I.

The qualifying and aggravating circumstances that were erroneously appreciated were (a)
abuse of superior strength, (b) treachery, (d) by means of motor vehicle, (e) disregard of sex, and
(g) abuse of public position.

The Supreme Court has ruled that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, it must
be used as a means to weaken the defense. There must be an intentional use of excessive force
which is out of proportion to the means of defense by the victim. Treachery is appreciated when
the perpetrator ensures that the victim is defenceless and there is safety on his part to execute the
attack. The Supreme court has ruled that for the means of a vehicle to be appreciated as a
qualifying or aggravating circumstance, the vehicle must have been used as a means to perform
the attack. For disregard of sex, the Supreme Court ruled that the sex of the victim must have
been intentionally sought in the performance of the act. Lastly, the Supreme Court has held that
abuse of public position may only be appreciated when the offense was committed during the
performance of official duties.

Here, Pedro performed the felonious act due to fear that his live-in partner will be killed
if he fails to do the act. The aggravating circumstances above were not intentionally sought by
Pedro in committing the felony. There is no showing of great perversity on the part of Pedro in
committing the crime.

Hence, the qualifying and aggravating circumstances were erroneously appreciated by the
Court against Pedro.

II.

(a)

Yes, Ganda is liable for perjury in the falsity made in her answer.

The Supreme Court has ruled that for one to be liable for perjury, it is not enough that the
pleading is required to be under oath. What the law requires is that the false statement must have
been made wilfully and deliberately.

Here, Ganda wilfully and deliberately lied that she never borrowed money from
Pokwang. She was aware that her statement is false and that it was made under oath.

Hence, Ganda can be held liable for perjury.

(b)
 Yes, Guapo is liable for perjury.

The Supreme Court held that for one to be liable for perjury, it is not enough that the
false statement be made under oath but that the assertion is made deliberately and wilfully.

Here Guapo was deliberate in stating that another person was driving the car. There is
malice on his part to mislead the courts as to his statements.

Hence, Guapo may be held liable for perjury.

III.

(1)

Agnes and Mary may be held liable for civil liability arising from the impossible crime of
homicide.

The Supreme Court has ruled that it is the criminal intent of the accused that is being
punished in an impossible crime, regardless if the plan was consummated or not.

Here, although Agnes and Mary were not successful in killing Sherman and Cweezy,
they may be held liable for the damages resulting from their felonious acts.

Hence, Agnes and Mary may be held civilly liable.

(2)

Yes, Agnes may be held criminally liable for the death of Mary in case that the bullet
ricocheted and killed her.

The Supreme Court has held that one is responsible for the resulting injury when the such
is the result of his or her felonious act.

Here the death of Mary resulted from the act of firing of the automatic rifle by Agnes.
There is a disregard on the part of Agnes to consider the consequences of her action.

Hence, she may be held criminally liable for Mary’s death.

IV.

No, band is not attendant to the crime committed.

 The Supreme court ruled that for a crime to be considered as committed by a band, there
must be more than three armed malefactors acting together in committing the crime.

Here, although the four of them were armed with the baseball bat, only three of them
actually committed the crime because Brando stayed in the car. He did not have an active
participation in the commission of the crime.

Henc, band may not be considered as an aggravating circumstance because there were not
more than three armed malefactors committing it.

V.

Yes, the criminal complaint for libel will prosper.

The Revised Penal Code defines libel as an imputation of a crime which tends to
dishonor, discredit or to blacken the memory of the dead person.

Here, Lea imputed a crime to the deceased judge who no longer is in a position to defend
himself. All that is left of him is his memory. Lea committed libel.

Hence, the criminal complaint against Lea for libel will prosper.

VI.

Pedro may be held liable for frustrated homicide.

The Supreme Court held that frustrated homicide is committed when all the acts of
execution has been performed and a fatal wound has been inflicted but it does not produce the
felony due by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

Here although Pedro desisted, he already inflicted fatal wounds against Juan and Pedro
and had it not been for the timely medical attention, they would have died.

Hence with these elements present, Pedro may be held liable for frustrated homicide.

VII.

No, the charges against Nora are not meritorious.

The Supreme Court has ruled that in order for grave coercion to prosper, the person being
coerced is being prevented from doing something which is not prohibited, there must be a use of
material force or a display of it and that the person coercing has no right to do so.
 Here, Nora has every right to deprive Vilma of the use of property because she was
unable to pay her rentals and electricity. Nora’s acts stem from a lawful cause. Although there
were bodyguards in the area, there was no use of force against Vilma.

Hence, the charge of grave coercion against Nora is not meritorious.

VIII.

The complaint for qualified theft will prosper.

The Supreme Court has ruled that an employee who is accountable for collection of
payments or is in charge of the company’s finances, having free access to the source of funds and
subsequently unlawfully takes them, is liable for qualified theft.

Here, Mario, being a credit assistant has the freedom to access the collected funds and his
failure to remit them is an abuse of the fiduciary relationship that was reposed to him by the
company.

Hence Mario may be held liable for qualified theft and the complaint against him will
prosper.

IX.

No, the offense has not prescribed.

Under the Revised Penal Code, crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment prescribe in 20 years.

Here, only 17 years have passed since the death of Petra’s mother.

Therefore, the offense of parricide has not yet prescribed.

X.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, I will lower the penalty of Pedro to one
degree of homicide.

As a rule, when there are two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance,
the penalty shall be one degree lower.

Therefore, I will sentence Pedro to prision correccional in its minimum to maximum

periods.
 XI.

Pikon committed direct assault.

The Supreme Court has ruled that a teacher, being a person in authority, should be given
due respect as such.

Here Pikon punched his teacher. Although she was not performing her official duty when
the incident happened, this does not divest him of his authority as a teacher.

Hence, Pikon may be made liable for direct assault.

XII.

Alberto should be held criminally liable for frustrated homicide.

The Supreme Court has ruled that there is frustrated homicide when the offender has
commenced the overt act but did not produce the felony by reason of causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

Here, if it were not for the tire of the jeepney shielding Divino,he would have been shot
or would have been dead. The choice of the weapon, a revolver, also shows the perversity of
Alberto and his intent to inflict a fatal wound.

Hence, he should be held criminally liable for frustrated homicide.

XIII.

Bhimboy is liable for kidnapping.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the primary element of kidnapping is the actual
confinement, detention and restraint of the victim.

Here, Darla and Josh were locked up inside a room. Evidently, their liberty was deprived
of them. It does not matter that Bhimboy merely drove them. His acts showed that he had some
level of awareness with what was going on because he knew where to pick up the two men.
 Hence, Bhimboy can be held liable for kidnapping.

XIV.

Lupito shall be charged for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

The Supreme court has held that one can be criminally liable for kidnapping for ransom
when the kidnapping was done intentionally for exchange of money.

Here, although Lupito did not declare that it was kidnapping for ransom, his acts point to
the purpose of the deprivation of liberty of Nel for the purpose of receiving money.

Hence Lupito shall be charged for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

XV.

No, the court can no longer rule on the civil aspect of the case upon the death of B before
the promulgation of the case.

The Supreme Court has ruled that no amount for damages ex contractu may be awarded
when the source of the crime has been extinguished.

Here, since B died before the promulgation of the decision, both the civil and the criminal
liability has been extinguished.

Hence, the court can no longer rule on the civil aspect of the case.

On the other hand, if B died while appealing his conviction, the court may still rule on the
civil aspect even upon his death.

XVI.

The trial court is correct.

The Supreme Court has ruled that cruelty, even not habitual, performed against a child is
considered child abuse. The child, being of tender age, is incapable of defending himself.

Here, the act of Kate in slapping George is not justified. It is an act of abuse against a
child.

Hence, Kate may be held liable for child abuse.

XVII.
 No, the defenses are not meritorious.

The Supreme Court has ruled that for self-defense to be appreciated, unlawful aggression
must be present. Performance of duty and mistake of fact cannot be appreciated to mitigate the
liability of PO2 Kaltog.

Here, PO2 Kaltog was in a position to find out what the victim was pulling out. He was
positioned close to the victim in such a way that he could ascertain what he was pulling out
before he could have shot him. It was not a simple case of mistake of fact had he exercised
diligence in his search. Neither was there an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

Hence, the defenses of performance of duty, mistake of fact and self-defense are not
meritorious.

XVIII.

Peter and Pedro committed the crime of corrupting a public official for bribing Juan.
Juan, on the other hand, committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners for
allowing Peter and Pedro to escape.

Under the Revised Penal Code, corrupting a public official involves bribery in exchange
for a consideration. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners is committed by a public officer who
shall consent to the escape of a prisoner.

Hence, the respective crimes, as mentioned above, were committed by Peter, Pedro and
Juan.

XIX.

No, Juan may not interpose the defense of property rights.

The Supreme Court has ruled that for defense of property, there must be an
imminent danger towards the property of the one defending his property.

Here, there was no imminent threat towards the property of Juan and his shooting
of Pedro was unreasonable.

Hence, he cannot interpose the claim of defense of property rights.