.35 Such tract or tracts of land
thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other
disposition until again declared alienable.36 Consistent with the foregoing
postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a
part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable,37 unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as
disposable and alienable public land.38 And until a given parcel of land is
released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and
reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable,
its status as part of a military reservation remains,39 even if incidentally it is
devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it must
be here.
There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned
October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under
Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would categorically
say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that "subject land is
within military reservation,"40 and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is
the private property of the government and therefore removed from the concept
of public domain per se,41 its own evidence themselves belie its posture. We
start with its Exhibit "2" (petitioner’s Exh. "B"), a copy of TCT No. 15084, which
described the area covered thereby measuring 399,922 square meters as a
"portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort
Bonifacio." Complementing its Exhibit "2" is its Exhibit "1" - the deed of sale -
which technically described the property purportedly being conveyed to private
respondent SHAI as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan
Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx
(Emphasis added) …
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private
respondent’s Exhibits "1" and "2,"formed part of that wide expanse under
Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of
the public domain as falling within its coverage. These include, inter alia, the
entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu
2031 located inside the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant point,
was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation Map
of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu
203142 prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the
outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also
shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAI’s TCT No. 15084,
defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-colored borders
of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAI’s TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of
the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No. 3
of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA,
DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has maintained all along this thesis.
Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property is part of
the reservation, the petitioner Republic need only to demonstrate that all of the
15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved
for military purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of reservation is the law
or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance of
which courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court.43
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked
Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the
proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084,
inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and
hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court seemed
to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain admissions
made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made in its answer
to the Republic’s allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of its complaint. To the
Republic’s allegations that the property covered by TCT No. 15084 was and
remains part the FBMR, SHAI’s answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs … 5 of the complaint,
the truth of the matter being that – in the Deed of Sale …, the Director of Lands
Certificate (sic) that he is "authorized under the law to sell" the subject property
and that the "lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee.44 ( Emphasis
and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic
alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the former’s denial to such
allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No. 15084
being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules on pleadings, a specific,
not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it is so qualified
or termed "specific" by the pleader.45 The defendant must specify each material
factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he will rely
to support his denial.46 Else, the denial will be regarded as general and will,
therefore, be regarded as an admission of a given material fact/s stated in the
complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what, under
the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the Republic’s averments that
what SHAI’s TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the
process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to admit the reality of such
averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than sufficiently
established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of land covered by TCT
No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on the issue of
inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence to disprove inalienability
or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for settlement purposes,
effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or excluded from the coverage
of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it
should be for the cogency of SHAI’s claim respecting the validity of both the
underlying deed of sale (Exh. "A"/"1") and its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") rests
on the postulate that what it purportedly bought from the LMB had ceased to be
part of the reserved lands of the public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove
that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the reservation and declared
open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as
against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of
evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it wanted to, pointed
to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its own Exhibit "5,"47 a letter
dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding General, M/Gen Lisandro
Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the SHAI, cannot but be viewed
as a party’s judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be excluded from
the military reservation. The Abadia letter, with its feature dis-serving to private
respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Dear Mrs. Gabon:
This is in connection with your move to make a petition to President Aquino
regarding the possible exclusion of Southside Housing Area from the military
reservation and for its eventual allotment to the … military officers presently
residing thereat. Allow me to state that I interpose no objection …. I find it …
helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of the Fort Bonifacio military
reservation …. (Underscoring added.)
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand how
the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The appellate court, apparently swayed
by what SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees48 that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that …, then President
Diosdado Macapagal … issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 … an area of 2,455,810 square meters more
or less…. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio containing an area of 4,436,
478 …. So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288]
square meters covered by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved
for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857
square meters or more or less 16 hectares ….49
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following
disquisition:
The foregoing admission aside, appellant’s [now petitioner’s] reliance on
Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that the land in litigation is
inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit serous
consideration. While it is true that, under the said July 12, 1957 Proclamation,
then President Carlos P. Garcia reserved the area now known as Fort Bonifacio
for military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our attention to
the fact, among other matters, that numerous exceptions thereto had already
been declared through the years. The excluded areas under Proclamation No.
461, dated September 29, 1965 and Proclamation No. 172, dated October 16,
1987 alone already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures in bracket added.)
The CA’s justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAI’s misleading assertion as a springboard to justify
speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved for military
purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On
the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 excluded a combined area
of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of
the disputed parcels of land having been reserved for military purposes to a
rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation because
6,892,338 square meters had already been withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is
simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual speculations do not make for
proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and quite
understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any proclamation, or
legislative act for that matter, segregating the property covered by TCT No.
15084 from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of
the public domain classified as a military reservation remains as such until, by
presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such
classification and declared open to disposition.50 The October 30, 1991 Deed of
Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity,
could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG
area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAI’s unyielding stance
that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the
LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the
Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its
officials or agents.51
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent
are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the
FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the
JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its reclassification as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such hypothesis
would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI. The reason therefor is
basic: Article XII, Section 352 of the 1987 Constitution forbids private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated the
observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear under existing
jurisprudence,53 the fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are
prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this
disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however,
without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991
Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the authenticity of what
appears to be Palad’s signature thereon.
With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances
and inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the
authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery.
The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent states,
without elaboration, that Palad’s declaration is aimed at avoiding "criminal
prosecution".54 The NBI signature expert corroborated Palad’s allegation on
forgery.55Respondent SHAI’s expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes
the NBI’s findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel
each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office
at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad
nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the
notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there
stamped "Received" by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of
October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the
whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The
very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head,
while in the exercise of his functions as the bureau’s authorized contracting
officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to
purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act.56 There is also no
record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an
application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property
valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November
24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management
Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court57attest to
this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization
and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau
record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.58
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the "deed of
sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203—C dated 29 October
1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment … of the agreed purchase price….." An
official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it
kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment,59 it
failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. A Certification under date
September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that "OR # 6030203
in the amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not among the
series of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to the Cashier,
LMB, Central Office."60 A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any of the
pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume that no such OR
exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as
paid has, in fact, never been paid.61
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in
cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in
a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAI’s witnesses’
account taxes credulity to the limit.
A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to pass
without the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a dishonest buck at the
expense of the government and most likely the members of SHAI. No less than
its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos) testified that a "facilitator" did, for a
fee, the necessary paper and leg work before the LMB and the Registry of
Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and issuance of the
certificate of title in question.62 Ms. Santos identified Eugenia Balis, a geodetic
engineer, as the "facilitator"63 who "facilitated all these presentation" of
documents,64 and most of the time, "directly transacted" with the LMB and the
Register of Deeds leading to acquisition of title.65 Engr. Balis was, in the course
of Ms. Santos’ testimony, directly mentioned by name for at least fifteen (15)
times. Not surprisingly, Engr. Balis did not appear in court, despite SHAI’s stated
intention to present her as witness.66
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this and
the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the Fact–Finding
Commission,67 "so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land …
complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation Benefits
System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in
comparison."68 The members of private respondent SHAI may very well have
paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the
JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the over P11 Million
they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the
commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong hands and did not enter the
government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of such payment.
At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring the petitioner Republic,
and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There
is nothing unjust to this approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No.
173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the
petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and,
accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in the
housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic. However,
contempt petitioners’ expressed revulsion over the efforts of the military
establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their
respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R. No. 156951
could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end
thisponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not always right; that
ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian or
military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat lightly any attempt to trifle,
intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming respect
to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court is a must for the
orderly administration of justice to triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the appealed
CA Decision is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale
dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. "A"/"1") purportedly executed in favor of private
respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084 (Exh. "B"/"2") of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal issued on the basis of such deed are declared VOID. The Register of
Deeds of Pasig or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to CANCEL
TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby
is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same
has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from such
reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or their
assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately upon the finality of
this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise
known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act.
Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further
thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL
MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG,
as Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION
TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL
ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING
COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN,respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents,
their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the
sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-
ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer
for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the
petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of
strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively
prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding
process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by
the Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary
Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment
by the Court's resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were
consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in
the Laurel case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the
respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to file
comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an extension
of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion
for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for
extension of time which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the
attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have been
pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047
asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved
to decide the two (2) cases.
I
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
which has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at
present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of
around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a commercial lot now
being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara,
Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the
Japanese government for national development projects are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550
million would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual
schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are
divided into those for use by the government sector and those for private
parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine.
Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to
Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities
in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government
under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading
"Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June
27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976
when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of
our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has
remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former
Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property
the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima
Corporation — which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and
one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine
Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be
the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be
constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other
building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy
Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings
shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of
ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The
Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and
thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this
proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties.
Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to
study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by
Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in
Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first
"Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the
government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has
twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The
first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one,
after postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding
on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on
bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became
merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The
petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi
property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a
principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine
government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and
entities. These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the
same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi
property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the
authority of the government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the property
available for sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities. He also questions
the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition
of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory
against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the
right to be informed about the bidding requirements.
II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and
the related lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese
government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine
government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is
classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under
Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property
intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He
states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can
attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi and related properties
were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters,
buildings and other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule).
The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary
service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use.
(Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the
commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated
nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v.
Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at
the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of public
dominion so long as the government has not used it for other purposes
nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or
use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying
that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws
of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex
situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also
invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the
Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the
inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the
Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become
property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because
it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over
thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because
the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it
to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as, among others:
(1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of
administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four government
properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the
enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating
that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign
countries; (5) the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property
but which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of
the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the
government's intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public
service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the
petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought
to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on
March 30, 1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a
petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989.
He now avers that the executive order contravenes the constitutional
mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the
Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of
the public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII,
Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-aüsl
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony (Section 10,
Article VI, Constitution);
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition
and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of
public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not
wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the
Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No.
1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article III, Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an
unconstitutional executive order is a misapplication of public funds He
states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi property
were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before
the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo,
and the accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified
bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities
owned by them did not have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer
Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a
minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under
Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that
the Roppongi site and the three related properties were through
reparations agreements, that these were assigned to the government
sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated
under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and
the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine
government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce
of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino,
Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p.
26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article
420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property
been changed because the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it
become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
[1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available
for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration
on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public
officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's
own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to
repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro,
166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of
government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study
of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were
merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell",
does not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the
four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The
executive order does not declare that the properties lost their public
character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners
and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It
merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations
goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%)
percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of
other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the above-mentioned
properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other manner of
disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino
citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption
that the Roppongi and the three other properties were earlier converted
into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789
differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private
sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector
properties can be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities
owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by
Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one
of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the
disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did
not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public
dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c)
refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for
public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates
possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the
Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously
any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a
source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the
Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code
should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people,
should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable
government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail.
The Japanese law - its coverage and effects, when enacted, and
exceptions to its provision — is not presented to the Court It is simply
asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without
stating what that law provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese law would
allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict
of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1)
There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that
the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See
Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign
law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which
law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is
no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect
its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not
apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
the relevance of the lex situsrule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle
the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the
existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are
capableof acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determinewho can acquire the properties so that
the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to
Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We
see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why
should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no
showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the
recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi
property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid
change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the
approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President
already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened
for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property
is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a
party. — In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to
real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of one
hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper
recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines
for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines
unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed
of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the
following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly
vested by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the
deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the
property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere
resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character
of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which
raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding
investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the
Philippine government properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al.,
supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296.
Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the
President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that
resolving the constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally
determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner
ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the
Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to
dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be
questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did
not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it
indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi
property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi
property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law,
the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic development
projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us
question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are
resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised in
1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the
Roppongi property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for
legislative authority to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling
reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless
these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their
resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law
(Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should
not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given
to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who
died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the
suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred,
for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the
war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of
the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the monuments of Rizal,
Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic or financial
benefits from them. But who would think of selling these monuments?
Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties in
Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered.
Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling them.
For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our
countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese
government in atonement for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice
of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic
devastation the whole Filipino people endured in World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life,
that its significance today remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45
years since the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years since the
property passed on to the Philippine government.
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not — be dissipated ...
(Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much
because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more
so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians
alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually
be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress
must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws
on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED.
A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding
with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20,
1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65334 December 26, 1984
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, petitioner,
vs.
AQUILINA ZAPANTA, ISIDRO DELA CRUZ, ELIAS DELA CRUZ, MARIA
DELA CRUZ, MODESTA LEYVA, FERMIN LEYVA, SUSANA LEYVA,
MARCIAL LEYVA, FELISA LEYVA, ISIDORA LEYVA, HONORIO LEYVA,
CONCORDIA GALICIA, APOLONIA AVENDANO, AMPARO AVENDANO,
FIDELA SARTE, BEATRIZ SARTE, VICTORIO SARTE, VIRGINIA SARTE,
JULIANA SARTE, RODOLFO SARTE, BENITA SARTE, ANTONINA SUAREZ,
DANIEL SUAREZ, BEATA SUAREZ, ENRIQUE AVENDANO, PAULINO
AVENDANO, SAMSON LAVILLA, SR., AURELIA LAPAR, VIRGILIO HILARIO,
NATIVIDAD MARQUEZ, LUISITO LOPEZ, REMEDIOS LOPEZ, ROMEO
LOPEZ, NATIVIDAD LOPEZ and the HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Mariano A.G. Cervo for petitioner.
Leonardo C. Rodriguez for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this appeal by Certiorari, we called upon to review the Resolution of
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated August 23, 1983. Dismissing
petitioner's appeal for failure to file its brief within the reglementary period, and
the subsequent Resolution of the same Court, dated September 27, 1983,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being without any legal and
factual basis.
The facts may be briefly stated as follows: On August 8, 1977, a single
application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two
distinct applicants before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
Makati (the Registration Court, for short). One of the two applicants was
Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a
parcel of land containing 258 square meters. The other applicant was "Heirs of
Joaquin Avendaño", and the land they were applying for registration was a
parcel (hereinafter called the DISPUTED PROPERTY) containing 9,826 square
meters surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo (ANTIPOLO, for
short). Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The
applications were approved by the Registration Court on February 26, 1980.
ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the
Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.
On May 22, 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a complaint in Civil Case No. 41353, also of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig (the CASE BELOW, for
short) against named "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño", and their assignees
(hereinafter called the AVENDAÑO HEIRS) praying for nullification of the
judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their Answer,
pleaded a special defense of res judicata, After a preliminary hearing on the
mentioned special defense, the CASE BELOW was dismissed. ANTIPOLO
perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals.
A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court, which ANTIPOLO
claimed it had not received. Upon motion of the defendants-appellees to dismiss
on the ground that ANTIPOLO had not filed its Brief within the reglementary
period, the appeal was dismissed despite the fact that before the dismissal,
ANTIPOLO had submitted its Appellant's Brief.
We gave due course to the Petition for Review on certiorari filed with this Court
by ANTIPOLO, and the latter had restated the issues as follow:
I
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal on the
alleged ground of failure to file appellant's brief within the reglementary period
the fact being that counsel had not been duly served with the notice to file brief.
II
At any rate, the Appellate Court should have given due course to the appeal
since the appellant's brief was filed within the 90-day period which is uniformly
granted as a matter of course to all litigants before the Appellate Court, instead
of dismissing the appeal on a technicality.
III
With more reason should petitioner's appeal have been given due course on the
important and substantial allegation that the registration court did not have
jurisdiction over the land subject of registration, it being property of the
Municipality of Antipolo, used long before the war as a public market and other
public purposes, and hence actually devoted to public use and service.
Only a short resolution need be made to sustain the first and second issues of
error. Although failure to file Brief within the time provided by the Rules is,
indeed, a ground for dismissal of an appeal, this Court had held that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interests of substantial justice 1 specially
where, as in this case, the important issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the Land Registration Court has been raised.
With the foregoing conclusion, a remand to respondent Court, for the
entertainment of the appeal on the merits, would ordinarily be the appropriate
relief. However, considering the three Motions for Early Decision filed by private
respondents, we shall resolve the substantive merits of the appeal to the
appellate tribunal from the judgment rendered in the CASE BELOW.
From the record, we have gathered that ANTIPOLO, for more than 50 years
now, has considered the DISPUTED PROPERTY to be public land subject to
ANTI POLO's use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes
of a municipal corporation. There is indication to the effect that it had been the
site of the public market as far back as 1908, 2 or at the latest, since 1920 "up to
today." 3 Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon, like the
Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated National Police
Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and the public abattoir. Those
public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land. At the time the
application for registration was filed on August 8, 1977, the DISPUTED
PROPERTY was already devoted to public use and public service. Therefore, it
was outside the commerce of man and could no longer be subject
to private registration.
The claim of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS that they merely tolerated occupancy by
ANTIPOLO which had borrowed the DISPUTED PROPERTY from them, since
they had been in possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously
presupposes ownership thereof since that time. They forget that all lands are
presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. 4 The fact that the
DISPUTED PROPERTY may have been declared for taxation purposes in their
names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 5 does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership. 6 ANTIPOLO had also declared the DISPUTED PROPERTY as its
own in Tax Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application
for registration of public property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the
DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is null and void. It never
attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action
brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata.
* * * the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders the
judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights
can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering, further, that
the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in
contemplation of law, and hence, can never become executory, it follows that
such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata. 7
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the AVENDAÑO HEIRS must also be
held to be null and void. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Perforce, they must be ordered cancelled.
...It follows that "if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which
includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate
of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included" (Republic vs.
Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769).
xxx xxx xxx
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled
(Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra), and the cancellation may be pursued
through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior
judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle
of res judicata does not apply. * * *. Certainly, one of the essential requisites, i.e.,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is absent in this case. 8 (Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The Resolutions of respondent Court, now the Intermediate Appellate Court,
dated August 23, 1983 and September 27, 1983, are hereby set aside, with this
Court acting directly on the appeal of the Municipality of Antipolo from the
judgment rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII, in its
Civil Case No. 41353;
(2) The aforesaid judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XIII, in Civil Case No. 41353 is set aside; and, instead, the judgment and decree
rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Land
Registration Case No. N-9995, LRC Rec. No. N-52176, is hereby declared null
and void in respect of the "Heirs of Joaquin Avendaño";
(3) The Register of Deeds of Rizal is hereby ordered to cancel all certificates of
title issued/transferred by virtue of the said judgment and decree issued in the
mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-9995; LRC Rec. No. N-52176 in
respect of the "Heirs of Isabela Avendaño";
(4) The certificate of title issued in the name of Conrado Eniceo and transfers
therefrom, by virtue of the judgment and decree in the mentioned Land
Registration Case No. N-9995; LRC Rec. No. N-52176, for practical purposes,
shall continue to be valid.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

 SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South
Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for petitioner.
Quitain Law Office for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I, General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in
its Civil Case No. 1253, entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani
Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Defendants",
instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and
Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued in the
name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant to
surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508 and the defendant
Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land in
question to the mass of public domain, and granting such further relief as may
be just and equitable in the premises.
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied
for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land
and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application
therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President
of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal
of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original
Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant
Isagani Du Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the
Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to declare free patent No.
V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant
Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in
question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that
the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under
the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity
where the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March
7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be
inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the
application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or
more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained
fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and
cultivated the land applied for.
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA
207-301), holding that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and
void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land
covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not, the
respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title
based on the patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-
year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act for review
of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973,
dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to
this Court for review.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the
area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part
of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free
patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land
covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or
disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as
agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public
Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto,
mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry
that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest
reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is
clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the
defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in
question on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or
alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private parties by the
Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land
but forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct.
31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508, 512, this Court said:
And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent
because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it
may be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject
to attack at any time by any party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et
al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vaño
vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663,
March 25, 1960).
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to
do so (Knight vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974;
emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which
includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the
Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the
same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said
certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See
Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 297, relied upon by respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not
controlling. In that case no forest land was involved but agricultural public land
which was first covered by a patent issued to one party and later registered
under the Torrens System by the other party. The litigation was between private
parties where the party who registered it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of
the title of the patentee under the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party
seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which is
specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such
proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private
individual.
The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was
never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to
the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in possession or
cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent search
by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in South
Cotabato, could not be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City; that
there are no existing signs of improvements found in the area in question as it is
not under cultivation but covered with grasses, bushes and small trees; that it is
being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that
no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there
was no actual survey thereof; that the property in question is inside the ranch of
the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1244 and,
therefore, inside the forest zone; and that said ranch has a fence around it to
show that other persons could not enter and cultivate the same, and that the
signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato
has been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the
application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would override
respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without hearing. The
misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating
the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the
patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as
follows:
That statements made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions or parts of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or
modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any
subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in
the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title
or permit granted. ...
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be
considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for
registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another.
In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to
comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void
(Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966,
17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; emphasis supplied). The lapse of the one year period
within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the
cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by
registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of
the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of
fraud in securing title. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398,
December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38).
Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of
respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for
prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A title founded on fraud may be
cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof,
through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail vs. Court of
First Instance of Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio,
et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-6088, Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil.
405).
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be
recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961).
Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of
Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New
Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred
prescription (Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-
23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348. People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan.
31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35
Phil. 728; 751-753).
Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no
longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby
may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section
101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the remedy of
reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant
of such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22,
1973, dismissing the complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the
motion for its reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. 1253 of the
respondent court, are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent court shall
proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly.
Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81961 April 18, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT and DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MINO HILARIO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
R.M. Molintas Law Office for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision which
affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the issuance of a certificate of title in
the name of Mino Hilario over a parcel of land particularly described in survey
plan PSU-221769.
The facts of the case as stated in the Court of Appeals' decision are as follows:
The land subject matter of the application for registration is situated in the sitio
of Cosaran, Bo. Baloy, Itogon, Benguet, Philippines. It is within the "Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve", established under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929, the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed covered by Executive
Proclamation No. 548, dated April 19, 1969, and the Upper Agno River Basin
Multiple Use of Forest Management District created under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 518, dated March 9, 1971.
In his application for land registration filed on March 10, 1975 with the Court of
First Instance of Baguio-Benguet (now RTC), applicant-appellee Mino Hilario
claimed ownership in fee simple over said land by purchase from his father
Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972. The subject land, consisting of one (1) parcel,
with an area of 5.3213 hectares, is situated, bounded and described as shown
in plan PSU-221769, the technical description of which is attached to the
application and made a part thereof.
The applicant seeks to register the title to the subject land under the Land
Registration Act (Act 496). However, as an alternative, the applicant invokes the
benefits of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874 as superseded by Commonwealth Act
141, as well as the provisions of Republic Act 1942 and Republic Act 3872
because the applicant is a member of the cultural minorities.
On December 3, 1975, the Director of Bureau of Lands filed his opposition dated
July 14, 1975, alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest
possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land applied for,
the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by
the Spanish Government, or have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the present application, and that
the aforesaid property is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines and is not subject to private appropriation.
On March 8, 1976, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development filed his
opposition dated March 1, 1976, to the registration of whatever title of the
applicant on the ground that the area applied for is within the "Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve" under LC Map No. 1435, aside from the fact that it is a part of
the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed covered by Executive Proclamation No. 548
dated April 19, 1969 as evidenced by the letter-report of Forest Ranger Antonio
Chagyo, and Engineer Carlito Banac; that the area sought to be registered is not
in the entire possession of applicant Mino Hilario in the concept of an owner
considering that there are several houses built by different individuals within the
area in question; that the applicant does not have any registrable title either in
law or in fact over the property; and that the area is not classified as alienable or
disposable land.
After due trial, the lower court rendered its decision dated May 16, 1985, which
decreed the confirmation and registration of the subject land in the name of
applicant Mino Hilario, married to Sofina Hilario.
The decision is based on the facts found by the trial court, to wit:
The evidence for the applicant consists of his testimony and those of his
witnesses, namely, Dionisio Capsula, 54 years old, farmer and a neighbor in the
place; Hilario Molang, 55 years old, the applicant's father; and Eustaquio
Cabson, 80 years old, and another neighbor; and documentary exhibits, Exhibits
"A" to "U". Also, an ocular inspection was conducted on the premises. From
these, the Court gathers that the applicant acquired the land subject hereof by
purchase from his father, Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972; that his said father, in
turn acquired the property from the latter's father, and the applicant's
grandfather Shawidi; that the applicant and his predecessors successively,
continuously, publicly and adversely occupied, possessed and worked on the
land in the concept of absolute owners since before the First World War, building
supporting walls, rice paddies where they planted rice, and planting fruit-bearing
trees; that as seen during the ocular inspection there are about 100 mango
trees, three of which are more than 100 years old, about 50 matured avocado
trees, about 200 banana trees, about 30 maguey, about 40 cheza trees, about
30 coffee trees, about 8 jackfruit trees, cassava, two bamboo groves more than
100 years old, 70 orange trees, camote patches, three rice paddies for planting
rice, about 50 pineapple plants, stone walls, fence of German cables, around 30
scattered Kaingins, 22 young coconut trees, and about two old coconut trees;
that the land is suitable to agriculture; and that there are seven old houses made
of galvanized iron inside the area being registered. The property had been
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Hilario Molang, and land tax
therefor had been paid by him since 1945. Since 1972 the property has been
declared in the name of the applicant and land tax has been paid by him.
The evidence for the Government oppositors consists of the testimonies of
Antonio Chaggyo, a Forest Manager of the Bureau of Forest Development, and
Alfredo A. Ramirez, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, and their
respective reports (Exhibits "1" and "2") and the first indorsement of the District
Land Office that the land in question "appears to be within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reservation which is outside the jurisdiction of this office." (Exhibit "3").
The testimonies of these witnesses on their respective observations when they
separately investigated the land in question and their respective reports do not
refute the evidence of the applicant as to the length, nature and manner of
possession of the land subject of this case by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest. On the contrary, their testimonies, viewed in their
entirety, would tend to corroborate the evidence adduced by the applicant. The
report of the Land Investigator even states that the other houses found within
the land at issue are "owned by his (applicant's) relatives ... who swore that they
are not claiming any portion of the land they occupy.
The preponderance of evidence clearly shows that the applicant, and his
predecessors-in-interest before him, all of whom are members of the national
cultural minorities, have been in actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject hereof
which is suitable to agriculture, under a bona fide claim of ownership since
before the First World War up to the present or at least more than sixty (60)
years.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
Hence, this present petition.
The Director of Land Management and the Director of Forest Development raise
the following assignments of errors in this petition, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the land in question,
notwithstanding that it is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, is
registrable on the basis of Republic Act No. 3872; which said court misconstrued
and misapplied.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that private respondent Mino
Hilario had acquired a private right to the land in question prior to the issuance
of Proclamation No. 217 on February 17, 1929 establishing the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve and Executive Proclamation No. 548 on April 19,
1969 establishing the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed, and therefore, said land is
exempted from the force and effect of those executive issuances.
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the lower Court's Decision
which granted the application for registration of the land in question of
respondent Mino Hilario. (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
The petition is impressed with merit.
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive
act of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
deemed waived.
As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, [154 SCRA 476 (1987)]:
... It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable
of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property, (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil.
161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands
v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land prior
to the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited
as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing
that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot
be assumed. It calls for proof.
In the instant case, the subject land is within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve. Private respondent Hilario submits that even assuming that this is so,
still he may own the land situated within the forest reserve as he is a member of
the cultural minorities. His basis for this is Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended (Public Land Act), sec. 48 (c) which provides:
... The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
(as amended by RA. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18, 1964).
Respondent Hilario contends that the phrase "whether disposable or not" should
be construed to mean that a parcel of land situated in an inalienable land may
be privately-owned by a member of the cultural minorities.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observations, to wit:
1. Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Public Land Act applies to
agricultural public lands and to no other type of land borne out by the explicit
terms of Section 2, Chapter I and Section 2, Chapter II, both under Title I of the
Public Land Act. Chapter I is subtitled "Short title of the Act, lands to which it
applies, and officers charged with its execution." Section 2 clearly states that the
"provisions of this Act apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and
mineral lands shall be governed by special laws ... Section 10 provides that the
words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as used in this Act, shall mean
any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or
benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral
lands. (Emphasis supplied).
2. The new sub-section (c) of Section 48 of the Public Land Act should be read
together with the provision of the preceding subsection (b) which expressly
refers to "agricultural lands of the public domain." Perforce, the term "lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture" as used in the said new subsection of
Sec. 48 should mean the same thing as the term "agricultural lands of public
domain." It does not appear that two different classes of lands were intended to
be the subject matter of one section of the same Public Land Act. And both
terms manifestly do not refer to either timber or forest land including forest
reserves.
3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular
provision of law involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to
private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the
1973 and present Constitution petitions do not include timber or forest lands as
alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that 'with the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated." The new
Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that "with the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated."
What the law contemplates are lands that are agricultural although not
disposable, such as agricultural lands within a reservation for fruit experiments
(as the one in Baguio City administered by the Bureau of Plant Industry, or
agricultural lands reserved for the Camarines Sur Agricultural School in Pili,
Camarines Sur), or those reserved for a specific purpose, but certainly not a
forest reserve, a timber land, which the Constitution, the Public Land Act itself,
and jurisprudence have excluded from alienation. (Rollo, pp. 16-18).
As to the lower court's ruling that "applicant's predecessor, Shawidi, had been
occupying and working on the land at the outbreak of the First World War in
1914" long before Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve was issued, this Court has had the opportunity to rule on this issue
earlier.
As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra:
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals, which the government oppositors also appear to have
overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General
Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land was
not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not earn
a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the proclamation. The
proclamation merely declared a special forest reserve out of already existing
forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before the
proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of
15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed area has no legal significance.
A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a
portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive
and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the private
respondent's application for registration of the land in question is reversed and
set aside. The application for land registration is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove
swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our
public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are
considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be
judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located
in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration
on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of
Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming
that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private
respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this.
The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove
swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not
disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land.
The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill
of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This
classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the
legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been
reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this
case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their
disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest
lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as
agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909,
mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending
their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate
there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally,
but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa
palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are
of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is
used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing
over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed
of without impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the
custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which
became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time
of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of
the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a
public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible
of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the
above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this
country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective
on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter
'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved
public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court
maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the
case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that
Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would
never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes,
shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does
not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the
Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said
that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands
that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative
Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights
of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v.
Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a
unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we
think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in
which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the
cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in
Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the
mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted
with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the
trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing
are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land.
Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public
domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands
that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of
decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in
1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose
of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court
was more positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.'
Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of
forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said
Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands'
do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where
this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in
dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not
private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a
categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of
whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the
legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision
classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide
for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own
role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy
prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid
down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed
that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of
the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the
Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands
are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law
provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public
domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use
or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for
in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from
one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves
from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of
such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves
shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for
forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or
modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any
such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and
become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the
public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no
authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of
our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no
less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More
importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic
or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be
respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply
it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural
lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership
had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective.
Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this
would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process
clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as
early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of
the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in
fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in
support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as
forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the
Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps
approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It
should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have
the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural
land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director
of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it
is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest
land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its
declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public
domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable
neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents,
leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of
utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are
still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which
can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and
disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into
private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the
proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is
remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no
convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly
obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in
the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse
possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the
Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were
practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of
possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the
declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the
registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be
granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition
embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which
remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of
the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the
Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost
against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160956 February 13, 2008
JOAQUIN QUIMPO, SR., substituted by Heirs of Joaquin Quimpo,
Sr., petitioners,
vs.
CONSUELO ABAD VDA. DE BELTRAN, IRENEO ABAD, DANILO ABAD,
MARITES ABAD, ANITA AND HELEN ABAD, respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56187, and the October 16, 2003
Resolution denying the motion for its reconsideration.
Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad (Eustaquia) was the owner of several parcels of land
in Goa, Camarines Sur, described as follows:
Parcel I - Residential land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering
an area of 684 square-meters;
Parcel II – Coconut land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an
area of 4.3731 hectares;
Parcel III – Residential land situated at San Jose Street, Goa, Camarines Sur
covering an area of 1,395 square meters; and
Parcel IV – Abaca and coconut land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur
covering an area 42.6127 hectares.2
Eustaquia died intestate in 1948 leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild
and great grandchildren, namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo,
Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, all surnamed Abad.
In 1966, Joaquin and respondents undertook an oral partition of parcel III (San
Jose property) and parcel IV. Half of the properties was given to Joaquin and the
other half to the respondents. However, no document of partition was executed,
because Joaquin refused to execute a deed. Consuelo and Ireneo occupied
their respective shares in the San Jose property, and installed several tenants
over their share in parcel IV. Joaquin, on the other hand, became the
administrator of the remaining undivided properties and of the shares of
respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, who were still minors at that time.
In 1989, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take possession of the
portions allotted to them, but Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same.
Joaquin also refused to heed respondents’ demand for partition of parcels I and
II, prompting respondents to file a complaint for judicial partition and/or recovery
of possession with accounting and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Camarines Sur.3
Joaquin denied the material allegations in the complaint, and averred, as his
special and affirmative defenses, lack of cause of action and prescription. He
asserted absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, claiming that he purchased
these lands from Eustaquia in 1946, evidenced by deeds of sale executed on
August 23, 1946 and December 2, 1946. He, likewise, claimed continuous,
peaceful and adverse possession of these lots since 1946, and alleged that
Consuelo’s occupation of the portion of the San Jose property was by mere
tolerance.4
During the pendency of the case, Joaquin died. Accordingly, he was substituted
by his wife, Estela Tena-Quimpo and his children, namely, Jose, Adelia, Joaquin,
Anita, Angelita, Amelia, Arlene, Joy and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo (the
Quimpos).
On December 12, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents,
declaring them as co-owners of all the properties left by Eustaquia. It rejected
Joaquin’s claim of absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, and declared void
the purported deeds of sale executed by Eustaquia for lack of consideration and
consent. The court found that at the time of the execution of these deeds,
Joaquin was not gainfully employed and had no known source of income, which
shows that the deeds of sale state a false and fictitious consideration. Likewise,
Eustaquia could not have possibly given her consent to the sale because she
was already 91 years old at that time. The RTC also sustained the oral partition
among the heirs in 1966. According to the trial court, the possession and
occupation of land by respondents Consuelo and Ireneo, and Joaquin’s
acquiescence for 23 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was actual
partition of the properties. It held that Joaquin and his heirs are
nowestopped from claiming ownership over the entire San Jose property as well
as over parcel IV.
The RTC disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Consuelo
Vda. de Beltran, Ireneo Abad, Marites Abad, Danilo Abad, Anita Abad and Helen
Abad and against defendant Joaquin Quimpo, substituted by the latter’s wife
Estela Tena and their children, Amparo, Jose, Amelia, Joaquin Jr., Adelia,
Arlene, Anita, Joy, Angelita and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo, as follows:
1. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants, and the plaintiffs to
execute their written agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. III and IV
more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and for them to
execute an agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. I and II, both
parcels are more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiffs Danilo Abad, Marites Abad, Anita Abad and Helen
Abad the owner of six (6) hectares a portion included in parcel No. IV also
described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and therefore, entitled to its
possession and ordering the said substituted defendants to deliver that portion
to them as their share thereto;
3. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency, as reasonable attorney’s
fees and the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) also of Philippine
Currency, as litigation expenses and for the said defendants to pay the costs.
The counterclaim, not being proved, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Sustaining the RTC, the CA
declared that it was plausible that Eustaquia’s consent was vitiated because she
was then 91 years old and sickly. It was bolstered by the fact that the deeds of
sale only surfaced 43 years after its alleged execution and 23 years from the
time of the oral partition. The CA also rejected petitioners’ argument that the
action was barred by prescription and laches, explaining that prescription does
not run against the heirs so long as the heirs, for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. The CA
found no repudiation on Joaquin’s part. It, therefore, concluded that
respondents’ action could not be barred by prescription or laches.
The Quimpos, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari imputing the
following errors to the CA:
1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS DID NOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER [THE] SUBJECT
PARCELS OF LAND BY WAY OF DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED
IN THEIR FAVOR;
2) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT CO-
OWNERSHIP EXISTS AMONG PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS OVER
THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND;
3) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE PROVEN THEIR FILIATION TO THE ORIGINAL
OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND BY MERE SCANT
EVIDENCE;
4) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
LACHES HAS TIME–BARRED THE RESPONDENTS FROM ASSAILING THE
ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS
OF LAND; AND
5) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES.7
The Quimpos insist on the validity of the deeds of sale between Joaquin and
Eustaquia. They assail the probative value and weight given by the RTC and the
CA in favor of the respondents’ pieces of evidence while refusing to give
credence or value to the documents they presented. Specifically, they contend
that the notarized deeds of sale and the tax declarations should have
adequately established Joaquin’s ownership of parcels III and IV.
The contention has no merit. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme
Court’s role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors
of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the
parties. Since such findings are generally not reviewable, this Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in
the proceedings below, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support from the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.8
Petitioners fail to convince us that the CA committed reversible error in affirming
the trial court and in giving no weight to the pieces of evidence they presented.
The stated consideration for the sale are P5,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively,
an amount which was so difficult to raise in the year 1946. Respondents
established that at the time of the purported sale Joaquin Quimpo was not
gainfully employed. He was studying in Manila and Eustaquia was the one
supporting him; that when Eustaquia died two (2) years later, Joaquin was not
able to continue his studies. The Quimpos failed to override this. Except for the
incredible and unpersuasive testimony of Joaquin’s daughter, Adelia Magsino,
no other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered to prove that Joaquin
was duly employed and had the financial capacity to buy the subject properties
in 1946.
In Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals,9 reiterated in Cruz v. Bancom Finance
Corp,10 we held that a deed of sale, in which the stated consideration has not
been, in fact, paid is a false contract; that it is void ab initio. Furthermore,Ocejo
v. Flores,11 ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and
produces no effect whatsoever where it appears that the same is without cause
or consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or the purchase
price which appears thereon as paid but which in fact has never been paid by
the purchaser to the vendor.
Likewise, both the trial court and the CA found that Eustaquia was 91 years old,
weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were executed. In other words,
she was already mentally incapacitated by then, and could no longer be
expected to give her consent to the sale. The RTC and CA cannot, therefore, be
faulted for not giving credence to the deeds of sale in favor of Joaquin.
Petitioners also presented Tax Declaration Nos. 3650,12 3708,13 and 365914 to
substantiate Joaquin’s claim of absolute dominion over parcels III and IV. But we
note that these tax declarations are all in the name of Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad.
These documents, therefore, do not support their claim of absolute dominion
since 1946, but enervate it instead. Besides, the fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Joaquin Quimpo
does not necessarily prove ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration
or tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.15 The CA, therefore,
correctly found this proof inadequate to establish Joaquin’s claim of absolute
dominion.
For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their portions of the
San Jose property and significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their possession.
They also installed tenants in parcel IV, and Joaquin did not prevent them from
doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same. These unerringly point
to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition of parcels III and IV.
In Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot,16 we held, viz.:
[P]artition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the
presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may
be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation
of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and
acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual
partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which
had been lost and were not recorded.
Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal,17 we explained that:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of
equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has
actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an
oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will
confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground ofestoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant
in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession
in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a
court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each
other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,
exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or
have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of
the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a
partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in sustaining the oral partition
over parcels III and IV and in invalidating the deeds of sale between Eustaquia
and Joaquin.
Similarly, we affirm the CA ruling that respondents are co-owners of the subject
four (4) parcels of land, having inherited the same from a common ancestor –
Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. Petitioners’ assertion that respondents failed to prove
their relationship to the late Eustaquia deserves scant consideration.
During the pre-trial, Joaquin Quimpo admitted that:
Eustaquia Perfecto Abad and Diego Abad had two (2) children by the names of
Leon Abad and Joaquin Abad; that Leon Abad has three (3) children namely:
Anastacia, Wilfredo and Consuelo, all surnamed Abad; that Joaquin Abad has
only one (1) child, a daughter by the name of Amparo; that Wilfredo has four (4)
children, namely, Danilo, Helen, Marites and Anita; Amparo has one child, son
Joaquin Quimpo, x x x 18
Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo, Helen,
Marites, Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo were Eustaquia’s great grandchildren.
As such, respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral partition
over parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is
replete with rulings that any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This
action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.19
Finally, petitioners challenge the attorney’s fees in favor of respondents.
The grant of attorney’s fees depends on the circumstances of each case and
lies within the discretion of the court. It may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an
unjustified act by the other,20 as in this case.
In fine, we find no reversible error in the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56187, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further
seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x
x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x
x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in
the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to
progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed
upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such
works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to
cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation
of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as
of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise
disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately
Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in
the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately
Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight
(3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean
Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First
Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988,
the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or
157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for
brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On
April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of
all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported
the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering
the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports
that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an
order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA
Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer
Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the
JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section
7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their
Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on
December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to
submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a
temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral
argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May
26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE
MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO
OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot
and academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the
on-going negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the
Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any
new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA
containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus,
PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations.
Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now
moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on
March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the
Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by
simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the
Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime
PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating
lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed
violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation,
and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional
contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now
becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs
counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even
in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of
the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural
landssold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right
to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI
seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and
submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No.
1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase.
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the
lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty
years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in
this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of
title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA,
PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate
share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA
even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entirereclaimed area to raise
financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe
the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to
disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed
information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that
mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera23 where the Court
granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially
demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Tañada, the Executive Department had
an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was,
therefore, no need for the petitioners in Tañada to make an initial demand from
the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative
statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA.
Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner
here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing
Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the
terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to
make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like
the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the
right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is
a purely legal or constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant
case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to
private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings
to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA
refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA
also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury
because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no
actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to
disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of
pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to
disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a
taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts
that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning
the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect
the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in
this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public
interest.
xxx
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public
right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is
sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of
the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result
of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right
to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in
order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the
Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared
that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a
citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may
not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development,
management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal,
'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the
subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the
magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute
sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information
and access to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed
under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor
general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic
requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e.
(1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule
that the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion
of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner
has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information
on matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This
State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If
the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to
citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to
hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people,"29 for unless
citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to
the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the
Court inValmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue
or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in
the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to
the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that
the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access
to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations
the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government."
PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory
stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-
decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its
contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished
from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer
to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the
contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore,
it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at
the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in
government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real
sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of
their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires
PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information
requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract,
PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public
matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size,
location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the
terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum
price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose
them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code
requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can
demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation,
there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this
moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all
the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez
v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders
of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory"
stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure
of information in general, as discussed earlier – such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion
of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly,
a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.1âwphi1.nêt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow
neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its
avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used
in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of
the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The
second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category
refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such
reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does
not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to
the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at
his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations
to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to
government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also
apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations
that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does
not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during
closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This is
not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is
rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of
the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines
except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and
waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-
honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the
Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18,
1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly
passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this
day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and
all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the
public domain for public use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed
by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the
party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the
necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public
use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory,
and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In
contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some
specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use,
but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.
This class of property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national
wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of
public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or
to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the
State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for
public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate
the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which
regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of
this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in
existing law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout
the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice
to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in
the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public
lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways
located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared
and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give
notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as
are not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and
business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and
best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the
Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands
reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control
and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed
by the government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose.
Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed
lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that
unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties,
these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the
sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the
sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the
Public Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands,
were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this
Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or
lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of
the public domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the
Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title48 shall
be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as
other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These
provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable
lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such
disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or
marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the
public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to
private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the
public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a
policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to
private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties.
The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56
(d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874,
the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their
sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed
from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the
Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine,
declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that –
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant."
(Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except
public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could
alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources,
became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands
only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the
classification of public agricultural lands.50 However, government reclaimed and
marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural
lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No.
2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory
prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The
1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were
classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or
hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four
hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in
excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one
thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four
hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may
be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association." (Emphasis
supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the
legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining for the
government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No.
141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws
on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day
the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public
domain into "alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior
to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section
7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government
can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially
delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of
the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another,53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having
been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public
domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There
must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither
timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or
for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed
of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as
the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to
purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-
nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary
of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in
class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this
Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All
these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such
lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands
falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural
purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became
inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these
lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive
purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions
of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term
"disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes
must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law
amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too
are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act
1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under
water remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing'
of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the
foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not
necessary for the public service. This requisite must have been met before the
land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under
water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition
of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land remained property of the
State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No.
141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in
1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional
edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as
natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and
classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would
fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold
to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private
parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for
the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands
into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under
Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority
before lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to
government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 declares that –
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably
necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall
not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this
limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes
deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest;but the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the
legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141
exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands
that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities
should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-
agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be
used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60
of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections
63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not
needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for
authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of
Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the
case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication
shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases
or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section
5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim
portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land
could become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land
of the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935
Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of
public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil
Code of 1950 state that –
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public
dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same
could be classified as patrimonial property of the State.59 In the case of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of
their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by
the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of
public dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public use,
are intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth."
Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not
employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national
wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted
the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
–
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands
of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the
exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However,
the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution encompassed
industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public
domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it
would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public
domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations,
even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that –
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological,
and development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law
the size of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired
by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the
conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in
excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold
by lease, concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber
or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such
area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of
the National Economic and Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations
became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands
of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA
with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by
dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real
property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for
the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out
the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to
private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for
the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis
supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of
the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the
ebb and flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under
water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged
areas indisputably belong to the public domain63 and are inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared
no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and
until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied
then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD
No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even
"in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA
can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public
domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell
these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA
No.141, which states –
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except
when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless,
any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such
legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has
adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural
resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that –
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more
than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress
shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.
As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to
private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well
understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line
5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was
introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations
from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in
jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in
1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large
landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-
square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it
would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional
ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of
public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size
farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed
the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more
than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation,
upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation
instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the
next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of
the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily
set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could
own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable
lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain,
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The
available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-
growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to
individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas
clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a
combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;"
and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or
less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom
Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option
"granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only
157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been
reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas
forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of
P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the
Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the
other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will
share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area
less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net
usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI.
Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on
the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall
then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title
covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if
more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to
AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles
pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of
additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its
name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-
AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended
JVA states that –
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform
Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the
Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right,
authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master
Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated
April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis
supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas
of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its
Memorandum,67 PEA admits that –
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President
Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded
that –
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority,
the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been
transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the
same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public
land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to
reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the
State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless
they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable
or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open
to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was
acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen
years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274of the Civil Code, a
property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared
otherwise. The Court ruled that –
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part
of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special
land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas
of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising
the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311
and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529
authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To
this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial
erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of
Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the
classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the
State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then
a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November
20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed
lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said
that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed
by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such
works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private
parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the
sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public
dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the
reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged,
belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without
permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land
which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it
replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-
honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No.
141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable
or disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not
be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract
between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the
Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A
declared that –
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation
of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the
National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper
contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National
Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private
parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National
Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects
of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such
contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services
rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind
consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The
reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first
classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared
no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila
Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part
of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are,
under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the
public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from
the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands,
which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may
alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands
no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is
tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of
PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other
kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such
systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and
operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue
"rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties
of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its
properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the
reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be
needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by
its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also
states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO
No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary
implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the
government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since large
portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service,
there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer
needed for public service from those still needed for public service.1âwphi1.nêt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify
inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain
would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not
classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084
or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the
country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic
resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and
police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon
failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other
causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and
supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of
all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible
for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in
consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State,
DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public
lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether
areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be
reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before
PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the
country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the
public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should
be classified as alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once
DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then
recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.
We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned
Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code
and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer
by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not
make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83of CA No. 141
and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with
CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits
that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government
"shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis
by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states that –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x
x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the Government. The Court declared that -
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative
authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on
February 4, 1977, provides that –
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila
Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November
20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is
hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD
No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid
contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume
the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public
Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding
shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which)
shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public
Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including
appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural
Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the
subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the
above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land
Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title."
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979,
provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the
PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or
disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084.
Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of
reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA
to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO
No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of
PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional
limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's
patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not
apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority
benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed
lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could
be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied)
would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these
lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a
public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is
issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the
provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No.
654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for
the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the
requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the
mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize
PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that –
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any
cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer
accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found
to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to
be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the
supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of
the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or
for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general
circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in
the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public
auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as
may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by
the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which
case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The
Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public
auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of
public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December
10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim
another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the
Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in
favor of the winning bidder.92No one, however, submitted a bid. On December
23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding,
because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public
bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid
justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area
publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December
10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April
25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the
intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is
absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act
No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative
authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional
ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states –
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the
form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments,
such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the
ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a
government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and
AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the
contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land,
to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and
Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment
plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or
the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso
similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership
automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local
Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor
or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions
of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of
the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may
be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing
such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the
Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed
lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to
private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the
"issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the
subject land away from the land of public domain and converts the property into
patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the
issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles,
the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands
of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of
the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of
title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically
comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where
the Court ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he
may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and
continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered
and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain
and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the
said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of
Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical
Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a
'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center.
Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government
of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or
private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of
this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titlesissued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under
the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the
Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National
Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the
Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare
public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of
Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed
the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical
Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a
public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its
character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the
name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well
as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any
private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or
certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a
private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred
by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not
give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes
private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer
of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No.
141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President
Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are
hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid
tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of
which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not
covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when
authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that
are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141
constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of
the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.104Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA
No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered
unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however,
cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit
from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section
60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public
domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public
domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities
not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if
Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands
in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will
allow private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless
areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the
National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that –
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible
for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the
Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and
efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas
shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under
proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National
Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in
the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates
Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands
and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing
authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition,
or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA,
and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it
with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national
government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR
as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the
public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private
lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable
lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public
domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands
become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and
authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public
domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the
public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands
of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands
of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued
land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make
such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now
numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This
will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds
of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the
hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations
amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the
very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely
reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The
1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024
hectares of public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution
has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act
No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to
existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered
under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their
character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD
No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section
103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided
in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System
pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is
expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land
"shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision
refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents
the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be
disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the
public domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter
12, Book I of the Code states –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance
shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality."
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of
a public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating
port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National
Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the
government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to
a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled
in the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the
public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529,
remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law
for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent
domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless,
Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the
name of the National Government new certificates of title covering such
expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states –
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or
interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National
Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper
Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of
title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new
certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province,
city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right
for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of
registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the
authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be
registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of
the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of
Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint
venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA
for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under
its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a
joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the
issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share
in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI
clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease.
The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a
transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the
Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the
government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas
for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain,
increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably
among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of
inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the
constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the
1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and
further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose
"object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce
of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of
whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and
this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-
REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT
OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE
LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of
Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et
al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R.
No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-
shaped island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reservesunder the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man.
Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in
their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title
was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following
facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land
in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and
other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the
titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners
and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and
to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to
the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled
in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No.
3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as
basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic
then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of
the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-
meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for
right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo
Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights"
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned
first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral
nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest,
the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable
and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to
release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay
Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN

CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,
SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD
705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF

PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY
LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND

DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS
SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE

OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE

SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants

in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right
to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain
to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141,
as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent
laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to
Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We
shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be
provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine
if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands,
as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions
in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was
first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information
as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the
Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when
duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership
only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must
be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation
of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to
the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands
of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the
definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning
of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared
in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration
by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This
is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the
next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and
Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial
or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD
No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree,
all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands
under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various
laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government
that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These
cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land
would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Court’s
ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols
Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that
the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable
cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was
then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the
dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an
argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did
the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except
those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration
cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those
cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles.
The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who
failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be
owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the
land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a
mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one
class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees
upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the
extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as
we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry,"
and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is
safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it
is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that
there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may
be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of
the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-
versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular
case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the
proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove
swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of
Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands
from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority,
whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their
title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different
issue. The pertinent issue inKrivenko was whether residential lots were included
in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien
could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was
prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the
public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied
on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases
cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also
contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the
requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-
a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the
government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public
land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject
of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered
public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No.
705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way
for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather
than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts
of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands"
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest

or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in
our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is
tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach
resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-
82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural.
Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas
but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the
PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department
pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular
recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas
in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due
regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but
sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro,
Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and
Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist
zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all
the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the
proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections
6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest
land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular,
much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by
the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to
make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA
No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim
that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of
RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural
lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking
into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not
bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island
still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state
that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified
lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral
or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of

land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay,
there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with
the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a)
is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of
public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of
determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to
speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2)
the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land.
Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified
as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since
June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove
the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations
in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the
tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of
possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession
and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded
by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do
not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
 One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years,
thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law
strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito
ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No.
141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of
right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to
acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the
House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is
for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary
to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists.
These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment
gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado
Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much,
and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects
of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes
which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction
to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173365 April 15, 2010
JULIO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITO FLORES
(deceased), substituted by his heirs; DOLORES FLORES and VIRGINIA
FLORES-DALERE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, JIMENA
TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
MARCIANO BAGAOISAN, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners seek a review of the March 29, 2006 Decision1 and the June 20,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), denying their motion for
reconsideration.
The case involves a 13,552-square meter portion of a parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-118802 in the name of the Heirs of
Victor Flores, namely: Julio, Benito, Dolores, and Virginia, herein petitioners.
OCT No. P-11880 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 138892, given
on November 12, 1973. This property is located in the Municipality of Piddig,
Ilocos Norte.
On December 20, 1976, petitioners, together with their mother Luisa Viernes,
executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim3 in favor of Vicente T. Lazo.
Through this document, petitioners agreed to "sell, cede, convey, grant, and
transfer by way of QUITCLAIM" the subject property to Lazo. Thereafter,
respondent, Marciano Bagaoisan, bought the subject property from Lazo, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1977.4
On April 4, 1983, Viernes and petitioner Virginia Flores-Dalere executed a
Palawag A Nasapataan (Affidavit), attesting to the fact that they conveyed to
Lazo the subject property through the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim.
Affiants also attested that Lazo and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the disputed portion since 1940 and that the same was
mistakenly included in the patent application of Victor Flores.
On June 21, 1996, respondent filed an action for ownership, quieting of title,
partition and damages against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the
true owner of the subject property and that the entire property covered by OCT
No. P-11880 be partitioned among them. In the Complaint, respondent asserted
that he was a tenant of Lazo and that he had been working on the subjec0t
property since time immemorial. He said that, since he bought the property in
1977, he possessed the land as owner and paid real property tax thereon. He
claimed that the subject property was erroneously covered by OCT No. P-11880
and that petitioners have previously recognized such fact, considering that they
executed an affidavit acknowledging the erroneous inclusion of the property in
their title. He averred that, lately, petitioners had denied his ownership of the
land and asserted their ownership thereof by working and harvesting the crops
thereon.5
In answer, petitioners stated that they did not relinquish ownership or
possession of the land to Lazo. While admitting that they executed the Deed of
Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Lazo, petitioners claimed that they were
misled into signing the same, with Lazo taking advantage of their lack of
education. Petitioners contended that it was too late for respondent to assert title
to the disputed portion because the title covering the same had already become
indefeasible one year after it was issued.6
On February 3, 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally:
1. To recognize plaintiff Marciano Bagaoisan as owner of the 13,552 sq.m.
parcel of land situated in Barrio Maab-abucay (now Estancia) Municipality of
Piddig, Ilocos Norte;
2. To cease and desist from further possession of said parcel of land and to
immediately reconvey the same to plaintiff;
3. To pay said plaintiff such amount as would be the peso equivalent of 100
cavanes of palay per year, for the loss of harvest he incurred in 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, computed as the price then obtaining in said years;
and
4. To pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the Deed of Confirmation and
Quitclaim. In light of petitioners’ admission that they signed the deed after it was
read to them, the CA dismissed their assertion that they did not know the
contents of the document. It further declared that the deed merely confirmed
petitioners’ non-ownership of the subject property and it did not involve an
alienation or encumbrance. Accordingly, it concluded that the five-year
prohibition against alienation of a property awarded through homestead patent
did not apply.
The CA likewise rejected petitioners’ contention that the action was barred by
prescription or laches. Citing Vital v. Anore,8 the CA held that where the
registered owner knew that the property described in the patent and the
certificate of title belonged to another, any statute barring an action by the real
owner would not apply, and the true owner might file an action to settle the issue
of ownership.
The dispositive portion of the assailed March 29, 2006 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of sufficient merit. The
assailed 3 February 2000 decision by the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, in
Civil Case No. 11048-14 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA likewise denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its Resolution
dated June 20, 2006.10
Consequently, petitioners filed this petition for review, insisting that the Deed of
Confirmation and Quitclaim is void as its contents were not fully explained to
them, and it violates Section 118 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141), which prohibits the alienation of lands acquired through a homestead
patent.
The petition is meritorious.
Without going into petitioners’ allegation that they were unaware of the contents
of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, we nonetheless hold that the deed is
void for violating the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands
acquired through homestead patent as provided under Section 118 of the Public
Land Act, which states:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not
be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent and grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops
on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and
before twenty-five years after the issuance of title shall be valid without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall
not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
We do not agree with the CA that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim
merely "confirmed" petitioners’ non-ownership of the subject property. The deed
uses the words "sell," "cede," "convey," "grant," and "transfer." These words
admit of no other interpretation than that the subject property was indeed being
transferred to Lazo.
The use of the words "confirmation" and "quitclaim" in the title of the document
was an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition imposed by law. Labeling
the deed as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim of rights would
actually make no difference, as the effect would still be the alienation or
conveyance of the property. The act of conveyance would still fall within the
ambit of the prohibition. To validate such an arrangement would be to throw the
door open to all possible fraudulent subterfuges and schemes that persons
interested in land given to a homesteader may devise to circumvent and defeat
the legal provisions prohibiting their alienation within five years from the
issuance of the patent.11
It bears stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee
every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating
it.12 Its basic objective, as the Court had occasion to stress, is to promote public
policy, that is to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at
providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of
peace and order.13 Hence, any act which would have the effect of removing the
property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee will be struck down
for being violative of the law.
To repeat, the conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the five-year
prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and
void and cannot be enforced, for it is not within the competence of any citizen to
barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.14 There is, therefore,
no doubt that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, which was executed
three years after the homestead patent was issued, is void and cannot be
enforced.1avvphi1
Furthermore, respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to surmount the
conclusiveness and indefeasibility of the certificate of title.
An OCT issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of
a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
promulgation of the Director of Lands’ order for the issuance of the
patent.15 After the lapse of such period, the sole remedy of a landowner, whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is to
file an action for reconveyance so long as the property has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value.16 In order that an action for reconveyance based
on fraud may prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, his title to the property and the fact of
fraud.17
Respondent did not allege in his complaint or prove during the trial that fraud
attended the registration of the subject property in petitioners’ names. In fact,
there was no allegation as to how petitioners were able to secure title to the
property despite the alleged ownership of respondent’s predecessor.
More importantly, respondent failed to prove that he has title to the subject
property. He merely asserted that his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the property since 1940. The basic presumption is that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be
"well-nigh incontrovertible." The Public Land Act requires that the possessor or
his predecessors-in-interest must be in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years. When
these conditions are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land ceases to be a part of the public domain
and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands,18 such that the latter would
have no more right to issue a homestead patent to another person.
Respondent merely established that he had been in possession of the property
and that he had been paying real property taxes thereon since 1977. The only
evidence on record attesting to the fact that respondent and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the property since 1940 was the affidavit
executed by some of petitioners. This, however, would not suffice.
In closing, it would be well to mention that the execution of the Deed of
Confirmation and Quitclaim within the five-year prohibitory period also makes
the homestead patent susceptible to cancellation, and the subject property
being reverted to the public domain.19 It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of
the government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for
reversion.20 Should the Solicitor General decide to file such an action, it is in
that action that petitioners’ defenses, particularly their alleged lack of knowledge
of the contents of the deed, will have to be resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 29, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its June 20, 2006 Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint for ownership, quieting of title and damages is
DISMISSED, without prejudice to an action for reversion that the Solicitor
General may decide to file for the State.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168464 January 23, 2006
ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO RAMOS, EUSEBIO I. RAMOS EVANGELISTO
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58644 reversing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996, in Civil Case
No. Br. 23-357 which ruled that herein petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio had a
superior right to possess Lot No. 204, Pls-15, situated at Muñoz, Roxas,
Isabela, as well as its Resolution3 dated June 14, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
As culled from the records, petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now
deceased) are the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The
spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in 1944. Susana
met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in 1946, with whom she
had five children, one of whom is respondent Rolando.
In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo applied
for a sales patent over the subject parcel of land which she opposed. The
Bureau of Lands resolved the dispute, thus:
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is clear that Felimon B. Domingo has not
entered, possessed or cultivated the land in question and therefore he has not
acquired any preference right thereto. Upon the other hand contestant Susana
Bueno Vda. de Ramos and her children have sufficiently established their right
of preference over the land except the one hectare Cemetery site, on the basis
of their continuous occupation and cultivation and their valuable improvements
introduced thereon.
Wherefore, it is ordered that the Sales Application No. 21992 of Felimon B.
Domingo be as hereby it is rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government
whatever amount have been paid on account thereof. The land in question shall
be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one hectare portion in the
northwestern part of the land, which shall be reserved as barrio cemetery site,
while the remaining area is hereby allocated to SUSANA BUENO VDA DE
RAMOS who shall file an appropriate application therefore within sixty (60) days
after the survey thereof at her own expense, it not appearing that this Office has
received the homestead (new) application allegedly filed by her for the same
land.
SO ORDERED.4
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier,
wherever he was assigned, Susana’s father, George Bueno, and daughter,
petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation and possession of the subject land.
Sometime later, Susana sold the land to petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it
among herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent Rolando and his siblings.
The partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of
Rolando and Alexander.
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge
that respondents Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the
mortgagees of possession over the land. After settling the mortgage, petitioner
filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and damages with a petition
for preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court had the land surveyed. Subdividing the land into Lots 204-A to
204-H5 based on the actual possessor or occupant, the survey plan revealed
the following:
1. Plaintiff Zenaida Ramos Balalio has no possession, occupation, and
cultivation whatsoever of lot 204, Pls-15;
2. Rolando Ramos is in possession and cultivation of lot 204-F, lot 204-G and lot
204-C, with a total area of 43,957 sq. m., more or less;
3. Eusebio Ramos is occupying and cultivating lot 204-A with an area of 4,994
sq. m., more or less;
4. Lot 204-B consisting of 17,685 sq. m., more or less, is possessed and
cultivated by Evangelisto Garcia, another intervenor. His occupation is very
much less than the two (2) hectares sold to him by Alexander Ramos. It is short
by 2,311 sq. m., more or less;
5. The total area of the land in question, after deducting one (1) hectare
occupied by the cemetery is 73,150 sq. m., more or less.6
On July 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner was
deprived of her right to cultivation and possession of her share of Lot No. 204
and thus ruled:
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff, Zenaida Ramos and against Rolando Ramos,
defendant, and Eusebio Ramos, intervenor.
1. Ordering Eusebio Ramos to vacate lot 204-A and surrender it to Evangelisto
Garcia because he is not entitled to any portion of the lot in question, it being the
conjugal property of the first marriage of Susana Bueno to Abundio Ramos;
2. Evangelisto Garcia is adjudicated the first two (2) hectares from the North and
East of the cemetery, as he validly bought the area from Alexander Ramos. He
is presently occupying only 17,689 sq. m., more or less. His possession now is
increased to two (2) hectares which includes the area being possessed by
Eusebio Ramos;
3. The remaining portion of the share of Alexander Ramos is 4,410 sq. m., more
or less. This is adjudicated in favor of his heirs. This portion now corresponds to
the area immediately South of the area of Evangelisto Garcia, the partition being
from East to West;
4. The middle portion consisting of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, and immediately
South of the cemetery, and also South of the portion adjudicated to the heirs of
Alexander is now given to Zenaida Ramos Balalio as her valid share of lot 204,
the partition being also East to West;
5. South of the share of Zenaida consisting also of 24,410 sq. m., more or less,
is the valid share of Rolando Ramos and his full blooded brother and sisters
namely Robin, Corazon, Myrna and Mila, all surnamed Ramos;
6. Rolando Ramos and Eusebio Ramos are ordered jointly and severally to pay
Zenaida Ramos:
a. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees;
b. One thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos as appearance fees of her
lawyer;
c. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as incidental expenses relative to the
case;
d. One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred (P100,800.00) Pesos as the
reasonable owner’s share of the produce of the land of Zenaida Ramos from
1975 to the present, with an interest of 6% per annum until fully paid;
7. The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff are ordered to repair to the land in question
and partition said land in accordance with the tenor of this decision;
8. And to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander
complied with the homestead application requirements in order to acquire
superior vested right. As a consequence, it reversed the decision of the trial
court, to wit:
As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of appellants as to
the fourth error and finds that the contract supposedly dividing that property
among Zenaida, Rolando Ramos and Alexander Ramos cannot be enforced
because neither of the parties therein can claim any vested right over the
subject parcel land which is still part of the public domain.
Also, prescinding from the above ruling, the intervention of Eusebio Ramos and
Evangelisto Garcia should likewise be dismissed. As to Eusebio, since Susana
never filed an application for homestead, her right never ripened to ownership
which she could have transmitted to her heirs. As to Evangelisto Garcia who
supposedly purchased that share of Alexander (an heir of Susana), since the
vendor never inherited anything from Susana there was nothing which he
(Evangelisto) could have bought. In fine, neither of the intervenors could claim
any right which they can enforce in court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 is REVERSED and the "Complaint" filed
by plaintiff-appellee as well as the respective "Answer in Intervention" of
Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
7.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION AND DISMISSING THE
PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT.
7.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER IS NOT IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND,
AND DECLARING THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO THE
DISPUTED LAND.
7.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE
ISSUE OF ACCION PUBLICIANA IN THE CASE AT BAR AND CONFINED
ITSELF TO THE CLAIM OF RECOVERY OF INHERITANCE.9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.10 Lands of the public domain are classified
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.11
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (1977), remains to be the general law governing
the classification and disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. It
enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these lands and prescribes the
terms and conditions to enable private persons to perfect their title to them. It is,
therefore, the applicable law to the case before us.
A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the
modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under
the Public Land Act, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this
country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the
owner of more than 2412hectares of land in the country.13 To be qualified, the
applicant must show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the
municipality where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth
of the land applied for.14
In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural
land that her parents Susana and Abundio had possessed since 1938. She
claims that, for some time, the cultivation of this land was left to her and her
grandfather and that, following the death of her father Abundio, the land was
allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana.
Zenaida’s argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents had
perfected their title over the land and that they could validly convey the same to
third persons, whether by sale or by inheritance. However, a careful examination
of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid
application for homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the
Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaida’s family’s right of preference
over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation of the land.
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of an appropriate
application for its registration which indicates that as of that time, there was as
yet no valid application filed.15
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be
given effect, nor can it be a source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not
have the authority to sell what did not belong to her. The invalidation of the sale
consequently nullifies the partition of the property among Zenaida, Alexander,
and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of the
land which she did not own.
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right
whatsoever as heirs of Susana. Their claim evidently relies on the provision of
the Public Land Act which states:
Section 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance
of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while
the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government, in
accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations
with respect to the land applied for or granted or leased under this Act by his
heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final
concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements
therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for
the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added)
The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of
an applicant, grantee, or lessee. Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime,
despite her possession and cultivation of the land, she failed to apply for a
homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or Rolando can
inherit. As such, the land remains part of the public domain. Furthermore,
Eusebio and Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of
the land because the same cannot be considered as adverse, open, public,
peaceful and to the exclusion of all.
Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully
belongs to the State. As held by the Court of Appeals, none of the parties
obtained a defensible title to the property which can be upheld by the Court.
Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different from the issue of
its ownership. Petitioner argues that her petition may be treated as an accion
publiciana and not merely an action for recovery of inheritance.
An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title.16 In this case, the issue is whether
Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be considered as having any right
to the land occupied, which may entitle her to sue in courts for the return of the
possession thereof.
We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she
claims as her share, which possession antedates the filing of the homestead
application. She produced evidence showing that she has filed a verified
application for the registration of the land with the Bureau of Lands on August
10, 1971,17 which is still pending. The documents remain uncontested and the
application has not been assailed by any of the parties to the case. She alleged
that during the lifetime of her mother, she and her maternal grandfather
cultivated and occupied the land.
Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her
predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and
again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession.18 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property
for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government.19
All told, petitioner Zenaida’s uncontested and verified application for a
homestead patent coupled with her open and notorious occupation of the land
convinces us of her preferential right to possess the land claimed, which entitles
her to be protected by the law in such possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 is MODIFIED, insofar as to grant
petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio preferential possession of the portion of Lot
204, Pls-15, situated in Muñoz, Roxas, Isabela, as delineated in the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more
or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the
appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in
this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is
a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable
as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the
land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said
land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from
time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials
of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the
Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part
of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'),
during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July
17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is
the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits
private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in
the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the
lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in
favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings
of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and
Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29,
1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves
and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason
thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act
to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register
ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than
Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that
the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was
already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding
1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time
of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of
the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand,
they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila
Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of
which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the
Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to
said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to
apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under
section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to
which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands
of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases
beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thruSusi in 1925 3 down to Herico in
1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident
from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of
said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was
so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when
Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which
came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private
lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it
did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to
which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application
to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may
not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-
78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of
a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in
its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either
the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed
and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,
there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or
owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer
in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that
there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such
natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because
of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco
vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels
and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to
Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same
result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone,
by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence
suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-
established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition
that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that
context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157306 November 25, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO (in
Substitution of NAZARIA BOMBEO),Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect. A court
judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation effective or valid.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66807. The assailed CA Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the ruling of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED."3
The Facts
The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows:
"This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting
[of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria
Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22,
1954. In her application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously
owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold
to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and
heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit ‘A’)
on June 14, 1954.
"After due notice and publication of said application, only the Provincial Fiscal of
Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition
thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared
Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army, to wit:
‘PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265. RESERVING FOR THE USE OF
THE PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
SITUATED IN THE BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF
CAGAYAN, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND OF MINDANAO.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and
pursuant to the provision of section eighty-three of Commonwealth Act Number
One Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby withdraw from sale of settlement and
reserve for the use of the Philippine Army, under the administration of the Chief
of Staff subject to private rights, if any thereby, the following described parcels of
public domain, situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, Municipality of
Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental, Island of Mindanao, and particularly
described in Bureau of Lands SWO-15234, to wit:
Lot No. 4318. – x x x.
Containing an area of 354,377 square meters.’
"During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an Order of General Default
was issued by the lower court. On July 29, 1959, Bombeo died and was
substituted by her daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died on
December 5, 1990. Thereafter, due to intervening deaths of the parties, the case
literally went to slumber until it was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch
17) of Misamis Oriental on October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the
daughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea
Actub Tiu Po. On the other hand, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines; were represented by the Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Abbu and
Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [Judge Advocate General’s Office]. On May 27,
1994, the trial court confirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo substituted
by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po and ordered
registration thereof under the names of the latter. Consequently, Oppositors
Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General’s Office; filed an appeal to said decision x x x.
"During the pendency of the appeal, however, Presidential Proclamation No.
3304 took effect on June 20, 2000, excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of
Presidential Proclamation No. 265[.]
xxxxxxxxx
"In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents urged the CA] to finally put
to rest the controversy in their favor considering that the opposition of the
Republic has no longer any basis."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 (Proc 265)
failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military reservation. The
CA said that the proclamation was "not self-executory and self-adjudicating
considering that there is a need to determine private rights of claimants over
lands sought to be reserved."
Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondents were
able to establish with sufficient evidence their right to have the land registered
under their names. It acknowledged that possession by respondents’
predecessors-in-interest had ripened into an imperfect title of ownership, subject
to judicial confirmation. It added that ownership of the land would still be
deemed vested in respondents, "in view of their almost half a century of open,
continuous, adverse and peaceful possession," even if possession by their
predecessors-in-interest were not taken into consideration.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 did not effectively segregate Lot 4318 from the public
domain.
"II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that respondents
were able to establish that they have already acquired private right over Lot
4318 which already amounted to a title.
"III.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the passage of
Presidential Proclamation No. 330 which excludes from the operation of
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 Lot 4318 negates the claim of the AFP that
the land in dispute is actively possessed and used by it."7
In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven their title to
the subject land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Validity of Respondents’ Title
The Public Land Act8 requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to
prove (1) that the land is alienable public land;9 and (2) that their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property
has taken place either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed by
law. When the legal conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by
operation of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without necessitating
the issuance of a certificate of title.10
After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate
courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents
failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.
Nature of Lot 4318
It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use of the
Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the land was not effectively
segregated as a military reservation by the Proclamation. Relying on Baloy v.
CA,11 they allege that a petition for reservation or a court judgment declaring
the reservation is necessary to make Proc 265 effective. They maintain that the
provision in the Proclamation subjecting the reservation to private rights
presumes that notice and hearing will be afforded to all persons claiming
ownership rights over the land. Otherwise, the reservation would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law. They further allege that the
AFP failed to observe these requirements, thus causing the reservation to be
ineffectual.
Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a judicial
order to create a military reservation. It contends that the proviso requiring the
reservation to be subject to private rights means that persons claiming rights
over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims. It contends
further that respondents were afforded due process when their application for
registration of title to Lot 4318 was heard by the lower courts.
We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public purpose is
governed by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of which are as
follows:
"SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or
tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of
the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with regulations prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for
highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems,
communal pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and other
improvements for the public benefit."
"SECTION 86. A certified copy of every proclamation of the President issued
under the provisions of this title shall be forwarded to the Director of Lands for
record in his office, and a copy of this record shall be forwarded to the Register
of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. Upon receipt of such
certified copy, the Director of Lands shall order the immediate survey of the
proposed reservation if the land has not yet been surveyed, and as soon as the
plat has been completed, he shall proceed in accordance with the next following
section."
"SECTION 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the President are
not registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if
requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
proceed in accordance with the provision of Section fifty-three of this Act."
"SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the
opinion of the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed
in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or
occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily come in under the
provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in substance
that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to
discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has not been brought
into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to
such lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land
or the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof be settled and
adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in accordance
with the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings."
Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the President is
needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that
while Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor
general -- to file a petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of
that petition is not mandatory. The director of lands is required to file a petition
only "whenever in the opinion of the President public interest requires it."
Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA12 requiring, after due notice and
hearing, a judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of the application for
registration in Baloy was originally private land, as evidenced by a possessory
information title issued in the applicants’ favor during the Spanish era. As will be
explained shortly, Lot 4318 in the present case is unquestionably public land.
The only issue is whether respondents have acquired title to the property.
Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.13 Under the provisions of
that law, the private character of the land shall be respected absent any court
order declaring that the property has become public. In the case before us, Proc
265 was issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Accordingly, only
a positive act of the President is required to create a government reservation.
Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military
reservation. Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in
1954, because it was considered inalienable14 since its reservation in 1938.
Respondents’ Period of Possession
Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military use,
respondents maintain their entitlement to have it registered under their names.
They allege that their predecessors-in-interest were already in adverse, open,
peaceful and continuous possession of the property for over 30 years prior to
1938. Thus, they conclude that their imperfect title had already attached long
before the issuance of the Proclamation segregating the land as a military
reservation.
We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this Court. To this
rule, however, there are settled exceptions; for instance, when the judgment
assailed is not supported by sufficient evidence or is based on a
misapprehension of facts.15 We find that these exceptions apply here.
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.16 For this reason,
imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before
judicial confirmation is granted.17 In the same manner, persons claiming the
protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military
reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of
property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public
lands.18
In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and
the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the
former. However, while the tax declarations were issued under the names of
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one presented was issued
only in 1954.19 The Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA20 held thus:
"x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership. They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands
vs. Santiago:
‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago,
had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for
taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and
Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least
proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.’"21
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents’ predecessors had purportedly bought
the property. This alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any
supporting
evidence on record. Respondents’ evidence hardly supported the conclusion
that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since
"time immemorial."
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto
Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did not show the nature and the period
of the alleged possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas. It is important that
applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must present specific acts
of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general
statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession.22
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving
that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition
from the government does not relieve them of this burden.23 Thus, it was
erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to hold that the failure of the
government to
dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since
1954 already amounted to a title.
In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling in Director of Lands v.
Agustin:24
"x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under
the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to
oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no
opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee
simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system,
simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence
of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system,
upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the
owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The segregation of Lot 4318
as part of a military reservation is declared VALID. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160145 November 11, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO O. ENCISO, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
September 26, 2003, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, promulgated on July 31, 2001 in LRC Case
No. RTC-N-75-I. The CA and the trial court adjudicated Lot No. 2278-A, Cad.
652-D, Masinloc Cadastre in favor of respondent Pedro O. Enciso, pursuant to
Section 29 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, show that on April 24, 2000,
the respondent, alleging to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential
land located in Barangay South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, filed a petition
for land registration before the RTC of Iba, Zambales. The lot is described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 2278-A of the subdivision plan Csd-03-012562-D being a
portion of Lot 2278, Cad. 652-D L.R.C. Rec. No.), situated in the Barrio of South
Poblacion, Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales. Bounded on the
NW., along line 1-2 by Sta. Lucia Street; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Capt.
Albright Street; on the SE. & SW. along line 3-4-1 by Lot 2278-B of the subd.
plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 39 deg. 35’E., 12.05 m.
from BLLM.1,
Cad. 652-D.
thence N. 16 deg. 13’E., 32.48 m. to point. 2;
thence S. 75 deg. 05’E., 44.83 m. to point. 3;
thence S. 16 deg. 19’W., 33.36 m. to point. 4;
thence N. 73 deg. 57’W., 44.76 m. to point. of;
beginning; containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE (1,475) square meters. All points referred to are indicated on
the plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 40 cms.
Bearings; true; date of original survey; Sept. 1927-July 1928 and that of the
subdivision survey; July 22, 1999 and was approved on Jan. 20, 2000.3
The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the said lot by virtue
of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and quitclaim on March 15, 1999; the
said property is not tenanted or occupied by any person other than the
respondent and his family who are in actual physical possession of the same;
and the respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
peaceful, open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for not less than 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of the application.4
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the
respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the respondent failed to adduce any
muniment of title and/or the tax declaration with the application to prove bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for or its open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax declaration adverted to in the
application does not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations indicate
such possession to be of recent vintage; (d) the claim of ownership in fee simple
on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
respondent considering that he failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required
by P.D. No. 892; and (e) the subject land is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private
appropriation.5
After ascertaining that the jurisdictional requirements for the application were
done in accordance with the law during the initial hearing6 on November 9,
2000, the trial court issued an Order of Default7 on January 3, 2001 against all
persons with the exception of the government.
The respondent presented tax receipts to show that the property was declared
for taxation purposes in his name. He also testified that he acquired the property
by inheritance from his deceased father, Vicente Enciso, who died on May 18,
1991. He then immediately took possession of the property and constructed a
house thereon in 1991. On March 15, 1999, he and his siblings executed an
extrajudicial settlement of estate where the land was adjudicated in his favor.
The respondent further narrated that the property was originally owned by the
Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. On October 5, 1968, the municipality
passed Resolution No. 71,8 undertaking to construct a road along the shoreline
of the poblacion, but requiring landowners adjoining the roads to share in the
expenses for an inner wall adjacent to their lots. In view of this, the same
resolution provided that:
WHEREAS, where the above landowners share in the construction of the roads,
the same may be given the priority to acquire such additional available areas by
purchase, if such additional areas are not needed by the government for public
use, the advances of the landowners as a result of his [sic] construction (inner
wall) be considered as price of the land, provided that the cost and value of the
inner wall exceeds the assessed value of the land, and if the cost of the inner
wall is less than the assessed value of the land, the landowners will have to pay
the corresponding balance to the government; …9
On March 8, 1969, the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales passed
supplementary Resolution No. 102,10 which stated that in consideration of the
financial assistance extended by the abutting property owners, and because the
government no longer needed the additional areas for public use, the
municipality was authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into and sign deeds of
purchase between the municipality and the landowners concerned.
Consequently, the Municipal Council of Masinloc, Zambales unanimously
approved Resolution No. 102-A11 dated March 15, 1969, authorizing its mayor
to execute a deed of sale in favor of Honorato Edaño, covering a portion of the
reclaimed lots no longer needed for public use. Honorato was thus entitled to
buy the lot for his help in carrying out the project envisioned in Resolution No.
71, and after the submission of an itemized statement of the cost of the
construction of the inner wall along Sta. Lucia Street.
Immediately thereafter, the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales, represented by
its Mayor, P.A. Edaño, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale12 covering a piece of
reclaimed land containing more or less 2,790 square meters in favor of
Honorato Edaño. The deed stated that the vendee constructed the inner wall
needed to facilitate the fabrication of a portion of Sta. Lucia Street, which was
opposite his lot, and the extensions of Magsaysay and Capt. Albright Streets at
a total expense of P1,683.80. Considering that the assessed value of the lot
was P2,092.50, or P408.70
more than the vendee spent for the construction of the inner wall, the vendee
paid P408.70 to the vendor.
The respondent admitted that Honorato was his uncle, being his father’s half-
brother.13 He further narrated that on December 9, 1980, the spouses Honorato
and Esperanza Edaño sold the lot to Vicente B. Enciso forP2,092.50 via a Deed
of Absolute Sale.14 On January 17, 1981, Vicente Enciso, Natividad Edaño
Asuncion and Thelma A. Edaño entered into a Deed of Partition15 involving the
same parcel of land. Vicente was awarded one-half of the total area of the
property, 1,398 square meters, more or less; Natividad and Thelma got one-
fourth each, or approximately 697.5 square meters individually.
No cross-examination was conducted and no evidence was adduced by the
government to controvert the application for registration.
On May 8, 2001, Director Felino M. Cortez of the Department on Registration
submitted the Report16 of the Land Registration Authority, informing the trial
court that it was not in a position to verify whether the parcel of land subject of
registration was already covered by a land patent and previously approved
isolated survey. Acting on this report, the trial court directed the Lands
Management Bureau, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of Iba, Zambales, and the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources Regional Executive Director

for Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, to submit a report on the status of the
parcel of land.17
Without waiting for the final report, the trial court granted the application for
registration on July 31, 2001, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court, after confirming the Order of General Default entered
into the record of this case on January 3, 2001 hereby adjudicates Lot No. 2278-
A, Cad. 652-D, Masinloc Cadastre, containing an area of 1,475 square meters,
situated at Brgy. South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, Philippines, as
appearing on the approved Plan No. Csd-03-012562-D (Exhibit "M") and also in
the Technical Description of said lot (Exhibit "K") in favor of the applicant whose
address is at Brgy. South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, Philippines, in
accordance with Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication
however is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under
pertinent laws, Presidential Decree and/or Presidential Letters of Instruction,
which should be annotated/projected in the title to be issued.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title be
issued.
SO ORDERED.18
The trial court ruled that the respondent satisfactorily proved his ownership in
fee simple, as well as the identity of the land sought to be titled. Likewise, the
trial court found that the respondent, as well as his predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, peaceful, continuous, public, adverse, and under a bona
fide claim of ownership. According to the trial court, there was no evidence that
the subject parcel of land was within any government reservation, or that the
applicant was disqualified from owning real property under the Constitution.19
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the case before the CA, contending
that the trial court erred in granting the application despite his failure to prove
registrable title over Lot No. 2278-A.
The CA disposed of the appeal on September 26, 2003 and affirmed the
decision of the trial court. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated July 31, 2001
of the RTC, Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales in LRC Case No. RTC-N-75-1 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
The petitioner dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration and
forthwith filed the instant petition.
The OSG assigned the following error to the appellate court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR REGISTRATION SANS ANY SHOWING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.21
The petitioner contends that the first and primordial element in order to warrant
the registration of title is to show that the land must be an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. On this note, the petitioner believes that
the respondent failed to adduce any evidence to show that the subject land was
already previously declared part of such alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, the petitioner adds that under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and those not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to it.
In his comment to the petition, the respondent asserts that the CA was correct in
affirming the decision of the land registration court. The respondent cites the
following justification of the CA in supporting his claim over Lot No. 2278-A:
Records reveal that subject land is a residential land owned by the Municipality
of Masinloc, Zambales. The Municipality of Masinloc, through Resolutions 71,
102 and 102-A-29 sold the subject land to Honorato Edaño as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 31, 1969 executed by the Municipal Mayor.
Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property."
Properties of political subdivision[s] which are patrimonial in character may be
alienated. By analogy, when a municipality’s properties for public use are no
longer intended for such use, the same become patrimonial and may be the
subject of a contract. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between
the Municipal Mayor of Masinloc and Honorato Edaño was a valid contract.
Subject land was likewise sold by Honorato Edaño to petitioner-appellee’s
father, Vicente Enciso, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. From then, subject
land changed hand until it was acquired by petitioner-appellee when his siblings
executed an Extrajudicial Partition assigning said land to him. It was declared for
taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 007-0700R. …
…
Subject land was reclassified as residential. It was already segregated from the
public domain and assumed the character of private ownership. It was reclaimed
by the Municipality of Masinloc and eventually adjudicated to Honorato Edaño.
The Municipality of Masinloc must have been in possession of the subject land
even before 1969 considering that it was originally surveyed way back in 1927-
1928. In the exercise of its proprietary right, the Municipality of Masinloc validly
conveyed the subject land to petitioner-appellee’s predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioner-appellee’s possession and occupation of the subject land is
continuous, public, adverse and uninterrupted and in the concept an owner and
no other person claimed possession and ownership of the same. Article 1137 of
the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribed
(sic) through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of titles or of good faith."
Parenthetically, petitioner-appellee’s possession tacked with that of his
predecessors-in-interest already complied with the thirty (30)-year requirement
of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession required under the law.
Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner-appellee sufficiently and satisfactorily
proved his real and absolute ownership in fee simple; that he has a registrable
title over the subject land and that he complied with the requirements under the
law to warrant registration of title over the subject land.22
The petition is meritorious.
While it is the rule that findings of fact of appellate courts are conclusive upon
this Court, among the recognized exceptions is where the findings of fact are not
supported by the record or are conspicuously erroneous as to constitute a
serious abuse of discretion.23 This is the situation in this case.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,

and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership either since time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945. It is not
disputed that the land sought to be registered was originally part of the
reclamation project undertaken by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. The
prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may only
be leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remainedsui generis, as
the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which the
government could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a
law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as
areas for public use or public service.24 The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all lands
and waters of the public domain belong to the State.25 On November 7, 1936,
the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the
Public Land Act, compiling all the existing laws on lands of the public domain.
This remains to this day the existing and applicable general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The State policy
prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable
lands of the public domain to private individuals continued under the 1935
Constitution.
Indeed, there is nothing to support the respondent’s claim that the property "was
reclassified as residential … already segregated from the public domain and
assumed the character of private ownership." At the

moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities classified the subject as
alienable and disposable. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence
must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.26
According to the CA, "the Municipality of Masinloc must have been in
possession of the subject land even before 1969 considering that it was
originally surveyed way back in 1927-1928." This is not the kind of possession
and occupation contemplated under the law. While the subject property was still
in the hands of the municipality, it was undeniably part of the public domain. The
municipality cannot then be considered a predecessor-in-interest of the
applicant from whom the period of possession and occupation required by law
may be reckoned with. Any other interpretation would be dangerously
detrimental to our national patrimony.
Even assuming that Honorato Edaño, the respondent’s earliest predecessor-in-
interest, possessed the property as early as 1969, the respondent’s claim must
still fail, as he was unable to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership. As the Court ruled in Republic v. Alconaba:27
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated
by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant
to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
The respondent’s possession and that of his "predecessors-in-interest" will not
suffice for purposes of judicial confirmation of title. What is categorically
required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
The evidence on record shows that a house was constructed on the subject
property only in 1991. Certain discrepancies likewise surround the application
for registration: Honorato Edaño sold a parcel of land consisting of 2,790 square
meters on December 9, 1980 to Vicente Enciso alone; on January 17, 1981,
Vicente Enciso, Natividad Edaño Asuncion and Thelma Edaño executed a deed
of partition covering the same lot. Why was there a need to partition the property
if the entire land had already been sold to Vicente? The Court also notes that in
the said deed of partition, one-half of the total area of the land, which was 1,398
square meters, was adjudicated in favor of Vicente; however, in the
respondent’s application for registration, the land sought to be registered
consists of 1,475 square meters.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases
rests on the applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence
that his alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law. Bare allegations, without more, do not amount to preponderant
evidence that would shift the burden to the oppositor.28
Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1) Lot No. 2278-A was classified
as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners since
time immemorial, or from June 12, 1945.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 26, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72859 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Pedro O. Enciso’s application for registration and issuance
of title to Lot No. 2278-A, Cad. 652-D, Masinloc Cadastre, is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164823 August 31, 2005
MARIA CARLOS, represented by
TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
Puno, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76824 entitled "Re: Application for Land
Registration of a Parcel of Land in Taguig, Metro Manila, Maria Carlos
represented by Teresita Carlos Victoria, Applicant-Appellee vs. Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General, Oppositor-Appellant."
On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter,
Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of
title over a parcel of land with an area of 3,975 square meters located at
Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Plan Psu-244418.
Petitioner alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land
which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since
July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership; that there is no
mortgage or encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or
naval reservation; that the property is being used for industrial purposes; and
that there are no tenants or lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed
that she has been in possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner;
that her possession has been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continuous
since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession with that of her predecessors-
in-interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for more than 50
years.1
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an
opposition to petitioner’s application.2
During the initial hearing, however, only petitioner and her counsel appeared.
They presented documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional
requirements.3
Petitioner later presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of
her neighbors, Sergio Cruz and Daniel Castillo, and Teresita Carlos Victoria
herself.4
Sergio Cruz, 83 years old, a native of Ususan, Taguig, and neighbor of Maria
Carlos, testified that the property subject of the application was previously
owned and possessed by Jose Carlos. He planted it with palay and sold the
harvest. Everyone in the community knew him as the owner of said parcel of
land. He also paid the taxes thereon. After the death of Jose Carlos in 1948, his
daughter, Maria Carlos, inherited the property and immediately took possession
thereof. Her possession was peaceful, open, public, continuous, uninterrupted,
notorious, adverse and in the concept of an owner. When Maria Carlos died, her
heirs took over the property.5
Cruz’s testimony was corroborated by Daniel Castillo, 76 years old, Barangay
Captain of Ususan, Taguig.6
Teresita Carlos Victoria stated on the witness stand that her mother, Maria
Carlos, was in possession of the subject property until she passed away on
January 6, 2001. Upon the demise of Maria Carlos, Victoria took possession of
the property with the consent of her brothers and sisters. She characterized
Maria Carlos’s possession as peaceful, open, public, continuous, adverse,
notorious and in the concept of an owner. She has never been disturbed in her
possession; the whole community recognized her as the owner of the land; she
declared the land for tax purposes; and she paid the taxes thereon. In addition,
Victoria informed the court that the heirs of Maria Carlos have not yet instituted a
settlement of her estate. However, they have agreed to undertake the titling of
the property and promised to deliver the certificate of title to Ususan
Development Corporation which bought the property from Maria Carlos. Victoria
admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan Development Corporation
in 1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the heirs of Maria Carlos made a
commitment to the corporation to deliver the certificate of title so that they could
collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price.7
Petitioner also presented in court the concerned officers of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to establish that the land in
question is alienable and disposable.
Elvira R. Reynaldo, Records Officer, DENR – Lands Management Bureau,
appeared to certify that their office "has no record of any kind of public land
application/land patent covering the parcel of land situated at
Ususan, Taguig, Rizal, identified/described in Plan Psu-244418."8
Ulysses Sigaton, Land Management Inspector, DENR – National Capital
Region, stated that he conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property
and found that it is within the alienable and disposable area under Project No.
27-B, LC Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on
January 4, 1968. He also noted that the land is being used for industrial
purposes. It had several warehouses, four big water tanks and is enclosed by a
fence.9
The trial court granted the application in its decision dated October 24, 2002. It
held:
After considering the applicant’s evidence ex-parte which is based on factual
and meritorious grounds, and considering that the applicant acquired the
property under registration through inheritance from her father, Jose Carlos, and
considering further that her possession thereof, tacked with that of her
predecessor-in-interest, is open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
undisturbed, under claim of ownership since time immemorial up to the present
time; and considering further that the subject parcel of land is part of the
disposable and alienable land (Tsn, July 3, 2002, p.6) and considering further
that the realty taxes due thereon have been religiously paid (Exhs. "HH," "II,"
"JJ," and "JJ-1"), and considering finally that the subject parcel of land belong[s]
to the applicant and that she possess[es] a perfect title thereto which may be
confirmed and registered in her name under the (P)roperty Registration Decree
(P.D. 1529), the herein application is hereby GRANTED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court. It noted that:
In the instant case, the applicant at the time she filed her application for
registration of title was no longer in possession and occupation of the land in
question since on October 16, 1996, the applicant’s mother and predecessor-in-
interest sold the subject land to Ususan Development Corporation. This was
admitted by witness Teresita Carlos Victoria x x x
Clearly, as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land in question
pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan Development Corporation, thus it can
be said that the applicant has no registrable title over the land in question.11
Hence, this petition.
We affirm the findings of the appellate court.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.12
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but
not the second.
The Court held in Republic vs. Alconaba13 that the applicant must show that
he is in actual possession of the property at the time of the application, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated
by the conjunction ["]and["], the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant
to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had
possession of the property at the time of the application for the issuance of a
certificate of title. The application was filed in court on December 19, 2001.
Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted during the
hearing that her mother had sold the property to Ususan Development
Corporation in 1996. They also presented as evidence the deed of absolute sale
executed by and between Maria Carlos and Ususan Development Corporation
on October 16, 1996.14 The document states, among others:
xxx
4. That the VENDOR, by this Deed hereby transfer(s) possession of the property
to the VENDEE.15
This contradicts petitioner’s claim that she was in possession of the property at
the time that she applied for confirmation of title.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual
possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer in the
concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in
the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept
of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other
hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior
right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
wrong.16 Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan
Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate
of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her
possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the
law, only he who possesses the property under abona fide claim of ownership is
entitled to confirmation of title.
We therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the issuance of
a certificate of title to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163751 March 31, 2006
ANECITO CALIMPONG and wife [NARCISA YGUAS],* Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF FILOMENA GUMELA represented by FLAVIA
MOLINA, Respondent.
 DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
Complying with the order issued on December 10, 1927 by Auxiliary Judge
Mariano Buyson Lampa of the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in
Cadastral Case No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record No. 757 for the registration, in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, of Lot No. 3013 of
the Cadastral Survey of Dipolog (the lot) located in Anastacio, Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte in the names of Filomena, Dionisio, Eusebio, Victoria,
Fortunata, Serapio, Hipolito, Victor, Romualdo and Miguel, all surnamed
Gumela1 who were therein decreed "the owners in fee simple" of the lot, Decree
No. 342638 was issued on October 19, 1928, as attested by Enrique Altavas,
Chief of the General Land Registration Office. Despite the issuance of the
decree, it appears that no certificate of title was issued and registered in the
names of the Gumelas.
By the claim of the Heirs of the Gumelas (the heirs), they hired an overseer in-
charge of the cultivation of the lot.
In 1992, the heirs agreed to partition the estate of their predecessors-in-interest
which includes the lot. They soon learned, however, that the lot was being
occupied by Anecito Calimpong (Calimpong).
It turned out that Calimpong filed in 1976 an application for Free Patent over the
lot, which application he followed up with the Bureau of Lands when his
possession was "disturbed" by the heirs.
The heirs thus filed on July 27, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City a complaint2 for quieting of title, damages, with prayer for preliminary
injunction against Calimpong and his wife.
In the meantime, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(PENRO) Hilarion L. Ramos approved Calimpong’s Free Patent application, by
Order3 of August 17, 1993, in light of the following findings:
1. That the applicant is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and is otherwise
qualified to acquire public lands through Free Patent;
2. That the land applied for has been classified as alienable and disposable and
is subject to disposition under the public land laws;
3. That upon investigation conducted by Deputy Public Land Inspector Marciano
I. Carangan, whose report was duly indorsed by LMO-III Designate, Ramon S.
Pacatang, it was found out that the land applied for has been occupied and
cultivated by the applicant himself and/or through his predecessor-in-interest,
since July 4, 1945 or prior thereto;
4. That the Notice of the acquisition of the land by the Applicant under this
application has been published in accordance with Law and that no person has
proven a better right to the land applied for;
5. That the claim of the applicant is in all other respects, complete and there
is no records in this office or any obstacle to the issuance of patent; and
6. That there is no adverse claim involving the land applied for still pending
determination in this office; (Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Order disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the occupation and cultivation of the land applied for as
described in the caption hereof is hereby confirmed and this application is then
hereby entered in the records of this office as Free Patent Entry No. 372.
As the applicant has already complied with all the requirements of the law for
the issuance of the corresponding patent to the land, it is also hereby ordered
that the necessary patent be prepared for the issuance in favor of the
Applicant.4 (Underscoring supplied)
On August 17, 1993, Patent No. 09721093961 was issued to Calimpong which
was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte for registration
and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.5
On August 19, 1993, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-337806 was issued
by and registered in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte in the name of Calimpong.
To the complaint of the heirs, the spouses Calimpong alleged in their September
3, 1993 Answer with Counterclaim7 that, inter alia, assuming that the lot was
adjudicated to the Gumelas, "the same ha[d] been considered long abandoned
because neither the adjudicatee[s] nor any of the heirs have pursued the titling
of the land, cultivation, improvement and possession." In any event, the spouses
Calimpong informed that a Free Patent and an OCT over the lot had already
been issued in the name of Calimpong by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga
del Norte.
The heirs thus filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint8 impleading as
additional defendants PENRO and the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte, seeking as additional reliefs the nullification of OCT No. P-33780 and
Free Patent No. 09721093961.
The amended complaint9 was admitted by the Dipolog RTC, by Resolution10 of
February 8, 1994.
After trial on the merits, the trial court, by Decision11 of February 28, 2001,
rendered judgment in favor of the heirs. It held that, among other things, the title
of the heirs is based on a grant thereof to their predecessors-in-interest by the
government in cadastral proceedings and by such grant, the lot ceased to be
part of public domain as it had become private property, hence, not subject to
free patent application. It thus concluded that the free patent and the title issued
to Calimpong were null and void. The decretal portion of the trial court’s decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court declares the herein plaintiffs
being the hereditary successors of the adjudicatees mentioned in the
Decree (Exhibit "L"), are the rightful owners of Lot No. 3013, Cad. Survey of
Dipolog under Cad. Case No. 5, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. 757, situated at
Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte and, as prayed for in the complaint,
in order to remove clouds cast on it by the claim of the defendants Free Patent
No. 09721093961 issued by the PENRO of Zamboanga del Norte, as well as
the Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued by said office and the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, are hereby declared null and
void; the defendants are hereby ordered to turn over the peaceful possession of
the land in question unto plaintiffs; the plaintiffs, upon proper petition filed in
Court, may ask the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte to cause the
issuance of a Certificate of Title under the same terms and conditions as stated
in the Decree issued to Lot No. 3013, with such decree as basis thereof.
No damages awarded, the same not being proved.12 (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal, the appellate court, by the challenged Decision13 of January 26,
2004, affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition of the spouses Calimpong (hereafter petitioners)
faulting the appellate court in:
1. . . . [not] holding that [they are the] true and real owners of the land in
question[.]
2. . . . [not] declaring . . . Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 .. as valid and
legally issued[.]
3. . . . giving weight to the alleged title in the name of respondent’s predecessors
in interest which was not found or existing in the records of the Register of
Deeds neither presented or offered in evidence by them[.]
4. . . . appreciating in respondents’ favor their inability to show proof that they
ever filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of said title, if at all, it actually
existed[.]
5. . . . failing to consider respondents’ alleged payment of taxes to the land
started only in 1993 at the time that this case had already been instituted in
court[.]
6. . . . [not] holding that laches, more than prescription, applies in this case[.]
7. . . . resolving that the existing Original Certificate of Title issued in favor of
petitioners coupled with the latter’s actual possession, not the ghost, alleged title
of the respondents’ predecessors[-]in[-]interest, should entitle the indefeasibility
of the torrens system[.]14
The petition fails.
It is undisputed that the lot was judicially adjudicated and an order for the
registration of the lot in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of the heirs
(hereafter respondent) as "owners in fee simple" was issued on December 10,
1927, and that a decree of registration was issued on October 19, 1928, to wit:
xxxx
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance
with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of said Filomena
Gumela, Dionisio Gumela, . . . subject, however, to such of the [e]ncumbrances
mentioned in article 39 of said Law as may be subsisting, and to a first lien in
favor of the Insular Government to guarantee the payment of the special taxes
assessed pursuant to the provisions of section 18 of Act 2259, as amended.
Witness the Honorable Mariano Buyson Lampa, Auxiliary Judge of said Court,
the 10th day of December, A. D., nineteen hundred and twenty-seven.
Issued at Manila, P.I, the 19th day of October A. D. 1928, at 10:03 a.m.
x x x x15
Nothing in the records shows that the order of adjudication was appealed,
questioned or set aside.
In De la Merced v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court held:
. . . [T]he title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the
expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the
cadastral court, without such appeal having been perfected. The certificate
of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be
necessary.1awphil.net
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the
issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No.
395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said
property had already become final, and there being no imputation of
irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the
said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial
decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become from that
time,registered property which could not be acquired by adverse
possession.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the immediately-quoted pronouncement in De la Merced, the title of
ownership on the adjudicatees, the Gumelas-predecessors-in-interest of
respondent, was vested on December 10, 1927.
Whether a certificate of title was issued in the name of respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest is immaterial. For, following De la Merced, the title of
ownership on respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was vested as of 1927. The
lot, for all intents and purposes, had become from said date registered property
which could not be acquired by adverse possession and was, therefore, beyond
the jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau of the DENR (formerly the
Bureau of Lands) to subject it to free patent.
Under the provision of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private
respondents’ predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the
Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a
free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to
private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises
not, from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned.
The purpose of the legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No.
2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands
held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any
manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private
ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come
within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such
freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and
the same are excluded from the provisions of the text thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) 18
Since the DENR had no authority to grant a free patent over the lot, Free Patent
No. 09721093961 issued on August 17, 1993 by the PENRO of Zamboanga del
Norte and Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued on August 19, 1993 by
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of petitioner Calimpong
are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

 SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17757 May 30, 1962
MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.
Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.
Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the original
decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No. 946),
upholding the right of ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the
Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.
As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:
In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3,
1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claiming
ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of
the cadastral court dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought
recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and
of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956.
Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their
ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and
their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter
of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common cause with
the defendants.
On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after
making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the Original Certificate of Title No.
425 issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los
Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that in a
decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case No.
14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in favor of the
conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal; that
pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued on December 17, 1925 an
order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property; that on
December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 was issued in the name
of Ezequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which was
cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court declared lot 395
public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a
homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original Certificate of Title
No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral court had no
jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and, therefore, the
same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void, the
court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. 3462 in the name of Juan de la
Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre and
surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay the latter as the landlord's
share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or their
equivalent, and costs of the suit; and the receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay
in his custody representing the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.
Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of the
decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing for
reception of additional evidence.
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:
The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated "Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre,
Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1971 and original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover Lot 3-
6". They, however, claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision
rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
21, entitled "Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et al.," (Exh. A-
1), and the other dated December 17, 1925 directing the issuance of a decree
pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, Rec. of exhibits).
No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much
less was there a title issued in the name of the plaintiffs over the said lot.
The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over the
said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, 1931 in
favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a
homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the defendants
and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26, 1923,
adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no
decree issued pursuant thereto.
The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if there
was actually a petition for review of the decision of December 26, 1923, or a
new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The fact of the
matter is that Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued pursuant to a
homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public land in a
decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at
Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh.
4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared
a public land and was the object of a homestead application by the respective
concessionaries (p. 21, rec. of exhibits). . . .
It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs. Justo
Abacan, et al., erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was already
adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision dated December 26, 1923
(Exhs. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that Lot 395 is
public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial notice of the
said decision and the other promulgated therein for the issuance of a decree in
favor of the plaintiffs over lot 395 (Exh. B-2).
While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain,
the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead patent
over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as
no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse
possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over
20 years, they were declared to have acquired the right over the same by
prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No.
3462 cancelled and a new one issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs
were directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them,
and to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its
decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on the basis of
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the decree by the
cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto becomes
incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription. And, as the land
was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was
obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can not prevail over the cadastral
court's decree of registration of Lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos'
predecessor.
Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the
Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of the
order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in favor of
Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the
issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute
registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has
not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby affected still be
lost by adverse possession?
For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be
considered:
By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was definitely
confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925
declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de
los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;
That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening
the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of which Juan de la
Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent
and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in
1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land
which included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot at
the time he applied for it as a homestead;
That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952.
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific
provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey
and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the
register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act 496). In
other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered
until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had
been accomplished.
With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant
has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration,
a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exception stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in
the general description "To all whom it may concern". Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree povided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate
of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and
minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree shall
be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of
titles hereinafter mentioned. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and a
certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the decree of
registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be
the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the
corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.
But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only to
voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to lands
titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes:
SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the
province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for
reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may designate,
and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings
in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same rules. Orders of
default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary
cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting interests
shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons
entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final,
shall be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said persons which
shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for
registration of land under the Land Registration Act, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding
is vested, this Court, in the case ofGovernment of the Philippine Islands v.
Abural,1 said:
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates
ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the
judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order
for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy
of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again is judicial action,
although to a less degree than the first.
The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of
the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec.
174.) . . . .
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the
certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is
a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is
unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
performed is the mere formulation of technical description. . . .
As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed
for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of
the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect
an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of
right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested
upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been
perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of
effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance
to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the
decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become
final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral
proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the
date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and
purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could not be
acquired by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1
vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the decision2dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled
"Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero, Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City."
The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:
Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the
Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin,
Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon favorable report and
recommendation of the District Land Officer, Guerrero’s application was
approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with the boundaries of the land
awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-
Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is contained at the back
of the Order of Award.
Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was
issued in favor of respondent. Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.
On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of
Lands claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false
statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square
meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her house is situated
and where she has been residing since 1961.
A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the
Director of Lands issued an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z.
Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the then Minister of
Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a Decision dated July
22, 1985.
Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22,
1985. Acting on the motion for reconsideration, the President, …, ordered that
the case be remanded to the DENR [Department of Environment and Natural
Resources] for the latter’s office to conduct an ocular investigation and resurvey
of the disputed area. The said directive is contained in the Order dated October
30, 1987(Exhibit "J").
Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and
relocation survey was conducted by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K") was
thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of the titled property of
Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL
POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante) with
only 91 square meters under the physical possession of Guerrero. It was also
found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters
wide, as even the Order of Award in favor of Guerrero, shows by the boundaries
of the land indicated therein, viz: bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-
Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public Land.
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR]
Ocular Investigation and Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") …, issued an
order directing the DENR to implement the … Report for the ‘proper correction’
of the technical description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to
respondent.
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for
Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of
Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss
the petition …, alleging among other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands’ petition and that the said petition
was defective in form and substance, inasmuch as it failed to name [Guerrero]
who holds a certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) over the properties subject of the
petition, as respondent in the action, and that the title sought to be amended
was irrevocable and can no longer be questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. Trial of the petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one
hand, and [Guerrero], on the other, presenting their respective evidence and
witnesses.3 [Words in bracket added.]
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to
prove its allegation that respondent obtained the sales patent and the certificate
of title through fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding for the
latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-
28) in the name of respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after
the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision
dated February 12, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:
It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent
involving public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate
of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration
proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other similar
patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an
incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been
determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely
conclusive and indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or
reopened within one year after the entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud,
a patent awarded in accordance with the Public Land Law may be reviewed
within one year from the date of the order for the issuance of the patent also on
the ground of actual fraud.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx there is no showing … that at the time the [respondent] applied for his
miscellaneous sales patent, there were third persons who had been in
occupation of the land applied for. While subsequent survey documents,
prepared as a consequence of the protest filed by the Bustamentes, report the
possession of the Bustamantes of a portion of the land, and the erection of their
house thereon, these reports do not indicate if such structures were existing at
the time the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was
guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent, and
subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same
was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of March 23, 1998.5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court
erred in holding -
I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public
lands is conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondent’s title was
procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual
fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling
of the Office of the President from which ruling respondent did not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third
person of the land, or a portion thereof, after the award and issuance of the
patent to the applicant despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed within
one year from the issuance of patent.6
Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and
certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation. To support its basic
posture, petitioner points to the verification survey conducted by Engr. Ernesto
Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that
respondent’s entitlement to a public land award should have been limited to a
91-square meter area instead of the 174 square meters eventually granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he
secured pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the
Torrens system of registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered,
impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this
Petition ― the presence of fraud ― is factual. As a general rule, this Court does
not review factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has consistently
held, factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are
final and conclusive on this Court,7 save when the judgment of the appellate
court is based on a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly
incorrect or when that court overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.8Obviously, petitioner is invoking
these exceptions toward having the Court review the factual determinations of
the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by
clear and convincing evidence that respondent procured Miscellaneous Sales
Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 through fraud and misrepresentation.
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the
public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now
covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the
operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of
1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to
issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is
the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.9 As it
were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense,
as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered
owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured
in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the
covered land.10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands … belonging to the Government of the
[Republic of the Philippines] are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of
the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of
the Government to cause such instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to
be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be
there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate
shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner’s duplicate
certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance
from the Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and
as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land,
and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the
register of deeds for the province where the land lies. xxx. (Words in bracket
added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and
becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
whose name appears thereon.11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of
land to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained
by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says so:
SEC. 38. ― xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the [Republic of the
Philippines] and all the branches thereof, …. Such decree shall not be opened
by reason of the absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees,
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of
the decree of registration within one year after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of
said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance
with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis and words in bracket
supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds
from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud
because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design to commit
positive fraud or injury upon other persons.12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic
where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or
where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein.
The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and
thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the
name of the applicant.13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud
had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or
reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his
interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that
the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting
that there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled
to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting
about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former
to withdraw his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is
that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one
that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted
where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not
collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, we have underscored
the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation
at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or
in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged
fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from
properly presenting the case.15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a
review of the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced
adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and
extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title.
Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right
over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such
fraud. In fact, other than its peremptory statement in its petition filed before the
trial court that "the patentee, Benjamin Guerrero, obtained the above indicated
sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material
facts,"16 petitioner did not specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by
respondent in procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any
evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed,
and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction
bears the burden of proof.17 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied
as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes
and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.18 Thus, the law
requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but
by clear and convincing evidence.19
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report20 which stated that
respondent Guerrero was entitled to only 91 square meters of the subject lot
instead of 174 square meters which was awarded to him. There is, however, no
proof that the area eventually awarded to respondent was intentionally and
fraudulently increased. It was never proven that respondent was a party to any
fraud that led to the award of a bigger area of 174 square meters instead of 91
square meters. Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error which
may have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the subject property
nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as to the reason for such
discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the
subject lot was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the
purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the material facts set out in the
application.22 The law also requires sufficient notice to the municipality and
barrio where the land is located in order to give adverse claimants the
opportunity to present their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after
respondent filed his miscellaneous sales application, an actual investigation and
site verification of the parcel of land was conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso
Tumbocon who reported that the land was free from claims and
conflicts.24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the lot in question was posted at the
District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon City Hall, and at Pugad
Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March
17, 1965 which was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said notice
was worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau
of Lands, Manila on or before the date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall
forever be barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance
of Patent"27 dated June 28, 1982 were both duly signed by the Director of
Lands. The "Order of Award" even declared that Guerrero has in good faith
established his residence on the land in question. On the other hand, the
"Issuance of Patent" stated that the land consisting of 174 square meters is free
from any adverse claim and that Guerrero has fully paid the purchase price of
the lot. Having complied with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the
issuance of the patent, respondent was thus issued MSP No. 8991 dated August
16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August
27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly
performed their official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land registration that
led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in respondent’s name
are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this legal presumption will not
only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the
Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility
of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.28 Besides, this presumption of
regularity has not been overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. We,
therefore, cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that fraud tainted the sales
patent granted to respondent Guerrero, as well as the certificate of title issued in
consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to
avail itself of the remedy within the prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act
No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration must
be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences
from the issuance of the patent by the government.29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16,
1982, while petitioner instituted an action to amend respondent’s certificate of
title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years from
the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the remedy
to contest Guerrero’s title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully
acquired property is not barred by prescription. Thus, it can still recover the land
granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may
still bring an action, even after the lapse of one year, for the reversion to the
public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in cases
of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title. In
the present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke this defense for, as
discussed earlier, it was never proven that respondent’s patent and title were
obtained through actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the
corresponding certificate of title ceases to be part of the public domain. As such,
it is considered a private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction.31
Petitioner likewise insists that respondent’s title had yet to attain the status of
indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file a protest
on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-year prescriptive period.
We do not agree.
While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in
favor of respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of Lands
instead of with the regional trial court as mandated by the aforequoted provision
of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition for
review of a decree of registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First
Instance" (now Regional Trial Court). The law did not say that such petition may
be filed with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what
the law contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-
blown trial before a regular court where each party could be afforded full
opportunity to present his/its case and where each of them must establish his
case by preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence, the
usual quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
means probability of truth.32On the other hand, substantial evidence refers to
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very
integrity of land titles and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the merits
before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of achieving a more in-depth
and thorough determination of all issues involved.
Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with
the Bureau of Lands cannot be considered in the context of a petition to review
the decree of registration issued to respondent. It was only on November 7,
1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with the RTC and
obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country
because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land
on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk
of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not
only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to
be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and
proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could
be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity
of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are
satisfied.34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the
amendment of OCT No. 0-28, derogates the very integrity of the system as it
gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like herein respondent, that their
titles can be questioned by the same authority who had approved their titles. In
that case, no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and
possession of his land, for land registration officers can question his title any
time they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more
frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he had bought the subject
lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now impugning his
title.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a
system of registration of titles to lands,35 justice and equity demand that the
titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a
fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of
the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity
of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency
of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.37
Respondent’s certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens
system, was thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167412 February 22, 2006
JUANITA NAVAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITO CAMALLA, JAIME NACION, CONRADO
BALILA, ESTER MOYA and PORFIRIA AGUIRRE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
December 14, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86736, which reversed the Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 2004-
0054 affirming the Decision3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, as well as the Resolution4 dated February
17, 2005 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 2, 1969, Ildefonso A. Naval sold a parcel of land located in Sto.
Tomas, Magarao, Camarines Sur, consisting of 858 sq. m. to Gregorio B.
Galarosa. The sale was recorded in the Registry of Property of the Registry of
Deeds of Camarines Sur on December 3, 1969 pursuant to Act No. 3344, the
law governing registrations of all instruments on unregistered lands.5
Subsequently, Gregorio sold portions of the land to respondents Conrado
Rodrigo Balilla6 on November 4, 1976, Jaime Nacion7 on January 10, 1977 and
spouses Ireneo and Ester Moya8 in July 1977, and Juanito Camalla9 on
September 4, 1987. All buyers occupied the portion they bought, built
improvements thereon, and paid the taxes due thereto.10
The controversy arose when petitioner Juanita Naval, the great granddaughter
of Ildefonso, was issued on April 1, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Sur an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-5386 (29791), covering 733 sq.
m. of the subject land.11 She claimed that she bought the subject land from
Ildefonso in 1972.12
On November 10, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession
against Bartolome Aguirre, Conrado Balila,13 Ireneo Moya, Jaime Nacion and
Domingo Nacion, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 306.14However, the
case was dismissed15 without prejudice16 for failure to prosecute the action for
an unreasonable length of time.
Almost 20 years later, or on April 21, 1997, petitioner re-filed the complaint for
recovery of possession with damages before the MCTC of Magarao-Canaman,
Camarines Sur, against Juanita17 Camalla, Diosdado Balila, Conrado Balila,
Forferia18 Aguirre, Jaime Nacion and Ester Moya. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 994.
After trial, the MCTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing consideration, decision is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants:
1) Declaring the plaintiff to be the legal owner of the land as described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2) Ordering defendants Juanito Camalla, Diosdado Balila, Conrado Balila,
Porferia Aguirre and Jaime Nacion to vacate the property in question and to
deliver its possession to the plaintiff;
3) Ordering Ester Moya to vacate the fifty (50) square meters occupied by her
and to relinquish its possession to the plaintiff;
4) Dismissing the respective claims for damages of the parties.
Pronouncing no costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the decision to the RTC of Naga City, which
affirmed in toto the assailed decision.20
Respondents thereafter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court. Finding the prior registration of the deed of sale between
Ildefonso and Gregorio with the Register of Deeds as a constructive notice to
subsequent buyers, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC. Thus,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED.
The appealed decision of the courta quo is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new judgment is hereby entered dismissing respondent's complaint for
recovery of possession with damages. Petitioners' counterclaim for damages is
likewise dismissed for lack of legal and factual bases.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT GREGORIO
GALAROSA HAS RIGHTFULLY ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT
COVERED BY OCT RP #5386 (29791) AND DECLARING HIM TO HAVE
POSSESSED THE LOT BEFORE THE ALLEGED SALES TO RESPONDENTS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF
TAXES BY RESPONDENTS WERE (sic) EVIDENCE OF LAWFUL
POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LOTS
CLAIMED BY THE RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN POSSESSED BY THEM IN
GOOD FAITH DESPITE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OCT
RP #5386(29791).22
Petitioner claims that she has superior rights over the subject land because the
sale between Ildefonso and Gregorio and the subsequent registration thereof
with the Register of Deeds had no legal effect since the subject land was
declared in the name of Agrifina Avila while the tax declaration cancelled by
Gregorio’s was that of Gregorio Boñaga. Petitioner thus assails the right claimed
by Gregorio over the subject land from which the respondents derived their
respective claims.23
On the other hand, respondents contend that the registered sale by Ildefonso to
Gregorio in 1969 of the subject land, from whom they derive their claims, vests
them with better right than the petitioner; that registration under Act No. 3344
served as constructive notice to the whole world, including the petitioner, who
claimed to have purchased the subject land from Ildefonso in 1972, but failed to
present evidence to prove such acquisition.24
We deny the petition.
Prefatorily, a perusal of the records reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject land was the exclusive property of Ildefonso
who sold it to her in 1972.25 However, in this appeal, petitioner assails the
ownership not only of Gregorio but also of Ildefonso by alleging that at the time
the latter sold the land to Gregorio, the same was declared in the name of
Agrifina Avila. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not
allowed to change his theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only
be unfair to the other party, but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.26
In this appeal, the issue for resolution is who has the superior right to a parcel of
land sold to different buyers at different times by its former owner.
It is not disputed that the subject land belonged to Ildefonso and that it was not
registered under the Torrens System27 when it was sold to Gregorio in 1969
and to the petitioner in 1972. Further, the deed of sale between Ildefonso and
Gregorio was registered with the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur pursuant
to Act No. 3344, as shown by Inscription No. 54609 dated December 3, 1969,
Page 119, Volume 186, File No. 55409 at the back thereof.
In holding that respondents have a better right to possess the subject land in
view of the bona fide registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur by Ildefonso and Gregorio, the Court of Appeals applied Article
1544 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
While we agree with the appellate court that respondents have superior right
over the petitioner on the subject property, we find Article 1544 inapplicable to
the case at bar since the subject land was unregistered at the time of the first
sale. The registration contemplated under this provision has been held to refer
to registration under the Torrens System, which considers the act of registration
as the operative act that binds the land.28 Thus, inCarumba v. Court of
Appeals,29 we held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land
not registered under Torrens System.
The law applicable therefore is Act No. 3344, which provides for the registration
of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the
Torrens System. Under this law, registration by the first buyer is constructive
notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith.
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule30 that the registration of an
instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates
constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the
same property. We also held in Bayoca v. Nogales31 that:
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the
second sale in their favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first
buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the
second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the
undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers],
necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the
[second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their
names. It follows that their title to the land cannot be upheld. x x x.
Even if petitioner argues that she purchased and registered the subject land in
good faith and without knowledge of any adverse claim thereto, respondents still
have superior right over the disputed property. We held in Rayos v.
Reyes32 that:
"[T]he issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the
subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from
the registered owner whose title to the land is clean x x x in such case the
purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he
is a purchaser in good faith for value." Since the properties in question are
unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers thereof did so at their peril.
Their claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e., without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not protect them if it
turns out, as it actually did in this case, that their seller did not own the property
at the time of the sale.
It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo
dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can
transfer legally.33 In the case at bar, since Ildefonso no longer owned the
subject land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he had nothing to sell and
the latter did not acquire any right to it.
Even if we apply Article 1544, the facts would nonetheless show that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest registered first the source of their
ownership and possession, i.e., the 1969 deed of sale, and possessed the
subject land at the earliest time. Applying the doctrine of "priority in time, priority
in rights" or "prius tempore, potior jure," respondents are entitled to the
ownership and possession of the subject land.34
True, a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding
permitted by law.35 Moreover, Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
provides that "[u]pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible."
However, it does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title or
ownership which is represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title.36 The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her
name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest
title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein.37 It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it
be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of others.38 Its issuance in favor of a particular
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned
with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.39
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of
the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the
registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that
reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of
the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better
right.40
Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly held that an action for reconveyance does
not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, as
in this case. Thus, in Leyson v. Bontuyan:41
x x x [T]his Court declared that an action for reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the
acts. In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
... [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date
of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming
to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this
is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay, the same pronouncement was reiterated
by the Court:
... There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece
of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or
his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek
the aid of the court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived
at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners
whose ... possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was
suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and
cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that
in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance
and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one
in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then
that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such
possessor.
The paramount reason for this exception is based on the theory that registration
proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud. Moreover, to hold otherwise
would be to put premium on land-grabbing and transgressing the broader
principle in human relations that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86736,
dismissing petitioner’s complaint for recovery of possession and respondents’
counterclaim for damages for lack of legal and factual bases, and the Resolution
dated February 17, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143027 October 11, 2005
ENCARNACION L. CUIZON and SALVADOR CUIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MERCEDES C. REMOTO, LEONIDA R. MEYNARD, CELERINA R. ROSALES
and REMEDIOS C. REMOTO,Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The parties in this case are vying for ownership of a 4,300 square meter-land
located in Barangay Basilisa, Remedios T. Romualdez, Agusan del Norte.
Petitioners-spouses Encarnacion L. Cuizon and Salvador Cuizon rely on
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3121 in the name of "Encarnacion L.
Cuizon, married to Salvador Cuizon," issued by the Registry of Deeds of Agusan
del Norte on March 15, 1984,1 pursuant to a notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement
with Sale dated August 3, 1983 (1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale)
executed by the heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo (Placida), wherein they
adjudicated unto themselves the one-fourth share of Placida, and, at the same
time, sold said portion to their co-heir, Encarnacion L. Cuizon.2 TCT No. RT-
3121 is a transfer from TCT No. RT-183 which originally covers 16 hectares in
the name of Placida (married to Gervacio Lambo), Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda
Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, each being one-fourth shareowner.3
On the other hand, respondents have in their favor a notarized Deed of Sale of
Real Property dated September 19, 1968, (1968 Deed of Sale) involving a
portion of the same property covered by TCT No. RT-183, measuring 4,300
square meters, executed by Placida in favor of Angel Remoto (Angel), husband
of respondent Mercedes C. Remoto, and father of the other respondents,
Leonida R. Meynard, Celerina R. Rosales and Remedios C. Remoto.4
In a Decision dated March 9, 1990 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City (Branch 3) in Civil Case No. 2846, which is an action for
reconveyance filed by respondents against petitioners on August 13, 1984, the
trial court ruled in favor of respondents and ordered that the property be
reconveyed to them. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is rendered in favor of herein plaintiffs Mercedes Remoto
and children Celerino R. Rosales, Leonida R. Meynard, Candelaria and
Remedios both surnamed Remoto, and against defendant-spouses Salvador
and Encarnacion Cuizon ordering the latter:
1) To immediately reconvey the lot in question to herein plaintiffs;
2) To pay the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as litigation expenses;
3) To pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees; and
4) To pay the costs (sic) of suit.
Done in Chambers this 9th day of March, 1990, at Butuan City, Philippines.5
In awarding the property to respondents, the trial court made the following
findings and conclusion, which the Court quotes with approval, viz.:
. . . a careful examination of the evidence on record shows that the evidence of
the plaintiffs is strong, substantial convincing and worthy of belief than that of the
defendants. The plaintiffs can legally claim possession and ownership of the lot
in dispute covered by the one—paged duly notarized but unregistered Deed of
Sale of Real Property (Exh. A, Rollo, p. 45 or 89). A perusal of this document
discloses that it was duly notarized and signed by vendor Placida Tabada,
together with [h]usband Gervacio Lambo, and vendee Angel Remoto.
Incidentally, the defendants-spouses utterly failed to prove any defect and
irregularity in the exec[u]tion of this Exh. A.
It is the posture of the defendants-spouses that this "state" (sic) and
unregistered deed of sale (Exh. A) "has lost its due execution and genuineness
and the fact of its being a public document"; that it cannot defeat the duly
registered Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale (Exh. 1-B); and
that the issuance of TCT No. RT-3121 in favor of defendants-spouses (Exh. 3)
conferred the latter a better right to the litigated lot under the Torrens system.
This Court is not in accord to (sic) these posturings of defendants-spouses.
Exhibit A, which is duly notarized, is a public document. Although it is not
registered, it is still enforceable and binding not only between the parties but
also their successors-in-interest. …
It is likewise [the] stance of defendants-spouses that they are purchasers in
good faith and for value of the lot in question. This fact is vividly rebutted by the
straight forward and credible testimonies of plaintiffs Mercedes O. Remoto and
Candelaria Remoto. Both testified that it was in September, 1982, not in 1983 as
defendant Salvador Cuizon wants this court to believe, when defendants-
spouses went to the residence of the Remotos and learned of the existence of
Exhibit A; that it was on this occasion that defendants-spouses were actually
shown the document, and that they read and examined the same (Vide, tsn.
December 28, 1984, 284-289; tsn. April 24, 1986, 32, 34-37).
Besides, defendants-spouses could not feign ignorance of the unrebutted fact
that the plaintiffs had enjoyed continuous, open, adverse and public possession
of the litigated lot in the concept of an owner for a duration of fourteen years or
more, i.e., from September 19, 1968, the date of execution of Exhibit A, to the
present (tsn. December 28, 1984, 283-284) or until September, 1982 when they
became aware of the existence of Exhibit A. Nor could the defendants-spouses
deny the unrebutted fact that they never had taken possession of the litigated lot
(tsn. id., 274-275).
Despite their knowledge of the existence of the Exhibit A and of the continuous
public and adverse possession for fourteen years of the lot by the plaintiffs,
defendants-spouses had caused the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale on August 3, 1983 by the Heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo
in their favor (Exh. 1-B), and the consequent issuance of TCT RT-3121 in the
name of defendant Encarnacion-Cuizon (Exh. 3). Hence, defendants-spouses
were buyers in bad faith. They could not pretend a lack of knowledge of
plaintiffs’ claim and interest in the land. They also acted in bad faith in the
registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale (Exh. 1-B) and in
their acquisition of TCT RT-3121 (Exh. 3).
…
Since defendants-spouses knew of the existence of the first deed of sale,
Exhibit A, this first unregistered deed of sale prevails over the registered second
deed of sale, Exhibit 1-B.
…
It is also stressed herein that the claim of defendants-spouses that they bought
the disputed lot in 1964 on installment basis from Placida Tabada and Gervacio
Lambo cannot be given credence. This claim of theirs is self-serving and an
afterthought in their last attempts to bolster their defense. In the absence of a
written document embodying the supposed deed of sale, the latter is
unenforceable contract. This conclusion is in pursuance to sub-paragraph (e),
paragraph 2 of Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. …
Furthermore, it is the submission of the defendants-spouses that Exhibit A is a
simulated contract because the questioned lot was intended for donation as a
barrio site. This submission of their (sic) cannot be sustained in the absence of a
written deed of donation. …
In fine, this Court finds and so holds that the Deed of Sale of Real Property of
September 1968 (Exh. A) can be the legal basis not only of the possession and
ownership of the lot in litigation, but also for the reconveyance of the same in
favor of the plaintiffs.6
On appeal by petitioners, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 31587, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings and conclusion of the trial court in its
Decision7 dated December 16, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal being devoid
of any merit in fact and in law, is hereby ordered DISMISSED; and the decision
appealed from hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
With cost to Defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it per Resolution
dated March 31, 2000.9
In the present petition for review, petitioners insist that they are the rightful
owners of the property based on TCT No. RT-3121, and that the 1968 Deed of
Sale is void, fictitious, unenforceable and has no legal effect. Petitioners also
argue that: (1) the property is covered by TCT No. RT-183 issued on June 21,
1930, and every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the title; (2) at the time the 1968 Deed of Sale was executed, no
written notice was given to all possible co-redemptioners, co-heirs, and co-
owners, as provided for under Articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code; (3)
respondents’ possession is ineffectual against a torrens title; and (4)
respondents’ action is barred by prescription and laches.10
The issue in this case is: who has a better right to the property in dispute?
As a rule, the Court cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the
CA in a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.11 It
should be stressed that a review by certiorari under Rule 45 is a matter of
discretion. Under this mode of review, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact. When supported by substantial
evidence, findings of fact of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties.12 This Court will not review unless
there are exceptional circumstances, viz.: (a) where the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (b) where the
information made is manifestly mistaken; (c) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) where the judgment is based on a misapplication of facts, and the
findings of facts of the trial court and the appellate court are contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (e) when certain material facts and circumstances had
been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the
result of the case.13 There exists no exceptional circumstance in this case that
would warrant a departure from the factual findings of both the trial court and the
CA.
As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the CA, the 1968 Deed of Sale
executed by Placida in favor of Angel should prevail over the 1983 Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of Placida in favor of petitioners-
spouses Cuizon. Prior tempore, potior jure. It simply means, "He who is first in
time is preferred in right." The only essential requisite of this rule is priority in
time, and the only one who can invoke this is the first vendee.14 Records bear
the fact that when Placida sold her one-fourth portion of the property covered by
TCT No. RT-183 in 1968, the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale was still
inexistent, and more importantly, said portion was yet to be transferred by
succession to Placida’s heirs. The records also show that after Placida sold her
portion to Angel, the latter immediately took possession of the same. Applying
the principle of priority in time, it is clear that Angel, and consequently his heirs,
the respondents herein, have a superior right to the property.
It must be noted that the sale by Placida to Angel is evidenced by a duly
notarized deed of sale. Documents acknowledged before notaries public are
public documents and public documents are admissible in evidence without
necessity of preliminary proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They
have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.15 Petitioners failed to present any clear and convincing evidence
to prove that the deed of sale is "void, fictitious, unenforceable and has no legal
effect."
Petitioners harp on the fact that the 1968 Deed of Sale dated September 19,
1968, while notarized, was not registered or annotated on TCT No. RT-183.
Petitioners must be reminded that registration is not a requirement for validity of
the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to
bind third persons.16 Petitioners are not third persons within the contemplation
of the registration rule. The conveyance shall not be valid against any person
unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third
persons having actual notice or knowledge thereof. Petitioners are both related
to the original owner of the property, Placida. Petitioner Encarnacion Lambo-
Cuizon is an heir of Placida, while Salvador Cuizon is Encarnacion’s husband.
Hence, registration is not required to bind petitioners.
Furthermore, where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.17 As was
found by the trial court, before petitioners bought the property in 1983, they went
to the Remotos’ residence in 1982 and were shown a copy of the 1968 Deed of
Sale. While petitioners dispute the year, saying that it was in 1983 and not 1982
when they went to the Remotos’ residence, the Court abides by the trial court’s
finding considering that it was in the best position to assess the respective
testimonies of the contending claimants.18
Petitioners rely heavily on TCT No. RT-3121 issued in their names. In the first
place, the issuance of the title was made pursuant to the 1983 Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale. At the time this document was entered into by the heirs of
Placida, the latter was no longer the owner of the property, having earlier sold
the same to Angel. No one can give what one does not have -- nemo dat quod
non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell,
and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally.19 Such being the case, the heirs of Placida did not acquire any right to
adjudicate the property unto them and sell it to Encarnacion.
What’s more, the defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title does not extend to
a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. The
principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that
attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.20 As previously noted,
petitioners knew of the existence of the 1968 Deed of Sale as the Remotos
showed it to them in 1982, a year before the execution of the 1983 Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Sale. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are
transferees in good faith and therefore, the defense of indefeasibility of the
torrens title is not applicable to them.
Likewise, petitioners cannot complain that no written notice was given to all
possible redemptioners or heirs at the time of the execution of the 1968 Deed of
Sale. Under the provisions of the Civil Code on Legal Redemption, it is stated:
Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case
the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the
thing owned in common.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Corollary to these, Article 1088 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor.
The right of legal redemption pertains to Placida’s original co-owners, namely,
Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, and their respective
heirs,21 not to petitioners who are the heirs of Placida. Also, the written
notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, Placida in this
case, and not from any other person.22 This is so because the vendor is in the
best position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified
of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to fact of the
sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation thereof, so
that the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest
the alienation. This assurance would not exist if the buyer should give the
notice.23
Even if the property has not yet been formally subdivided, still, records show
that the particular portions belonging to the co-owners have already been
allocated and Placida’s co-owners have already been exercising proprietary
rights over their respective allotments. Thus, inscribed on TCT No. RT-183 are
several deeds of mortgages executed by Placida’s co-owner Eugenio C. Tabada
in favor of the Butuan City Rural Bank with respect to his one-fourth share, and
a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase dated May 13, 1968 executed by the
spouses Eugenio G. Tabada and Trinidad Ontong in favor of one Hernando R.
Sanchez, also covering Eugenio’s one-fourth portion of the property.24
The Court notes, however, that the property originally co-owned by Placida,
Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, covered by TCT No.
RT-183, measures 16 hectares, while the 1968 Deed of Sale covers 4,300
square meters.
The right of Placida to sell her one-fourth portion of the property covered by TCT
No. RT-183 is sanctioned under Article 493 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The sale to Angel affects only Placida’s pro indiviso share in the property, and
Angel gets only what corresponds to Placida’s share in the partition of the
property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.25
Given the foregoing, the portion sold by Placida and bought by Angel under
the 1968 Deed of Sale should only pertain to one-fourth of Placida’s share
in the 16-hectare property, or 4,000 square meters.
Lastly, prescription and laches do not apply in this case. To begin with,
respondents have been in actual and continuous possession of the property
since Angel first bought it in 1968. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is
in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this
is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.26
Neither can respondents be held guilty of laches. On the contrary, it was
respondents’ vigilance in protecting their right over the property that gave rise to
the present case. Their action for reconveyance was filed only after one year
and ten days from the execution of the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale,
one year and three days after its registration, and four months and twenty-eight
days after the issuance of TCT No. RT-3121. Obviously, laches has not yet set
in.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 16, 1999 together with its Resolution dated March 31, 2000 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 31587 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145264 August 30, 2005
NAPOLEON PORTES, SR., MARIA PORTES, and HEIRS OF NAPOLEON
PORTES, SR. namely NAPOLEON PORTES, NESTOR PORTES, REBECCA
PORTES, ROSALINA PORTES-ISUGA, NICANOR PORTES, Petitioners,
vs.
SEGUNDA ARCALA, EULALIA ARCALA, SALUSTANCIA ARCALA,
VAMERCO ARCALA, JOSEFINA ARCALA, FELOMINO ARCALA,
MARCIANO ARCALA, LYDIA ARCALA, and SALOME
ARCALA,1 Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50107 dated 14 August 2000 affirming the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, Bacolod City in Civil Case
No. 1815.
The Antecedent Facts
This case stems from a complaint for recovery of possession and annulment of
titles filed on 21 April 1977 by respondents Segunda, Eulalia, Salustancia,
Vamerco, Josefina, Felomino, Marciano, Lydia, and Salome, all surnamed
Arcala.
Respondents claimed that as early as 1908, their parents, Vicente and Felisa,
had already occupied and developed the disputed parcels of land, Lots 2 and 3.
These two lots are located in Sitio Pagba, Mansalanao, La Castellana, Negros
Occidental. On 20 June 1912, the Director of Lands approved Vicente’s
homestead application for Lots 2 and 3. Vicente and Felisa were in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of Lots 2 and 3 until their deaths in 1930
and 1940, respectively. As Vicente and Felisa’s heirs, respondents succeeded
them in their rights over Lots 2 and 3. Respondents then took possession of
Lots 2 and 3.
Respondents filed the complaint against their cousins, Vicente, Jr., Perfecta,
Sotera, and Consolacion, all surnamed Arcala. Vicente, Jr., Perfecta, Sotera,
and Consolacion are the nephew and nieces of respondents’ father, Vicente.
Vicente, Jr., Perfecta, Sotera, and Consolacion were impleaded with their
respective spouses, Ramona, Roberto Cadongon, Alfredo Magsico, and Martin
Mujas. Also impleaded as defendants were Felomina Gustilo ("Felomina"), Angel
Gustilo ("Angel"), Luis Gustilo ("Luis"), spouses Enrique and Pacita Palmares
("Enrique and Pacita"), and Napoleon Portes, Sr. ("Napoleon"), the predecessor-
in-interest of petitioners.
Respondents alleged that on 30 November 1917, Felomina, the aunt of Luis,
registered Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in her name. These lots are situated in Barrio
Mansalanao, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental and described in Plan II-12285.
The decree of registration dated 11 November 1920 was issued to Felomina by
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in GLRO Case No. 15426.
However, on 26 July 1930, the cadastral court issued another decree of
registration excluding Lots 2 and 3 from the decree of registration issued to
Felomina. The cadastral court amended Felomina’s decree of registration
because Vicente and Felisa had already obtained a homestead patent over Lots
2 and 3. The Director of Lands issued another plan to Felomina. The new plan
reflected the true area of Felomina’s land. From 196.3176 hectares, Felomina’s
registered land area was reduced to 164.9178 hectares, composed only of Lots
1, 4, 5, and 6.
Despite the amended decree of 26 July 1930, Felomina was still able to have
the title of Lot 2 reconstituted by invoking GLRO Case No. 15426. On 31 March
1964, the reconstituted title of Lot 2, OCT No. RO-8932, was issued to
Felomina. Felomina then subdivided Lot 2 into Lots 2-A and 2-B. In December
1964, OCT No. RO-8932 was cancelled. TCT No. T-39331 covering Lot 2-A was
issued to Luis while TCT No. T-39332 covering Lot 2-B was issued to Felomina.
In 1966, Vicente, Jr., Sotera and Perfecta had Lot 2-B subdivided. Vicente, Jr.
pretended to be the son of Vicente, respondents’ father, and had the subdivided
portions of Lot 2-B titled in this manner: Lot 2-B-3 covered by TCT No. T-44568
in Vicente’s name; Lot 2-B-1 covered by TCT No. T-44566 in Perfecta’s name;
and Lot 2-B-2 covered by TCT No. T-44567 in Sotera’s name.
On 21 February 1967, Vicente, Jr., Sotera and Perfecta executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the properties in favor of Enrique and Pacita. Later, TCT
Nos. T-46568, T-46567 and T-46569 covering Lots 2-B-1, 2-B-2 and 2-B-3,
respectively, were issued to Enrique and Pacita.
Luis sold Lot 2-A to Napoleon as evidenced by a "Deed of Sale of Realty with
Assumption of Mortgage" dated 28 December 1967. TCT No. T-65157 covering
Lot 2-A was subsequently issued to Napoleon.
On 3 August 1970, Angel and a certain Eleuteria Espinosa ("Eleuteria"),
reconstituted the title of Lot 3. OCT No. RO-10754 (11988) was issued to Angel
and Eleuteria.
Respondents, who were still in possession of Lots 2 and 3, learned of
defendants’ fraudulent acts in 1966 when Vicente, Jr. claimed ownership of Lot
2. Segunda had the land dispute investigated by the Bureau of Lands.
The investigation report of the Bureau of Lands dated 24 February 1970 was
favorable to respondents. The investigation report recommended the revocation
of Felomina’s certificates of title over Lot 2. On 9 October 1970, Segunda
caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the transfer certificates of title of
Lots 2 and 3.
On 23 October 1970, certain persons acting in behalf of Luis forcibly entered Lot
3. Luis allegedly caused the imprisonment of Segunda and respondents’ tenant,
Valentino Serapio ("Valentino") for refusing to give a share of the land’s produce
to either Luis or Vicente, Jr.
Respondents prayed for the nullification of petitioners’ certificates of title, turning
over of possession of Lots 2 and 3 to respondents and payment of 30% of
whatever may be recovered as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
In his Answer, Luis claimed that he is the registered owner of Lot 3 with the
corresponding title. Luis denied entering the property through force, stealth,
strategy and intimidation. Luis insisted that the present action is barred by prior
judgment in Felomina’s favor. During the trial, Luis died. He was substituted by
his daughter Concepcion Gustilo.
Spouses Enrique and Pacita asserted in their Answer with Counterclaim that
they purchased Lots 2-B-1, 2-B-2 and 2-B-3 from Perfecta, Sotera, and Vicente,
Jr. in good faith and for value. The certificates of title did not contain any
annotation of encumbrance. Ever since Enrique and Pacita acquired the lots in
1967, they have been in possession of the lots, paying the land and educational
taxes on the lots.
Vicente, Jr., Sotera, Perfecta and Consolacion were declared in default for their
failure to file their answer despite service of summons.
Napoleon was substituted by his heirs Maria, Napoleon, Jr., Nestor, Rebecca,
Rosalina and Nicanor, all surnamed Portes. In their Answer, the heirs of
Napoleon insisted that Napoleon acquired ownership of Lot 2-A in good faith
and for value. The heirs of Napoleon argued that the action has prescribed and
laches now bars the action.
On 5 September 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 14 August 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in its
entirety. Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that respondents own Lots 2 and 3.
Felomina’s reconstituted title over Lot 2 is void because she had no right to
reconstitute the title of this property. Vicente, Jr., Sotera, Perfecta, Consolacion,
Luis, Napoleon and the spouses Enrique and Pacita, the subsequent buyers of
the subdivided portions of Lot 2, were not innocent purchasers. All of them had
notice of the flaws of the certificates of title. Vicente, Jr., Sotera, Perfecta, and
Consolacion were declared in default because of their failure to file their answer
despite notice.
Angel and Eleuteria also had no prior title over Lot 3 to reconstitute. Angel and
Eleuteria’s title over Lot 3 is thus void.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants, declaring null and void:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46568 for Lot 2-B-1 of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-58548, being a portion of Lot No. 2-B (LRC) Psd-38764, LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 117, situated in the Barrio of Mansalanao, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, in the names of the spouses Enrique Palmares and Pacita
Palmares;
2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46567 for Lot 2-B-2 of the subdivision plan,
LRC Psd-58548, being a portion of Lot No. 2-B, LRC Psd-38764, LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 117, situated in the Barrio of Mansalanao, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, in the names of the spouses Enrique Palmares and Pacita
Palmares;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46569 for Lot No. 2-B-3 of the subdivision
plan, LRC Psd-58548, being a portion of Lot No. 2-B, LRC Psd-38764, LRC
Cad. Rec. No. 117, situated in the Barrio of Mansalanao, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, in the names of the spouses Enrique Palmares and Pacita
Palmares;
4. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46569 for Lot No. 2-B-4 of the subdivision
plan, LRC Psd-58548, being a portion of Lot No. 2-B, LRC Psd-38764, LRC
Cad. Rec. No. 117, situated in the Barrio of Mansalanao, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, in the names of Consolacion Arcala, married to Martin Mujas;
5. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65157 for Lot No. 2-A, being a portion of Lot
2, Cad. Rec. No. 117, situated in the Barrio of Mansalanao, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, in the names of the spouses Napoleon Portes and Maria Portes;
and ordering:
1. Defendant-spouses Enrique Palmares and Pacita Palmares to deliver and
peacefully turn over possession of Lot Nos. 2-B-1, 2-B-2, and 2-B-3 to herein
plaintiffs;
2. Defendant Consolacion Arcala, married to Martin Mujas, to deliver and turn
over peacefully possession of Lot No. 2-B-4 to herein plaintiffs;
3. Defendant-spouses Napoleon Portes and Maria Portes, to deliver and turn
over peacefully possession of Lot No. 2-A to herein plaintiffs;
4. Defendant Angel Gustilo and his successor-in-interest, to deliver and turn
over peacefully possession of Lot No. 3 to herein plaintiffs;
5. Defendants to pay plaintiffs, by way of attorney’s fee[s] 20% per centum of the
fair market value of the land they each possessed;
6. Defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only the heirs of Napoleon appealed from the decision of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals
explained that a party could invoke indefeasibility of title, prescription and laches
if no valid title exists. Moreover, in the present case the transferees had notice of
the flaw in their titles.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision in Civil Case No.
1815 is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety. Costs against the defendants-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
The Issues
The heirs of Napoleon raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS NAPOLEON PORTES, SR. AND MARIA
PORTES HAVE ACQUIRED LOT 2-A IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE;
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS NAPOLEON PORTES, SR. AND MARIA
PORTES HAVE ACQUIRED VALID TITLE TO LOT 2-A;
3. WHETHER THE DOCTRINES OF LACHES, PRESCRIPTION AND
INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM OR
REGISTRATION ARE APPLICABLE TO THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER
LOT 2-A.6
The Ruling of the Court
A judgment is final and executory against a party who does not appeal.7 Only
the heirs of Napoleon appealed from the decision of the trial court with the Court
of Appeals and filed the present petition before the Court. Thus, the decisions of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and executory on Felomina and
Luis, Angel, and the spouses Enrique and Pacita, Perfecta and Roberto, Sotera
and Alfredo, Vicente, Jr. and Ramona, and Consolacion and Martin.
The appeals filed by the heirs of Napoleon did not inure to the benefit of their co-
defendants. The rights and liabilities of the heirs of Napoleon and their co-
defendants are not dependent on each other.8 In this case, the defense of being
an innocent purchaser for value is unique to each party. Moreover, the parties
were represented by different counsels during trial. The counsels could not have
legally acted for each other. 9 Therefore, when the heirs of Napoleon appealed
from the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, they were acting only for
themselves.
We thus limit our discussion to the rights of the heirs of Napoleon over Lot 2-A.
A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes
as indefeasible as a Torrens Title.10 Respondents’ parents, Vicente and Felisa,
owned Lots 2 and 3 by virtue of a homestead patent. The 26 July 1930 decision
of the cadastral court recognized the indefeasibility of Vicente and Felisa’s
homestead patent when it excluded Lots 2 and 3 from the decree of registration
it had issued to Felomina.
Felomina had no right over Lot 2. However, Felomina still caused the
reconstitution of the title of Lot 2. Reconstitution is simply the restoration of a
lost or destroyed instrument or title to its original form and condition.11Felomina
had nothing to reconstitute as no certificate of title was ever issued to her over
Lot 2. The fraud in the reconstitution of Lot 2 is evident.
Luis, from whom Napoleon purchased Lot 2-A, was just as guilty as his aunt
Felomina in defrauding respondents. Respondents were still in possession of
Lot 2 when Luis supposedly purchased the lot from Felomina and when Luis
had the lot subdivided and the subdivided lots titled. Luis was definitely not a
buyer in good faith. The only way for the heirs of Napoleon to validly claim Lot 2-
A is to prove that Napoleon purchased Lot 2-A in good faith.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that Napoleon was not a purchaser in good
faith. We agree with the two courts.
The trial and appellate courts pointed out that as early as 1966, there was
already a brewing dispute between respondents and Luis over Lot 2. Luis
conveyed Lot 2-A, one of the subdivided portions of Lot 2, to Napoleon on 28
December 1967. Maria, Napoleon’s widow, testified that she was with Napoleon
when Luis sold to them Lot 2-A.12 Maria asserted that she was familiar with the
history of Lot 2-A and the supposed previous owners, Luis and Felomina.13 It
was thus impossible for Napoleon and Maria not to have known of the Bureau of
Lands’ pending investigation and the incarceration of Segunda and Valentino at
the time Luis sold to them Lot 2-A. The controversy between respondents and
Luis should have prompted Napoleon to inquire into the status of Luis’ title over
Lot 2-A. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
man on his guard and still claim that he acted in good faith.14 A holder in bad
faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law.
Assuming that Napoleon was unaware of the conflict over Lot 2-A at the time of
the execution of the deed of sale, Napoleon was, however, already charged with
knowledge of the flaw in Luis’ title at the time of the registration of the sale.
Inscriptions of an adverse claim dated 23 November 1970 and lis
pendens dated 14 September 1971 were already annotated on Luis’ title over
Lot 2-A when Napoleon registered the Deed of Sale on 16 December 1971.
While the sale between Luis and Napoleon bound both parties, the registration
of the sale with the property registry is what binds third parties and the world to
the transfer of ownership.15 Moreover, registration alone without good faith is
not sufficient.16 Good faith must concur with registration for such prior right to
be enforceable.17
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation.18The inscription serves as a warning that
one who acquires an interest over litigated property does so at his own risk, or
that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the property.19 By
disregarding the inscriptions and pursuing the registration of the sale, Napoleon
assumed the risk of losing Lot 2-A to respondents. Napoleon’s heirs, being
merely the juridical continuation of his personality, hold Lot 2-A in trust for
respondents.
Respondents’ action for reconveyance is not barred by prescription. The
fraudulent registration of a parcel of land holds the person in whose name the
land is registered as a mere trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.20 An action for reconveyance of
registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten years even if the decree
of registration is no longer open to review.21 However, when the adverse
claimants are still in possession of the property in dispute, the action for
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to property in one’s own
possession, is not subject to prescription.22
At the time that Felomina and Luis fraudulently titled Lot 2 in their names,
Vicente and Felisa, respondents’ parents, were still in possession of Lot 2.
Vicente and Felisa’s right to file an action for reconveyance was thus not subject
to prescription. Respondents remained in possession of Lot 2 until 1967 when
they were ousted from Lot 2-A. Since respondents were no longer in possession
of Lot 2-A, the ten-year prescriptive period must be reckoned from the time that
TCT No. T-65157 covering Lot 2-A was issued to Napoleon, which was on 16
December 1971. Prescription had not yet set in as the action for reconveyance
was filed on 21 April 1977, or only six years after title to Lot 2-A was issued to
Napoleon.
Respondents are not estopped by laches. Laches or "stale demands" is the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
Laches gives rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert a right either
has abandoned or declined to assert it.23 Respondents’ vigilance in asserting
and protecting their rights over Lot 2-A is on record. They initiated the
investigation with the Bureau of Lands and registered their adverse claims on
the certificate of title of Lot 2-A even before title was transferred to Napoleon.
Respondents are far from guilty of sleeping on their rights.
Attorney’s fees may be awarded when the defendant’s act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.24 The trial court
ordered petitioners to pay 20% of the fair market value of the land they each
possessed as attorney’s fees. We modify the award of attorney’s fees. The heirs
of Napoleon shall pay attorney’s fees of P 50,000.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2000 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 50107. We ANNUL Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65157 of Lot 2-A, a
portion of Lot 2, Cadastral Record No. 117, situated in the Barrio of Mansalanao,
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, in the names of the spouses Napoleon, Sr. and
Maria Portes. The heirs of Napoleon Portes, Sr., Maria, Napoleon, Jr., Nestor,
Rebecca, Rosalina, and Nicanor all surnamed PORTES shall pay P50,000
attorney’s fees, and deliver and turn over possession of Lot 2-A to respondents
Segunda, Eulalia, Salustancia, Vamerco, Josefina, Felomino, Marciano, Lydia,
and Salome, all surnamed ARCALA. The 5 September 1994 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 51,
Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 1815 isFINAL and EXECUTORY on Felomina
Gustilo, Angel Gustilo, Luis Gustilo, spouses Vicente, Jr. and Ramona Arcala,
Perfecta and Roberto Cadongon, Sotera and Alfredo Magsico, Consolacion and
Martin Mujas, and Enrique and Pacita Palmares.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 170096-97 March 3, 2006
RICARDO SANTOS and PAULA SANTOS WONG, Petitioners,
vs.
ILUMINADA CRUZ, represented by Attorney-in-fact GLORIA ISRAEL,
JUDGE FRANCISCO LINDO, MeTC, Branch 55, Malabon City, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Joint Decision1 dated July 15, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
City of Malabon, which reversed the Joint Decision2 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 55, City of Malabon.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows.
Respondent Iluminada Cruz is the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
M-19968 and TCT No. 19973 of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Malabon,
portions of which were occupied by petitioners Ricardo Santos and Paula Wong,
respectively.
Respondent Cruz filed two actions for ejectment docketed as Civil Case Nos.
JL00-346 and JL00-347, against petitioners alleging that the latter entered her
lot without her consent and built thereon structures without her permission; that
petitioners, being her relatives, were allowed to stay free of charge on condition
that they will vacate the premises upon demand; despite repeated demands,
petitioners refused to vacate the said lots, and in view of the failure of the
contending parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent was
constrained to file the instant suit.
In answer, petitioner Ricardo Santos and spouse admitted respondent’s
ownership of the land covered by TCT No. M-19968 but alleged that 177 sq. m.
thereof was sold to them on August 28, 1978 as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale3 in their favor.
Petitioner Paula Wong, while admitting respondent’s ownership of the lot
covered by TCT No. 19973, averred that a portion thereof, measuring 142 sq.
m., was sold to her husband Marcos Santos by the respondent under a
Subdivision Agreement with Contract of Sale dated July 31, 1976.4
In a Joint Decision dated February 4, 2005, the Metropolitan Trial Court of the
City of Malabon, Branch 55 rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the plaintiff to prove by preponderance of evidence
her cause of actions alleged in the complaint, the case is hereby dismissed with
cost against the plaintiffs (sic) while the defendants[’] counterclaims in both
cases for payment of attorneys fee[‘]s are likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, respondent Cruz filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Malabon which reversed and set aside the judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the lower court having committed
reversible error, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside
and new one entered:
1. Appealed Case No. A5-014-MN (Civil Case No. JLOO-346)
a) Ordering the defendants Ricardo Santos and his spouse, and all persons
claiming rights under them, to vacate and demolish their structures/houses on
the premises located at M. Sioson St., Dampalit, Malabon City, Metro Manila
and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff and/or any of her authorized
representative;
b) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, a reasonable amount of
Php20,000.00 monthly from October 21, 2002, the date of the demand letter, for
their continued use of the premises involved until they finally vacate and
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff without the structures/houses which
they built thereon;
c) Ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally, to pay an amount of
Php30,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees plus the costs of the suit.
2. Appealed Case No. A5-015-MN (Civil Case No. JLOO-347)
a) Ordering the defendant Paula Santos, and all persons claiming rights under
her, to vacate and demolish her structure/house on the premises involved
located at M. Sioson St., Dampalit, Malabon City, Metro Manila and surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiff and/or any of her authorized representative;
b) Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay, a reasonable amount of
Php20,000.00 monthly from October 21, 2002, the date of the demand letter, for
her continued use of the premises involved until she finally vacates and
surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff without the structure/house
which she built thereon;
c) Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the amount of Php30,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees plus the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.6
Without moving for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
before this Court decrying the alleged violation by the Regional Trial Court of
their right to procedural and substantive due process. However, in view of the
manifest violation of the procedural requirements, the Court issued a Resolution
on October 3, 20057 ordering the petitioners to:
a) PAY the amount of P1,230.00 as balance for docket and other legal fees as
required under Sec. 3, Rule 46 in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56; and
b) SUBMIT: (1) a certification against forum shopping, that is, a certification
under oath by petitioners that they have not theretofore commenced any other
action involving the same issues thereof in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or in the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, they must state the status of the same;
and if they should thereafter learn that a similar action has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, they undertake to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
days therefrom as required by Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46 in relation to
Sec. 2, Rule 56 and Sec. 5, Rule 7; (2) a statement of material date showing
when notice of the assailed RTC joint decision was received, to show that the
petition was filed on time pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 65 in relation to the second
paragraph of Sec. 3, Rule 46; (3) proof of service (e.g., a written admission of
the party served, an affidavit of the party serving/registry receipts) of the petition
on the lower courts concerned and on the adverse parties as required by Sec.
2(c), Rule 56, the third paragraph of Sec. 3, Rule 46 in relation to the first
paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 56 and Sec. 13, Rule 13; and (4) proof of authority of
Ricardo Santos to sign the verification in behalf of the other petitioner.
(Emphasis added)
After having paid the balance of the docket fees, petitioners submitted a two-
page petition dated November 4, 2005,8 which purportedly was in compliance
with the October 3, 2005 Resolution. A cursory perusal of the petition however,
showed that it had the same procedural infirmities as the original petition. The
petition was written in old and torn piece of scratch paper, which does not look
like a formal pleading. The petition lacked certification against forum shopping, a
statement of the material date showing when notice of the assailed decision was
received, proof of service, and proof of authority of Ricardo Santos to sign the
verification on behalf of the other petitioner.
Even on the merits, petitioners’ case will not prosper. Petitioners anchor their
claim of ownership on the photocopies of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 28, 1978 executed in favor of Ricardo Santos and his spouse and
the Subdivision Agreement with Contract of Sale dated July 31, 1976 allegedly
executed in favor of Paula Wong and her deceased husband Marcos Santos.
On the other hand, respondent Cruz relies for her claim of ownership in the
transfer certificates of title covering the assailed properties registered in her
name. These certificates of title, specifically TCT No. M- 19968 and TCT No.
19973, being genuine and valid on their face, are incontrovertible, indefeasible,
and conclusive against petitioners and the whole world. Thus, the unregistered
deed of sale and the subdivision contract upon which petitioners rely cannot
prevail over the certificate of title in the name of respondent Cruz. To hold
otherwise is to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make
the Torrens Title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.
In filing the instant petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that their right to
due process was violated by the trial court. However, other than a general
statement of such fact, the petition does not state what specific acts or
omissions were committed by the lower court that would constitute a violation of
petitioners’ right to due process to warrant the invocation of the equitable
remedy of certiorari.
The petition must allege the facts showing that the tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess, or with grave abuse of discretion, with prayer that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board, or officer. It must likewise allege that the petitioners, through a motion for
reconsideration, has called the attention of the lower court upon such error or
irregularity and asked for its correction, unless such previous motion for
reconsideration was unnecessary either because the proceeding in which the
error occurred is a patent nullity, or because the question of want or excess of
jurisdiction had been squarely raised and submitted in the lower court and the
latter had squarely met and decided the same.9
As a general rule, the special civil action of certiorari may only be availed when
the lower court or any of its officers, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. When an appeal is in itself a sufficient and
adequate remedy that would promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the order or judgment complained of, existence of that appeal would
bar the institution of the remedy of certiorari.10
The case of Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,11 citing Flores v. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Pampanga,12 clarified that "plain" and "adequate remedy"
referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Order or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing
of a special civil action for certiorari,13 subject to certain exceptions, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
In Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,14 we further stressed that a writ of certiorari is
a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except
in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari
must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To
dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner
must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not file a prior motion for reconsideration from
the decision of the trial court. Even as they alleged in the petition that the lower
court acted without jurisdiction when it rendered a decision without due process
in the proceedings, the averment of facts was incomplete.
Moreover, the instant petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court
of Appeals pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Disregard of this rule
warrants the dismissal of the petition. While the Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not allow an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.15Petitioners have not alleged
sufficient ground why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus, we
reaffirm the established rule that this Court will not entertain a direct appeal
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for insufficiency of form and
substance. The assailed Joint Decision dated July 15, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, City of Malabon, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 131667 July 28, 2005
HEIRS OF CARLOS ALCARAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BENJAMIN DAYOR and ADELA
ALCARAZ, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following issuances of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35570, to wit:
1. Decision dated 18 March 1997,1 affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan insofar as it declared null and
void ab initio petitioners’ Free Patent No. (III-6) 00075 and Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1887 but setting aside paragraphs 2 to 6 of the dispositive portion of
said decision; and
2. Resolution dated 27 November 1997,2 denying the separate motions for
reconsideration filed by the parties.
The material facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, may be briefly stated, as
follows:
Julian Alcaraz was the possessor and actual occupant of a parcel of land,
identified as Lot No. 391, Cad-337, Meycauayan Cadastre, with an area of
2,888 square meters, more or less, and situated at Barangay Bancal,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Upon his death on 13 April 1924, his three (3) children
namely, Carlos, Timotea andIgmedio, all surnamed Alcaraz, succeeded in the
possession and occupation of said land with each of them allocating to each
other a one-third (1/3) portion thereof.
Carlos Alcaraz had four (4) children, namely Silvino, Isabel, Flaviana and
Feliza. Timotea Alcaraz had only one (1) child named Benito Dayor who had
three (3) children, to wit: Benjamin, Leonila and Rosario, all surnamed Dayor.
For his part, Igmedio Alcaraz had two (2) children, Miguel and Cirila.
Although there was no Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement or Partition of the
property that was left by their deceased father Julian Alcaraz, the heirs and their
respective descendants nonetheless made a physical partition thereof among
themselves by confining their respective possessions and occupations of the
property in three (3) separate clusters distinguishing their respective origins from
the possessions of their ascendants, Carlos, Timotea and Igmedio. The heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz had grouped themselves on the southern portion of the land,
while theheirs of Timotea Alcaraz had settled on the western portion. The
northern portion was occupied by the heirs of Igmedio Alcaraz.
On 2 February 1974, Maria Paz Alcaraz-Gomez, representing the heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz, filed with the Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. III-6 at
Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan, Free Patent Application No. (III-6) 933, Entry No.
000705 covering the entire subject parcel of land.
Thereafter, or on 28 February 1974, Geodetic Engineer Luis E. Balicanta, land
inspector of the said District Land Office, conducted an investigation and ocular
inspection of the subject land. After the requisite investigation and verification,
District Land Officer Jesus B. Toledo, for and by authority of the Director of
Lands, issued on 22 April 1974 an Order of Approval of Application and
Issuance of Patent – Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705. On even date, he sent a
letter-request to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue the corresponding
certificate of title for Free Patent (III-6) 000705, in the name of the heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz.
Pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds issued on 7 May 1974 Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1887 covering Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 in the
name of the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz.
After some time, a formal protest was filed in the same District Land Office by
the heirs of Timotea Alcaraz and Igmedio Alcaraz, respectively represented by
Benjamin Dayor and Adela Alcaraz-Evea. Not long thereafter, the protesting
heirs amended their formal protest by assailing the validity of the free patent
issued in the name of the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz and alleging that the same was
obtained thru fraudulent acts and misrepresentation.
Thereupon, a formal investigation and ocular inspection was conducted by a
land investigator of the District Land Office. In his report, the land investigator
recommended the recall and nullification of Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and
the execution of appropriate steps to restore the rights of the heirs of Timotea
Alcaraz and Igmedio Alcaraz over the subject parcel of land and grant them
preferential rights to apply for the registration of the same in their names.
Then, on 30 July 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed against
the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz a complaint for annulment and cancellation of Free
Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and OCT No. P-1887 and the reversion of the same
land to the public domain on the ground that fraud and misrepresentation
attended the acquisition of said free patent and title. The complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 382-M-87, was raffled to Branch 15 of the court.
In their answer, the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz denied the material allegations of the
complaint, averring that they have complied with all the requirements for the
issuance of a free patent and have not committed any fraud or
misrepresentation in their application.
On 21 January 1988, the heirs of Timotea Alcaraz and Igmedio Alcaraz filed a
motion for intervention. Their motion having been granted by the trial court on 3
March 1988, they thereafter filed their complaint-in-intervention, therein
maintaining that they and the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz are co-owners of the land
in question, hence the latter heirs own only one-third (1/3) thereof, with the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) belonging to them. They thus prayed for the
cancellation of the free patent and the corresponding OCT issued to the heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz over the entire parcel for being null and void, and that they be
declared co-owners thereof and the land itself ordered partitioned into three (3)
lots with each set of heirs allotted a one-third (1/3) portion thereof.
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated 9 October 1991,
ordered the cancellation of the free patent and title of the heirs of Carlos
Alcaraz; recognized the intervenors’ co-ownership rights over the same
property; and decreed the subdivision thereof. In full, the decision dispositively
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered by
preponderance of evidence:
1) Declaring Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and the corresponding OCT No. P-
1887 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz as null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering defendants heirs of Carlos Alcaraz to surrender the owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT No. P-1887 to defendant Register of Deeds of Bulacan
and directing the Registrar to cancel the same as well as the original thereof,
and all other certificate of title issued in lieu thereof;
3) Declaring the heirs of Timotea Alcaraz and heirs of Igmedio Alcaraz,
represented by the intervenors Benjamin Dayor and Adela Alcaraz, respectively,
as co-owners of one-third (1/3) portion each over the parcel of residential land in
question;
4) Ordering the Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Meycauayan, Province
of Bulacan, to cancel the tax declaration covering the parcel of land in question
and in lieu thereof a new tax declaration be issued in the names of the (1) Heirs
of Carlos Alcaraz, (2) Heirs of Timotea Alcaraz and (3) Heirs of Igmedio Alcaraz
as co-owners over one-third (1/3) a piece of the land under controversy;
5) Ordering the Heirs of Carlos, Timotea and Igmedio, all surnamed Alcaraz, to
cause the subdivision of the land in litigation by a licensed Geodetic Engineer
into three (3) lots, with a pathway in the middle from the lot of the Heirs of
Timotea Alcaraz through the Barrio Road of Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan, the
expense to be shouldered by them equally, to be used as Right of Way of
occupants thereto; and
6) Ordering the defendants to pay costs of suit and attorney’s fee of intervenors
in the sum of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the judgment, petitioners went to the Court of
Appeals via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which appeal
was thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 35570.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in a decision dated 18 March
1997,3 affirmed with modification that of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 9, 1991, of the court a
quo is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it declared null and void ab initio Free
Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1887 issued by
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, in the names of the Heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz. Paragraphs 2 to 6 of the dispositive portion of the aforesaid
decision is (sic) SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered as follows:
1. Ordering that the land covered by Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1887 be reverted to the mass of the public domain; and
2. Ordering appellants and intervenors to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
In time, all the three (3) sets of heirs filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, all of which were denied by the appellate court in its resolution
of 27 November 1997.4
From there, only the herein petitioners Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz came to this
Court thru the present recourse, commending for our resolution the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION HAD BEEN
 COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN THEIR APPLICATION FOR FREE
PATENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 91 OF C.A. NO. 141, AS
AMENDED.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FREE PATENT NO. (III-6) 000705 AND ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-1887 WERE LEGALLY AND VALIDLY ISSUED
AND REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONERS, HEIRS OF
CARLOS ALCARAZ.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-1887 ISSUED
BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN
COVERING FREE PATENT NO. (III-6) 000705 HAD BECOME INDEFEASIBLE
AND CONCLUSIVE OF THE PETITIONERS’ TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT
LAND.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION TAKEN BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. P-1887.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT COURT A QUO MAY CONVERT THE ORIGINAL ACTION
FOR REVERSION FILED BY RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES INTO AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE, A SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS FOR SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
AND A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR PARTITION.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN MODIFY THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY ORDERING THE
REVERSION OF THE LAND COVERED BY FREE PATENT NO. (III-6) 000705
AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-1887 TO THE MASS OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN DESPITE THE FAILURE OF BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS (PLAINTIFFS) TO APPEAL SAID DECISION.
We DENY.
As it is, the first and second issues tendered by the petitioners call for a
reexamination and reevaluation of the factual findings of the two (2) courts
below that fraud and misrepresentation characterized their free patent
application when their representative Maria Paz Alcaraz-Gomez failed to
disclose thereunder that other persons, no less the heirs of Timotea and
Igmedio, were occupying portions of the land subject thereof.
The task required of us by the petitioners cannot be done, consistent with our
repeated holdings that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. We have
made this clear in a long line of decisions.5 In fact, in Aclon vs. Court of
Appeals,6 we even said:
It is settled that as a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals especially
those affirming the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Sure, the rule which precludes review by this Court of the factual findings of
lower courts admits of exceptions. InInsular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs.
Court of Appeals,7 we enumerated those exceptions:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial
of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to
this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, however, our own careful study of the case
yields none of the above circumstances which may warrant our reevaluation of
the factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts.
Significantly, the presence of the heirs of Timotea and Igmedio on the land in
question at the time petitioners filed their free patent application was in fact
acknowledged by them in this petition (at p. 15 thereof), albeit saying that their
occupation of portions thereof "was merely tolerated."
In this connection, Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
provides:
The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of
such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering,
changing, or modifying the considerations of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of material
facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted. (Italics supplied.)
Doubtless, petitioner’s failure to state in their free patent application that private
respondents, as representatives of the heirs of Timotea and Igmedio, are also in
possession of the land subject thereof clearly constitutes a concealment of a
material fact amounting to fraud and misrepresentation within the context of the
aforequoted provision, sufficient enough to cause ipso facto the cancellation of
their patent and title. For sure, had only petitioners made such a disclosure, the
Director of Lands would have had second thoughts in directing the issuance of
petitioners’ patent and title.
With the recognition of the fact that petitioners’ free patent application was
attended with fraud and misrepresentation, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly applied the law when they declared the nullity of petitioners’
Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and the title issued pursuant thereto, and directed
the cancellation of the same.
Prescinding from the premise that no defect vitiates their application, petitioners
next contend that their patent and title had thereby become indefeasible and
conclusive, and that the land therein covered no longer subject to reversion.
Because the premise is wrong, so must the conclusion be.
Jurisprudence is unambiguous on this point. In the words of Bagiuo vs.
Republic, et al.:8
It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title
is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent
becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance
of such patent.However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna , even after the
lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under §101 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 for the reversion to the public domain of land which
has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Such action is not barred by
prescription, and this is settled law.
Indeed, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who
procured the title by means of fraud. Public policy demands that one who
obtains title to public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit
therefrom. (Underscoring supplied)
Running in parallel vein is our holding in Director of Lands vs. Abanilla and The
Register of Deeds of Isabela,9 to wit:
The doctrine in Heirs of Carle, Sumail, and other cases cited by the appellant
regarding the indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to a free patent one year
after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured
through misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case, since
said grant is null and avoid and of no effect whatsoever. (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, it is settled that a title emanating from a free patent which was secured
through fraud and misrepresentation does not become indefeasible, precisely
because the patent from whence the title sprung is itself void and of no effect
whatsoever.
Petitioners next argue that the complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General in this case is a collateral attack on their OCT No. P-1887, which is
impermissible.
True it is that in Henderson vs. Garrido and The Register of Deeds,10 this Court
has made it clear that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and may
only be challenged in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose:
It is well known principle that a Torrens Title is irrevocable and indefeasible. It
cannot be collaterally attacked. It can only be challenged in a direct proceeding.
The rule on indefeasibility of title, however, finds no application herein for the
simple reason that the title involved in this case cannot attain indefeasibility on
account of petitioners’ concealment of a material fact in their free patent
application.
Anent the fifth issue, it is petitioners’ submission that it was error on the part of
the trial court to have converted the original action for reversion filed by
respondent Republic into an action for reconveyance. For sure, in
theirMemorandum,11 petitioners agreed with that portion of the Court of
Appeals’ decision holding that the trial court cannot convert the action for
reversion into an action for reconveyance. In the same breath, however, they
took issue and opposed the appellate court’s suggestion that herein private
respondents may later on file their respective public land application after Free
Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1887 had been
annulled or cancelled.
We find nothing wrong with said suggestion by the Court of Appeals, which
merely expressed the only logical and legal consequence (which constitutes
therein intervenors’ remedy under the law), resulting from the factual conclusion
(that the land in question remained to be part of the public domain because of
the defect in appellants’ free patent application), which was arrived at by said
appellate court. To put this issue in the right context, we quote the exact words
of said court in the decision under review:
Not being the owners of the land in dispute, intervenors can not ask for the
reconveyance of the property to them. Intervenors remedy is to file their
respective public land applications with the Bureau of Lands, after the Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1887 in the name of appellants had been cancelled by
the Register of Deeds for the province of Bulacan, and the land had been
reverted to the public domain.12
By expressing the foregoing suggestion, the Court of Appeals did not make any
declaration or adjudicate on the contending rights of the parties. Verily, it has not
granted ownership rights in favor of the intervenors but merely confirmed the
fact that, since the land in question is still public land, the procedure laid down
by law for acquisition of title over such public land must be followed.
Coming now to the sixth and final issue, it is petitioners’ posture that the
appellate court cannot modify the decision of the trial court by ordering the
reversion of the subject land to the mass of public domain because neither the
Republic nor the private respondents took an appeal from the decision of the
trial court.
We are not persuaded.
This is no novel issue for this Court. In Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,13 this Court addressed this matter squarely:
The first question represents an attack on the appellate court's reliance on
Ordinances Nos. 81 and 81-01, a matter not supposedly taken up at the trial or
assigned as an error on appeal. As a rule, the Court of Appeals (then the
Intermediate Appellate Court) may determine only such questions as have been
properly raised to it, yet, this is not an inflexible rule of procedure. In Hernandez
v. Andal, it was stated that "an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised
by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error." In Baquiran v. Court of Appeals, we referred to the "modern trend of
procedure . . . accord[ing] the courts broad discretionary power," and in which
we allowed consideration of matters "having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignore[d]." And
in Vda. de Javellana v. Court of Appeals, we permitted the consideration of a
"patent error" of the trial court by the Court of Appeals under Section 7
(now Section 8), of Rule 51, of the Rules of Court,14 although such an
error had not been raised in the brief. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no question that petitioners raised the issue on the validity of OCT No.
P-1887 before the Court of Appeals. Necessarily connected with said issue is
the issue of reversion, because the ultimate legal consequence of any
declaration of nullity of a decree of registration and its corresponding OCT, is
none other than reversion of subject parcel of land to the mass of public domain.
There is no doubt whatsoever that such reversion is inevitably related to the
issue of the validity of OCT No. P-1887, duly raised before the Court of Appeals.
In any event, when petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
appealed case was thereby thrown wide open for review by that court, which is
thus necessarily empowered to come out with a judgment as it thinks would be a
just determination of the controversy. Given this power, the appellate court has
the authority to either affirm, reverse or modify the appealed decision of the trial
court. To withhold from the appellate court its power to render an entirely new
decision would violate its power of review and would, in effect, render it
incapable of correcting patent errors committed by the lower courts.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the herein assailed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146823. August 9, 2005
SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO, Petitioners,
vs.
FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, to wit:
1. Decision dated 19 July 2000,1 affirming with modification an earlier decision
of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, Branch 155, in an action for recovery of
possession thereat commenced by the herein respondent against the
petitioners; and
2. Resolution dated 29 January 2001,2 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The facts may be briefly stated, as follows:
Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,825
square meters (hereinafter referred to as the Fabella Estate), which formed part
of the estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized themselves and
formed the Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of
acquiring said property and distributing it to its members.
Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from the heirs of Don
Dionisio M. Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the latter’s Community Mortgage Program.
However, as a pre-condition for the loan, and in order that specific portions of
the property could be allotted to each tenant who will have to pay the
corresponding price therefor, NHMFC required all tenants to become members
of FETA.
Accordingly, all the tenants occupying portions of the Fabella Estate were asked
to join FETA. While the rest did, the spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella
Ragudo who were occupying the lot subject matter of this controversy,
consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella Estate, refused to join the
Association. Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs.
Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member.
Later, and with the help of the city government of Mandaluyong, FETA became
the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2902 issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong in 1989.
To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo from the portion in question
which they continued to occupy despite the earlier award thereof to Mrs. Miriam
de Guzman, FETA filed against them a complaint for unlawful detainer before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City.
In a decision dated 6 August 1990, the MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer
case on the ground that it was an improper remedy because the Ragudos had
been occupying the subject portion for more than one (1) year prior to the filing
of the complaint, hence the proper action should have been one for recovery of
possession before the proper regional trial court. FETA appealed the dismissal
to the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, which affirmed the same.
FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession
against the Ragudos. In their Answer, the spouses interposed the defense that
they have already acquired ownership of the disputed portion since they have
been in occupation thereof in the concept of an owner for more than forty (40)
years. They further argued that FETA’s title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake
because as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it was originally registered as OCT No.
13, a title which has been previously adjudged null and void by RTC-Pasig in a
much earlier case involving different parties. Finally, they insist that FETA’s right
to recover has been barred by laches in view of their more than 40-year
occupancy of the portion in question.
Eventually, in a decision dated 29 July 1994,3 the trial court rendered judgment
in FETA’s favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) ordering [spouses Ragudo] to vacate the premises in question and to turn
over possession thereof to [FETA];
2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of November 1981
and every month thereafter until they vacate the premises;
3) to pay [FETA] attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
4) to pay [FETA] the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, the spouses Ragudo went on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51230.
Meanwhile, pending resolution by the appellate court of the Ragudos’ appeal,
FETA filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal, to which the Ragudos interposed an Opposition, followed by
FETA’s Reply to Opposition. Then, on 11 October 1994, the Ragudos filed with
the trial court aRejoinder to Reply With Counter-Motion to Admit Attached
Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident.4 Attached thereto and
sought to be admitted therein were the following documents and photographs, to
wit:
1. Letter dated 21 November 19895 of the spouses Ragudo’s son, Engr. Aurelio
Ragudo, addressed to FETA, stating therein that the Ragudos were willing to
become FETA members;
2. Joint Affidavit, dated 07 October 1994, of three (3) residents of the Fabella
Estate;6
3. Photos of three (3) alleged houses of Miriam de Guzman located at the
Fabella Estate;7
4. Photos of two (2) alleged houses of the sons of Miriam de Guzman located at
the Fabella Estate;8
5. Photo of a lot allegedly awarded by FETA to its president, Amparo Nobleza,
located at the Fabella Estate;9 and
6. Photo of a three (3)-storey house of Nobleza’s relative named Architect
Fernandez located at the Fabella Estate.10
In an order dated 25 November 1994, the trial court admitted in evidence the
attachments to the Ragudos' aforementioned Rejoinder With Counter-Motion,
etc., and ultimately denied FETA’s motion for execution pending appeal.
Later, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, the Ragudos filed with the appellate court
a Motion To Admit Certain Documentary Evidence by Way of Partial New Trial,
In the Interest of Justice,11 thereunder seeking the admission in evidence of the
very documents earlier admitted by the trial court in connection with the then
pending incident of execution pending appeal, and praying that said documents
be made part of the records and considered in the resolution of their appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51230.
This time, however, the Ragudos were not as lucky. For, in a Resolution dated
19 May 1997,12 the appellate court denied their aforesaid motion and ordered
expunged from the records of the appealed case the documents they sought
admission of, on the ground that they could not be considered as newly
discovered evidence under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Dispositively, the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant motion to admit certain documentary evidence by
way of partial new trial is DENIED for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, the Joint Affidavit dated October 7, 1994 of Honesto Garcia III
and Miguela L. Balbino and the latter of Aurelio Raguo to Atty. Cesar G. Untalan
dated November 21, 1989 are ordered EXPUNGED from the records of this
case.
SO ORDERED.
The Ragudos moved for a reconsideration, invoking "liberality in the exercise of
judicial discretion" and the "interest of equity and substantial justice". Unmoved,
the appellate court denied their motion in its subsequent Resolution of 24
September 1997.13
Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated 19 July 2000, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Ragudos’ appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 and affirmed
with modification the RTC decision in the main case, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, except for the second clause of the dispositive portion
which should be MODIFIED, as follows:
"2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of November,
1989 and every month thereafter until they vacate the premises."
SO ORDERED.
With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court
in its equally challenged Resolution of 29 January 2001, the Ragudos are now
with us via the instant recourse, commending for our resolution the following
issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE
INTRODUCED BY RAGUDO AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL ON THE GROUND
OF "LIBERALITY OF PROCEDURAL RULES", "EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE", THE "MISTAKE AND EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE" ON THE PART
OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, AND THE "SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PARENS
PATRIAE CLAUSE" OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT "ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EQUITABLE
LACHES" HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF
THE SUBJECT LOT BY RAGUDO AND WHETHER THE SAME PRINCIPLES
HAD CREATED A "VESTED RIGHT" IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO TO CONTINUE
TO POSSESS AND OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.14
Informed of Mr. Ramon Ragudo’s death on 26 March 2001, the Court, in a
resolution dated 14 January 2002,15allowed his substitution by his other heirs.
The recourse must fall.
Relative to the first issue, it is petitioners’ submission that the appellate court
committed an error when it refused admission as evidence in the main case the
documents earlier admitted by the trial court in connection with FETA’s motion
for execution pending appeal. Appealing to this Court’s sense of judicial
discretion in the interest of equity and substantial justice, petitioners explain that
the documents in question were not presented and offered in evidence during
the trial of the main case before the RTC due to the honest mistake and
excusable negligence of their former counsel, Atty. Celso A. Tabobo, Jr.
We are not persuaded.
In this jurisdiction, well-entrenched is the rule that the mistake and negligence of
counsel to introduce, during the trial of a case, certain pieces of evidence bind
his client.16 For sure, in Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas,17 we
even ruled that the omitted evidence by reason of counsel’s mistake or
negligence, cannot be invoked as a ground for new trial:
On the effects of counsel’s acts upon his client, this Court has categorically
declared:
It has been repeatedly enunciated that ‘a client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the
mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted and reasons for
reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel
could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to
the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain
evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce
certain evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case arenot proper
grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great that his
client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case.’ (Vol. 2,
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero v.
Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500, 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279; Montes v.
Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33;
see also People v. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151, 1164). In the 1988 case of Palanca v.
American Food, etc. (24 SCRA 819, 828), this principle was reiterated. (Tesoro
v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304). [Citations in the original; Emphasis
supplied].
This is, as it should be, because a counsel has the implied authority to do all
acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client.18 And, any act performed by
counsel within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of
the law, regarded as the act of the client himself and consequently, the mistake
or negligence of the client’s counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against him.19
A contrary rule would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice.
For, all that a losing party will do is to invoke the mistake or negligence of his
counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him,
thereby putting no end to litigation. Again, to quote from our decision in Aguila:
Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and
recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that his
counsel was grossly inept. Such a reason is hardly plausible as the petitioner’s
new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to do
to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel
as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would be no end to
litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be
the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is
also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client
through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the
mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. (Emphasis supplied).
Admittedly, the rule thus stated admits of exceptions. Thus, in cases where the
counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied
his day in court20 or when he is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
client’s deprivation of his property without due process of law,21 the client is not
bound by his counsel’s mistakes and the case may even be reopened in order to
give the client another chance to present his case.
Unfortunately, however, petitioners’ case does not fall under any of the
exceptions but rather squarely within the ambit of the rule.
As it is, petitioners were given full opportunity during the trial of the main case to
adduce any and all relevant evidence to advance their cause. In no sense,
therefore, may it be argued that they were denied due process of law. As we
said in Antonio vs. Court of Appeals,22 a client cannot be said to have been
deprived of his day in court and there is no denial of due process as long as he
has been given an opportunity to be heard, which, we emphasize, was done in
the instant case.
Petitioners further argue that the documents which their former counsel failed to
adduce in evidence during trial of the main case must be allowed to stay in the
records thereof and duly considered in the resolution of their appeal because
they were duly admitted in the trial court during the hearing on the incidental
motion for execution pending appeal.
Again, we are not persuaded.
With the reality that those documents were never presented and formally offered
during the trial of the main case, their belated admission for purposes of having
them duly considered in the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 would certainly
collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. (Emphasis supplied).
To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution pending
appeal that said documents were presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the
trial court admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose for which
they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETA’s motion for execution
pending appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall consider
evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered.23
While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the case
for purposes of the incidental issue of execution pending appeal, they do not
have that same right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and ought not
be considered in the resolution thereof.
Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had
set in, thereby vesting them with a right to a continued possession of the subject
lot.
The contention holds no water.
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases,24 we have consistently ruled
that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al.,25 we
held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is
a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code26 in relation to Act
496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 152927):
Appellants’ claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article
1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under
the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively,
Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and
inconsequential. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that
FETA as well as its predecessor in interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty
of laches and should, therefore, be already precluded from asserting their right
as against them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this Court28 to the effect
that while a registered land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of
the registered owner’s inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession
thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.
While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners’ posture, a closer look at
our jurisprudence negates their submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners’ possession of the subject lot
was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this connection, Bishop
vs. Court of Appeals29 teaches that if the claimant’s possession of the land is
merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latter’s right to recover possession is
never barred by laches:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a
right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioner’s occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. (Emphasis
supplied).
To the same effect is our pronouncement in Urquiaga vs. Court of Appeals,30 to
wit:
We find no reversible error committed by respondent Court of Appeals. We
sustain private respondents’ ownership of Lot No. 6532-B. As between the
verbal claim of ownership by petitioners through possession for a long
period of time, which was found by the court a quo to be inherently weak,
and the validly documented claim of ownership of respondents, the latter
must naturally prevail. (Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND
HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people
he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing a fertile
ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that
illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are
locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein
petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated
January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the
Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99,
Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the
estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank
deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate
be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an
opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is
composed of "paraphernalproperties." Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for
her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter
has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory
heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that
both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided
to, in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued
letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed
against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s
estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate
among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there
is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are
conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that
she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus,
she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate
taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate
court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the
declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to
the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in
the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the
paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the
oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’"
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s
prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating
that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing
the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of
ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court
has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate
proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are
matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The
probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into
the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in
determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of
grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorarianchored on the following assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE
COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE
INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE
COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties
claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or
a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a
probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose
is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In
such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus,
in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s
claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show
that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the
inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended
Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not
October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion.
Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real
estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic
pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to
be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking
exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement
of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-
administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which have come into his possession or knowledge."19 He could have
submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which
respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to
submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court
a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She
wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on
this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a
claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate
proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be
mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which
she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience,
Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and hence,
should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set
by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor’s
(respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the
oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it
means that she has a "material and direct interest in the estate" and,
hence, "she should be given her day in court."The intended "day in court" or
hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that
she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a
proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s
estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the
pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction.
Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the
matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long
line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence
teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of
her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to
Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a
provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates covered by the
Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or
with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties
until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We
find this Court’s pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability
until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of
course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
xxx
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified
in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree,"
proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present
convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her
testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this
sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese
tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our
only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full
responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do
you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that
right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and
the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any
more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half
share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among
you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late
husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen…
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks,
investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests
and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and
various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should
these properties be partitioned or what should be done with these
properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of
the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land
located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang
dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin…
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi
kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in
petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to
prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did
nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate is composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion
could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her
submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and
that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint business
venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed
in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title
and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested
to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children.28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or
deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to
be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties
alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby
REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005
ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 242) AND
ESTATE OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 240), BOTH
REPRESENTED BY THE JUDICIAL CO-ADMINISTRATOR LUIS ISASI,
MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA and
FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY PRESENTACION
HERNAEZ BELBAR, HEIRS OF LUISA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY
WILFREDO GAYARES, LOLITA GAYARES, JULIETA FORTALEZA AND
ROSAURO FORTALEZA, HEIRS OF ROGACIANA HERNAEZ,
REPRESENTED BY LOURDES MONCERA,Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure assails the March 3, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 52817, and its April 17, 2000 resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On December 27, 1967, a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original
certificates of title (OCT) and owner’s duplicate copies in the name of Eleuterio
Hernaez covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and
717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the Province of Negros Occidental, was filed by his
successors-in-interest Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez
(Hernaez) with then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bacolod City.
On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of
the subject OCTs and its duplicate copies.1 Accordingly, the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental issued reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-10173, RO-10174, and
RO-10175, for Lot Nos. 1316, 2685, and 717, respectively. These reconstituted
OCTs were cancelled on May 29, 1969 upon presentation by Hernaez of a
"declaration of heirship" and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-51546, T-51547, and T-51548 were issued in their names.
Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra, for and
in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim and moved for the
cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They averred that they are holders of
valid and existing certificates of title over the subject properties and have been
in continuous and actual possession thereof.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to cancel the reconstituted titles and
granted instead Hernaez’ prayer that they be placed in possession of the subject
properties, which petitioners challenged before the Court of Appeals in a petition
for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-00139.2
On June 7, 1971, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction3 which was ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693,4 seeking to annul the
resolution lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.
On March 22, 1991, this Court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of the
respondent Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET
ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records
No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records of this case and of CA-G.R.
No. 00139 are remanded to the trial court for hearing of the motion for
cancellation of the reconstituted titles. Private respondents are ordered to return
to petitioners the possession of the properties in question. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on February 15, 1972, enjoining private
respondents from interfering in any manner, with petitioners’ right of possession
of the properties in question, shall remain effective until the issue of ownership
and/or possession of the properties is finally settled by a competent court.
SO ORDERED.5
Pursuant thereto, the trial court heard petitioners’ motion for cancellation of
certificates of title and on November 25, 1998, rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises and considerations, the court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the oppositors and hereby orders the
following:
1) The petition filed by movants Serra Serra dated November 4, 1968 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit;
2) Declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27644 covering Lot No. 1316,
Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-22344 covering Lot No. 717-A, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
22351, Ilog Cadastre, all issued in the name of movants Serra Serra NULL and
VOID for being issued to foreigners;
3) Declaring the oppositors Hernaez as owners of Lot No. 1316, Kabankalan
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51546; Lot No. 2685, Ilog
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-51547; and Lot No. 717,
Ilog Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certiticate of Title No. T-51548; and
4) Ordering the movants Serra Serra to return possession of said lots to the
oppositors Hernaez.
SO ORDERED.6
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners assailed the lower court’s
decision before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. On March 3,
2000, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed judgment which
dismissed the petition for lack of merit, pertinent portion of which reads:
In the case at bench, We find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed decision
denying petitioners’ motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles, especially
after the court a quo found that the evidence presented is sufficient and
proper to uphold the reconstituted certificates of title in question. A perusal of the
assailed order shows that the trial court correctly applied the established legal
principle that in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party
seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by
clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.
Petitioners (Serra Serra), however, as noted by the court a quo in its Order
dated November 25, 1998, failed to present in court as evidence the original
certificates of title of the aforementioned lots, Lot No. 1316, Lot No. 2685 and
Lot No. 717. Petitioners were also found to be of Spanish citizenship and,
hence, as aliens, disqualified to acquire lands in the Philippines under the 1935
Constitution.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, hence the
instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ... DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT, IN THAT:
THE RULE THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH THE LOWER COURT BEFORE HE
MAY AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT IS SUBJECT TO WELL-SETTLED EXCEPTIONS ...
...
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ... HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26,
OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN
SERRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-34080, MARCH 22, 1991.8
Petitioners assail the dismissal of their petition on the ground that they failed to
file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court before filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. While admitting procedural lapse on
their part, they argue that the rule is subject to well-settled exceptions, such as,
when the questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those
which have been squarely raised and passed upon by the trial court, or when
the petitioner has been deprived of due process of law, or when the writ is
urgent under the circumstances.9
The petition is denied. Other than citing general exceptions to the rule requiring
a motion for reconsideration as a pre-condition to instituting a petition
for certiorari, the petitioners did not offer valid reason why their particular case
fall under any of the specified exceptions.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non condition
for the filing of a petition forcertiorari. The purpose is to grant an opportunity to
public respondent to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.10 Petitioners’
failure to file a motion for reconsideration deprived the trial court of the
opportunity to rectify an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act
unfairly imputed. Besides, a motion for reconsideration under the present
circumstances is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to the adverse
judgment of the trial court.
Granting arguendo that certiorari is the proper remedy, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless did not err in dismissing the petition.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners are Spanish
citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. As a
rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines and the
only instances when a foreigner can own private lands are by hereditary
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship. The records are bereft of any showing that petitioners
derived their title by any mode which would qualify them to acquire private lands
in the country. Petitioners’ bare allegation that they acquired the subject lots
from Salvador Serra Serra has no probative value lacking sufficient proof that
the latter is not disqualified to own or hold private property and was able to
legally transmit to petitioners title thereto.
Petitioners’ alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the subject
lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily conclusive where
the assertion of proprietary rights is founded on dubious claim of ownership.
They claimed that their title over the subject properties emanated from Salvador
Serra Serra; yet they failed to present in evidence the OCT in the name of the
latter. Since petitioners impugn the proprietary claim of Hernaez over the
properties, the burden rests on them to establish their superior right over the
latter. To recall, the trial court found that the evidence they presented have not
established superior proprietary rights over the respondents’ on the subject lots.
It held that the non-presentation of the OCTs cast doubt on the veracity of their
claim. He who asserts must prove.
It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under Philippine
law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by hereditary succession or when
they were formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In
this case, petitioners did not present proof that they acquired the properties by
inheritance. Neither did they claim to be former natural-born Filipinos. On the
contrary, they declare in this petition that they are all Spanish citizens residing in
Mallorca, Spain.
It is axiomatic that factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on
appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to examine and
determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision.
Moreover, well entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law
and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with
greater force to the petition under consideration because the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are in full agreement with what the trial court found.11
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 3, 2000 decision and the
April 17, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52817 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145849. July 22, 2005
SPOUSES JOSE BEJOC and JOVITA CAPUTOL BEJOC, Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMA CALDERON CABREROS and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
 DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court1 are the
decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals4 which affirmed the trial
court’s judgment5 declaring respondent the lawful owner of two parcels of
agricultural land, the subject of this petition.
The original owner of the disputed parcels of land was Maura Caputol, the
mother-in-law of respondent. On November 7, 1975, Maura Caputol executed a
deed of donation inter vivos in favor of her son, Domingo Cabreros. The latter
accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Domingo and his wife, respondent Prima Cabreros, took physical possession of
the lots. In 1976, they had the tax declarations in the name of Maura Caputol
cancelled and transferred to them.6
When the new owners and Maura Caputol migrated to Hawaii, they left the
charge and administration of the land to petitioner spouses. Aside from being
the uncle and aunt of Domingo, they were chosen as caretakers because they
had been the overseers of the properties even before the donation to Domingo.
As caretakers, the petitioners were tasked to deliver the harvest to Lucinda
Calderon,7 the mother of respondent Prima Calderon Cabreros. They were also
responsible for paying the taxes due thereon, to be taken from the proceeds of
the sale of the crops.
When Domingo died in Hawaii in 1979, his forced heirs, respondent Prima and a
minor daughter, succeeded to his estate.8
Sometime in October 1989, respondent Prima made a visit to the Philippines
and went to Danao City, Cebu. She heard rumors that petitioner spouses were
exercising acts of ownership over the disputed land. With her mother-in law
Maura Caputol, she confronted petitioners about the rumors but the latter initially
denied the accusations. Later on, however, they claimed that Maura Caputol
gave the properties to them, an allegation disclaimed by Maura who said it was
no longer possible for her to give the properties to her younger sister, petitioner
Jovita, because she had already donated them to her son Domingo in 1975.
Respondent also found out that petitioners stopped delivering the harvest to her
mother since 1984. Moreover, she discovered that in 1981, Tax Declaration (TD)
No. 19470 in the name of Domingo Cabreros issued in 1980 for the first parcel
of land (parcel 1) was mysteriously cancelled and changed by TD No. 25472.
This new tax declaration was issued in the name of Maura Caputol on the basis
of a quitclaim allegedly executed before notary public Leonardo Garcillano in
1971, annotated therein. The same thing happened to the second parcel of land
(parcel 2). The property was declared in the name of Domingo Cabreros in 1980
under TD No. 19471. Yet, in 1983, this TD was cancelled and changed by TD
No. 25473 issued in the name of Maura Caputol, based on the same quitclaim.
In 1984, TD No. 25472 for parcel 1 and TD No. 25473 for parcel 2, both in the
name of Maura Caputol, were cancelled by TD No. 24007 and 15-26009,
respectively. These new declarations were now in the name of petitioner Jovita
Caputol, based on a deed of confirmation of sale dated May 18, 1984 annotated
therein. This document was allegedly executed by Maura Caputol in favor of
petitioner Jovita.
Respondent further found that the petitioner spouses applied for a free patent on
the properties. On October 17, 1984, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
26947 was issued to petitioner Jose Bejoc by virtue of free patent no. (VII-
5)17844 which he was able to obtain.
Earnest efforts to have the controversy settled out of court were unsuccessful as
petitioners even dared respondent to sue them in court. Consequently, the
respondent filed an action for reconveyance against the petitioner spouses on
February 1, 1990 before Branch 17, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu.
In their answer, petitioners alleged that they had been in possession of the
parcels of land as administrators since 1974 and as absolute owners since
1978. They claimed that Maura Caputol never donated the parcels of land to her
son Domingo.
On December 24, 1978, Maura Caputol allegedly sold the subject properties to
petitioners for P5,000 in a deed of sale. This sale was later on confirmed in
another document dated May 18, 1984. From then on, they exercised their
rights as owners of the land and paid the taxes due beginning 1979. They also
successfully applied for a free patent on the properties. In 1984, they were
issued an original certificate of title.
Lastly, they contended that, even assuming the truth of respondent’s allegations,
the action for reconveyance was already barred by prescription.
From the evidence adduced, the trial court ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and
against the defendants hereby declaring the plaintiff as the true, absolute and
lawful owner of the two parcels of land in question; ordering the defendants to
reconvey the aforesaid properties in favor of the plaintiff; ordering the
defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos a year from 1978 with legal rate of interest until the two
parcels of land shall have been reconveyed and delivered to the plaintiff plus
costs of this action.9
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a decision dated
September 20, 1999.10 The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
October 13, 2000.11
Hence, petitioner spouses are now before us via a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent’s action for
reconveyance has prescribed.
Petitioner spouses contend that respondent’s action for reconveyance was
based on fraud, not implied trust, as found by the trial and appellate courts.
Respondent’s allegation was that petitioner spouses conspired to transfer the
tax declarations in their names and obtained title for the parcels of land by
fabricating the quitclaim, contract of sale and deed of confirmation of sale. Since
the fraud committed by petitioners ― not implied trust ― was the basis of the
action, the prescriptive period was 4 years and not 10 years as enunciated
in Millena v. Court of Appeals.12 This period should be reckoned either from the
time that petitioners committed unequivocal acts of repudiation in 1978 or from
the time the OCT was issued in their names in 1984. Considering that more than
four years had passed in either case, it was clear error for the Court of Appeals
to hold that respondent’s action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed when it
was filed in 1990.
We find no merit in the petition.
An implied trust is one that, without being express, is deducible from the nature
of the transaction as a matter of intent or which is superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as a matter of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties.13 It may either be resulting or constructive
trust.
A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction but not
expressed in the deed itself.14 It is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration, not legal title, determines the equitable title or interest.15
A constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing a direct intention to
create a trust, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and to prevent unjust enrichment. It arises contrary to an agreement or intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the
legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to
hold.16 A constructive trust is illustrated in Article 1456 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
It is on this ground that we find no error in the trial and appellate courts’ findings
that an implied trust was created in favor of respondent when petitioners
transferred the properties to their names in violation of the trust placed in them
as overseers. Records show that, while the properties were under their
administration, they transferred the tax declarations in the name of Domingo
Cabreros to Maura Caputol on the basis of a fake quitclaim purportedly
executed in 1971. These tax declarations were in turn transferred to petitioner
Jovita Caputol on the strength of a fraudulent deed of confirmation of sale
supposedly executed by Maura Caputol on May 18, 1984.
All these documents, including a deed of sale allegedly executed in 1978, were
denounced as spurious by Maura Caputol. She explained that she had donated
the properties to her only son Domingo Cabreros on November 7, 1975. There
was no way she could have sold these properties thereafter, considering that
she no longer owned them. Also, at the time of the alleged confirmation of sale,
Maura Caputol was already 78 years old and living alone. At that age, she could
have been easily manipulated by her sister, petitioner Jovita, into signing just
about any document.
Telling is her testimony regarding the deed of confirmation of sale:
Q: Now Mrs. Caputol, I will show to you this document evidencing the
confirmation of sale from you to your sister. In fact they have the signature of
Maura Caputol marked on their exhibit. Can you identify that signature?
A: I signed the document just to confirm that they are the one staying [in] the
house and over-seeing the property and I did not sell the property and in fact I
even wanted to buy some more.17 (emphasis ours)
Moreover, the quitclaim and the deed of sale, upon which petitioners based their
claim, were never presented. Considering that they were the ones who had
been asserting the existence of these documents, it was incumbent upon them
to present said documents to prove that the properties had indeed been sold to
them by Maura Caputol. The fundamental rule is that he who alleges must
prove.18 Petitioners’ failure to do so was therefore fatal to their cause.
More telling is the fact that OCT No. 26947 was issued in the name of petitioner
Jose Bejoc on October 17, 1984 by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 17844.
Undoubtedly, the patent and title were obtained by the petitioner spouses in
flagrant breach of the confidence reposed in them by Maura Caputol, and
Domingo Cabreros and his wife, respondent Prima. The evidence was that
petitioners knew all along that the properties were not theirs. They, in fact,
admitted that they were mere overseers thereof.
We have already held that simple possession of a certificate of title is not
necessarily conclusive of a holder’s true ownership of property. If a person
obtains title that includes land to which he has no legal right, that person does
not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the land illegally or
erroneously included.19 It has been held time and again that the rule on
indefeasibility of title cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real
owner.20
In Viral v. Anore, et al. 21 we ruled that:
While under ordinary circumstances the statute of limitations may bar an action
to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent, yet where the registered
owner x x x knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the
Torrens title actually belonged to another person, such statute barring action will
not apply. It may be the better procedure, however, that the true owner bring an
action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially settled, and the court in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the
Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the registered owner to reconvey
the land to the rightful owner. (emphasis ours)
The right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not
absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription.22 On this point, petitioners insist
that the action prescribed in 4 years as held in the case of Millena v. Court of
Appeals.23 Petitioners’ insistence is, however, misplaced. The 4-year
prescriptive period is not applicable in the present case because the action was
not based exclusively on fraud but on implied trust. Significantly, petitioners
overlooked the well-settled rule, reiterated in the same case, that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.
This period is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of
title or transfer certificate of title. Since such issuance operates as a constructive
notice to the whole world,24 the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken
place at that time. Here, the title was issued on October 17, 1984. The action for
reconveyance was, on the other hand, filed 6 years later, on February 1, 1990.
Clearly, prescription had not yet attached. The suit was brought well within the
10-year prescriptive period for implied trusts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168809 March 10, 2006
EDWARD ROCO TAN and EDWIN ROCO TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO DE LA VEGA, ANGELA TUASON STALEY and ANTONIO PEREZ
Y TUASON, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the February 3, 2005 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79957, which affirmed the March 21, 2003
Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, granting the motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by respondents in Civil Case No. 62269.
Likewise questioned is the appellate court’s July 6, 2005 Resolution3 which
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on August 3, 1992, respondents filed a
complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Free Patent No.
495269, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 711 and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 186516, against the heirs of Macario Mencias (defendant heirs),
namely, Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M. Cadete, Myrna M.
Quirante; and the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Director of the Land Management Bureau and the Register of
Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later amended to implead herein
petitioner purchasers of the disputed lot and to nullify TCT No. 272191 issued in
their name.
The Amended Complaint averred that respondents are the co-owners of a
159,576 square meter parcel of land located in Marikina, Rizal, Metro Manila
and covered by TCT No. 257152, issued on June 20, 1969. Said title was a
transfer from TCT No. 22395 in the name of J. Antonio Araneta as trustee of the
children of Angela I. Tuason. Among the lots covered by TCT No. 257152 is the
controverted Lot 89 containing an area of 54,197 square meters.4
Sometime in April 1992, respondents learned that the defendant heirs are
causing the ejectment of the occupants of a 29,945 square meter portion of Lot
89; and that Macario Mencias was able to obtain Free Patent No. 495269 on
July 31, 1971, and OCT No. 711 on August 11, 1971, over said portion. Upon
Macario's death, OCT No. 711 was canceled and TCT No. 186516 was issued
to the defendant heirs on July 5, 1990.5 By virtue of a Deed of Sale inscribed on
November 14, 1994, TCT No. 186516 was further cancelled and TCT No.
271604 was issued on the same date in favor of New Atlantis Real Estate &
Development, Inc., (Corporation) represented by its President, Victor C.
Salvador, Jr. The questioned lot was thereafter sold by the Corporation to
petitioners. TCT No. 271604 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
272191 was issued to petitioners on November 17, 1994.6
Respondents contended that Macario’s OCT No. 711 and its derivative titles-
TCT No. 186516, in the name of defendant heirs and petitioners’ TCT NO.
272191, are void because the area they cover is entirely within their
(respondents) land, specifically, Lot 89, as shown by the notation in the said
titles, i.e., "This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496; and "This survey is
entirely inside No. 89, II-4755."7 Respondents further averred that since the
controverted lot is already a private land, the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had no jurisdiction to approve
Macario’s application and to issue Free Patent No. 495269. The pendency of
this action was allegedly inscribed in the defendant heirs’ title (TCT No. 186516)
on August 4, 1992 and carried over to the petitioners' TCT No. 272191.8
In their Answer,9 the defendant heirs contended that Lot 89 was never part of
respondents’ TCT No. 257152 which originated from OCT No. 730.
Respondents’ own exhibits, i.e., the documents purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Lands (Exhibits "E" and "F"), show that Lot 89 was covered by OCT
No. 734 and not OCT No. 730. Defendant heirs further stated that respondents’
TCT No. 257152 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 22395 which is a mere
reconstitution of TCT No. 45046. Upon verification with the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, TCT No. 45046, covers a different parcel of land situated in San Juan,
Rizal, and measuring about 356 square meters only. The defendant heirs also
raised the defenses of laches and prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they are purchasers in
good faith and for value and that they have no knowledge of any defect in the
title of the Corporation from whom they purchased the controverted lot. The
notice of lis pendens alleged to have been inscribed in TCT No. 186516 on
August 4, 1992 does not appear in the Corporation’s title, TCT No. 271604 nor
in their title, TCT No. 272191. Absent said notice, petitioners claim that they
cannot be charged with knowledge of any defect in the Corporation's title.
Neither does the note "This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496;" and
"This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755," serve as sufficient warning to
third persons because said notes do not indicate that the property is covered by
another title.10
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat,11 public defendants
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Director of
Land Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina,12 were
declared in default.
On March 4, 2003, respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
which was granted by the trial court. It was held that the disputed lot is within Lot
89 covered by respondents’ TCT No. 257152, issued on June 20, 1969. Said lot
therefore became a private land long before the Free Patent was issued to
Macario on July 31, 1971. Hence, the titles derived or issued on the basis of
said Free Patent are void because Public Land Act applies only to public lands
and not private lands. On the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its
source, the trial court concluded that petitioners cannot be purchasers in good
faith considering that their title was derived from Macario who acquired the
property by virtue of a void title. It further ruled that petitioners’ defense of good
faith must fail because they were forewarned of the notice indicating that the
questioned lot is inside Lot 89. The dispositive portion of the March 21, 2003
order, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs’ [respondents herein] Motion is
hereby Granted and judgment rendered as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 257152 is declared valid and
superior to defendants’ [petitioners] TCT No. 272191;
2. Free Patent No. 495269 issued by then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to Macario Mencias on July 21, 1971 is declared null and void;
3. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 711, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 271604/T-1358 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272191, TCT No.
186516 and TCT No. 272191, all derivatives [sic] title of Free Patent 495269
issued by Registry of Deeds of Marikina, are also declared null and void;
4. The Bureau of Lands and Land Registration Administration are directed to
enter into their technical files the findings in this order;
5. The Registry of Deeds of Marikina is directed to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) NO. 272191 in the names of Edward and Edwin Roco Tan.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the assailed order of
the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a
resolution dated July 6, 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether a judgment on the pleadings is proper in
the instant case.
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. x x x.
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is
whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the
failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue.14 The answer would
fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in
the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with
them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of
new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint
expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the
plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.15
In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the
pleadings because the pleadings filed by the parties generated ostensible
issues that necessitate the presentation of evidence. Respondents’ action for
declaration of nullity of Free Patent No. 495269 and the titles derived therefrom
is based on their claim that the lot titled in the name of petitioners, is a portion of
a bigger tract of land previously titled in the name of their (respondents)
predecessors-in-interest. The documents presented in support thereof were the
photocopy of respondents’ TCT No. 257152 which shows that the land it covers,
including lot 89, originated from OCT No. 730; and photocopies of the
documents alleged to have been issued by the Bureau of Lands and confirming
that the disputed lot is a portion of respondents’ Lot 89. Pertinent portions of the
Amended Complaint, state:
5. Sometime in early April, 1992, plaintiff de la Vega was informed by one of the
occupants of the above-described lot No. 89 that the heirs of Macario Mencias,
the defendants herein, were causing the ejectment of said occupants and
claiming to be the owners of an area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic) which is within, or
part of, Lot No. 89 covered by plaintiffs’ T.C.T. No. 257152. It was only then that
the plaintiffs heard of Macario Mencias and of his encroaching into plaintiffs’ Lot
89.
6. The plaintiffs later learned that, unknown to them, Macario Mencias had
applied with the then Bureau of Lands for, and obtained on 31 July 1971, Free
Patent No. 495269 which was granted under the signature of the then Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and covering an area of 29,945 sq. ms.
(sic) as described in Plan F (III-1) 4496-D. On 11 August 1971, Original
Certificate of Title No. 711 (Rizal) was issued to him based on the said Free
Patent, and upon his death, said OCT No. 711 was cancelled and transferred to
his heirs, the defendants herein, to whom T.C.T. No. 186516 (Marikina) was
issued on 5 July 1990. The plaintiffs were never notified of said application of
Mencias for free patent nor of the issuance of Free Patent No. 495269 and OCT
No. 711 to him and T.C.T. No. 186515 to his heirs, the defendants herein.
Photocopies of OCT No. 711, which incorporated Free Patent No. 495269, and
T.C.T. No. 186516 are hereto appended as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.
xxxx
8. A letter dated 29 October 1971 of Mr. Amando A. Salvador as Chief of the
Survey Division of the then Bureau of Lands and addressed to Macario
Mencias, 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 1974, signed by Mr. Daniel C.
Florida as Acting Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands, a report
dated 17 December 1976 by Mr. Jose B. Isidro as Hearing Officer addressed to
the Director of Lands, and the 1st Indorsement, dated 3 January 1977, also
addressed to the Director of Lands by Mr. Claudio C. Batiles as the District Land
Officer, photocopies of which are appended hereto as Annexes "D", "E", "F" and
"G", respectively, unequivocally confirmed that the area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic)
covered by the Free Patent based on Plan F (III-1) 4496-D and issued to
Macario Mencias was entirely inside Lot 89 of Plan II-4755, which was covered
by T.C.T. No. 22395 in the name of "J Antonio Araneta, Trustee of the children
Angela I. Tauson", and since 20 June 1969, by T.C.T. No. 257152 in the
plaintiffs’ names.
9. There can be no doubt that the area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic) covered by Free
Patent No. 495269, which was incorporated in OCT No. 711 issued to Macario
Mencias, was within Lot 89 of Plan II-4755 covered by T.C.T. No. 22395 and,
since 20 June 1969, by T.C.T. No. 2597152 (sic) in the plaintiffs’ names,
because the technical description of said area embodied in the said Free Patent
itself and in OCT No. 711 disclosed the following information:
"NOTE: This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496.
This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755" (See Annex "B" hereof). (See
Annex "B" hereof).
10. In fact the very same notes were carried over in T.C.T. No. 186516 issued to
the heirs of Mencias, the defendants herein, thus forewarning all those who
dealt or may have dealt with the private defendants regarding the area therein
described that there was something anomalous in said title (See Annex "C"
hereof).
xxxx
14. The records of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, disclosed
that TCT No. 186516, Annex "C", was cancelled and T.C.T. No. 271604,
covering the same parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 186516, was issued on
November 14, 1994 by the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Mr. Artemio B. Caña,
to the New Atlantis Real Eastate & Dev., Inc. represented by its President, Victor
C. Salvador, Jr., based on a sale in its favor inscribed on the same date; and
that T.C.T. No. 271604 was thereupon cancelled and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No.
272191 was issued by the said Register of Deeds to private defendants Edward
and Edwin Roco Tan on November 17, 1994 based on a sale in their favor
inscribed on the same date. A photocopy of T.C.T. No. 272191 is hereto attached
as Annex "H".
xxxx
16. Neither New Atlantis Real Estate & Dev. Inc., nor Edward Roco Tan and
Edwin Roco Tan could claim to be purchasers in good faith not only because
their titles are void and inexistent and could not possibly have any legal effect
whatsoever but also because the "NOTE" cited in paragraphs 9 and 10 above,
which likewise appears on T.C.T. No. 272191 itself, discloses the very basis for
its nullity.
17. The notice of the pendency of this action (Notice of Lis Pendens) was duly
inscribed on T.C.T. No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 under Entry No. 274711,
which notice has been carried over to T.C.T. No. 272191, a photocopy of which
is hereto appended as Annex "H".
x x x x.16
The foregoing averments were specifically denied by defendant heirs who
raised, among others, the affirmative defense that respondents’ TCT No. 22395
is void and that lot 89 is not found inside respondents’ land. Thus –
11. Lot 89 was never a part of the Mariquina Estate as shown in subdivision plan
PSD 29965 as surveyed in December, 1950 up to June, 1951. This fact is also
certified by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as early as 1967, a photo
copy of said certification is hereto attached as Annex "1";
12. Plaintiffs’ own exhibits (Annexes "E", "F", in relation to Annex "A") show that
lot 89 was never part of Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. 730 from which
plaintiffs’ alleged title was derived (T.C.T. No. 257152, Annex "A"). In Annexes
"E" and "F", Lot No. 89 of II-4755 is covered by O.C.T. No. 734 and not 730;
13. T.C. T. No. 257152 is spurious, falsified, hence, null and void. This certificate
of title was issued in lieu of T.C.T. No. 22395/T 389 as per Annex "A" of the
Complaint. T.C.T. No. 22395/T 389 was in turn issued in lieu of T.C.T. No. 45046
as shown in a document (T.C.T. No. 22395) hereto attached as Annex "2";
14. It also appears that T.C.T. No. 22395 is a mere reconstitution of a
lost/destroyed T.C.T. No. 45046 as shown on page 3 of T.C.T. No. 257152;
15. Upon verification with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, T.C.T. No.
45046 covered a different parcel of land situated in San Juan, Rizal and
measuring about 356 square meters only, photo copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "3" hereof;
x x x x.17
Petitioners asserted, inter alia, the affirmative defense of good faith and denied
the material allegations of the complaint relating to the origin of the title of
respondents; and the latter’s claim that Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152.
Pertinent portions of the Answer state:
In further support of the Specific Denials and Affirmative Allegations herein set
forth, and by way of Affirmative Defenses, defendants allege:
xxxx
4.2 Defendants are innocent purchasers for value of the subject property. They
had no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the alleged defect in their title,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 272191, or of the title of their predecessor-in-
interest, the Corporation.
4.2.1 Plaintiff's (sic) notice of lis pendens alleged to have been duly inscribed on
TCT No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 under Entry No, 274711 did not appear or
was not annotated on the corporation’s title, TCT No. 271604, which was issued
on November 14, 1994 or long after the alleged inscription was made on the
said title. Attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A" is a copy of
Corporation's title, TCT No. 271604.
4.2.2 Neither did said inscription appear or annotated on defendants’ title, TCT
No. 272191, which was issued on 17 November 1994. Attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex "B" is a copy of TCT No. 272191.
4.2.3 It bears stressing that if the said inscription was duly made on 4 August
1992 as plaintiffs alleged, the same would have been annotated on TCT Nos.
271604 and 272191 which were issued long after the said entry was allegedly
made. Obviously, if said entry does appear today on TCT No. 272191, it was
made only recently or at the earliest, after the latter title was issued on 17
November 1994. But certainly said entry could not have been possibly made on
4 August 1992.
4.2.4 With the absence of the notice of lis pendens, defendants could not be
charged with notice of any defect in their title No. 272191 nor their status as
innocent purchasers for value be adversely affected by the same.
4.2.5 Neither does the note, "this survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496;
This survey is entirely inside No. 89 II-4755." serve as sufficient notice to
defendants of any defect in their title. Said note does not indicate or disclose
that the subject property is covered by another title.
4.2.6 Moreover, the fact that the subject property was covered by TCT No.
271604 duly issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of the corporation
without any encumbrance, liens or adverse claims annotated thereon negates
any possibility that the subject property belongs to any person other than the
corporation.18
It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the instant case
generated the following issues: (1) whether respondents’ TCT No. 257152 is
valid; (2) whether Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether
petitioners are purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the Answers tendered factual
issues. The trial court rendered a summary judgment on March 21, 2003 and not
a judgment on the pleadings.
In Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court explained the
distinction between a proper case of summary judgment and judgment on the
pleadings, in this wise:
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one
hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a
proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In
a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all
because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the
other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist ― i.e.
facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission,
disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth
set out in the answer―but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham,
fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. x x
x.
In any case, a summary judgment is likewise not warranted in this case as there
are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. A "genuine issue" is an issue
of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear
uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as
to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have
limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there
is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment
cannot take the place of trial.20
In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to determine the
validity of TCT No. 22395 from which respondents’ title (TCT No. 257152) was
derived. As alleged by defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere
reconstitution of TCT No. 45046, which per verification from the Register of
Deeds of Rizal pertain to a different piece of land measuring only about 356
square meters and located in San Juan, Rizal. These allegations were never
refuted by respondents, hence, they cannot be simply brushed aside by the trial
court.
Moreover, even assuming that the title of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest
(TCT No. 22395) is valid, the evidence at this stage is still insufficient to sustain
the conclusion of the trial court that Lot 89 is inside respondents’ land now
covered by TCT No. 257152. The title appended by respondents in their
complaint is a mere photocopy. Likewise, the document allegedly issued by the
Bureau of Lands and presented by respondents to prove that Lot 89 is inside
their land are also mere photocopies and not authenticated by said office.
Furthermore, the title referred in the said documents as the origin of TCT No.
257152, is a different title, that is OCT No. 734 and not OCT No. 730. There is
thus a need to present evidence to settle the issues in a full blown trial.
If the evidence show that the Free Patent and the OCT issued to petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest is valid and or Lot 89 is not inside TCT No. 257152,
then judgment should be rendered in favor of petitioners; and whether the latter
acted in good or bad faith will no longer be a decisive issue in this case. On the
other hand, if the title of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is declared void,
the defense of good faith maystill be available to petitioners who claim to be
purchasers in good faith and for value. The rule is that a void title may be the
source of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.21 An
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.22
Since good faith is always presumed,23 it was premature for the trial court to
conclude that petitioners are not purchasers in good faith. Note that the
complaint did not state that the notice of the pendency of this action was
inscribed in the title of the Corporation from whom petitioners purchased the
property. Petitioners even denied the presence of said inscription in their own
title and in the title of the Corporation.24 Neither the presence of the notation
"This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496; and This survey is entirely
inside No. 89, II-4755," in the title of the Corporation automatically make
petitioners purchasers in bad faith. In the absence of other evidence to explain
said notation, bad faith, which is never presumed, cannot be charged against
petitioners. The notation that the disputed lot is covered by Free Patent
Application No. (III-1) 4496, will not place the title in dubious light because the
same is the number of the application for Free Patent of Macario
Mencias,25 petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. The same is true with respect to
the notation in the title that the questioned lot is inside Lot 89. Considering that
the title presented is a mere photocopy and that the notes appearing thereon do
not indicate that the subject property is covered by any title, the trial court should
have directed the parties to substantiate their respective allegations instead of
rendering judgment. Indeed, in determining the propriety of rendering a motion
for summary judgment, the lower court should take that view of the evidence
most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the
benefit of all favorable inferences.26
In sum, we find that respondents failed to prove that presentation of evidence
may be dispensed with in the present controversy. The instant case is neither a
proper case for rendition of judgment on the pleadings nor of summary
judgment. A full blown trial should therefore be conducted to resolve the issues
raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the
February 3, 2005 Decision and the July 6, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79957 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 264 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149118 February 16, 2006
FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES SANTIAGO and FORTUNATA BATUYONG, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the two rulings of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No. 50952. The first decision dated 27 November
20001 upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirming the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) order for ejectment, while the Resolution dated
5 July 20012 denied the motion for reconsideration.
First, the factual background of the case.
Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani
P. Candelaria (Candelaria) were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot, then
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-10870. On 1 February 1995,
a partition agreement3 was entered into by petitioners and Candelaria, wherein
Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less,
was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an
area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to petitioners. TCT No. C-
10870 was cancelled and TCT No. 288500 was issued in the name of
petitioners.
On 30 May 1995, Candelaria sold his property, including the improvements
thereon, to Spouses Santiago and Fortunata Batuyong (respondents). TCT No.
294743 was issued in their names over the said parcel of land.4
On 21 May 1996, petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door
bungalow-type building that allegedly intruded into the lot of Respondents. At the
instance of respondents, petitioners were summoned by barangay officials to a
meeting on the matter. It was then agreed upon that petitioners would defer the
construction work pending the result of a relocation survey to be conducted by a
government surveyor.
A verification survey was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C.
Valencia. She submitted a report dated 12 November 1996 which yielded the
findings that Lot 6-A (Candelaria’s) and Lot 6-B (petitioners’) were not correctly
positioned geographically on the ground with respect to TCT No. 294743. Thus,
as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters serves as right of
way of Lot 6-B (petitioners’ lot) while sub-lot C with an area of 10.18 square
meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents’ lot) presently occupied by
petitioners.5
Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the
forestalled construction, allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters of
respondents’ lot, including the portion being used as right of way for petitioners’
tenants.
After respondents secured a permit from the barangay and the Caloocan City
Building Official to fence their lot, they made demands to petitioners to vacate
the encroached portion but to no avail. Respondents brought the matter to the
barangay but no amicable settlement was reached. A Certificate to File Action
was issued to them by the Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa. A final demand was
made through a letter dated 20 May 1997 upon petitioners to vacate the
encroached premises. Petitioners, however, vehemently refused to vacate and
surrender the premises.
On 14 April 1997, respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before
the Metropolitan Trial Court6(MeTC) of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 23359. In a Decision7 dated 2 July 1998, the MeTC ordered petitioners to
vacate and surrender possession of a portion of respondents’ lot and to
pay P500.00 per month as fair rental value from May 1996 until the premises is
finally vacated, plus P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.8
On appeal, the RTC9 affirmed the judgment of the MeTC.10 In doing so, the
RTC debunked the three (3) arguments posed by petitioners. First, contrary to
petitioners’ submission, the RTC ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the
instant complaint. The RTC noted that the issue of jurisdiction was never raised
in the court a quo while on the other hand, petitioners actively participated in the
proceedings therein by filing their Answer and Position Paper. Evidently,
petitioners raised the question of jurisdiction as a mere afterthought as he did so
only after he obtained an adverse judgment. Second, the allegations of the
complaint sufficiently averred a case for ejectment which the RTC found to be
within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Third, the trial court ruled that
petitioners categorically recognized the validity of the verification survey done by
Engineer Valencia, as shown by the presence of petitioner Flaviana Cajayon
during the verification survey and setting of monuments per survey report.11
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied in
an Order12 dated 12 January 1999 of the RTC. They elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. On 27 November 2000, the appellate court rendered a
Decision13 dismissing the petition. Holding that the exclusive jurisdiction to try
unlawful detainer cases is vested with the MeTC, the appellate court
ratiocinated, thus:
The complaint in the instant case establishes jurisdictional facts necessary to
sustain the action for unlawful detainer and the remedy it seeks is merely to
obtain possession of the controverted lot from Respondents. Specifically, it
alleges that sometime on May 21, 1996, petitioners started construction works in
the area which intruded into a portion of respondents’ property; that the parties
eventually agreed to stop the construction subject to the result of a survey to be
conducted thereon; that a survey was conducted in the presence of the parties
and a report was submitted by Engr. Valencia on November 12, 1996, showing
an encroachment of about 20.61 square meters of respondents’ lot including
that portion being used as a right of way for petitioners’ tenants; that even after
the boundaries had been verified, petitioners resumed the construction on the
area; that despite verbal and written demands, the last of which was made on
March 20, 1999, petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the encroached
area. Surely, respondents’ resort to unlawful detainer when petitioners failed to
leave the controverted premises upon demand is in order.14
The appellate court also held that the fact that petitioners’ houses already stood
on the controverted lot long before the purchase of the land by respondents
failed to negate the case for ejectment.15 The appellate court emphasized that
prior physical possession is not a condition sine qua non in unlawful detainer
cases. The court likewise sustained the RTC findings on the validity of the
verification survey conducted by Engineer Valencia that petitioners have
encroached on a 20.61 square meter portion of respondents’ lot.
On 5 July 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution16 denying petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the
question of jurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey
results.17
Petitioners anchor their petition on the court a quo’s lack of jurisdiction over the
instant suit. The averments in the complaint do not make out a case for
ejectment, they claim, as their entry into the disputed lot was not made by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Neither was their possession of the
disputed property by virtue of the tolerance of respondents or the latter’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Respondents counter that the jurisdictional elements necessary to maintain an
action for unlawful detainer clearly obtain in the case at bar, namely: (a) after the
parties agreed to the conduct of a survey by a government surveyor and after
the survey, it was determined that the structures introduced by herein petitioners
have encroached a portion of herein respondents’ lot; (b) notices to vacate and
surrender of possession of the encroached portion were made to petitioners, the
last being on March 20, 1997; and (c) the suit was instituted on April 11, 1997 or
within one (1) year from date of last demand.18
Respondents also stress that possession of the premises by petitioners took
place more than one year before the filing of the complaint and the absence of
an allegation in the complaint that such possession of the disputed portion was
merely by virtue of respondents’ tolerance does not deprive the lower court of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction nor will it negate respondents’ action for
unlawful detainer.19
It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.20
The Complaint21 filed by respondents (plaintiffs therein) alleged these material
facts:1avvphil.net
2. That defendants and Isagani P. Candelaria were the former co-owners of a
certain piece of land located in Maypajo, Caloocan City containing an area of
260 square meters, more or less, under TCT No. C-10870 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City;
3. That on February 1, 1995, said co-owners subdivided this parcel of land by
virtue of a Partition Agreement wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an
area of 100 square meters, more or less, was given to Isagani P. Candelaria,
while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square meters, more
or less, was given to defendants. A copy of said Partition Agreement is hereto
attached as Annex "A";
xxx xxx xxx
5. That on May 30, 1995, Isagani P. Candelaria sold his share to the herein
plaintiffs, including the improvements thereon, in the sum of P100,000.00, under
a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
7. That sometime in May 21, 1996, defendants started construction works in the
area and intruded into the lot owned by the plaintiffs causing the latter to protest
and report the matter to the barangay authorities;
8. That on the same day, the parties were summoned to appear before the
Barangay Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the construction works,
and in a subsequent conference on June 7, 1996, they agreed to defer the
matter pending the result of a survey to be conducted by a government
surveyor;
xxx xxx xxx
11. That the following day, September 5, 1996, Geodetic Engineer Florentina C.
Valencia conducted a survey of the aforesaid property and placed the concrete
monuments thereon in the presence of plaintiffs and defendants;
12. That on November 12, 1996, a verification survey report was submitted by
Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia together with the survey verification
plan xxx;
13. That despite defendants’ knowledge of the property boundary, and despite
repeated serious objections from plaintiffs, defendants proceeded to construct a
seven-door bungalow-type semi-concrete building, occupying at least 10.18
square meters and another 10.43 square meters for the right of way, thus
encroaching upon at least 20.61 square meters of plaintiffs’ lot, and further
demolishing plaintiff’s wall.
xxx xxx xxx
20. That despite repeated and continuous demands made by plaintiffs upon
defendants, both oral and written, the last being on March 20, 1997, defendants
in manifest bad faith, wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and oppressive
manner and in utter disregard of the property rights of plaintiffs, have failed and
refused, and still fail and refuse to vacate the same up to the present time x x
x.22
From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook
distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the
complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer.
The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible
entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second,
in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the
beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is
inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right
to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in
forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to
vacate the premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such
demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.23
Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property in the
concept of owner prior to petitioners’ intrusion on 21 May 1996. When
petitioners encroached upon respondents’ lot and started construction works
thereon the latter was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite various
demands by respondents to vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so.
Clearly, petitioners’ entry into the said property was illegal from the beginning,
precluding an action for unlawful detainer.
On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must
allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of
that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth.24 It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly
employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up
showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.25
The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To
constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision,
the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary
that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of
going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.26 In the case at bar, petitioners’ encroachment into respondents’
property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with their refusal to
vacate the premises despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless
of respondents’ serious objections, indelibly connotes "force" within the meaning
of the law.
Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on
respondents’ property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed
more than one (1) year after the occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The
contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff
to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from
the date of actual entry on the land.27
Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997.
Petitioners’ actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place
on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period
mandated by law.
As a collateral issue, petitioners claim that they are at least entitled to the rights
of a builder in good faith on the premise that they are not the owners of the
property encroached upon.
This contention is not tenable. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that
the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
title.28 In the instant case, when the verification survey report came to
petitioners’ knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a
professional’s field confirmation of petitioners’ encroachment of respondents’
titled property. It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled
property adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith.
Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot despite
knowledge of respondents’ ownership put petitioners in bad faith.
Now, the second issue. Petitioners question the evidentiary weight of the
verification survey report. They point out that since the survey was a unilateral
act of respondents, done as it was without their consent, they should not be
bound by its findings.29
In raising the issue, petitioners are in effect asking this Court to reassess the
factual findings of the courts below, a task which is beyond this Court’s domain.
Factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court
at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed
by the lower courts.30We find no ample reason to depart from this rule, more so
in this case where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the factual findings of the
RTC and the MeTC.
Moreover, there is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed,31 i.e.,
government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of
regularity,32 as the courts below pointed out.33 In this case, the verification
survey was conducted by a government functionary.
Even prescinding from the presumption of regularity, what appears on record is
that the verification survey was conducted with the agreement of both parties
and in their presence. That was the finding made by the courts below and
affirmed by the appellate court without any wrinkle.34
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, this Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 130871 February 17, 2006
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., MEGATOP REALTY DEVELOPMENT,
INC., PEAKSUN ENTERPRISES AND EXPORT CORP., ARTURO DY, AND
ELENA DY JAO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEORGE H. TRONO, MA. TERESA TRONO, MA. VIRGINIA TRONO, JESSE
TRONO, MA. CRISTINA TRONO, PATRICIA TRONO, MA. DIVINA TRONO,
INOCENCIO TRONO, JR., CARMEN TRONO, AND ZENAIDA
TRONO,Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
May 20, 1997 and Resolution3 dated September 5, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263, "Ayala Land, Inc., Fil-estate Management Inc.,
Megatop Realty Development, Inc., Peaksun Enterprises and Export Corp.,
Arturo E. Dy, and Elena Dy Jao,petitioners, versus Hon. Florentino Alumbres,
George H. Trono, Ma. Teresa Trono, Edgardo Trono, Ma. Virginia Trono, Jesse
Trono, Ma. Cristina Trono, Inocencio Trono, Jr., Carmen Trono, and Zenaida
Trono, respondents."
The petition alleges that on November 9, 1994, George, Ma. Teresa, Edgardo,
Ma. Virginia, Jesse, Ma. Cristina, Inocencio, Jr., Carmen, and Zenaida, all
surnamed Trono, herein respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
255, Las Piñas City, an application for registration4 of a parcel of land, docketed
as LRC Case No. M-228. The land is located at Bo. Almanza, Las Piñas City,
Metro Manila consisting of 245,536 square meters.
Mr. Salvador L. Oriel, Chief of the Docket Division, Land Registration Authority
(LRA), issued a Notice of Initial Hearing,5 stating, among others, that:
NOTE: This lot is covered portion of Lot 2271 that which is overlapped by Lot
10, Psu-80886 Lot 2276, that which is overlapped by Lot 2, Psu-56007 which is
also Lot 6, Psu-80886; Lot 2270, portion of that which is overlapped by Lot 7,
Psu-56007 and the whole Lot 8, Psu-56007.
On August 11, 1995, the above-named petitioners filed their opposition to LRC
Case No. M-228 alleging that as per Survey Plan Psu-31086, respondents’
property partly overlaps their lot. As early as April 28, 1989, this lot was
registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9182 of
the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Earlier, or on July 25, 1995, Ayala Land, Inc. (Ayala Land) also filed an
opposition to respondents’ application for registration anchored on the ground
that the land applied for overlaps the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-
5331, T-41326, T-15644, T-41325, T-36979, T-36891, and T-36982 registered in
its name in the Registry of Deeds, same city.
During the hearing, respondents presented the July 24, 1995 Report of the LRA
and the Survey Report of the Land Management Services, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, showing that the land they sought to
register under Plan Psu-31086 overlaps the property already registered in the
names of petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners and Ayala Land filed their respective motions to dismiss
respondents’ application for registration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
They claimed that "since the property was previously Torrens registered in their
names, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
proceedings."
On March 4, 1996, the trial court issued a Resolution denying the motions to
dismiss, holding that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over all applications for original registration of title to lands.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
On May 20, 1997, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision granting the petition
for certiorari, holding that:
The incontrovertibility of a title prevents a land registration court from acquiring
jurisdiction over a land that is applied for registration if that land is already
decreed and registered under the Torrens System.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Order dated March 4,
1996 (Annex "A," Petition) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Instead, the
respondent Judge is directed to DISMISS without prejudice LRC M-228.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners then filed their motion for partial reconsideration praying that LRC
Case No. M-228 be dismissed with prejudice and to declare that the right of
respondents to file any action for reconveyance of the property has prescribed.
Meanwhile, on July 9, 1997, Ayala Land and respondents executed a
Compromise Agreement.6 On July 10, 1997, they filed with the Court of Appeals
a "Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement."
On July 25, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amendatory Decision,
holding that in view of the Compromise Agreement, the case as between Ayala
Land and respondents has become moot and academic.
In a Resolution dated September 5, 1997, the Appellate Court denied
petitioners’ motion for partial reconsideration.
Petitioners then filed the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the
Court of Appeals the following errors:
IN REFUSING TO DECLARE THE DISMISSAL OF LRC M-228 TO BE WITH
PREJUDICE AND THAT ANY ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE TO HAVE
LONG AGO PRESCRIBED, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE ISSUE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT –
I.
HAVING ALREADY FOUND THAT THE LAND WAS TITLED, THE COURT OF
APPEALS’ REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE WITH
PREJUDICE CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINES THAT A) DECREES OF
REGISTRATION ARE IN REM, B) TITLED LANDS CANNOT BE DECREED
AGAIN AND C) THERE CAN BE NO COLLATERAL ATTACK ON TITLES.
II.
HAVING FOUND THAT THE DECREES FROM WHICH PETITIONERS’ TITLE
IS DERIVED, WERE ISSUED IN 1966, THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REFUSAL
TO DECLARE AS ALREADY PRESCRIBED, ANY DIRECT ATTACK OR
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE CONTRAVENES SECTION 32 OF PD 1529
AND THE DOCTRINES IN CARO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND SALVATIERRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
Petitioners contend that the dismissal of a subsequent application for original
registration of title already covered by a Torrens title should be with
prejudice; that an action for annulment of title or reconveyance of the property
involved has prescribed; and that respondents’ application for registration (LRC
Case No. M-228) is a collateral attack against petitioners’ land titles.
In their comment, respondents claim that they were misled by their lawyers and
that what they should have filed was a complaint for nullification of titles instead
of an application for registration of land.
The petition is impressed with merit.1avvphil.net
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the trial court has
jurisdiction over respondents’ application for registration of a parcel of land.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) 15297 partly provides:
Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. – Judicial
proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in
rem, and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens System.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. x x
x
Pursuant to the above provisions, the Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of
First Instance) has the authority to act, not only on applications for original
registration of title to land, but also on all petitions filed after the original
registration of title. Thus, it has the authority and power to hear and determine
all questions arising from such applications or petitions.8
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 255, Las Piñas City has no jurisdiction over LRC Case No. M-228 on the
ground that the land subject of respondents’ application for registration was
already registered in the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Significantly, even respondents themselves admit in their comment on the
instant petition that what they should have filed was a complaint for nullity of
petitioners’ titles.
Likewise, Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Underscoring ours)
Respondents’ application for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a
Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against petitioners’ title not permitted
under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the validity of title, i.e.,
whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for the purpose.9 Hence, whether or not respondents have
the right to claim title over the property in question is beyond the province of the
instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. It has been
invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to
land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered,
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility of losing his
land.10
In Ramos v. Rodriguez,11 we held:
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged
that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to
substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the
Torrens System, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in
an earlier case (Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil.
791), "(t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same
land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration." The
application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the
circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is
not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (underscoring ours)
Corollarily, Section 32 of the same law states:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. – The
decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of
title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent
purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other person responsible for the
fraud. (underscoring ours)
A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not
only on the questions actually contested and determined, but also upon all
matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings.12
As per records of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City, TCT No. T-
918213 was registered in petitioners’ name as early as April 28, 1989, or five
(5) years before the filing of respondents’ application for registration. Thus,
it is too late for them (respondents) to question petitioners’ titles considering that
the Certificates of Title issued to the latter have become incontrovertible after
the lapse of one year from the decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents’ application for registration of land in LRC Case No. M-
228 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City is
ordered DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case
No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended
application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter
alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years;
and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal
or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an
opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the
lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as
against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General,
and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested
her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no
objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor
manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for
herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in
question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels
of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447
containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446
containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to
herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the
improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name
in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is
subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be
annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words
in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court,
petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s
decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since
respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple
or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their
registration under … (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular,
petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length
of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her application for
registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by
positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the
question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status
of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large
tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and
underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands"
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State – the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying
or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government
and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already
alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public
domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said
doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and
underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a registerable
title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous
and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on
to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of
the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land
and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however,
winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the
disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was
established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted
in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the
property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has
been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this
reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that
declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their
conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act
from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous
possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For,
unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision
dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for
original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional
Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158919. August 9, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAVITE COLLEGE OF
FISHERIES, Petitioners,
vs.
MAXIMA LENSICO, RUFINA LENSICO, ROGELIO LENSICO and VICTOR
LENSICO, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In denying this Petition, the Court relies on a well-established doctrine. Thus,
subject to some exceptions that do not apply here, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court cannot be disturbed, modified
or reversed by this Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the June 30, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 46045. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, except for the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit which
are hereby DELETED, the appealed decision is otherwise AFFIRMED."3
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
"x x x. This land was originally a part of the Friar Land known as Lot No. 2833,
Fls-644 of the Naic Estate, containing an area of 16,459 square meters, and
was registered on February 4, 1913 under Act No. 496 and issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 181. Its then occupant of 34 years, the now deceased
Melanio Lensico, on September 8, 1964 filed an Application to Purchase Friar
Lands. An investigation was conducted by Land Investigator Dominador Bayot
who found the information contained in the application to be true, and
recommended that the lot be sold at private sale without auction in favor of
Melanio Lensico, and gave its appraised value. After drawing three (3) favorable
endorsements, said recommendation was approved. Whereupon Sales Contract
No. V-270 was executed between the Bureau of Lands as the vendor and
Melanio Lensico married to Donata Mojica as the vendees who paid the
purchase price in full. This sale was acknowledged on August 8, 1968 by the
Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
with Deed No. V-1-0193. Eventually, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-78832
was issued on September 8, 1975 in the names of Melanio Lensico and Donata
Mojica.
"Out of the 16,459 square meters total area of the property, Cavite College
occupies a portion of some 11,650. Their squabble began after the death of the
registered owners, their children and heirs namely the litigants Maxima, Rufina,
Rogelio and Victor, surnamed Lensico, required the payment of rentals for the
occupancy of the area. Their demands having been ignored, the Lensicos
required Cavite College compensation for occupancy and to either vacate or buy
the premises. The Republic of the Philippines on the other hand made moves to
cancel the issued Transfer Certificate of Title. Their disagreements resulted in
the filing of Civil Case No. NC-934 and Civil Case No. NC-963.
"Civil Case No. NC-934 is a suit styled to be for Recovery of Possession of
Property or Payment of Price of Landfiled by the Lensicos against Cavite
College. They alleged that they are the legitimate children of the registered
owners; that it was only after the death of their parents when they learned that
Cavite College has been occupying a portion of the lot sans payment of rentals;
that apart from verbal demands they also sent three (3) letters to Cavite College
but to no avail.
"Cavite College admitted the existence of TCT T-78332 but insisted that by its
actual occupation since 1961 and the immense improvements it had introduced,
it has a better and superior right to the property. Cavite College traced its right of
possession on the following occurrences: that Congress on June 18, 1960
enacted Republic Act [2]661 which was AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SCHOOL OF FISHERIES IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NAIC, PROVINCE OF CAVITE; that pursuant to this, the Naic Municipal Council
on August 6, 1961 passed a resolution designated as KAPASIYAHANG
IPINAGKAKALOOB SA CAVITE SCHOOL OF FISHERIES ANG MGA SANGAB
(FORESHORE LAND) SIMULA SA NGAYON MGA BAGONG KARSADA
(BOUNDARY) HANGGANG SA NAYON NG BUCANA, PARA MAGAMIT SA
KANILANG PAGTUTURO. That after this, Cavite College started to construct its
school buildings without objection from the Lensicos or their parents. It averred
that the property in question was mostly an area reclaimed from the sea by the
construction of rock groins. Although Cavite College admitted that the property
was covered by a title, it argued that its issuance to the registered owners is null
and void because the lot is actually a part of the foreshore land which is a public
domain. The sales application of the registered owners was only on 1964
whereas Cavite College had been occupying the area since 1961. And that the
Information Sheet for the sales application did not disclose the true
improvements on the property because despite the buildings that Cavite College
have constructed thereon and which occupies the greater area, what was
reflected as improvements are only the following: ‘one house of strong
materials, 1 smallnipa hut, 6 coconut trees, and 1 tamarind tree,
valued P500.00’ Cavite College stressed that with its continued possession and
introduction of valuable improvements thereon, it should be given a superior
right to the property because had it not been for the rock groins it constructed,
then the whole property which faces Manila Bay would have been lost to the
sea.
"Civil Case No. NC-963, on the other hand, is a suit for Annulment of Title and
Reversion of Land to the State filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
the Lensicos and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite. Through this
action, the Republic of the Philippines sought the cancellation of TCT No. T-
78832 which it claims to be null and void, and that the Lensicos have no vested
rights whatsoever on the property which is part of the foreshore land and could
not be titled as private property. According to the Republic of the Philippines, the
particulars given by Melanio Lensico in the Application to Purchase Friar Lands
and the Information Sheet were false, and so also was the recommendation
submitted by Land Investigator Dominador Bayot in the Information Sheet
because it did not declare as one of the improvements in the property the school
buildings and other developments introduced by Cavite College. That were it not
for these false informations, then there would have been no sale between the
Bureau of Lands and Melanio Lensico. In trying to invalidate the issuance of the
TCT, it was argued by the Republic of the Philippines that the Bureau of Lands
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had no jurisdiction or
authority to award or sell the said property because this has already been
designated by Republic Act 2661 on June 18, 1960 as a site for the
establishment of the school of Cavite College.
"The Lensicos countered that it was not true that the Cavite College had erected
a building on the property as early as 1961 because in 1964 there was as yet no
building in the area. To controvert further, they stated that when Congress
approved Republic Act 2661 and the Naic Municipal Council passed its
Resolution on August 5, 1961 designating the foreshore land as the school site,
the exact location was not yet determined and it was only later when it was
discovered that the Cavite College already encroached on their property that the
subject area was imputed. It was also denied that the property was part of the
sea because this had long been dry land and part of the Naic Estate known as
Lot No. 2833, Fls-644 and among its boundaries are Lot Nos. 733 and 2834.
"These two cases were consolidated, and on July 5, 1993, the court a
quo rendered its judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, this Court passes judgment ordering the defendant in Civil
Case No. NC-934 to pay plaintiffs the price of P25.00 per square meter of the
portion of Lot 2833 with an area of 11,650 square meters, or, to pay reasonable
rent at the rate of P2,000.00 per month from the time defendant occupied said
premises until December 1999, unless the plaintiffs agreed for an extended
period of 30 years thereafter. Should the defendant fail to comply to the
foregoing terms and conditions, it shall vacate the said area occupied within
three (3) months from finality of this Decision, and, to pay the rents thereof at
the reasonable rate of P2,000.00 per month from July 1961. Since there
appears no evidence regarding attorney’s fees, the defendant is hereby Ordered
to pay plaintiffs reasonable sum of attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 plus costs of
suit.’"4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the subject lot was
formerly a friar land and not a part of the public domain. The CA added that the
evidence of respondents was not sufficiently overcome by that presented by
petitioners to establish the claim that the property was foreshore or beach
land.5 It further said that the public nature of the land was dispelled by its
registration since February 4, 1913 under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
181.6
The court a quo also debunked petitioners’ claim that Melanio Lensico’s Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) T-78832 had been fraudulently obtained. According to
the CA, the TCT was granted upon full compliance with the substantive and
procedural requirements for its acquisition, such as the appraisal and
investigation by the Bureau of Lands (BL), as well as several endorsements
from BL officers. The appellate court further reasoned that respondents had an
indefeasible and conclusive title to the property, by virtue of which the Municipal
Council of Naic had no authority to dispose of any part of the land.7
Finally, while affirming the trial court’s Order for petitioners either to purchase
the property or to pay corresponding rentals, the CA nonetheless set aside the
award for attorney’s fees for lack of basis.8
Hence, this Petition.9
The Issue
Petitioners raise this sole issue for our consideration:
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on
the ground that the subject property is not part of foreshore land and that
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not commit fraud in securing a
certificate of title over the subject property."10
Otherwise stated, the issue is whether respondents’ predecessor was the lawful
owner of the parcel of land occupied by petitioner school.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Ownership of the Subject Premises
Petitioners argue that respondents did not have a valid title to the property,
because TCT T-78832 was null and void. They contend that Lot 2833, the area
covered by the title, is foreshore and beach land and, thus, a piece of public
property.11 Consequently, it may not be alienated or registered, notwithstanding
the alleged possession of it by Melanio Lensico for a substantial length of
time.12 They present the Information Sheet he prepared and two Survey Plans,
all describing the property as beach land. That it was mostly so was allegedly
revealed, too, by the trial court’s ocular inspection.13
To further bolster their position, petitioners allege that it was previously not in
existence, because it did not appear in the June 6, 1911 map of the Naic Friar
Estate, although it did in the March 25, 1930 survey, which described it as beach
land. They also submit pictures taken by a geodetic engineer of the Bureau of
Lands during the relocation survey, illustrating that two corners of the lot
adjoined the Manila Bay.14 Thus, they conclude that the property is foreshore
land.
Foreshore or Friar Lands
On the basis of all these arguments, petitioners ask this Court to set aside the
trial and the appellate courts’ factual finding that the subject property was not
foreshore land.
It must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in petitions to
review decisions of the Court of Appeals filed before this Court.15 The factual
findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive. They
cannot be reviewed by this Court, save only in the following circumstances,
which we find absent in the instant case: (1) when the factual conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case in making its findings,
which are further contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the conclusions do not cite the specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the CA’s
finding’s of fact, supposedly premised on the absence of evidence, is
contradicted by the evidence on record.16
Petitioners have failed to establish that the present case falls under any of the
exceptions enumerated above. A perusal of the facts and evidence presented
does not convince this Court to deviate from the findings of fact of the courts a
quo. The lower courts properly appreciated the evidence submitted by both
parties as regards the nature of the property. These courts have determined that
the lot was part of the friar lands that had been titled since 1913; it was not
foreshore land.
Foreshore land has been defined as that which lies between the high and the
low water marks, and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide.17 In other words, it is that strip of land between high and low water, the
land left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides.18
In the present case, although corners 3 and 4 of Lot 2833 have been shown to
adjoin19 the sea, they -- let alone the entire Lot 2833 -- have not been proven to
be covered by water during high tide. Hence, the property cannot be considered
foreshore land.
Fraud in Title Application
Petitioners submit that because TCT No. T-78832 was fraudulently acquired, the
principle of indefeasibility of title does not attach to it. They allege that Melanio
Lensico was merely a dummy. Supposedly because he was illiterate, someone
else completed the application without verifying from the former the correctness
of the entries made.20 In that application, the latter allegedly misrepresented
Lensico as the actual occupant of the property at the time. Petitioners, as
testified to by their witnesses as well as Rogelio Lensico, had purportedly
constructed several buildings in the area before the application was filed.21 The
alleged misrepresentation is cited as a sufficient ground to nullify the TCT.22
To illustrate an alleged pattern of fraud, petitioners maintain that the application
was granted without actual investigation, which no government employee could
have conducted on Saturday and Sunday, the days between September 18,
1964, when the application was submitted; and September 21, 1964, when the
Information Sheet, stating that an investigation had been conducted, was
completed. They further contend that the elder Lensico’s description of the lot
and the improvements on it were blindly and wholly copied in the Information
Sheet.23
Finally, Melanio Lensico purportedly failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice (to the municipal president) and publication, as laid down
in Sections 9 and 11 of Act 1120, which governs the disposition of friar
lands.24 Petitioners point out that neither the school nor the elders in the area
were aware of the application.
Whether fraud attended the application for the title is a factual question that
revolves purely upon a proper appreciation of the evidence. For the same
reasons stated previously, the findings of the lower courts that petitioners failed
to adduce evidence sufficient to establish that fraud had attended the issuance
of the title to Lensico cannot be overturned.
To prove the existence of fraud, petitioners rely on mere allegations unsupported
by sufficient evidence. There is no showing that, although illiterate, Lensico was
not informed of the contents of the document he was privy to. Neither is there
any evidence to show the absence of an actual investigation of the property.
Petitioners’ allegation that government employees do not work on weekends,
when pitted against the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed,25 falls short of the required preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners maintain that Lensico misrepresented himself as the actual occupant
of the property at the time of his application to purchase the land. They insist
that respondents could not have been occupying it, because Petitioner Cavite
College of Fisheries had already constructed buildings on 11,650 square meters
of it, supposedly since 1961.
Assuming arguendo that the contention of petitioners is true, the existence of
those buildings at the time does not preclude the fact that Lensico could have
indeed been the actual occupant of Lot 2833 -- at least, of 4,809 square meters
of it. Hence, their mere assertion that they constructed buildings on a portion of
the lot does not preclude the possibility that someone else could have occupied
the other portions of it, and that the latter had been in possession of the entire
property prior to their entry. It is worth pointing out that the College was granted
the foreshore land to be used in teaching.26 However, it ended up occupying
the property, which was not foreshore but titled land, specifically a portion of Lot
2833.
All told, we find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the two
lower courts. Petitioners have failed to prove that, in his application to purchase
Lot 2833, Melanio Lensico willfully and knowingly made any false statement that
would sufficiently cause the cancellation of the application and the forfeiture (in
favor of the government) of all amounts paid on the land. The validity of TCT T-
78322, as well as its issuance to respondents’ predecessor, stands.
The predecessor of respondents paid the government for the purchase of the
entire 16,459 square meters comprising Lot 2833. Therefore, it would be just
and correct that they be compensated for Petitioner Cavite College of Fisheries’
use of the portion that belongs to the Lensicos.
Basis for the Purchase Price
Petitioners theorize that the purchase price of the land should be based on its
value at the time it was taken, considering that the occupied portion consists
mainly of areas reclaimed through the efforts and resources of the government.
As the College is a public entity that promotes public welfare, it avers that its
interests prevail over respondents’ private interests.27
In expropriation proceedings, the value of the land and its character at the time it
was taken by the government are the criteria for determining just
compensation.28 As noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico,29 there are instances when,
as in the present case, the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to
the expropriation suit, in which situation just compensation shall be determined
as of the time of taking. Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos30 held that
the price of the land when it was taken, not its value after the passage of time,
represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. Hence, the value of
the property upon its actual taking, subject of course to interest accruing from
that time, should be the basis of the purchase price if Petitioner Cavite College
of Fisheries opts to buy the property.
In the present case, the trial court has already determined that the just
compensation for the taking of the subject portion of respondents’ land is the
selling price of P25 per square meter or rent of P2,000 per month. The justness
of this determination, which was affirmed by the CA, is not seriously assailed by
petitioners. Again, we find no compelling reason to disturb this finding, as it is
factual in nature.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168222 April 18, 2006
SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA RUMARATE;
deceased TEODULO RUMARATE is represented herein by his
Heirs/Substitutes, namely, ANASTACIA RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE,
MARINA RUMARATE, ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO RUMARATE,
FIDEL RUMARATE, MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE,
CLEMENCIA RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA
RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs.
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR HERNANDEZ,
BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA
HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO, RODRIGOHERNANDEZ, BERNARDO
HERNANDEZ, LOURDES HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO SALVATIERRA,
ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053, which reversed and set aside the March 31,
1997 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in
Civil Case No. C-964, declaring petitioners as owners of Lot No. 379 with an
area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio Catimo,3 Municipality of
Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo
Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of
real property and/or quieting of title with damages against respondent heirs of
the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.4 Teodulo averred that
Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather, Santiago
Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate family in
San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate family
transferred residence to avail of the land distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan,
Quezon. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five
hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon in 1929, Santiago
orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and entrusted to him a
copy of a Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April 21,
1925 recognizing his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379.5 Since Teodulo was
only 14 years old then, his father helped him cultivate the land.6 Their family
thereafter cleared the land, built a house7 and planted coconut trees, corn,
palay and vegetables thereon.8 In 1960, Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-
claim)"9 ratifying the transfer of his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo. Between
1960 and 1970, three conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of
coconut trees growing therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo testified in
1992, the remaining portions of the land was almost entirely cultivated and
planted with coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, mangoes and vegetables.10 From
1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners
and declared the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961.11
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta,
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No.
379. He did not immediately file a case against respondents because he was
advised to just remain on the land and pay the corresponding taxes thereon.12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, 1964, Santiago
sold the questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta, for P9,000.00.13 Respondents alleged that on April 21, 1925, the
CFI of Tayabas rendered a Decision written in Spanish, declaring Lot No. 379 as
a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant thereof in Cadastral
Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was issued to Santiago because he failed
to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to
re-open Cadastral Proceeding No. 12, alleging that though no title was issued in
the name of Santiago, the same decision is, nevertheless, proof that Santiago
was in possession of Lot No. 379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having
succeeded in the rights of Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral
Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened and that the corresponding title over Lot No.
379 be issued in their name. On September 13, 1965, the CFI of Tayabas
rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose
name Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1184414 was issued on the same
date.15 Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land through the help
of a certain Fredo16 who was instituted as caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed
Cipriano Hernandez that he will no longer stay on the land because there are
people instructing him to discontinue tilling the same.17
After the death of the spouses,18 respondents executed a deed of partition over
the subject lot and were issued TCT No. T- 237330 on June 28, 1988 in lieu of
OCT No. O-11844.19
Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he
accompanied his father in inspecting the lot which was then planted with
coconut trees.20 Thereafter, he visited the land twice, once in 1966 and the
other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he testified, his family declared the lot
for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon.21 Joaquin explained that after the
death of his father in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only when
the complaint was filed against them when he learned that petitioners are in
actual possession of the property.22 He added that his siblings had planned to
convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it off for fear
of the rampant operations then of the New People’s Army between the years
1965-1970.23 1avvphil.net
On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It
held that since the latter possessed the land in the concept of an owner since
1929, they became the owners thereof by acquisitive prescription after the lapse
of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold
the lot to respondents’ parents in 1964, the former no longer had the right over
the property and therefore transmitted no title to said respondents. The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the Cadastral Survey of
Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557), situated
in Brgy. Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently, deceitfully and
mistakenly registered in the names of the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta;
2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta have no better rights than their parents/predecessors-in-interest,
they having stepped only on (sic) their shoes;
3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and substitute plaintiffs-
[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate are the true, real and legal owners/or
the owners in fee simple absolute of the above described parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-described parcel of land to
plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the
deceased Teodulo Rumarate;
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province in Lucena City to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-237330 and to issue in lieu thereof a new
certificate of title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and the substitute
plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff Teodulo Rumarate, in accordance with
law and settled jurisprudence; and
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.24
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, 2005,
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that Teodulo did not
acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by donation or acquisitive prescription; that
Teodulo’s bare allegation that Santiago orally bequeathed to him the litigated lot
is insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and that even assuming that
the property was truly donated by Santiago to Teodulo in 1929, or in the 1960
Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not complying with the formalities of a valid
donation which require the donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to
be embodied in a public instrument. Both requirements, however, are absent in
this case because in 1929, the alleged donation was not reduced to writing while
the purported 1960 donation was never accepted in a public document by
Teodulo. The appellate court thus surmised that since it was not established that
Santiago donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also failed to
prove that he possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the concept of an
owner, a vital requisite before one may acquire title by acquisitive prescription.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals ruled that even assuming further that
Teodulo had a right over the property, his cause of action is now barred by
laches because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding knowledge as
early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. The decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25
Hence, the instant appeal.
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To
petitioners who possessed and cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the present,
but do not have a certificate of title over the property, or to respondents who
have a certificate of title but are not in possession of the controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the parties so that the complainant and those claiming under him may
be forever free from any danger of hostile claim.26 Under Article 47627 of the
Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but
is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast
on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein. Article 477 of
the same Code states that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the suit.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.28
In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real property refers to that
upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the
extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule,
assert a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years vested him and his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable
at the time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of
Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,
effective June 22, 195730 which provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Property Registration Decree),
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be
part of the public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such conversion already effected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession became complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of
Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulo’s) possession of the land since
1929 was open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner.
It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that in the matter of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are given great weight and
highest degree of respect by the appellate court considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed
and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo
cultivated the controverted land, built his home, and raised his 11 children
thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but failed to
pursue the same.33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the youngest being 28
years old,34 continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never
challenged Teodulo’s possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the
produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act of
ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer
interested in asserting any right over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a
quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as owner
thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960
quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the
formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his family’s long
years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of their possession
thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of land
in the name of the successors-in-interest of the donee notwithstanding the
invalidity of the donation inasmuch as said donee possessed the property in the
concept of an owner. Thus –
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves
an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as
required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of
the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said
donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength
thereof the donee has taken possession of the property adversely and in the
concept of owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in
the concept of an owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with Sec. 48
(b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private
property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell the same to
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter
and herein respondents did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the
titles issued in their name are void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago acquired title over
Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which
merely recognized his rights over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of
possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to their (respondents)
predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. On
the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an action for, and successfully
obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that
Santiago’s alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature
contemplated by the Public Land Act which requires more than constructive
possession and casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court:36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation."
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the wordoccupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect
of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of
the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice
Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
"x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos
vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Rosales vs. Director of
Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the application of the
doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is ‘one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy
with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant.’ While,
therefore, ‘possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession’, possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot
justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is
not a mere fiction x x x."
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:
"x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and
visiting it every once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of
possession."
In the instant case, Santiago’s short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot No.
379 could not vest him title. While he tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to
possess and cultivate the same since 1928. He abandoned the property and
allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession of Lot
No. 379 could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre
quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to another than he himself
has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein
respondents did not acquire any right over the questioned lot and the title issued
in their names are void, because of the legal truism that the spring cannot rise
higher than the source.37
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be
considered as purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry.38 The Court notes that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379 at the
time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and maintain
an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted the spouses to
further inquire who was actually tilling the land. Had they done so, they would
have found that Teodulo and his family are the ones possessing and cultivating
the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or
purchasers in good faith and for value or those who buy the property and pay a
full and fair price for the same39 because they merely inherited Lot No. 379
from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by virtue of the April
21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and not on account of his alleged 30-
year possession thereof, we will still arrive at the same conclusion. This is so
because the declaration of this Court that petitioners are the rightful owners of
the controverted lot is based on Teodulo’s own possession and occupation of
said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, regardless of the
manner by which Santiago acquired ownership over same lot.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title
is imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in
possession of the disputed property. A person in actual possession of a piece of
land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his
undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his title.40 Considering that petitioners herein
continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present, their right to
institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred by the statute of
limitations.
Neither could petitioners’ action be barred by laches because they continuously
enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested the fruits thereof up to the
present to the exclusion of and without any interference from respondents. They
cannot therefore be said to have slept on their rights as they in fact exercised
the same by continuously possessing Lot No. 379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of laches.
Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can properly address the issue of
laches based on petitioners’ allegation in the complaint that "[n]either spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor [herein respondents] had taken
steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel of land from the date of
their registration of title in November, 1965 up to the present."41 Such averment
is sufficient to impute abandonment of right on the part of respondents. At any
rate, laches need not be specifically pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may
consider it in determining the rights of the parties.42
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier constitutes
laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law that
no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule
that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches.43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows the
following number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of action
without enforcing his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34
years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19
years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years.44
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the
other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting one’s rights, despite having
had knowledge or notice of the other party’s conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of a
party that the person against whom laches is imputed would assert the right;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the event the suit is
allowed to prosper.45
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners’ continuous possession
and occupation of Lot No. 379 should have prompted the respondents to file an
action against petitioners, but they chose not to. Respondents cannot deny
knowledge of said possession by petitioners as they even asserted in their
Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant they (respondents) instituted in
the lot. From 1970 up to the filing of petitioners’ complaint in 1992, or after 22
years, respondents never bothered to assert any right over Lot No. 379.
Respondent Joaquin Hernandez testified that he and his siblings had a plan to
convert the land into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it off for fear of
the rampant operations of the New People’s Army between the years 1965-
1970. However, even after said years, respondents took no step to implement
their plan. Worse, among the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta who are all living in the Philippines,46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited the
land and only thrice, i.e., once in each years of 1964, 1966 and 1970.
Thereafter, not one of them paid visit to Lot No. 379, up to the time Joaquin
Hernandez testified in 1996,47 despite the fact that two of them are living only in
Calauag, Quezon; one in Agdangan, Quezon;48 and two in Lucena
City.49 Neither did they send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking
their right over the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta as well respondents, have neglected Lot No. 379.
Were it not for this action instituted by petitioners in 1992, their conflicting claims
over the property could not have been settled. It goes without saying that to lose
a property that has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77
years will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to petitioners,
especially so if the same ancestral land will be lost under most unfair
circumstances in favor of respondents who appear to have no real interest in
cultivating the same.
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a
positive and categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners
would rule out the application of laches. It means taking the offensive by
instituting legal means to wrest possession of the property which, however, is
absent in this case. Respondents’ payment of taxes alone, without possession
could hardly be construed as an exercise of ownership. What stands out is their
overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and
to enjoy the fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of
petitioners.
One last point. Notwithstanding this Court’s declaration that Lot No. 379 should
be awarded in favor of petitioners, their title over the same is imperfect and is
still subject to the filing of the proper application for confirmation of title under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, where the State and other oppositors may
be given the chance to be heard. It was therefore premature for the trial court to
direct the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the
name of petitioners.
Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is enough to
defeat the certificate of title issued to respondents.50
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. GR. CV No. 57053, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The March 31, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon,
Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No. 379 in favor petitioners
and ordering the cancellation of respondents’ Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
237330, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATIONdeleting the trial court’s order
directing the Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the
name of petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147081 December 9, 2005
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO GARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
518011 dated November 20, 2000 which dismissed the petition of Planters
Development Bank (PDB) and affirmed in toto the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Appeal Board (DARAB Appeal Board)
dated February 23, 1999,2 as well as the CA’s resolution dated February 15,
2001 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
This case involves a parcel of land located in Sto. Cristo, San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija with an area of 35,916 square meters. Respondent alleged that he had
been an agricultural lessee on said parcel of land since 1936. This land was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1847, with the spouses Jose
Cruz and Braulia Ortiz as the registered owners.
On November 16, 1976, the spouses sold the land to their grandson, Lorenzo
Bautista. TCT No. NT-147561 was then issued in his name. Bautista mortgaged
the land in favor of PDB to secure a loan on March 2, 1977. For failure to pay
the loan, PDB foreclosed on the mortgage and bought the property in a public
auction.3 The certificate of sale and the affidavit of consolidation of ownership
were registered on July 11, 1979 and September 25, 1984 respectively.4 On the
latter date, PDB was also issued TCT No. NT-185020. Thereafter, PDB sold the
land to spouses Marciano Ramirez and Erlinda Camacho on July 30, 1986.5
Respondent Francisco Garcia (Garcia) filed a petition for redemption before the
DARAB-Region III in Cabanatuan City on January 17, 1994.6 The petition was
originally against PDB only but in Garcia’s amended petition, he impleaded the
spouses Marciano Ramirez and Erlinda Camacho as additional respondents. He
alleged that as an agricultural lessee, he was a holder of Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) No. 0-089665 issued on May 26, 1982. He prayed that he be
allowed to redeem the land.
The Provincial Adjudicator of DARAB-Cabanatuan City dismissed the petition.
On appeal, however, the decision was reversed and set aside by the DARAB
Appeal Board in Quezon City:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 28,
1995 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered as follows:
1. Affirming the coverage of the land in question under Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27;
Declaring the sale and transfer of the subject property under OLT coverage to
respondent-appellee Bank as null and void ab initio for lack of legal and factual
basis;
2. Directing the respondent-appellee Bank to turn-over the questioned
landholding to petitioner-appellant;
3. Directing the MARO of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija to facilitate the generation of
the necessary Emancipation Patent (E.P.) pursuant to the pertinent laws and
guidelines.7
PDB elevated the case to the CA which affirmed in toto the decision of the
DARAB Appeal Board. Hence this petition.
The main issues before us are as follows:
1) whether or not Garcia was an agricultural lessee of the predecessors of PDB
under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27);
2) whether or not the transfer of the subject land to PDB was valid and
3) whether Garcia can redeem the land under Section 12 of Republic Act No.
3844 (RA 3844), as amended by RA 6389.
The land subject of this case is covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
pursuant to PD 278 which laid down a system for the purchase by small farmers
of the lands they tilled. Landowners of agricultural lands which were devoted
primarily to rice and corn and exceeded the minimum retention area were
compelled to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions
through the intercession of the government. A qualified tenant farmer was then
issued a CLT.9
On the first issue, PDB insists that the existence of a tenancy relationship
between Garcia and Braulia Ortiz Cruz was never raised as an issue by Garcia
because the latter only dwelt on his right of redemption.10 However, in resolving
the issue of the right of redemption, the question of tenancy must first be
resolved. The existence or non-existence of a tenancy relationship was a
question of fact resolved by the DARAB-Cabanatuan City against Garcia but
decided in his favor by the DARAB Appeal Board and the CA. The CA held that:
On the outset, it should be borne in mind that whether the respondent was
indeed a tenant or laborer is a question of fact. In this regard, jurisprudence
has provided the following requisites for tenancy relationship: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these
must concur to establish the juridical relationship of tenancy.
There is no better and eloquent proof of the existence of the tenancy
relationship between the respondent and Braulia Ortiz than the issuance in the
former’s favor of CLT No. 0-089665 over the subject parcel of land. Obviously,
the afore-enumerated requisites have been met; otherwise, the said CLT could
not have been issued.11 (Emphasis supplied)
The decision of the DARAB Appeal Board, as affirmed in toto by the CA, in turn
had these findings of fact:
As gleaned from the records of the case, there is no denying the fact that
petitioner-appellant has farmed and cultivated the land in question since 1936
with the permission of Braulia Ortiz Cruz who was the registered owner of the
questioned property xxx
Sometime in December 1974, however, then landowner Braulia Ortiz Cruz
entered into a written leasehold contract entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan sa
Sakahan" (sic) (Annex C) evidencing petitioner’s status as "de jure"
tenant/agricultural lessee of the land in question.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, petitioner-
appellant was identified by the DAR Office concerned as a qualified farmer-
beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the
government, such that the latter was a recipient of Certificate of Land Transfer
No. 0-089665 dated May 26, 1982 covering the subject property.12
PDB, however, argues that there was nothing to show that the property covered
by the CLT was the same property subject of this case. The CA merely assumed
that these were the same.13
It is true that CLT No. 0-08966514 issued in the name of Garcia merely
mentions that it pertained to Lot No. 00147 located in Sto. Cristo, San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija. However, a document entitled Kasunduan sa Buwis ng
Sakahanwas executed by Braulia Ortiz Cruz and Francisco Garcia pertaining to
Lot No. 487-A, the same lot covered by TCT No. T-1874 registered in the name
of Braulia Ortiz and Jose R. Cruz which was transferred to Lorenzo Bautista and
then to PDB. This document evidenced the leasehold tenancy relationship
between Garcia and Ortiz Cruz,15 and carried the essential requisites of such
relationship:
1. Ortiz Cruz was the landowner and Garcia was the tenant;
2. the subject land was agricultural;
3. the parties consented to this agreement;
4. Garcia was obligated to cultivate the same by planting rice thereon;
5. the purpose was agricultural production and
6. there was sharing of harvests between the parties.16
In addition to the Kasunduan, there was also a certification from the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform-Region III17certifying that Garcia was the recipient of CLT No.
0-089665 and specifying Braulia Ortiz as landowner. Lastly, there was the
handwritten certification of the barangay captain of Sto. Cristo, San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija18 which specified, among others, that Braulia Ortiz was the
landowner of the land cultivated by Garcia.19
PDB contends that the affidavits of the previous owners (Ortiz Cruz and
Bautista) that the subject land was not tenanted, which affidavits were annotated
on the certificate of title, should be believed over the documents submitted by
Garcia. This contention is untenable. As we ruled in Nisnisan, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.: 20
While there are annotations in Gavino Nisnisan's certificate of title (Entry
No. 72086 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy under Justice Circular No. 31 and
Entry No. 117718 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan)
that the subject land is not tenanted, said annotations are not conclusive
proof of the real relationship between Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner
Policarpio Nisnisan and are not binding upon the court. As we have ruled
in Cuaño vs. Court of Appeals,
"We believe and so hold that such annotation cannot be regarded as conclusive
upon the courts of justice as to the legal nature and incidents of the relationship
between the landowner(s) in this case and private respondents. Firstly, the
annotation serves basically as notice to all persons of the existence of the
Certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo, but neither adds to the validity or
correctness of that certification nor converts a defective and invalid instrument
into a valid one as between the parties. Secondly, the certification issued by Mr.
Eugenio Bernardo of the MAR (Ministry of Agrarian Reform) is very much like
the certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and other officials
of the Ministry and later the Department of Agrarian Reform concerning the
existence of tenancy relationships in respect of agricultural lands from which
persons, who claim to be tenants, are sought to be ejected. It is well settled that
the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or
absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely
preliminary or provisional and not binding upon the courts.`"21 (Emphasis
supplied)
While it is true that certifications by officials of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), like the certification submitted by Garcia, are not necessarily
conclusive on the courts, all of the evidence on record, taken as a whole, can be
considered as ample proof that Garcia’s CLT referred to the land subject of this
case and that Garcia was the tenant or agricultural lessee of Braulia Ortiz Cruz
therein. As stated by the DARAB Appeal Board, "with respect to the adjudication
of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies, the degree of proof or evidence
necessary to prove one’s cause is only ‘substantial evidence’."22 Accordingly,
we will not disturb the factual finding of the CA and DARAB Appeal Board that
Garcia was the agricultural lessee of the subject land, considering that it was
supported by substantial evidence.
On the second issue, PDB argues that it was a mortgagee in good faith, hence it
acquired the subject land validly. This contention has merit.
Well-settled is the rule that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
Certificate of Title may rely on the face of the certificate. As a rule, they are not
required to go beyond what appears therein. Good faith is likewise
presumed.23 Garcia failed to show that PDB acquired the property in bad faith.
We thus hold that PDB was a mortgagee in good faith and acquired the subject
land validly.
However, Garcia, as tenant or agricultural lessee, enjoys certain legal rights
under RA 3844, otherwise known as the
"Agricultural Land Reform Code."24 Section 10 of this law provides that the
existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes
in ownership in case of sale or transfer of legal possession (as in lease):
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished By Expiration of
Period, etc. - The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor
by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In
case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.(Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is well-settled in jurisprudence. 25
Thus, when PDB became the absolute owner of the subject land, it was
subrogated to the rights and obligations of its predecessors, Jose Cruz, Braulia
Ortiz Cruz and Lorenzo Bautista as agricultural lessors. The tenancy relationship
was not affected by the transfer of the ownership of the landholding.26 The new
owner was bound to respect and maintain the tenant’s landholding because the
tenancy right attached to the land regardless of who its owner may be.27 The
purpose of the law is to strengthen the security of tenure of the tenants:
…in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order
to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the
purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against
unjustified dismissal from their holdings.28
We therefore conclude that it was error for the CA to declare the sale and
transfer of the subject property to the bank as null and void ab initio. The
transfer to PDB was valid but subject to the rights of Garcia as tenant. As we
ruled in the recent case of Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 29
…(W)e are unable to agree with the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals and
of DARAB that the sale of the land in question should be declared null and void.
There is no legal basis for such declaration. Lest it be forgotten, it is Carolina
Zacarias who is the owner of the subject land and both Emilio Peña and Delia
Razon Peña only succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto.
As an owner, Carolina has the right to dispose of the property without other
limitations than those established by law. This attribute of ownership is impliedly
recognized in Sections 10, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, where the law
allows the agricultural lessor to sell the landholding, with or without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee and at the same time recognizes the right
of preemption and redemption of the agricultural lessee. Thus, the existence of
tenancy rights of agricultural lessee cannot affect nor derogate from the
right of the agricultural lessor as owner to dispose of the property. The
only right of the agricultural lessee or his successor in interest is the right
of preemption and/or redemption.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Carolina became the absolute owner of
the subject landholding by virtue of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Affidavit
of Settlement executed by the other heirs of Alfonso Olympia and Spouses
Claro and Cristina Zacarias. As the owner, it is within her right to execute a deed
of sale of said landholding, without prejudice however to the tenancy rights and
the right of redemption of Delia Razon Peña. InManuel, we held that the tenancy
relationship is not affected or severed by the change of ownership. The new
owner is under the obligation to respect and maintain the tenant's
landholding. In turn, Delia Razon Peña, as the successor tenant, has the legal
right of redemption. This right of redemption is statutory in character. It attaches
to a particular landholding by operation of law. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, we are also unable to agree with the CA when it affirmed the
DARAB Appeal Board’s ruling "directing (PDB) to turn-over the questioned
landholding to (Garcia)."30 According to the CA, "once a CLT has been issued
to a tenant covering the property under the supervision of and in compliance
with (the) implementing rules and regulations of the DAR, he is thereby deemed
to be the owner of the agricultural land in question."31The DARAB Appeal
Board, on the other hand, reasoned:
Succinctly put, areas covered by OLT pursuant to P.D. 27 are beyond the
commerce of man. The Honorable Supreme Court has squarely ruled on this
issue by ruling in this wise:
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED
OWNER of the land in question.32
It is true that in past decisions of this Court, in particular Torres v.
Ventura33 (which was cited by the DARAB Appeal Board) and Quiban v.
Butalid34 (which was relied upon by the CA), we held that a tenant issued a CLT
is deemed the owner of the land. This is because PD 27 states that "(t)he tenant
farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed
owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated."
But, as correctly argued by PDB, more current decisions of this Court (where the
interpretation of the phrase "deemed owner" was directly tackled) have clarified
these pronouncements by distinguishing the legal effects of a CLT and those of
an emancipation patent. Martillano v. Court of Appeals 35 is instructive:
Both instruments have varying legal effects and implications insofar as the
grantee’s entitlements to his landholdings. A certificate of land transfer merely
evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to, in the words ofPagtalunan, "avail
of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by
him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27." It is not a muniment of title that
vests upon the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage. On the other
hand, an emancipation patent, while it presupposes that the grantee thereof
shall have already complied with all the requirements prescribed under
Presidential Decree No. 27, serves as a basis for the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title. It is the issuance of this emancipation patent that conclusively
entitles the farmer/grantee of the rights of absolute
ownership. Pagtalunan distinctly recognizes this point when it said that:
It is the emancipation patent which constitutes conclusive authority for the
issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or a Transfer Certificate of Title, in
the name of the grantee . . .
Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a
farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of
absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. At best, the
farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a
contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding. (Citations
omitted)36
Given that Garcia is a holder of a CLT but not of an emancipation patent, full
ownership of the land has not yet vested in him. Hence, there is no basis for the
CA and DARAB Appeal Board to direct the bank to turn over the land to him.
We are aware that in another recent case, Heirs of Guillermo A. Batongbacal v.
Court of Appeals,37 we ruled that transfer of ownership of land covered by PD
27 is allowed only in favor of actual tenants and the sale to a third party is null
and void:
Department Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 1974, implementing P.D. 27,
provides:
4. No act shall be done to undermine or subvert the intent and provisions of
Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, Memoranda and Directives, such
as the following and/or similar acts:
xxx xxx xxx
f.) Transferring ownership of tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21,
1972, except to the actual tenant-farmers or tillers but in strict conformity with
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27 and the requirements of the
Department of Agrarian Reform . . .
In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after
October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon.
Hence, the sale executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of
petitioner was in violation of the aforequoted provision of P.D. 27 and its
implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and void.38
Nevertheless, we maintain that there is nothing in PD 27 which declares any
sale or transfer as null and void ab initio when the sale is done by the
agricultural lessor after its enactment. Section 1239 of RA 3844, as amended by
RA 6389, provides the remedy of redemption40 to the agricultural lessee when
the land is sold, with or without his knowledge.
This leads us to the question of whether or not the period for the exercise of
Garcia’s right to redeem had already lapsed when he invoked it on January 17,
1994.
Section 12 of RA 384441 before its amendment provided that:
Sec. 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration.
Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided, further,
that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to
said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by
him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within
two (2) years from the registration of the sale and shall have priority over any
other right of legal redemption. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by RA 6389,42 it now provides that:
Sec. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration:
Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be
exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which
shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department
of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority
over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
PDB asserts that the registration of the certificate of sale and affidavit of
consolidation of ownership in its favor should be considered as sufficient notice
since registration constitutes notice to the whole world.43 We do not agree. To
emphasize, the law is worded this way:
The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred
eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all
lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of
the sale xxx
It is clear from the above provision that the 180-day period must be counted
from notice in writing. This notice in writing shall be served by the vendee on all
the lessees affected and the DAR upon the registration of the
sale.Obviously, notice in writing does not
contemplate registration otherwise registration would not have been specified
separately from notice in writing. If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.44
This is consistent with our conclusion in the very recent case Springsun
Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino45 wherein we affirmed the
decision of the trial court:
The only evidence of defendants (now petitioners) shows that the former owner,
Victoria Homes, Inc., sold the lands covered by TCT Nos. (289237) S-6135 and
(289236) S-35855 to defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation
on February 9, 1983 in the amount of P7,223,799.00 (Exh. ‘4’). The sale was
made without notifying the lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform as mandated by Section 12 of R.A. 3844 despite the fact
that the Deed of Sale was duly registered with the Register of Deeds on
April 11, 1983 that cancelled the titles in the name of Victoria Homes, Inc.
and TCT Nos. 120542 and 120541 were issued on the same date in the
name of defendant Springsun.
Similarly, when Victoria Homes, Inc. sold its land described in TCT No. S-72244
to defendant Springsun on July 12, 1983 in the amount of P2,566,813.00
(Exh.’5’), no notice was ever sent either to the plaintiffs or to the
Department of Agrarian Reform, notwithstanding that the Deed of Sale was
registered on July 29, 1983 that resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. S-
72244 in the name of Victoria Homes, Inc. and a new title bearing No. 123872
was issued to defendant Springsun.
In view of the absence of the notice to the plaintiffs and to the Department of
Agrarian Reform as required by law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the subject lands from the defendants
Springsun.46 (Emphasis supplied)
PDB nonetheless maintains that the summons received by Garcia in the action
for issuance of writ of possession filed47 in 1984 by PDB in RTC-Branch 36,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija was effectively a notice in writing as required by law
because the petition attached to the summons alleged, among others, the
mortgage, foreclosure and sale of the subject property and PDB’s consolidation
of ownership.48 This is correct.
In Quiño v. Court of Appeals, 49 we ruled that:
The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties
as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the
alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe any particular form of
notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as the
redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the
period for redemption will start running. The letter received by petitioner, being
bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the terms, particulars
and validity of the sale.50
Garcia admits that he "came to know of the alienation of the subject property
only when he received the summons from (the RTC)…in 1984" and that
"immediately thereafter, (he) filed a complaint for recognition of tenancy … (in)
1985."51 He also received a copy of the petition along with the summons.52 It is
fair to conclude therefore that Garcia did not entertain doubts about the transfer
to PDB and that he received the "notice in writing" prescribed by law considering
that "(t)he law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any
distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner."53 As a result, when Garcia
filed his petition for redemption in 1994, his right to redeem had already
prescribed.
As to whether or not there was service of notice to the DAR, we also agree with
PDB that this question of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.54
In sum, we hold that private respondent Garcia is a bona fide and de
jure agricultural lessee or tenant of the landholding subject of this case.
Petitioner PDB, however, acquired the property in good faith and was
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the previous agricultural lessors.
Consequently, PDB and its successors, spouses Marciano Ramirez and Erlinda
Camacho, were obliged to maintain Garcia in peaceful possession and
cultivation of the land. Finally, considering that Garcia was notified in writing of
the transfer to PDB in 1984 but filed his petition for redemption only in 1994, his
right of redemption had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it
affirmed the decision of the DARAB Appeal Board declaring the sale to petitioner
as null and void and directing the petitioner to turn over the landholding to
respondent.
The Court orders the dismissal of the petition for redemption filed with the
DARAB, Region III, Cabanatuan City. However, this is without prejudice to the
right of respondent to continue as agricultural lessee in peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the land tenanted by him.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.