People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 171448

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
171448
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
*
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
CHARLIE COMILA and Promulgated:

AIDA COMILA,
Accused-Appellants. February 28, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On April 5, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, an Information[1] for Illegal
Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and penalized under Article 13(6) in relation to
Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code, as amended,
was filed against Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offer, recruit, and promise employment as contract workers in Italy, to the herein
complainants, namely: MARLYN ARO y PADCAYAN, ANNIE FELIX y
BAKISAN, ELEONOR DONGGA-AS y ANGHEL, ESPERANZA BACKIAN y LAD-EY,
ZALDY DUMPILES y MALIKDAN, JOEL EDIONG y CALDERON, RICKY WALDO y
NICKEY, JEROME MONTAEZ y OSBEN, DOVAL DUMPILES y SAP-AY, JONATHAN
NGAOSI y DUMPILES, EDMUND DIEGO y SUBIANGAN and MARLON PETTOCO y
SUGOT, without said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information was docketed in the RTC as Crim. Case No. 16427-R and raffled to Branch 60 thereof.
On the same date April 5, 1999 and in the same court, twelve (12) separate Informations[2] for Estafa were
filed against the same accused at the instance of the same complainants. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 16428-R
to 16439-R and likewise raffled to the same branch of the court, the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa, varying
only as regards the names of the offended parties and the respective amounts involved, uniformly recite:
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one ZALDY DUMPILES Y MALIKDAN by way of false pretenses, which
are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the
accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not AUTHORIZED job RECRUITERS for
persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan and
pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the
sum of P25,000.00 and representing the placement and medical fees when in truth and in fact
could not; the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan deceived and convinced by the false pretenses
employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P25,000,00 in favor of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan in the aforementioned amount
of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00), Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the three accused named in all the aforementioned two sets of Informations, only accused Aida Comila
and Charlie Comila were brought under the jurisdiction of the trial court, the third, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, being
then and still is at large.
Arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY not only to the Information for Illegal Recruitment (Crim. Case No. 16427-R) but also to the twelve (12)
Informations for Estafa (Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R).
Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
Of the twelve (12) complainants in both the illegal recruitment and estafa charges, the prosecution was able to
present only seven (7) of them, namely: Annie Felix y Bakisan; Ricky Waldo y Nickey; Jonathan Ngaosi y
Dumpiles; Marilyn Aro y Padcayan; Edmund Diego y Subiangan; Jerome Montaez y Osben; and Eleonor Dongga-as
y Anghel. A certain Jose Matias of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was supposed to
testify for the prosecution but his testimony was dispensed after the defense agreed that he will merely testify to the
effect that as per POEA records, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were not duly licensed or authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment.
In a consolidated decision[3] dated October 3, 2000, the trial court found both accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as charged in Crim. Case No.
16427-R, and of estafa, as charged in Crim. Case Nos. 16430-R; 16431-R, 16432-R, 16434-R, 16436-R, 16438-R,
and 16439-R. The other informations for estafa in Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R, 16429-R, 16433-R, 16435-R and
16437-R were, however, dismissed for lack of evidence. We quote the falloof the trial courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused, Aida Comila and
Charlie Comila:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale Committed by a
Syndicate. They are hereby sentenced to each suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00;

of the crime of Estafa. There being no mitigating and aggravating
circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. They shall also jointly and severally pay the
complainant, Marilyn Aro, the sum of P25,500.00 plus interest from the
date this Information was filed until it is fully paid;

circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. They shall also jointly and severally pay the complainant,
Annie Felix, the sum of P50,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed until it is fully paid;

circumstances, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
Eleanor Dongga-as, the sum of P50,000.00 plus interest from the date
this Information was filed until it is fully paid;

circumstances and applying the provisions of Indeterminate Sentence
Law, they are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. They shall
also jointly and severally pay the complainant, Edmund Diego, the sum
of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this Information was filed
until it is fully paid;

indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
Jonathan Ngaosi, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this

correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
Ricky Waldo, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
Jerome Montaez, the sum of P25,000.00 plus interest from the date this
Information was filed; and
9. Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R; 16435-R and

16437-R are hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
In the service of the various prison terms herein imposed upon the accused Aida Comila and
Charlie Comila, the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed.
As to the accused, Indira Sighn Lastra, let all these cases be archived in the meantime
until the said accused is arrested.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to a Notice of Appeal[4] filed by the two accused, the trial court forwarded the records of the cases
to this Court in view of the penalty of life imprisonment meted in Crim. Case No. 16427-R (Illegal Recruitment in
large scale). In its Resolution[5] of October 3, 2001, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and the subsequent
respective briefs for the appellants[6] and the appellee[7] as well as the appellants reply brief.[8]
Thereafter, and consistent with its pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[9] the Court, via its Resolution[10] of
September 22, 2004, transferred the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action and disposition. In the
CA, the cases were assigned one docket number and thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01615.
In a decision[11] promulgated on December 29, 2005, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial court, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 3, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal Cases Nos. 16427-R to 16439-R finding
accused-appellants guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large scale; and (2) seven (7)
counts of estafa is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
The cases are again with this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal [12] interposed by the herein accused-
appellants from the aforementioned affirmatory CA decision.
Acting thereon, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire.
In their respective manifestations,[13] the parties opted not to file any supplemental brief and instead merely
reiterated what they have said in their earlier appellants and appellee's briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in the brief[14] it filed for appellee People, summarizes the facts of the
case in the following manner:
Annie Felix was introduced by her sister-in-law, Ella Bakisan, to appellant Aida Comila
in August 1998 (pp. 3, 24, tsn, September 14, 1999). Ella Bakisan told her that appellant Aida
Comila could help her find work abroad as she was recruiting workers for a factory
in Palermo, Italy (ibid.). Annie Felix then went to meet appellant Aida Comila at the Jollibee
outlet along Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City in August, 1998 to inquire about the supposed work
in Italy (pp. 3-4, tsn, ibid.). There were other applicants, aside from Annie at the Jollibee outlet at
the time, similarly inquiring about the prospective jobs abroad (ibid.).
Annie met appellant again at the St. Theresas College on or about September 6 or 7, 1998
(p.11, ibid.). there were around fifty (50) to sixty (60) applicants at that time (ibid.). Appellant
introduced them to a certain Erlinda Ramos, one of the agents of Mrs. Indira Lastra, a
representative of the Far East Trading Corporation (p.4,11, ibid.). Accordingly, Erlinda Ramos
would be responsible for the processing of the applicants visas (ibid.). Erlinda Ramos even
showed them the copy of the job order from Italy (ibid.). Like Ramos, appellant likewise
introduced herself to Annie and the other applicants as an agent of Lastra (pp. 3-4, ibid.).
Annie submitted all her requirements to appellant, along with the amount of two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) as processing fee (p.6, tsn, ibid.). She also paid a total of twenty three thousand
(P23,000.00) as partial payment of her placement fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) on or
about September 6 or 7, 1998. Appellant issued a common receipt detailing the amounts she
received not only from Annie Felix (23,000.00) but also for her fellow applicants, Zaldy Dumpiles
(P23,000.00), Joel Ediong (P25,000.00), and Ricky Baldo (P25, 000.00) (p. 8, tsn, ibid.).
Annie went to Manila several times to complete her medical examination as required (pp.
14-16, tsn, ibid.). Considering appellant Aida Comilas pregnancy at that time, her husband Charlie
Comila, also an agent of Lastra, accompanied Annie and the other applicants during their medical
check-up (pp. 22-24, ibid.).
On the last week of October, 1998, Annie again paid appellant the total amount of twenty
five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to complete her placement fee of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00). Annie was told that her flight to Italy was scheduled on September 14, 1998 (p. 20,
ibid.). Later on, Erlinda Ramos told Annie that her flight to Italy was re-scheduled to October,
1998 due to a typhoon (p.20, ibid.).
There were others like Annie Felix who were similarly enticed to apply for the promised
job in Italy (pp. 4-5, tsn, September 22, 1999). Among them were Ricky Waldo, Edmund Diego,
Eleanor Donga-as, Jonathan Ngaosi, Marilyn Aro and Jerome Montaez (pp. 4-5; 19-28,
tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon session).
In the briefing at St. Theresas College, Navy Road, Pacdal, Baguio City, (p. 7, tsn,
September 22, 1999; pp. 29-30, tsn, September 14, 1999) appellant briefed Ricky Waldo and the
rest of the applicants on their application requirements (pp. 7-8, tsn, Sept. 22, 1999). The briefing
was conducted by appellants Aida Comila, Charlie Comila, and Erlinda Ramos who alternately
talked about the documents to be submitted for the processing of their applications and the
processing fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) they have to pay (p.8, tsn, September 22,
1999). In the same briefing, they were also told that Erlinda Ramos was scheduled to go
to Italy on September 14, 1998 and that whoever would pay P25,000.00 first, or half of the
P50,000.00 processing fee would be able to go with her to Italy (p. 8. tsn, September 22, 1999).
Per the job order shown to Jonathan Ngaosi, for instance, male workers were to receive a salary of
two thousand three hundred dollars ($2,300.00) plus an additional eight dollars ($8.00) for
overtime work (p.8, tsn, September 21, 1999, afternoon session).
After undergoing the required medical examination in Manila, applicants Ricky Waldo
and company paid the following amounts for their respective processing fees, which were duly
receipted by appellant Aida Comila in three separate documents, thus:
8-23-98, received the amount of P14,000.00 from Ella Bakisan. Signed, Aida Comila.
The second document again is a piece of paper of which the following is written: 9-7-98. Received
the amount of the following: Philip Waldo, P20,000.00; Doval Dumpiles, P23,000.00 Edmund
Diego, P25,000.00; Jerome Montaez, P25,000.00 Total- P93,000.00. Received by A. Comila. The
3rd document is page of a yellow pad and it reads 9-7-98, received the following amounts from
Zaldy Dumpiles - P23,000.00; Joel Ediong - P25,000.00; Ricky Waldo- P25,000.00; Annie Felix -
P23,000.00; Marlon Tedoco P23,000.00. Total P119,000.00. Received by Aida Comila; witnesses
Ella Bakisan. (p.14, tsn, of witness Edmund Diego, September 22, 1999, morning session).
Considering the payments they made, Ricky Waldos flight to Italy was scheduled on
September 14, 1999 while those of Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Jerome Montanez, Jonathan
Ngaosi, and Eleanor Donga-as were scheduled on October 27, 1999 (pp. 8-9, tsn, September 22,
1999; pp. 32-33, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999; p. 24, September 21,
1999; p.10, tsn, September 22, 1999, morning session; p. 27, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon
session).
Like Annie Felix, Ricky Waldos flight did not push through as scheduled on September
14, 1999 (pp. 32-34, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999). Appellant Aida
Comila explained that the re-scheduling was due to typhoon (ibid.). Rickys flight was then re-
scheduled to October 7, 1999 but was again moved to October 27, 1999 as, according to appellant
Aida Comila, there were some problems in his papers and that of the other applicants (pp. 2-3,
ibid.).
On October 25, 1998, appellant Aida Comila called the applicants for a briefing at
the St. Therese Building at the Navy Base, Baguio City (p.24, tsn, September 21, 1999). In the
same briefing, Erlinda Ramos, as representative of the supposed principal, Indira Lastra, explained
to the applicants that their flight on October 27, 1999 was cancelled but will be re-scheduled
(ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila told them that they have to wait for the notice from the Italian
Embassy (ibid.).
On the first week of November, 1998, appellant Charlie Comila told Marilyn Aro and
several other applicants that their visas would be released (p. 25, September, 21, 1999). Appellant
Charlie Comila accompanied them and the others to the Elco Building at Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig City purportedly to see Erlinda Ramos (p.25, tsn, September 21, 1999). When
Erlinda Ramos arrived, she told Marilyn and the other applicants to wait for the release of their
visas, the following day (p.25, ibid.). Marilyn and the rest came back each day for one whole week
but the promised visas were not released to them (ibid.).
Marilyn and the other applicants complained to appellant Charlie Comila about the delay
and told him of their doubts about their application and the promised job in Italy (ibid.). At this
point, appellant Charlie Comila assured them that they should not worry and that everything will
be alright (ibid). Appellant Charlie Comila then brought them to Indira Lastra (p.26, ibid.).
Marilyn Aro, Annie Felix, and the rest were all shocked to find out that Indira Lastra was
actually an inmate of Manila (Quiapo) city jail. (p.26, ibid.; p. 13, tsn, September 14, 1999). They
felt at once that they were, indeed, victims of illegal recruitment (ibid.).When they demanded the
return of their money from Indira Lastra, the latter told them to withdraw their money from
appellant Aida Comila (p.26. ibid.).
Upon their return to Baguio, Marilyns group proceeded to appellant Aida Comilas
residence at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet to demand the return of their money (p. 27, tsn, ibid.).
Appellant Aida Comila, however, told them to wait as Indira Lastra will soon be out of jail and
will personally process their papers at the Italian Embassy (ibid.). Marilyn and the other applicants
followed-up several times with appellant Aida Comila the return of the amounts of money they
paid for their supposed placement fee, but were simply told to wait (ibid.). the last time
complainants visited them, appellants Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were already in a Bulacan
jail (p. 27, ibid.).
In April, 1999, Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Annie Felix, Eleanor Donga-as, Jerome
Montanez, Ricky Waldo and Jonathan Ngaosi filed their complaint against appellants Aida Comila
and Charlie Comila before the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG).
In the same month of April 1999, separate Informations for estafa and illegal recruitment
committed in large scale by a syndicate or violation of Article 13 (b) in relation to Article 38 (b)
34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines were filed
against appellants Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and Indira Lastra.
In their appellants brief, accused-appellants would fault the two courts below in (1) finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa; and (2) totally disregarding the defense of
denial honestly advanced by them.
It is not disputed that accused-appellants Charlie Comila and Aida Comila are husband-and-wife. Neither is
it disputed that husband and wife knew and are well-acquainted with their co-accused, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, and
one Erlinda Ramos. It is their posture, however, that from the very beginning, appellant Aida Comila never
professed that she had the authority to recruit and made it clear to the applicants for overseas employment that it was
Erlinda Ramos who had such authority and who issued the job orders from Italy. Upon this premise, this appellant
contends that the subsequent transactions she had with the applicants negate the presence of deceit, an essential
element of estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. On the charge of illegal
recruitment, this appellant argues that she was merely trying to help the applicants to process their papers, believing
that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants to Italy. With respect to co-
appellant Charlie Comila, the defense submits that the prosecution miserably failed to prove his participation in the
illegal recruitment and estafa.
The appeal must fail.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, we are fully convinced that both the trial and
appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the crimes
charged against them. Through the respective testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution has satisfactorily
established that both appellants were then engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The combined
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses point to appellant Aida Comila as the one who promised them foreign
employment and assured them of placement overseas through the help of their co-accused Indira Ram Singh
Lastra. For sure, it was Aida herself who informed them of the existence of job orders from Palermo, Italy, and of
the documents needed for the processing of their applications. Aida, in fact, accompanied the applicants to undergo
medical examinations in Manila. And relying completely on Aidas representations, the applicants-complainants
entrusted their money to her only to discover later that their hopes for an overseas employment were but vain. In the
words of the trial court:
Aida Comila cannot escape culpability by the mere assertion that the recruitment
activities were done by Ella Bakisan, Erlinda Ramos and Indira Lastra as if she was just a mere
observer of the activities going on right under her nose, especially so that the seven complainants
who testified all pointed to her as their recruiter. She could not adequately explain why: (1) she
had to show and explain the job order and the work and travel requirements to the complainants;
(2) she had to meet the complainants at Jollibee, Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City and in her
residence; (3) she had to be present at the briefings for the applicants; (4) she received the
placement fees even if she claims that she received them from Ella Bakisan; (5) she had to go
down to Manila and accompanied the complainants for their medical examination; and (6) she had
to go out of her way to do all these things even when she was pregnant and was about to give
birth. Certainly, she was not a social worker or a humanitarian who had all the time in this world
to go out of her way to render free services to other people whom she did not know or just met. To
be sure, Aida Comila had children to attend to and a husband who was unemployed to be able to
conduct such time-consuming charitable activities.[15]
Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision:[16]
As regards appellant Aida Comilas contention that she did not represent herself as a
licensed recruiter, and that she merely helped complainants avail of the job opportunity on the
belief that Indira Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send them to Italy, the same hardly
deserves merit. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when, among other things, a person
who, without being duly authorized according to law represents or gives the distinct impression
that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the
representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in
order to be assured of that employment.
In fact, even if there is no consideration involved, appellant will still be deemed as having
engaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she promised
overseas employment to private complainants. To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is
plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a
recruiter whether locally or abroad.
As regards appellant Charlie Comila, it is inconceivable for him to feign ignorance of the illegal
recruitment activities of his wife Aida, and of his lack of participation therein. Again, we quote with approval what
the trial court has said in its decision:[17]
Charlie Comila could not, likewise, feign ignorance of the illegal transactions. It is
contrary to human experience, hence, highly incredible for a husband not to have known the
activities of his wife who was living with him under the same roof. In fact, he admitted that when
Aida gave birth, he had to accompany the complainants to Manila for their medical examination
and again, on another trip, to bring them to the office of Erlinda Ramos to follow-up their visas.
The fact that he knew the ins and outs of Manila was a desperate excuse or reason why he
accompanied the complainants to Manila considering that, as he and his wife claimed, they have
nothing to do with the recruitment activities. Furthermore, if he and his wife had nothing to do
with the recruitment of the complainants, why did he have to sign the letter and accommodate the
request of Myra Daluca whom they have not really known. But damning was his statement that he
signed the letter because Aida was not there to sign it. Such a statement would only show that they
were indeed parties to these illegal transactions. Charlie Comila would even claim that he was just
an elementary graduate and so he did not understand what he was asked to sign. But his booking
sheet showed that he was a high school graduate. He was a conductor of a bus company who
should know and understand how to read and write. Furthermore, he was already a grown up man
in his thirties who knew what was right and wrong and what he should or should not do.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be

charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.[18] Here, it has been sufficiently
proven that both appellants represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the capacity to send them
to Italy for employment, even as they do not have the authority or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this
misrepresentation that induced the complainants to part with their hard-earned money for placement and medical
fees. Such act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2), of the Revised
Penal Code.
Appellants next bewail the alleged total disregard by the two courts below their defense of denial which,
had it been duly considered and appreciated, could have merited their acquittal.
The Court disagrees. The two courts below did consider their defense of denial. However, given the
positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants who were one in pointing to appellants, in cahoots with
their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra, as having recruited and promised them with overseas employment,
appellants defense of denial must inevitably collapse.
All told, we rule and so hold that the two courts below committed no error in adjudging both appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in large scale and of
estafa in seven (7) counts. We also rule that the penalties imposed by the court of origin, as affirmed by the CA,
accord with law and jurisprudence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of the CA,
affirmatory of that the trial court, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH JAMILOSA, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case
No. Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph Jamilosa of large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6
and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a P500,000.00
fine.
The Information charging appellant with large scale illegal recruitment was filed by the Senior State
Prosecutor on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or thereabout in the City of Quezon, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, representing to have the capacity,
authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein
complainants, namely, Haide R. Ruallo, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for
work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center without first
obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
Contrary to law.2
On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of Appeals (CA), is as follows:
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: private complainants Imelda D. Bamba,
Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh.
Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she met the appellant in Cubao, Quezon
City on board an aircon bus. She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North EDSA, Quezon City where
she was working as a company nurse. The appellant was seated beside her and introduced himself as a
recruiter of workers for employment abroad. The appellant told her that his sister is a head nurse in a
nursing home in Los Angeles, California, USA and he could help her get employed as a nurse at a
monthly salary of Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she could leave in two (2) weeks time.
He further averred that he has connections with the US Embassy, being a US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in the Philippines for one month. According to the appellant,
she has to pay the amount of US$300.00 intended for the US consul. The appellant gave his pager
number and instructed her to contact him if she is interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.
On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her house where she
gave him the photocopies of her transcript of records, diploma, Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) license and other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she handed to the appellant the amount
of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in North EDSA, Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a
photocopy of her supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got several pieces of jewelry which she was
then selling and assured her that he would sell the same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did
not issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry. Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her
work at SM because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles, California,
USA on February 25, 1996.
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled departure to
hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant who was supposed to be with them in the
flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant called and informed her that he failed to give the passport
and US visa because he had to go to the province because his wife died. She and her companions were
not able to leave for the United States. They went to the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but
nobody knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel where he temporarily resided,
but to no avail. They also inquired from the US embassy and found out that there was no such person
connected with the said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that she is a registered nurse by profession.
In the morning of January 22, 1996, she went to SM North EDSA, Quezon City to visit her cousin Imelda
Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that she was going to meet the appellant who is an FBI agent
and was willing to help nurses find a job abroad. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. On the same date
at about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she and Bamba met the appellant at the SM Fast-Food Center,
Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad
and told them that he has a sister in the United States. Lagman told the appellant that she had no working
experience in any hospital but the appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one. The
appellant asked for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa and an additional amount of
Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.
On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North EDSA, Quezon City wherein she
handed to the latter her passport and transcript of records. The appellant promised to file the said
documents with the US embassy. After one (1) week, they met again at the same place and the appellant
showed to her a photocopy of her US visa. This prompted her to give the amount of US$300.00 and two
(2) bottles of Black Label to the appellant. She gave the said money and liquor to the appellant without
any receipt out of trust and after the appellant promised her that he would issue the necessary receipt
later. The appellant even went to her house, met her mother and uncle and showed to them a computer
printout from Northwest Airlines showing that she was booked to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA
on February 25, 1996.
Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called her because her number was
appearing in the appellant’s cellphone documents. The caller asked if she knew him because they were
trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to pay his telephone bills in the amount
of P100,000.00. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. One (1) week before her
scheduled flight on February 25, 1996, they called up the appellant but he said he could not meet them
because his mother passed away. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file a complaint with
the NBI for illegal recruitment.
Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the appellant on
February 13, 1996 at SM North EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. The
appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of the FBI and he could fix her US visa as he has a
contact in the US embassy. The appellant told her that he could help her and her companions Haidee
Raullo, Geraldine Lagman and Imelda Bamba find jobs in the US as staff nurses in home care centers.
On February 14, 1996 at about 6:30 in the evening, the appellant got her passport and picture. The
following day or on February 15, 1996, she gave the appellant the amount of US$300.00 and a bottle of
cognac as "grease money" to facilitate the processing of her visa. When she asked for a receipt, the
appellant assured her that there is no need for one because she was being directly hired as a nurse in the
United States.
She again met the appellant on February 19, 1996 at the Farmers Plaza and this time, the appellant
required her to submit photocopies of her college diploma, nursing board certificate and PRC license. To
show his sincerity, the appellant insisted on meeting her father. They then proceeded to the office of her
father in Barrio Ugong, Pasig City and she introduced the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant asked
permission from her father to allow her to go with him to the Northwest Airlines office in Ermita, Manila to
reserve airline tickets. The appellant was able to get a ticket confirmation and told her that they will meet
again the following day for her to give P10,000.00 covering the half price of her plane ticket. Singh did not
meet the appellant as agreed upon. Instead, she went to Bamba to inquire if the latter gave the appellant
the same amount and found out that Bamba has not yet given the said amount. They then paged the
appellant through his beeper and told him that they wanted to see him. However, the appellant avoided
them and reasoned out that he could not meet them as he had many things to do. When the appellant did
not show up, they decided to file a complaint for illegal recruitment with the NBI.
The prosecution likewise presented the following documentary evidence:
Exh. "A" – Certification dated February 23, 1998 issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Director II, Licensing
Branch, POEA.
Exh. "B" – Affidavit of Alma E. Singh dated February 23, 1996.3
On the other hand, the case for the appellant, as culled from his Brief, is as follows:
Accused JOSEPH JAMILOSA testified on direct examination that he got acquainted with Imelda Bamba
inside an aircon bus bound for Caloocan City when the latter borrowed his cellular phone to call her office
at Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City. He never told Bamba that he could get her a job in Los
Angeles, California, USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she
was having a problem thereat. Bamba called him up several times, seeking advice from him if Los
Angeles, California is a good place to work as a nurse. He started courting Bamba and they went out
dating until the latter became his girlfriend. He met Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh at the Shoe Mart
(SM), North Edsa, Quezon City thru Imelda Bamba. As complainants were all seeking advice on how they
could apply for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Imelda Bamba, Geraldine
Lagman and Alma Singh sign separate certifications on January 17, 1996 (Exh. "2"), January 22, 1996
(Exh. "4"), and February 19, 1996 (Exh. "3"), respectively, all to the effect that he never recruited them
and no money was involved. Bamba filed an Illegal Recruitment case against him because they quarreled
and separated. He came to know for the first time that charges were filed against him in September 1996
when a preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Dañosos of the Department of Justice. (TSN,
October 13, 1999, pp. 3-9 and TSN, December 8, 1999, pp. 2-9)4
On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.5 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment in large scale; accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), plus costs.
Accused is ordered to indemnify each of the complainants, Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma
Singh the amount of Three Hundred US Dollars ($300.00).
SO ORDERED.6
In rejecting the defenses of the appellant, the trial court declared:

To counter the version of the prosecution, accused claims that he did not recruit the complainants for
work abroad but that it was they who sought his advice relative to their desire to apply for jobs in Los
Angeles, California, USA and thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them sign three
certifications, Exh. "2," "3" and "4," which in essence state that accused never recruited them and that
there was no money involved.
Accused’s contention simply does not hold water. Admittedly, he executed and submitted a counter-
affidavit during the preliminary investigation at the Department of Justice, and that he never mentioned
the aforesaid certifications, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 in said counter-affidavit. These certifications were
allegedly executed before charges were filed against him. Knowing that he was already being charged for
prohibited recruitment, why did he not bring out these certifications which were definitely favorable to him,
if the same were authentic. It is so contrary to human nature that one would suppress evidence which
would belie the charge against him.
Denials of the accused can not stand against the positive and categorical narration of each complainant
as to how they were recruited by accused who had received some amounts from them for the processing
of their papers. Want of receipts is not fatal to the prosecution’s case, for as long as it has been shown,
as in this case, that accused had engaged in prohibited recruitment. (People v. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574).
That accused is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, is shown in
the Certification issued by POEA, Exh. "A."
In fine, the offense committed by the accused is Illegal Recruitment in large scale, it having been
committed against three (3) persons, individually.7
Appellant appealed the decision to this Court on the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL

RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE PROSECUTION.8
According to appellant, the criminal Information charging him with illegal recruitment specifically
mentioned the phrase "for a fee," and as such, receipts to show proof of payment are indispensable. He
pointed out that the three (3) complaining witnesses did not present even one receipt to prove the alleged
payment of any fee. In its eagerness to cure this "patent flaw," the prosecution resorted to presenting the
oral testimonies of complainants which were "contrary to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits
of life [under Section 3(y), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence] and defied credulity." Appellant also
pointed out that complainants’ testimony that they paid him but no receipts were issued runs counter to
the presumption under Section [3](d), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence that persons take ordinary care
of their concern. The fact that complainants were not able to present receipts lends credence to his
allegation that it was they who sought advice regarding their desire to apply for jobs in Los Angeles,
California, USA. Thus, thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them sign three (3)
certifications stating that he never recruited them and there was no money involved. On the fact that the
trial court disregarded the certifications due to his failure to mention them during the preliminary
investigation at the Department of Justice (DOJ), appellant pointed out that there is no provision in the
Rules of Court which bars the presentation of evidence during the hearing of the case in court. He also
pointed out that the counter-affidavit was prepared while he was in jail "and probably not assisted by a
lawyer."9
Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that the absence of receipts
signed by appellant acknowledging receipt of the money and liquor from the complaining witnesses
cannot defeat the prosecution and conviction for illegal recruitment. The OSG insisted that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt via the collective
testimonies of the complaining witnesses, which the trial court found credible and deserving of full
probative weight. It pointed out that appellant failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the complaining
witnesses to falsely charge him of illegal recruitment.
On appellant’s claim that the complaining witness Imelda Bamba was his girlfriend, the OSG averred:
Appellant’s self-serving declaration that Imelda is his girlfriend and that she filed a complaint for illegal
recruitment after they quarreled and separated is simply preposterous. No love letters or other
documentary evidence was presented by appellant to substantiate such claim which could be made with
facility. Imelda has no reason to incriminate appellant except to seek justice. The evidence shows that
Alma and Geraldine have no previous quarrel with appellant. Prior to their being recruited by appellant,
Alma and Geraldine have never met appellant. It is against human nature and experience for private
complainants to conspire and accuse a stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings.
(People v. Coral, 230 SCRA 499, 510 [1994])10
The OSG posited that the appellant’s reliance on the certifications 11 purportedly signed by the
complaining witnesses is misplaced, considering that the certifications are barren of probative weight.
On February 23, 2005, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the CA. 12 On June 22, 2005, the CA
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.13
The OSG filed a Supplemental Brief, while the appellant found no need to file one.
The appeal has no merit.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-
licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x
Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts shall be deemed

illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 14 Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group.15
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3) essential
elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the
same against three or more persons individually or as a group. 16 As gleaned from the collective
testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible
and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial
court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by appellant where
he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the
absence of money or other valuables given as consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is
considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of recruitment may be
for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant
conviction for illegal recruitment.17 As the Court held in People v. Sagaydo:18
Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and enticement
of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment
abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave for work abroad nor get their money back.
The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to produce receipts as proof of
their payment to accused-appellant does not free the latter from liability. The absence of receipts cannot
defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. As long as the witnesses can positively show through
their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in prohibited recruitment, he may be
convicted of the offense despite the absence of receipts.19
Appellant’s reliance on the certifications purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses Imelda Bamba,
Alma Singh and Geraldine Lagman20 is misplaced. Indeed, the trial court and the appellate court found
the certifications barren of credence and probative weight. We agree with the following pronouncement of
the appellate court:
Anent the claim of the appellant that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the certifications (Exhs.
"2," "3" & "4") allegedly executed by the complainants to the effect that he did not recruit them and that no
money was involved, the same deserves scant consideration.
The appellant testified that he was in possession of the said certifications at the time the same were
executed by the complainants and the same were always in his possession; however, when he filed his
counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation before the Department of Justice, he did not mention
the said certifications nor attach them to his counter-affidavit.lavvphil.net
We find it unbelievable that the appellant, a college graduate, would not divulge the said certifications
which would prove that, indeed, he is not an illegal recruiter. By failing to present the said certifications
prior to the trial, the appellant risks the adverse inference and legal presumption that, indeed, such
certifications were not genuine. When a party has it in his possession or power to produce the best
evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the
evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent
purpose. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:
"x x x These certifications were allegedly executed before charges were filed against him. Knowing that
he was already being charged for prohibited recruitment, why did he not bring out these certifications
which were definitely favorable to him, if the same were authentic. It is so contrary to human nature that
one would suppress evidence which would belie the charge against him." (Emphasis Ours) 21
At the preliminary investigation, appellant was furnished with copies of the affidavits of the complaining
witnesses and was required to submit his counter-affidavit. The complaining witnesses identified him as
the culprit who "recruited" them. At no time did appellant present the certifications purportedly signed by
the complaining witnesses to belie the complaint against him. He likewise did not indicate in his counter-
affidavit that the complaining witnesses had executed certifications stating that they were not recruited by
him and that he did not receive any money from any of them. He has not come forward with any valid
excuse for his inaction. It was only when he testified in his defense that he revealed the certifications for
the first time. Even then, appellant lied when he claimed that he did not submit the certifications because
the State Prosecutor did not require him to submit any counter-affidavit, and that he was told that the
criminal complaint would be dismissed on account of the failure of the complaining witnesses to appear
during the preliminary investigation. The prevarications of appellant were exposed by Public Prosecutor
Pedro Catral on cross-examination, thus:
The Court notes that the trial court ordered appellant to refund US$300.00 to each of the complaining
witnesses. The ruling of the appellate court must be modified. Appellant must pay only the peso
equivalent of US$300.00 to each of the complaining witnesses.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the conviction of Joseph Jamilosa for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby ordered to refund to
each of the complaining witnesses the peso equivalent of US$300.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Santosa Datuman VS. First Cosmopolitan Manpower
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated August 7, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825, setting
aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc. recruited
petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work abroad under the following terms and conditions:
Site of employment - Bahrain

Employees Classification/Position/Grade - Saleslady
Basic Monthly Salary - US$370.00
Duration of Contract - One (1) year
Foreign Employer - Mohammed Sharif Abbas Ghulam Hussain[2]
On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required placement fee. However,
her employer Mohammed Hussain took her passport when she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady,
she was forced to work as a domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to One
Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to the agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of
Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).[3]
On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract, transferring her to another
employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the duration of two (2) years. [4] She pleaded with him to give
her a release paper and to return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she continued
working against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation from September 1991 to April 1993
because of her employers continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993, she was able
to finally return to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department. [5]
In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office against respondent for
underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of her plane fare, docketed as Case No.
POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586.[6] While the case was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for
underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of
return airfare.
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before the Labor Arbiter, they were required to
file their respective position papers, subsequent pleadings and documentary exhibits.
In its Position Paper,[7] respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in Bahrain as a
housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position available then. However, since such position was not yet
allowed by the POEA at that time, they mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioners
position as saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually petitioner herself who violated the terms of their
contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without respondents knowledge and approval. Lastly,
respondent raised the defense of prescription of cause of action since the claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year
period from the time the right accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991. [8]
On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding respondent liable for
violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or
its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months;
and, (b) the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of
plane ticket, thus:
From the foregoing factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to resolve in this case
is whether or not complainant is entitled to her monetary claims.
xxx
In the instant case, from the facts and circumstances laid down, it is thus self-evident that
the relationship of the complainant and respondent agency is governed by the Contract of
Employment, the basic terms a covenants of which provided for the position of saleslady, monthly
compensation of US$370.00 and duration of contract for one (1) year. As it is, when the parties
complainant and respondent Agency signed and executed the POEA approved Contract of
Employment, this agreement is the law that governs them. Thus, when respondent agency deviated
from the terms of the contract by assigning the position of a housemaid to complainant instead of a
saleslady as agreed upon in the POEA-approved Contract of Employment, respondent Agency
committed a breach of said Employment Contract. Worthy of mention is the fact that
respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph 2, Brief Statement of the Facts and of
the Case admitted that it had entered into an illegal contract with complainant by proposing
the position of a housemaid which said position was then not allowed by the POEA, by
making it appear in the Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the
position of a saleslady. As it is, we find indubitably clear that the foreign employer had took
advantage to the herein hopeless complainant and because of this ordeal, the same obviously
rendered complainants continuous employment unreasonable if not downright
impossible. The facts and surrounding circumstances of her ordeal was convincingly laid down by
the complainant in her Position Paper, from which we find no flaws material enough to disregard
the same. Complainant had clearly made out her case and no amount of persuasion can convince
us to tilt the scales of justice in favor of respondents whose defense was anchored solely on the
flimsy allegations that for a period of more than five (5) years from 1989 until 1995 nothing was
heard from her or from her relatives, presuming then that complainant had no problem with her
employment abroad. We also find that the pleadings and the annexes filed by the parties reveal a
total lapse on the part of respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions their failure to
support with substantial evidence their contention that complainant transferred from one employer
to another without knowledge and approval of respondent agency in contravention of the terms of
the POEA approved Employment Contract. Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its
disquisition on the alleged contracts signed by the complainant that she agreed with the terms of
said contracts one (1) year duration only and as a housemaid to support its contention that
complainant violated the contract agreement by transferring from one employer to another on her
own volition without the knowledge and consent of respondent agency. To us, this posture of
respondent agency is unavailing. These documents are self-serving. We could not but rule that the
same were fabricated to tailor-fit their defense that complainant was guilty of violating the terms
of the Employment Contract. Consequently, we could not avoid the inference of a more logical
conclusion that complainant was forced against her will to continue with her employment
notwithstanding the fact that it was in violation of the original Employment Contract
including the illegal withholding of her passport.
With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondent Agency failed to discharge the
burden of proving with substantial evidence that complainant violated the terms of the
Employment Contract, thus negating respondent Agencys liability for complainants money
claims. All the more, the record is bereft of any evidence to show that complainant Datuman is
either not entitled to her wage differentials or have already received the same from respondent. As
such, we are perforce constrained to grant complainants prayer for payment of salary differentials
computed as follows:
January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)

US$370.00 agreed salary
US$100.00 actual paid salary
US$270.00 balance
US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00
We are also inclined to grant complainants entitlement to a refund of her plane ticket in the
amount of BD 180 Bahrain Dinar or the equivalent in Philippine Currency at the rate of exchange
prevailing at the time of payment.
Anent complainants claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay, we cannot, however, grant the
same for failure on the part of complainant to prove with particularity the months that she was not
granted vacation leave and the day wherein she did render overtime work.
Also, we could not grant complainants prayer for award of damages and attorneys fees for lack of
factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding respondent Agency

liable for violating the term of Employment Contract and respondent First Cosmopolitan
Manpower and Promotions is hereby ordered:
To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND FIFTY (US$4,050.00), or its
equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen
(15) months;
To pay complainant the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of
payment, representing the refund of plane ticket;
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9] (emphasis supplied)
On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision[10] affirming with modification the Decision of
Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00
ratiocinating as follows:
Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of
1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her complaint on May 31,
1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for salary
differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear that only the claims for the months of
May 1993 to April 1994 have not yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate of US$370.00 vis--
vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00, complainant is entitled to the salary
differential for the said period in the amount of $2,970.00.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the

assailed Decision by reducing the award of salary differentials to $2,970.00 to the complainant.
The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On July 21, 2000, respondent elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
On August 2, 2000,[12] the CA dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
On October 20, 2000,[13] however, the CA reinstated the petition upon respondents motion for reconsideration. [14]
On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision[15] granting the petition and reversing the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter, thus:
Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations, the local agency
shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited to payment
of wages, health and disability compensation and repatriation.
Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of private respondent for
salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed. It must be noted that
petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting arguendo that its liability extends to
the acts of its foreign principal, the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in
the execution of the second contract, it is Our considered opinion that the same would, at the most,
extend only up to the expiration of the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the
money claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed.
However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only having abused its discretion, but
as being without jurisdiction at all, in declaring private respondent entitled to salary
differentials. After decreeing the money claims accruing before April 1993 as having prescribed, it
has no more jurisdiction to hold petitioner company for salary differentials after that period.To
reiterate, the local agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims
and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract.Which
contract? Upon a judicious consideration, we so hold that it is only in connection with
the first contract. The provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations were not made to make the local agency a perpetual insurer against all untoward acts
that may be done by the foreign principal or the direct employer abroad. It is only as regards the
principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability extend. In Catan v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 160 SCRA 691 (1988), it was held that the responsibilities of the local
agent and the foreign principal towards the contracted employees under the recruitment agreement
extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
xxx
Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24 February 2000 and the Resolution dated 23
June 2000 of respondent Commission in NLRC NCR CA 016354-98 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[17] thereon was denied in the assailed Resolution[18] dated November
14, 2002.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN

IT ABANDONED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS AFFIRMED
BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT AGENCY IS ONLY A [sic] PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL
CONTRACT.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PETITIONER ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
The respondent counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in ruling that it is not liable for the monetary
claims of petitioner as the claim had already prescribed and had no factual basis.
Simply put, the issues boil down to whether the CA erred in not holding respondent liable for petitioners
money claims pursuant to their Contract of Employment.
We grant the petition.
On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioners monetary

claims
Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. Every applicant for license to operate a private
employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application together with the
following requirements:
xxx
f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
xxx
(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not
limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation. (emphasis
supplied)
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary
liability with the employer.[19] This Court has, time and again, ruled that private employment agencies are held
jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment.[20] This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign
employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him.[21] This
is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law and the policy of the state
when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As the agency which recruited petitioner,
respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the latters principal employer abroad for her (petitioners) money
claims. Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the
implementation of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment.
We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends only to the first
contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of until April 1990). The signing of the
substitute contracts with the foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and
any continuation of petitioners employment beyond the original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are
continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To accept the CAs reasoning will open the floodgates
to even more abuse of our overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the
recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for breaches of the POEA-approved contract
by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the approved contract with another upon the workers arrival
in the country of employment. Such outcome is certainly contrary to the States policy of extending protection and
support to our overseas workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration
to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE. [22]
Respondents contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract of Employment when she
signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant consideration. It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC which, significantly, the CA did not disturb that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her
original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the foreign employer.
In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote,[23] we held that the subsequently executed side
agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which reduced his salary below the amount
approved by the POEA is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side
agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the POEA.
Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from US$370.00 to US$100 (BD
40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms, and
conditions of her employment. Consequently, the solidary liability of respondent with petitioners foreign employer
for petitioners money claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain. It is the terms of
the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the relationship of petitioner with the
respondent recruitment agency and the foreign employer. We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
precepts of justice and fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all months worked regardless of the
supposed termination of the original contract in April 1990. It is undisputed that petitioner was compelled to render
service until April 1993 and for the entire period that she worked for the foreign employer or his unilaterally
appointed successor, she should have been paid US$370/month for every month worked in accordance with her
original contract.
Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign employer which forced petitioner to remain
employed in violation of our laws and under the most oppressive conditions on the allegation that it purportedly had
no knowledge of, or participation in, the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad. We cannot give credence
to this claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew from the outset that the contract submitted to
the POEA for approval was not to be the real contract. Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a
contract stating that the position to be filled by petitioner is that of Saleslady although she was to be employed as a
domestic helper since the latter position was not approved for deployment by the POEA at that time. Respondents
evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations
of innocence and put petitioner in a position where she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as what
indeed happened to her in this case.
We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or ignorance on the part of
local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign principals, as if the agencies responsibility ends with the
deployment of the worker. In the light of the recruitment agencys legally mandated joint and several liability with
the foreign employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the contract, it is the recruitment
agencys responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the employment contract, as approved by the
POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly by its foreign client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best
interest to do so to avoid being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for acts of its
foreign principal.
On whether petitioners claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed
It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that petitioner is entitled to
underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of months for which salary differentials should be paid. The
CA, on the other hand, held that all of petitioners monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article 291 of the
Labor Code which provides that:
Art. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time that
cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis supplied)
We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had already prescribed as the three-
year prescriptive period should be reckoned from September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another
contract against her will. As stated in the complaint, one of petitioners causes of action was for underpayment of
salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials)
accrue as they fall due.[24] Thus, petitioners cause of action to claim salary differential for October 1989 only
accrued after she had rendered service for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary
differential for November 1989 only accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work until April 1993. Interestingly, the
CA did not disturb this finding but held only that the extent of respondents liability was limited to the term under the
original contract or, at most, to the term of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation of respondents
foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed previously the reasons why (a) the CAs theory of limited liability on
the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a right to be compensated for all months she, in fact,
was forced to work. To determine for which months petitioners right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed,
we must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims accruing prior
to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims
for salary differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months.[25]
We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary differential due to petitioner at US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as
approved salary rate US$100.00 as salary received = US$290 as underpaid salary per month x 11
months). However, it should be for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as
erroneously stated in the NLRCs Decision.
A final note
This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to guarantee our overseas workers that
they are being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona fideemployers. Local agencies should never allow themselves
to be instruments of exploitation or oppression of their compatriots at the hands of foreign employers. Indeed, being
the ones who profit most from the exodus of Filipino workers to find greener pastures abroad, recruiters should be
first to ensure the welfare of the very people that keep their industry alive.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
7, 2002 and Resolution dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825 are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated February 24,
2000 is REINSTATED with a qualification with respect to the award of salary differentials, which should be
granted for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182232
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
- versus -
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
NENITA B. HU,
Accused-Appellant. October 6, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu (Hu) seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 9 October 2007 in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243, affirming with
modification the Decision[2] dated 4 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, in
Criminal Case No. 03-356. The RTC in its Decision found Hu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, [3] and accordingly,
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay the fine of P500,000.00, and to indemnify private
complainants Paul Abril (Abril), Joel Panguelo (Panguelo) and Evangeline Garcia (Garcia) in the amounts
of P44,000.00, P50,000 and P50,000, respectively. The decretal part of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
reads:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 03-856, finding appellant
Nenita B. Hu, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
As modified, the award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000 in favor of

Evangeline Garcia, is DELETED.[4]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An Information[5] for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale was filed against Hu and Ethel V. Genoves
(Genoves) which reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses Ethel V. Genoves a.k.a. Merry Ann Genoves and
Nenita B. Hu, of the crime of Violation of Section 6 penalized under Section 7(b) of RA
8042[6](Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale) committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October 2001, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit, promise employment/job placement abroad for an overseas
employment and collect fees from the following persons to wit:
NOEL P. DELAYUN JOEY F. SILAO
JOEL U. PANGUELO PAUL C. ABRIL
EVANGELINE E. GARCIA ERIC V. ORILLANO
thus in large scale amounting to economic sabotage without any license or authorized by the
POEA of the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for an overseas
employment.
Upon arraignment, Hu assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty while Genoves remained at
large.[7] Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued. While the Information for illegal recruitment named several
persons as having been promised jobs by Hu and Genoves, only four of them Panguelo, Garcia, Abril and Orillano --
testified.
Hu was the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. (Brighturn), a land-based recruitment
agency duly licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to engage in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers abroad, with principal address at No. 1916 San Marcelino St.,
Malate, Manila. Brighturn was authorized by the POEA to recruit, process and deploy land-based workers for the
period 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001.[8]
Genoves worked as a consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside from her stint at Brighturn,
Genoves was also connected with Riverland Consultancy Service (Riverland), another recruitment agency located
at Room No. 210, LPL Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
Private complainants Orillano, Panguelo, Abril and Garcia sought employment at Brighturn for the
positions of factory worker and electronic operator in Taiwan.[9]Notwithstanding private complainants compliance
with all of the pre-employment requirements, including the payment of placement fees, they were not able to
leave the country to work abroad.
Sometime in June 2001, Panguelo was informed by a friend that Brighturn was hiring factory workers
for Taiwan. When Panguelo went to Brighturn, he was promised employment abroad by Hu for P50,000.00. Upon
Hus instruction, Panguelo paid in full the placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00 to Genoves. The payment
was evidenced by an Official Receipt dated 16 October 2001 bearing Genoves signature. Panguelo waited for three
years to be deployed to Taiwan. His waiting was all for naught. Thus, Panguelo decided to abort his application and
demanded from Hu the return of the amount he paid for the placement fee, but Hu could no longer return the
money.[10]
Also sometime in September 2001, Abril went to Brighturn to apply as a factory worker in Taiwan. At
Brighturn, Abril was entertained by Hu who oriented him on the necessary requirements for application which
included a valid passport, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Clearance and ID pictures. After complying with
the documentary requirements, Abril was required by Hu to pay the placement fee to Genoves in the amount
of P44,000.00. As shown in Official Receipts dated 9 October 2001 and 26 October 2000, which were signed by
Genoves, Abril paid the whole amount of P44,000.00 as placement fee. Abril was assured by Hu that he would be
deployed to Taiwanby December 2001 which was subsequently reset to April 2002. Despite several
postponements, Abril was not able to leave the country.[11]
For his part, Orillano came to know of Brighturn thru Genoves. Orillano was interviewed at Brighturn by a
Taiwanese principal in October 2001. After the interview, Huinformed Orillano to submit a medical certificate, NBI
clearance and passport; and to pay the requisite placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00. Believing that Hu
could send him abroad, Orillano faithfully complied with these requirements including the placement fee, the
payment of which was made to Genoves at Brighturns office. Despite such payment, however, Orillano was not
able to leave the country.[12]
Garcia suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In April 2002, Garcia applied as Electronic Operator at Brighturn
wherein she was entertained by Hu who informed her that Brighturns license was suspended. Garcia was then
referred by Hu to Best One International (Best One), another recruitment agency likewise located in
Malate, Manila. While Garcia was told by Hu that the processing of her documents would be done at Best One, the
placement fee, however, should be paid at Brighturn. Accordingly, the amount of P60,000.00 was paid by Garcia to
Hu and Genoves as placement fee upon Hus instruction. Almost predictably, the promise of an employment
abroad never came to pass.[13]
When Hu was not able to refund the amounts paid as placement fees upon demand, private complainants went to
NBI to file a complaint for illegal recruitment against Hu and Genoves.
For her defense, Hu claimed that she was the President of Brighturn, a duly authorized land-based
recruitment agency. Brighturn had foreign principals in Taiwan who were looking for skilled individuals willing to
work in a foreign country. Hu alleged that Brighturn had an established recruitment procedure wherein applicants
were only required to pay the corresponding placement fees after the POEA had already approved their
employment contracts. According to Hu, announcements were posted all over Brighturns premises warning job
applicants to pay placement fees only to the cashier. After the expiration of its license issued by the POEA on 18
December 1999, Brighturn failed to pursue its application for renewal due its inability to post the required cash
bond. Brighturn was thus constrained to refer all pending applications to Best One. [14]
Hu admitted knowing the private complainants because these individuals went to her office demanding
the return of their placement fees by showing their official receipts.Hu averred that when she examined such
receipts, she found that private complainants paid their placement fees to Riverland and not to Brighturn as shown
in the heading of the said receipts which bore the name and address of Riverland and its proprietress, Genoves. Hu
denied knowing Genoves.[15]
On 4 January 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision[16] finding Hu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Nenita Hu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 and 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042,
and, accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, pay the fine
of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private complainants Paul Abril in the amount of P44,000.00,
Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00 and Evangeline Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[17] dated 9 October 2007, confirmed the presence of all the elements
of illegal recruitment in large scale, and thereby affirmed the conviction of Hu with the modification that
the amount of actual damages awarded to Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00 be deleted.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING HU GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE.
Hu was charged with and convicted by the trial court of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, which
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found that Hu made enticing, albeit empty
promises, which moved private complainants to part with their money and pay the placement fee.
For its part, the Solicitor General joined the lower courts in finding that Hu was indeed guilty of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale. According to the Solicitor General, all the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale had been
established beyond reasonable doubt.[18]
We cannot sustain the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2)
he undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code.[19]Recruitment and placement is any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.[20]
The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with the addition
of a third element the recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as group. [21]
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal
recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group.While it is true that the law does
not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is
sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. [22]
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden of
proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui
dicit non qui negat; i.e., he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The conviction of appellant must rest not
on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. [23]
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that illegal recruitment
was committed against three or more persons. What we have uncovered upon careful scrutiny of the records was
the fact that illegal recruitment was committed against only one person; that is, against Garcia alone. Illegal
recruitment cannot successfully attach to the allegations of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, since they testified that
they accomplished their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn from June 2001 up to October of the
same year,[24] a period wherein Brighturns license to engage in recruitment and placement was still in full force
and effect. [25]
While there were six private complainants in this case, four of whom were presented during the trial, the
prosecution, nonetheless, failed to establish that Hu engaged in illegal recruitment acts against at least three of
these complainants. In offenses in which the number of victims is essential, such as in the present petition, failure
of the prosecution to prove by convincing evidence that the offense is committed against the minimum number of
persons required by law is fatal to its cause of action. Underscoring the significance of the number of victims was
the disquisition of Justice Florenz Regalado in People v. Ortiz-Miyake[26]:
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is determinative. Where
illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal
recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) [27] of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where
the offense is committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which
provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a)[28] of the same Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Regrettably, we cannot affirm the conviction of Hu for the offense of illegal recruitment in large
scale. While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on
innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to
prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt. It is unfortunate that the prosecution evidence did not pass the
test of reasonable doubt, since the testimonies of its witnesses unveil a contradicting inference -- that the
recruitment of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano was undertaken by Hu with the required authority from the POEA.
Failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt does not absolve her of her
civil obligation to return the money she collected from private complaints Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, plus legal
interest in accordance with our ruling in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals.[29] There, the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish a case to warrant a conviction, but clearly proved a just debt owed to the private
complainant. Thus, the accused was ordered to pay the face value of the check with 12% legal interest per annum,
reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of the judgment. It is well settled that acquittal based
on reasonable doubt does not preclude an award for civil damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. Thus, civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. There appears to be no sound reason to
require that a separate action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings.[30] In the present case, the prosecution explicitly proved that private
complainants parted with substantial amounts of money upon the prodding and enticement of Hu on the false
pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end, private complainants were
not able to leave for work abroad or get their money back.
Neither does her acquittal herein exempt Hu from subsequent criminal prosecution for estafa [31] provided
that deceit, which is an essential element of estafa, be proven by the prosecution. [32] Apparently, Hu deluded
private complainants into believing that she had the capacity to send them abroad for employment. Through this
hoax, she was able to convince private complainants to surrender their money to her in the vain hope, as it turned
out, of securing employment abroad.
This leaves us a case of simple illegal recruitment committed against Garcia.
Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for the position of Electronic Operator thru
Brighturn in April 2002. Due to the alleged suspension of Brighturns license, Hu referred her to a neighboring
agency (Best One), but Hu continued collecting placement fees from her.
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after an initial
interview to a selected employer, placement or bureau, is included in recruitment. [33] Undoubtedly, the act of Hu in
referring Garcia to another recruitment agency squarely fell within the purview of recruitment that was
undertaken by Hu after her authority to recruit and place workers already expired on 17 December 2001.
Failure of Garcia to present proof of payment is irrelevant. The absence of receipts in the case of illegal
recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the prosecutions case. As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible and testimonial evidence, as in the case at bar, that the appellant
had engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be very well justified. [34]
Irrefragably, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hu of the charge of illegal
recruitment against Garcia when the former referred the latter to another agency without the license or authority
to do so. The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of Garcia, which unmistakably demonstrated how Hu
successfully enticed her to part with a considerable amount of money in exchange for an employment abroad
which was never realized. This finding was adopted by the appellate court, considering that that the trial court was
in the best position to ascertain credibility issues, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial.
Aptly, the bare denials of Hu have no probative value when ranged against the affirmative declarations of
Garcia, even if the latter failed to present receipts for the payments she had made. In People v. Villas,[35] this Court
affirmed the conviction of the appellant for illegal recruitment even if private complaints were not able to present
any receipt that they paid appellant anything, thus:
Neither is there merit in the contention of the defense that appellant should be
exonerated for failure of the prosecution to present any receipt proving that private
complainants paid her anything. The defense argues that a receipt is the best evidence to prove
delivery of money and the absence thereof shows that no payment was made.
This argument is not novel. The Court has previously ruled that the absence of receipts
evidencing payment does not defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. In People vs.
Pabalan [262 SCRA 574, 30 September 1996], this Court ruled:
x x x the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant
the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the
witnesses had positively shown through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one
involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the want of
receipts.
The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the
presentation of receipts in order to prove the existence of recruitment
agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The
amounts may consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses.
The private complainants have convincingly testified that the accused enticed them to
apply and, in actual fact, received payments from them. And to these testimonies, the trial court
accorded credence. On the other hand, appellant has not shown any reason to justify a
modification or reversal of the trial courts finding.
Our ruling in People v. Villas[36] that the absence of receipts in illegal recruitment case does not warrant
the acquittal of the accused has been reiterated in several cases. [37] We are not unaware of the proliferation of
these scheming illegal recruiters who cunningly rob Filipino workers, desperate to work abroad, of their money in
exchange of empty promises. This Court cannot be drawn to the ingenious ploy of these illegal recruiters in
withholding receipts from their victims in their vain attempt to evade liability.
In fine, the Court will have to discard the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale meted out by the
RTC, since only one applicant abroad was recruited by Hu without license and authority from the
POEA. Accordingly, Hu should be held responsible for simple illegal recruitment only. Hus unsuccessful indictment
for illegal recruitment in large scale, however, does not discharge her from her civil obligation to return the
placement fees paid by private complainants.
Under Section 7(a) of Republic Act No. 8042,[38] simple illegal recruitment is punishable by imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve years and a fine of not less than two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if the offense is punishable by a special law, as
in this case, the court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by the said law and the minimum of which shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. Accordingly, a penalty of eight (8) to twelve (12) years of imprisonment should be meted
out to Hu. In addition, a fine in the amount of P500,000.00; and indemnity to private complainants -- Abril in the
amount of P44,000.00, Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00, Garcia in the amount of P60,000.00 and Orillano in
the amount of P50,000.00, with 12% legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the
finality of the judgment is imposed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243 affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu for the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to life
imprisonment is hereby VACATED. A new Decision is hereby entered convicting the accused-appellant of the
offense of Simple Illegal Recruitment committed against private complainant Evangeline Garcia. She is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. She is ordered to pay a
fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant Evangeline Garcia in the amount
of P60,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of the
judgment.
Accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu is likewise ordered to indemnify private complainants Paul Abril in the
amount of P44,000.00, Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00, and Eric Orillano in the amount
of P50,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, as reckoned above.
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER G.R. Nos. 182978-79
AND PROMOTION, INC vs SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in
actual damages with interest.
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,
Inc.[2] (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract
duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a female
cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling of poison. [3]
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital, who
conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning. Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police Station, for examining the corpse
of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital.
1. The Police Report on the Death
2. The Medical Diagnosis
Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian
The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital; time 12.20 P.M.
and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd undertaken
but without success.
3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and brain damage
due to an apparent poisoning which is under investigation.[4]
Name: Jasmin Cuaresma
Sex: Female
Marital Status: Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion: Christian Profession: Nurse
Address: Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have examined the
dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result was:
1. Report of the Police on the death
2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood
circulation and respiratory system and brain damage. There were no external
injuries. Likelypoisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined. There was
a bad smell in the mouth and unknown to us.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the
City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report
indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by
the KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions at her
inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds
and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs;
intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions
on the labia minora of the vaginal area.[6]
On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and
insecticides.[7]
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her surviving heirs, received from the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits;
P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA,
Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages
for Jasmins death.[8]
In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related, having occurred at the
employers premises;[9] that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is entitled to iqama insurance coverage; that
Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her
monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining
years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at
age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under mysterious circumstances, they suffered
sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by findings in the autopsy and
exhumation reports which evidently show that a grave injustice has been committed against them and their
daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful
suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of
the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other
benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to iqama insurance
because this refers to the issuance not insurance of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the
issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they
have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that Rajab
terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new
recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and
reiterated Becmens arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision [10] dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter
concluded that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case, Jasmins death was not service-connected, nor was it shown
that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received all corresponding benefits they were
entitled to under the law. In regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their
autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution [11] declared
that, based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-connected criminal
aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physicians report as well as the KSA police report, finding
the same to be inconclusive. It declared that Jasmins death was the result of an accident occurring within the
employers premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she lived, and thus
arose out of and in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in
the form of Jasmins lost earnings, including future earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The
Commission, however, dismissed all other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the Commission issued its
October 9, 2003 Resolution[12] reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual damages to US$80,000.00.[13] The
NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. [14] On June 28,
2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision,[15] the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision, it
should first be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it
is already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White Falcon).
SO ORDERED.[16]
The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins death was compensable, the same having
occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer. Thus her death should be
considered to have occurred within the employers premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate court rendered the
assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly, the award of
US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the legal rate
computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners are hereby adjudged jointly
and solidarily liable with the employer for the monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter
and Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmins death was compensable,
however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor
may lost earnings be collected, because the same may be charged only against the perpetrator of the crime or
quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court held that Jasmins beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum
equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied
by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The Cuaresmas, on the
other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was denied. They are now before us via
G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R. Nos. 182978-79.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE
AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE
REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION
PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN
CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN TALLER
VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER 20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT IQAMA INSURANCE
WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE IQAMA IS NOT AN INSURANCE.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF
JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO JASMINS
BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN THIS
MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER OF
THE TERM OF JASMINS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY
INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND WHITE
FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE
CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O. 247, R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE
CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL LAWS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DECEASEDS FUTURE
EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS OF
OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS

AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE DISTURBED THROUGH
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and
damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her employer Rajab
freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not
contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting
parties.[18] An examination of said employment agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or other
benefits/privileges than the following:
1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the end
thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
3. Transportation to and from work;
4. Free living accommodations;
5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic surgery
charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the exit/re-
entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty four-
months of continuous service;
8. Eight days public holidays per year;
9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as per labor
laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other benefits
that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court granted variably in the guise
of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make Jasmins
employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these benefits; and
neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage unless of course the KSA labor laws have been amended to the
opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as work-connected and thus compensable? The
evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not on duty, or else evidence to the contrary
would have been adduced. Neither was she within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory
room on personal time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the time
she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her employment as nurse, because
she was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk Hospital,
and not at her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is not on duty. It is
not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees personal time away from work, which the latter
are free to spend of their own choosing. Whether they choose to spend their free time in the pursuit of safe or
perilous undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this is not one area which their
employers should be made accountable for. While we have emphasized the need to observe official work time
strictly,[19] what an employee does on free time is beyond the employers sphere of inquiry.
While the employers premises may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned by it, but
also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses,[20] we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin
stayed should constitute employers premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered to
have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly
exceptions,[21] but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination would have to depend
on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that she did; thus, her
heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not
believe so.
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her
employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of her life and
working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own
country, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of poisoning
are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the exhumation report of
the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained external and internal injuries,
specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right
ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and
legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the
labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report came up negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin was poisoned to
death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and
possibly raped her are certainly responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world blind to the
realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign employers. It is inconceivable that
our Filipina women would seek employment abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide
for unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort and safety of home, to work in
a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed, many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to
end up with undesirable employers have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body
yet they have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with cigarettes, kicked in
the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved with incessant work,
locked in their rooms, forced to serve their masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized and insulted, their
spirits fought on and they lived for the day that they would once again be reunited with their families and loved
ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide, without even
lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmins death. Being in the business of sending OFWs to work abroad,
Becmen and White Falcon should know what happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be
completely unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed by
vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or environments where they are liable to become
victims of crime. By now they should know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of
killing themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and, worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting scheme of conveniently avoiding responsibility
by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life. Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation
(as employer and recruiter) to assist Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on
Jasmins case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police reports themselves
indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or representative in the KSA who would
naturally demand and seek an investigation of her case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient
route to avoiding and denying liability, by casting Jasmins fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this
date, no follow up of Jasmins case was ever made at all by them, and they seem to have expediently treated
Jasmins death as a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the
Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to restore honor to
her name.
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmins remains were
repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to make personal representations
with Jasmins parents, if only to extend their condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie
Fajardo, was designated to accompany Jasmins body home.
Of all lifes tragedies, the death of ones own child must be the most painful for a parent. Not knowing why
or how Jasmins life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly unbearable for Jasmins parents, and further aggravated
by Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons baseless insistence and accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal
sin by any religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs; and the resilient
and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of her physical self, that Jasmin did not
commit suicide but a victim of murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins case has caused unfathomable pain and
suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their moral obligation, as employer and recruiter and as
entities laden with social and civic obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents
and those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to pursue justice, they chose
to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may avoid pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to
the Philippine authorities autopsy and toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing
justice for Jasmins death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and
social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to
answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for her death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995,[22] the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in general,
and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.[23] The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and
legal services to Filipino migrant workers.[24] The rights and interest of distressed[25] overseas Filipinos, in general,
and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and
safeguarded.[26]
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the
provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs,
especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further
their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from
them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just
one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not even
show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmins
case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the
argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be the ones to actively pursue a just resolution
of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen
and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmins parents can do is to coordinate with
Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and secure the aid of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to
solve the case or obtain relief, in accordance with Section 23 [27] of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all
that was within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even further. To the
best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate Jasmins case on their own: they caused another
autopsy on Jasmins remains as soon as it arrived to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that, they
subjected themselves to the painful and distressful experience of exhuming Jasmins remains in order to obtain
another autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether or not their daughter was poisoned. Their quest for
the truth and justice is equally to be expected of all loving parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of
extending their full cooperation to the Cuaresma family merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,[28] a seaman who was being repatriated after his
employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila connecting flight as he began to wander the
streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to death by Thai police four days after, on account of running amuck
with a knife in hand and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer, sued for death and other
benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer agreement which provides that no
compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on
his own life by the seaman. The Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the recruitment
agency should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed the seaman, who was
later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable for the seamans
death. We ruled therein that
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its
agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by
petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental
disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such
attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and
disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their
usefulness.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals, recruitment agencies have
equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not
discriminatory treatment from the foreign government, and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation,
legal aid, and the Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the rescue of our
distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where they are deployed or stationed. Upon
them lies the primary obligation to protect the rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or
not. Who else is in a better position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed
OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21
of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires
that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because they
undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection
under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act
with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmins
case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true
circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence
that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate
interests above of the welfare of their employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy,
and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack
of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it just to protect
Rajab and Becmens material interest despite evidence to the contrary is against the moral law and runs contrary to
the good custom of not denouncing ones fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good
name and honor.[30]
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor
and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with
the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. This
ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. [31]
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest,[32] and neither shall act
oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. [33] In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. [34]
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer is
sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)[35] of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in actions referred to
in Article 21.[36]
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages, which
Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary damages for wanton and
oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law
against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due him.[37] If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. [38]
White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not automatically result in Becmens freedom or
release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v. NLRC.[39] Instead, both
Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be
reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor
what he has paid.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619
and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service
Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable
and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following
amounts:
Bernardo vs NLRC
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and
conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular
workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the
contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.
The Case
Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari[1] before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision[2] of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC),[3] which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L.
Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.
Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution[5] of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:[6]
Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993
by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement
called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said agreement is
quoted below:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros, Manila,
represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the
BANK);
- and -
________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at

__________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled and
handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-economic
well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate in
the mainstream of society;
WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons,
particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and authorized
government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible
employment with the BANK;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this Employment
Contract as follows:
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully
work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:
i Sort out bills according to color;
ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;
iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;
iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine
whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.
4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the sole
judgment of the BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at
eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant,
for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed
during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:
i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.
ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.
iii. SSS premium payment.
7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and
Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment program of
the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her
case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the
employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular employee are not applicable to the
EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANK shall
be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations that the Department
of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of disabled and handicapped
workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor
Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable
to him/her.
9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier terminated
by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall be in writing and
therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of
_________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in
1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months
such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under
the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract
expired on July 1993.
xxxxxxxxx
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained
that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under
[a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities
to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to pakiusap which must be considered in the light of the
context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career and working environment which is to
maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are
baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular
employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder;
that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it
adopted the special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the
complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting of bills
which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and sorting of money are
tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers normal functions; that from
the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the
tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties (p.
97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting
bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any
other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.
Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz: [7]
NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed
1. MARITES BERNARDO ET AL….
As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this
recourse to this Court.[9]
The Ruling of the NLRC
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were
hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were
covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art.
80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the
parties.[10]
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the
prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money sorters
and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.
II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts
signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were valid.
III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna
Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons. [11]
In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.
This Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose
contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.
Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari
Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not
allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public
respondents that petitioners were not regular employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in
a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change
the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and
counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts
served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should
not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.[12] Rather, they were special workers
under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners,
whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government officials and civic-
minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of government representatives, that they could
not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to be
performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need but merely for humanitarian
reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the petitioners no longer
exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment
contracts.
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to provide
employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However,
we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment
irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show
that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal
rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law
and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one
month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term
of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable
cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the
Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an
employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the
applicable legal minimum wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding
events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), [13]however, justify the
application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to
the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualifiedto perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be
given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta
provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and
the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied
person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts
from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they
are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists.
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,[14] in which this Court held:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection
can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the
following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante,
Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George
P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody
V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia
Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth
Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.
As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making
permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary
appointments, ad infinitum.[15] The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during
which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of
the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. [16] No employer is allowed to
determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may
be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause,[17] these twenty-
seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges.[18] Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is
no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, [19] petitioners are
hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.[20]
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not
entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling
Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora[21] in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment
contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing.It adds that the
petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and
Representative Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were
disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80
of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under
the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed
by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their
positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring
instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. [22] Provisions
of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves
and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each
other.[23] Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions
of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied
employees.
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task could not
be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night. [24] We find
no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This
excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change the
nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of
service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and
that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,[25] the Court held that the determination of
whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of
hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence.
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular
employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are
not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the
contract, but by the nature of the work performed. [26] Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple
expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:[27]
Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be secure in
his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the
concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular
employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment.
xxxxxxxxx
At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent
cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term
employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon
the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this Court went on to say
that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of
tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and
morals.
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class,
but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment
of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance
to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why then
should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their
fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular
employees.
In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause. [28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the
August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company is hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27)
petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller,
Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales,
Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani
R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie
Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to
compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days
from the finality of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

CHARLIE COMILA and Promulgated:

Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.

1. In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

2. In Criminal Case No. 16430-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

3. In Criminal Case No. 16431-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

4. In Criminal Case No. 16432-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

5. In Criminal Case No. 16434-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

6. In Criminal Case No. 16436-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

7. In Criminal Case No. 16438-R, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

9. Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R; 16435-R and

With costs against the accused-appellants.

Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision:[16]

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be

Costs against appellants.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The prosecution likewise presented the following documentary evidence:

Exh. "B" – Affidavit of Alma E. Singh dated February 23, 1996.3

In rejecting the defenses of the appellant, the trial court declared:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL

The appeal has no merit.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:

Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts shall be deemed

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The facts are as follows:

Site of employment - Bahrain

January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding respondent Agency

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the

The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.

Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN

We grant the petition.

On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioners monetary

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:

On whether petitioners claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed

As modified, the award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000 in favor of

The antecedent facts are as follows:

NOEL P. DELAYUN JOEY F. SILAO

JOEL U. PANGUELO PAUL C. ABRIL

EVANGELINE E. GARCIA ERIC V. ORILLANO

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

We cannot sustain the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale.

This leaves us a case of simple illegal recruitment committed against Garcia.

Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.

1. The Police Report on the Death

2. The Medical Diagnosis

Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

Name: Jasmin Cuaresma

Religion: Christian Profession: Nurse

Address: Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines

1. Report of the Police on the death

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS

1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

3. Transportation to and from work;

4. Free living accommodations;

8. Eight days public holidays per year;

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:[6]

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS

This Contract, entered into by and between:

________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at

i Sort out bills according to color;

____, years old, of legal age, _, and residing at