CANON 1:

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

- versus -
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission
on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004,
informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4] After that hearing,
complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. [5] Accordingly,
the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this
wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven
by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the
taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his
car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled
of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the
accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter
boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could
be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle
was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of
the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the
same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on
the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed
by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto
Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because
the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had
not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord
injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for
probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court
in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]
 According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking,
even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an
obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken
him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun,
wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two
unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment
or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment,
of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain
to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants
disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide.
Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and
held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment
Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a
pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude
is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether
any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of
incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances
of the crime are quoted as follows:
 x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the
victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that
Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that
he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay
the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense
and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character
and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and
his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of
aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim
when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention
to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the
tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his
illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19] He has thus brazenly violated the law
and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years [21] since he
was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to
their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit
for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing them from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had
sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.[25] But when this effort failed,
respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a conference with him to
obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by
complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
 The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not
support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The
injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he
said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x. [28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. [29] The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead
the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude
for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31] The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [32] Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession
of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed
when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to
respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting
out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar
of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as
a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate
their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 7547

GREGORY U. CHAN, Complainant,- versus –

NLRC COMMISSIONERROMEO L. GO and ATTY. JOSE RAULITO E. PARAS,

Respondents. September 4, 2009

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified Complaint[1] dated June 5, 2007, complainant Gregory U. Chan prayed for the disbarment or imposition of proper
disciplinary sanctions upon respondents Commissioner Romeo Go of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Atty. Jose
Raulito E. Paras for perpetrating acts unbecoming and degrading to the legal profession, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[2] Canons of Professional Ethics,[3] and the Rules of Court.[4]
 Complainant alleged that respondents are influence peddlers who pride themselves in being able to direct the outcome of
cases pending before the NLRC; that respondents belittled and denigrated the nobility of the legal profession by indicating that decisions
of the NLRC are merely drafted by humble secretaries or clerks who write in accordance to their mandate; and that respondents
attempted to extort money from him.

The present controversy stemmed from an illegal dismissal case[5] filed by Susan Que Tiu against complainant and his
companies. On July 18, 2003, the labor arbiter[6]ruled in favor of Tiu and ordered her employers to pay backwages, separation pay,
unpaid commissions, and 10% attorneys fees.[7] Pending resolution of their appeal before theNLRC, complainant alleged that
respondents Go and Paras attempted to extort money from him in behalf of Tiu. He narrated that respondent Go arranged for meetings
at expensive restaurants to wit:

First Meeting on September 16, 2003

at Yuraken Japanese Restaurant, Diamond Hotel, Manila

Complainant alleged that it was during this dinner when respondents were first introduced to him, his
wife Jenny, his brother Glenn, and the latters mother-in-law Mrs. Ban Ha; that respondent Go claimed that he is
a very powerful high ranking commissioner at the NLRC; that respondents were personally overseeing the
developments of the labor case although it was pending before another division; that it was merely respondent
Gos secretary or clerk who would be drafting the decision of the said case; and that respondents told him to
simply give in to Tius demands.[8]

Second Meeting on September 26, 2003

at Akiga Japanese Restaurant, Mandaluyong

Complainant alleged that respondents brought with them a certain Mr. Alfredo Lim, a former
schoolmate of respondent Go and a godfather of Tiu; that Lim demanded the settlement of Tius claims; that he
illustrated he is not a bad employer Tiu painted him to be as the latter even invited him to her wedding; that
respondent Go offered him the services of respondent Paras as legal counsel; and that respondents asked him to
give them pertinent documents relating to the labor case in their next meeting.[9]

Third Meeting on October 20, 2003

at Korean Village Restaurant, Manila

Complainant alleged that his group brought their company accountant Ms. Leah Pascual, while
respondents brought Atty. Jessie Andres who was introduced to be connected with then Senator Noli De Castro;
that he showed the group the company documents proving payment to Tiu of her sales commission; that
respondents did not bother expressing interest in examining the documents; that respondent Go left the dinner
early for another business commitment; and that the remaining people instead discussed his possible support for
Sen. De Castros campaign.[10]

Fourth Meeting on December 2, 2003

at Akiga Japanese Restaurant, Mandaluyong

Complainant alleged that he did not personally attend the meeting to avoid a confrontation with Tiu;
that Jenny, Glenn, and Pascual met with respondents, Lim, Tiu, and her husband; that respondent Go dismissed
the documents presented by Jenny and claimed that it was his tactic for Tiu to submit a sur-rejoinder with photo-
 attachments[11] showing MCC Industrial Sales, Corp. and Sanyo Seiki Industrial Sales, Corp. conducting business in
one office; that respondent Go goaded Jenny to give in to Tius demands as the latter was suffering from cancer;
that Jenny refused the demands, prompting her to lose her appetite and walk out to regain her composure; and
that respondent and his companions simply enjoyed their free sumptuous meals.[12]

Fifth Meeting on February 24, 2004

at California Pizza Kitchen, Shangri-La Plaza Mall, Mandaluyong

Complainant alleged that his wife Jenny again met with respondent Go, Mr. Lim, Ms. Que Tiu and her
husband; that Tiu lowered the settlement amount to P450,000.00; that Jenny insisted that Tius claim should not
exceed P198,000.00; and that respondent Go prevented Jenny from walking out of their meeting with assurances
that he will further convince Tiu.[13]

Sixth Meeting on March 3, 2004

at Palm Court Caf, Diamond Hotel, Manila

Complainant alleged that he, together with his wife Jenny, and brother Glenn met with respondents
Paras and Go and his wife; and that respondent Go assured them that its going to be their last meeting and Tiu
will just settle for P300,000.00.[14]

Seventh Meeting on October 4, 2004

at Una Mas, Greenhills

Complainant alleged that respondent Paras asked for another dinner appointment to which he sent his
brother Glenn to attend; that respondent Paras disclosed during the meeting that the matter was no longer in
their hands as they decided not to push through with the deal with Tiu; that Glenn was shocked at respondents
fraudulent duplicity that he left the restaurant in a huff after paying the bill. [15]

As proof of these meetings, complainant attached receipts[16] for the meals ordered at the above-mentioned establishments
and affidavits of Jenny Chan,[17] Leah Pascual,[18] and Glenn Chan,[19] recounting the matters that transpired therein.

On September 10, 2004, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision, but removed the award of separation pay and ordered
complainant to reinstate Tiu to her former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges. [20] On July 12, 2005, the NLRC denied
the parties Motions for Reconsideration and sustained its earlier Resolution.[21]

On June 5, 2007, or simultaneously with the filing of the present administrative complaint, complainant filed a case for Grave
Misconduct[22] against respondents Go and Paras with the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the same set of facts in the administrative
case.

Previously, complainant also filed an Estafa case[23] against Susan Que Tiu, Ramon Givertz, and Zed Metal and Construction
Corporation. However, it was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in a Resolution [24] dated May 22, 2006, for
insufficiency of evidence.

Thereafter, in April 2007, respondent Paras filed a complaint against complainant Chan for Grave Oral Slander, Serious Slander
by Deed, Grave Threats, and Alarms and Scandals[25] with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong. He alleged that without
provocation, complainant suddenly pushed his left shoulder and hurled insults and invectives when his group bumped onto him on
March 31, 2007 at Fish and Co. restaurant in Shangri-La Mall at Mandaluyong City.

On July 9, 2007, complainant filed a Manifestation[26] stating that he received death threats[27] about two weeks after filing the
present complaint.

On July 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolutions of the NLRC, with modification that the total monetary award
should be P737,757.41.[28] Complainant and his companies thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court which is still
pending resolution. [29]
 In his Comment,[30] respondent Paras alleged that the present complaint, like the Ombudsman case for Grave Misconduct, was
filed by complainant to gain leverage against him for the criminal case (I.S. No. 07-71604-D) he filed against the latter. Paras denied
conspiring with Go in the commission of the acts complained of. He likewise denied knowing Tiu or the labor case. As for the enumerated
meetings, respondent Paras alleged that he was not present on September 16, 2003, December 2, 2003, and February 24, 2004; that
he merely fetched respondent Go at the meeting on September 26, 2003; that he was present during the October 20, 2003 meeting,
but deemed the same to be social dinner rather than a conciliation/mediation for settlement; that during the March 3, 2004 meeting,
he merely accompanied respondent Go and his wife because they previously came from an earlier dinner; that it was complainants
brother Glenn who asked for an appointment on October 4, 2004 and offered to secure his services as their counsel for the labor case
against Tiu; and that days later, Glenn even asked for his services regarding a collection case which he declined because it was his law
firms policy not to accept simple collection cases.

Respondent Paras also alleged that complainants charge of violation of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is misplaced as he was not a lawyer in the government service at the time material to the acts complained of.

Meanwhile, respondent Go labelled as blatant lies the allegations of Chan in his complaint. He alleged that he met Chan, Jenny,
and Glenn, through his mothers close friends Yek Ti L. Chua and Ban Ha; that he came to know of the labor case of Susan Que Tiu during
a casual bridge session with the latters godfather Alfredo Lim; that it was complainant who organized the meetings and persisted in
asking his help regarding the said labor case; that he refused to help complainant because he would not want to influence his colleagues
in the NLRC to reverse their judgments; that he did not impress upon complainant and his family that he is engaged in influence peddling;
that when he relayed to Lim complainants intention to amicably settle the case, Lim agreed to be introduced to complainant; that he
never introduced respondent Paras as his associate; that he only assisted the parties during the conciliation meetings but never coerced
complainant to give in to the demands of Lim; and that he did not extort money from complainant.

To substantiate his claim, Go submitted affidavits of Yek Ti L. Chua; [31] Evangeline C. Apanay[32] and Marina R. Taculao,[33] both
of whom are administrative personnel assigned at his office in the NLRC.

The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to the administration of discipline to those found culpable
of misconduct but also to the protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously charged. In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[34]

After a careful study of the instant case, we find no sufficient evidence to support complainants claim. Except for complainants
bare allegations, there is no proof that respondents engaged in influence peddling, extortion, or in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct. It is axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus of validating it.[35]

We note that the labor case of Tiu has already been decided in the latters favor prior the alleged meetings. Even after the said
meetings, the NLRC still affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter which was adverse to herein complainant and his companies. If
respondent Go really agreed to influence the outcome of the case, then the results would have been otherwise.

In addition, the receipts presented by complainant do not necessarily prove the presence of respondents in said meetings. They
only show that certain persons went to the aforenamed restaurants to eat and meet. However, it could not be said with certainty that
respondents were among them based only on the receipts presented.

Moreover, the alleged representations by respondent Go regarding the drafting of NLRC decisions were refuted by the
affidavits executed by Apanay and Taculao. Also, no proof was presented in support of the allegation regarding the belittling or
denigration of the legal profession and the NLRC.

Significantly, the present complaint was filed only after the lapse of almost four years since the alleged extortion was made or
two years since the resolution of the labor case by the NLRC. Complainant did not offer any reason for the belated filing of the case thus
giving the impression that it was filed as a leverage against the case for Grave Oral Slander, Serious Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, and
Alarms and Scandals (I.S. No. 07-71604-D) filed by Paras against complainant.

Also, the ruling of the labor arbiter was favorable to Tiu; hence, there was no need for respondents to get in touch with
complainant to settle the case in Tius behalf. In contrast, complainant who was the defeated party in the labor case has more reason to
seek avenues to convince Tiu to accept a lower settlement amount. This Court is thus convinced that it was the complainant who
arranged to meet with respondent Go and not the contrary as he averred.

We cannot lend credence to complainants allegation that he or his group met with respondents six or seven times. Complainant
and his group were allegedly angered, insulted, and offended by respondents yet they still agreed to foot the bills for the meals. Even
after the denial by the NLRC of their motion for reconsideration, with nothing more to discuss, complainants still allegedly met with
respondents. These actions are not in accord with human behavior, logic, and common sense. At this time, complainant would have
known that respondents could not deliver on their alleged promises to influence the outcome of the case in his favor; that they were
only trying to extort money from him, and abusing him for free meals. As such, he should have stopped meeting them, or immediately
filed criminal and/or administrative charges against them, or at the least, refused to foot the bill for their meals.

This Court agrees with respondent Paras that complainants charge of violation of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is misplaced because he was not a government lawyer at the time material to the acts complained of. This fact is
certified[36] by the Training and Administrative Manager[37] of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. where respondent Paras was employed
as Assistant Manager, then as Manager for Legal Services and Government Affairs from July 31, 2000 to March 31, 2004.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and NLRC Commissioner Romeo Go
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. P-06-2177

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR

Promulgated: April 19, 2007

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody as required
by OCA Circular No. 8A-93.[1] We ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000 for his transgression. The matter did not end there, however.
Because his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to
show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in compliance
with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a government
lawyer.

In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was
inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the courts safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.

Atty. Khos apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact
that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That
omission was a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities [3] and of his duties
under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility for these are a lawyers
foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation
imposed on every citizen, a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants
of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are
expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.[4] This, in fact, is what a lawyers obligation to promote respect for law
and legal processes entails.

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. [5] By definition, any act
or omission contrary to law is unlawful.[6] It does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include
it.[7] Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of
Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

Atty. Khos conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to account. However,
his candid and repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to gain and the fact that this is his first offense should temper his
culpability considerably. Under the circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorneys Oath, Section 20(a),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000
within ten days from receipt of this resolution.

The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to deduct from Atty. Khos accrued
leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this resolution
and in the resolution dated June 27, 2006. SO ORDERED.

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

- versus -
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA,Respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty.
Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino
Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. xxxx

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me
that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of
my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told
me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli
Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. xxxx

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence x xx

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the
prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea
was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married
Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy
image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met
Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems
and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel
Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not
practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third
marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he
became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as
they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained
this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her.
Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea
filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage
between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents
argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any
immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his
admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9]

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to
maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise
denied this motion.[11]

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This
resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby
DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No.
XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did
not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under
the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight
of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand,
advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried
to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because
it involves service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material
in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to
be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both
a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental
or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption
that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
even after admission to the Bar.[19]

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the
Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of
this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated,
Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal
only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their
merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or
refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial
interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the communitys sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple
marriages.
 In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever
them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this
society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held
that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good
moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with
the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also
declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral
conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife;
marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.[26] This was a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an
open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into
consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his
second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who
at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-
Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge,
to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules,
of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated
his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all
of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered
this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition
to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall
at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish
motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be
used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject
to the watchful public eye and community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this
scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the
circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them
exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no
distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the
respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of
morality required of them as members of the Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good moral character, a person must
have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement
of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a
married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during
the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer,
a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems,
would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away
from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was
a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from
the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing
his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of
the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt
free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the
nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired
before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,
contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry
Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage
in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge
of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty.
Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not
appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration
of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her
actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability
and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty.
Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did
not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards
of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.
Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership
in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers.
We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and
as an officer of the Court.[42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern
of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for
the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their
separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character,
which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the
administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR.,Complainant, - versus - ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA,Respondent

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide
B. Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct.

The facts are as follows.

Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a verified Complaint[1] against respondent, also a
resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3,[2] Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the IBP Board of Governors for proper
disposition.

Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent asked to be lent ₱350,000.00. Respondent assured him that
she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter
parcel of land located in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2055[3] and registered in her fathers
name. Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of Attorney [4] (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured
complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property. Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was
assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help
of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in complainants favor an open Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto
the SPA. Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date, the deed
of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the amount of ₱350,000.00 to respondent.

Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite complainants repeated demands.
Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him
since the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely
to banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was the first
time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit or
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Responsive Pleading[5] but no answer or comment was ever filed by her before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise,
the IBP-CBD allowed respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by complainant but she did not file any answer
thereto.[6] She also chose not to attend the mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13, 2007 and January 25, 2008
despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed to have waived her right to participate in the proceedings.

On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered his report[7] finding respondent guilty of violating Canon
1, Rule 1.01[9] and Canon 7[10] of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that she be suspended from the practice of
[8]

law for one year. Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to be a co-owner of the property as evidenced by an
annotation on the back of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of the property has been sold to her, it was evident that she employed deceit
and dishonest means to make complainant believe, by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly authorized to sell the entire property.

On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner De
La Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for her failure to submit verified Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory conference,
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. [11]
 We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for,
pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.[12]

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[13]Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required,
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents
and false representations and taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by
complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was
authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the open deed of sale if she fails to
pay the loan.[14] By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics
perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

xxxx

We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded
the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for the mandatory conferences despite due notice. Respondent should
bear in mind that she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP.[15]

Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient
to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed
as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. [16] In this
case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of suspension for one year too
severe. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After all, suspension
is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. [17]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively liable for grave misconduct. She
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.SO ORDERED.

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by upholding the
ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye
and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.1

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint 2 for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."

In her complaint, complainant alleged that

2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a
Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person
sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5,
San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines….

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired
between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself….

4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued
a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime
of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002….

5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in
the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur….

6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR
REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department of Justice.

xxxx

8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B.
VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute … "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME
COURT."

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the maid’s
room at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident
happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with
him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos
and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her mother agreed to
let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused,
she was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her
mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to
6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a
dilapidated shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a
complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was
dismissed. Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years….
 xxxx

5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that the acts of
respondent in having sex with complainant constitute … grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in
having sex with complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute… grossly immoral conduct.

There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant accepts
compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct….

xxxx

6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein. The said
Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to
misunderstanding….

7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and planned act
of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of
the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of
respondent….

8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with her and
demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the criminal
case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura
sent word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort
from respondent so that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;

9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is
hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting
down the respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before hand that
her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura
is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414….

xxxx

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having sex with
complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation
when a woman shall invite him for sex?

Attached to respondent’s Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that
complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard
rumors that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant
with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have
money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that
afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant,
sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the
car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his
poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked him if he could use the latter’s hut. The farm worker agreed and they went
straight to the hut.

Inside the farm worker’s hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any involuntariness on her
part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the
complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had
happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, she’s not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she
accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent
insisted that what happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that
complainant is no longer a virgin.

It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand trial for qualified
seduction.7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion
for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.

Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their respective
Affidavits of Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed. 9

In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be
suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act
will merit a more severe penalty.

On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victim’s guardians and for being a married
man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the
gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have
sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
complainant considering that she was then staying at respondent’s residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and
undeserving of the honor and privilege which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.12

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that complainant has not presented
any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that
complainant’s mother even testified that her daughter stayed at respondent’s house only until February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a
reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of
the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. 15 Consequently, any errant behavior
on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community.16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency.17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondent’s act of
engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction.
Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted
that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a
woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.
Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low
regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.

In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor,19who for a time was
under respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s
consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely
show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. 20

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court pronounced:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no moment. Complainant’s Affidavit of
Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and
the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to
grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members
in order to protect the public and the courts.1âwphi1 A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the
circumstances.24 In this case, respondent’s gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character,
his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.25
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus,
where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.26 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to
be the most appropriate penalty.27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and
Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the. Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts. This Decision takes effect immediately.SO ORDERED.

CANON 2:

MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM

Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's
cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the
maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client. 1

Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll
No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts
unbecoming of an officer of the court.

The essential facts are as follows: 2

Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment" docketed as Civil Case No. 6046 before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168,
Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 54117 for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit
being rented by complainant and her sister.

When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. Civil Case No. 54117 for reconveyance was ordered
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987 while Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Court against her.

On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment, complainant and Peregrina were
served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice.

Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them
to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case. Forthwith, a
petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo
Order, etc." was prepared by respondent to forestall the execution of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.
In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared,
poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised
her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran"
(close friend).

Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed as Civil Case No. 55118.
Respondent demanded from the complainant one thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same
afternoon.

However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the
case on the ground of their friendship.

On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be ready with two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00)
to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her
sister were only able to raise the amount of one thousand pesos which they immediately gave to respondent.

Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he could not locate the judge who would issue the restraining order.
The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags of food
allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining balance
of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.

Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file
another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told
complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of
Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent
stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint.

Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and relatives. On October 26,1987, the
money was handed over to the respondent.

On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment of Simulated or Spurious Sale with Damages," later docketed as
Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by respondent with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro Manila.

At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his promise that he
would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another
lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in
Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed.

Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P
l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on
December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return of the total amount of eleven thousand
pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never
returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein respondent.

Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, dismissed Civil Case No. 55118 for failure to state a cause of
action. 4 On January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521 0 was likewise dismissed for being identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5

Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the allegations
of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only intended to harrass
him. 6

This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. having
represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have carefully
prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant
reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently respondent was more interested in
getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in
one case and talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P 10,000.00 as alleged deposit in
court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious.

When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The
failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had
reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics . 7

The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge
beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of
their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this
fact.

Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4)
days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing
as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void,
respondent failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. 8

His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust
and confidence which he owes his client. 9 More so in this case, where by reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby suffered
by losing all her cases.

The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had already filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good faith as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the complainant in said
case. It was all a show to get more money from her. This adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with this
evident irregularity, he lamely stated that while he did not physically appear for complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted
the pleadings.

His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property subject of the ejectment proceeding would be returned to her. In
fact, it was respondent who persuaded complainant that the filing of these two cases simultaneously were the means by which this
objective can be achieved. His duty was not only to prepare the pleadings but to represent complainant until the termination of the
cases. This he failed to do.

His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he already knew that he could no longer
physically handle the same is an act of deception of his client. 10 It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the
Philippine bar.

The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was given to him as fee for his services, is simply incredible.
Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered. 11 And his failure to return even a portion of
the amount upon demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent does not deserve to
remain as an officer of the court.

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing
criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is
an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not
synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to
be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal
interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned. SO ORDERED.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the
last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office;
can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint
for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and
serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in
Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to
my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session
of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and
notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every
Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits
to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as
member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary
public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have
my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings
so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the
people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their
land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said
codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908
and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
 27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of
ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per
se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to
bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other
causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ
agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of
such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the
ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member
of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end
that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one
of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been
provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason
behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas.,
625; Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases
in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here
be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the
case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our
attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third,
his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of
practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs.

ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for
the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by
Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

"x x x xxx xxx

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his
office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to
legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal
papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute,
Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as
Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount
of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the
case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I
should receive notice of its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no
progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty.
Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even
brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the
City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the
Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my
draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all
of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following
day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and
only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for
the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached
as Annexes D and E;

"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

xxx xxx x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed his
Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand
letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted
by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's
law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only
for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case.
However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose
services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these
fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of
the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of
the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid
was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former
might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by
Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once
more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the
amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the
undesirable events, it was he.

The IBP's Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the
part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client,
the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage
and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his
offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year." 4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.

 Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and
(b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the
complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They
who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They
do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. 5 Members of the bar must do nothing
that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter
never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established.7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant
or the nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant waskumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and
that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's
interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a
client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it
was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's
attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law – a Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a business.11Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of
law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of
respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that
have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and
that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them
of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any
event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal
fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file. SO ORDERED.

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo,
was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not
involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of
which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited
acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is
not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law,
public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this
Court on November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-
606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to
do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact
that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18Such
acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and
fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.: 22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the
law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

CANON 3:

JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant,

vs.
JOSE ANTONIO S. BERNAS, respondent.

TORRES, JR., J.:

On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for
alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. In his complaint-affidavit 1 dated
August 12, 1996, complainant alleged as follows:

A. That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribed under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a
notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyer Jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping which
was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before
the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC, which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy
of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;

B. That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of
Annex A-6, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping which states:

Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:

He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of
which are true to his personal knowledge and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If
he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court or
any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that fact within Five (5) days from notice to this notice
(sic) to this Honorable Court. Emphasis supplied.

C. That the cause of action relied upon by the respondent in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned
from paragraphs 15, 16, and 22;

D. That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and
his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public
document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of
Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B".

D-1. That as stated in Annex "B", the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in
Civil Case No. 65646;

D-2. That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the
same cause of action which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen signatures dated
October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto attached and marked as Annexes (sic) "C".

E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted
and perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, that:

He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency." Where verification-certification was placed
under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of respondent in both cases at Branch 159
of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the Supreme
Court prohibiting forum shopping.

F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer who
instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each
other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and deliberate violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchanged (sic) or any other kind of commercial document; and
 2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated, abetted and facilitated the perversion and
subversion of truth in the said verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02,
Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of which are herein
below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E";

CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or decietful (sic) conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

CANON 3. A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 — A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

In his Comment, 2 respondent Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not
an action that involves the same issue as those in a civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as
the civil aspect has not been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exists when identical reliefs are
issued by the same parties in multiple fora.

In his Supplemental Comment, 3 respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any criminal action.
Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of
an endorsement to the prosecutor, who would determine probable cause, would be appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI
that he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant. Likewise,
respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBI's
functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judical powers and is
incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.

The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91,
and Administrative Circular No. 04 - 94 on forum shopping.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed.

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resorts to forum shopping because "by filing another petition involving
the same essential facts and circumstances, . . . , respondents approached two different fora in order to increase their chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action. 4 In this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of. Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual,
Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus. 5 The
filing of a civil case for reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to
institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating the circulars
on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the
purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness
as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible. 6

Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 7, specifically section 1 hereof provides, viz:

Sec. 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which shall have the following
functions:

(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its initiative and as
public interest may require;
(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and other offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other informations for the benefit and use of all prosecuting and law-
enforcement entities of the Philippines, identification records of all persons without criminal convictions, records of
identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership or possession of all firearms as well as of test bullets fired therefrom;
(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and entities of the Government as well as the
courts that may request its services;
(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil nature in
which the Government is interested;
(f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city and municipal peace officers at the request of
their respective superiors along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to insure greater
efficiency in the discharge of their duties;
(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct researches in furtherance of
scientific knowledge in criminal investigation;
(h) To perform such other related functions as the Secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.

Explicitly, the functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial
or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an
investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as
public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what
Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those persons responsible for defrauding his client.

The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-
94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between
adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or
proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon
him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. 7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached
on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section
27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any
repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule
8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of
law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. 15 Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18

Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client
nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court notes
that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore,
he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his
own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice
of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. 24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations
of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism
degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to
prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He isSTERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED.

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant

vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine
other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the
names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a
client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago,
Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar,
practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. SO ORDERED.