20.

Osmena v Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech,
he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed
by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were
found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution
violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an
answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to
discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

21. Paredes v Sandiganbayan

252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and
Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in
a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself
that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty.
Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies.
Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the
Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but
was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of
each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a
Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension,
when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the House of Representatives.”

22. US v Pons
34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered
5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on
record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and
dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and

1
introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved
while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was
passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28,
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a
law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals
in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in
this particular case.
23. Casco Phil. Chemical co. v Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported
abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde.
Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central
Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor
General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct
components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining
urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between
the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde”
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of
the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea”
and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the
entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled
bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

2
24. Arroyo v De Venecia;
G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption
and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform
to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

SECTION 17
25. Lazatin v HRET
168 SCRA 391
Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul his proclamation after
he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of
Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the
sole judge of all election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had become moot and
academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a
TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course
because the proclamation was valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the

3
winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC
to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the
proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without
waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain
election returns.

Issue: Whether or not, the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

Held: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition
is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering
the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

26. Bondoc v Pineda

201 SCRA 792
Facts: Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were
rival candidates for Rep of the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner of the election. Bondoc filed
protest to house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The decision held that Bondoc won over Pineda by a
margin of 23 votes. The LDP insisted a recount and the recount has increased Bondoc’s win by 107 votes.
So congressman Camasura voted with the SC justices and Congressman Cerilles proclaimed Bondoc the winner
of the election.so Camasura being a member of the LDP revealed to the chief congressman Conjuanco that he voted for
Bondoc and he did so in view of what was in line with truth justice and self-respect. The revelation prompted efforts by the
LDP to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
So on the eve of promulgation of Bondoc’s win, Congress man Jose Conjuangco thru a letter stated that
Camasura and Bautista were being expelled for the LDP for allegedly helping in the organization of Partido Pilipino of
Danding cojuanco and for having members of LDP join said pol party. The LDP informed Herrera that they were no longer
part of LDP hence; his (Camasura’s) vote in favor of Bondoc should be withdrawn. The judges in HRET all wanted out
cause of this distressing development. They were saying that unseating should be prevented in all cost.
They also said that the tribunal should not be hampered in doing its constitutional function by factors, which have
nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. The Bondoc promulgation was cancelled because the decisionlack
the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of the rules of the tribunal. Bondoc asked the court to annul the
decision of the House in rescinding Camasura’s nomination and restrain the replacement of Camasura through a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with the disposition of an election
contest in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the tribunal?

Held: No. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the answer to this question. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relation to the election, returns and qualification of their respective members. The operative term found in the section was
“sole Judge”. It (HRET) was made to function as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. It’s
supposed to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office devoid of
partisan consideration, so they cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for the electoral tribunal to
serve the interests of party in power.
Its independence would be undermined if the removal of Camasura for as a punishment for “party disloyalty” for
voting for Bondoc would allow them to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.If allowed so, then the
HRET isn’t really a sole judge of senatorial elections. The members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as
the members of the judiciary are. They can only be replaced in cases such as expiration, death, permanent disability,
resignation forms the political party, and formal affiliation with another party of any valid cause hence mere disloyalty is
not a valid cause for termination.

4
27. Chavez v. COMELEC
211 SCRA 315
Facts: This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial
candidate.

On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was received by
respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to disseminate through the
fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list
of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed that
COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted.

Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen the ballot
boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which were
invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition?

Ruling: It is quite obvious that petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors” in the certificates of
canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even
pointed to any “manifest error” in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being
none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus
Election code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Section 17, Article Vl of the constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members…” (Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunal’s jurisdiction over
election contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate.

As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie
considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

28. Pimentel v. HRET

168 SCRA 391

Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List
System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list
groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe,
Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang
Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and
Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the
12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various
political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these
two constitutional bodies.
In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy
seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From
available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated
any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and

5
mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed
solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President
Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as
Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the
CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B.
Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto
P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and
against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA.
They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the
letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR
141490 with GR 141489.
On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of
the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the
Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives
from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

Issue: [1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to
the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments.
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose,
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s
respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA
is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26]
However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House
of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27]
Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge
its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents
prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA.
Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at
that time simply refrained from participating in the election process.
The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with
the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As
the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator

6
Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA
are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

29. Rep Jovito Palparan, Jr. v. HRET, February 11, 2010

(Consolidated Case)

Facts: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition
for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a
party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent
congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its
nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-
list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that
he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal
concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

Issue: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan?

Held: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
“members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to,
among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

30. Walden F. Bello v. COMELEC, December 7, 2010 (Consolidated Case)

G.R. No. 191998, G.R. No. 192769, G.R. No. 192832

Facts: Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) on November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. In order not to be disqualified, they

7
 must prove that the party-list group and the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and
to the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.
Mikey Arroyo was one of the party’s nominees. Here arose several questions regarding his qualification for, he is not only
a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not Arroyo duly represents the marginalized sector he is representing; and

Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation
and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives?

Held: 1. It held, among others, that a Filipino citizen, in order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and must likewise be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. The COMELEC en
banc also held that Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is not found in RA 7941.Thus, it concluded that Arroyo
possessed all the requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941.

2. This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. The consistent judicial holding is that the
HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity
directly voted upon was their party. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.

Section 18
31. Daza v. Singson
180 SCRA 496

FACTS: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned
its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to
the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments

HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments
to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that

8
such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments
and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

32. Coseteng v. Mitra

187 SCRA 337

FACTS: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to
Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a
request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on,
added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political
realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition
for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of
the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected
by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen
from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and
that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

ISSUE: WON the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
HELD: Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because
revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79%
of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL
as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if
KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and,
hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party
and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their
parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred
the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.

33. Guingona v. Gonzales

214 SCRA 789

FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected
The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for
LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the

9
CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of
the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is
against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership
of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for
every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

Section 19
34. Wigberto Tanada v. Comelec et. Al., October 22, 2013

FACTS: Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John Tanada for false
representations and to declare him as a nuisance candidate. They were both candidates for the position of Congress
Representative. A COMELEC division denied both his petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on April
13, 2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John for false representations. The petition to declare him as nuisance
candidate however was denied. Wigberto again sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the basis of a
newly discovered evidence. Comes election day and the name of Alvin John remained in the ballots, whichafter Angelica
Tan was the winning candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct manifest mistakes concerning the cancelled candidacy of
Alvin John and a motion to consolidate Alvin John’s votes with the votes he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to
consolidate the votes because Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed Angelica as the winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Tan,
which was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed
office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC en banc’s
ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election protest claiming that fraud has been
perpetrated. The SC, noting that the proclaimed candidate has already assumed office, dismissed the election protest
and directed Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is the HRET. The certiorari was also dismissed
for being filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period.
Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance and for lack of
jurisdiction over John Alvin who was not a member of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Wigberto assails the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring that Alvin John was not a
nuisance candidate as defined under Section 69 of the OEC. In consequence, he seeks that the votes cast in favor of
Alvin John be credited to him and, thereafter, to be declared the winning candidate for the congressional post.

HELD: The petition must fail.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members:

10
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the
HRET.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.
In particular, the term "election" refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed
office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the
issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters
which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s
sole jurisdiction.

Section 21 and 22
35. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
203 SCRA 767

FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices,
schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege
before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies
or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard
to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify
on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused
to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and
petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the
matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in
requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. Whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

HELD:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Court has provided that the
allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held
in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival

11
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle
in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private
affairs in purported aid of legislation.

2. No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any
and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,
i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right
of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he
is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to
take the witness stand completely.

36. Camilo Sabio et. al. v. Gordon et. al, October 17, 2006

FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No.
1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in
Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation”
and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry,

12
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its
basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI,
Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.

37. Senate et. al. v. Ermita et. al. April 20, 2006

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
“Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section
3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine
of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient
of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

38. Gudani et. al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et. al. August 15, 2006

FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued
a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time

13
honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them
from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

HELD: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law
of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified
grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in
aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief,
it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The
impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of
the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the
military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before
the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

39. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that
he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate
cited him for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING: The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It
pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and
that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making
of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional
role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

14
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” - i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

40. Reghis Romero v Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, et. Al. April 2, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were invited on an
investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey
Mountain project. The said investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act 8042
other known as the Migrant Workers Act.

ISSUE: Whether the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?

HELD: YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;

The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SECTION 24 – SHALL ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN HOR

41. TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630, 1994

FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No.
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities (defects), among others: Law did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representative as required by Section 24, Article VI – they contended that to be
considered as having originated in the HOR, it should retain the essence of the House Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since it did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representative as required by Sec. 24, Article VI.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the Senate is empowered by the Constitution to concur with amendments and
propose amendments, even substitute the entire bill as a whole. A bill originating in the HOR may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result maybe rewriting of the whole; As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced AND to insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate‘s power not only to ―concur with amendments‖ but also to ―propose amendments”

15
42. Alvarez et. Al. v Guingona et. Al.
252 SCRA 695

FACTS: Law converting municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a city is being assailed that the Bill did not
originate exclusively from HOR as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution since it had a
counterpart in the Senate.

ISSUE: Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817,
Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.

HELD: A bill of local application, such as one asking for the conversion of a municipality into a city, is deemed
to have originated from the House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to the filing of the bill in
the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own version. The filing in the Senate of a substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as
the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

SECTION 25 – APPROPRIATIONS
43. GARCIA VS. MATA
65 SCRA 517, 1975

FACTS: Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the AFP until his reversion to inactive status
pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 2332. Petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus and recovery of a sum
of money, to compel the former to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP, to readjust
his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive
status. Petitioner anchored his claim to reinstatement at paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP
in RA 1600 which was the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 as reads: THAT RESERVE OFFICERS
WITH AT LEAST 10 YEARS OF ACCUMULATED COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHO ARE STILL ON ACTIVE DUTY AT
THE TIME OF THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT SHALL NOT BE REVERTED TO INACTIVE STATUS EXCEPT FOR CAUSE
AFTER PROPER COURTMARTIAL PROCEEDINGS OR UPON THEIR REQUEST. Respondent, Judge Mata, declared
paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP in RA No. 1600 which was the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1956-57 unconstitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative. Hence, this petition for certiorari
to review the decision of the CFI.

ISSUE: Is the provision valid?

HELD: The SC held that the said provision used by the petitioner as a basis was a RIDER because the
Constitution provides that no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
UNLESS it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein (Art. VI, Section 25(2)). RA 1600
appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph
11 refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to
inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It clearly shows that the paragraph in question does not relate
to the appropriation.

16
44. DEMETRIA VS. ALBA
148 SCRA 208, 1987

FACTS: Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 states that the President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

ISSUE: Is the provision valid?

HELD: No. The court said that such was unconstitutional as it empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department to any program, project, or activity of any departments without regard
as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to
be taken.

45. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ

235 SCRA 506. 1994 QUIASON, J.:

FACTS: The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of Congress. It
presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power. One of the special provisions vetoed by
the President is with respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member of Congress
is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the house
which he belongs.
If he does not spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to transfer his
allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocations for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that this practice
is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue that the Senate President and
Speaker of the House, not the individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the savings
as appropriated.
Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the appropriation for debt service. It
provides ―Use of funds. The appropriation authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and
interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in excess of the amount
therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of the Congress
of the Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
Central Bank of Liquidators.‖
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special provision on the appropriations for debt
service without vetoing the entire amount of P86B for said purpose. In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According to the President, the grant retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose pursuant to Section
29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section
25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or
limitation, which is intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner‘s contentions are tenable.

HELD: Petitioner‘s contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable to the Congress of
the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings
in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the

17
one who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may be who shall
approve the realignment.
Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to
be aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be
taken and to the transfer on realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to be made. It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to the
appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the appropriation for debt service in
so far as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an ―inappropriate provision‖
referring to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994. The veto power while exercised by
the President is actually a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than Article VII.
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the Congress can include in an appropriate to
which it relates, ―it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate provision which be
vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of inappropriate provision are
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws because clearly those
kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill. The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the
special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said
item shall be used for the payment of one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and
that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
These provisos are germane to and have direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in
the power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said provisos are
appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately. The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein requiring that any
payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject to the approval of the President
of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines. The special provision which allows
the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article VI of the
Constitution.

SECTION 26 – PASSING OF A BILL

46. PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ
15 SCRA 489, 1965

FACTS: The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the
constitutionality of RA 3836 ―insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress). The
constitutionality of the law is assailed on the ground that the provision for the retirement of the members
and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

HELD: YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by RA Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits
are granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age.
This provision is related and germane to the subject of CA 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph
of RA 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the GSIS.
To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate to subject matter, not germane to
CA 186.

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47. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
151 SCRA 204, 1987

FACTS: PD NO 1987 is entitled ―An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board.‖ Section 10 thereof
imposes a 30% tax on gross receipts on video transactions. The petitioner argued that such tax impose is a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof.

ISSUE: Is section 10 a RIDER?

HELD: NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently related to the regulation of the video industry. The
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board
as expressed in its title.
The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards whether or not a provision is embraced in
the title:
 Title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
 If all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter expressed in the title.
 So long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general subject to the title.
 Regardless of how diverse it is so long as it maybe considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.
 Should not be construed as to cripple legislative power
 Given a PRACTICAL rather than a technical construction.

48. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO

227 SCRA 703, 1993

FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration
cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene. The petition assails the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the ground that its title embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7354 violates the Constitution for it was alleged to embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purpose.

HELD: NO. The franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal
objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Court ruled that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act,
or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated
to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute
to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.

19
SECTION 27 – METHODS BY WHICH A BILL MAY BECOME A LAW
49. TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630, 1994

FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money
of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. It was challenged for alleged constitutional
infirmities (defects), among others: It is claimed that the conference committee included provisions not
found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill – that these provisions were stealthily inserted by the
conference committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since the conference committee included
provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill.

HELD: A third version of the bill may result from the conference committee, which is considered may result
from the conference committee, which is considered an ―amendment in the nature of a substitute‖ the
only requirement being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained: Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any
material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already
agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one
house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. The result is a third version, which is
considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the
third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.

50. TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO

(237 SCRA 324 [1994])

FACTS: Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 7496 is a misnomer or, at least deficient f0r being merely
entitled "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For Self Employed and Professionals Engaged in the
practice of their Profession". It is the petitioner's view that the said law should be considered as having now
adopted a gross income scheme, instead of having still deductions from gross income of single
proprietorships and professionals in the computation of their, taxable net income, petitioner argued that
this violated the requirement for uniformity in taxation and due process because single proprietorship and
professional were taxed differently from corporations and partnerships.

ISSUE: WON RA No. 7496 is in violation of Art. VI Sec. 26 and 28 of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: On the basis of the language of the said questioned law, it would be difficult to accept the
petitioner's view that the amendatory should be considered as now having adopted a gross income, instead
of as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme.
The allowance of deductible items may have been significantly reduced by the questioned law in
comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment, limiting, however, allowable deductions
from gross income is neither discordant with nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. Art. VI Sec. 26 (I)
of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent logrolling legislation intended to unite the
members of the legislature who favor anyone of the unrelated subjects in support of the whole act; (b) to
avoid surprise or even fraud upon the legislature and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such

20
publications of its proceedings are as usually made, of the subjects of legislations. The above objective of the
fundamental law appears to have sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium
of the law which could have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate. The contention of the
petitioner that RA No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and
equitable is of no merit. The contention clearly forgets that such a system of taxation has long been the
prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496. Uniformity of Taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation similarly situated are to be treated both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniform does nor forefend classification as long as 1.) The standards that are used therefore are
substantial and not arbitrary. 2.) The categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose. 3.) The law
applies all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and 4.) The classification applies equally
well to all those belonging to the same class.
Shifting the income taxation of individuals to the schedules system, this makes the income tax
depend on the kind of taxable income, and maintaining for corporations the global treatment which treats in
common all kinds of taxable income of the taxpayer.

SECTION 27
51. TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630, 1994

FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money
of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. It was challenged for alleged constitutional
infirmities (defects), among others: It is claimed that the conference committee included provisions not
found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill – that these provisions were stealthily inserted by the
conference committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since the conference committee included
provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill.

HELD: A third version of the bill may result from the conference committee, which is considered may result
from the conference committee, which is considered an ―amendment in the nature of a substitute‖ the
only requirement being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills. As to
the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any
material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already
agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one
house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. The result is a third version, which is
considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the
third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.

52. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG

191 SCRA 452

FACTS: The veto of a particular section in the 1989 appropriations act was assailed for being
unconstitutional on grounds that the president may not veto provisions with regard to appropriation bills
and if the president vetoes a provision in an appropriation bill that the entire bill should be vetoed.
Further, item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions.

21
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to veto provisions with regard to appropriation bills.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held the following: The President can veto an item or items in an
appropriations bill BUT nothing less than an item or items. o Item – an indivisible sum of money dedicated to
a stated purpose that a distinct and severable part of a bill maybe subject to a different veto.
Therefore, regard to the petitioner‘s contention that if a provision in an appropriations bill is vetoed
the entire bill must be vetoed cannot be sustained. The said power to veto provisions has been carried over
the previous constitutions and has now been understood as broadened to include the item or items to which
the provision relates. In relation still to veto of provisions, the principle that distinct and severable parts of a
bill maybe the subject to a different veto is founded on Art. 6, Section 25(2) wherein provisions are limited to
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates…a distinct and severable part subject to a different veto.
Therefore it doesn‘t mean that if the president vetoes a provision in an appropriations bill he‘ll need to veto
the entire bill. Besides, the said provisions are inappropriate in the first place because the provisions should
relate to a particular appropriation in the general appropriations bill. That said sections of the appropriation
bill cannot be subject to veto if such are made to be conditions on the expenditure of funds cannot be
sustained because such conditions ―inappropriate.‖
Restrictions or conditions in an appropriation bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a
budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Said sections were in fact general law measures, there was
no necessary connection with the schedule of expenditures. That in any case, the sections mentioned
contravene the Constitution as it takes away the power of the President to augment any item in the
appropriations law of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations,
since a statute has already authorized such power.

53. BENGZON VS. DRILON

208 SCRA 133, 1992

FACTS: The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. The law appropriated 500M Pesos ―For
general fund adjustment for operational and special requirements as indicated hereunder.‖ Among the
several authorized uses of the fund was the adjustment of pension of justices as authorized by an earlier law.
The President vetoed the use of such fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices. The funds pertaining
to the payment of the adjusted pensions of Retired Justices of the Supreme Court and CA was vetoed and
assailed as being unconstitutional.
 RA 1797 was the law granted these benefits in 1957.
 Section 3-A of RA 1797 was repealed by PD 644.
 Congress thought to revive RA 1797 through HB No.16297.
 But PD 644 never became a law! (not published)
 President vetoed HB No. 16297.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto act of the President the use of such fund for the adjustment of the pension
of justices is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled:

 In declaring the veto invalid, the Court said that it was not the veto of an item. The item was the entire
500M peso allocation out of which unavoidable obligations not adequately funded in separate items could
be met. What the President had vetoed was the method of meeting unavoidable obligations or the manner
of using the 500M Pesos.
 When the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually
vetoing RA 1797 since PD 644 never took effect which is beyond the power to accomplish.
 The Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings
which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution.

22
 As long as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of
the government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8- 225-CA. Neither may
the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797.
This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The
President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal
existing laws. The President‘s power is merely to execute the laws passed by Congress.

ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1 ARTICLE 8, 1987 CONSTITUTION
54. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506. 1994
QUIASON, J.:

FACTS: The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of Congress. It
presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power. One of the special provisions vetoed by
the President is with respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member of Congress
is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the house
which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to
transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocations for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that
this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution.
They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the individual member of
Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated. Another special provision vetoed
by the President is on the appropriation for debt service.
It provides ―Use of funds. The appropriation authorized therein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in excess of the
amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of the
Congress of the Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities
of the Central Bank of Liquidators.‖
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special provision on the appropriations for debt
service without vetoing the entire amount of P86B for said purpose. In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
According to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriation specially approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section
25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or
limitation, which is intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner‘s contentions are tenable.

HELD: Petitioner‘s contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable to the Congress
of the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are
the one who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may be who shall
approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) the funds to be aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the
same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made. It is readily apparent that the special

23
provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the
appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill,
is an ―inappropriate provision‖ referring to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually a part of the legislative process. Hence,
found in Article VI rather than Article VII. As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the Congress
can include in an appropriate to which it relates, ―it follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item or which it extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an
inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item.
Also to be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an
appropriation bill. The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the special provision of the item on
debt services including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the
payment of one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in no case shall this
fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
These provisos are germane to and have direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in
the power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said provisos are
appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service can only be with
respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress
of the Philippines. The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative
of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.

SECTION 28 – RULE ON TAXATION, TARIFF POWERS, EXEMPTIONS

55. KAPATIRAN VS. TAN

163 SCRA 371, 1988
CASE: The VAT law or EO 273 is being assailed on grounds among others that taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Court overruled the contention holding that such was uniform because it operates with the
same effect and force in every place where the subject may be found. It is also equitable since it is imposed
only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sale
exceeding 200,000.

56. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO

162 SCRA 106, 1988

FACTS: Petitioner filed suit to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its
lot and building for non-payment of real state taxes and penalties. Petitioner contends that the primary use
of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines and
exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary Private
respondents counter that the college lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and sale
to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (I) for the educational purposes of the r college; (2) permanent
residence of the President and Director thereof, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and
(3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by a
commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building is question are used exclusively for educational purposes
thereby exempting petitioner from property taxes.

24
HELD: NO. The lot and building are not used exclusively for educational purposes. It must be stressed
however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase
"exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemptions extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in
the case at the bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the
concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose - educational, the lease of
the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school
building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the, second floor of the same is
being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being
used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.

SECTION 29 – RULES ON PUBLIC MONEY

58. PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL. 331, 1960

FACTS: The sum of 85,000 pesos was appropriated by Congress for the construction of a feeder road
running through a private subdivision and over a property owned by a private individual. Subsequently, the
feeder road is donated to the government.

ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid?

HELD: The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing that the property sought to be improved with public
funds was private in nature at the time the appropriation was made. The circumstance that the roads were
later donated to the government did not cure the basic defect of the appropriation as it was null and void ab
initio.

59. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ

64 PHIL. 201, 1937

FACTS: The Philippine government authorized a special stamp issue on occasion of the observance
in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The
petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure and contended that it
violated the Constitution inasmuch as it benefited a particular region. The Supreme Court, on examining the
facts, discovered that the original design of the stamp featured a picture of a Catholic chalice, but this was
later rejected in favor of a map of the Philippines under which appeared the caption ―Seat, 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.‖

ISSUE: Whether or not the stamp issue was valid.

HELD: Yes. As the purpose of the stamp issue were not for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor
money was derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church but was evidently to focus attention not
on the Eucharistic Congress but on its site, the idea being to attract tourists to our country and not primarily
the religious event, it was held that the stamp issue was not invalid.

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60. GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
196 SCRA 221, 1991

FACTS: PD 1177 is being assailed on its constitutionality. It is argued that the automatic reappropriation law
for servicing foreign debts is invalid because it does not appropriate a fixed amount and is therefore an
undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The amount is fixed by the parameters of the law itself which requires the simple act of looking
into the books of the Treasure.

61. OSMENA VS. ORBOS

220 SCRA 703, 1993

FACTS: The Oil Price Stabilzation Fund (OPSF) was created to minimize the frequent price changes brought
about by exchange rate adjustments and/or changes brought about by changes in world market prices of
crude oil and imported petroleum products. A Terminal Fund Balance deficit now aims to resolve the deficit
by increasing petroleum prices, contravening Section 29(3), Article VI where such fund shall be paid only for
the purpose for which it was created.

ISSUE: Whether or not the increase of petroleum prices to resolve the Terminal Fund Balance deficit is valid.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that it was a valid exercise of police power.

62. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ

235 SCRA 506. 1994
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS: The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of Congress. It
presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power. One of the special provisions vetoed by
the President is with respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member of Congress
is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the house
which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to
transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocations for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that
this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue that the Senate
President and Speaker of the House, not the individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to
realign the savings as appropriated. Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
appropriation for debt service.
It provides ―Use of funds. The appropriation authorized therein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in excess of the
amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of the
Congress of the Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities
of the Central Bank of Liquidators.‖
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special provision on the appropriations for debt
service without vetoing the entire amount of P86B for said purpose. In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.

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 According to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriation specially approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
On the contrary, petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner‘s contentions are tenable.

HELD: Petitioner‘s contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable to the Congress
of the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are
the one who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may be who shall
approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) the funds to be aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the
same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made. It is readily apparent that the special
provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the
appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill,
is an ―inappropriate provision‖ referring to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually a part of the legislative process. Hence,
found in Article VI rather than Article VII.
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the Congress can include in an appropriate to
which it relates, ―it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate provision which be
vetoed separately from an item.
Also to be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an
appropriation bill. The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the special provision of the item on
debt services including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the
payment of one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in no case shall this
fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
These provisos are germane to and have direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in
the power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said provisos are
appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service can only be with
respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress
of the Philippines.
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25 and
Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.

SECTION 30

63. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC V. CA

64. DIAZ VS.COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. L-109698 DECEMBER 5, 1994)
BELLOSILLO, J.:

27
FACTS: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service. The Asian
Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC at One Billion One Hundred Forty One
Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00). On 6 December 1992, ERB
approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation.
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing the decision of ERB on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In Supreme
Court‘s resolution of 8 September 1992, it referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals
which subsequently dismissed the petition. Among the grounds given was that the filing of the petition for
review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the
above circular. They further claimed that E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the
Board of Energy provides under Sec. 10 thereof that "[a] party adversely affected by a decision, order or
ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition to be known as petition for review with the Supreme Court."

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 10 of E.O. No.172 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The predecessor of the Energy Regulatory Board was the Board of Energy created under P.D. No.
1206. There under, appeals from the decisions of the Board of Energy were appealable to the Office of the
President. However, under the Interim Rules Implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final
decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of the Board of Energy were made appealable to the Intermediate
Appellate Court (Sec. 9). Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution, Sec. 30, Art VI provides: "No law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence." It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice
and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be
deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now
ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994). On 27
February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No.1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides that
the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals. If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by
the wrong procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is no longer any
justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990). Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court promulgated
Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that "[a]n appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed". Also,
paragraph (d) of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o transfer of appeals erroneously taken to the
Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate
jurisdiction will be allowed; continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will not be
tolerated." Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held — Contrary to petitioners' stand,
the Supreme Court's Resolution dated September 8, 1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for
further disposition" was not a directive for this court to disregard the above circulars and precedents. Rather
the said SC resolution could mean only that this court should dispose of the subject petition in conformity
with, and not in violation of, those circulars and precedents (Rollo, p. 26). WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DISMISSED.

SECTION 32
65. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS

28
G.R. NO. 125416 SEPTEMBER 26, 1996

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan (Sangguniang Bayan) passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Respondents Garcia, et al. filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang Bayan promulgated Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress to amend certain provisions of R.A. No.7227, particularly those concerning the matters
cited in items of private respondents‘ petition. Not satisfied, private respondents resorted to their power of
initiative. Respondent COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. Thereafter, COMELEC
issued a Resolution directing its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on authentication of signatures
being solicited by private respondent. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting a ―Calendar of
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan.‖ It then promulgated said Resolution, providing for ―the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct
of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan. Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2428, petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari
and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan?

HELD: Yes. COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No.
2848. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only. Based on the definitions given by the Local Government Code (R.A.
7160): Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; while Local Referendum is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the
Sanggunian.
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and
consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without
the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely
of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the
process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where
expectedly the voters will simply answer ―yes‖ or ―no‖ in the ballot. In the case at bar, the exercise
conducted is unquestionably an Initiative.

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