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The Making of chancellor Merkel

Article  in  German Politics · March 2006

DOI: 10.1080/09644000500535037

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 The Making of Chancellor Merkel

MARK R. THOMPSON and LUDMILLA LENNARTZ

As a woman and an East German, Angela Merkel beat long political odds to
become chancellor of Germany in November 2005. In addition, she overcame
her party’s poor electoral performance, out-manoeuvring political rivals in
negotiations for a ‘grand coalition’. Merkel’s rise to power can be divided
into three phases. Like many other female political leaders of her generation
in Germany, she was initially apolitical. She only became politically active
during the dying days of the German Democratic Republic. The second phase
was her apparently unremarkable political ascent as ‘Kohl’s Mädchen’ (girl),
when she had little independent standing of her own. The final phase began
when a major finance scandal propelled her to the top of party ranks. She bene-
fited from a gendered stereotype as a Trümmerfrau who could rebuild the con-
servative’s moral standing out of the affair’s ruins. But her continued success
had much to do with successful political learning of how to turn critics’
attacks against themselves.

Angela Merkel beat what appeared long political odds when she was elected chancellor
by the Bundestag on 22 November 2005. Female political leaders are not unusual in
Scandinavia, or even Asia (where several women have been presidents and prime min-
isters recently), but they are hardly common in Germany, where women have long been
under-represented in major political offices.1 Merkel’s rise to the chancellorship was
even more startling as she suffered from an additional political disability: her East
German origins. Yet, like Matthias Platzeck, who was recently elected chairman of
Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), she overcame this disadvantage as well.
Both had relatively short careers in their respective parties (Merkel has only been a
member of the union of Christian democrats, CDU, since 1990; Platzeck of the SPD
since 1995).2 Seemingly, worst of all, though, Merkel’s party performed poorly in
the September 2005 elections. Yet instead of destroying her chances to become the
country’s top political leader, Merkel skilfully turned her weakness into strength,
closing party ranks in long and tough negotiations with the Social Democrats for a
so called ‘grand coalition’ government which see now heads.
In this brief article, we analyse the career of Angela Merkel as the initial part of a
larger project about female political leaders in Germany.3 Analytically, we draw on
earlier work about female leaders in Asia.4 In the study on Germany, we focus on
women who are already in power, rather than concentrating on the question of why
women are underrepresented in politics.5 We are thus concerned with a classical pol-
itical question of who achieves power under what conditions. In our view, such an
approach helps integrate gender research into ‘mainstream’ political science. As our
study is comparative in nature, we explore similarities between Merkel’s career and
German Politics, Vol.15, No.1, March 2006, pp.99–110
ISSN 0964-4008 print=1743-8993 online
DOI: 10.1080=09644000500535037 # 2006 Association for the Study of German Politics
100 GERMAN POLITICS

that of other leading female politicians in Germany and Asia. We also examine
Merkel’s background in East Germany. In fact, we suggest, that Merkel was often
able to skilfully turn these ‘handicaps’ of gender and origin to her political advantage.
Existing biographical literature about Angela Merkel is largely journalistic in char-
acter. Early biographies were written by Jacqueline Boysen, an independent journalist,
and Evelyn Roll, of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, who updated their books for the election
campaign of 2005. Roll’s book is the least precise of available studies on Merkel,
sometimes mixing up events and persons.6 Boysen’s biography is more strictly chrono-
logical, but is written in an inventive manner.7 Wolfgang Stock, a professor of journal-
ism, wrote the first biography of Merkel, with a new edition providing additional
material about the electoral campaign.8 Nicole Schley’s new biography offers little
that was not covered in previous works.9 The best biography is by the political scientist
Gerd Langguth, who has written a well researched and comprehensive account.10 The
most recent biography is by Matthias Krauss.11 ‘Mein Weg’ (my journey) appeared in
2004, based on nine interviews Merkel gave to Hugo Müller-Vogg, a long time editor
of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.12
We find it helpful for the analysis of Merkel’s political career to divide it into three
phases. In the first phase, she was largely apolitical, like many other female political
leaders of her generation in Germany. She was a physicist with no known political
involvement or commitments during the late period of the German Democratic Repub-
lic (GDR). Her entry into politics came during the dying days of East Germany and
seemed determined largely by happenstance. The second phase is her apparently unre-
markable political ascent. Her appointment as minister in Helmut Kohl’s cabinet was
largely coincidental. Known as ‘Kohl’s Mädchen’ (girl), she seemed a weak player in
the government, having little independent standing of her own. The third phase
stretches from her emergence as party leader during a crisis situation to her election
as chancellor despite a poor electoral result. During the worst scandal in the CDU’s
history, Merkel turned against her mentor, Helmut Kohl. It was this phase that she
began to take her political fate into her own hands, gaining in confidence and
ambition. She successively became party chairwoman (in 2000), then candidate for
the chancellorship (after yielding to Edmund Stoiber in the 2002 elections), and
finally chancellor.

APOLITICAL BEGINNINGS

For someone who was later to become chancellor of Germany, Merkel’s youth and
early adulthood were remarkably apolitical. She was neither active in the East
German government, nor involved in the opposition to it. Neither did she participate
in church-related activities, such as prayer meetings, as one might have expected of
a pastor’s daughter. She was not even involved in school or university politics.
One of the most striking aspects of Merkel’s biography is that she was born in West
Germany, in Hamburg (as Angela Dorothea Kasner on 17 July 1954). But when she
was just a few weeks old, her mother moved the family to East Germany to join her
father who had just become pastor of a local church in Quitzow in what is today the
state of Brandenburg. Merkel never publicly criticised this move to the East that so pro-
foundly shaped her youth and young adulthood. Three years later, the Kasner family
THE MAKING OF CHANCELLOR MERKEL 101
moved to Templin, where Angela Merkel grew up and her father became head of a
seminar for further education for pastors. Her father was a socialist idealist – known
as ‘the red Kasner’ – who left the West to take up a pastorate in East Germany out
of the conviction that he was needed more there.13 But when her father was black-
mailed to cooperate with the Ministry of State Security known as the Stasi (because
it was discovered he possessed an article written by the Soviet dissident Andrei
Sakharov), he refused, thereby sparing his family involvement in this bitter chapter
of East German history.14
Though shy in school, she received top marks and, with one notable exception, had
no run-ins with school authorities.15 She was a member of the Freie Deutsche Jugend
(FDJ, Free German Youth), but this was unremarkable for her generation.16 Her youth
was overshadowed by her father’s profession: as the daughter of a Protestant pastor in
the officially atheist East Germany, she felt she had to be better than her peers to have
the opportunity to study at university. Growing up in this Protestant milieu did not lead
her to later become active in church-linked ‘peace prayers’ or other religious-based dis-
sident activities, however. She was close to her mother who, unlike most East German
women, was a housewife, only beginning to work after her children were older.
Merkel’s relationship with her father was more difficult. He was such a strong influence
and moral authority that the process of ‘cutting the umbilical cord’ to him was particu-
larly protracted.17 It has been argued that her father’s high expectations fuelled her later
political ambitious.18
Her choice of theoretical physics as a profession is further indication of her apoli-
tical orientation. She later claimed she wanted to avoid a university subject or pro-
fession involving state indoctrination.19 Had she considered studying theology, on
the other hand, she would have been consigned to professional marginalisation by a
suspicious state. Natural science was a prestigious, non-ideological subject, providing
her with the greatest possible academic freedom. (It is interesting to note in this context
that the current SPD leader Platzeck also studied in natural science – biomedical cyber-
netics and environmental hygiene.) The only indication of politicisation during
Merkel’s university studies were her weekly visits to a student group, where politically
sensitive subjects were often discussed.20 She worked at a leading research centre, the
Central Institute for Physics and Chemistry of the Academy of Sciences in Berlin,
where she finished her Ph.D. in 1986. Her colleague Michael Schindhelm has described
her during this time as a young scientist without any illusions, in no hurry to complete
her doctorate.21
Generally, it can be said that Merkel’s history as a ‘gelernte DDR-Bürgerin’ (‘GDR
citizen by vocation’, more generally her ability to deal demands by the authorities
without surrendering personal integrity) was a successful one. She did not face
major obstacles to either her university studies, or in her career as a physicist
despite her father being a pastor. She experienced none of the hardships that those in
the active political opposition confronted (although she was once approached by the
Stasi, whose advances she rejected). She later claimed, though, that she had inwardly
rejected the East German system. She said that she was prepared – should it one day
become necessary – to leave her parents and flee to West Germany.22 She saw com-
munist rule as inhumane and lacking a future. Without showing it outwardly, she
engaged in ‘inner immigration’.23
102 GERMAN POLITICS

Merkel’s lack of political engagement in her life in the former German Democratic
Republic, of course, had the advantage of not bringing her too near to state power (and
the corresponding danger of ties to the Ministry of State Security, which has plagued so
many politicians who were active during the East German period, such as former
Transportation Minister Manfred Stolpe or the former head of the Party of Democratic
Socialism, Gregor Gysi). She shares this ‘white vest’ due to a lack of political involve-
ment in the ancién regime with Matthias Platzeck, the new head of the Social
Democrats. Both only became active in the East German opposition movement at a
late date (Merkel’s involvement began only after the fall of the Wall).24 On the
other hand, if she had become a prominent oppositionist – like Regine Hildebrandt,
the later minister of social affairs and employment in Brandenburg, or Wolfgang
Thierse, the president of the Bundestag during the Red – Green coalition – she
would have been more strongly identified as an East German politician, making her
rise to national power less likely. But even if she had grown up in West Germany
(which she would have had her family not moved to the GDR), it is unlikely she
would have been politically active. As a young person, she had been reserved and unas-
suming, not the most promising personal attributes for political involvement. In fact, it
was only after the sudden and unexpected changes brought by German reunification
that – as Shakespeare put it – she had ‘greatness thrust upon’ her.
Merkel shares these apolitical beginnings with the same cohort of prominent
West German politicians. Neither Heide Simonis (former premier of Schleswig-
Holstein), nor Renate Schmidt (former head of the Social Democratic Party in
Bavaria and Family Minister), nor Ursula von der Leyen (the current Family
Minister) were politically active in their youth or early adulthood. In the case of
Simonis, she accompanied her husband on several longer professional trips
abroad, where she worked part time. Later, she was asked to be a candidate for
a local assembly where she won a seat only after several other party members
had resigned from office.25
A younger generation of female German politicians has been active politically at an
earlier age, however. Andrea Nahles was a former chairwoman of the young socialists
and a leading left-wing Social Democrat, Ute Vogts became head of the Social Demo-
crats in Baden-Württemberg at a young age, Hildegard Müller was head of the young
union and is now a close advisor of Merkel, and Silvana Koch-Mehrin became a
leading liberal party member in her twenties and is currently an MP in the European
Parliament.
A parallel can also be drawn to female leaders in Asia, such as Corazon C. Aquino,
Aung Sung Suu Kyi, and Megawati Sukarnoputri. All of these privileged women lived
sheltered childhoods and were ‘simple housewives’ before being thrust into politics.
Although the cultural context is, of course, radically different than the one in which
Angela Merkel rose to power, the shared apolitical beginnings are striking. An import-
ant reason for this similarity may be that abrupt political changes occurred both in
Germany and these Asian countries. Merkel’s political career began during the demo-
cratisation of East Germany and German unification, while these Asian female leaders
became politicised as leaders of democratic movements against dictatorial regimes.26
Angela Merkel’s political career was an unintended product of rapid political
transformation.
THE MAKING OF CHANCELLOR MERKEL 103
PHASE TWO: UNREMARKABLE ASCENT

There is no indication that Merkel attended an opposition rally or joined a dissident

organisation until after the fall of the Wall, underlining again how apolitical she was
at that time. She joined the new the Demokratischer Aufbruch (DA, Democratic Awa-
kening) party. But even here her choice appears coincidental. She claims her decision
was largely intuitive, not based on clearly defined policy preferences.27 While she
became more politicised during the Wendezeit (the period of transition leading to uni-
fication), she had not yet developed any notable political ambitions. She was not part of
the DA’s inner circle, as shown by the fact that her name is missing in the directory of
the ‘most important telephone numbers and addresses’ of the party from 31 January
1990.28 In February 1990, she took a leave of absence from her work as a physicist
at the Academy to work full time as an administrator for the DA. Her low-key style
and modest manner led Merkel to often be mistaken for a secretary in the DA
office, an impression that a man in her position would surely have done his best to
avoid.29
Her first high-ranking political office in the party was also the result of coincidence.
Kept from an appointment through a double booking, party chairman Wolfgang Schnur
spontaneously appointed her vice spokesperson of the party in order to avoid aggravat-
ing an important visitor likely to be disappointed at having to speak with a mere party
administrator.30 But she was not a candidate in the East German Volkskammer (parlia-
ment) elections in March 1990. The electoral results led to a ‘grand coalition’ of five
parties. Although the DA’s vote had been much lower than expected, it still received
ample representation in the new East German government as agreed in inter-party
negotiations before polling day when the ‘Alliance for Germany’ was created.
Merkel was appointed vice spokesperson of the first and last democratically elected
East German government. It has been suggested that the key recommendation came
from Rainer Eppelmann, the new chairman of the DA after the resignation of
Schnur (because of revelations about his ties with the Stasi).31 Still, despite this appar-
ently prominent position, Angela Merkel was not a powerful figure in de Maizière’s
government.32 Only after chief government spokesman Matthias Gehler allowed
Merkel to undertake prestigious foreign trips (because he did not like flying), did
she develop a close relationship to de Maizière, who called her ‘my Angela’, foresha-
dowing a similar role under Helmut Kohl.33
With German unification complete, Merkel decided definitely not to return to the
Academy of Science (a wise decision, as few East German scientists found long-
term employment in unified Germany).34 Instead she landed an administrative job in
the Press Office of the Federal Government. At this point she decided to become a pro-
fessional politician. But she seemed to lack a clear conception of exactly how to
proceed with this new vocation. It is telling in this regard that she had not found a par-
liamentary constituency where she could be a candidate for the Bundestag. She turned
to Günther Krause, who was then a junior minister in the interior ministry and the head
of the CDU in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pommerania. Claiming that Lothar de
Maizière had not adequately taken care of the members of his regime in unified
Germany, he termed Angela Merkel a ‘Versorgungsfall’ (somebody needing to be
taken care of) and found her a parliamentary constituency.35
104 GERMAN POLITICS

Merkel did not show much loyalty to Krause later, however. After his involvement
in a political scandal, she pressured him to step down as head of the CDU in the state of
Mecklenberg-Western-Pommerania in 1993 and provided him with little support when
he was a candidate in the Bundestag elections of 1998.36 Critics say that there is a
pattern in Merkel’s political career of her brushing aside former political patrons
when they are longer useful to her advancement. Other ‘victims’ were Wolfgang
Schäuble, who appointed her general secretary of the CDU (he was not nominated
for the Federal Presidency as he wished, but is now interior minister in Merkel’s
cabinet) and Helmut Kohl, who Merkel famously distanced herself from during the
party finance scandal in the late 1990s. As will be discussed below, this was part of
Merkel’s successful ‘political learning’ that may well account for why she has
advanced further politically than other any other woman in Germany. While her
gender led her to be underestimated, she was growing increasingly hardnosed in her
political battles.
This feature of Merkel’s political career distinguishes her from other prominent
female politicians in Germany. Heide Simonis, for example, was known to have
been ‘softer’ in her dealings with inner-party disputes.37 But this approach had its
drawbacks. Simonis was criticised for being unable to push through key programmes
in her party. It is also doubtful whether such an approach can be carried through into
harder fought national politics. In this sense, Merkel was more like many of her male
political counterparts at the federal level who were also known to sacrifice loyalty
when it proved disadvantageous and to deal harshly with rivals. But because of her
gender, Merkel’s ‘ruthlessness’ (one author speaks of her many political ‘scalps’)
has been more widely commented upon than that of other politicians’.38
Merkel met Helmut Kohl at the unification conference of the CDU in Hamburg in
October 1990 (where the East German sister party merged with the West-CDU, at
which time she also officially joined the party). After federal elections, Kohl was
looking for a young, East German woman to be his Minister for Women and Youth
in order to ‘balance’ his new, post-unification cabinet. But other female politicians
from former East Germany seemed to have better prospects of being appointed to
this ministry. The former Minister of Youth and Sport in the de Maizière government,
Cordula Schubert, enjoyed an inside track for the position until she failed to win a seat
in the Bundestag. The former Volkskammer president Sabine Bergmann-Pohl also had
a good chance of appointment until de Maizière recommended that Kohl should not
choose her.39 This again points to how important coincidence was in Merkel’s political
advancement.
With her appointment as minister, Merkel became known as ‘Kohl’s Mädchen’
(girl). Merkel later admitted she had mixed feelings about this nickname. But, while
she did not like being perceived as so dependent on the paternalistic Bundeskanzler,
she also recognised the political protection this status provided her.40 In any case,
she did not feel the need to distance herself from Kohl as might be expected from a
leading male politician whose masculinity had been threatened by media portrayals
of him as nothing more than ‘Kohl’s Junge’ (boy).
Merkel’s ministry was smaller and had less authority than the former Family and
Health Ministry, which was now divided into three parts.41 But she understood this
as an opportunity, not a hindrance, undertaking a political apprenticeship without a
THE MAKING OF CHANCELLOR MERKEL 105
mammoth administration and intensive lobbying. When Merkel took over the Environ-
mental Ministry after the 1994 elections returned Kohl’s conservative-liberal coalition
to power, she found herself prepared to handle a more difficult and controversial policy
area. The 28-year-old Claudia Nolte, another former East German who was her succes-
sor as Minister of Women and the Family (two ministries had again been merged), was
notably less successful. Unlike Merkel, she failed to ‘grow into’ the role of a successful
minister. The comparison with Nolte shows how quickly Merkel was able to transform
herself from a political novice into a respected minister and that this political ‘learning
effect’ was by no means inevitable.
Typical of many female leaders, Merkel’s political career began in a ministry
associated with women’s issues. This was true of many other female politicians in
Germany such as Rita Süssmuth, Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, Regine Hildebrandt,
Ursula von der Leyen and Annette Schavan (the last two are the current family and edu-
cation/research ministers, respectively).42 But what distinguishes Merkel’s career
from most other female politicians was her ability to use a typically ‘female’ ministry
as a springboard to higher political office. Merkel’s eight years in Kohl’s cabinets were
highly instructive. She learned how to organise political majorities, win debates, and
‘sit out’ (‘aussitzen’, a speciality of Helmut Kohl) political controversies until they
faded away. Most importantly, she also learned how to deal with political rivals and
even former friends (and would one day even turn on her former boss.) She also
built up her media contacts, taking a friendlier attitude toward the press than Kohl,
who was growing increasingly combative toward journalists.
At the same time, she became Minister of Women and Youth, Merkel also became
deputy leader of the CDU, occupying a position created especially for Lothar de
Maizière until revelations of his cooperation with the Stasi had forced him to resign.
Soon after, the number of deputy leaders was increased to four, reducing her formal
power proportionately. She did not complain publicly, accepting this apparent political
affront quietly; something that again is hard to imagine a leading male political doing.
Merkel had entered West German politics as a (threefold) Quotenfrau (a woman aided
by a quota). Besides gender, her youth and East German origins were ‘qualifying’ cri-
teria for her political ascent under Helmut Kohl, who took her under his wing. But her
apparently unassuming political style was equally helpful. She did not allow herself to
be humiliated by the media (who dismissed her as ‘Kohl’s Mädchen’) or her own party
(which unceremoniously degraded her by appointing additional deputy party leaders).
It was already evident at this stage that Merkel was being underestimated, something
her rivals would later come to regret.

PHASE THREE: RISE TO LEADERSHIP DURING CRISIS

After Helmut Kohl‘s defeat in the 1998 Bundestag elections, Wolfgang Schäuble
became head of the CDU and appointed Merkel the party’s general secretary.
Shortly thereafter the CDU campaign finance affair came to light, the worst scandal
in the party’s history. Apart from tax evasion and revelations about a party slush
fund, suspicion arose that former chancellor and his inner circle had been ‘bought’
by secret campaign contributors, whose names Kohl refused to reveal. The CDU
sank to new lows in opinion polls. Caught in the middle of the scandal, Schäuble
106 GERMAN POLITICS

was forced to resign as party head. A new leader was needed who could rescue the party
at a time of crisis. It is striking that in this situation the CDU turned to Merkel. During
the crisis, gender seemed to work for Merkel, not against her. She had been close to, but
not a part of Kohl’s inner circle, which was now discredited by accusations of corrup-
tion. Traditional stereotypes of women suggest that they are less Machiavellian than
men (The Prince, after all, is a book about rough and tumble male politics). In ‘every-
day’ politics, this disadvantages women who are seen as less politically skilful than
men and often unsuitable for the harsh world of political conflict at all.
Linda Richter has analysed this point in the following manner:

The ideology of patriarchy has had a decisive impact on the fate of women in
most cultures around the globe . . . Politics or the public life of the polity has
been presumed to be a natural sphere for men while for women, to the extent
they had a space or turf to call their own, the ‘natural’ sphere was presumed to
be private. Different cultures or religions might base this division of roles on
the ‘dirtiness or roughness of politics’ [or] ‘the toughness needed’. . .43

But in extraordinary situations in which male political leaders are tainted by scandal, a
‘cleaner’, ‘softer’ style may suddenly seem appealing. In such situations, traditional
attitudes do not block women, but assist them politically. Women are seen as best
suited to cleanse the soiled public realm. They possess the ‘moral capital’ necessary
to make a clean start.44
Merkel distanced herself from Kohl with a call for a thorough investigation of the
scandal in an article in a leading German newspaper.45 The CDU organised nine
regional conferences to gather grassroots opinions within the party. It was at these
meetings that Merkel won widespread support as a kind of ‘Trümmerfrau’, an icon
of the postwar period in which women uncomplainingly cleaned up the ruins of war
in order to help rebuild the country.46 At the party’s annual conference, the Bundespar-
teitag, Merkel was elected as new party leader with an overwhelming 96 per cent of the
vote. Her success as the party’s ‘saviour’ in this regard can be demonstrated by the fact
that during the 2005 election campaign there was little media discussion of the CDU
campaign finance affair. That this would be a political non-event was everything
other than inevitable. A key figure in the scandal, Holger Pfals, a former state secretary
in the defence ministry who had been on the run for years, was on trial in Augsburg
where sensitive details of the affair were emerging. Yet because Merkel had success-
fully renewed her party’s personnel, she distanced it from the scandal and the party’s
popularity was untouched by the trial.
Merkel has herself confirmed this thesis about her rise to leadership in the midst of
crisis. During a discussion, female managers at IBM complained that while it was
common for women to be appointed to secondary positions, they still did not get top
jobs. Merkel answered: ‘Perhaps IBM must first go through a real crisis before a
woman is allowed to take over the company leadership’.47
Interestingly, Heide Simonis made a similar claim. While women can rise through
the ranks, they seldom become political leaders. ‘It is still the case that at the very top
women are most likely to have a chance when the male leader fails and has to be carried
from the field during a time in which no suitable male replacement is in sight. Secretly,
THE MAKING OF CHANCELLOR MERKEL 107
male rivals assume that the woman will not succeed in her new position and make prep-
arations to step in to salvage the situation the moment the woman fails’.48
Simonis’ last point accurately described Merkel’s struggle to consolidate her party
leadership over the next five years. A number of leading male politicians attempted to
undermine her leadership. It would go beyond the scope of this article to analyse these
power struggles in detail. But Merkel encountered opposition at an early stage from
Volker Rühe, the former defence minister under Kohl, and Kurt Biedenkopf, the
former premier of Saxony. Both had been former general secretaries of the CDU.49
She later engaged in a titanic struggle with the party’s leading finance expert, Friedrich
Merz, whom she replaced as head of the CDU parliamentary faction in 2002. Embit-
tered, he later resigned his remaining position in the party faction, criticising her
periodically from the backbenches. There have been persistent rumours about
tension between her and two leading ‘Landesfürsten’ (state ‘princes’, that is premiers)
in her party, Christian Wulff of Lower Saxony and Roland Koch of Hessen. Here, the
CDU’s poor electoral result in the September 2005 elections may well have come to her
rescue. Facing tough negotiations with the Social Democrats who at the time were still
claiming the right to name the chancellor, these two potential rivals of Merkel fell into
line to serve the higher party interest. (Merkel also cleverly postponed discussion of the
reasons for the party’s poor electoral result until after the formation of the government).
Similarly, Merkel managed to out-duel Edmund Stoiber, the Bavarian premier and
head of the conservative sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). She had
yielded to Stoiber as candidate for the chancellorship in 2002. But after the conserva-
tives’ narrow loss in the election, her chances of being named as a candidate in the next
election rose. Here, she again had a bit of good luck. After the defeat of the long ruling
Social Democrats in the state of Northrhine-Westphalia in May 2005, Schröder forced
a vote of no confidence in the Bundestag, which he intentionally lost in order to call
new elections. Because the conservative sister parties had to act quickly, Merkel was
declared chancellor candidate without substantial debate. But Stoiber’s uneasiness
with working under Merkel was evident. His counterproductive attacks during the cam-
paign, particularly a barb directed against East Germans, probably cost the conserva-
tives votes and showed how limited his willingness to engage in campaign ‘team
work’ with Merkel was.50 After the election, Stoiber hesitated about joining the new
Merkel-led ‘grand coalition’ cabinet. He raised doubts about the chancellor’s constitu-
tionally guaranteed policy-making powers in Article 65 of the Basic Law in a grand
coalition. Merkel coolly waited for a week, before cleverly making light of her
gender. Speaking before a meeting of the conservative parliamentary faction with
Stoiber sitting next to her, she said that even though she would be a Kanzlerin
(female chancellor), she was confident constitutional provisions concerning the
policy prerogatives of the Kanzler still applied to her.51 Stoiber ultimately fled
Berlin to return to the premiership of Bavaria, giving up his claim to a seat in the
national cabinet with his political reputation in tatters.
Though she had benefited from the stereotype of women being ‘soft’ and ‘unsul-
lied’ during the party finance affair, Merkel had in fact learned to use ‘hard power’
to consolidate her political position. While in 1998 she claimed ‘not to be as hard
boiled as one needs to be in politics in the long term’, in 2004 she said in answer to
the question of whether she had grown harder in her years in politics: ‘Yes, naturally’.52
108 GERMAN POLITICS

It is revealing in this context that Merkel has a picture of the Russian Czarina Catherine
the Great on her desk!53
While her skills in political infighting were gradually recognised, doubts persisted
about whether she stood for anything politically, or whether she merely strove for
power without a programme. As if in answer to this criticism, Merkel began cultivating
an image as a reformer. This culminated in the CDU party conference in Leipzig in
December 2003, where a series of major reforms to the welfare state and foreign
policy were agreed to and where paternalistic, conservative ‘wets’ who opposed
such changes such as Norbert Blüm (the former labour minister) were marginalised.
Although she attempted to avoid associations with Margaret Thatcher, the media
found such comparisons irresistible.54 Her nomination of a law professor with a flat-
rate tax programme, Paul Kirchhof, as finance spokesman in her 2005 election cam-
paign team was a welcome target for Schröder. Her reform proposals and political
honesty (for example, in saying that VAT must be increased) cost her votes. After
the election, Kirchhof was quietly dropped as Merkel moved away from the reformist
programme in negotiations with the Social Democrats. In the new coalition, she is now
stressing the importance of austerity to get government finances back into balance
rather than focusing on ‘radical’ reforms of the welfare state. Although US hopes
for a pro-American shift in foreign policy have been partially fulfilled, Merkel’s criti-
cisms of American treatment of terrorist suspects signalled her government’s
independence.55

CONCLUSION

Merkel’s 15-year rise to the chancellorship was improbable, accidental and unex-
pected. Long apolitical, she became involved in politics only in the midst of the demo-
cratic revolution in the GDR. Her early political appointments were largely
coincidental. It took a major scandal to propel her to the top of party ranks, where
she benefited from a gendered stereotype as a ‘Trümmerfrau’ who could rebuild the
conservatives’ moral standing out of the affair’s ruins. But her success also had
much to do with successful political learning. Through careful manoeuvring, she sur-
vived several challenges to her leadership. Taking a page from Kohl’s political tactics
(when he let a CSU politician Franz Joseph Strauss be chancellor candidate against a
popular Helmut Schmidt so Kohl could later be the undisputed conservative candidate),
Merkel let her conservative sister party rival Stoiber run for chancellor in 2002, a race
which he narrowly lost against Schröder. Although the conservatives performed much
worse than expected in the 2005 election, she nonetheless became chancellor. She
proved a master of political jiu jitisiu, repeatedly turning her critics’ attacks against
themselves. She also managed to shed her image as an unloved radical reformer to
emerge as a chancellor seeking consensus in a grand coalition between the two
major political parties.
This ambiguity makes Merkel hard to categorise. Her political rise to power after
apolitical beginnings, an unremarkable ascent, and in a crisis situation is similar to that
of other German female politicians such as Heide Simonis, and even reminiscent of
several prominent women leaders in Asia. But she has also proved adept at ‘hardball’
tactics. Though her toughness reminded the media of Margaret Thatcher, she is a
THE MAKING OF CHANCELLOR MERKEL 109
relatively non-ideological politician. Her image as a radical reformer proved but a brief
phase in her political career. It is perhaps most helpful to recall that as ‘Kohl’s
Mädchen’, Merkel was a brilliant pupil of the former conservative chancellor.
Consensus-oriented, she seeks gradual change. Her placid exterior hides her infighting
skills. Although Angela Merkel is Germany’ first female and East German born leader,
she has an easily recognisable political style.

NOTES

1. Joanna McKay, ‘Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys’, German Politics 13/1 (March
2004), pp.56–80.
2. As usual, the Bild newspaper of 2 Nov. 2005 could not resist punning about the situation: ‘Ossis sind die
Bossis’ (The East Germans are the bosses).
3. This project is funded by a German University Science Programme (HWP) grant for gender research
awarded by the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg.
4. Mark R. Thompson and Claudia Derichs (ed.), Frauen an der Macht: Dynastien und politische Führer-
innen in Asien (Passau: Passauer Beiträge zur Südostasienkunde, Band 10, 2005).
5. See, for example, Ingrid Reichart-Dreyer, ‘Warum tun sich Frauen schwer mit der aktiven Politik?’, Die
Frau in unserer Zeit, 3 (1987), pp. 20–32 and Angelika von Wahl, Gleichstellungsregime (Opladen:
Leske þ Budrich Verlag, 1999). There are fewer studies about women already exercising political
power. See, for example, Christina Schenk, ‘Feministische Politik im Bundestag – Erfahrungen und
Perspektiven’, in Elke Biester, Barbara Holland-Cunz and Birgit Sauer (eds.), Demokratie oder Androk-
ratie (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1994), pp.35–51, and Waltraud Cornelißen ‘Politische Partizipation von
Frauen in der alten Bundesrepublik und im vereinten Deutschland’, in: Gisela Helwig and Hildegard
Maria Nickel (eds), Frauen in Deutschland 1945– 1992 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für Politische
Bildung, 1993), pp.321–50.
6. Evelyn Roll, Das Mädchen und die Macht: Angela Merkels Demokratischer Aufbruch (Berlin: Rowohlt,
2001), 2nd edition with the title Die Erste: Angela Merkels Weg zur Macht (Reinbek: Rowohlt, June
2005).
7. Jacqueline Boysen, Angela Merkel: Eine deutsch-deutsche Biographie (Munich: Ullstein, 2001), 2nd
edition with the title: Angela Merkel: Eine Karriere (Berlin: Ullstein, Aug. 2005).
8. Wolfgang Stock, Angela Merkel: Eine politische Biographie (Munich: Olzog, 2000, 2nd edition July
2005).
9. Nicole Schley, Angela Merkel: Deutschlands Zukunft ist weiblich (Munich: Knaur, Aug. 2005).
10. Gerd Langguth, Angela Merkel (Munich: DTV, Aug. 2005).
11. Matthias Krauss, Das Mädchen für alles: Angela Merkel (Anderbeck: Anderbeck Verlag, 2005).
12. Angela Merkel and Hugo Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2004).
13. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.25 and Schley, Angela Merkel, p.12.
14. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.32.
15. Merkel was involved in a school graduation play in which the ‘internationale’ was sung in English (the
language of the ‘class enemy’), a poem by Christian Morgenstern that made illusions to the Wall was
read, and the proceeds went not as wished to Vietnam but to Mozambique: Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.24.
16. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.51.
17. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.307. One illustration of this quest for independence was her decision, after
her divorce, to keep the name Merkel, and not go back to her maiden name Kasner.
18. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.50, reports Merkel’s father visiting on her thirtieth birthday, criticising her for
‘not achieving much’ in the first three decades of life.
19. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.46.
20. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.47.
21. Schindhelm, Michael, Roberts Reise (Munich: DTV, 2002), p.283.
22. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.42.
23. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.71.
24. Platzeck became active somewhat earlier, founding a dissident environmental group in 1988.
25. Heide Simonis, Unter Männern (Munich: Beck, 2003), pp.54–55.
26. Mark R. Thompson, ‘Female Leadership of Democratic Transitions in Asia’, Pacific Affairs 75/4
(Winter 2002–2003), pp.535–55.
110 GERMAN POLITICS

27. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.78. It is interesting to note in this context that at about same time
her brother joined Bündnis 90 (Alliance [19]90) while her mother joined the Social Democratic Party,
indicating that there was also no clear party allegiance within her family.
28. Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.102.
29. Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.101.
30. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.23.
31. Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.119 and Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.133.
32. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.135.
33. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.82.
34. Her husband, the physicist Joachim Sauer, was an exception to this rule, as he retained a leading
scientific position.
35. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.84.
36. Roll, Die Erste, p.215.
37. Simonis, Unter Männern, p.107.
38. Langguth, Das Innenleben der Macht: Krise und Zukunft der CDU (Munich: Ullstein, 2001), p.233.
39. Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.141.
40. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.87.
41. Ibid., p.88.
42. McKay, ‘Women in German Politics’, p.59.
43. Linda K. Richter, ‘Exploring Theories of Female Leadership in South and Southeast Asia’, Pacific
Affairs 63 (Winter 1990–91), p.526.
44. John Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
45. Angela Merkel, ‘Die Zeit Kohls ist unwiderbringlich vorüber’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, internet
edition, 22 December 1999.
46. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.133. Boysen, p.205 refers to Merkel in this period as ‘Jeanne d’Arc’.
47. Roll, Die Erste, p.278 (authors’ translation).
48. Simonis, Unter Männern, p.83 (authors’ translation).
49. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.212 and Stock, Angela Merkel, pp.146–47.
50. For an example of the press echo see the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, internet edition, 11 Aug. 2005,
‘Das war ja Stoiber im Bierzelt in Bayern’.
51. ‘Die Mechanik der Macht’, Der Spiegel, 21 Nov. 2005, p.21.
52. Merkel and Müller-Vogg, Mein Weg, p.109.
53. This was the answer to one of the questions in a popular quiz about Angela Merkel on a prominent
television station’s internet site (tageschau.de), catering to Germans’ thirst for information about
their new chancellor.
54. See, for example, ‘Merkel ¼ Thatcher’, Wall Street Journal, internet edition, 6 June 2005 and
‘Germany’s Merkel: Thatcher Lite’ Business Week Online, 25 July 2005.
55. Henry A. Kisssinger expressed such hopes in the article ‘Chancellor Merkel: A new generation in
Germany’, International Herald Tribune, 22 Nov. 2005, p.8. Disagreement about US policy towards
terrorist suspects overshadowed Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Berlin in early December 2005, suggesting
that tensions in German–American relations will persist under Merkel.
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